[
  {
    "id": "T-058",
    "title": "Ransomware against mobility operators and fleet platforms",
    "description": "Ransomware encrypts systems and/or steals data to extort a mobility operator, fleet platform, authority or transport service, disrupting operations.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Malicious cyberattack",
    "category": "Malware and extortion",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "D",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "4",
    "risk_score": "16",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Related to T-001 and T-011, but adds a distinct initiating mechanism and extortion/data-theft dimension.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which operators, services and recovery dependencies are in scope?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-059",
    "title": "Phishing and compromise of mobility-sector personnel",
    "description": "Phishing or targeted social engineering compromises staff, contractor or supplier credentials and becomes an entry point to vehicle, backend, fleet, charging or authority systems.",
    "domain": "User / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "Social engineering",
    "category": "Identity and access compromise",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "D",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "4",
    "risk_score": "16",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Not explicit; currently implicit as a possible attack path.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat or initiating-cause scenario",
    "assessment_question": "Which roles have privileged or safety-relevant access?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-060",
    "title": "Privileged identity, credential and certificate compromise",
    "description": "Attackers steal or misuse administrator accounts, service identities, API keys, signing keys, vehicle certificates or other machine credentials.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Vehicle",
    "threat_type": "Identity compromise",
    "category": "Identity, cryptography and trust",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Partly overlaps software, backend and access threats, but common trust infrastructure is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which credentials create fleet-wide or multi-organization exposure?",
    "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-061",
    "title": "Insider misuse by employees, contractors or service personnel",
    "description": "A malicious or negligent insider abuses legitimate access to vehicle backends, fleet systems, diagnostic tools, data or operational processes.",
    "domain": "User / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "Insider threat",
    "category": "Human and organizational threats",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Supplier and governance risks exist, but insider misuse is not a distinct scenario.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which privileged roles lack segregation, monitoring or dual control?",
    "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-062",
    "title": "Compromise of OTA software-update infrastructure",
    "description": "Update signing, build, approval or distribution infrastructure is compromised, enabling malicious, unauthorized, vulnerable or rollback software to reach vehicles at scale.",
    "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "Supply-chain cyberattack",
    "category": "Software and update security",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Related to software manipulation and supply-chain rows, but fleet-wide OTA compromise merits a distinct scenario.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Can one compromised update path affect multiple models or fleets?",
    "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-063",
    "title": "Compromise of diagnostic and maintenance tools",
    "description": "Dealer tools, workshop laptops, remote diagnostics, service credentials or maintenance interfaces are compromised and used to alter or access vehicles.",
    "domain": "Vehicle / User",
    "threat_type": "Cyber-physical access",
    "category": "Diagnostics and maintenance",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "USB and physical access are covered, but the service ecosystem and trusted tools are not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which diagnostic functions can reach safety-critical domains?",
    "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-064",
    "title": "Mobile application or customer-account takeover",
    "description": "A vehicle or mobility account is taken over through stolen credentials, weak recovery, token theft or application vulnerabilities, enabling tracking, unlocking or remote commands.",
    "domain": "User / Vehicle",
    "threat_type": "Account takeover",
    "category": "Consumer applications and identity",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "D",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "4",
    "risk_score": "16",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Remote locking, theft and privacy consequences exist, but account takeover is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "What remote functions are available and what step-up authentication applies?",
    "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-065",
    "title": "Manipulation of V2X messages and trust infrastructure",
    "description": "Attackers forge, replay, suppress or multiply V2X messages, abuse certificates or create Sybil identities to influence cooperative awareness or manoeuvre coordination.",
    "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "Protocol and trust attack",
    "category": "V2X and cooperative mobility",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "GNSS and wireless attacks are covered; V2X message trust and PKI are not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which V2X use cases can directly influence vehicle behaviour?",
    "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-066",
    "title": "Attack on traffic-management and roadside infrastructure",
    "description": "Traffic lights, lane-control systems, variable-message signs, roadside units, tunnel systems or road sensors are manipulated or disrupted.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "OT cyberattack",
    "category": "Roadside and traffic management",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Scope mentions infrastructure, but there is no explicit traffic-management attack scenario.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which roadside systems can create unsafe traffic states or national disruption?",
    "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-067",
    "title": "Compromise of fleet-management and dispatch systems",
    "description": "Attackers manipulate routes, assignments, geofences, driver instructions, dispatch data or immobilisation functions across commercial, public or emergency fleets.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Operational-system compromise",
    "category": "Fleet operations",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Fleet-scale disruption is covered mainly as a consequence, not dispatch compromise as the initiating scenario.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "What single fleet platform or identity has common-mode reach?",
    "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-068",
    "title": "Sensor deception affecting cameras, lidar, radar or ultrasonic systems",
    "description": "Physical or digital techniques deceive or blind perception sensors, causing incorrect object, lane, distance or environmental interpretation.",
    "domain": "Vehicle",
    "threat_type": "Cyber-physical attack",
    "category": "Automated-driving sensors",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Autonomous-driving vulnerabilities are broad; sensor deception is not a dedicated scenario.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which sensor combinations and fallback modes prevent unsafe decisions?",
    "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificial-intelligence-in-autonomous-driving",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-069",
    "title": "Compromise of maps, traffic data or digital twins",
    "description": "Trusted maps, lane geometry, speed information, closures, hazards, parking or routing data are falsified or corrupted.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Vehicle",
    "threat_type": "Data integrity attack",
    "category": "External mobility data",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "GNSS is covered, but trusted content and map-data integrity are not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which external data can alter routing or automated-driving decisions?",
    "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
    "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificial-intelligence-in-autonomous-driving",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-070",
    "title": "Telecommunications or mobile-network outage",
    "description": "Public mobile, 5G, private wireless or connectivity-provider failure disrupts connected mobility, fleet operations, charging, remote assistance or V2X services.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Dependency failure",
    "category": "Communications dependency",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "External services are covered generally; telecom common-mode failure is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as dependency scenario",
    "assessment_question": "Which safety or continuity functions fail without connectivity?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-071",
    "title": "Cloud, DNS, identity-provider or trusted-time failure",
    "description": "Failure or compromise of a shared cloud region, DNS, identity provider, certificate service or time source simultaneously affects multiple mobility services or OEMs.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Common-mode dependency",
    "category": "Cloud and shared digital services",
    "priority": "1",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "15",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Partially covered by external-service dependency, but shared digital control-plane failure warrants explicit treatment.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate dependency scenario",
    "assessment_question": "Which shared providers create cross-organization concentration risk?",
    "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-072",
    "title": "Compromise of charging authentication, billing or payment",
    "description": "Charging identifiers, accounts, authorization, billing or payment flows are exposed, manipulated or fraudulently used.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / User",
    "threat_type": "Fraud and cyberattack",
    "category": "EV charging and payments",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Charging disruption is covered, but financial and identity integrity are not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as sub-scenario or separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Could fraud or identity compromise scale across operators and roaming platforms?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-073",
    "title": "Coordinated denial-of-service against mobility APIs and platforms",
    "description": "DDoS or ransom-DoS disrupts booking, journey planning, parking, ticketing, charging, dispatch or regulatory APIs.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Denial of service",
    "category": "Mobility platforms",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "D",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "4",
    "risk_score": "16",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Service outage exists, but coordinated DoS and API concentration are not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as sub-scenario or separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which APIs are single points of failure for multiple services?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-074",
    "title": "Manipulation of ticketing, tolling, parking and mobility payments",
    "description": "Attackers create or alter entitlements, balances, transactions, toll records, parking sessions or settlement data to commit fraud or disrupt revenue systems.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / User",
    "threat_type": "Fraud and data-integrity attack",
    "category": "Mobility payments",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "C",
    "likelihood_class": "D",
    "impact_score": "3",
    "likelihood_score": "4",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Financial/payment fraud is not clearly represented in the vehicle-centred register.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat if within scope",
    "assessment_question": "Does the assessment scope include public transport, tolling and MaaS payments?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-075",
    "title": "Failure or compromise of eCall and emergency-response integration",
    "description": "Emergency calls, coordinates, crash information or rescue interfaces are suppressed, falsified, redirected or flooded.",
    "domain": "Vehicle / Society",
    "threat_type": "Safety-system compromise",
    "category": "Emergency response",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "B",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "2",
    "risk_score": "10",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "General vehicle disruption exists, but emergency-response integration is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
    "assessment_question": "Can compromise delay rescue or overload emergency services?",
    "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-076",
    "title": "Compromise of driver, vehicle-registration or licensing systems",
    "description": "Records are fraudulently created, changed, deleted or made unavailable, affecting ownership, licensing, recalls, enforcement or vehicle legitimacy.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Data and service compromise",
    "category": "Government mobility systems",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Not explicit; expands the scope beyond the vehicle technology ecosystem.",
    "disposition": "Add if authority systems are in scope",
    "assessment_question": "Which registration and licensing functions are essential or safety relevant?",
    "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-077",
    "title": "Failure of vulnerability disclosure and emergency patch coordination",
    "description": "Reported vulnerabilities are not received, triaged, coordinated or remediated in time, allowing known weaknesses to remain exploitable across fleets or suppliers.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Vehicle",
    "threat_type": "Governance/control failure",
    "category": "Vulnerability management",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Related to lifecycle visibility and oversight; better classified as a risk condition than an external threat.",
    "disposition": "Track as control weakness or risk driver",
    "assessment_question": "Are disclosure, triage, coordinated response and emergency update responsibilities defined?",
    "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-078",
    "title": "Cryptographic obsolescence or compromise of long-lived keys",
    "description": "Weak algorithms, expired credentials, compromised certificate authorities or inability to migrate cryptography undermine vehicles and services over long operational lifetimes.",
    "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "Lifecycle and trust failure",
    "category": "Cryptography lifecycle",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Related to lifecycle support, but cryptographic agility is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as lifecycle threat or risk driver",
    "assessment_question": "Can deployed vehicles revoke, replace and migrate credentials and algorithms?",
    "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-079",
    "title": "Cross-modal cascading disruption",
    "description": "A cyber incident in road mobility propagates to or originates from rail, ports, aviation, public transport, energy, logistics hubs or emergency services.",
    "domain": "Society / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "Systemic dependency failure",
    "category": "Cross-modal resilience",
    "priority": "2",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "B",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "2",
    "risk_score": "10",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Societal disruption is present, but cross-modal propagation paths are not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as strategic scenario",
    "assessment_question": "Which intermodal dependencies produce national-level cascades?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-080",
    "title": "AI model poisoning or malicious model update",
    "description": "Training data, model weights, validation artefacts or model updates are poisoned, replaced or backdoored, causing unsafe or systematically biased automated decisions.",
    "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "AI supply-chain attack",
    "category": "AI and autonomous driving",
    "priority": "3",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "B",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "2",
    "risk_score": "10",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "AI-assisted attack and supply-chain visibility exist, but compromise of the driving model itself is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as emerging threat",
    "assessment_question": "What evidence protects model provenance, training data and update integrity?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificial-intelligence-in-autonomous-driving",
    "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-081",
    "title": "Remote-operator or teleoperation compromise",
    "description": "Remote assistance or teleoperation accounts, consoles, communication channels or video streams are compromised, enabling unsafe commands or loss of supervision.",
    "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
    "threat_type": "Remote-control compromise",
    "category": "Autonomous mobility operations",
    "priority": "3",
    "impact_class": "E",
    "likelihood_class": "B",
    "impact_score": "5",
    "likelihood_score": "2",
    "risk_score": "10",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Not explicit and may only apply where remote assistance or teleoperation is deployed.",
    "disposition": "Add conditionally based on deployment",
    "assessment_question": "Which vehicles rely on remote intervention and what is the safe-state behaviour?",
    "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-082",
    "title": "Mobility-data poisoning and demand manipulation",
    "description": "False bookings, vehicles, congestion, demand or availability data manipulate fleet positioning, routing, service coverage or prices.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Data integrity and fraud",
    "category": "Mobility-as-a-Service",
    "priority": "3",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Data quality risks exist broadly, but coordinated operational demand manipulation is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add if MaaS/fleet optimisation is in scope",
    "assessment_question": "Can untrusted demand data materially change fleet deployment or public accessibility?",
    "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  },
  {
    "id": "T-083",
    "title": "Coordinated physical attack on connected mobility infrastructure",
    "description": "Attackers steal, destroy, tamper with or physically access roadside units, charging equipment, depots, sensors or communications cabinets, potentially combined with cyber activity.",
    "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
    "threat_type": "Physical/cyber-physical attack",
    "category": "Physical security and sabotage",
    "priority": "3",
    "impact_class": "D",
    "likelihood_class": "C",
    "impact_score": "4",
    "likelihood_score": "3",
    "risk_score": "12",
    "risk_rating": "High",
    "relationship": "Physical access and USB are narrow; coordinated infrastructure sabotage is not explicit.",
    "disposition": "Add as separate cyber-physical threat",
    "assessment_question": "Which distributed assets are accessible, poorly monitored or hard to restore?",
    "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
    "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
    "review_status": "For SME review"
  }
]