{
  "threats": [
    {
      "id": "T-001",
      "title_nl": "Grootschalige cyberverstoring van voertuigen en mobiliteitsdiensten",
      "title": "Large-scale cyber disruption of vehicles and mobility services",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "A fleet-scale disruption of connected vehicles or mobility platforms could halt transport services and create widespread operational and safety impacts.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Large-scale attacks are feasible against connected ecosystems, but achieving broad simultaneous disruption requires significant reach and coordination. Success requires exploitable weaknesses, access, scale, or control gaps and tied into multiple hop attack paths.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "availability; fleet-scale; cascading effects",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-002",
      "title_nl": "Cyberaanval op EV-laadinfrastructuur",
      "title": "Cyberattack on EV charging infrastructure",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle; User",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Compromise of charging infrastructure can interrupt charging services, damage operations, and affect large groups of EV users.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Attempt frequency is expected to be recurring because targets are exposed or monetizable. These are regularly targetted with unlimited window of opportunity. Successful realization is plausible with available techniques and harmful consequence still depends on scale.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "energy; charging; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-003",
      "title_nl": "Sabotage van elektriciteitsnet met impact op voertuigen",
      "title": "Sabotage of the electricity grid impacting vehicles",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Grid sabotage can indirectly disable vehicle charging and mobility services across affected regions. May affect the electricity net throughout the region.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Compromise EV charger management interface → gain access to charging network backend → pivot into utility/energy management connections (EMS/V2G platform) → manipulate charging load or grid-control signals → disrupt grid operations and availability. A successful harmful outcome requires uncommon access, coordinated capabilities, geopolitical intent, or several safeguards to fail. Attempts may occur, but successful consequence is still not available in academic research.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "energy; charging; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-004",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van V2G-functionaliteit voor destabilisatie energienet",
      "title": "Misuse of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) functionality to destabilize the energy grid",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Same as above. Abuse of V2G functions at scale could create load imbalances that affect grid stability and vehicle availability.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Coordinated manipulation of many participating vehicles and energy assets is difficult to achieve. Same as above.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "energy; charging; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-005",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van voertuigen voor sabotage of gerichte aanvallen",
      "title": "Misuse of vehicles for sabotage or targeted attacks",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Manipulated vehicles could be intentionally used to cause physical damage, disruption, or harm to people and assets.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Such attacks require targeted access to vehicle functions and clear malicious intent. But, it is very hard to identify the likelihood of such targeted threats. Depends on the motivation of the attacker.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "integrity; control; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-006",
      "title_nl": "Gerichte aanval op vitale infrastructuur of VIP-vervoer",
      "title": "Targeted attack on critical infrastructure or VIP transportation",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "User; Vehicle; Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User; Vehicle; Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "A successful attack against VIP transport or critical services could have national-security and public-safety consequences.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The scenario is plausible but typically demands well-resourced and highly capable adversaries. Further inputs necessary for making sense of likelihood.??",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "systemic; sovereignty; critical services",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-007",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van voertuig als cyber-fysiek aanvalsmiddel",
      "title": "Use of a vehicle as a cyber-physical attack tool",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Successful realization could credibly cause fatalities or widespread, prolonged disruption across society assets, with potential cascading effects to vehicle. Unauthorized control of a vehicle may enable its use as a physical attack platform against people or infrastructure.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "A successful harmful outcome requires uncommon access, coordinated capabilities, geopolitical intent, or several safeguards to fail. Achieving reliable remote control requires multiple conditions and controls to be bypassed. So, low.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "integrity; control; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-008",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende mogelijkheid om onveilig voertuig buiten gebruik te stellen",
      "title": "Insufficient capability to disable an unsafe vehicle",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "User",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Could cause major safety, operational, privacy, or financial harm affecting multiple vehicle assets or services; recovery may require coordinated technical and organizational action.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Attempts or precursor failures are plausible within the three-year horizon, but success requires exploitable weaknesses, access, scale, or control gaps. Evidence is mixed and the rating carries moderate uncertainty.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "integrity; control; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-009",
      "title_nl": "Compromittering van voertuigen voor inzet in botnets",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicles for use in botnets",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Compromised vehicles could be leveraged for distributed attacks, degrading trust and consuming vehicle resources.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle botnet creation is feasible but requires scalable compromise of connected endpoints.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "secure development; assurance; lifecycle",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-010",
      "title_nl": "Aantasting verkeersveiligheid door cyberincidenten",
      "title": "Deterioration of road safety due to cyber incidents",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "User; Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User; Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Cyber incidents affecting driving functions can directly increase collision risk and road-safety impacts. So, based on the safety objective of authorities and governments, it is exceptional.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation is plausible where connected or software-driven functions are exposed and can be indiviudlaly compromised for the whole chain.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "safety; autonomy; perception/control",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-011",
      "title_nl": "Uitval van digitale voertuig, en mobiliteitsdiensten",
      "title": "Outage of digital vehicle and mobility services",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Outages of digital mobility services can interrupt transport operations and affect large user populations. But assumption is core safety functions are still workable.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Cloud-connected mobility services face frequent availability threats and disruptions.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "availability; fleet-scale; cascading effects",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-012",
      "title_nl": "Kwetsbaarheden in autonome rijfuncties",
      "title": "Vulnerabilities in autonomous driving functions",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "User",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Weaknesses in autonomous-driving functions may result in unsafe decisions or loss of control.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Discovery and exploitation of software flaws in complex autonomy stacks remains realistic but unprovable as of now. For e.g., academic research on end to end compromise of an autonomous stack or E2E architecture is not available as yet.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "safety; autonomy; perception/control",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-013",
      "title_nl": "Kritieke kwetsbaarheden in autonome voertuigen",
      "title": "Critical vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "User",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Critical vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles can compromise safety-critical behavior with severe consequences.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The attack path is credible, although exploitation generally requires specialized knowledge, equipment, window of opportunity and expertise. Since the technology is fairly new, all these aforementioned parameters are on low/medium feasibility.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "safety; autonomy; perception/control",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-014",
      "title_nl": "Geopolitieke beïnvloeding van voertuigfabrikanten",
      "title": "Geopolitical influence over vehicle manufacturers",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "External influence over manufacturers could affect product integrity, support decisions, or strategic availability. Moreover, connected vehicles could be prone to geopolitical warfare.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Meaningful influence campaigns are possible but uncommon and often constrained by governance structures. General discourse is it is plasible but not yet ever executed.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "third party; concentration; continuity",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-015",
      "title_nl": "Ongeautoriseerde monitoring van inzittenden",
      "title": "Unauthorized monitoring of vehicle occupants",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Unauthorized access to cabin sensors or data can expose sensitive information about occupants. Assuming ordinary persons. For VIP peronnel, it is under espionage and sabotage T-005 and 006",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Personal data is a frequent target because it has intelligence and commercial value.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-016",
      "title_nl": "Onrechtmatige gedrags, of locatiecontrole van personen",
      "title": "Unlawful behavioral or location tracking of individuals",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Persistent tracking can reveal routines, associations, and sensitive movements of individuals.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Location data is routinely collected and therefore attractive for misuse.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-017",
      "title_nl": "Digitale spionage via voertuigen",
      "title": "Digital espionage through vehicles",
      "category": "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Vehicles can serve as collection points for sensitive operational, personal, or governmental information.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Espionage activity is plausible but usually depends on targeted access and persistence.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "confidentiality; intelligence; surveillance",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-018",
      "title_nl": "Spionage via voertuigsensoren of leveranciers",
      "title": "Espionage through vehicle sensors or suppliers",
      "category": "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Sensor feeds and supplier access may expose information that is valuable for intelligence gathering.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Multiple parties handle vehicle data, increasing opportunities for collection or interception.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "confidentiality; intelligence; surveillance",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-019",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende toezicht door hoge complexiteit voertuigenlandschap",
      "title": "Insufficient oversight due to the complexity of the vehicle ecosystem",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Limited ecosystem visibility can delay identification of systemic weaknesses and coordinated risks.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Complex supply chains make consistent oversight difficult across all stakeholders.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "governance; compliance; accountability",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-020",
      "title_nl": "Cyberincidenten leiden tot maatschappelijke onrust",
      "title": "Cyber incidents leading to societal disruption",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "A major vehicle-related cyber incident could disrupt public services and generate societal instability.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Large societal effects generally require a high-impact trigger and broad propagation.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "systemic; sovereignty; critical services",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-021",
      "title_nl": "Afnemend vertrouwen in digitale mobiliteitsinfrastructuur",
      "title": "Declining trust in digital mobility infrastructure",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Repeated incidents can reduce confidence in digital mobility technologies and services.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Trust erosion can develop gradually through recurring visible security failures.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "systemic; sovereignty; critical services",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-022",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende regelgeving en toezicht op voertuigcybersecurity",
      "title": "Insufficient regulation and oversight of vehicle cybersecurity",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Regulatory gaps may leave significant cybersecurity weaknesses insufficiently addressed across the sector.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Differences in oversight and implementation can persist across organizations.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "governance; compliance; accountability",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-023",
      "title_nl": "Overname van voertuigfuncties via infotainmentsysteem",
      "title": "Takeover of vehicle functions through the infotainment system",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "User",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Compromise of an infotainment pathway may provide access to safety-relevant vehicle functions. This results in complete takeover of the vehicle safety, operational, provacy and financial aspects.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connectivity and exposed interfaces make this attack route a credible and recurring concern. Various pre-regulation vehicles have been researched to have been possible to be compromised through the infotainment system. [Charlie & Miller Jeep Hack, 2014]",
      "risk_level": "Critical",
      "priority": "Immediate cross-stakeholder treatment and executive ownership",
      "tags": "integrity; control; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Intolerable without urgent treatment; severe/high consequence combines with credible materialisation.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-024",
      "title_nl": "Veiligheid krijgt onvoldoende prioriteit bij fabrikanten",
      "title": "Safety receives insufficient priority from manufacturers",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle; User",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Weak safety prioritization can allow preventable vulnerabilities to remain in vehicles and services.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Commercial pressures and uneven maturity can result in inconsistent security practices.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "secure development; assurance; lifecycle",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-025",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende testdekking voorafgaand aan toelating",
      "title": "Inadequate testing prior to market approval",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle; User",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Insufficient testing may leave exploitable defects undiscovered before deployment.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Complex systems make complete test coverage challenging to achieve.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "secure development; assurance; lifecycle",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-026",
      "title_nl": "Beperkt inzicht in voertuigsoftware",
      "title": "Limited visibility into vehicle software",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Poor software visibility hinders vulnerability management, patching, and risk assessment.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Limited transparency increases the chance that weaknesses remain unnoticed.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "asset visibility; architecture; traceability",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-027",
      "title_nl": "Onvolledig zicht op voertuigen in het ecosysteem",
      "title": "Incomplete visibility of vehicles within the ecosystem",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Incomplete asset visibility impairs tracking of vulnerable vehicles across the ecosystem.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Accurate inventories are difficult to maintain in diverse vehicle environments.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "asset visibility; architecture; traceability",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-028",
      "title_nl": "Onzekerheid over toepassing Cyber Resilience Act",
      "title": "Uncertainty regarding the applicability of the Cyber Resilience Act",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Low",
      "impact_rationale": "Regulatory uncertainty can delay compliance planning and coordinated cybersecurity improvements.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The threat stems primarily from evolving interpretation rather than active exploitation.",
      "risk_level": "Low",
      "priority": "Accept/monitor subject to risk appetite",
      "tags": "governance; compliance; accountability",
      "impact_score": "1",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Monitor or accept subject to risk appetite and change triggers.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-029",
      "title_nl": "Onzekerheid over toepasselijke regelgeving",
      "title": "Uncertainty regarding applicable regulations",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domain": "",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Low",
      "impact_rationale": "Unclear regulatory obligations can create inconsistent security expectations and implementation.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Changes in legislation and overlapping frameworks can sustain uncertainty.",
      "risk_level": "Low",
      "priority": "Accept/monitor subject to risk appetite",
      "tags": "governance; compliance; accountability",
      "impact_score": "1",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Monitor or accept subject to risk appetite and change triggers.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-030",
      "title_nl": "Wegvallen van OEM,ondersteuning",
      "title": "Loss of OEM support",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Loss of OEM support may leave vehicles without security updates or technical assistance.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Support withdrawal is plausible over long lifecycles and aging platforms.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "third party; concentration; continuity",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-031",
      "title_nl": "Wegvallen van kritieke leveranciers",
      "title": "Loss of critical suppliers",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Failure of critical suppliers can disrupt security maintenance and essential service delivery.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Dependence on specialized providers creates credible continuity risks.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "third party; concentration; continuity",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-032",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende cybersecurity,eisen voor individuele voertuigtypen",
      "title": "Insufficient cybersecurity requirements for individual vehicle types",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Weak cybersecurity requirements can permit uneven protection levels across vehicle types.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Control gaps may persist where requirements are incomplete or inconsistently applied.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "governance; compliance; accountability",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-033",
      "title_nl": "Ketenoverschrijdende cyberaanvallen over meerdere lagen",
      "title": "Cross-supply-chain cyberattacks spanning multiple layers",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Attacks spanning multiple suppliers can propagate across interconnected vehicle services and products.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Interconnected supply chains create opportunities for broader compromise.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "third party; concentration; continuity",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-034",
      "title_nl": "Ontbreken van centrale detectie van afwijkend voertuiggedrag",
      "title": "Absence of centralized detection of anomalous vehicle behavior",
      "category": "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Without centralized detection, malicious activity may remain unnoticed until significant damage occurs.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Limited visibility reduces the chance of early identification and containment.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "detection; telemetry; response",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-035",
      "title_nl": "GNSS jamming en spoofing van voertuigen",
      "title": "GNSS jamming and spoofing of vehicles",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Manipulated or unavailable GNSS signals can disrupt navigation and autonomous vehicle operation. Spoofing in general has severe consequences on vehicle safety and operations.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Jamming and spoofing tools are easily accessible and frequently demonstrated in practice. And such vulnerabilities combined with Autonomous functions and Full self driving creates enormous feasibility.",
      "risk_level": "Critical",
      "priority": "Immediate cross-stakeholder treatment and executive ownership",
      "tags": "wireless; navigation; availability/integrity",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Intolerable without urgent treatment; severe/high consequence combines with credible materialisation.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-036",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende bescherming van gegevens van inzittenden",
      "title": "Insufficient protection of occupant data",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Weak protection of occupant data can lead to unauthorized access, disclosure, or misuse.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Personal information remains a common target for attackers and third parties.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-037",
      "title_nl": "AI versnelt ontdekking en exploitatie van kwetsbaarheden",
      "title": "AI accelerates the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "AI-assisted exploitation can increase the scale and speed of attacks against vehicle ecosystems.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Widely available AI tools can lower effort required to identify weaknesses.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "AI; cloud; software dependency",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-038",
      "title_nl": "Gebrek aan inzicht in AI, en softwareketens",
      "title": "Lack of visibility into AI and software supply chains",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Lack of supply-chain transparency makes it harder to assess inherited AI and software risks.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Dependencies are often complex and not fully visible to all stakeholders.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "AI; cloud; software dependency",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-039",
      "title_nl": "Gebrek aan transparantie over gegevensverwerking",
      "title": "Lack of transparency regarding data processing",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Insufficient transparency over data processing can undermine privacy expectations and compliance.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Data collection practices are often extensive and difficult for users to verify.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-040",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van locatie, en bewegingsgegevens",
      "title": "Misuse of location and movement data",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Misuse of movement data can expose sensitive behavior patterns and personal activities.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Location information is valuable and frequently collected by connected services.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-041",
      "title_nl": "Ongewenste verzameling van gegevens uit de omgeving",
      "title": "Unwanted collection of data from the surrounding environment",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Environmental sensors may capture personal or sensitive information beyond the intended purpose.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Broad sensor coverage creates recurring privacy exposure opportunities.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-042",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende beheer van fysieke aanvalsvectoren zoals USB",
      "title": "Inadequate management of physical attack vectors such as USB devices",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Physical interfaces such as USB ports may provide a direct path to vehicle systems.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation requires access, but removable media remains a known attack vector.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "secure development; assurance; lifecycle",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-043",
      "title_nl": "Ongeautoriseerd vergrendelen van voertuigen",
      "title": "Unauthorized locking of vehicles",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Unauthorized locking can disrupt access to vehicles and affect user safety or mobility.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connected access features may be targeted for extortion, misuse, or disruption.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "integrity; control; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-044",
      "title_nl": "Digitale diefstal van voertuigen",
      "title": "Digital vehicle theft",
      "category": "Vehicle Theft and Digital Crime",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Digital compromise of access mechanisms can result in theft of vehicles and associated assets.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle theft is a strong criminal incentive and attack methods continue to evolve.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "criminal monetization; access; theft",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-045",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende verwijdering van voertuigdata bij sloop, verkoop, verhuur of uitleen",
      "title": "Inadequate deletion of vehicle data during disposal, sale, rental, or [source text truncated after 'or']",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Residual data left in vehicles can expose previous users after sale, rental, or disposal.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Data removal processes are often inconsistent across lifecycle transitions.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-046",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende bescherming van persoonsgegevens gedurende de levenscyclus van een voertuig",
      "title": "Insufficient protection of personal data throughout the vehicle lifecycle",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "user": "X",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Personal data may be exposed at multiple stages of the vehicle lifecycle if controls are weak.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Numerous systems and stakeholders handle data throughout ownership and servicing.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "privacy; confidentiality; data governance",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-047",
      "title_nl": "Manipulatie of ongeautoriseerde beïnvloeding van voertuiggedrag via software, data of communicatiediensten",
      "title": "Manipulation or unauthorized influence of vehicle behavior through software, data, or communication services",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Manipulation of software, data, or communications can directly alter vehicle behavior and safety.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation is realistic where trusted inputs or control channels can be influenced.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "integrity; control; cyber-physical",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-048",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende inzicht in en toezicht op de volledige voertuigketen en levenscyclus",
      "title": "Insufficient visibility and oversight across the entire vehicle supply chain and lifecycle",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Poor oversight across the lifecycle can allow vulnerabilities and dependencies to go unmanaged.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The breadth of suppliers, updates, and processes increases coordination challenges.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "secure development; assurance; lifecycle",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-049",
      "title_nl": "Onderschatting van de impact van grootschalige cyberincidenten binnen voertuigvloten",
      "title": "Underestimation of the impact of large-scale cyber incidents affecting vehicle fleets",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Underestimating fleet-wide cyber incidents can result in inadequate preparedness for large disruptions.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Fleet-scale impacts are plausible, though realization depends on broad compromise paths.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "availability; fleet-scale; cascading effects",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-050",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende inzicht in hardware, en softwarevarianten binnen hetzelfde voertuigtype",
      "title": "Insufficient visibility into hardware and software variants within the same vehicle type",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Unknown hardware and software variants complicate vulnerability tracking and remediation.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Variant proliferation reduces confidence in asset and exposure assessments.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "asset visibility; architecture; traceability",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-051",
      "title_nl": "Verschillen in voertuigarchitectuur leiden tot onbekende gegevensstromen en functionaliteiten",
      "title": "Differences in vehicle architectures resulting in unknown data flows and functionalities",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Architectural differences can hide data flows or functions that introduce unmanaged risks.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Complex platform diversity makes comprehensive understanding difficult.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "asset visibility; architecture; traceability",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-052",
      "title_nl": "Verplaatsing van voertuigintelligentie naar externe AI, en communicatiediensten buiten het voertuig",
      "title": "Migration of vehicle intelligence to external AI and communication services outside the vehicle",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Externalizing vehicle intelligence increases dependence on remote services and communication paths.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Reliance on external platforms expands the attack surface and operational dependencies.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "AI; cloud; software dependency",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-053",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende toezicht op aftermarket hardware, software en voertuigaanpassingen",
      "title": "Insufficient oversight of aftermarket hardware, software, and vehicle modifications",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Uncontrolled aftermarket modifications may weaken security assumptions and safety controls.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Third-party changes are difficult to monitor and assess consistently.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "secure development; assurance; lifecycle",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-054",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van Software Defined Radio (SDR) voor verstoring, afluisteren en manipulatie van draadloze voertuigcommunicatie",
      "title": "Misuse of Software Defined Radio (SDR) for disruption, eavesdropping, and manipulation of wireless vehicle communications",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "SDR-based attacks can intercept, disrupt, or manipulate wireless vehicle communications.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Low-cost radio tools and exposed protocols make such attacks achievable.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "wireless; navigation; availability/integrity",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-055",
      "title_nl": "Afhankelijkheid van satellietcommunicatie,infrastructuur van buitenlandse of niet,vertrouwde partijen",
      "title": "Dependence on satellite communication infrastructure owned or controlled by foreign or untrusted parties",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Dependence on foreign or untrusted satellite services may affect resilience and service continuity.",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation would require strategic capabilities and favorable circumstances.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "systemic; sovereignty; critical services",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-056",
      "title_nl": "Verslechterde financiële positie van voertuigfabrikanten leidt tot verminderde cybersecurity,ondersteuning",
      "title": "Deteriorating financial health of vehicle manufacturers resulting in reduced cybersecurity support",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Financially stressed manufacturers may reduce patching, support, or cybersecurity investment.",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Economic pressures can gradually degrade long-term security maintenance.",
      "risk_level": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": "third party; concentration; continuity",
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-057",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende logging, monitoring en incidentanalyse van voertuigen en voertuigecosystemen",
      "title": "Insufficient logging, monitoring, and incident analysis across vehicles and vehicle ecosystems",
      "category": "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
      "user": "",
      "vehicle": "X",
      "infrastructure": "X",
      "society": "X",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domain": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Insufficient logging and monitoring can delay investigation, containment, and recovery activities.",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Detection gaps make successful compromise harder to identify across distributed environments.And accordingly the likelihood of attacker motivation for such systems would be high.",
      "risk_level": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": "detection; telemetry; response",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "github_count": 0,
      "cve_count": 0,
      "paper_count": 0,
      "incident_count": 0,
      "repositories": [],
      "cves": [],
      "papers": [],
      "incidents": [],
      "evidence_score": 0,
      "evidence_strength": "Unknown"
    }
  ],
  "categories": [
    {
      "id": "1",
      "name": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-001",
        "T-011",
        "T-049",
        "T-067"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "2",
      "name": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-002",
        "T-003",
        "T-004"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "3",
      "name": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-005",
        "T-007",
        "T-008",
        "T-023",
        "T-043",
        "T-047"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "4",
      "name": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-006",
        "T-020",
        "T-021",
        "T-055",
        "T-068",
        "T-069"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "5",
      "name": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-009",
        "T-024",
        "T-025",
        "T-042",
        "T-048",
        "T-053",
        "T-060"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "6",
      "name": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-010",
        "T-012",
        "T-013",
        "T-066"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "7",
      "name": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-014",
        "T-030",
        "T-031",
        "T-033",
        "T-056",
        "T-062"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "8",
      "name": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-015",
        "T-016",
        "T-036",
        "T-039",
        "T-040",
        "T-041",
        "T-045",
        "T-046",
        "T-063"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "9",
      "name": "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-017",
        "T-018"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "10",
      "name": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-019",
        "T-022",
        "T-028",
        "T-029",
        "T-032",
        "T-061"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "11",
      "name": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-026",
        "T-027",
        "T-050",
        "T-051",
        "T-064",
        "T-065"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "12",
      "name": "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-034",
        "T-057"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "13",
      "name": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-035",
        "T-054",
        "T-059"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "14",
      "name": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-037",
        "T-038",
        "T-052",
        "T-058"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "15",
      "name": "Vehicle Theft and Digital Crime",
      "threat_ids": [
        "T-044"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "taxonomy": [
    {
      "id": "T-001",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Large-scale cyber disruption of vehicles and mobility services",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "description": "A cyber incident affects multiple vehicle fleets, mobility providers, manufacturers, or regions at the same time, causing widespread disruption to transport, logistics, vehicle services, and access to essential mobility.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial: Digital Space(1.3) [vital Transport infrastructure, Loss of Control, Scale of Impact]\n- Physical Safety: Primary Needs (2.3) [Essential services interuption]\n- Economic: Costs (3.1) [Direct/indirect damage]\n- Social/Political Stability: Daily life disruption(5.1), societal impact(5.3) and Privacy(5.4)  [Mobility restrictions, Population affected]",
      "comments": "A coordinated cyberattack exploits a shared component used by several mobility providers. Connected public-transport vehicles, delivery fleets, shared-mobility services, charging platforms, and remote vehicle services become unavailable across multiple regions for several days.",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connected vehicles and mobility services depend on shared software, cloud platforms, suppliers, communication networks, and backend services. A serious incident affecting one operator is credible, but multi-provider or multi-region disruption requires a scalable attack path, shared dependency, and failure of containment and recovery controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-002",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Cyberattack on EV charging infrastructure",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; User",
      "description": "Compromise of charging infrastructure can interrupt or outage of  charging services, unauthorized access, manipulated charging sessions, billing fraud or disruption across multiple charging operators.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Primary Needs (2.3) [Restricted availability of electric mobility and possible delays to healthcare, emergency-response or essential-delivery transport; alternative vehicles and charging options may limit direct safety consequences.]\n\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Incident response and recovery costs, lost income, charging-service interruption, commercial-fleet downtime and logistics delays.]\n- Social/Political Stability: Daily Life Disruption (5.1), Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Mobility restrictions, population affected, reduced access to charging, declining trust in electric-mobility infrastructure, and possible exposure of payment, account, vehicle and location data.]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Unauthorized access to or loss of control over strategically important charging infrastructure and digital charging platforms; multiple charging operators or service providers may be affected.]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "EV charging infrastructure is increasingly connected to public networks, cloud platforms, mobile applications, payment services and roaming providers. This creates likely possibility of multiple attack paths, although large-scale attacks would require access to shared management systems and failure of authentication at multiple vendors, segmentation and recovery controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-003",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Sabotage of the electricity grid impacting vehicles",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Society",
      "description": "Sabotage of the electricity grid could interrupt power supply to charging stations, charging-management platforms, roadside infrastructure and other services supporting electric mobility, leaving vehicles unable to charge or operate as planned. This threat is based on the assumption that sabotage of the electric grid impacting only vehicles.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]\n- Social/Political Stability: Daily Life Disruption (5.1), Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where data is affected) [Mobility restrictions, population affected, accessibility loss and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "A prolonged or widespread grid disruption could immobilize electric fleets, interrupt public transport, logistics and emergency services, and restrict access to essential mobility. The incident could also cause substantial economic losses and difficult multi-sector recovery. Direct vehicle-safety effects would generally arise indirectly through loss of charging and essential transport services.",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "A compromised EV charging backend could provide a entry path to energy-management or V2G platforms and enable manipulation of charging loads or grid-control signals. \n\nHowever, significant grid disruption requires advanced access, coordinated capability, malicious intent, and failure of multiple cybersecurity and grid-resilience controls. Local incidents are more plausible, but successful, prolonged, wide-area disruption remains unlikely within five years and is not yet well researched in published academic research.\nAssuming that the adoption will increase the attacker motivation and looking at the high impact, advent of disruptive technologies, this could be somewhat likely in next 5 years.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-004",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Misuse of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) functionality to destabilize the energy grid",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Society",
      "description": "Attackers could manipulate coordinated V2G charging and discharging commands across many electric vehicles, causing sudden changes in electricity demand or supply and potentially destabilizing local or national energy-grid operations.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]\n- Social/Political Stability: Daily Life Disruption (5.1), Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where data is affected) [Mobility restrictions, population affected, accessibility loss and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "Large-scale synchronized V2G manipulation could overload grid components, interrupt charging and electricity services, damage equipment, disrupt mobility and essential services, and create substantial recovery costs. The impact depends on the number of connected vehicles, available battery capacity, geographic concentration and grid safeguards.",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Successful grid destabilization requires access to a large number of V2G-enabled vehicles(unknown) or a central aggregation platform, sufficient controllable capacity, synchronized commands, aggregator and grid-protection controls. Current V2G deployment remains limited, but the likelihood may increase as adoption and aggregation grow. In the next 5 years, there is a possibility of a somewhat likely materialization of the attack path.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-005",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Misuse of vehicles for sabotage or targeted attacks",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Manipulated vehicles could be intentionally used to cause physical damage, disruption, or harm to people and assets.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "Physical Safety: Vehicles could be deliberately directed into people, buildings or crowded locations. A coordinated attack involving several vehicles could cause many deaths and serious injuries before the vehicles can be stopped.\nE.g.,: Fleet wide cyber attacks",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Such attacks require targeted access to vehicle functions and clear malicious intent. But, it is very hard to identify the likelihood of such targeted threats. Depends on the motivation of the attacker. The scenario is credible, but targeted high-consequence execution is not expected to occur frequently.",
      "combined_likelihood": "B",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "2",
      "combined_risk_score": "10",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-006",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Targeted attack on critical infrastructure or VIP transportation",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure;\nUser; \nVehicle;",
      "description": "A successful attack against VIP transport or critical services could have national-security and public-safety consequences. The attacker motivation must be considered in such attacks. Even though the likelihood of such attacks for a normal attacker are lower, additional support from rogue nation states might increase the likelihood of such threats and increase the risks manifold.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "Physical Safety: A successful attack on hazardous, emergency or protected transport could cause fatalities, serious injuries or loss of vital services.\nTerritorial Security: A deliberate attack could disable or manipulate nationally important transport infrastructure or protected mobility, causing sustained loss of control and requiring national crisis coordination.\n\nAssumption: Road, Rail and Waterways are assumed to be critical infrastructure in this risk assessment.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "A targeted attack on critical infrastructure or VIP transport requires a capable and motivated attacker, detailed planning and execution, target-specific intelligence and access to protected systems. The scenario is credible within five years, but strong security controls(likely additional layer of security evaluations), limited access and operational security rails reduce the probability of successful materialisation. \n\nAdditionally, hostile geopolitical situation could increase the likelihood and involvement of rogue state actors could increase the probability in the next 5 years.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-007",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Use of a vehicle as a cyber-physical attack tool",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Users;",
      "description": "Successful realization could credibly cause fatalities or widespread, prolonged disruption across society assets, with potential cascading effects to vehicle. Unauthorized control of a vehicle may enable its use as a physical attack platform against people or infrastructure.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "Physical Safety: A compromised vehicle could be used as a moving weapon. If repeated or coordinated, the attack could cause many fatalities and serious injuries.\n\nAssumption: The vehicle itself is used as a cyber-physical tool to attack in the phyical world as explained above.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "A successful harmful outcome requires uncommon access, coordinated capabilities, geopolitical intent, or several safeguards to fail. Achieving reliable remote control requires multiple conditions and controls to be bypassed. So, unlikely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "B",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "2",
      "combined_risk_score": "10",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-008",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient capability to disable an unsafe vehicle",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "User",
      "description": "Could cause major safety, operational, privacy, or financial harm affecting multiple vehicle assets or services; recovery may require coordinated technical and organizational action.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "B",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Somewhat likely. Disabling unsafe vehicles needs tremendously complicated technical implimentation of remote stopping which could also be used as an attack path by attackers themselves. Therefore, human intervention, local vehicle based safety mechanisms as last resort and minimum risk manoeuvres may limit the consequences.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-009",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicles for use in botnets",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "Compromised vehicles could be leveraged for distributed attacks, degrading trust and consuming vehicle resources. Attackers compromise connected vehicles and remotely control them as part of a botnet to generate malicious traffic, attack other systems, distribute malware or coordinate disruptive activities.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Botnet activity could consume vehicle communication and computing resources, expose vehicle data, disrupt connected services and enable large-scale attacks on external targets. Direct physical-safety consequences are normally limited unless the compromise also reaches safety-critical vehicle functions.",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connected vehicles have long lifecycles, multiple communication interfaces and software from several suppliers. Botnet compromise is plausible where common vulnerabilities, reused credentials or inadequate patching exist, but large-scale requires a widely exploitable weakness across many vehicles. So, plausible or somewhat likely in next 5 years combined with other factors like disruptive tech to hunt for such unpatched or zero day vulnerabilities.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-010",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Deterioration of road safety due to cyber incidents",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "User; Vehicle",
      "description": "Cyber incidents affecting driving functions can directly increase collision risk and road-safety impacts. So, based on the safety objective of authorities and governments, it is exceptional.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "Physical Safety: A widespread cyber failure affecting steering, braking, acceleration, warnings or traffic coordination could cause many simultaneous crashes and overwhelm emergency response.\nE.g., Fleet wide cyber attacks affecting multiple vehicles",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Cyber incidents affecting individual vehicles or mobility systems are credible within five years. However, widespread deterioration of road safety requires scalable access, safety-critical influence and failure of vehicle, infrastructure and operational safeguards.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-011",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Outage of digital vehicle and mobility services",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Society",
      "description": "Outages of digital mobility services can interrupt transport operations and affect large user populations. But assumption is core safety functions are still workable.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]\n- Social/Political Stability: Daily Life Disruption (5.1), Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where data is affected) [Mobility restrictions, population affected, accessibility loss and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "An outage could prevent access to fleet management, remote vehicle services, booking, authentication, charging, payment, navigation, or customer applications. The disruption could cause operational delays, financial losses, and mobility restrictions, but direct physical harm is normally limited if vehicles retain safe offline functionality.",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Digital mobility services depend on internet connectivity, cloud platforms, identity providers, APIs, telecom networks, and third-party services. Outages and denial-of-service incidents are credible within five years, although redundancy, offline operation, and tested recovery can limit duration and scale.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-012",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Vulnerabilities in autonomous driving functions",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "User",
      "description": "Weaknesses in autonomous-driving functions may result in unsafe decisions or loss of control.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Discovery and exploitation of software flaws in complex autonomy stacks remains realistic but unprovable as of now. For e.g., academic research on end to end compromise of an autonomous stack or E2E architecture is not available as yet. Such exploitation requires weaknesses to be reachable, repeatable and capable of defeating the fallback scenarios. Hence, it is somewhat likely/plausible.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-013",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Critical vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "User",
      "description": "Critical vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles can compromise safety-critical behavior with severe consequences.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "Physical Safety: A critical autonomous-driving weakness shared across a large autonomous vehicle fleet could trigger the same unsafe decision making in many vehicles, causing multiple fatal or serious collisions before a fix can be deployed.\nAlso, the controllability factor in an autonomous vehicle is considerably lower than an average human driver. Thats the reason, the impact could be multiple factor more for an autonomous vehicle. Additionally, the motivation for the exploitation of such vulnerabilities is higher than in normal vehicles.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The attack path is credible, although exploitation generally requires specialized knowledge, equipment, window of opportunity and expertise. Since the technology is fairly new, all these aforementioned parameters are somehwat likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-014",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Geopolitical influence over vehicle manufacturers",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "External influence over manufacturers could affect product integrity, support decisions, or strategic availability. Moreover, connected vehicles could be prone to geopolitical warfare.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "Territorial Security: A foreign state or state-influenced manufacturer could retain strategic access to large vehicle fleets, updates or data. That access could be used to disable mobility or influence Dutch digital transport infrastructure during a crisis.\n\nConnected vehicles from geographical adversaries could be used as a possible tool for espionage inlcuding the entire depth of the supply chain.",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Global vehicle supply chains and technology platforms are exposed to geopolitical pressure and conflicting national laws. However, harmful influence requires both the capability and intent to exploit that position, while European regulation, market diversification and technical controls may reduce exposure.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-015",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Unauthorized monitoring of vehicle occupants",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Unauthorized access to cabin sensors or data can expose sensitive information about occupants. Assuming ordinary persons. For VIP peronnel, it is under espionage and sabotage T-005 and 006",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "Unauthorized monitoring could expose conversations, images, behaviour, identity and activities inside vehicles. Persistent or large-scale monitoring could seriously violate privacy, enable surveillance or discrimination and reduce trust in connected vehicles.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Personal data is a frequent target because it has intelligence and commercial value. Modern vehicles increasingly contain occupant-monitoring sensors and connected backend services. Misuse is plausible/likely through excessive access rights, insecure applications, supplier access or unclear data governance, but widespread monitoring requires sustained unauthorized access.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-016",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Unlawful behavioral or location tracking of individuals",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Vehicle location, route, driving behaviour and usage data may be collected, linked or shared without an adequate legal basis, allowing individuals and their activities to be tracked over time.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "Large-scale misuse could facilitate surveillance, stalking, discrimination or targeting and significantly undermine public trust.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Tracking misuse is likely where consent, purpose limitation, access control, retention and third-party sharing are inadequately governed and inadequate regulatory enforcement",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-017",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Digital espionage through vehicles",
      "category": "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Society",
      "description": "Attackers may use connected nature of vehicles, onboard sensors, applications or backend services to secretly collect sensitive information about individuals, organizations, locations, movements or activities for political, military or commercial intelligence purposes. There could be more unknown purposes as well.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "Espionage through a large vehicle volume could expose sensitive rides, strategic locations, government or corporate activities and patterns of movement. Persistent collection could threaten personal privacy, national security and confidence in connected vehicles, even without disrupting the normal operation of the vehicle.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connected vehicles collect extensive location, sensor and communication data, creating valuable insights. Successful espionage requires access to vehicle systems, suppliers or backend platforms and the ability to remain undetected, making sustained large-scale collection plausible but not routine within five years. Currently, regulatory oversight for data collection is not extensive. Several studies like \"Lion Cage\" Project for Societal and digital risks focusses on the fact that a NIO vehicle sends encrypted data to Chinese servers continuously even though the vehicle is turned off creating strong case for espionage. This makes it very likely currently as well as frequent in the next 5 years.",
      "combined_likelihood": "E",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "5",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-018",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Espionage through vehicle sensors or suppliers",
      "category": "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Society",
      "description": "As compared to T-017, Supplier systems with contries of origin outside Europe and blackbox nature of systems, may expose additional paths for intelligence gathering which could be used for nefarious purposes like espionage.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "Addition of non-European suppliers contributing to the espionage endeavors as described in T017, could increase the impact a tad more as it could result accelerate sensitive data gathering and analysis.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Same as T017",
      "combined_likelihood": "E",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "5",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-019",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient oversight due to the complexity of the vehicle ecosystem",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Complex relationships between manufacturers, suppliers, software providers, cloud platforms, dealers and service operators may prevent authorities and organizations from understanding dependencies, assigning responsibilities and identifying systemic cybersecurity risks.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Complex supply chains make consistent oversight difficult across all stakeholders.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "9",
      "combined_rating": "Moderate",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-020",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Cyber incidents leading to societal disruption",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "A cyber incident affecting vehicles, fleets, mobility services or supporting infrastructure could disrupt daily travel, logistics, emergency services and access to essential goods and services across a large population. It could generate societal instability deeply influencing public opinion and creating chaos/confusion across a large population.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Daily Life Disruption (5.1), Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where data is affected) [Mobility restrictions, population affected, accessibility loss and declining trust]",
      "comments": "Social, Political & Privacy: A prolonged, nationwide mobility disruption could prevent large numbers of people from reaching work, healthcare, education and essential services, creating serious public-order and trust consequences that are difficult to reverse.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "E",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Significant cyber incidents affecting mobility systems are credible within five years, but societal disruption requires the incident to spread across multiple operators, fleets or shared dependencies and exceed normal continuity and recovery capabilities.\n\nAdditionally, interplay of geopolitical situation and influence and advent of disruptive technologies might make it possible in next 5 years.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-021",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Declining trust in digital mobility infrastructure",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "Repeated incidents can reduce confidence in digital mobility technologies and services. Repeated cyber incidents, unreliable digital services, privacy breaches or poor incident handling could reduce public confidence in connected, automated and shared mobility systems.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Public trust can decline quickly following visible safety incidents, recurring service outages, data misuse or unclear communication. However, sustained sector-wide distrust normally requires repeated failures or a major incident with inadequate response.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-022",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient regulation and oversight of vehicle cybersecurity",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Poorly enforced cybersecurity regulation may allow manufacturers, suppliers and mobility providers to deviate from the objective of the regulation. Whether it be Technical Service, Approval Authority or Market Surveillance Authority, due diligence has to be carried out in the spirit of the regulation than just being commercillay viable and not take responsibilities.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Regulatory gaps can permit insecure vehicles, components or services to enter and remain in operation. Weak enforcement may delay remediation, allow systemic vulnerabilities to persist and increase the severity of fleet-scale cyber incidents.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Implementation of the R155 and ISO SAE 21434 has achieved a good baseline for introduction of cybersecurity. However, in the current situation of disruptive AI models endangering cybersecurity, introductory level is insufficient and there is a need of dramatic improvement especially in the supply chain and to plug as many holes/gaps as possible on the regulatory side. Regulatory oversight and regulations itself is currently insufficient looking at just the pure nature of regulations running much behind technology.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-023",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Takeover of vehicle functions through the infotainment system",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "User",
      "description": "Compromise of an infotainment pathway may provide access to safety-relevant vehicle functions. This results in complete takeover of the vehicle safety, operational, provacy and financial aspects.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "16",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "If an infotainment compromise crosses into safety-critical networks, attackers could control steering, braking or acceleration in many similarly designed vehicles, creating the potential for multiple fatal crashes. Older generation vehicles sold before the regulatory requirements have shown the feasibility.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connectivity and exposed interfaces make this attack route a credible and recurring concern. Various pre-regulation vehicles have been researched to have been possible to be compromised through the infotainment system. [Charlie & Miller Jeep Hack, 2014]",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-024",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Safety/Security receives insufficient priority from manufacturers",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; User",
      "description": "Manufacturers may prioritize time-to-market, cost, performance, or convenience over cybersecurity and functional safety, allowing known weaknesses or insufficiently tested functions to remain in vehicles. Widely prevalent in the industry.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Commercial and delivery pressures create conflicts with safety and security objectives. However, type approval especially safety and cybersecurity regulations, testing, and regulatory oversight reduce the likelihood of serious weaknesses reaching the market. But the restrictions and fundamental nature of type approval testing does not provide full coverage. Risks remain due to open norms nature of new regulations. In the next 5 years, it is likely that such developmental insufficiencies will be exploitable.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-025",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Inadequate testing prior to market approval",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; User",
      "description": "Insufficient testing may leave exploitable defects undiscovered for in-use vehicles. As in T-024, Type approval cannot detect all vulnerabilities and only adequate and sufficient manufacturer testing is the answer.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Absence of sufficient testing at manufacturers and a plausible probability of this not getting detected in Type Approval makes it a likely scenario   currently and in the next 5 years.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-026",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Limited visibility into vehicle software",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Poor software visibility hinders vulnerability management, patching, and risk assessment. Manufacturers, authorities or operators may lack complete information about the software, libraries, versions and dependencies installed in a vehicle owing to the complexity of the vehicle supply chain ecosystem.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Limited software visibility can delay vulnerability assessment, patching, recalls and incident response. A vulnerable component may remain undetected across multiple vehicles, but the lack of visibility does not normally cause direct physical harm by itself.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Modern vehicles contain software from many suppliers and open-source components, with frequent updates and long operational lifecycles. Maintaining an accurate software inventory and software bill of materials across all variants is therefore difficult.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-027",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Incomplete visibility of vehicles within the ecosystem.\n\nAssumption is this threat deals with traceability of vehicles.",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "description": "Incomplete asset visibility impairs tracking of vulnerable vehicles across the ecosystem.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Incomplete fleet visibility can prevent organizations from identifying affected vehicles, distributing security updates, managing recalls and coordinating incident response. The weakness may increase the scale and duration of an incident but does not directly create unsafe behaviour.",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicles have long lifecycles and frequently change owners, operators, locations and configurations. Fragmented registration, manufacturer, fleet, dealer and service-provider records make visibility gaps likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "9",
      "combined_rating": "Moderate",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-028",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Uncertainty regarding the applicability of the Cyber Resilience Act",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Uncertainty about how the Cyber Resilience Act applies to vehicle software, components, aftermarket products and connected mobility services may create unclear responsibilities or overlapping requirements. Regulatory loopholes might lead to known or unknown non-compliance and could lead to cybersecurity weaknesses.",
      "impact": "Low",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "2",
      "risk_rating": "Low",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Unclear applicability could delay compliance decisions, vulnerability handling, security updates and supplier requirements and responsibilities. The uncertainty is unlikely to cause direct physical harm by itself but may leave products or services insufficiently built for proportional cybersecurity measures.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "B",
      "territorial_impact": "B",
      "combined_impact": "B",
      "combined_impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The threat stems primarily from evolving interpretation rather than active exploitation. Automotive products involve complex boundaries between complete vehicles, embedded components, standalone software, cloud services and aftermarket products. Interpretation and coordination challenges are therefore likely during implementation and enforcement.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "8",
      "combined_rating": "Moderate",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-029",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Uncertainty regarding applicable regulations",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Unclear regulatory obligations can create inconsistent security expectations and implementation. Organizations may be uncertain which automotive, cybersecurity, data-protection, AI, product-safety and critical-infrastructure requirements apply to a vehicle, component or mobility service.",
      "impact": "Low",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "3",
      "risk_rating": "Low",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connected mobility crosses several regulatory areas and jurisdictions, including vehicle type approval, cybersecurity, software updates, privacy, AI, telecommunications and critical infrastructure. Overlapping scope and different implementation timelines make uncertainty likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-030",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Loss of OEM support",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "A vehicle manufacturer may stop providing cybersecurity monitoring, vulnerability remediation, software updates, certificates, backend services or technical support before the end of the vehicle’s operational life.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]",
      "comments": "Unsupported vehicles may remain exposed to known vulnerabilities. Where a large vehicle fleet is affected, the loss of support could create persistent safety, privacy and operational risks that cannot be reasonably resolved.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Support withdrawal is plausible over long lifecycles and aging platforms. Moreover, in the current scenario, OEMs could fail and cease to exist. So, it is a likely scenario.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-031",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Loss of critical suppliers",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Similar to Loss of OEM support, failure of critical suppliers can disrupt security maintenance till end of life of vehicles. Additionally, loss of a unique or difficult-to-replace supplier could throw security updates, repairs, incident response and production into jeopardy.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Supplier insolvency, acquisition, geopolitical restrictions, service withdrawal and technology discontinuation are credible across a long vehicle lifecycle (generally 15-20 years across EU). Significant disruption is less likely where alternative suppliers, source-code escrow, component inventories and transition plans exist.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-032",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient cybersecurity requirements for individual vehicle types",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Weak cybersecurity requirements can permit uneven protection levels across vehicle types. This might be exaceraberated by differing strictness in type approval assessments by various technical services and approval authorities as well as insufficient surveillance by Market surveillance.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Based on the current experience, the process of type approvals and market surveilance needs to be standardized across Europe and 1958 Agreement member states because there is severe lack of homogeneity in assessments.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-033",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Cross-supply-chain cyberattacks spanning multiple layers",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "description": "Attacks spanning multiple suppliers can propagate across interconnected vehicle services and products.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]\nCATASTROPHIC impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]",
      "comments": "A compromised component or service used across several manufacturers could introduce malicious code, backdoors or vulnerabilities into a large vehicle population. Fleet-scale compromise could affect vehicle safety, sensitive data, software updates and mobility-service availability before the common source is identified.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "E",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Automotive supply chains contain many supplier tiers, shared software components and external service providers. Supply-chain compromise is credible, but fleet-scale harmful consequences require a widely reused dependency, trusted distribution path and failure of supplier assurance, code signing, testing, monitoring and containment controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-034",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Absence of centralized detection of anomalous vehicle behavior",
      "category": "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure; User; Society",
      "description": "The absence of centralized detection does not directly cause harm, but it can delay recognition, containment and recovery. An attack may spread across more vehicles, continue longer and create greater safety, operational and privacy consequences.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle data is distributed across different manufacturers, models, suppliers and service platforms. Differences in telemetry, logging and data-sharing arrangements make fleet-wide anomaly detection difficult, so significant detection gaps are likely to remain.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-035",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "GNSS jamming and spoofing of vehicles",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "GNSS jamming can remove positioning and timing, while spoofing can cause vehicles to accept plausible but false location information. A wide interference could affect automated-driving localization, V2X, fleet operations, emergency response and strategic/emergency transport. \n\nA catastrophic outcome would require the attack to affect many highly automated vehicles and defeat independent localization and safe fallback.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "16",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "Large-scale GNSS spoofing or jamming could give many vehicles false position or timing information, disrupting automated driving, emergency services and traffic coordination and causing multiple serious or fatal incidents.\n\nAdditional context in case of Autonomous systems which could prove to be fatal before the takeover is feasible. Current Autonomous systems do not completely depend on GNSS but have redundancies around localized HD maps which can be manipulated into believing the spoofed location.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "GNSS signals are weak and localized jamming equipment is accessible. Meaningful interference affecting vehicle or mobility operations is credible within five years. Sophisticated spoofing that causes fleet-scale safety consequences is less likely because it requires greater capability and failure of integrity checks, sensor fusion and fallback controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-036",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient protection of occupant data",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Weak security controls may allow unauthorized access to occupant identity, communications, media, contacts, account, biometric or behavioural data stored in vehicles or connected services. Also, unclear responsibilities might create regulatory gaps. For e.g., handling of privacy controls in vehicle in scope of Type approval or GDPR?",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "Impact increases if additional info like location histories and biometrics is part of this occupant data.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Long vehicle lifecycles, shared access, inconsistent encryption and complex data flows make protection gaps likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-037",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "AI accelerates the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "AI-assisted exploitation can increase the scale and speed of attacks against vehicle ecosystems. Legacy vehicle controllers(which) are in use currently as well might have these previously unknown but now exploitable vulnerabilities. Moreover, patching of vehicles is not regular because of absence of software OTA capabilities for such legacy controllers.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Widely available AI tools can make it faster and easier for attackers to identify vulnerabilities. If attackers have access to more capable AI models than defenders, vulnerabilities may be discovered and exploited faster than organizations can analyse them, develop patches, test fixes, and deploy updates.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-038",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Lack of visibility into AI and software supply chains",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Lack of supply-chain transparency makes it harder to assess inherited AI and software risks. Moreover, regulatory frameworks like R155 is restricted with respect to supply chain. Approval Authorities/Technical Services jurisdiction is restricted to OEMs and in very rare cases maybe Tier I suppliers. Moreover, lack of transparency, absence of regulatory oversight and supply of such components from adversary countries could have severe impact. Moreover, the enforcement of EU AI Act has been delayed.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Technology supply chains are often complex, and stakeholders may not have full visibility into all components, suppliers, software, and dependencies. This limited transparency is particularly concerning for advanced vehicle technologies sourced from outside Europe, as it increases the risk that undocumented functions, hidden access mechanisms, or backdoors could be introduced into the European vehicle ecosystem.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-039",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Lack of transparency regarding data processing",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Insufficient transparency over data processing can undermine privacy expectations and compliance. Moreover, Users, operators and authorities may not understand what vehicle data is collected, why it is processed, where it is stored, how long it is retained or which third parties receive it.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "The weakness does not normally cause direct harm by itself but increases privacy, compliance and trust risks.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle data passes through manufacturers, suppliers, mobile applications, cloud providers and analytics services. Complex responsibilities and changing software functions make incomplete or unclear processing information likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-040",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Misuse of location and movement data",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Same as T-016",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Same as T-016",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-041",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Unwanted collection of data from the surrounding environment",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Vehicle cameras, microphones, radar and other sensors may collect information about pedestrians, cyclists, nearby vehicles, homes or public spaces",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "Continuous or fleet-scale collection could create detailed records of vulnerable road users, locations and activities. Combining environmental data with time and location information could enable identification, surveillance or unintended secondary use.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Sensor-equipped vehicles routinely observe their surroundings for safety and automated-driving functions. Unwanted or excessive collection is likely where data is retained, transmitted or reused beyond immediate vehicle operation.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-042",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Inadequate management of physical attack vectors such as USB devices",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Malicious intrusion through external interfaces(for e.g. USB, Wi-Fi etc.)  could compromise those controllers which host these interfaces and, where network separation is inadequate, provide access to safety-critical vehicle functions.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation requires access, but removable media remains a known attack vector. Manufacturers implement proportional controls for such interfaces. However, the possibility of intrusion is lessened by access to these interfaces and leads to a local attack affecting lesser vehicles. However, there are interfaces like cellular interfaces which could lead to fleet wide attack feasibility as well. In the next 5 years, based on attacker motivation of influencing multiple vehicles remotely leads to likely scenario that external interfaces based attacks through malicious devices is plausible.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-043",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Unauthorized locking of vehicles",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Unauthorized locking can disrupt access to vehicles and affect user safety or mobility.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Primary Needs (2.3) [Reduced availability of transport, emergency, healthcare, logistics or essential mobility services]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]",
      "comments": "Unauthorized locking could strand users, interrupt commercial fleets and delay essential transport. Safety consequences are normally indirect, but the impact may increase where emergency, healthcare, public-service or mobility-dependent users are affected.",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "B",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Remote locking functions are commonly accessible through mobile applications and backend services. Account takeover, weak recovery processes, stolen tokens or compromised service platforms make unauthorized locking credible, although physical keys and local recovery may limit duration.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-044",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Digital vehicle theft",
      "category": "Vehicle Theft and Digital Crime",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Attackers may exploit keyless-entry systems, mobile applications, customer accounts, diagnostic functions or vehicle communication protocols to unlock, start, locate or steal a vehicle without possessing the legitimate physical key.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Digital theft can cause financial loss, privacy exposure and personal-safety concerns and may support organized crime. Widespread exploitation of a common weakness could affect many vehicles, but the central consequence is normally theft rather than mass physical harm.",
      "physical_safety": "B",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle theft is a strong criminal incentive and attack methods continue to evolve. RKE based Relay, Replay and RollJam Attacks, NFC based cloning attacks is getting easier with easy availability of equipment and knowledge of systems as well as expertise. Its very likely possibility of such digital theft of vehicles.",
      "combined_likelihood": "E",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "5",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-045",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Inadequate deletion of vehicle data during disposal, sale, rental, or any other similar usage.",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Personal, account, location or vehicle data may remain accessible when a vehicle is sold, rented, returned, repaired, recycled or transferred to another user.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "Residual data may expose previous users’ addresses, contacts, journeys, credentials or application accounts. Harm is normally limited to affected vehicles and users, but repeated lifecycle failures could expose many individuals.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "B",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Data removal processes are often inconsistent across lifecycle transitions. Vehicle ownership, rental and service transitions occur frequently, while deletion procedures vary across manufacturers, applications and operators. Users may assume that account removal or a factory reset deletes all data when backend or module-level copies remain.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-046",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient protection of personal data throughout the vehicle lifecycle",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Personal data may be exposed at multiple stages of the vehicle lifecycle if controls are weak.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"LIMITED\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"SIGNIFICANT\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]",
      "comments": "Lifecycle weaknesses can expose identity, location, behavioural, biometric and account data through multiple organizations and systems. Long retention periods and unclear responsibility may make breaches difficult to detect, contain and remediate.",
      "physical_safety": "A",
      "economic_impact": "B",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicles operate for many years and involve manufacturers, suppliers, dealers, repairers, application providers, fleet operators and recyclers. Changing ownership, software and service relationships make persistent data-protection gaps likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-047",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Manipulation or unauthorized influence of vehicle behavior through software, data, or communication services",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Manipulation of software, data, or communications can directly alter vehicle behavior and safety.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths (2.1), Serious Injuries (2.2) and Primary Needs (2.3) [Unsafe vehicle behaviour, collision exposure, emergency-response or essential-mobility interruption]",
      "comments": "Manipulated software, data or communications could make many vehicles behave unsafely at the same time. Common platforms or updates could turn one compromise into multiple fatal collisions.\n\nThis is the cause which could lead to threats as outlined in T007, T005.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation is realistic where trusted inputs or control channels can be influenced. Somewhat likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-048",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient visibility and oversight across the entire vehicle supply chain and lifecycle",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure; Society",
      "description": "Poor oversight across the lifecycle can allow vulnerabilities and dependencies to go unmanaged. And Type Approval is restricted to manufacturers and very rarely Tier I suppliers. Moreover, suppliers are increasingly located outside Europe decreasing the oversight even further.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Limited traceability can delay recalls, incident containment, patching and recovery, increasing safety, financial and systemic consequences.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle supply chains involve many supplier tiers, systems, software and hardware dependencies, inconsistent aftermarket monitoring and response. Information is often fragmented across organizations, making significant visibility and oversight gaps likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-049",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Underestimation of the impact of large-scale cyber incidents affecting vehicle fleets",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Underestimating fleet-wide cyber incidents can result in inadequate preparedness for large disruptions. Risk assessments and continuity plans may consider individual vehicle incidents but fail to account for shared platforms, common components, correlated failures, and the simultaneous recovery of large vehicle fleets.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Primary Needs (2.3) [Reduced availability of transport, emergency, healthcare, logistics or essential mobility services]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) and Economic Vitality (3.2) [Multi-organization recovery, service downtime, logistics interruption, lost income and productivity]\n- Social/Political Stability: Daily Life Disruption (5.1), Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where data is affected) [Mobility restrictions, population affected, accessibility loss and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "This focusses more on emergency preparedness or planning and eventual execution when such situation arises on a fleet-scale and not only low scale or individual vehicles.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Fleet-scale dependencies are difficult to identify because vehicle ecosystems involve multiple suppliers, software variants, cloud services, communication providers, and long lifecycles. Organizations may therefore underestimate the potential. Hence, it is likely for underestimation.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-050",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient visibility into hardware and software variants within the same vehicle type",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Vehicles marketed as the same type may contain different hardware, firmware, software versions or supplier components, making it difficult to determine which variants are vulnerable or compatible with a security update.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Variant uncertainty can cause vulnerable vehicles to be missed, safe vehicles to receive incompatible updates or remediation to be delayed. Incorrect variant handling may create service disruption or safety risks across part of a vehicle population.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Without accurate configuration management, significant visibility gaps are likely leading to inadequate vulnerability management and incident response",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-051",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Differences in vehicle architectures resulting in unknown data flows and functionalities\n\nAssumption: deals with difference in understanding of vehicle architectures by different stakeholders",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Difference in understanding of vehicle architectures and non-transparency between manufacturers, technical services and approval/market surveillance authorities.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "Uncertainties could lead to incorrect validations during manufacturer testing and type approval or market surveillance testing.",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle architectures differ by manufacturer, model, supplier and production year. Undocumented or poorly understood functions are plausible, but cybersecurity engineering, architecture reviews and type-approval processes reduce the likelihood of major unknown pathways remaining undetected.",
      "combined_likelihood": "B",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "2",
      "combined_risk_score": "8",
      "combined_rating": "Moderate",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-052",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Migration of vehicle intelligence to external AI and communication services outside the vehicle\n\nClarification: Vehicles depend on external AI, cloud and communication services for operational or safety-related functions.",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "Externalizing vehicle intelligence increases dependence on remote services and communication paths. One external service may support many vehicles or operators multiplying the impact in case of loss of the capability. Moreover, compromise, manipulation, unavailability or foreign control of these services could affect vehicle behaviour, service continuity, data protection and national control over mobility.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Reliance on external platforms increases the number of systems, connections and third parties that could be targeted or compromised. It also creates operational dependencies on providers whose outages, security incidents, service changes or withdrawal could disrupt vehicle functions and mobility services.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-053",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient oversight of aftermarket hardware, software, and vehicle modifications",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Aftermarket hardware, software, and vehicle modifications may introduce unverified components, insecure code, altered configurations, or undocumented communication paths that bypass the vehicle manufacturer’s original security controls and might completely nullify it.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Primary Needs (2.3) [Reduced availability of transport, emergency, healthcare, logistics or essential mobility services]",
      "comments": "Unsafe or insecure modifications could weaken network separation, expose diagnostic access, interfere with safety-critical functions, or compromise vehicle data. Widely used aftermarket products or modification tools could introduce the same vulnerability across many vehicles.",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Third-party changes are difficult to monitor and assess consistently. Vehicles have long lifecycles and are frequently modified using third-party devices, applications, replacement components, diagnostic tools, and performance software. Limited manufacturer visibility and inconsistent aftermarket security practices make significant oversight gaps likely.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-054",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Misuse of Software Defined Radio (SDR) for disruption, eavesdropping, and manipulation of wireless vehicle communications",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "SDR-based attacks can intercept, disrupt, or manipulate wireless vehicle communications. Immediate(low hanging fruits) impact can be theft of vehicles using short range or medium range communications like LF/RF, NFC, BLE, UWB for theft control applications in vehicles.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Low-cost radio tools and exposed protocols make such attacks achievable.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-055",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Dependence on satellite communication infrastructure owned or controlled by foreign or untrusted parties",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Reliance on foreign-owned or externally controlled satellite communication services creates a strategic dependency. Service disruption, manipulation, withdrawal or restricted access could affect connected vehicles, fleet operations, emergency services and mobility ecosystem as a whole.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n\"CATASTROPHIC\" impact on the following:\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Strategic or vital transport providers, unauthorized access/loss of control, multi-organization scale, motive and duration]",
      "comments": "Territorial Security: Dependence on foreign-controlled navigation, positioning and satellite communication services exposes the mobility ecosystem to external influence and service disruption. Allied, partner or adversarial countries may have the capability to degrade, manipulate, restrict or discontinue these services, resulting in reduced availability, inaccurate information, operational disruption and loss of control over critical mobility functions.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Significant disruption requires a major technical failure, hostile state action, provider withdrawal or coordinated attack against protected satellite services. The scenario is credible within five years, but redundancy, alternative communication networks and international agreements reduce the probability of prolonged harmful disruption.\n\nThe current geopolitical tensions naturally increases this risk because agreements are not respected and corresponding national government interests are paramount.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-056",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Deteriorating financial health of vehicle manufacturers resulting in reduced cybersecurity support",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Society",
      "description": "Financially stressed manufacturers may reduce patching, support, or cybersecurity investment.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "6",
      "risk_rating": "Moderate",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4 where applicable) [Public confidence, unequal effects, service reliability and possible personal-data consequences]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]\n\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Incident response, recovery, asset damage, service interruption and lost income]",
      "comments": "Reduced support can leave known vulnerabilities unpatched, weaken incident response and eventually interrupt backend or connected services. The consequences may persist across a large vehicle population and transfer costs and responsibilities to owners, suppliers, authorities and other service providers.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Economic pressures can gradually degrade long-term security maintenance.Vehicle manufacturers face high development costs, market competition, technology transitions and long-term support obligations. Serious financial deterioration is plausible, but bankruptcy, support withdrawal or major cybersecurity reductions are limited by restructuring, acquisition, regulatory requirements and continuity arrangements.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-057",
      "source": "Workshop - ILT, RDI, I&W, RDW",
      "title": "Insufficient logging, monitoring, and incident analysis across vehicles and vehicle ecosystems",
      "category": "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure; User; Society",
      "description": "Insufficient logging and monitoring can prevent organizations/investigators from detecting attacks, understanding which vehicles or systems are affected, and coordinating an effective response across manufacturers, suppliers, fleets and service providers.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"SERIOUS\" impact on the following:\n- Physical Safety: Deaths/Serious Injuries (2.1/2.2) [Limited or indirect safety pathway; harm requires escalation into vehicle or operational functions]\n- Economic Security: Costs (3.1) [Investigation, remediation, legal/regulatory exposure and operational inefficiency]\n- Social/Political Stability: Societal Impact (5.3) and Privacy (5.4) [Loss of confidentiality, tracking/profiling, personal-data exposure and declining trust]\n- Territorial Security: Digital Space (1.3) [Integrity of connected vehicle, supplier or mobility information systems; scale and loss of control determine severity]",
      "comments": "The weakness does not normally create direct harm by itself, but it can allow an attack to remain undetected, spread further and continue longer. Incomplete evidence can delay containment, vehicle recovery, vulnerability remediation and safety decisions.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Inconsistent vehicle architectures, long lifecycles, limited onboard storage and fragmented responsibilities make monitoring gaps likely. The weakness becomes significant when logs are missing, incompatible, unavailable remotely or insufficient for fleet-wide incident analysis.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": ""
    },
    {
      "id": "T-058",
      "source": "UNECE R155, Annex 5, 4.3.1.",
      "title": "Compromise or disruption of vehicle-related backend and cloud services",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Encryption, destructive malware or data-extortion can disable fleet, backend, charging, roadside or mobility services and may delay transport, logistics and emergency operations. \nSub-level threats from Annex 5 for this threat includes back end servers used as a means to attack a vehicle or extract data, services from back end server being disrupted, affecting the operation of a vehicle and vehicle data held on back end servers being lost or compromised.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact may arise where a trusted backend is used to issue commands, distribute software, expose data or remove services across a large vehicle population. Physical safety, economic activity, daily mobility and Dutch digital-space integrity may all be affected.",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Backend and cloud services are continuously exposed and attractive to attackers. A successful compromise is plausible within five years, but widespread vehicle or mobility impact requires privileged access and failure of multiple security and recovery controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-011 covers outages, T-033 supply-chain attacks, T-047 vehicle-behaviour manipulation and T-052 external-service dependency. T-058 adds the backend as the initiating vehicle attack surface."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-059",
      "source": "UNECE R155, Annex 5, 4.3.2.",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicle communication channels and message trust",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "",
      "description": "Sub-level threats from Annex 5 for this threat includes Spoofing of messages or data received by the vehicle, Communication channels used to conduct unauthorized manipulation, deletion or other amendments to vehicle held code/data, Communication channels permit untrusted/unreliable messages to be accepted or are vulnerable to session hijacking/replay attacks, Information can be readily disclosed, Denial of service attacks via communication channels to disrupt vehicle functions, An unprivileged user is able to\ngain privileged access to vehicle systems, Viruses embedded in\ncommunication media are able to infect vehicle systems, Messages received by the vehicle or transmitted within it, contain malicious content",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" physical-safety impact is credible if false, replayed or suppressed messages influence safety-critical functions across many vehicles. Economic, societal and territorial effects may be very serious where communications or positioning are disrupted at scale.",
      "comments": "Propagation of malicious information to the safety critical domains and controllers will have catasptrophic impact to the vehicle operations and safety. Moreover, safety controllers are not handled through high perfroming units but legacy controllers. High perfroming units are restricted to advanced controllers like Infotainments, Gateways etc.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Communication attacks are technically feasible, but fleet-scale harmful effects depend on access, protocol weaknesses, message authority, deployment scale and failure of plausibility or fallback controls. A serious scenario is somewhat likely within five years. However, the interfaces and gateways are fairly controlled through indutry wide best practices and standards.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": "T-023 covers infotainment takeover, T-035 GNSS attacks, T-047 behaviour manipulation and T-054 SDR misuse. T-059 consolidates the complete message-trust chain and internal-network paths."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-060",
      "source": "UNECE R155, Annex 5, 4.3.3.",
      "title": "Compromise or failure of vehicle software-update processes",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "Sub-threats in Annex 5 includes misuse or compromise of update procedures and possibility to deny legitimate updates",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" physical-safety impact is credible if a malicious or defective update reaches a large eligible fleet and disables safety functions or introduces common unsafe behaviour. Recovery, economic and digital-sovereignty effects may be very serious.",
      "comments": "A compromised update process could distribute malicious or defective software to a large vehicle population, disable safety functions, introduce unsafe behaviour, or make vehicles unavailable. A common update failure may also cause major recalls, service disruption, and complex fleet-wide recovery.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Update systems are highly trusted and repeatedly used, but normally protected by signing, staged deployment and validation. Compromise or major process failure is plausible within five years, while successful fleet-scale harm remains dependent on several control failures.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-025 covers testing, T-026 software visibility, T-033 supply chain, T-047 software influence and T-050 variants."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-061",
      "source": "UNECE R155, Annex 5, 4.3.4.",
      "title": "Human error, social engineering and misuse of authorized access",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Sub-level threats from Annex 5 for this threat includes legitimate actors able to take actions that would unwittingly facilitate a cyber attack",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact is possible when a manipulated, negligent or malicious trusted person gains authority over updates, diagnostics, backend commands, fleet operations or sensitive data. Legitimate access can bypass technical barriers and enable wide effects.",
      "comments": "A manipulated, negligent, or malicious trusted person could misuse privileged access to alter updates, vehicle configurations, diagnostic functions, backend data, or fleet operations. The effects could spread across multiple vehicles where the person has broad administrative or supplier access.",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Human error, social engineering, excessive privileges, credential sharing, and insider misuse are persistent risks throughout the vehicle ecosystem. Significant consequences are especially credible where access is not restricted by least privilege, segregation of duties, approval controls, activity monitoring etc. as part of the Quality/Cybersecurity management system.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "16",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-019 and T-022 address oversight, T-042 physical media and T-048 lifecycle visibility. T-061 explicitly covers the human action and authorized-access pathway missing from the original set."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-062",
      "source": "UNECE R155, Annex 5, 4.3.5.",
      "title": "Compromise through vehicle external interfaces and connected equipment",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure",
      "description": "Sub-level threats from Annex 5 for this threat includes Manipulation of the connectivity of vehicle functions enables a cyber-attack, this can include telematics; systems that permit remote operations; and systems using short range wireless communications, Hosted 3rd party software, e.g. entertainment applications, used as a means to attack\nvehicle systems, Devices connected to external interfaces e.g. USB ports, OBD port, used as a means to attack vehicle systems",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" physical-safety impact may result when diagnostics, telematics, charging, maintenance or aftermarket interfaces provide a path to safety-critical systems. Financial and societal effects are serious but usually remain localized unless tools or devices are widely shared.",
      "comments": "A compromised external interface could provide access to operational or safety-critical vehicle systems possibly making a remote fleet wide attack possible with catastrophic safety repercussions.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "C",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "External interfaces are routinely exploited through malicious attempts. Successful  compromise generally requires proximity or remote attack, credentials, vulnerability, weak segmentation etc. making a serious realization likely within five years.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": "T-042 covers USB and T-053 aftermarket changes. T-062 broadens coverage to diagnostics, OBD, debug, telematics, charging, maintenance tools, mobile devices and connected equipment."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-063",
      "source": "UNECE R155, Annex 5, 4.3.6.",
      "title": "Unauthorized access to or manipulation of vehicle data, code and credentials",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "User; Infrastructure",
      "description": "Sub-level threats from Annex 5 for this threat includes Extraction of vehicle data/code, Manipulation of vehicle data/code, Erasure of data/code, Introduction of malware, Introduction of new software or\noverwrite existing software, Disruption of systems or operations, Manipulation of vehicle parameters",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" social, privacy and territorial impacts may arise from large-scale theft or manipulation of location data, code, calibration, credentials, logs or system-critical information. Manipulated data or credentials may also enable unsafe vehicle actions.",
      "comments": "Manipulation of code, calibration, credentials, or configuration could affect vehicle operation and undermine trust in vehicle systems. Large-scale theft of personal, location, technical, or security data could enable espionage, privacy violations, fraud, further attacks, and delayed incident response.",
      "physical_safety": "C",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle information is distributed across onboard systems, mobile applications, supplier environments, diagnostic tools, and backend platforms. Unauthorized access is plausible, but large-scale or safety-relevant manipulation requires privileged access, weak protection, and failure of integrity verification, key protection, and monitoring controls",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-015 to T-018 and T-036 to T-046 already cover monitoring, tracking, espionage, privacy and deletion. T-063 fills code, calibration, credential, log and non-personal operational-data coverage."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-064",
      "source": "UNECE R155, Annex 5, 4.3.7.",
      "title": "Exploitation of insufficiently protected vehicle systems and components",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "Infrastructure; User; Society",
      "description": "Annex 5 subthreats include Cryptographic technologies can\nbe compromised or are insufficiently applied, Parts or supplies could be compromised to permit vehicles to be attacked, Software or hardware development permits vulnerabilities, Network design introduces vulnerabilities, Unintended transfer of data can\noccur, Physical manipulation of systems can enable an attack",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "9",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" physical-safety impact is credible where a shared vulnerability permits unauthorized safety-critical control across many vehicles. Economic, societal and territorial impacts may be very serious when the weakness is widely deployed and difficult to patch.",
      "comments": "This is a hardening and exploitability umbrella rather than one event or threat.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "These are very likely threats. However, presence of a regulatory framework, and subsequent enforcement through type assessments. However, uniformity and depth of assessments vary from one technical service to another. Therefore, such threats could still exist and hence, is likely to occur.",
      "combined_likelihood": "D",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "4",
      "combined_risk_score": "20",
      "combined_rating": "Critical",
      "additional_comments": "T-013, T-025, T-026, T-032, T-037, T-050 and T-051 already cover vulnerabilities, testing, requirements, AI exploitation and architecture. T-064 is the Annex 5 hardening umbrella linking those weaknesses to exploit scenarios."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-065",
      "source": "NHTSA 2022",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicle identities, cryptographic keys and trust services (Overall high level threat across lifecycle )",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle",
      "description": "Cryptographic keys, digital certificates, vehicle identities or shared trust services are stolen, forged, misused or compromised, allowing attackers to impersonate trusted vehicles, users, devices or services and authorize malicious messages, commands or software.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Low",
      "risk_score": "8",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" physical-safety impact is credible if shared signing keys, certificates or trust anchors are compromised and attackers can impersonate trusted services or authorize commands and software across a fleet. Other dimensions may be very serious.",
      "comments": "Compromise of a highly trusted administrator account, signing key, certificate authority or vehicle identity service could allow attackers to authorize malicious software, issue trusted commands or impersonate legitimate services across a large vehicle population. Fleet-scale misuse could cause unsafe vehicle behaviour, major data exposure, widespread service disruption and loss of trust in the vehicle ecosystem.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Credential theft, excessive privileges, compromised service accounts and access-control failures are credible within five years. However, catastrophic fleet-scale consequences require compromise of high-value shared identities or cryptographic trust services, broad authorization rights and failure of MFA, least privilege, key protection, certificate revocation, monitoring and containment controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-063 includes credentials as attack targets, T-059 message trust and T-060 update authorization. T-065 adds the distinct common trust-service compromise that can enable all three."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-066",
      "source": "ENISA-JRC AI in autonomous driving",
      "title": "Manipulation of vehicle perception, localization and automated-driving inputs",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": "User; Society",
      "description": "Spoofing, blinding, obstruction or adversarial manipulation of perception sensors can cause missed objects, false objects, incorrect lane or distance estimation and unsafe automated or assisted-driving behavior.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" physical-safety impact is credible if common perception, localization, map or sensor-fusion weaknesses cause many automated vehicles to miss road users, detect false hazards or make the same unsafe decision.",
      "comments": "The E grade assumes widespread automated-driving deployment and a repeatable attack or defect defeating sensor diversity and fallback. A local sensor obstruction or a vehicle that safely disengages would justify a lower class.\n\nNot all vulnerabilities can be tracked to cyber attacks on autonomous vehicles. There could be malicious manipulation of inputs in order to influence the outputs. For e.g., manipulation of sensor outputs for incorrect control/decision making.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "C",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "C",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Sensor and localization attacks are technically demonstrated, but real-world safety impact depends on proximity, environmental conditions, repeatability, automation authority, redundancy and minimum-risk fallback. A high-consequence event is unlikely but credible.",
      "combined_likelihood": "B",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "2",
      "combined_risk_score": "10",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-012 and T-013 broadly cover autonomous-driving vulnerabilities, while T-035 covers GNSS. T-066 adds the explicit perception, map, localization and sensor-fusion attack pathway."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-067",
      "source": "NHTSA 2022",
      "title": "Unauthorized manipulation of fleet, dispatch, teleoperation and operational mobility-control platforms",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Infrastructure",
      "description": "Attackers may compromise centralized platforms used to dispatch, supervise, route, remotely assist, or control vehicle fleets and then use legitimate platform functions to manipulate mobility operations.",
      "impact": "High",
      "likelihood": "High",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"VERY SERIOUS\" impact may arise when fleet, dispatch, teleoperation, remote-assistance or emergency-support platforms are manipulated to reroute, immobilize or issue unsafe instructions to many vehicles or essential fleets.",
      "comments": "E.g., An attacker compromises a remote-operation centre supervising several autonomous shuttles. The attacker manipulates video feeds and sends unauthorized manoeuvre instructions to selected vehicles.",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Fleet and operational platforms are increasingly connected to cloud services, APIs, mobile applications, and third-party systems. A high-impact attack remains dependent on privileged access, broad command authority, inadequate tenant separation, and failure of authentication, monitoring, and command-limiting controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "12",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-001 and T-011 cover disruption, T-047 vehicle influence and T-049 fleet-scale impact. T-067 adds centralized operational supervision and command as the initiating attack surface."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-068",
      "source": "NHTSA 2022; ENISA Transport Threat Landscape",
      "title": "Compromise of connected road and traffic-management infrastructure affecting vehicles",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Society",
      "description": "A cyberattack on traffic signals, lane-control systems, roadside units, tunnel systems or central traffic-management platforms could create unsafe traffic conditions, provide false information to vehicles and disrupt road-network operations.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" physical-safety impact is credible if traffic signals, lane controls, tunnels, roadside units or infrastructure-to-vehicle messages are manipulated across a wide area, creating conflicting movements and multiple fatal collisions. Economic and territorial effects may be very serious.",
      "comments": "Multiple connected domains comprising of road infra, traffic systems, charging infra, bridges and waterways, IT and cloud infra could worsen the impact. Needs further analysis on understanding the connectivity of the multi-domains along with wegbeheerders.",
      "physical_safety": "E",
      "economic_impact": "D",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "D",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connected road infrastructure may contain remotely accessible, long-lived or insufficiently segmented systems. A successful regional attack is plausible within five years, but broad safety consequences require access to operational controls, coordinated manipulation and failure of the last resort \"local fail-safe\" or manual override controls.",
      "combined_likelihood": "C",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "3",
      "combined_risk_score": "15",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-002 and T-004 cover charging and V2G; T-006 critical-infrastructure targeting and T-035/T-054 communications. T-068 fills the connected road and traffic-management asset boundary."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-069",
      "source": "NHTSA 2022; ENISA Transport Threat Landscape",
      "title": "Simultaneous disruption of multiple vehicle fleets and mobility providers through a shared dependency (Single point of failure)",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": "Vehicle; Society",
      "description": "A shared cloud platform, software component, communication provider, update service, supplier, credential, or other dependency is compromised or fails, causing several vehicle fleets or mobility providers to be disrupted at the same time. It emphasizes that the threat is defined by a single point of dependency causing simultaneous, cross-organization disruption, rather than an isolated supplier or fleet incident.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "likelihood": "Medium",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "Critical",
      "impact_rationale": "\"CATASTROPHIC\" economic and territorial impacts are credible if one shared provider, component, key, architecture or update path simultaneously disrupts several OEMs, fleets or vital mobility providers. Physical and societal effects may be very serious.",
      "comments": "",
      "physical_safety": "D",
      "economic_impact": "E",
      "social_impact": "D",
      "territorial_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact": "E",
      "combined_impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Shared dependencies are common, but catastrophic disruption requires a highly concentrated dependency, widespread use, limited independent fallback of different domains, and a compromise or failure capable of affecting several organizations simultaneously. In the next 5 years, this could lead to a Unlikely scenario.",
      "combined_likelihood": "B",
      "combined_likelihood_score": "2",
      "combined_risk_score": "10",
      "combined_rating": "High",
      "additional_comments": "T-001 covers large-scale disruption; T-031/T-033 supply-chain risk; T-049 fleet-scale underestimation; T-052/T-055 external dependencies; T-056 support failure. T-069 explicitly assesses correlated concentration risk across them."
    }
  ],
  "additional_risks": [
    {
      "id": "T-058",
      "title": "Compromise or disruption of vehicle-related backend services",
      "coverage": "4.3.1. Vehicle-related backend servers"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-059",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicle communication channels",
      "coverage": "4.3.2. Vehicle communication channels"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-060",
      "title": "Compromise or failure of vehicle software-update processes",
      "coverage": "4.3.3. Vehicle update procedures and UN R156"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-061",
      "title": "Human error, social engineering and misuse of authorized access",
      "coverage": "4.3.4. Unintended human actions and staff privilege abuse"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-062",
      "title": "Compromise through vehicle external interfaces and connected equipment",
      "coverage": "4.3.5. External connectivity and connections"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-063",
      "title": "Unauthorized access to or manipulation of vehicle data, code and credentials",
      "coverage": "4.3.6. Vehicle data and code as attack targets"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-064",
      "title": "Exploitation of insufficiently protected vehicle systems and components",
      "coverage": "4.3.7. Exploitable vulnerabilities and insufficient protection"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-065",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicle identities, cryptographic keys and trust services (Overall high level threat across lifecycle )",
      "coverage": "Covers weaknesses across the full identity, access and cryptographic trust lifecycle that could enable unauthorized access, impersonation or trusted malicious actions across many vehicles and services."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-066",
      "title": "Manipulation of vehicle perception, localization and automated-driving inputs",
      "coverage": "Covers deliberate manipulation of sensors, positioning, maps and AI inputs that could cause automated-driving systems to misunderstand the road environment and behave unsafely."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-067",
      "title": "Unauthorized manipulation of fleet, dispatch, teleoperation and operational mobility-control platforms",
      "coverage": "Covers centralized operational platforms whose compromise could allow one attacker to reroute, immobilize or manipulate multiple vehicles or essential fleets simultaneously."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-068",
      "title": "Compromise of connected road and traffic-management infrastructure affecting vehicles",
      "coverage": "Covers road and traffic-management systems outside the vehicle that can create unsafe traffic conditions or disrupt mobility even when individual vehicles remain secure."
    },
    {
      "id": "T-069",
      "title": "Simultaneous disruption of multiple vehicle fleets and mobility providers through a shared dependency (Single point of failure)",
      "coverage": "Covers concentration risk where the failure or compromise of one shared supplier, platform, component or service simultaneously affects multiple fleets or mobility providers."
    }
  ],
  "frameworks": [
    {
      "Reference": "Leidraad Risicobeoordeling Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid",
      "Full Title": "Leidraad Risicobeoordeling Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid",
      "Issuing Organisation": "De Leidraad Risicobeoordeling is gemaakt door de methodiekgroep van het Analistennetwerk Nationale Veiligheid in opdracht van de NCTV.",
      "Version / Revision": "-",
      "Publication Year": 2022,
      "Official URL / Publisher": "https://www.rivm.nl/sites/default/files/2022-09/Leidraad%20risicobeoordeling%202022.pdf",
      "Methodological Relevance": "National Security Risk Analysis Method used widely within the Netherlands among Government and Authorities",
      "Verification / Access Limitation": ""
    },
    {
      "Reference": "ISO 31000:2018 [Supporting]",
      "Full Title": "Risk management — Guidelines",
      "Issuing Organisation": "International Organization for Standardization (ISO)",
      "Version / Revision": "Edition 2",
      "Publication Year": 2018,
      "Official URL / Publisher": "https://www.iso.org/standard/31000",
      "Methodological Relevance": "Provides general principles, framework, and process for identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, and communicating risk. ",
      "Verification / Access Limitation": "Official publication page and preview checked; full standard is paywalled."
    },
    {
      "Reference": "ISO/IEC 27005:2022 [Supporting]",
      "Full Title": "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Guidance on managing information security risks",
      "Issuing Organisation": "ISO and IEC",
      "Version / Revision": "Edition 4",
      "Publication Year": 2022,
      "Official URL / Publisher": "https://www.iso.org/standard/80585.html",
      "Methodological Relevance": "Supports information-security risk criteria, identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring and communication. ",
      "Verification / Access Limitation": "Official ISO/IEC pages checked; detailed normative text is paywalled."
    },
    {
      "Reference": "ISO/SAE 21434:2021 [Supporting]",
      "Full Title": "Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering",
      "Issuing Organisation": "ISO and SAE International",
      "Version / Revision": "Edition 1",
      "Publication Year": 2021,
      "Official URL / Publisher": "https://www.iso.org/standard/70918.html",
      "Methodological Relevance": "Automotive-specific basis for cybersecurity engineering and threat analysis/risk assessment concerning road-vehicle E/E systems and interfaces.",
      "Verification / Access Limitation": "Official ISO and SAE publication pages checked; full standard is paywalled."
    },
    {
      "Reference": "Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Safety of Modern Vehicles",
      "Full Title": "Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Safety of\nModern Vehicles (Updated 2022)",
      "Issuing Organisation": "NHTSA",
      "Version / Revision": "Edition 2",
      "Publication Year": 2022,
      "Official URL / Publisher": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-pre-final-tag_0_0.pdf",
      "Methodological Relevance": "Cybersecurity Best Practices Reference used for additional threats",
      "Verification / Access Limitation": ""
    },
    {
      "Reference": "Cybersecurity Challenges in the uptake of AI in Autonomous Driving",
      "Full Title": "Cybersecurity Challenges in the uptake of AI in Autonomous Driving",
      "Issuing Organisation": "ENISA/JRC",
      "Version / Revision": "Edition 1",
      "Publication Year": 2021,
      "Official URL / Publisher": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificial-intelligence-in-autonomous-driving",
      "Methodological Relevance": "Cybersecurity Best Practices used for cybersecurity challenges in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "Verification / Access Limitation": ""
    }
  ],
  "summary": {
    "rows": [
      [
        "Executive Summary",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Total threats assessed",
        69.0,
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Category",
        "",
        "",
        "By Primary Domain",
        "",
        "By Likelihood",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
        4.0,
        "",
        "User",
        14.0,
        "A",
        0.0
      ],
      [
        "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
        3.0,
        "",
        "Vehicle",
        32.0,
        "B",
        5.0
      ],
      [
        "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
        6.0,
        "",
        "Infrastructure",
        10.0,
        "C",
        26.0
      ],
      [
        "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
        6.0,
        "",
        "Society",
        13.0,
        "D",
        35.0
      ],
      [
        "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
        7.0,
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "E",
        3.0
      ],
      [
        "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
        4.0,
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
        6.0,
        "",
        "By Impact",
        "",
        "By Overall Risk",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
        9.0,
        "",
        "A",
        0.0,
        "Critical",
        8.0
      ],
      [
        "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
        2.0,
        "",
        "B",
        1.0,
        "High",
        57.0
      ],
      [
        "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
        6.0,
        "",
        "C",
        10.0,
        "Moderate",
        4.0
      ],
      [
        "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
        6.0,
        "",
        "D",
        38.0,
        "Low",
        0.0
      ],
      [
        "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
        2.0,
        "",
        "E",
        20.0,
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
        3.0,
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
        4.0,
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Vehicle Theft and Digital Crime",
        1.0,
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Priority themes",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "1. Safety-critical control, autonomy, GNSS/wireless integrity, and cyber-physical misuse require strongest prevention and fail-safe design. \n2. Fleet-scale service, charging/energy, supplier, cloud/AI, and communications dependencies require resilience and shared ownership. \n3. Privacy and digital theft are highly exposed and recurring, demanding lifecycle data governance and strong identity/access controls. \n4. Detection, logging, variant visibility, and supply-chain transparency are foundational priorities because they reduce uncertainty and response time across many threats.",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Most exposed domains",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ],
      [
        "Vehicle is the most frequent primary domain, with Infrastructure and Society prominent where dependencies or scale create direct cascading effects. User impacts concentrate in privacy, theft, monitoring, and safety scenarios. Society is assigned only where direct scale, continuity, public-safety, or national-security consequences are credible.",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        "",
        ""
      ]
    ]
  },
  "future_threats": [
    {
      "id": "T-058",
      "title": "Ransomware against mobility operators and fleet platforms",
      "description": "Ransomware encrypts systems and/or steals data to extort a mobility operator, fleet platform, authority or transport service, disrupting operations.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Malicious cyberattack",
      "category": "Malware and extortion",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "D",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_score": "16",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Related to T-001 and T-011, but adds a distinct initiating mechanism and extortion/data-theft dimension.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which operators, services and recovery dependencies are in scope?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-059",
      "title": "Phishing and compromise of mobility-sector personnel",
      "description": "Phishing or targeted social engineering compromises staff, contractor or supplier credentials and becomes an entry point to vehicle, backend, fleet, charging or authority systems.",
      "domain": "User / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "Social engineering",
      "category": "Identity and access compromise",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "D",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_score": "16",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Not explicit; currently implicit as a possible attack path.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat or initiating-cause scenario",
      "assessment_question": "Which roles have privileged or safety-relevant access?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-060",
      "title": "Privileged identity, credential and certificate compromise",
      "description": "Attackers steal or misuse administrator accounts, service identities, API keys, signing keys, vehicle certificates or other machine credentials.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Vehicle",
      "threat_type": "Identity compromise",
      "category": "Identity, cryptography and trust",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Partly overlaps software, backend and access threats, but common trust infrastructure is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which credentials create fleet-wide or multi-organization exposure?",
      "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-061",
      "title": "Insider misuse by employees, contractors or service personnel",
      "description": "A malicious or negligent insider abuses legitimate access to vehicle backends, fleet systems, diagnostic tools, data or operational processes.",
      "domain": "User / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "Insider threat",
      "category": "Human and organizational threats",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Supplier and governance risks exist, but insider misuse is not a distinct scenario.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which privileged roles lack segregation, monitoring or dual control?",
      "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-062",
      "title": "Compromise of OTA software-update infrastructure",
      "description": "Update signing, build, approval or distribution infrastructure is compromised, enabling malicious, unauthorized, vulnerable or rollback software to reach vehicles at scale.",
      "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "Supply-chain cyberattack",
      "category": "Software and update security",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Related to software manipulation and supply-chain rows, but fleet-wide OTA compromise merits a distinct scenario.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Can one compromised update path affect multiple models or fleets?",
      "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-063",
      "title": "Compromise of diagnostic and maintenance tools",
      "description": "Dealer tools, workshop laptops, remote diagnostics, service credentials or maintenance interfaces are compromised and used to alter or access vehicles.",
      "domain": "Vehicle / User",
      "threat_type": "Cyber-physical access",
      "category": "Diagnostics and maintenance",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "USB and physical access are covered, but the service ecosystem and trusted tools are not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which diagnostic functions can reach safety-critical domains?",
      "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-064",
      "title": "Mobile application or customer-account takeover",
      "description": "A vehicle or mobility account is taken over through stolen credentials, weak recovery, token theft or application vulnerabilities, enabling tracking, unlocking or remote commands.",
      "domain": "User / Vehicle",
      "threat_type": "Account takeover",
      "category": "Consumer applications and identity",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "D",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_score": "16",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Remote locking, theft and privacy consequences exist, but account takeover is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "What remote functions are available and what step-up authentication applies?",
      "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-065",
      "title": "Manipulation of V2X messages and trust infrastructure",
      "description": "Attackers forge, replay, suppress or multiply V2X messages, abuse certificates or create Sybil identities to influence cooperative awareness or manoeuvre coordination.",
      "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "Protocol and trust attack",
      "category": "V2X and cooperative mobility",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "GNSS and wireless attacks are covered; V2X message trust and PKI are not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which V2X use cases can directly influence vehicle behaviour?",
      "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-066",
      "title": "Attack on traffic-management and roadside infrastructure",
      "description": "Traffic lights, lane-control systems, variable-message signs, roadside units, tunnel systems or road sensors are manipulated or disrupted.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "OT cyberattack",
      "category": "Roadside and traffic management",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Scope mentions infrastructure, but there is no explicit traffic-management attack scenario.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which roadside systems can create unsafe traffic states or national disruption?",
      "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-067",
      "title": "Compromise of fleet-management and dispatch systems",
      "description": "Attackers manipulate routes, assignments, geofences, driver instructions, dispatch data or immobilisation functions across commercial, public or emergency fleets.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Operational-system compromise",
      "category": "Fleet operations",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Fleet-scale disruption is covered mainly as a consequence, not dispatch compromise as the initiating scenario.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "What single fleet platform or identity has common-mode reach?",
      "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-068",
      "title": "Sensor deception affecting cameras, lidar, radar or ultrasonic systems",
      "description": "Physical or digital techniques deceive or blind perception sensors, causing incorrect object, lane, distance or environmental interpretation.",
      "domain": "Vehicle",
      "threat_type": "Cyber-physical attack",
      "category": "Automated-driving sensors",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Autonomous-driving vulnerabilities are broad; sensor deception is not a dedicated scenario.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which sensor combinations and fallback modes prevent unsafe decisions?",
      "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificial-intelligence-in-autonomous-driving",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-069",
      "title": "Compromise of maps, traffic data or digital twins",
      "description": "Trusted maps, lane geometry, speed information, closures, hazards, parking or routing data are falsified or corrupted.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Vehicle",
      "threat_type": "Data integrity attack",
      "category": "External mobility data",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "GNSS is covered, but trusted content and map-data integrity are not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which external data can alter routing or automated-driving decisions?",
      "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
      "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificial-intelligence-in-autonomous-driving",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-070",
      "title": "Telecommunications or mobile-network outage",
      "description": "Public mobile, 5G, private wireless or connectivity-provider failure disrupts connected mobility, fleet operations, charging, remote assistance or V2X services.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Dependency failure",
      "category": "Communications dependency",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "External services are covered generally; telecom common-mode failure is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as dependency scenario",
      "assessment_question": "Which safety or continuity functions fail without connectivity?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-071",
      "title": "Cloud, DNS, identity-provider or trusted-time failure",
      "description": "Failure or compromise of a shared cloud region, DNS, identity provider, certificate service or time source simultaneously affects multiple mobility services or OEMs.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Common-mode dependency",
      "category": "Cloud and shared digital services",
      "priority": "1",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "15",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Partially covered by external-service dependency, but shared digital control-plane failure warrants explicit treatment.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate dependency scenario",
      "assessment_question": "Which shared providers create cross-organization concentration risk?",
      "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-072",
      "title": "Compromise of charging authentication, billing or payment",
      "description": "Charging identifiers, accounts, authorization, billing or payment flows are exposed, manipulated or fraudulently used.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / User",
      "threat_type": "Fraud and cyberattack",
      "category": "EV charging and payments",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Charging disruption is covered, but financial and identity integrity are not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as sub-scenario or separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Could fraud or identity compromise scale across operators and roaming platforms?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-073",
      "title": "Coordinated denial-of-service against mobility APIs and platforms",
      "description": "DDoS or ransom-DoS disrupts booking, journey planning, parking, ticketing, charging, dispatch or regulatory APIs.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Denial of service",
      "category": "Mobility platforms",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "D",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_score": "16",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Service outage exists, but coordinated DoS and API concentration are not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as sub-scenario or separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which APIs are single points of failure for multiple services?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-074",
      "title": "Manipulation of ticketing, tolling, parking and mobility payments",
      "description": "Attackers create or alter entitlements, balances, transactions, toll records, parking sessions or settlement data to commit fraud or disrupt revenue systems.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / User",
      "threat_type": "Fraud and data-integrity attack",
      "category": "Mobility payments",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "C",
      "likelihood_class": "D",
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Financial/payment fraud is not clearly represented in the vehicle-centred register.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat if within scope",
      "assessment_question": "Does the assessment scope include public transport, tolling and MaaS payments?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-075",
      "title": "Failure or compromise of eCall and emergency-response integration",
      "description": "Emergency calls, coordinates, crash information or rescue interfaces are suppressed, falsified, redirected or flooded.",
      "domain": "Vehicle / Society",
      "threat_type": "Safety-system compromise",
      "category": "Emergency response",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "B",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_score": "10",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "General vehicle disruption exists, but emergency-response integration is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate threat",
      "assessment_question": "Can compromise delay rescue or overload emergency services?",
      "source1": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-076",
      "title": "Compromise of driver, vehicle-registration or licensing systems",
      "description": "Records are fraudulently created, changed, deleted or made unavailable, affecting ownership, licensing, recalls, enforcement or vehicle legitimacy.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Data and service compromise",
      "category": "Government mobility systems",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Not explicit; expands the scope beyond the vehicle technology ecosystem.",
      "disposition": "Add if authority systems are in scope",
      "assessment_question": "Which registration and licensing functions are essential or safety relevant?",
      "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "source2": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-077",
      "title": "Failure of vulnerability disclosure and emergency patch coordination",
      "description": "Reported vulnerabilities are not received, triaged, coordinated or remediated in time, allowing known weaknesses to remain exploitable across fleets or suppliers.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Vehicle",
      "threat_type": "Governance/control failure",
      "category": "Vulnerability management",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Related to lifecycle visibility and oversight; better classified as a risk condition than an external threat.",
      "disposition": "Track as control weakness or risk driver",
      "assessment_question": "Are disclosure, triage, coordinated response and emergency update responsibilities defined?",
      "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-078",
      "title": "Cryptographic obsolescence or compromise of long-lived keys",
      "description": "Weak algorithms, expired credentials, compromised certificate authorities or inability to migrate cryptography undermine vehicles and services over long operational lifetimes.",
      "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "Lifecycle and trust failure",
      "category": "Cryptography lifecycle",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Related to lifecycle support, but cryptographic agility is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as lifecycle threat or risk driver",
      "assessment_question": "Can deployed vehicles revoke, replace and migrate credentials and algorithms?",
      "source1": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "source2": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-079",
      "title": "Cross-modal cascading disruption",
      "description": "A cyber incident in road mobility propagates to or originates from rail, ports, aviation, public transport, energy, logistics hubs or emergency services.",
      "domain": "Society / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "Systemic dependency failure",
      "category": "Cross-modal resilience",
      "priority": "2",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "B",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_score": "10",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Societal disruption is present, but cross-modal propagation paths are not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as strategic scenario",
      "assessment_question": "Which intermodal dependencies produce national-level cascades?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-080",
      "title": "AI model poisoning or malicious model update",
      "description": "Training data, model weights, validation artefacts or model updates are poisoned, replaced or backdoored, causing unsafe or systematically biased automated decisions.",
      "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "AI supply-chain attack",
      "category": "AI and autonomous driving",
      "priority": "3",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "B",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_score": "10",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "AI-assisted attack and supply-chain visibility exist, but compromise of the driving model itself is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as emerging threat",
      "assessment_question": "What evidence protects model provenance, training data and update integrity?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-jrc-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-uptake-of-artificial-intelligence-in-autonomous-driving",
      "source2": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-081",
      "title": "Remote-operator or teleoperation compromise",
      "description": "Remote assistance or teleoperation accounts, consoles, communication channels or video streams are compromised, enabling unsafe commands or loss of supervision.",
      "domain": "Vehicle / Infrastructure",
      "threat_type": "Remote-control compromise",
      "category": "Autonomous mobility operations",
      "priority": "3",
      "impact_class": "E",
      "likelihood_class": "B",
      "impact_score": "5",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_score": "10",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Not explicit and may only apply where remote assistance or teleoperation is deployed.",
      "disposition": "Add conditionally based on deployment",
      "assessment_question": "Which vehicles rely on remote intervention and what is the safe-state behaviour?",
      "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-082",
      "title": "Mobility-data poisoning and demand manipulation",
      "description": "False bookings, vehicles, congestion, demand or availability data manipulate fleet positioning, routing, service coverage or prices.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Data integrity and fraud",
      "category": "Mobility-as-a-Service",
      "priority": "3",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Data quality risks exist broadly, but coordinated operational demand manipulation is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add if MaaS/fleet optimisation is in scope",
      "assessment_question": "Can untrusted demand data materially change fleet deployment or public accessibility?",
      "source1": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-transport-threat-landscape",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    },
    {
      "id": "T-083",
      "title": "Coordinated physical attack on connected mobility infrastructure",
      "description": "Attackers steal, destroy, tamper with or physically access roadside units, charging equipment, depots, sensors or communications cabinets, potentially combined with cyber activity.",
      "domain": "Infrastructure / Society",
      "threat_type": "Physical/cyber-physical attack",
      "category": "Physical security and sabotage",
      "priority": "3",
      "impact_class": "D",
      "likelihood_class": "C",
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_score": "12",
      "risk_rating": "High",
      "relationship": "Physical access and USB are narrow; coordinated infrastructure sabotage is not explicit.",
      "disposition": "Add as separate cyber-physical threat",
      "assessment_question": "Which distributed assets are accessible, poorly monitored or hard to restore?",
      "source1": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/autonomous-ground-vehicle-security-guide",
      "source2": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/transportation-systems-sector",
      "review_status": "For SME review"
    }
  ]
}