{
  "_comment": "Generated by build_register.py from the workbook. 'surfaces', 'terms' and 'evidence_types' decide which evidence may be correlated to a threat. Supported types are cve, paper, repo and signal. evidence_types [] means that no directly correlated external evidence is expected. Signal evidence provides contextual or strategic support and does not by itself prove exploitation.",
  "source_workbook": "Automotive Cybersecurity Risk Assessment xlsx",
  "evidence_type_definitions": {
    "cve": "Known vulnerability evidence associated with a technical component or surface.",
    "paper": "Academic or technical research supporting the threat model.",
    "repo": "Public tooling, proof-of-concept, detection or mitigation research.",
    "signal": "Incident reporting, public reporting or strategic development that supports or contextualises the threat."
  },
  "categories": {
    "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions": {
      "surfaces": [
        "Telematics",
        "Backend / Cloud",
        "OTA / Firmware"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "fleet",
        "fleet management",
        "mobility service",
        "vehicle cloud",
        "back end",
        "cascading"
      ],
      "types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "fleet cyberattack connected vehicles large scale disruption",
        "vehicle backend cloud outage resilience"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected fleet disruption",
        "mobility service outage",
        "vehicle backend incident",
        "large scale automotive cyber disruption"
      ]
    },
    "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure": {
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "v2g",
        "vehicle to grid",
        "iso 15118",
        "charging station",
        "ocpp",
        "evse",
        "smart charging",
        "power grid"
      ],
      "types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "electric vehicle charging infrastructure cyber attack",
        "vehicle-to-grid security",
        "ISO 15118 security charging"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "EV charging cyber incident",
        "charging infrastructure disruption",
        "V2G security development",
        "OCPP vulnerability incident"
      ]
    },
    "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation": {
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU",
        "UDS Diagnostics",
        "Infotainment",
        "Gateway",
        "OBD"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "remote control",
        "remote command",
        "vehicle takeover",
        "remote code execution"
      ],
      "types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control manipulation attack",
        "infotainment attack vehicle takeover",
        "remote lock unlock vehicle attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control incident",
        "automotive function manipulation",
        "connected vehicle takeover report"
      ]
    },
    "Critical Infrastructure and National Security": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "critical infrastructure",
        "national security",
        "satellite",
        "sovereignty",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected vehicles critical infrastructure national security",
        "satellite communication vehicles security"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive critical infrastructure threat",
        "connected vehicles national security",
        "transportation infrastructure cyber campaign",
        "satellite vehicle communication disruption"
      ]
    },
    "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "secure development",
        "secure boot",
        "type approval",
        "penetration testing",
        "fuzzing",
        "security testing",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "autonomous driving",
        "adas",
        "self driving",
        "perception",
        "lidar",
        "adversarial",
        "sensor spoofing"
      ],
      "types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle cyber attack safety",
        "adversarial attack autonomous driving perception",
        "sensor spoofing lidar camera vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle security incident",
        "ADAS manipulation report",
        "vehicle sensor spoofing incident",
        "autonomous driving cyber development"
      ]
    },
    "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "supply chain",
        "supplier",
        "third party",
        "dependency",
        "tier 1",
        "end of life",
        "end of support",
        "geopolitical"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive supply chain cybersecurity",
        "OEM supplier dependency vehicle cybersecurity"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive supplier cyber incident",
        "vehicle software supply chain compromise",
        "OEM third party dependency disruption",
        "automotive geopolitical dependency"
      ]
    },
    "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "privacy",
        "personal data",
        "location data",
        "tracking",
        "gdpr",
        "driver monitoring",
        "occupant",
        "data leakage",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "espionage",
        "surveillance",
        "microphone",
        "camera",
        "sensor data",
        "exfiltration"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle espionage surveillance sensors",
        "connected car data foreign access"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle espionage campaign",
        "connected car intelligence collection",
        "automotive sensor data exfiltration",
        "vehicle surveillance concern"
      ]
    },
    "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "unece r155",
        "r156",
        "iso 21434",
        "cyber resilience act",
        "regulation",
        "type approval",
        "compliance"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "UNECE R155 R156 cybersecurity management system",
        "cyber resilience act automotive"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive cybersecurity regulation development",
        "UNECE R155 enforcement",
        "vehicle type approval oversight",
        "automotive compliance gap"
      ]
    },
    "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "sbom",
        "software bill of materials",
        "firmware",
        "reverse engineering",
        "architecture",
        "variants",
        "asset inventory"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM software bill of materials",
        "vehicle software transparency firmware analysis"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM development",
        "vehicle firmware transparency issue",
        "automotive asset inventory gap"
      ]
    },
    "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "intrusion detection",
        "anomaly detection",
        "security operations center",
        "vsoc",
        "incident response",
        "logging",
        "telemetry",
        "siem"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle security operations center",
        "automotive intrusion detection fleet monitoring",
        "vehicle incident response logging forensics"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive incident response development",
        "vehicle SOC monitoring capability",
        "fleet intrusion detection incident",
        "automotive forensics development"
      ]
    },
    "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks": {
      "surfaces": [
        "GNSS",
        "Bluetooth",
        "Wi-Fi",
        "V2X"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "gnss",
        "gps",
        "jamming",
        "spoofing",
        "sdr",
        "software defined radio",
        "wireless"
      ],
      "types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "GNSS spoofing jamming vehicles",
        "software defined radio vehicle attack",
        "V2X wireless attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "GNSS jamming transportation incident",
        "vehicle wireless attack report",
        "V2X security incident",
        "automotive radio interference"
      ]
    },
    "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services": {
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "llm",
        "large language model",
        "machine learning",
        "ai",
        "software supply chain",
        "open source",
        "dependency",
        "cloud"
      ],
      "types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "large language model automotive security",
        "AI software supply chain vehicle",
        "cloud AI services connected vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive AI security development",
        "vehicle cloud service incident",
        "AI software supply chain compromise",
        "connected vehicle external service disruption"
      ]
    },
    "Vehicle Theft and Digital Crime": {
      "surfaces": [
        "Keyless / Hardware",
        "CAN Bus",
        "OBD"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "relay attack",
        "can injection",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "immobilizer",
        "vehicle theft",
        "car theft"
      ],
      "types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "relay attack keyless entry vehicle theft",
        "CAN injection vehicle theft"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "digital vehicle theft campaign",
        "keyless relay theft incident",
        "CAN injection theft report",
        "automotive crime tooling"
      ]
    }
  },
  "threats": [
    {
      "id": "T-001",
      "title": "Large-scale cyber disruption of vehicles and mobility services",
      "title_nl": "Grootschalige cyberverstoring van voertuigen en mobiliteitsdiensten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "A fleet-scale disruption of connected vehicles or mobility platforms could halt transport services and create widespread operational and safety impacts.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Large-scale attacks are feasible against connected ecosystems, but achieving broad simultaneous disruption requires significant reach and coordination. Success requires exploitable weaknesses, access, scale, or control gaps and tied into multiple hop attack paths.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "availability",
        "fleet-scale",
        "cascading effects"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "Telematics",
        "Backend / Cloud",
        "OTA / Firmware"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "fleet",
        "fleet management",
        "mobility service",
        "vehicle cloud",
        "back end",
        "cascading"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "fleet cyberattack connected vehicles large scale disruption",
        "vehicle backend cloud outage resilience"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected fleet disruption",
        "mobility service outage",
        "vehicle backend incident",
        "large scale automotive cyber disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-002",
      "title": "Cyberattack on EV charging infrastructure",
      "title_nl": "Cyberaanval op EV-laadinfrastructuur",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle",
        "User"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Compromise of charging infrastructure can interrupt charging services, damage operations, and affect large groups of EV users.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Attempt frequency is expected to be recurring because targets are exposed or monetizable. These are regularly targetted with unlimited window of opportunity. Successful realization is plausible with available techniques and harmful consequence still depends on scale.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "energy",
        "charging",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "v2g",
        "vehicle to grid",
        "iso 15118",
        "charging station",
        "ocpp",
        "evse",
        "smart charging",
        "power grid"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "electric vehicle charging infrastructure cyber attack",
        "vehicle-to-grid security",
        "ISO 15118 security charging"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "EV charging cyber incident",
        "charging infrastructure disruption",
        "V2G security development",
        "OCPP vulnerability incident"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-003",
      "title": "Sabotage of the electricity grid impacting vehicles",
      "title_nl": "Sabotage van elektriciteitsnet met impact op voertuigen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Grid sabotage can indirectly disable vehicle charging and mobility services across affected regions. May affect the electricity net throughout the region.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Compromise EV charger management interface → gain access to charging network backend → pivot into utility/energy management connections (EMS/V2G platform) → manipulate charging load or grid-control signals → disrupt grid operations and availability. A successful harmful outcome requires uncommon access, coordinated capabilities, geopolitical intent, or several safeguards to fail. Attempts may occur, but successful consequence is still not available in academic research.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "energy",
        "charging",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "power grid",
        "grid",
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "electric vehicle charging infrastructure cyber attack",
        "vehicle-to-grid security",
        "ISO 15118 security charging"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "EV charging cyber incident",
        "charging infrastructure disruption",
        "V2G security development",
        "OCPP vulnerability incident"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-004",
      "title": "Misuse of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) functionality to destabilize the energy grid",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van V2G-functionaliteit voor destabilisatie energienet",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Energy, Charging, and V2G Infrastructure",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Same as above. Abuse of V2G functions at scale could create load imbalances that affect grid stability and vehicle availability.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Coordinated manipulation of many participating vehicles and energy assets is difficult to achieve. Same as above.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "energy",
        "charging",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "v2g",
        "vehicle to grid",
        "iso 15118"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "electric vehicle charging infrastructure cyber attack",
        "vehicle-to-grid security",
        "ISO 15118 security charging"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "EV charging cyber incident",
        "charging infrastructure disruption",
        "V2G security development",
        "OCPP vulnerability incident"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-005",
      "title": "Misuse of vehicles for sabotage or targeted attacks",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van voertuigen voor sabotage of gerichte aanvallen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Manipulated vehicles could be intentionally used to cause physical damage, disruption, or harm to people and assets.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Such attacks require targeted access to vehicle functions and clear malicious intent. But, it is very hard to identify the likelihood of such targeted threats. Depends on the motivation of the attacker.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "integrity",
        "control",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU",
        "Telematics",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "remote control",
        "sabotage"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control manipulation attack",
        "infotainment attack vehicle takeover",
        "remote lock unlock vehicle attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control incident",
        "automotive function manipulation",
        "connected vehicle takeover report"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-006",
      "title": "Targeted attack on critical infrastructure or VIP transportation",
      "title_nl": "Gerichte aanval op vitale infrastructuur of VIP-vervoer",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User; Vehicle; Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "A successful attack against VIP transport or critical services could have national-security and public-safety consequences.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The scenario is plausible but typically demands well-resourced and highly capable adversaries. Further inputs necessary for making sense of likelihood.??",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "systemic",
        "sovereignty",
        "critical services"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "critical infrastructure",
        "national security",
        "satellite",
        "sovereignty",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected vehicles critical infrastructure national security",
        "satellite communication vehicles security"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive critical infrastructure threat",
        "connected vehicles national security",
        "transportation infrastructure cyber campaign",
        "satellite vehicle communication disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-007",
      "title": "Use of a vehicle as a cyber-physical attack tool",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van voertuig als cyber-fysiek aanvalsmiddel",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Successful realization could credibly cause fatalities or widespread, prolonged disruption across society assets, with potential cascading effects to vehicle. Unauthorized control of a vehicle may enable its use as a physical attack platform against people or infrastructure.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "A successful harmful outcome requires uncommon access, coordinated capabilities, geopolitical intent, or several safeguards to fail. Achieving reliable remote control requires multiple conditions and controls to be bypassed. So, low.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "integrity",
        "control",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU",
        "Telematics",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "remote control",
        "sabotage"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control manipulation attack",
        "infotainment attack vehicle takeover",
        "remote lock unlock vehicle attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control incident",
        "automotive function manipulation",
        "connected vehicle takeover report"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-008",
      "title": "Insufficient capability to disable an unsafe vehicle",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende mogelijkheid om onveilig voertuig buiten gebruik te stellen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "User"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Could cause major safety, operational, privacy, or financial harm affecting multiple vehicle assets or services; recovery may require coordinated technical and organizational action.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Attempts or precursor failures are plausible within the three-year horizon, but success requires exploitable weaknesses, access, scale, or control gaps. Evidence is mixed and the rating carries moderate uncertainty.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "integrity",
        "control",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "ECU",
        "Telematics",
        "OTA / Firmware"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "remote disable",
        "immobilizer",
        "kill switch"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control manipulation attack",
        "infotainment attack vehicle takeover",
        "remote lock unlock vehicle attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control incident",
        "automotive function manipulation",
        "connected vehicle takeover report"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-009",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicles for use in botnets",
      "title_nl": "Compromittering van voertuigen voor inzet in botnets",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Compromised vehicles could be leveraged for distributed attacks, degrading trust and consuming vehicle resources.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle botnet creation is feasible but requires scalable compromise of connected endpoints.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "secure development",
        "assurance",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "Telematics",
        "Infotainment",
        "Backend / Cloud",
        "Wi-Fi",
        "Bluetooth"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "botnet",
        "ddos",
        "remote code execution"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-010",
      "title": "Deterioration of road safety due to cyber incidents",
      "title_nl": "Aantasting verkeersveiligheid door cyberincidenten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User; Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Cyber incidents affecting driving functions can directly increase collision risk and road-safety impacts. So, based on the safety objective of authorities and governments, it is exceptional.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation is plausible where connected or software-driven functions are exposed and can be indiviudlaly compromised for the whole chain.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "safety",
        "autonomy",
        "perception/control"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "autonomous driving",
        "adas",
        "self driving",
        "perception",
        "lidar",
        "adversarial",
        "sensor spoofing"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle cyber attack safety",
        "adversarial attack autonomous driving perception",
        "sensor spoofing lidar camera vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle security incident",
        "ADAS manipulation report",
        "vehicle sensor spoofing incident",
        "autonomous driving cyber development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-011",
      "title": "Outage of digital vehicle and mobility services",
      "title_nl": "Uitval van digitale voertuig, en mobiliteitsdiensten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Outages of digital mobility services can interrupt transport operations and affect large user populations. But assumption is core safety functions are still workable.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Cloud-connected mobility services face frequent availability threats and disruptions.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "availability",
        "fleet-scale",
        "cascading effects"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "Telematics",
        "Backend / Cloud",
        "OTA / Firmware"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "fleet",
        "fleet management",
        "mobility service",
        "vehicle cloud",
        "back end",
        "cascading"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "fleet cyberattack connected vehicles large scale disruption",
        "vehicle backend cloud outage resilience"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected fleet disruption",
        "mobility service outage",
        "vehicle backend incident",
        "large scale automotive cyber disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-012",
      "title": "Vulnerabilities in autonomous driving functions",
      "title_nl": "Kwetsbaarheden in autonome rijfuncties",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "User"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Weaknesses in autonomous-driving functions may result in unsafe decisions or loss of control.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Discovery and exploitation of software flaws in complex autonomy stacks remains realistic but unprovable as of now. For e.g., academic research on end to end compromise of an autonomous stack or E2E architecture is not available as yet.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "safety",
        "autonomy",
        "perception/control"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "autonomous driving",
        "adas",
        "self driving",
        "perception",
        "lidar",
        "adversarial",
        "sensor spoofing"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle cyber attack safety",
        "adversarial attack autonomous driving perception",
        "sensor spoofing lidar camera vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle security incident",
        "ADAS manipulation report",
        "vehicle sensor spoofing incident",
        "autonomous driving cyber development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-013",
      "title": "Critical vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles",
      "title_nl": "Kritieke kwetsbaarheden in autonome voertuigen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "User"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Critical vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles can compromise safety-critical behavior with severe consequences.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The attack path is credible, although exploitation generally requires specialized knowledge, equipment, window of opportunity and expertise. Since the technology is fairly new, all these aforementioned parameters are on low/medium feasibility.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "safety",
        "autonomy",
        "perception/control"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "autonomous driving",
        "adas",
        "self driving",
        "perception",
        "lidar",
        "adversarial",
        "sensor spoofing"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle cyber attack safety",
        "adversarial attack autonomous driving perception",
        "sensor spoofing lidar camera vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle security incident",
        "ADAS manipulation report",
        "vehicle sensor spoofing incident",
        "autonomous driving cyber development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-014",
      "title": "Geopolitical influence over vehicle manufacturers",
      "title_nl": "Geopolitieke beïnvloeding van voertuigfabrikanten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "External influence over manufacturers could affect product integrity, support decisions, or strategic availability. Moreover, connected vehicles could be prone to geopolitical warfare.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Meaningful influence campaigns are possible but uncommon and often constrained by governance structures. General discourse is it is plasible but not yet ever executed.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "third party",
        "concentration",
        "continuity"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "geopolitical",
        "sovereignty",
        "foreign",
        "trusted supplier",
        "export control"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive supply chain cybersecurity",
        "OEM supplier dependency vehicle cybersecurity"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive supplier cyber incident",
        "vehicle software supply chain compromise",
        "OEM third party dependency disruption",
        "automotive geopolitical dependency"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-015",
      "title": "Unauthorized monitoring of vehicle occupants",
      "title_nl": "Ongeautoriseerde monitoring van inzittenden",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Unauthorized access to cabin sensors or data can expose sensitive information about occupants. Assuming ordinary persons. For VIP peronnel, it is under espionage and sabotage T-005 and 006",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Personal data is a frequent target because it has intelligence and commercial value.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "privacy",
        "personal data",
        "location data",
        "tracking",
        "gdpr",
        "driver monitoring",
        "occupant",
        "data leakage",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-016",
      "title": "Unlawful behavioral or location tracking of individuals",
      "title_nl": "Onrechtmatige gedrags, of locatiecontrole van personen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Persistent tracking can reveal routines, associations, and sensitive movements of individuals.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Location data is routinely collected and therefore attractive for misuse.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "privacy",
        "personal data",
        "location data",
        "tracking",
        "gdpr",
        "driver monitoring",
        "occupant",
        "data leakage",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-017",
      "title": "Digital espionage through vehicles",
      "title_nl": "Digitale spionage via voertuigen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Vehicles can serve as collection points for sensitive operational, personal, or governmental information.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Espionage activity is plausible but usually depends on targeted access and persistence.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "confidentiality",
        "intelligence",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "espionage",
        "surveillance",
        "microphone",
        "camera",
        "sensor data",
        "exfiltration"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle espionage surveillance sensors",
        "connected car data foreign access"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle espionage campaign",
        "connected car intelligence collection",
        "automotive sensor data exfiltration",
        "vehicle surveillance concern"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-018",
      "title": "Espionage through vehicle sensors or suppliers",
      "title_nl": "Spionage via voertuigsensoren of leveranciers",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Espionage and Intelligence Gathering",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Sensor feeds and supplier access may expose information that is valuable for intelligence gathering.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Multiple parties handle vehicle data, increasing opportunities for collection or interception.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "confidentiality",
        "intelligence",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "espionage",
        "surveillance",
        "microphone",
        "camera",
        "sensor data",
        "exfiltration"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle espionage surveillance sensors",
        "connected car data foreign access"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle espionage campaign",
        "connected car intelligence collection",
        "automotive sensor data exfiltration",
        "vehicle surveillance concern"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-019",
      "title": "Insufficient oversight due to the complexity of the vehicle ecosystem",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende toezicht door hoge complexiteit voertuigenlandschap",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Limited ecosystem visibility can delay identification of systemic weaknesses and coordinated risks.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Complex supply chains make consistent oversight difficult across all stakeholders.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "governance",
        "compliance",
        "accountability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "unece r155",
        "r156",
        "iso 21434",
        "cyber resilience act",
        "regulation",
        "type approval",
        "compliance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [],
      "paper_queries": [
        "UNECE R155 R156 cybersecurity management system",
        "cyber resilience act automotive"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive cybersecurity regulation development",
        "UNECE R155 enforcement",
        "vehicle type approval oversight",
        "automotive compliance gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-020",
      "title": "Cyber incidents leading to societal disruption",
      "title_nl": "Cyberincidenten leiden tot maatschappelijke onrust",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "affects": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "A major vehicle-related cyber incident could disrupt public services and generate societal instability.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Large societal effects generally require a high-impact trigger and broad propagation.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "systemic",
        "sovereignty",
        "critical services"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "critical infrastructure",
        "national security",
        "satellite",
        "sovereignty",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected vehicles critical infrastructure national security",
        "satellite communication vehicles security"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive critical infrastructure threat",
        "connected vehicles national security",
        "transportation infrastructure cyber campaign",
        "satellite vehicle communication disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-021",
      "title": "Declining trust in digital mobility infrastructure",
      "title_nl": "Afnemend vertrouwen in digitale mobiliteitsinfrastructuur",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "affects": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Repeated incidents can reduce confidence in digital mobility technologies and services.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Trust erosion can develop gradually through recurring visible security failures.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "systemic",
        "sovereignty",
        "critical services"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "critical infrastructure",
        "national security",
        "satellite",
        "sovereignty",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected vehicles critical infrastructure national security",
        "satellite communication vehicles security"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive critical infrastructure threat",
        "connected vehicles national security",
        "transportation infrastructure cyber campaign",
        "satellite vehicle communication disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-022",
      "title": "Insufficient regulation and oversight of vehicle cybersecurity",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende regelgeving en toezicht op voertuigcybersecurity",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Regulatory gaps may leave significant cybersecurity weaknesses insufficiently addressed across the sector.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Differences in oversight and implementation can persist across organizations.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "governance",
        "compliance",
        "accountability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "unece r155",
        "r156",
        "iso 21434",
        "cyber resilience act",
        "regulation",
        "type approval",
        "compliance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "UNECE R155 R156 cybersecurity management system",
        "cyber resilience act automotive"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive cybersecurity regulation development",
        "UNECE R155 enforcement",
        "vehicle type approval oversight",
        "automotive compliance gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-023",
      "title": "Takeover of vehicle functions through the infotainment system",
      "title_nl": "Overname van voertuigfuncties via infotainmentsysteem",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "User"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Compromise of an infotainment pathway may provide access to safety-relevant vehicle functions. This results in complete takeover of the vehicle safety, operational, provacy and financial aspects.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connectivity and exposed interfaces make this attack route a credible and recurring concern. Various pre-regulation vehicles have been researched to have been possible to be compromised through the infotainment system. [Charlie & Miller Jeep Hack, 2014]",
      "risk": "Critical",
      "priority": "Immediate cross-stakeholder treatment and executive ownership",
      "tags": [
        "integrity",
        "control",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Intolerable without urgent treatment; severe/high consequence combines with credible materialisation.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "Infotainment",
        "Gateway"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "head unit",
        "infotainment",
        "ivi"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control manipulation attack",
        "infotainment attack vehicle takeover",
        "remote lock unlock vehicle attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control incident",
        "automotive function manipulation",
        "connected vehicle takeover report"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-024",
      "title": "Safety receives insufficient priority from manufacturers",
      "title_nl": "Veiligheid krijgt onvoldoende prioriteit bij fabrikanten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle",
        "User"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Weak safety prioritization can allow preventable vulnerabilities to remain in vehicles and services.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Commercial pressures and uneven maturity can result in inconsistent security practices.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "secure development",
        "assurance",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "safety",
        "iso 26262",
        "sotif",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-025",
      "title": "Inadequate testing prior to market approval",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende testdekking voorafgaand aan toelating",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle",
        "User"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle; User, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Insufficient testing may leave exploitable defects undiscovered before deployment.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Complex systems make complete test coverage challenging to achieve.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "secure development",
        "assurance",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "penetration testing",
        "fuzzing",
        "security testing",
        "type approval"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-026",
      "title": "Limited visibility into vehicle software",
      "title_nl": "Beperkt inzicht in voertuigsoftware",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Poor software visibility hinders vulnerability management, patching, and risk assessment.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Limited transparency increases the chance that weaknesses remain unnoticed.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "asset visibility",
        "architecture",
        "traceability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "sbom",
        "software bill of materials",
        "firmware",
        "reverse engineering",
        "architecture",
        "variants",
        "asset inventory"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM software bill of materials",
        "vehicle software transparency firmware analysis"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM development",
        "vehicle firmware transparency issue",
        "automotive asset inventory gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-027",
      "title": "Incomplete visibility of vehicles within the ecosystem",
      "title_nl": "Onvolledig zicht op voertuigen in het ecosysteem",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Incomplete asset visibility impairs tracking of vulnerable vehicles across the ecosystem.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Accurate inventories are difficult to maintain in diverse vehicle environments.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "asset visibility",
        "architecture",
        "traceability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "vehicle identification",
        "fleet inventory",
        "asset inventory"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM software bill of materials",
        "vehicle software transparency firmware analysis"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM development",
        "vehicle firmware transparency issue",
        "automotive asset inventory gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-028",
      "title": "Uncertainty regarding the applicability of the Cyber Resilience Act",
      "title_nl": "Onzekerheid over toepassing Cyber Resilience Act",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "affects": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Low",
      "impact_rationale": "Regulatory uncertainty can delay compliance planning and coordinated cybersecurity improvements.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The threat stems primarily from evolving interpretation rather than active exploitation.",
      "risk": "Low",
      "priority": "Accept/monitor subject to risk appetite",
      "tags": [
        "governance",
        "compliance",
        "accountability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "1",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Monitor or accept subject to risk appetite and change triggers.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "cyber resilience act"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "UNECE R155 R156 cybersecurity management system",
        "cyber resilience act automotive"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive cybersecurity regulation development",
        "UNECE R155 enforcement",
        "vehicle type approval oversight",
        "automotive compliance gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-029",
      "title": "Uncertainty regarding applicable regulations",
      "title_nl": "Onzekerheid over toepasselijke regelgeving",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "affects": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Society",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Society, because the direct first-order harm falls on society assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Low",
      "impact_rationale": "Unclear regulatory obligations can create inconsistent security expectations and implementation.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Changes in legislation and overlapping frameworks can sustain uncertainty.",
      "risk": "Low",
      "priority": "Accept/monitor subject to risk appetite",
      "tags": [
        "governance",
        "compliance",
        "accountability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "1",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Monitor or accept subject to risk appetite and change triggers.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "unece r155",
        "r156",
        "iso 21434",
        "cyber resilience act",
        "regulation",
        "type approval",
        "compliance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [],
      "paper_queries": [
        "UNECE R155 R156 cybersecurity management system",
        "cyber resilience act automotive"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive cybersecurity regulation development",
        "UNECE R155 enforcement",
        "vehicle type approval oversight",
        "automotive compliance gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-030",
      "title": "Loss of OEM support",
      "title_nl": "Wegvallen van OEM,ondersteuning",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Loss of OEM support may leave vehicles without security updates or technical assistance.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Support withdrawal is plausible over long lifecycles and aging platforms.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "third party",
        "concentration",
        "continuity"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "end of life",
        "end of support",
        "patching",
        "software updates",
        "long term support"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive supply chain cybersecurity",
        "OEM supplier dependency vehicle cybersecurity"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive supplier cyber incident",
        "vehicle software supply chain compromise",
        "OEM third party dependency disruption",
        "automotive geopolitical dependency"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-031",
      "title": "Loss of critical suppliers",
      "title_nl": "Wegvallen van kritieke leveranciers",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "affects": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Failure of critical suppliers can disrupt security maintenance and essential service delivery.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Dependence on specialized providers creates credible continuity risks.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "third party",
        "concentration",
        "continuity"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "supply chain",
        "supplier",
        "tier 1"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive supply chain cybersecurity",
        "OEM supplier dependency vehicle cybersecurity"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive supplier cyber incident",
        "vehicle software supply chain compromise",
        "OEM third party dependency disruption",
        "automotive geopolitical dependency"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-032",
      "title": "Insufficient cybersecurity requirements for individual vehicle types",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende cybersecurity,eisen voor individuele voertuigtypen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Weak cybersecurity requirements can permit uneven protection levels across vehicle types.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Control gaps may persist where requirements are incomplete or inconsistently applied.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "governance",
        "compliance",
        "accountability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "unece r155",
        "r156",
        "iso 21434",
        "cyber resilience act",
        "regulation",
        "type approval",
        "compliance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "UNECE R155 R156 cybersecurity management system",
        "cyber resilience act automotive"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive cybersecurity regulation development",
        "UNECE R155 enforcement",
        "vehicle type approval oversight",
        "automotive compliance gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-033",
      "title": "Cross-supply-chain cyberattacks spanning multiple layers",
      "title_nl": "Ketenoverschrijdende cyberaanvallen over meerdere lagen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Attacks spanning multiple suppliers can propagate across interconnected vehicle services and products.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Interconnected supply chains create opportunities for broader compromise.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "third party",
        "concentration",
        "continuity"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "supply chain attack",
        "third party",
        "dependency"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive supply chain cybersecurity",
        "OEM supplier dependency vehicle cybersecurity"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive supplier cyber incident",
        "vehicle software supply chain compromise",
        "OEM third party dependency disruption",
        "automotive geopolitical dependency"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-034",
      "title": "Absence of centralized detection of anomalous vehicle behavior",
      "title_nl": "Ontbreken van centrale detectie van afwijkend voertuiggedrag",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Without centralized detection, malicious activity may remain unnoticed until significant damage occurs.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Limited visibility reduces the chance of early identification and containment.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "detection",
        "telemetry",
        "response"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "intrusion detection",
        "anomaly detection",
        "security operations center",
        "vsoc",
        "incident response",
        "logging",
        "telemetry",
        "siem"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle security operations center",
        "automotive intrusion detection fleet monitoring",
        "vehicle incident response logging forensics"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive incident response development",
        "vehicle SOC monitoring capability",
        "fleet intrusion detection incident",
        "automotive forensics development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-035",
      "title": "GNSS jamming and spoofing of vehicles",
      "title_nl": "GNSS jamming en spoofing van voertuigen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Manipulated or unavailable GNSS signals can disrupt navigation and autonomous vehicle operation. Spoofing in general has severe consequences on vehicle safety and operations.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Jamming and spoofing tools are easily accessible and frequently demonstrated in practice. And such vulnerabilities combined with Autonomous functions and Full self driving creates enormous feasibility.",
      "risk": "Critical",
      "priority": "Immediate cross-stakeholder treatment and executive ownership",
      "tags": [
        "wireless",
        "navigation",
        "availability/integrity"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Intolerable without urgent treatment; severe/high consequence combines with credible materialisation.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "GNSS"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "gnss",
        "gps",
        "gps spoofing",
        "jamming",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "GNSS spoofing jamming vehicles",
        "software defined radio vehicle attack",
        "V2X wireless attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "GNSS jamming transportation incident",
        "vehicle wireless attack report",
        "V2X security incident",
        "automotive radio interference"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-036",
      "title": "Insufficient protection of occupant data",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende bescherming van gegevens van inzittenden",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Weak protection of occupant data can lead to unauthorized access, disclosure, or misuse.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Personal information remains a common target for attackers and third parties.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "information disclosure",
        "sensitive information",
        "personal data",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "cve",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-037",
      "title": "AI accelerates the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities",
      "title_nl": "AI versnelt ontdekking en exploitatie van kwetsbaarheden",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "AI-assisted exploitation can increase the scale and speed of attacks against vehicle ecosystems.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Widely available AI tools can lower effort required to identify weaknesses.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "AI",
        "cloud",
        "software dependency"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "llm",
        "large language model",
        "machine learning",
        "vulnerability discovery",
        "fuzzing",
        "automated exploit"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "large language model automotive security",
        "AI software supply chain vehicle",
        "cloud AI services connected vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive AI security development",
        "vehicle cloud service incident",
        "AI software supply chain compromise",
        "connected vehicle external service disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-038",
      "title": "Lack of visibility into AI and software supply chains",
      "title_nl": "Gebrek aan inzicht in AI, en softwareketens",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Lack of supply-chain transparency makes it harder to assess inherited AI and software risks.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Dependencies are often complex and not fully visible to all stakeholders.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "AI",
        "cloud",
        "software dependency"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "sbom",
        "software supply chain",
        "open source",
        "dependency",
        "llm",
        "ai"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "large language model automotive security",
        "AI software supply chain vehicle",
        "cloud AI services connected vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive AI security development",
        "vehicle cloud service incident",
        "AI software supply chain compromise",
        "connected vehicle external service disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-039",
      "title": "Lack of transparency regarding data processing",
      "title_nl": "Gebrek aan transparantie over gegevensverwerking",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Insufficient transparency over data processing can undermine privacy expectations and compliance.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Data collection practices are often extensive and difficult for users to verify.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "privacy",
        "personal data",
        "location data",
        "tracking",
        "gdpr",
        "driver monitoring",
        "occupant",
        "data leakage",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-040",
      "title": "Misuse of location and movement data",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van locatie, en bewegingsgegevens",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Misuse of movement data can expose sensitive behavior patterns and personal activities.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Location information is valuable and frequently collected by connected services.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "privacy",
        "personal data",
        "location data",
        "tracking",
        "gdpr",
        "driver monitoring",
        "occupant",
        "data leakage",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-041",
      "title": "Unwanted collection of data from the surrounding environment",
      "title_nl": "Ongewenste verzameling van gegevens uit de omgeving",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Environmental sensors may capture personal or sensitive information beyond the intended purpose.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Broad sensor coverage creates recurring privacy exposure opportunities.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "privacy",
        "personal data",
        "location data",
        "tracking",
        "gdpr",
        "driver monitoring",
        "occupant",
        "data leakage",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-042",
      "title": "Inadequate management of physical attack vectors such as USB devices",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende beheer van fysieke aanvalsvectoren zoals USB",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Physical interfaces such as USB ports may provide a direct path to vehicle systems.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation requires access, but removable media remains a known attack vector.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "secure development",
        "assurance",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "ECU",
        "Infotainment",
        "OBD"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "usb",
        "physical access"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-043",
      "title": "Unauthorized locking of vehicles",
      "title_nl": "Ongeautoriseerd vergrendelen van voertuigen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Unauthorized locking can disrupt access to vehicles and affect user safety or mobility.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Connected access features may be targeted for extortion, misuse, or disruption.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "integrity",
        "control",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "Keyless / Hardware",
        "Backend / Cloud"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "remote lock",
        "central locking",
        "remote unlock"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control manipulation attack",
        "infotainment attack vehicle takeover",
        "remote lock unlock vehicle attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control incident",
        "automotive function manipulation",
        "connected vehicle takeover report"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-044",
      "title": "Digital vehicle theft",
      "title_nl": "Digitale diefstal van voertuigen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Theft and Digital Crime",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Digital compromise of access mechanisms can result in theft of vehicles and associated assets.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Vehicle theft is a strong criminal incentive and attack methods continue to evolve.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "criminal monetization",
        "access",
        "theft"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "Keyless / Hardware",
        "CAN Bus",
        "OBD"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "relay attack",
        "can injection",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "immobilizer",
        "vehicle theft",
        "car theft"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "relay attack keyless entry vehicle theft",
        "CAN injection vehicle theft"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "digital vehicle theft campaign",
        "keyless relay theft incident",
        "CAN injection theft report",
        "automotive crime tooling"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-045",
      "title": "Inadequate deletion of vehicle data during disposal, sale, rental, or …",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende verwijdering van voertuigdata bij sloop, verkoop, verhuur of uitleen",
      "title_note": "Title is truncated in the source spreadsheet; fix it there.",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Residual data left in vehicles can expose previous users after sale, rental, or disposal.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Data removal processes are often inconsistent across lifecycle transitions.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "factory reset",
        "data deletion",
        "second hand",
        "used vehicle",
        "disposal"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-046",
      "title": "Insufficient protection of personal data throughout the vehicle lifecycle",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende bescherming van persoonsgegevens gedurende de levenscyclus van een voertuig",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [
        "User",
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "User",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: User, because the direct first-order harm falls on user assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Vehicle, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Personal data may be exposed at multiple stages of the vehicle lifecycle if controls are weak.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Numerous systems and stakeholders handle data throughout ownership and servicing.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "privacy",
        "confidentiality",
        "data governance"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "privacy",
        "personal data",
        "location data",
        "tracking",
        "gdpr",
        "driver monitoring",
        "occupant",
        "data leakage",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-047",
      "title": "Manipulation or unauthorized influence of vehicle behavior through software, data, or communication services",
      "title_nl": "Manipulatie of ongeautoriseerde beïnvloeding van voertuiggedrag via software, data of communicatiediensten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Control and Function Manipulation",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Manipulation of software, data, or communications can directly alter vehicle behavior and safety.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation is realistic where trusted inputs or control channels can be influenced.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "integrity",
        "control",
        "cyber-physical"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "OTA / Firmware",
        "Backend / Cloud",
        "Telematics",
        "ECU"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "manipulation",
        "remote command"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control manipulation attack",
        "infotainment attack vehicle takeover",
        "remote lock unlock vehicle attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "vehicle remote control incident",
        "automotive function manipulation",
        "connected vehicle takeover report"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-048",
      "title": "Insufficient visibility and oversight across the entire vehicle supply chain and lifecycle",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende inzicht in en toezicht op de volledige voertuigketen en levenscyclus",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Poor oversight across the lifecycle can allow vulnerabilities and dependencies to go unmanaged.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "The breadth of suppliers, updates, and processes increases coordination challenges.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "secure development",
        "assurance",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "secure development",
        "secure boot",
        "type approval",
        "penetration testing",
        "fuzzing",
        "security testing",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-049",
      "title": "Underestimation of the impact of large-scale cyber incidents affecting vehicle fleets",
      "title_nl": "Onderschatting van de impact van grootschalige cyberincidenten binnen voertuigvloten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Underestimating fleet-wide cyber incidents can result in inadequate preparedness for large disruptions.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Fleet-scale impacts are plausible, though realization depends on broad compromise paths.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "availability",
        "fleet-scale",
        "cascading effects"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "Telematics",
        "Backend / Cloud",
        "OTA / Firmware"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "fleet",
        "fleet management",
        "mobility service",
        "vehicle cloud",
        "back end",
        "cascading"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "fleet cyberattack connected vehicles large scale disruption",
        "vehicle backend cloud outage resilience"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected fleet disruption",
        "mobility service outage",
        "vehicle backend incident",
        "large scale automotive cyber disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-050",
      "title": "Insufficient visibility into hardware and software variants within the same vehicle type",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende inzicht in hardware, en softwarevarianten binnen hetzelfde voertuigtype",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Unknown hardware and software variants complicate vulnerability tracking and remediation.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Variant proliferation reduces confidence in asset and exposure assessments.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "asset visibility",
        "architecture",
        "traceability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "sbom",
        "software bill of materials",
        "firmware",
        "reverse engineering",
        "architecture",
        "variants",
        "asset inventory"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM software bill of materials",
        "vehicle software transparency firmware analysis"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM development",
        "vehicle firmware transparency issue",
        "automotive asset inventory gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-051",
      "title": "Differences in vehicle architectures resulting in unknown data flows and functionalities",
      "title_nl": "Verschillen in voertuigarchitectuur leiden tot onbekende gegevensstromen en functionaliteiten",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Architectural differences can hide data flows or functions that introduce unmanaged risks.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Complex platform diversity makes comprehensive understanding difficult.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "asset visibility",
        "architecture",
        "traceability"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "sbom",
        "software bill of materials",
        "firmware",
        "reverse engineering",
        "architecture",
        "variants",
        "asset inventory"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM software bill of materials",
        "vehicle software transparency firmware analysis"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM development",
        "vehicle firmware transparency issue",
        "automotive asset inventory gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-052",
      "title": "Migration of vehicle intelligence to external AI and communication services outside the vehicle",
      "title_nl": "Verplaatsing van voertuigintelligentie naar externe AI, en communicatiediensten buiten het voertuig",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Externalizing vehicle intelligence increases dependence on remote services and communication paths.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Reliance on external platforms expands the attack surface and operational dependencies.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "AI",
        "cloud",
        "software dependency"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "cloud",
        "voice assistant",
        "ai assistant",
        "edge",
        "external service",
        "backend"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "large language model automotive security",
        "AI software supply chain vehicle",
        "cloud AI services connected vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive AI security development",
        "vehicle cloud service incident",
        "AI software supply chain compromise",
        "connected vehicle external service disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-053",
      "title": "Insufficient oversight of aftermarket hardware, software, and vehicle modifications",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende toezicht op aftermarket hardware, software en voertuigaanpassingen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Uncontrolled aftermarket modifications may weaken security assumptions and safety controls.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Third-party changes are difficult to monitor and assess consistently.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "secure development",
        "assurance",
        "lifecycle"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "OBD"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "aftermarket",
        "dongle",
        "obd dongle",
        "tuning",
        "retrofit"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-054",
      "title": "Misuse of Software Defined Radio (SDR) for disruption, eavesdropping, and manipulation of wireless vehicle communications",
      "title_nl": "Misbruik van Software Defined Radio (SDR) voor verstoring, afluisteren en manipulatie van draadloze voertuigcommunicatie",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "SDR-based attacks can intercept, disrupt, or manipulate wireless vehicle communications.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Low-cost radio tools and exposed protocols make such attacks achievable.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "wireless",
        "navigation",
        "availability/integrity"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [
        "SDR / Radio",
        "Keyless / Hardware",
        "Bluetooth",
        "Wi-Fi",
        "V2X"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "sdr",
        "software defined radio",
        "gnu radio",
        "relay attack",
        "replay attack"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "GNSS spoofing jamming vehicles",
        "software defined radio vehicle attack",
        "V2X wireless attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "GNSS jamming transportation incident",
        "vehicle wireless attack report",
        "V2X security incident",
        "automotive radio interference"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-055",
      "title": "Dependence on satellite communication infrastructure owned or controlled by foreign or untrusted parties",
      "title_nl": "Afhankelijkheid van satellietcommunicatie,infrastructuur van buitenlandse of niet,vertrouwde partijen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "affects": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Infrastructure",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Infrastructure, because the direct first-order harm falls on infrastructure assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Severe",
      "impact_rationale": "Dependence on foreign or untrusted satellite services may affect resilience and service continuity.",
      "probability": "Low",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Exploitation would require strategic capabilities and favorable circumstances.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "systemic",
        "sovereignty",
        "critical services"
      ],
      "impact_score": "4",
      "likelihood_score": "2",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "satellite",
        "satcom",
        "starlink"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected vehicles critical infrastructure national security",
        "satellite communication vehicles security"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive critical infrastructure threat",
        "connected vehicles national security",
        "transportation infrastructure cyber campaign",
        "satellite vehicle communication disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-056",
      "title": "Deteriorating financial health of vehicle manufacturers resulting in reduced cybersecurity support",
      "title_nl": "Verslechterde financiële positie van voertuigfabrikanten leidt tot verminderde cybersecurity,ondersteuning",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "Medium",
      "impact_rationale": "Financially stressed manufacturers may reduce patching, support, or cybersecurity investment.",
      "probability": "Medium",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Economic pressures can gradually degrade long-term security maintenance.",
      "risk": "Moderate",
      "priority": "Planned mitigation and monitoring",
      "tags": [
        "third party",
        "concentration",
        "continuity"
      ],
      "impact_score": "2",
      "likelihood_score": "3",
      "risk_rationale": "Manage through planned controls, monitoring, and periodic reassessment.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "bankruptcy",
        "end of support",
        "financial"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive supply chain cybersecurity",
        "OEM supplier dependency vehicle cybersecurity"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive supplier cyber incident",
        "vehicle software supply chain compromise",
        "OEM third party dependency disruption",
        "automotive geopolitical dependency"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-057",
      "title": "Insufficient logging, monitoring, and incident analysis across vehicles and vehicle ecosystems",
      "title_nl": "Onvoldoende logging, monitoring en incidentanalyse van voertuigen en voertuigecosystemen",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Detection, Monitoring, and Incident Response",
      "affects": [
        "Vehicle",
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "primary_domain": "Vehicle",
      "secondary_domains": [
        "Infrastructure",
        "Society"
      ],
      "domain_rationale": "Primary: Vehicle, because the direct first-order harm falls on vehicle assets or stakeholders. Secondary: Infrastructure; Society, where credible direct propagation or dependency exists.",
      "impact": "High",
      "impact_rationale": "Insufficient logging and monitoring can delay investigation, containment, and recovery activities.",
      "probability": "High",
      "likelihood_rationale": "Detection gaps make successful compromise harder to identify across distributed environments.And accordingly the likelihood of attacker motivation for such systems would be high.",
      "risk": "High",
      "priority": "Priority treatment plan and shared control ownership",
      "tags": [
        "detection",
        "telemetry",
        "response"
      ],
      "impact_score": "3",
      "likelihood_score": "4",
      "risk_rationale": "Significant risk requiring prioritized treatment and accountable ownership.",
      "source": "workshop",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "intrusion detection",
        "anomaly detection",
        "security operations center",
        "vsoc",
        "incident response",
        "logging",
        "telemetry",
        "siem"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "vehicle security operations center",
        "automotive intrusion detection fleet monitoring",
        "vehicle incident response logging forensics"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive incident response development",
        "vehicle SOC monitoring capability",
        "fleet intrusion detection incident",
        "automotive forensics development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-058",
      "title": "Compromise or disruption of vehicle-related backend services",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "AI, Software Supply Chains, and External Services",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "4.3.1. Vehicle-related backend servers",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend / Cloud",
        "Telematics"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "backend",
        "cloud",
        "api"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "large language model automotive security",
        "AI software supply chain vehicle",
        "cloud AI services connected vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive AI security development",
        "vehicle cloud service incident",
        "AI software supply chain compromise",
        "connected vehicle external service disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-059",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicle communication channels",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Communication, Navigation, and Wireless Attacks",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "4.3.2. Vehicle communication channels",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "Wi-Fi",
        "V2X",
        "Telematics"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "communication channel",
        "wireless"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "GNSS spoofing jamming vehicles",
        "software defined radio vehicle attack",
        "V2X wireless attack"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "GNSS jamming transportation incident",
        "vehicle wireless attack report",
        "V2X security incident",
        "automotive radio interference"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-060",
      "title": "Compromise or failure of vehicle software-update processes",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Development, Approval, and Lifecycle Management",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "4.3.3. Vehicle update procedures and UN R156",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "OTA / Firmware"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "ota",
        "software update",
        "r156"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive secure development lifecycle",
        "vehicle type approval cybersecurity testing"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive type approval cybersecurity development",
        "vehicle lifecycle security issue",
        "automotive testing capability development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-061",
      "title": "Human error, social engineering and misuse of authorized access",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Governance, Regulation, and Oversight",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "4.3.4. Unintended human actions and staff privilege abuse",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "social engineering",
        "phishing",
        "insider"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "UNECE R155 R156 cybersecurity management system",
        "cyber resilience act automotive"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive cybersecurity regulation development",
        "UNECE R155 enforcement",
        "vehicle type approval oversight",
        "automotive compliance gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-062",
      "title": "Compromise through vehicle external interfaces and connected equipment",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Vehicle Ecosystem, Supply Chain, and Dependencies",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "4.3.5. External connectivity and connections",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "OBD",
        "Bluetooth",
        "Wi-Fi",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "usb",
        "obd",
        "dongle"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive supply chain cybersecurity",
        "OEM supplier dependency vehicle cybersecurity"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive supplier cyber incident",
        "vehicle software supply chain compromise",
        "OEM third party dependency disruption",
        "automotive geopolitical dependency"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-063",
      "title": "Unauthorized access to or manipulation of vehicle data, code and credentials",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "4.3.6. Vehicle data and code as attack targets",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "ECU",
        "OTA / Firmware"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "credentials",
        "firmware extraction",
        "key extraction"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected car privacy personal data",
        "vehicle location tracking privacy",
        "driver monitoring camera privacy"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected vehicle privacy incident",
        "automotive personal data exposure",
        "vehicle location tracking report",
        "driver monitoring surveillance development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-064",
      "title": "Exploitation of insufficiently protected vehicle systems and components",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "4.3.7. Exploitable vulnerabilities and insufficient protection",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "ECU",
        "Gateway",
        "Infotainment",
        "UDS Diagnostics"
      ],
      "terms": [],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM software bill of materials",
        "vehicle software transparency firmware analysis"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM development",
        "vehicle firmware transparency issue",
        "automotive asset inventory gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-065",
      "title": "Compromise of vehicle identities, cryptographic keys and trust services (Overall high level threat across lifecycle )",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Software, Hardware, and Architecture Transparency",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "Covers weaknesses across the full identity, access and cryptographic trust lifecycle that could enable unauthorized access, impersonation or trusted malicious actions across many vehicles and services.",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend / Cloud"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "certificate",
        "pki",
        "cryptographic key",
        "key management"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM software bill of materials",
        "vehicle software transparency firmware analysis"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive SBOM development",
        "vehicle firmware transparency issue",
        "automotive asset inventory gap"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-066",
      "title": "Manipulation of vehicle perception, localization and automated-driving inputs",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Road Safety and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "Covers deliberate manipulation of sensors, positioning, maps and AI inputs that could cause automated-driving systems to misunderstand the road environment and behave unsafely.",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "autonomous driving",
        "adas",
        "self driving",
        "perception",
        "lidar",
        "adversarial",
        "sensor spoofing"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle cyber attack safety",
        "adversarial attack autonomous driving perception",
        "sensor spoofing lidar camera vehicle"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "autonomous vehicle security incident",
        "ADAS manipulation report",
        "vehicle sensor spoofing incident",
        "autonomous driving cyber development"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-067",
      "title": "Unauthorized manipulation of fleet, dispatch, teleoperation and operational mobility-control platforms",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Mobility Services and Large-Scale Disruptions",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "Covers centralized operational platforms whose compromise could allow one attacker to reroute, immobilize or manipulate multiple vehicles or essential fleets simultaneously.",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "Telematics",
        "Backend / Cloud"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "teleoperation",
        "dispatch",
        "fleet"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "cve",
        "paper",
        "repo",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "fleet cyberattack connected vehicles large scale disruption",
        "vehicle backend cloud outage resilience"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "connected fleet disruption",
        "mobility service outage",
        "vehicle backend incident",
        "large scale automotive cyber disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-068",
      "title": "Compromise of connected road and traffic-management infrastructure affecting vehicles",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "Covers road and traffic-management systems outside the vehicle that can create unsafe traffic conditions or disrupt mobility even when individual vehicles remain secure.",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [
        "V2X"
      ],
      "terms": [
        "traffic management",
        "traffic light",
        "roadside unit",
        "rsu",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "cve",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected vehicles critical infrastructure national security",
        "satellite communication vehicles security"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive critical infrastructure threat",
        "connected vehicles national security",
        "transportation infrastructure cyber campaign",
        "satellite vehicle communication disruption"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "T-069",
      "title": "Simultaneous disruption of multiple vehicle fleets and mobility providers through a shared dependency (Single point of failure)",
      "title_nl": "",
      "title_note": "",
      "category": "Critical Infrastructure and National Security",
      "affects": [],
      "primary_domain": "",
      "secondary_domains": [],
      "domain_rationale": "",
      "impact": "",
      "impact_rationale": "",
      "probability": "",
      "likelihood_rationale": "",
      "risk": "Not rated",
      "priority": "",
      "tags": [],
      "impact_score": "",
      "likelihood_score": "",
      "risk_rationale": "",
      "annex5_area": "Covers concentration risk where the failure or compromise of one shared supplier, platform, component or service simultaneously affects multiple fleets or mobility providers.",
      "source": "RDW addition",
      "surfaces": [],
      "terms": [
        "single point of failure",
        "shared dependency",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "evidence_types": [
        "paper",
        "signal"
      ],
      "paper_queries": [
        "connected vehicles critical infrastructure national security",
        "satellite communication vehicles security"
      ],
      "signal_queries": [
        "automotive critical infrastructure threat",
        "connected vehicles national security",
        "transportation infrastructure cyber campaign",
        "satellite vehicle communication disruption"
      ]
    }
  ]
}