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  "generated_at": "2026-11-07T23:10:28.393216+01:00",
  "records": [
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-0D142A1C8BA2",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland 2024 voor ondernemers",
      "description": "Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland 2024 voor ondernemers",
      "published": "2024-10-28",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/cybersecuritybeeld-nederland-2024-voor-ondernemers",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-5872C1438ABD",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Aanhoudende statelijke cyberspionagecampagne via kwetsbare edge devices",
      "description": "Eerder dit jaar heeft het NCSC samen met de Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD) en de Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) een rapport gepubliceerd over de geavanceerde COATHANGER-malware gericht op FortiGate-systemen. Sindsdien heeft de MIVD nader onderzoek gedaan en is gebleken dat de Chinese cyberspionagecampagne veel omvangrijker blijkt te zijn dan eerder bekend. Het NCSC vraagt daarom extra aandacht voor deze campagne en het misbruik van kwetsbaarheden in edge devices. Hiervoor heeft het NCSC een kennisproduct opgesteld met aanvullende informatie over edge devices, bijbehorende uitdagingen en te nemen maatregelen.",
      "published": "2024-06-10",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/aanhoudende-statelijke-cyberspionagecampagne-kwetsbare-edge-devices",
      "matched_terms": [
        "espionage",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "espionage"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.78,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between INC-2024-5872C1438ABD and T-017: structured overlap in impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, assessment_context_and_feature; shared terms: chinese, espionage, unknown."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-85DFC73C1FF5",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Naam NCSC wederom misbruikt in phishingcampagne",
      "description": "Het NCSC heeft berichten ontvangen dat mensen per e-mail zijn benaderd door het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) waarin wordt opgeroepen tot het activeren van een antivirusoplossing. Deze e-mails maken deel uit van een phishingcampagne. In algemene zin neemt het NCSC geen contact op met burgers over digitale dreigingen en antivirusoplossingen.",
      "published": "2024-11-22",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/naam-ncsc-wederom-misbruikt-phishingcampagne",
      "matched_terms": [
        "identity",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "identity"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "phishing"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-9A279A19EF23",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "'De aandacht voor digitale dreigingen verschuift richting de bestuurder'",
      "description": "De NIS2-richtlijn brengt veranderingen met zich mee voor bedrijven en organisaties die hieraan moeten gaan voldoen. In dit interview deelt Peter Baard (manager ICT en CISO bij NV RENDO Holding) zijn visie op de impact van NIS2. Hij bespreekt onderwerpen zoals de bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid, de meldplicht en de grootste uitdagingen die de richtlijn met zich meebrengt. Ook geeft hij inzichten in hoe organisaties zich het beste kunnen voorbereiden op deze nieuwe verplichtingen.",
      "published": "2024-10-16",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/interviews/de-aandacht-voor-digitale-dreigingen-verschuift-richting-de-bestuurder",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-A5BF43D96FE2",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Wet bevordering digitale weerbaarheid bedrijven aangenomen door de Tweede Kamer",
      "description": "Op dinsdag 19 maart 2024 heeft de Tweede Kamer het wetsvoorstel bevordering digitale weerbaarheid bedrijven (Wbdwb) aangenomen. Het wetsvoorstel legt de taken en bevoegdheden van de minister van Economische Zaken en Klimaat (EZK) vast op het terrein van digitale weerbaarheid van niet-vitale bedrijven in Nederland, zoals het verwerken en verspreiden van informatie over kwetsbaarheden, dreigingen en incidenten en het samenwerken met andere bestuursorganen en organisaties.",
      "published": "2024-03-21",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/wet-bevordering-digitale-weerbaarheid-bedrijven-aangenomen-door-de-tweede-kamer",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-AB70AFF1B68A",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "CSBN 2024: turbulente tijden, onvoorziene effecten",
      "description": "De digitale dreiging voor Nederland is groot en divers. Nederland is doelwit van cyberaanvallen en wordt daarnaast geraakt door cyberaanvallen elders die vervolgens doorwerken binnen het digitale ecosysteem. Ook is een intensivering te zien in de activiteiten én een verbreding van de capaciteiten van statelijke actoren.",
      "published": "2024-10-28",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/csbn-2024-turbulente-tijden-onvoorziene-effecten",
      "matched_terms": [
        "state_actor",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "state_actor"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-C8F296533D93",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "NIS2-Quickscan helpt organisaties bij voorbereiding op nieuwe cyberwet",
      "description": "Op donderdag 29 februari heeft de Rijksoverheid de NIS2-Quickscan gelanceerd: een hulpmiddel voor organisaties die willen weten hoe zij zich kunnen voorbereiden op de komst van de nieuwe Europese NIS2-richtlijn. Deze richtlijn is gericht op het vergroten van de digitale weerbaarheid van organisaties in de Europese Unie.",
      "published": "2024-02-29",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/nis2-quickscan-helpt-organisaties-bij-voorbereiding-op-nieuwe-cyberwet",
      "matched_terms": [
        "government",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "government"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-CF51E5827C49",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Motie-Boswijk c.s. over een analyse van de risico's van elektrische auto's voor de nationale veiligheid",
      "description": "De motie verzoekt de regering om een analyse van de risico's van elektrische auto's voor de nationale veiligheid en, indien risico's worden geconstateerd, opties voor mitigatie uit te werken, waaronder de optie van gebiedsverboden bij militaire complexen, kritieke infrastructuur en overheidsgebouwen.",
      "published": "2024-04-16",
      "url": "https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2024Z06717&did=2024D15517",
      "matched_terms": [
        "government",
        "healthcare",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "government",
        "healthcare"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-E9080FDF6F40",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Mijn Cyberweerbare Zaak-subsidie voor kleine bedrijven opent",
      "description": "Op 2 september gaat de subsidieregeling ‘Mijn Cyberweerbare Zaak’ weer open. Micro- en kleine ondernemingen kunnen met deze regeling subsidie krijgen voor de kosten van de aanschaf en implementatie van één of meer belangrijke cyberweerbaarheidsmaatregelen. Dit jaar stelt het Digital Trust Center (DTC) een totaalbedrag van €1.000.000 beschikbaar om de financiële drempel te verlagen. Met name kleine ondernemingen ervaren deze drempel bij het nemen van basismaatregelen die de weerbaarheid tegen cyberaanvallen verhogen.",
      "published": "2024-08-30",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/mijn-cyberweerbare-zaak-subsidie-voor-kleine-bedrijven-opent",
      "matched_terms": [
        "finance",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "finance"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-27104296C627",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Motie-Boswijk c.s. over het vervolgonderzoek naar de beveiliging van vitale infrastructuur met spoed uitvoeren",
      "description": "De motie stelt dat onderzoek bevestigt dat slimme elektrische voertuigen risico's op het gebied van spionage en sabotage opleveren en verzoekt om versneld vervolgonderzoek naar verstrekkende beveiligingsmaatregelen rond bijvoorbeeld vitale infrastructuur.",
      "published": "2025-04-09",
      "url": "https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2025Z06917&did=2025D15887",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "espionage",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "automotive",
        "espionage"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.78,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between INC-2025-27104296C627 and T-017: structured overlap in impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, assessment_context_and_feature; shared terms: spionage, voertuigen, espionage, direct, unknown."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-351FB1F38873",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Cybersecuritybeeld 2025: dreigingen divers en onvoorspelbaar, digitale basishygiëne op orde blijft cruciaal",
      "description": "De Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV) heeft het Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland 2025 (CSBN) gepubliceerd. Het CSBN schetst een beeld van een digitaal dreigingslandschap dat steeds complexer en onvoorspelbaarder wordt. Cyberaanvallen worden geavanceerder terwijl digitale systemen onderling sterk van elkaar afhankelijk zijn. Deze ontwikkeling vraagt om een brede, proactieve aanpak om digitale weerbaarheid te vergroten. In dit bericht belichten we de belangrijkste aandachtspunten uit het CSBN voor Nederlandse organisaties en bedrijven.",
      "published": "2025-11-26",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/cybersecuritybeeld-2025-dreigingen-divers-en-onvoorspelbaar-digitale-basishygiene-op-orde-blijft",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-3BFEBB4A4146",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Uitvoering van de motie van het lid Boswijk c.s. over een analyse van de risico's van elektrische auto's voor de nationale veiligheid",
      "description": "De regering rapporteert over een brede nationale risicoanalyse naar slimme elektrische voertuigen. De onderzoeksopdracht is verbreed van elektrische voertuigen naar slimme voertuigen die met netwerken zoals het internet verbonden zijn, ongeacht hun herkomst. Uit de risicoanalyse blijkt een bepaalde mate van risico op het gebied van spionage en sabotage.",
      "published": "2025-03-19",
      "url": "https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2025Z05094&did=2025D11739",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "espionage",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "automotive",
        "espionage"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.52,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.78,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between INC-2025-3BFEBB4A4146 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, assessment_context_and_feature, assessment_multi_axis, assessment_asset_and_impact; shared terms: spionage, voertuigen, espionage, direct, unknown."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-3E345776A1B4",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Onze jury presenteert: de Wall of Fame van 2024!",
      "description": "Al jaren is het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) hét meldpunt van kwetsbaarheden in de digitale infrastructuur van Rijksoverheid of vitale partijen. Securityonderzoekers van buitenaf zetten hun kennis en kunde in als extra paar ogen en oren van ons Fusion Centre. Met hun impactvolle CVD-meldingen dragen zij direct bij aan de digitale weerbaarheid van Nederland.",
      "published": "2025-01-29",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/expertblogs/onze-jury-presenteert-de-wall-fame-van-2024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "government",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "government"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-81749A0996D5",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "NCSC en DTC lanceren gezamenlijke basisprincipes voor digitale weerbaarheid",
      "description": "Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) en het Digital Trust Center (DTC) introduceren een vernieuwde, gezamenlijke set basisprincipes om de digitale weerbaarheid van Nederlandse bedrijven en organisaties te versterken. Met de komst van deze uniforme en breed afgestemde set basisprincipes is er nu één leidraad die toepasbaar is voor alle bedrijven en organisaties in Nederland.",
      "published": "2025-04-07",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/ncsc-en-dtc-lanceren-gezamenlijke-basisprincipes-voor-digitale-weerbaarheid",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-90430079F0CC",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Een passend niveau van digitale weerbaarheid – op zoek naar het gouden midden",
      "description": "Hoe kom je als organisatie tot een passend niveau van digitale weerbaarheid? Als cybersecurity-adviseur lees ik veel rapporten over dreigingen en maatregelen om je als organisatie te beschermen. In gesprek met organisaties blijkt dan vaak dat het toepassen van die maatregelen om maatwerk vraagt. Wat betekenen die maatregelen voor hun specifieke situatie? Iedere organisatie heeft immers een eigen dreigingsprofiel, een eigen IT-of OT-landschap, budget etc. Je wilt uiteindelijk maatregelen die passend zijn voor jouw organisatie. Maar hoe kom je daar?",
      "published": "2025-12-05",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/expertblogs/op-zoek-naar-het-gouden-midden",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-9CE04747E5D8",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Eefje Zents Chief Relations Officer/directeur Samenwerking Digitale weerbaarheid bij NCSC",
      "description": "Eefje Zents wordt met ingang van 15 september 2025 Chief Relations Officer/directeur Samenwerking Digitale weerbaarheid bij het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) van het ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid.",
      "published": "2025-08-15",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/eefje-zents-chief-relations-officerdirecteur-samenwerking-digitale-weerbaarheid-bij-ncsc",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-A3B5F1AF03AF",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Praatplaat digitale veiligheid: Samenwerken aan preventie én incidentrespons",
      "description": "Hoe zorg je als mkb’er dat je goed bent voorbereid op digitale dreigingen? En wat doe je als er tóch iets misgaat? Om het gesprek hierover tussen bedrijven en hun IT-dienstverlener(s) te faciliteren, is een interactieve 'praatplaat' ontwikkeld door NLdigital, Cyberveilig Nederland, CIO Platform Nederland, VNO-NCW, MKB-Nederland en het Digital Trust Center.",
      "published": "2025-04-23",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/praatplaat-digitale-veiligheid-samenwerken-aan-preventie-en-incidentrespons",
      "matched_terms": [
        "healthcare",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "healthcare"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-D7264AB2DFE8",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "28 publieke en private partijen tekenen convenant samenwerking Cyclotron",
      "description": "Vandaag heeft het NCSC samen met 27 partijen het convenant samenwerking Cyclotron ondertekend op de ONE Conference. De ondertekenaars zijn een groot aantal private partijen en daarnaast ook de AIVD, MIVD, Politie en het NCTV. De ondertekening is een volgende belangrijke stap in de samenwerking met als doel om het beeld op cyberdreigingen en incidenten te versterken door het structureel delen van informatie, het gezamenlijk analyseren van informatie en het verstrekken van informatie uit die analyses aan belanghebbende organisaties. Hiermee wordt de digitale weerbaarheid van Nederland verhoogd.",
      "published": "2025-09-30",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/28-publieke-en-private-partijen-tekenen-convenant-samenwerking-cyclotron",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2025-F05EDE09C710",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Internetconsultatie Cyberbeveiligingsbesluit en Besluit weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten gesloten",
      "description": "Internetconsultatie Cyberbeveiligingsbesluit en Besluit weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten gesloten",
      "published": "2025-03-13",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/internetconsultatie-cyberbeveiligingsbesluit-en-besluit-weerbaarheid-kritieke-entiteiten-gesloten",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-07B7D618266C",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "De moderne auto als mogelijke spion",
      "description": "Moderne voertuigen bevatten in toenemende mate digitale systemen die data verzamelen en met internet verbonden zijn. De AIVD waarschuwt voor spionagerisico's rond moderne voertuigen en beschrijft dat verschillende partijen, waaronder statelijke actoren, toegang kunnen verkrijgen tot voertuigdata.",
      "published": "2026-09-30",
      "url": "https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/2026/09/30/de-moderne-auto-als-mogelijke-spion",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "data_collection",
        "espionage",
        "state_actor",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "automotive",
        "data_collection",
        "espionage",
        "state_actor"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.52,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.78,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between INC-2026-07B7D618266C and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, assessment_context_and_feature, assessment_multi_axis, assessment_asset_and_impact; shared terms: voertuigen, espionage, digitale, direct, unknown."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-07B8D7E7A4F1",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Cyberadvies Edge devices structureel doelwit van Chinese cyberactoren",
      "description": "MIVD en AIVD verwachten dat het aantal Chinese cyberaanvallen via kwetsbare edge devices de komende jaren flink zal toenemen. Chinese hackers richten zich steeds vaker op apparaten waarmee organisaties verbinding maken met internet.",
      "published": "2026-10-07",
      "url": "https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/2026/10/07/cyberadvies-edge-devices-structureel-doelwit-van-chinese-cyberactoren",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-19CEE4099C2E",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Het oordeel van onze jury: de Wall of Fame 2025",
      "description": "Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) vervult al jarenlang een centrale rol als meldpunt voor kwetsbaarheden binnen de digitale infrastructuur van de Rijksoverheid en vitale organisaties. Securityonderzoekers van buiten het NCSC leveren daarbij een onmisbare bijdrage. Met hun expertise fungeren zij als verlengstuk van ons Fusion Centre en helpen zij actief mee om digitale risico’s tijdig te signaleren. Hun CVD-meldingen dragen aantoonbaar bij aan het versterken van de digitale weerbaarheid van Nederland.",
      "published": "2026-01-26",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/expertblogs/het-oordeel-van-onze-jury-de-wall-of-fame-2025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "government",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "government"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-305008C542AE",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "NCSC en toezichthouders maken afspraken over samenwerking bij Cyberbeveiligingswet",
      "description": "Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) en de toezichthouders Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur (RDI), Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport (ILT), Autoriteit Nucleaire Veiligheid en Stralingsbescherming (ANVS) en Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (NVWA) hebben op woensdag 7 oktober tijdens de ONE Conference, officieel hun handtekening gezet onder nieuwe samenwerkafspraken. Deze stap vloeit voort uit de Cyberbeveiligingswet (Cbw), die organisaties verplicht maatregelen te nemen om hun digitale weerbaarheid te vergroten. Naast de afspraken tussen het NCSC en de toezichthouders, hebben de toezichthouders ook onderling afspraken vastgelegd.",
      "published": "2026-10-07",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/ncsc-en-toezichthouders-maken-afspraken-over-samenwerking-bij-cyberbeveiligingswet",
      "matched_terms": [
        "transportation",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "transportation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-39CD04F192DA",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Digitale dreigingen in slimme voertuigen",
      "description": "Moderne voertuigen hebben steeds vaker digitale systemen die data verzamelen en verbonden zijn met internet. Volgens de AIVD kunnen verschillende partijen, waaronder statelijke actoren, interesse hebben in deze data en er toegang toe verkrijgen. De AIVD wijst daarbij op spionagerisico's van slimme voertuigen.",
      "published": "2026-09-30",
      "url": "https://www.aivd.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/09/30/digitale-dreigingen-in-slimme-voertuigen",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "data_collection",
        "espionage",
        "state_actor",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "automotive",
        "data_collection",
        "espionage",
        "state_actor"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.52,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.78,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between INC-2026-39CD04F192DA and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, assessment_context_and_feature, assessment_multi_axis, assessment_asset_and_impact; shared terms: voertuigen, espionage, digitale, direct, unknown."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-496680338AB9",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "House of Cyber versterkt digitale weerbaarheid",
      "description": "De overheid bundelt de krachten op het gebied van cyberveiligheid in het op te richten House of Cyber in Den Haag. Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC), het ministerie van Defensie, de Nationale Politie, het Nederlands Forensisch Instituut en diverse andere publieke en private organisaties gaan onder één dak samenwerken aan de versterking van de digitale weerbaarheid en slagkracht van Nederland, het Koninkrijk en bondgenoten.",
      "published": "2026-02-27",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/house-of-cyber-versterkt-digitale-weerbaarheid",
      "matched_terms": [
        "government",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "government"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-4C1FD66A11D5",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Versterkt NCSC: alle Nederlandse organisaties krijgen één aanspreekpunt voor digitale weerbaarheid",
      "description": "Per 1 januari 2026 zijn het Digital Trust Center (DTC) en het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) samengevoegd. Hierdoor is het NCSC nu voor 2,4 miljoen Nederlandse organisaties het aanspreekpunt voor digitale weerbaarheid. Met een vernieuwde website, uitgebreid aanbod aan kennis en 24/7 bereikbaarheid versterkt het NCSC de digitale weerbaarheid van Nederland.",
      "published": "2026-01-06",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/versterkt-ncsc-alle-nederlandse-organisaties-krijgen-een-aanspreekpunt-voor-digitale-weerbaarheid",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-7F30E24CE333",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Beveilig je IP-camera’s om spionage van statelijke actoren te voorkomen",
      "description": "Russische statelijke actoren hacken IP-camera’s om (vitale) infrastructuur van NAVO-landen, waaronder Nederland, te bespioneren. Het NCSC ziet dat niet alleen statelijke actoren misbruik maken van deze camera’s, maar ook hacktivistische groeperingen en cybercriminelen. Daarom roept het NCSC organisaties en thuisgebruikers op om IP-camera’s beter te beveiligen door onder andere je apparaten up-to-date te houden, je netwerk te segmenteren en het aanvalsoppervlak te verkleinen. Lees hieronder ons uitgebreide handelingsperspectief.",
      "published": "2026-07-10",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/alerts/beveilig-je-ip-cameras-om-spionage-van-statelijke-actoren-te-voorkomen",
      "matched_terms": [
        "espionage",
        "state_actor",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "espionage",
        "state_actor"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.78,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between INC-2026-7F30E24CE333 and T-017: structured overlap in impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, assessment_context_and_feature; shared terms: spionage, espionage, camera, unknown."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-863598EBC979",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "De Cyberbeveiligingswet in laatste fase van vaststelling",
      "description": "Op 6 en 7 juli 2026 vergadert de Eerste Kamer over de Cyberbeveiligingswet (Cbw). Dan zal er ook over het wetsvoorstel worden gestemd. Als de Eerste Kamer het wetsvoorstel aanneemt, treedt de Cbw naar verwachting op 15 augustus 2026 in werking. Organisaties die onder de wet vallen, krijgen dan te maken met nieuwe verplichtingen op het gebied van digitale weerbaarheid.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/de-cyberbeveiligingswet-in-laatste-fase-van-vaststelling",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-9183FC830307",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Uitvoering moties nationale veiligheidsrisico's van slimme (elektrische) voertuigen",
      "description": "Het kabinet meldt dat een risicoanalyse van slimme elektrische voertuigen bestond uit een dreigingsanalyse en impactanalyse met scenario's waarin voertuigen de nationale veiligheid konden schaden. Uit de risicoanalyse bleek een bepaalde mate van risico op het gebied van spionage en sabotage.",
      "published": "2026-03-26",
      "url": "https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2026D14286&did=2026D14286",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "espionage",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "automotive",
        "espionage"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.78,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between INC-2026-9183FC830307 and T-017: structured overlap in impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, assessment_context_and_feature; shared terms: spionage, voertuigen, espionage, direct, unknown."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-94AC3B53517C",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Vernieuwd NCSC klaar voor de toekomst",
      "description": "Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) heeft een beslissende stap gezet om beter te voldoen aan de groeiende maatschappelijke behoefte aan digitale weerbaarheid. Met een vernieuwd directieteam en een nieuwe organisatiestructuur wordt het NCSC wendbaarder en schaalbaarder.",
      "published": "2026-07-23",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/vernieuwd-ncsc-klaar-voor-de-toekomst",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-A2B8B456D28E",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Veiligheidsdiensten verwachten toename Chinese cyberaanvallen",
      "description": "Het aantal cyberaanvallen door Chinese hackers op kwetsbare edge devices neemt de komende jaren aanzienlijk toe. Dat schrijven de Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD) en Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) op basis van inlichtingen. De diensten publiceren daarom in nauwe samenwerking met het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) een cyberadvies met uitleg over welke factoren leiden tot deze waarschuwing en hoe organisaties zich hier tegen kunnen weren.",
      "published": "2026-10-07",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/veiligheidsdiensten-verwachten-toename-chinese-cyberaanvallen",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-AE987B2C52DE",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Cybersecuritybeeld 2026: AI versnelt en vergroot de dreiging",
      "description": "De capaciteiten en activiteiten van statelijke actoren en cybercriminelen nemen verder toe, terwijl de digitale weerbaarheid van Nederlandse organisaties hierbij achterblijft. Dat concludeert de Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV) in het vandaag verschenen Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland (CSBN) 2026. Uit het CSBN blijkt dat kwaadwillenden kunstmatige intelligentie (AI) aantoonbaar inzetten in alle fasen van cyberaanvallen, waardoor de snelheid en schaal van aanvallen verder toenemen.",
      "published": "2026-11-06",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/cybersecuritybeeld-2026-ai-versnelt-en-vergroot-de-dreiging",
      "matched_terms": [
        "AI",
        "state_actor",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI",
        "state_actor"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-BC9ADD3007FF",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Wat doet het mkb aan digitale weerbaarheid?",
      "description": "Het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) onderzoekt elk jaar in welke mate het mkb bepaalde ICT-veiligheidsmaatregelen treft. Een paar cijfers: slechts 29% van de mkb-bedrijven maakt een risico-analyse en maar 9% doet aan verplichte trainingen voor medewerkers. Er valt dus nog veel te winnen op het gebied van digitale weerbaarheid. Hoe effectief is de inzet van samenwerkingsverbanden om het mkb hierin te stimuleren?",
      "published": "2026-02-13",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/wat-doet-het-mkb-aan-digitale-weerbaarheid",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-C03B31B8BFCF",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Tweede Kamer stemt in met Cyberbeveiligingswet",
      "description": "Vandaag, 15 april, heeft de Tweede Kamer de wetsvoorstellen voor de Cyberbeveiligingswet (Cbw) en de Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten aangenomen. Dat is een belangrijke stap, ook voor ons werk bij NCSC.",
      "published": "2026-04-15",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/tweede-kamer-stemt-in-met-cyberbeveiligingswet",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-CB425E0C2340",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Debat in Tweede Kamer over wetsvoorstellen Cyberbeveiligingswet en Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten",
      "description": "Op 23 maart 2026 was in de Tweede Kamer een wetgevingsoverleg over de Cyberbeveiligingswet (Cbw) en de Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten (Wwke).",
      "published": "2026-03-24",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/debat-in-tweede-kamer-over-wetsvoorstellen-cyberbeveiligingswet-en-wet-weerbaarheid-kritieke",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-CE11DBAB0FBF",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "AI versnelt en vergroot de dreiging: nu handelen noodzakelijk",
      "description": "AI (Artificial Intelligence) versnelt en vergroot de dreiging van cyberaanvallen tegen onze overheid en maatschappij. De aanvallen worden door AI groter, complexer en zullen toenemen. Daarom is daartegen handelen nu noodzakelijk.",
      "published": "2026-09-24",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/ai-versnelt-en-vergroot-de-dreiging-nu-handelen-noodzakelijk",
      "matched_terms": [
        "government",
        "AI",
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "government",
        "AI"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)",
        "Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-E305F1EBC85C",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Cyberbeveiligingswet en Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten vanaf vandaag van kracht",
      "description": "Cyberbeveiligingswet en Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten vanaf vandaag van kracht",
      "published": "2026-08-15",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/cbw-en-wwke-nu-van-kracht",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-FAFC60C53E40",
      "type": "assessment",
      "title": "Cyberbeveiligingswet en Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten vanaf 15 augustus 2026 van kracht",
      "description": "De Eerste Kamer heeft op 7 juli ingestemd met de Cyberbeveiligingswet (Cbw) en de Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten (Wwke). Hiermee zet Nederland een belangrijke stap in het versterken van de digitale en fysieke weerbaarheid van organisaties tegen toenemende dreigingen.",
      "published": "2026-07-07",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/cbw-en-wwke-vanaf-15-augustus-2026-van-kracht",
      "matched_terms": [
        "real_world",
        "strategic_assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-28905",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-28905",
      "description": "A heap buffer overflow in the image processing binary of the MIB3 infotainment unit allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on it. The vulnerability was originally discovered in Skoda Superb III car with MIB3 infotainment unit OEM part number 3V0035820. The list of affected MIB3 OEM part numbers is provided in the referenced resources.",
      "published": "2025-06-28T16:15:22.410",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28905",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "skoda"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-28905"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.0,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-28906",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-28906",
      "description": "A command injection in the networking service of the MIB3 infotainment allows an attacker already presenting in the system to escalate privileges and obtain administrative access to the system. The vulnerability was originally discovered in Skoda Superb III car with MIB3 infotainment unit OEM part number 3V0035820. The list of affected MIB3 OEM part numbers is provided in the referenced resources.",
      "published": "2025-06-28T16:15:22.573",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28906",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "skoda"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-28906"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-28909",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-28909",
      "description": "A specific flaw exists within the Bluetooth stack of the MIB3 unit. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in an integer overflow when receiving fragmented HCI packets on a channel. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass the MTU check on a channel with enabled fragmentation. Consequently, this can lead to a buffer overflow in upper layer profiles, which can be used to obtain remote code execution. The vulnerability was originally discovered in Skoda Superb III car with MIB3 infotainment unit OEM part number 3V0035820. The list of affected MIB3 OEM part numbers is provided in the referenced resources.",
      "published": "2025-06-28T16:15:23.080",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28909",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "skoda"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-28909"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.0,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-28910",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-28910",
      "description": "A specific flaw exists within the Bluetooth stack of the MIB3 infotainment system. The issue results from the disabled abortion flag eventually leading to bypassing assertion functions. The vulnerability was originally discovered in Skoda Superb III car with MIB3 infotainment unit OEM part number 3V0035820. The list of affected MIB3 OEM part numbers is provided in the referenced resources.",
      "published": "2025-06-28T16:15:23.253",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28910",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "skoda"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-28910"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.0,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-34398",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-34398",
      "description": "Mercedes-Benz head-unit NTG6 contains functions to import or export profile settings over USB. Some values of this table are serialized archive according boost library. The boost library contains a vulnerability/null pointer dereference.",
      "published": "2025-02-13T22:15:10.603",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34398",
      "matched_terms": [
        "mercedes-benz"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-34398"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-34399",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-34399",
      "description": "Mercedes-Benz head-unit NTG6 contains functions to import or export profile settings over USB. Some values of this table are serialized archive according boost library. The version of boost library contains vulnerability integer overflow.",
      "published": "2025-02-13T22:15:10.730",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34399",
      "matched_terms": [
        "mercedes-benz"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-34399"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-34400",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-34400",
      "description": "Mercedes-Benz head-unit NTG6 contains functions to import or export profile settings over USB. In case of parsing file, service try to define header inside the file and convert it to null-terminated string. If character is missed, will return null pointer.",
      "published": "2025-02-13T22:15:10.847",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34400",
      "matched_terms": [
        "mercedes-benz"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-34400"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-34402",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-34402",
      "description": "Mercedes-Benz head-unit NTG6 contains functions to import or export profile settings over USB. Inside file is encapsulate another file, which service will drop during processing. Due to missed checks, attacker can achieve Arbitrary File Write with service speech rights.",
      "published": "2025-02-13T23:15:09.337",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34402",
      "matched_terms": [
        "mercedes-benz"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-34402"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.7,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2023-53523",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2023-53523",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: gs_usb: fix time stamp counter initialization If the gs_usb device driver is unloaded (or unbound) before the interface is shut down, the USB stack first calls the struct usb_driver::disconnect and then the struct net_device_ops::ndo_stop callback. In gs_usb_disconnect() all pending bulk URBs are killed, i.e. no more RX'ed CAN frames are send from the USB device to the host. Later in gs_can_close() a reset control message is send to each CAN channel to remove the controller from the CAN bus. In this race window the USB device can still receive CAN frames from the bus and internally queue them to be send to the host. At least in the current version of the candlelight firmware, the queue of received CAN frames is not emptied during the reset command. After loading (or binding) the gs_usb driver, new URBs are submitted during the struct net_device_ops::ndo_open callback and the candlelight firmware starts sending its already queued CAN frames to the host. However, this scenario was not considered when implementing the hardware timestamp function. The cycle counter/time counter infrastructure is set up (gs_usb_timestamp_init()) after the USBs are submitted, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference if timecounter_cyc2time() (via the call chain: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() -> gs_usb_set_timestamp() -> gs_usb_skb_set_timestamp()) is called too early. Move the gs_usb_timestamp_init() function before the URBs are submitted to fix this problem. For a comprehensive solution, we need to consider gs_usb devices with more than 1 channel. The cycle counter/time counter infrastructure is setup per channel, but the RX URBs are per device. Once gs_can_open() of _a_ channel has been called, and URBs have been submitted, the gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() can be called for _all_ available channels, even for channels that are not running, yet. As cycle counter/time counter has not set up, this will again lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Convert the cycle counter/time counter from a \"per channel\" to a \"per device\" functionality. Also set it up, before submitting any URBs to the device. Further in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(), don't process any URBs for not started CAN channels, only resubmit the URB.",
      "published": "2025-10-01T12:15:56.747",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53523",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "can frames"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2023-53523"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 5.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-13943",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-13943",
      "description": "Tesla Model S Iris Modem QCMAP_ConnectionManager Improper Input Validation Sandbox Escape Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escape the sandbox on affected affected Tesla Model S vehicles. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the QCMAP_ConnectionManager component. An attacker can abuse the service to assign LAN addresses to the WWAN. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to access network services that were only intended to be exposed to the internal LAN. Was ZDI-CAN-23199.",
      "published": "2025-04-30T20:15:20.520",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13943",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-13943"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-23929",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-23929",
      "description": "This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to create arbitrary files on affected installations of Pioneer DMH-WT7600NEX devices. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. The specific flaw exists within the telematics functionality. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of root.",
      "published": "2025-01-31T01:15:09.697",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23929",
      "matched_terms": [
        "pioneer",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Telematics"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-23929"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-23971",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-23971",
      "description": "This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of ChargePoint Home Flex charging stations. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of OCPP messages. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root.",
      "published": "2025-01-31T00:15:09.920",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23971",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp",
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-23971"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-36842",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-36842",
      "description": "An issue in Oncord+ Android Infotainment Systems OS Android 12, Model Hardware TS17,Hardware part Number F57L_V3.2_20220301, and Build Number PlatformVER:K24-2023/05/09-v0.01 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the ADB port component.",
      "published": "2025-04-15T16:15:23.187",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36842",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-36842"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43648",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43648",
      "description": "Command injection in the <redacted> parameter of a <redacted>.exe request leads to remote code execution as the root user. This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before version 24120701. Likelihood: Moderate – This action is not a common place for command injection vulnerabilities to occur. Thus, an attacker will likely only be able to find this vulnerability by reverse-engineering the firmware or trying it on all <redacted> fields. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a payload. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services. CVSS clarification. The attack can be executed over any network connection the station is listening to and serves the web interface (AV:N), and there are no additional security measure sin place that need to be circumvented (AC:L), the attack does not rely on preconditions (AT:N). The attack does require authentication, but the level of authentication is irrelevant (PR:L), it does not require user interaction (UI:N). If is a full system compromise, potentially fully compromising confidentiality, integrity and availability of the devicer (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H). A compromised charger can be used to \"pivot\" onto networks that should otherwise be closed, cause a low confidentiality and interity impact on subsequent systems. (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Because this device is an EV charger handing significant amounts of power, we suspect this vulnerability can have a safety impact (S:P). The attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:26.980",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43648",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43648"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43649",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43649",
      "description": "Authenticated command injection in the filename of a <redacted>.exe request leads to remote code execution as the root user. This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before version 24120701. Likelihood: Moderate – This action is not a common place for command injection vulnerabilities to occur. Thus, an attacker will likely only be able to find this vulnerability by reverse-engineering the firmware or trying it on all <redacted> fields. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a payload. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services. CVSS clarification: This attack can be performed over any network conenction serving the web interfacr (AV:N), and there are not additional mitigating measures that need to be circumvented (AC:L) or other prerequisites (AT:N). The attack does require privileges, but the level does not matter (PR:L), there is no user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leeds to a full compromised of the charger (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) and a compromised charger can be used to \"pivot\" to networks that should normally not be reachable (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Because this is an EV chargers with significant pwoer, there is a potential safety imp0act (S:P). THis attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:27.233",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43649",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43649"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43650",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43650",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability in Iocharger firmware for AC models allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects firmware versions before 24120701. Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services. CVSS clarification: The attack can be executed over any network connection serving the web interface (AV:N). There are no additional measures that need to be circumvented (AC:L) or attack preconditions (AT:N). THe attack is privileged, but the level does not matter (PR:L) and does not require user interaction (UI:N). Attack leads to full system compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) and compromised devices can be used to \"pivot\" to other networks that should be unreachable (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Because this an EV charger using high power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). The attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:27.417",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43650",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43650"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.3,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43651",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43651",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before version 241207101 Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services. CVSS clarification: Any network connection serving the web interface is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are no additional measures to circumvent (AC:L) nor does the attack require special conditions to be present (AT:N). The attack requires authentication, but the level does not matter (PR:L), nor is user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) and a compromised device can be used to potentially \"pivot\" into a network that should nopt be reachable (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Because this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). THe attack can be autometed (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:27.590",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43651",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43651"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.3,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43652",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43652",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701 Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services.",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:27.757",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43652",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43652"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43653",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43653",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701. Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services. CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:27.950",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43653",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43653"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43654",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43654",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability in Iocharger firmware for AC models allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects all Iocharger AC EV charger models on a firmware version before 25010801. Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services. CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:28.127",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43654",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43654"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43655",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43655",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701. Likelihood: Moderate – The attacker will first need to find the name of the script, and needs a (low privilege) account to gain access to the script, or convince a user with such access to execute a request to it. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and deletefiles and services. CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:28.300",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43655",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43655"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.3,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43656",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43656",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701. Likelihood: Moderate – It might be difficult for an attacker to identify the file structure of the <redated> directory, and then modify the backup to add a new CGI script in the correct directory. Furthermore, the attacker will need an account to restore the settings backup, or convince a user with such access to upload a modified backup file. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and deletefiles and services. CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:28.487",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43656",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43656"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43657",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43657",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701. Likelihood: High. However, the attacker will need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the action.exe CGI binary and upload the crafted firmware file, or convince a user with such access to upload it. Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and deletefiles and services. CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:28.680",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43657",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43657"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43658",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43658",
      "description": "Patch traversal, External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability in Iocharger Home allows deletion of arbitrary files This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model before firmware version 25010801. Likelihood: High, but requires authentication Impact: Critical – The vulnerability can be used to delete any file on the charging station, severely impacting the integrity of the charging station. Furthermore, the vulnerability could be used to delete binaries required for the functioning of the charging station, severely impacting the availability of the charging station. CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads compromised of the integrity and availability of the device (VVC:N/VI:H/VA:H), with no effect on subsequent systems (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). We do not forsee a safety impact (S:N). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:28.867",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43658",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43658"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.2,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43659",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43659",
      "description": "After gaining access to the firmware of a charging station, a file at <redacted> can be accessed to obtain default credentials that are the same across all Iocharger AC model EV chargers. This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before firmware version 25010801. The issue is addressed by requiring a mandatory password change on first login, it is still recommended to change the password on older models. Likelihood: Moderate – The attacker will first have to abuse a code execution or file inclusion vulnerability (for example by using <redacted>.sh) to gain access to the <redacted>.json file, or obtain a firmware dump of the charging station or obtain the firmware via other channels. Impact: Critical – All chargers using Iocharger firmware for AC models started with the same initial password. For models with firmware version before 25010801 a password change was not mandatory. It is therefore very likely that this firmware password is still active on many chargers. These credentials could, once obtained, allow an attacker to log into many Iocharger charging station, and allow them to execute arbitrary commands via the System → Custom page. CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, and requires high privileges (PR:H), there is no user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a compromised of the confidentialy of the \"super user\" credentials of the device (VC:H/VI:N/VA:N), and can subsequently be used to full compromise and other devices (SC:H/SI:H/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:29.060",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43659",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43659"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.2,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43661",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43661",
      "description": "The <redacted>.so library, which is used by <redacted>, is vulnerable to a buffer overflow in the code that handles the deletion of certificates. This buffer overflow can be triggered by providing a long file path to the <redacted> action of the <redacted>.exe CGI binary or to the <redacted>.sh CGI script. This binary or script will write this file path to <redacted>, which is then read by <redacted>.so This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before version 24120701. Likelihood: Moderate – An attacker will have to find this exploit by either obtaining the binaries involved in this vulnerability, or by trial and error. Furthermore, the attacker will need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted>.exe CGI binary or <redacted>.sh script to trigger the vulnerability, or convince a user with such access send an HTTP request that triggers it. Impact: High – The <redacted> process, which we assume is responsible for OCPP communication, will keep crashing after performing the exploit. This happens because the buffer overflow causes the process to segfault before <redacted> is removed. This means that, even though <redacted> is automatically restarted, it will crash again as soon as it tries to parse the text file. CVSS clarification. The attack can be executed over any network connection the station is listening to and serves the web interface (AV:N), and there are no additional security measure sin place that need to be circumvented (AC:L), the attack does not rely on preconditions (AT:N). The attack does require authentication, but the level of authentication is irrelevant (PR:L), it does not require user interaction (UI:N). The attack leads to reducred availability of the device (VC:N/VI:N/VA:H). THere is not impact on subsequent systems. (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). Alltough this device is an EV charger handing significant amounts of power, we do not forsee a safety impact. The attack can be automated (AU:Y). Because the DoS condition is written to disk persistantly, it cannot be recovered by the user (R:I).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:29.450",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43661",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43661"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-43663",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-43663",
      "description": "There are many buffer overflow vulnerabilities present in several CGI binaries of the charging station.This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers beforeversion 24120701. Likelihood: High – Given the prevalence of these buffer overflows, and the clear error message of the web server, an attacker is very likely to be able to find these vulnerabilities. Impact: Low – Usually, overflowing one of these buffers just causes a segmentation fault of the CGI binary, which causes the web server to return a 502 Bad Gateway error. However the webserver itself is not affected, and no DoS can be achieved. Abusing these buffer overflows in a meaningful way requires highly technical knowledge, especially since ASLR also seems to be enabled on the charging station. However, a skilled attacker might be able to use one of these buffer overflows to obtain remote code execution. CVSS clarification. The attack can be executed over any network connection the station is listening to and serves the web interface (AV:N), and there are no additional security measure sin place that need to be circumvented (AC:L), the attack does not rely on preconditions (AT:N). The attack does require authentication, but the level of authentication is irrelevant (PR:L), it does not require user interaction (UI:N). The attack has a small impact on the availability of the device (VC:N/VI:N/VA:L). There is no impact on subsequent systems. (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). While this device is an EV charger handing significant amounts of power, we do not expect this vulnerability to have a safety impact. The attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
      "published": "2025-01-09T08:15:29.810",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43663",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "gateway"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Gateway",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-43663"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-46442",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-46442",
      "description": "An issue in the BYD Dilink Headunit System v3.0 to v4.0 allows attackers to bypass authentication via a bruteforce attack.",
      "published": "2024-12-10T19:15:27.030",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46442",
      "matched_terms": [
        "byd"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-46442"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-48854",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-48854",
      "description": "Off-by-one error in the TIFF image codec in QNX SDP versions 8.0, 7.1 and 7.0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause an information disclosure in the context of the process using the image codec.",
      "published": "2025-01-14T19:15:31.267",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48854",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-48854"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-48855",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-48855",
      "description": "Out-of-bounds read in the TIFF image codec in QNX SDP versions 8.0, 7.1 and 7.0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause an information disclosure in the context of the process using the image codec.",
      "published": "2025-01-14T19:15:31.413",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48855",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-48855"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-48856",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-48856",
      "description": "Out-of-bounds write in the PCX image codec in QNX SDP versions 8.0, 7.1 and 7.0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition or execute code in the context of the process using the image codec.",
      "published": "2025-01-14T19:15:31.543",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48856",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-48856"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-48857",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-48857",
      "description": "NULL pointer dereference in the PCX image codec in QNX SDP versions 8.0, 7.1 and 7.0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition in the context of the process using the image codec.",
      "published": "2025-01-14T19:15:31.680",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48857",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-48857"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-48858",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-48858",
      "description": "Improper input validation in the PCX image codec in QNX SDP versions 8.0, 7.1 and 7.0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition in the context of the process using the image codec.",
      "published": "2025-01-14T20:15:28.373",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48858",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-48858"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-51073",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-51073",
      "description": "An issue in KIA Seltos vehicle instrument cluster with software and hardware v1.0 allows attackers to control or disrupt CAN communication between the instrument cluster and CAN bus. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because the findings came from a potentially unrealistic test environment (an isolated ECU part that was not in a vehicle), and because the observed behavior follows the UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services) specification.",
      "published": "2024-11-22T16:15:33.730",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51073",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "diagnostic",
        "ecu",
        "kia",
        "uds",
        "unified diagnostic services"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU",
        "UDS Diagnostics"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-51073"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 6.7,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-51074",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-51074",
      "description": "Incorrect access control in KIA Seltos vehicle instrument cluster with software and hardware v1.0 allows attackers to arbitrarily change odometer readings in the vehicle by targeting the instrument cluster through the unsecured CAN network. NOTE: this is disputed by the supplier because the CAN bus is not externally exposed, and because the packets can only increase the odometer reading (which typically has no value to an adversary). Also, this is disputed by the Supplier because the findings came from a potentially unrealistic test environment (an isolated ECU part that was not in a vehicle), and because the observed behavior follows the UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services) specification.",
      "published": "2024-11-22T16:15:33.860",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51074",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "diagnostic",
        "ecu",
        "kia",
        "uds",
        "unified diagnostic services"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU",
        "UDS Diagnostics"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-51074"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 6.7,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-6030",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-6030",
      "description": "Tesla Model S oFono Unnecessary Privileges Sandbox Escape Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escape the sandbox on affected Tesla Model S vehicles. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute code within the sandbox on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the oFono process. The process allows an attacker to modify interfaces. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass the iptables network sandbox. Was ZDI-CAN-23200.",
      "published": "2025-04-30T20:15:21.030",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-6030"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.0,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-6031",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-6031",
      "description": "Tesla Model S oFono AT Command Heap-based Buffer Overflow Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected Tesla Model S vehicles. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute code on the target modem in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of responses from AT commands. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-23198.",
      "published": "2025-04-30T20:15:21.153",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-6031"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-6032",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-6032",
      "description": "Tesla Model S Iris Modem ql_atfwd Command Injection Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected Tesla Model S vehicles. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the ql_atfwd process. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code on the target modem in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-23201.",
      "published": "2025-04-30T20:15:21.283",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6032",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-6032"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-8356",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-8356",
      "description": "Visteon Infotainment VIP MCU Code Insufficient Validation of Data Authenticity Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of Visteon Infotainment systems. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the firmware update process of the VIP microcontroller. The process does not properly verify authenticity of the supplied firmware image before programming it into internal memory. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges execute arbitrary code in the context of the VIP MCU. Was ZDI-CAN-23758.",
      "published": "2024-11-22T22:15:18.980",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8356",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "visteon"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Infotainment",
        "OTA"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-8356"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2024-8357",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2024-8357",
      "description": "Visteon Infotainment App SoC Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of Visteon Infotainment systems. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. The specific flaw exists within the configuration of the application system-on-chip (SoC). The issue results from the lack of properly configured hardware root of trust. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of the boot process. Was ZDI-CAN-23759.",
      "published": "2024-11-22T22:15:19.107",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8357",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "visteon"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-8357"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-2082",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-2082",
      "description": "Tesla Model 3 VCSEC Integer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected Tesla Model 3 vehicles. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the VCSEC module. By manipulating the certificate response sent from the Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS), an attacker can trigger an integer overflow before writing to memory. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the VCSEC module and send arbitrary messages to the vehicle CAN bus. Was ZDI-CAN-23800.",
      "published": "2025-04-30T20:15:21.563",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2082",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "tesla",
        "tpms",
        "vcsec"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "Identity",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-2082"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-2474",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-2474",
      "description": "Out-of-bounds write in the PCX image codec in QNX SDP versions 8.0, 7.1 and 7.0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition or execute code in the context of the process using the image codec.",
      "published": "2025-06-10T18:15:30.477",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2474",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-2474"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-25271",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-25271",
      "description": "An unauthenticated adjacent attacker is able to configure a new OCPP backend, due to insecure defaults for the configuration interface.",
      "published": "2025-07-08T07:15:25.270",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25271",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-25271"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-28169",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-28169",
      "description": "BYD QIN PLUS DM-i Dilink OS v3.0_13.1.7.2204050.1 to v3.0_13.1.7.2312290.1_0 was discovered to cend broadcasts to the manufacturer's cloud server unencrypted, allowing attackers to execute a man-in-the-middle attack.",
      "published": "2025-04-23T20:15:43.767",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-28169",
      "matched_terms": [
        "byd"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-28169"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-30118",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-30118",
      "description": "An issue was discovered on the Audi Universal Traffic Recorder 2.88. It has Susceptibility to denial of service. It uses the same default credentials for all devices and does not implement proper multi-device authentication, allowing attackers to deny the owner access by occupying the only available connection. The SSID remains broadcast at all times, increasing exposure to potential attacks.",
      "published": "2025-03-25T20:15:22.447",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30118",
      "matched_terms": [
        "audi"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-30118"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-32058",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-32058",
      "description": "The Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch uses a RH850 module for CAN communication. RH850 is connected to infotainment over the INC interface through a custom protocol. There is a vulnerability during processing requests of this protocol on the V850 side which allows an attacker with code execution on the infotainment main SoC to perform code execution on the RH850 module and subsequently send arbitrary CAN messages over the connected CAN bus. First identified on Nissan Leaf ZE1 manufactured in 2020.",
      "published": "2026-02-15T11:15:52.773",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "bosch",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "infotainment",
        "nissan"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-32058"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-32059",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-32059",
      "description": "The specific flaw exists within the Bluetooth stack developed by Alps Alpine of the Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch. The issue results from the lack of proper boundary validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a stack-based buffer overflow when receiving a specific packet on the established upper layer L2CAP channel. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to obtain remote code execution on the Infotainment ECU with root privileges. First identified on Nissan Leaf ZE1 manufactured in 2020.",
      "published": "2026-02-15T11:15:53.880",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "alpine",
        "bosch",
        "ecu",
        "infotainment",
        "nissan"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "ECU",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-32059"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-32061",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-32061",
      "description": "The specific flaw exists within the Bluetooth stack developed by Alps Alpine of the Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch. The issue results from the lack of proper boundary validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a stack-based buffer overflow when receiving a specific packet on the established upper layer L2CAP channel. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to obtain remote code execution on the Infotainment ECU with root privileges. First identified on Nissan Leaf ZE1 manufactured in 2020.",
      "published": "2026-02-15T11:15:54.170",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32061",
      "matched_terms": [
        "alpine",
        "bosch",
        "ecu",
        "infotainment",
        "nissan"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "ECU",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-32061"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-32062",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-32062",
      "description": "The specific flaw exists within the Bluetooth stack developed by Alps Alpine of the Infotainment ECU manufactured by Bosch. The issue results from the lack of proper boundary validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a stack-based buffer overflow when receiving a specific packet on the established upper layer L2CAP channel. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to obtain remote code execution on the Infotainment ECU with root privileges. First identified on Nissan Leaf ZE1 manufactured in 2020.",
      "published": "2026-02-15T11:15:54.307",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "alpine",
        "bosch",
        "ecu",
        "infotainment",
        "nissan"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "ECU",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-32062"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-34251",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-34251",
      "description": "Tesla Telematics Control Unit (TCU) firmware prior to v2025.14 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability. The TCU runs the Android Debug Bridge (adbd) as root and, despite a “lockdown” check that disables adb shell, still permits adb push/pull and adb forward. Because adbd is privileged and the device’s USB port is exposed externally, an attacker with physical access can write an arbitrary file to a writable location and then overwrite the kernel’s uevent_helper or /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug entries via ADB, causing the script to be executed with root privileges.",
      "published": "2025-10-07T00:15:34.357",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34251",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tcu",
        "telematics control unit",
        "tesla",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Telematics"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-34251"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.6,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-3937",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-3937",
      "description": "Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort vulnerability in Tridium Niagara Framework on Windows, Linux, QNX, Tridium Niagara Enterprise Security on Windows, Linux, QNX allows Cryptanalysis. This issue affects Niagara Framework: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11; Niagara Enterprise Security: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11. Tridium recommends upgrading to Niagara Framework and Enterprise Security versions 4.14.2u2, 4.15.u1, or 4.10u.11.",
      "published": "2025-05-22T13:15:56.457",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3937",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-3937"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-3938",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-3938",
      "description": "Missing Cryptographic Step vulnerability in Tridium Niagara Framework on Windows, Linux, QNX, Tridium Niagara Enterprise Security on Windows, Linux, QNX allows Cryptanalysis. This issue affects Niagara Framework: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11; Niagara Enterprise Security: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11. Tridium recommends upgrading to Niagara Framework and Enterprise Security versions 4.14.2u2, 4.15.u1, or 4.10u.11.",
      "published": "2025-05-22T13:15:56.587",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3938",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-3938"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-3940",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-3940",
      "description": "Improper Use of Validation Framework vulnerability in Tridium Niagara Framework on Windows, Linux, QNX, Tridium Niagara Enterprise Security on Windows, Linux, QNX allows Input Data Manipulation. This issue affects Niagara Framework: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11; Niagara Enterprise Security: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11. Tridium recommends upgrading to Niagara Framework and Enterprise Security versions 4.14.2u2, 4.15.u1, or 4.10u.11.",
      "published": "2025-05-22T13:15:56.870",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3940",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-3940"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-3942",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-3942",
      "description": "Improper Output Neutralization for Logs vulnerability in Tridium Niagara Framework on Windows, Linux, QNX, Tridium Niagara Enterprise Security on Windows, Linux, QNX allows Input Data Manipulation. This issue affects Niagara Framework: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11; Niagara Enterprise Security: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11. Tridium recommends upgrading to Niagara Framework and Enterprise Security versions 4.14.2u2, 4.15.u1, or 4.10u.11.",
      "published": "2025-05-22T13:15:57.123",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3942",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-3942"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-3943",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-3943",
      "description": "Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings vulnerability in Tridium Niagara Framework on Windows, Linux, QNX, Tridium Niagara Enterprise Security on Windows, Linux, QNX allows Parameter Injection. This issue affects Niagara Framework: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11; Niagara Enterprise Security: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11. Tridium recommends upgrading to Niagara Framework and Enterprise Security versions 4.14.2u2, 4.15.u1, or 4.10u.11.",
      "published": "2025-05-22T13:15:57.257",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3943",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-3943"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-3944",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-3944",
      "description": "Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource vulnerability in Tridium Niagara Framework on QNX, Tridium Niagara Enterprise Security on QNX allows File Manipulation. This issue affects Niagara Framework: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11; Niagara Enterprise Security: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11. Tridium recommends upgrading to Niagara Framework and Enterprise Security versions 4.14.2u2, 4.15.u1, or 4.10u.11.",
      "published": "2025-05-22T13:15:57.387",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3944",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-3944"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-3945",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-3945",
      "description": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') vulnerability in Tridium Niagara Framework on QNX, Tridium Niagara Enterprise Security on QNX allows Command Delimiters. This issue affects Niagara Framework: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11; Niagara Enterprise Security: before 4.14.2, before 4.15.1, before 4.10.11. Tridium recommends upgrading to Niagara Framework and Enterprise Security versions 4.14.2u2, 4.15.u1, or 4.10u.11.",
      "published": "2025-05-22T13:15:57.517",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3945",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-3945"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-45583",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-45583",
      "description": "Incorrect access control in the FTP protocol of Audi UTR 2.0 Universal Traffic Recorder 2.0 allows attackers to authenticate into the service using any combination of username and password.",
      "published": "2025-09-12T21:15:33.640",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-45583",
      "matched_terms": [
        "audi"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-45583"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-45584",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-45584",
      "description": "Incorrect access control in the web service of Audi UTR 2.0 Universal Traffic Recorder 2.0 allows attackers to download car information without authentication.",
      "published": "2025-09-12T21:15:33.773",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-45584",
      "matched_terms": [
        "audi"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-45584"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-45586",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-45586",
      "description": "An issue in Audi UTR 2.0 Universal Traffic Recorder 2.0 allows attackers to arbitrarily overwrite files via supplying a crafted PUT request.",
      "published": "2025-09-12T21:15:34.020",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-45586",
      "matched_terms": [
        "audi"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-45586"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-45587",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-45587",
      "description": "A stack overflow in the FTP service of Audi UTR 2.0 Universal Traffic Recorder 2.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted input.",
      "published": "2025-09-12T21:15:34.147",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-45587",
      "matched_terms": [
        "audi"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-45587"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.0,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-55618",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-55618",
      "description": "In Hyundai Navigation App STD5W.EUR.HMC.230516.afa908d, an attacker can inject HTML payloads in the profile name field in navigation app which then get rendered.",
      "published": "2025-08-27T20:15:33.637",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55618",
      "matched_terms": [
        "hyundai"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-55618"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-55705",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-55705",
      "description": "This vulnerability occurs when the system permits multiple simultaneous connections to the backend using the same charging station ID. This can result in unauthorized access, data inconsistency, or potential manipulation of charging sessions. The lack of proper session management and expiration control allows attackers to exploit this weakness by reusing valid charging station IDs to establish multiple sessions concurrently.",
      "published": "2026-01-22T23:15:50.137",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55705",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-55705"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-56448",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-56448",
      "description": "The Positron PX360BT SW REV 8 car alarm system is vulnerable to a replay attack due to a failure in implementing rolling code security. The alarm system does not properly rotate or invalidate used codes, allowing repeated reuse of captured transmissions. This exposes users to significant security risks, including vehicle theft and loss of trust in the alarm's anti-cloning claims.",
      "published": "2025-09-15T20:15:38.127",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "rolling code"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-56448"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 6.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-57781",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-57781",
      "description": "The installers of DENSO TEN drive recorder viewer contain an issue with the DLL search path, which may lead to insecurely loading Dynamic Link Libraries. As a result, arbitrary code may be executed with the privilege of the user invoking the installer.",
      "published": "2025-10-06T06:15:36.203",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "denso"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-57781"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-6029",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-6029",
      "description": "Use of fixed learning codes, one code to lock the car and the other code to unlock it, the Key Fob Transmitter in KIA-branded Aftermarket Generic Smart Keyless Entry System, primarily distributed in Ecuador, which allows a replay attack. Manufacture is unknown at the time of release. CVE Record will be updated once this is clarified.",
      "published": "2025-06-13T15:15:21.430",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6029",
      "matched_terms": [
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "kia",
        "keyless entry"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-6029"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.4,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-6030",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-6030",
      "description": "Use of fixed learning codes, one code to lock the car and the other code to unlock it, in the Key Fob Transmitter in Cyclone Matrix TRF Smart Keyless Entry System, which allows a replay attack. Research was completed on the 2024 KIA Soluto. Attack confirmed on other KIA Models in Ecuador.",
      "published": "2025-06-13T15:15:21.600",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "kia",
        "keyless entry"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-6030"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.4,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-6785",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-6785",
      "description": "Securing externally available CAN wires can easily allow physical access to the CAN bus, allowing possible injection of specially formed CAN messages to control remote start functions of the vehicle. Testing completed on Tesla Model 3 vehicles with software version v11.1 (2023.20.9 ee6de92ddac5). This issue affects Model 3: With software versions from 2023.Xx before 2023.44.",
      "published": "2025-09-04T15:15:48.720",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6785",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-6785"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 4.7,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-68133",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-68133",
      "description": "EVerest is an EV charging software stack. In versions 2025.9.0 and below, an attacker can exhaust the operating system's memory and cause the module to terminate by initiating an unlimited number of TCP connections that never proceed to ISO 15118-2 communication. This is possible because a new thread is started for each incoming plain TCP or TLS socket connection before any verification occurs, and the verification performed is too permissive. The EVerest processes and all its modules shut down, affecting all EVSE functionality. This issue is fixed in version 2025.10.0.",
      "published": "2026-01-21T03:15:45.513",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68133",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-68133"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.4,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-68134",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-68134",
      "description": "EVerest is an EV charging software stack. Prior to version 2025.10.0, the use of the `assert` function to handle errors frequently causes the module to crash. This is particularly critical because the manager shuts down all other modules and exits when any one of them terminates, leading to a denial of service. In a context where a manager handles multiple EVSE, this would also impact other users. Version 2025.10.0 fixes the issue.",
      "published": "2026-01-21T19:16:04.510",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68134",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-68134"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.4,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-68141",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-68141",
      "description": "EVerest is an EV charging software stack. Prior to version 2025.10.0, during the deserialization of a `DC_ChargeLoopRes` message that includes Receipt as well as TaxCosts, the vector `<DetailedTax>tax_costs` in the target `Receipt` structure is accessed out of bounds. This occurs in the method `template <> void convert(const struct iso20_dc_DetailedTaxType& in, datatypes::DetailedTax& out)` which leads to a null pointer dereference and causes the module to terminate. The EVerest processes and all its modules shut down, affecting all EVSE. Version 2025.10.0 fixes the issue.",
      "published": "2026-01-21T20:16:06.523",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68141",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-68141"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.4,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-69515",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-69515",
      "description": "An issue in JXL 9 Inch Car Android Double Din Player Android v12.0 allows attackers to force the infotainment system into accepting falsified GPS signals as legitimate, resulting in the device reporting an incorrect or static location.",
      "published": "2026-04-07T20:16:22.950",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "GNSS",
        "Infotainment"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-69515"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-70994",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-70994",
      "description": "Yadea T5 Electric Bicycles (models manufactured in/after 2024) have a weak authentication mechanism in their keyless entry system. The system utilizes the EV1527 fixed-code RF protocol without implementing rolling codes or cryptographic challenge-response mechanisms. This is vulnerable to signal forgery after a local attacker intercepts any legitimate key fob transmission, allowing for complete unauthorized vehicle operation via a replay attack.",
      "published": "2026-04-23T15:36:26.687",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-70994",
      "matched_terms": [
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "keyless entry",
        "rolling code"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-70994"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2025-8320",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2025-8320",
      "description": "Tesla Wall Connector Content-Length Header Improper Input Validation Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Tesla Wall Connector devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of the HTTP Content-Length header. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in memory access past the end of an allocated buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-26300.",
      "published": "2025-07-30T01:15:26.077",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8320",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2025-8320"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-10653",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-10653",
      "description": "The Zephyr net_buf library (lib/net_buf/buf.c) manipulated both of its reference counts -- the per-header buf->ref and the per-data-block ref_count at the start of each variable/heap data allocation -- with plain non-atomic C operators (buf->ref++, if (--buf->ref > 0), if (--(*ref_count))). The API is documented as self-synchronizing: callers may share one buffer across threads (e.g. via k_fifo) and each holder independently calls net_buf_unref() with no surrounding lock. Under true concurrency (SMP, or single-core preemption between the non-atomic load and store while another context unrefs the same buffer), two holders can both observe the same prior reference value and both conclude they are the last reference. For heap/variable-data pools (mem_pool_data_unref/heap_data_unref, used by zbus message subscribers, the IP stack RX/TX buffers when CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE=n, capture, wireguard, ISO-TP and usbip) this produces a double k_heap_free()/k_free() of the same block -- heap-metadata corruption and a use-after-free on the heap-hardening poison pattern. For the per-header refcount the buffer is returned to the pool free LIFO twice for any pool type (including fixed-data pools used by Bluetooth and networking), corrupting the free list so a later allocation hands the same buffer to two owners. The fix converts both refcounts to atomic_inc/atomic_dec (overlaying buf->ref in an atomic_t-sized union and changing the data-block refcount from uint8_t to atomic_t). Impact is gated on genuine concurrency and on an application architecture that shares one buffer among multiple independent unref'ers; the trigger is a refcount/timing race rather than packet content, so an external attacker has at most weak indirect influence over the race window. Affects all Zephyr releases through v4.4.0. This fix is not being backported to v3.7-branch (LTS). The backport was attempted and closed unmerged (#111181): the v3.7 networking tree has diverged from main, and the new atomic word-packing -- together with the assertions it adds -- turns pre-existing v3.7-only reference-counting defects elsewhere in the stack into hard faults, so landing the change faithfully would mean pulling an open-ended set of additional v3.7-only fixes into an LTS branch. v3.7 remains affected. Applications on v3.7 that share one net_buf across threads should serialize their own net_buf_unref() calls rather than rely on the documented self-synchronizing behaviour. The fix is on main and has been backported to v4.3-branch (#110852) and v4.4-branch (#110853).",
      "published": "2026-06-30T17:16:20.160",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10653",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso-tp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-10653"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-10848",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-10848",
      "description": "The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp parsed inbound WAMP RPC frames in parse_rpc_msg() (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c) using a hand-rolled helper, extract_string_field(), that copied the message's uid and action fields with strncpy(out_buf, token + 1, outlen - 1) and then scanned the result with strchr(out_buf, '\"'). Because strncpy does not NUL-terminate the destination when the source is at least outlen - 1 (127) bytes long, the subsequent strchr reads past the 128-byte destination buffer into adjacent stack memory; if a \" byte is found beyond the buffer, a one-byte out-of-bounds NUL write also occurs. A related defect in extract_payload() runs strchr/strrchr over the receive buffer, which may not be NUL-terminated when a maximal-length frame fills it. The parsed bytes come directly from the OCPP central-system server over a websocket: the reader thread fills recv_buf via websocket_recv_msg() and calls parse_rpc_msg() on each inbound DATA frame (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c). A malicious or compromised central server, or an on-path attacker (OCPP is commonly deployed over plain ws://), can send an RPC frame whose uid or action field is 127+ bytes with no closing quote, triggering the out-of-bounds access. The primary impact is a remotely triggerable denial of service: the unbounded scan can fault on an unmapped page, and the stray NUL write can corrupt adjacent stack state. The over-read data is not reflected to the peer, so disclosure is limited. The feature is EXPERIMENTAL and must be explicitly enabled (CONFIG_OCPP). The fix replaces the manual parser with the bounds-respecting json_mixed_arr_parse() and copies the extracted uid with an explicitly NUL-terminated buffer, eliminating both over-reads.",
      "published": "2026-08-02T17:16:58.163",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10848",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-10848"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.6,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-112354",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-112354",
      "description": "Etrel INCH AC charging station management web interface prior to firmware versions 7.1.2 and 8.0.1 contains a hard-coded default credentials vulnerability that allows remote attackers to gain full Administrator access by authenticating with the factory-default account. Attackers can log in over cleartext HTTP to obtain complete charger configuration, OCPP ChargePoint Identity, and CSMS WebSocket connection details, enabling unauthorized administrative control of the charging station.",
      "published": "2026-11-03T22:17:44.660",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112354",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-112354"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-13214",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-13214",
      "description": "The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON \"key\" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048). The GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose \"key\" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes. The consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers.",
      "published": "2026-08-25T05:17:20.060",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13214",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-13214"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-13308",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-13308",
      "description": "Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home WebSockets Integer Underflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home EV chargers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of WebSocket messages related to the OCPP service. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in an integer underflow before allocating a buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-29113.",
      "published": "2026-07-29T21:17:46.490",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13308",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-13308"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-20744",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-20744",
      "description": "The charging station websocket endpoint accepts connections without proper authentication, which could lead to privilege escalation.",
      "published": "2026-07-10T23:16:47.683",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20744",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-20744"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-20748",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-20748",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-03-06T16:16:09.707",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20748",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-20748"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.6,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-20781",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-20781",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:55.807",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-20781"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-20791",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-20791",
      "description": "Charging station authentication identifiers are publicly accessible via web-based mapping platforms.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:56.010",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-20791"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-20895",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-20895",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:56.350",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20895",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-20895"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-22099",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-22099",
      "description": "The charging station does not require authentication for Bluetooth commands to perform actions. The functionality exposed includes sensitive information leakage, triggering reboots, or pushing a firmware update URL.",
      "published": "2026-07-13T10:16:27.523",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22099",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Bluetooth",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity",
        "OTA"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-22099"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.7,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-22100",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-22100",
      "description": "The OCPP DataTransfer message `ReserveLogin` is vulnerable to command injection. By manipulating the data value, arbitrary OS commands can be executed as root.",
      "published": "2026-07-13T10:16:27.670",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22100",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-22100"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.6,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-22105",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-22105",
      "description": "Delta UFC500 charging stations derive the default credentials of the Service account from character positions of the device serial number. An unauthenticated attacker with adjacent network access can reconstruct the resulting password, or exhaust the keyspace, and log in to read and change sensitive settings such as the OCPP backend.",
      "published": "2026-10-30T11:17:32.700",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22105",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp",
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-22105"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.7,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-22552",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-22552",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-03-06T00:16:10.347",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22552",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-22552"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-24731",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-24731",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:56.683",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24731",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-24731"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-24912",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-24912",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-03-06T00:16:10.553",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24912",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-24912"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.6,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-25192",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-25192",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-03-20T23:16:42.780",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25192",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-25192"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-2541",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-2541",
      "description": "The Micca KE700 system relies on a 6-bit portion of an identifier for authentication within rolling codes, providing only 64 possible combinations. This low entropy allows an attacker to perform a brute-force attack against one component of the rolling code. Successful exploitation simplify an attacker to predict the next valid rolling code, granting unauthorized access to the vehicle.",
      "published": "2026-02-15T11:15:55.223",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2541",
      "matched_terms": [
        "rolling code"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-2541"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 6.4,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-25711",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-25711",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:57.200",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25711",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-25711"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-25778",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-25778",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:57.383",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25778",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-25778"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-25851",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-25851",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:57.550",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25851",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-25851"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-26051",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-26051",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-03-06T15:16:09.973",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26051",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-26051"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-26074",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-26074",
      "description": "EVerest is an EV charging software stack. Versions prior to 2026.02.0 have a data race leading to possible `std::map<std::queue>` corruption. The trigger is CSMS GetLog/UpdateFirmware request (network) with an EVSE fault event (physical). This results in TSAN reports concurrent access (data race) to `event_queue`. Version 2026.2.0 contains a patch.",
      "published": "2026-03-26T17:16:33.407",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26074",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-26074"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.0,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-26288",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-26288",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-03-06T16:16:10.723",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26288",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-26288"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-26290",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-26290",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T01:16:20.433",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26290",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-26290"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27028",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27028",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T01:16:20.790",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27028"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27647",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27647",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T01:16:20.967",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27647"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27652",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27652",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:57.900",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27652",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27652"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27764",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27764",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers and enables session hijacking or shadowing, where the most recent connection displaces the legitimate charging station and receives backend commands intended for that station. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-03-06T16:16:11.267",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27764",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27764"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.6,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27767",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27767",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:58.073",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27767",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27767"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27772",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27772",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-02-27T00:16:58.250",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27772",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27772"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27815",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27815",
      "description": "EVerest is an EV charging software stack. Prior to versions to 2026.02.0, ISO15118_chargerImpl::handle_session_setup copies a variable-length payment_options list into a fixed-size array of length 2 without bounds checking. With schema validation disabled by default, oversized MQTT Cmd payloads can trigger out-of-bounds writes and corrupt adjacent EVSE state or crash the process. Version 2026.02.0 contains a patch.",
      "published": "2026-03-26T17:16:34.063",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27815",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27815"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27816",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27816",
      "description": "EVerest is an EV charging software stack. Prior to versions to 2026.02.0, ISO15118_chargerImpl::handle_update_energy_transfer_modes copies a variable-length list into a fixed-size array of length 6 without bounds checking. With schema validation disabled by default, oversized MQTT Cmd payloads can trigger out-of-bounds writes and corrupt adjacent EVSE state or crash the process. Version 2026.02.0 contains a patch.",
      "published": "2026-03-26T17:16:34.210",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27816",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27816"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-27828",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27828",
      "description": "EVerest is an EV charging software stack. Prior to version 2026.02.0, ISO15118_chargerImpl::handle_session_setup uses v2g_ctx after it has been freed when ISO15118 initialization fails (e.g., no IPv6 link-local address). The EVSE process can be crashed remotely by an attacker with MQTT access who issues a session_setup command while v2g_ctx has been released. Version 2026.02.0 contains a patch.",
      "published": "2026-03-26T17:16:34.357",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27828",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-27828"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-29796",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-29796",
      "description": "WebSocket endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to perform unauthorized station impersonation and manipulate data sent to the backend. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the OCPP WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier, then issue or receive OCPP commands as a legitimate charger. Given that no authentication is required, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend.",
      "published": "2026-03-20T23:16:43.410",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29796",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-29796"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-31474",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-31474",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: fix tx.buf use-after-free in isotp_sendmsg() isotp_sendmsg() uses only cmpxchg() on so->tx.state to serialize access to so->tx.buf. isotp_release() waits for ISOTP_IDLE via wait_event_interruptible() and then calls kfree(so->tx.buf). If a signal interrupts the wait_event_interruptible() inside close() while tx.state is ISOTP_SENDING, the loop exits early and release proceeds to force ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and continues to kfree(so->tx.buf) while sendmsg may still be reading so->tx.buf for the final CAN frame in isotp_fill_dataframe(). The so->tx.buf can be allocated once when the standard tx.buf length needs to be extended. Move the kfree() of this potentially extended tx.buf to sk_destruct time when either isotp_sendmsg() and isotp_release() are done.",
      "published": "2026-04-22T14:16:44.053",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31474",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can frame",
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-31474"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-37530",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-37530",
      "description": "AGL agl-service-can-low-level thru 17.1.12 contains a stack buffer overflow in the uds-c library. The send_diagnostic_request function in uds.c allocates a 6-byte stack buffer (MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_PAYLOAD_SIZE=6) but copies up to 7 bytes (MAX_UDS_REQUEST_PAYLOAD_LENGTH=7) via memcpy at an offset of 1+pid_length (2-3 bytes), resulting in 1-4 bytes of controlled stack overflow. The payload_length field (uint8_t) has no bounds check against the destination buffer. On 32-bit ARM automotive ECUs without stack canaries, this can lead to return address overwrite and RCE.",
      "published": "2026-05-01T17:16:22.603",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-37530",
      "matched_terms": [
        "diagnostic",
        "ecus",
        "uds",
        "automotive ecu"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ECU",
        "UDS Diagnostics"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-37530"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-37532",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-37532",
      "description": "AGL agl-service-can-low-level thru 17.1.12 contains a heap buffer over-read in the isotp-c library. In isotp_continue_receive (receive.c:87-89), the payload_length for a Single Frame is extracted from a 4-bit nibble in the CAN frame data, yielding values 0-15. However, a standard CAN frame is only 8 bytes, with payload starting at data[1] (7 bytes available). When payload_length exceeds the available data (e.g., nibble=15 but only 7 payload bytes exist), memcpy(message.payload, &data[1], payload_length) reads up to 8 bytes past the end of the data buffer.",
      "published": "2026-05-01T17:16:22.897",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-37532",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can frame",
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-37532"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-37535",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-37535",
      "description": "openxc/isotp-c thru commit 5a5d19245f65189202719321facd49ce6f5d46ac (2021-08-09) contains an out-of-bounds read in the ISO-TP Single Frame receive handler, where the 4-bit payload length nibble is used directly as the memcpy size without validating it against the actual CAN data length. A malicious CAN frame with an oversized length nibble can cause memory reads beyond the buffer, allowing attackers to cause a denial of service, or gain sensitive information.",
      "published": "2026-05-01T17:16:23.210",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-37535",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can frame",
        "iso-tp",
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-37535"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-4017",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-4017",
      "description": "Buffer Overflow in the entry handler of the TraceEvent() system call could allow an attacker with local access to cause information disclosure, data tampering or a crash of the QNX Neutrino kernel.",
      "published": "2026-07-14T18:17:26.820",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-4017"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.4,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-40272",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-40272",
      "description": "Improper Input Validation in the decode() function of the traceparser library could allow an attacker with a corrupted kernel trace event log (.kev) file, to execute arbitrary code or cause a crash in processes that use libtraceparser in QNX hosts or targets.",
      "published": "2026-07-29T18:16:53.347",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40272",
      "matched_terms": [
        "qnx"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-40272"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.0,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-4156",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-4156",
      "description": "ChargePoint Home Flex OCPP getpreq Stack-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of ChargePoint Home Flex EV chargers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of OCPP messages. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-26339.",
      "published": "2026-04-11T01:16:17.360",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4156",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-4156"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-4157",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-4157",
      "description": "ChargePoint Home Flex revssh Service Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of ChargePoint Home Flex devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of OCPP messages. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-26338.",
      "published": "2026-04-11T01:16:17.487",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4157",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-4157"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-42467",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-42467",
      "description": "An issue was discovered in Open-SAE-J1939 thru commit b6caf884df46435e539b1ecbf92b6c29b345bdfe (2025-11-30) in SAE_J1939_Read_Binary_Data_Transfer_DM16 causing a denial of service via crafted CAN frame on the J1939 bus.",
      "published": "2026-05-01T17:16:25.027",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42467",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can frame",
        "j1939"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "J1939"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-42467"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-42485",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-42485",
      "description": "AGL agl-service-can-low-level contains a stack buffer overflow in the uds-c library. The send_diagnostic_request function in uds.c allocates a 6-byte stack buffer (MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_PAYLOAD_SIZE=6) but copies up to 7 bytes (MAX_UDS_REQUEST_PAYLOAD_LENGTH=7) via memcpy at an offset of 1+pid_length (2-3 bytes), resulting in 1-4 bytes of controlled stack overflow. The payload_length field (uint8_t) has no bounds check against the destination buffer. On 32-bit ARM automotive ECUs without stack canaries, this can lead to return address overwrite and RCE.",
      "published": "2026-05-01T17:16:25.377",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42485",
      "matched_terms": [
        "diagnostic",
        "ecus",
        "uds",
        "automotive ecu"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ECU",
        "UDS Diagnostics"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-42485"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-42952",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-42952",
      "description": "Previously, there was no throttling on repeated authentication attempts to the charging station backend, which could allow an attacker to execute a denial-of-service attack.",
      "published": "2026-07-10T23:16:48.203",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42952",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-42952"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-44098",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-44098",
      "description": "This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker with control over the OCPP backend via firewall-bypass to perform an OS command injection, resulting in the execution of arbitrary commands as the limited user charx-oa. Charging could be interrupted.",
      "published": "2026-07-30T07:16:57.950",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44098",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-44098"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.6,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-44101",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-44101",
      "description": "Due to missing authentication the CHARX OCPP Agent service allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to reconfigure the backend connection. This can lead to Denial-of-Service and confidential data being disclosed to the attacker.",
      "published": "2026-07-30T07:16:58.357",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-44101"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-44383",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-44383",
      "description": "Multiple connections to the backend using the same charging station ID are allowed, which could allow an attacker to deploy multiple instances of malicious OCPP clients to overwhelm the backend.",
      "published": "2026-07-10T23:16:48.343",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44383",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-44383"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-48594",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-48594",
      "description": "Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in elixir-tesla tesla allows a denial of service via decompression bomb in HTTP response bodies. When Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse or Tesla.Middleware.Compression is included in a Tesla middleware pipeline, HTTP response bodies are decompressed eagerly with no size limit. The decompress_body/2 function in lib/tesla/middleware/compression.ex passes the entire response body to :zlib.gunzip/1 or :zlib.unzip/1 without any cap on the output size. Additionally, compression_algorithms/1 splits the content-encoding header on commas and decompress_body/2 recurses once per token, applying a decompression pass on each iteration. A server advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzip causes four recursive decompression passes, yielding exponential amplification: each gzip layer can expand its input roughly 1000x, so a payload of a few hundred bytes on the wire inflates to gigabytes of BEAM heap, exhausting memory and crashing or freezing the calling process. This issue affects tesla: from 0.6.0 before 1.18.3.",
      "published": "2026-06-02T20:16:38.193",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48594",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-48594"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-49316",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-49316",
      "description": "Expected behavior violation in the in-vehicle network of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker to bypass the motorcycle's anti-theft shutdown by forcing the Wireless Control Module (WCM) into the CAN bus-off state. Using a well-known CAN error-frame injection technique against a periodic WCM transmission, the attacker drives the WCM CAN controller's transmit error counter past the bus-off threshold, after which the WCM stops transmitting all messages, including the shutdown command. Peer ECUs do not interpret WCM silence as a security event and continue normal operation, allowing the motorcycle to be operated despite the immobilizer never having been unlocked. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.",
      "published": "2026-05-29T14:16:32.480",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49316",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "immobilizer",
        "in-vehicle",
        "indian motorcycle",
        "wcm"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-49316"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 4.6,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-49319",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-49319",
      "description": "Remote Keyless Entry System (RKES), using the 433 MHz key fob bearing FCC ID CWTR53R0 manufactured by ALPS ALPINE CO., LTD., is vulnerable to a roll-back attack against its rolling-code authentication. An attacker within RF range who records two consecutive lock or unlock transmissions from a legitimate key fob can later replay the same pair of transmissions repeatedly. During testing, replaying the first captured transmission caused the RKES to enter a state in which replaying the second captured transmission resulted in a successful lock or unlock operation of the vehicle. Tested and confirmed on a 2024 Suzuki Swift (SWIFT ISG GLS AC 1.2 5P 4x2 TM).",
      "published": "2026-06-25T15:16:37.980",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49319",
      "matched_terms": [
        "alpine",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "rolling-code",
        "suzuki",
        "keyless entry"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-49319"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 6.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-49322",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-49322",
      "description": "Weak authentication in the Wireless Control Module (WCM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with read access to the in-vehicle network to recover the user-set unlock PIN by passively observing a single PIN authentication exchange. The Infotainment Digital Round display computes its response using a non-cryptographic operation rather than a cryptographic challenge-response, so the PIN is mathematically derivable from one captured exchange, defeating the motorcycle's primary user-authentication control. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.",
      "published": "2026-05-29T08:16:19.060",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49322",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "indian motorcycle",
        "infotainment",
        "wcm"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Infotainment",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-49322"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 4.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-49323",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-49323",
      "description": "Weak authentication between the Wireless Control Module (WCM) and the Engine Control Module (ECM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with read access to the in-vehicle network to recover the per-vehicle ECM immobilizer secret by passively observing a single seed/key exchange. The WCM derives its response using a reversible, non-cryptographic operation rather than a cryptographic challenge-response, so the persistent immobilizer secret can be reconstructed from one captured exchange. With this secret the attacker can authenticate to the ECM independently of the WCM and start the engine, defeating the immobilizer. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.",
      "published": "2026-05-29T13:16:23.407",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49323",
      "matched_terms": [
        "immobilizer",
        "in-vehicle",
        "indian motorcycle",
        "wcm"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-49323"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 4.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-49324",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-49324",
      "description": "Uncontrolled resource consumption in the Wireless Control Module (WCM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with write access to the in-vehicle network to permanently immobilize the motorcycle. The WCM enforces a brute-force lockout on the immobilizer authentication algorithm, but the lockout counter is reachable by any unauthenticated message, has no session binding, and does not reset on power cycle. An attacker can deliberately trip the lockout with a small number of crafted frames, leaving the bike un-startable until dealer service. Specific thresholds have been withheld pending vendor remediation.",
      "published": "2026-05-29T13:16:23.557",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49324",
      "matched_terms": [
        "immobilizer",
        "in-vehicle",
        "indian motorcycle",
        "wcm"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Identity",
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-49324"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 4.6,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-54413",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-54413",
      "description": "driftregion iso14229 through 0.9.0 contains an integer underflow and downstream out-of-bounds read in the Handle_0x27_SecurityAccess function in iso14229.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash a UDS server and potentially read memory past the receive buffer by sending a single-byte 0x27 SecurityAccess request that follows any earlier well-formed 0x27 message.",
      "published": "2026-06-14T18:17:20.943",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54413",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "doip",
        "ecus",
        "iso-tp",
        "obd-ii",
        "uds"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "DOIP",
        "ECU",
        "ISO-TP",
        "UDS Diagnostics"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-54413"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.2,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-54479",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-54479",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-06-25T22:17:02.063",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54479",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-54479"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-56790",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-56790",
      "description": "CANBoat through 6.22, fixed in commit a5a22b7, contains an off-by-one global buffer overflow in the searchForPgn() function in analyzer/pgn.c that allows remote attackers to crash the application. Attackers can deliver a crafted NMEA-2000 message with an out-of-range PGN value over CAN bus or N2K-over-IP to trigger an out-of-bounds array access and denial of service.",
      "published": "2026-06-25T19:16:45.637",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56790",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-56790"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-67560",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-67560",
      "description": "Bendix EC80 Brake ECU is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow, which may allow an attacker to crash the ECU. A crafted payload can then be used to remotely execute arbitrary code or inject arbitrary CAN bus traffic. This could cause the loss of the ABS function, steering assist, speedometer, and shifting.",
      "published": "2026-08-28T00:18:08.150",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67560",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "ecu"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "ECU"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-67560"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-68387",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-68387",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: raw: add locking for raw flags bitfield With commit 890e5198a6e5 (\"can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock\") the formerly separate integer values have been integrated into a single bitfield. This led to a read-modify-write operation when changing a flag in raw_setsockopt() which now needs a locking to prevent concurrent access. Instead of adding a lock/unlock hell in each of the flag manipulations this patch introduces a wrapper for a new raw_setsockopt_locked() function analogue to the isotp_setsockopt[_locked]() approach in net/can/isotp.c [mkl: use Closes tag instead of Link]",
      "published": "2026-08-10T13:20:31.950",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68387",
      "matched_terms": [
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-68387"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-72113",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-72113",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: add missing device refcount for CAN filter removal sashiko-bot remarked a problem with a concurrent device unregistration in isotp.c which also is present in the bcm.c code. A former fix for raw.c commit c275a176e4b6 (\"can: raw: add missing refcount for memory leak fix\") introduced a netdevice_tracker which solves the issue for bcm.c too. bcm_release(), bcm_delete_rx_op() and bcm_notifier() relied on dev_get_by_index(ifindex) to re-find the device for an rx_op before unregistering its filter. If a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER has already unlisted the device from the ifindex table, that lookup fails and can_rx_unregister() is silently skipped, leaving a stale CAN filter pointing at the soon-to-be-freed bcm_op/socket. Hold a netdev_hold()/netdev_put() tracked reference on op->rx_reg_dev from the moment the rx filter is registered in bcm_rx_setup() until it is unregistered in bcm_rx_unreg(), and use that reference directly in bcm_release() and bcm_delete_rx_op() instead of re-looking the device up by ifindex.",
      "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:25.680",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72113",
      "matched_terms": [
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-72113"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-72124",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-72124",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock The TX state machine (so->tx.state) is driven from three contexts: sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so->rx_lock elsewhere left windows where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer. so->rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg() takes it to check so->tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to ISOTP_SENDING, bump so->tx_gen and drain the previous transfer's timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf() already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim. This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()'s cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel timers and reset the state unconditionally. isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg() sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending. Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so->rx_lock, since they run under so->rx_lock's cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves would deadlock. so->tx_gen lets them recognize whether the transfer they timed out is still the one currently active, so they don't report an error against a transfer that has since completed or been superseded.",
      "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:29.720",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72124",
      "matched_terms": [
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-72124"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-72125",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-72125",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: fix use-after-free race with concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER isotp_release() looked up the bound network device via dev_get_by_index() using the stored ifindex. During device unregistration the device is unlisted from the ifindex hash before the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier chain runs, so a concurrent isotp_release() could find no device, skip can_rx_unregister() entirely, and still proceed to free the socket. Since isotp_release() had already removed itself from the isotp notifier list at that point, isotp_notify() would never get a chance to clean up either, leaving a stale CAN filter that keeps pointing at the freed socket. Fix this the same way raw.c already does: hold a tracked reference to the bound net_device in the socket (so->dev/so->dev_tracker) from bind() onward instead of re-resolving it from the ifindex, and serialize bind()/release() with rtnl_lock() so that so->dev is always consistent with what the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier sees. so->dev stays valid regardless of ifindex-hash unlisting, and is only ever cleared by whichever of isotp_release()/isotp_notify() gets there first, so the filter is always removed exactly once. isotp_bind() now rejects a (re)bind with -EAGAIN while so->[tx|rx].state isn't ISOTP_IDLE yet, so a timer left running by a prior NETDEV_UNREGISTER can't act on a newly bound so->ifindex. Both checks share the same lock_sock() section, so there is no window in which a concurrent isotp_notify() clearing so->bound could be missed.",
      "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:29.840",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72125",
      "matched_terms": [
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-72125"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-72126",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-72126",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release() isotp_notify() unregisters the (RCU) CAN filters via can_rx_unregister() and clears so->bound without waiting for a grace period. isotp_release() uses so->bound to decide whether it needs to call synchronize_rcu() before cancelling so->rxtimer, so when NETDEV_UNREGISTER runs first it skips that synchronize_rcu() and can cancel the timer while an in-flight isotp_rcv() is still executing and about to re-arm it via isotp_send_fc(), leading to a use-after-free timer callback on the freed socket. sakisho-bot remarked a problem with rtnl_lock held in isotp_notify(), therefore make isotp_release() always call synchronize_rcu() before cancelling the timers, regardless of so->bound. This still closes the original race (isotp_notify() clearing so->bound without waiting for in-flight isotp_rcv() callers before isotp_release() cancels the RX timer) without adding any RCU wait to the netdevice notifier path.",
      "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:29.963",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72126",
      "matched_terms": [
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-72126"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-73523",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-73523",
      "description": "COVESA Open1722 through 0.9.2 contains an integer truncation vulnerability in acf-can-listener.c that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to cause the CAN listener to transmit process stack memory onto the CAN bus by sending a rejected UDP datagram with a matching AVTP stream ID. The num_can_msgs variable declared as uint8_t truncates the -1 error return value from avtp_to_can() to 255, causing a write loop to iterate 255 times over a 15-slot stack array and leak approximately 18 KB of adjacent stack memory as roughly 240 CAN frames to any recipient on the CAN bus.",
      "published": "2026-08-17T18:18:14.170",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73523",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "can frames"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-73523"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-80572",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-80572",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data byd_disconnect() uses timer_delete() before freeing the driver's private data. This does not wait for a running byd_clear_touch() callback, which dereferences the private data and its psmouse pointer. A callback racing with disconnect can therefore access the private data after it has been freed. The timer can also still be re-armed by byd_process_byte() while the disconnect is in progress. Use timer_shutdown_sync() before freeing the private data: it waits for a running callback and turns any later re-arm attempt into a no-op.",
      "published": "2026-08-26T15:17:13.140",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80572",
      "matched_terms": [
        "byd"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-80572"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-80707",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-80707",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: j1939: transport: j1939_session_fresh_new(): initialize receive buffer Zero the allocated buffer in j1939_session_fresh_new() to ensure it contains no residual data. While there is a potential performance impact if users allocate maximum sized ETP buffers, most real-world use cases are not noticeably affected since the maximum known buffer size is typically around 65K. [mkl: add Message-ID]",
      "published": "2026-08-28T08:16:56.277",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80707",
      "matched_terms": [
        "j1939"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "J1939"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-80707"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-80889",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-80889",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: fix timer drain order, wakeup handling and tx_gen ordering This patch is a follow-up to commit cf070fe33bfb (\"can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock\") which addresses following sashiko-bot findings: - isotp_sendmsg(): drain so->txfrtimer first so a stale callback can't re-arm echotimer after the claim - isotp_release(): wake so->wait after forcing ISOTP_SHUTDOWN so a sleeping sendmsg() claim isn't stranded - isotp_sendmsg(): have both wait_event_interruptible() calls in isotp_sendmsg() also wake on ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and do not return claim to IDLE to avoid corrupting a concurrent isotp_release() process. - isotp_sendmsg(): handle potential claim of a new transfer when the wait_event_interruptible() call returns in CAN_ISOTP_WAIT_TX_DONE mode. Don't touch timers and states of the new transfer if a new thread incremented so->tx_gen before getting the lock at err_event_drop. - isotp_sendmsg(): handle a stuck can_send() and omit timer and state changes if a new transfer was claimed. wait_tx_done() returns the error recorded in so->tx_result[], tagged with the caller's own generation. - isotp_tx_timeout(): on a claimed timeout, record the ECOMM error for the timed-out transfer's own generation in so->tx_result[]; sk->sk_err is raised unconditionally, same as every other error path here. - isotp_tx_gen_done()/isotp_tx_timeout(): always read tx.state (acquire) before tx_gen - the reverse order let a weakly ordered CPU pair a fresh tx.state with a stale tx_gen/tx_result slot. - isotp_sendmsg(): wait_tx_done: drain sk_err via sock_error() once we have read the result from so->tx_result[], so an already-reported error doesn't stay latched for a later poll()/SO_ERROR. Also align the remaining lock-free so->tx.state/rx.state/cfecho accesses and use skb->hash as unique loopback echo frame indicator.",
      "published": "2026-09-04T18:17:56.910",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80889",
      "matched_terms": [
        "isotp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "ISO-TP"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-80889"
      ],
      "severity": "Unknown",
      "cvss": null,
      "cvss_version": "",
      "pending_analysis": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-82357",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-82357",
      "description": "RT-Labs AB C-Open CANopen contains a NULL pointer dereference if the LSS protocol is used to configure the device. An object defined by the user application may not have all required subindexes for object 0x1018. An unauthenticated, remote attacker with access to the CAN bus, through a compromised node for instance, can initiate the LSS protocol on a device with a misconfigured identity object and potentially crash the device. Fixed in 1.1.1.",
      "published": "2026-10-01T20:17:32.363",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82357",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-82357"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 6.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-82358",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-82358",
      "description": "RT-Labs AB C-Open CANopen contains a write protection bypass in the SDO (Service Data Object) server implementation 'src/co_sdo_server.c' that fails to properly validate write permissions when processing download-segment frames. An unauthenticated attacker on the CAN bus can initiate an SDO upload for a read-only Object Dictionary (OD) entry, which sets a data pointer to the read-only object, then send download-segment frames to write to that memory location. The download-segment handler does not verify that a download session is active, allowing any CANopen node to overwrite read-only OD entries using two SDO frames. Note that CANopen protocol operates over CAN bus and does not provide built-in authentication mechanisms. Fixed in 1.1.1.",
      "published": "2026-10-01T20:17:32.540",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82358",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "CAN Bus",
        "Identity"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-82358"
      ],
      "severity": "Medium",
      "cvss": 6.5,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-89803",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-89803",
      "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau: unsubscribe the channel-kill event before the fence context nouveau_channel_del() tears the fence context down first and only drops the channel-kill subscription later, in the middle of the nvif object teardown: if (chan->fence) nouveau_fence(chan->cli->drm)->context_del(chan); ... nvif_object_dtor(&chan->vram); nvif_event_dtor(&chan->kill); The subscribed handler is nouveau_channel_killed(), which calls nouveau_channel_kill() and from there nouveau_fence_context_kill() on chan->fence. A kill event delivered in that window takes fctx->lock and walks fctx->pending on a fence context that context_del() has already freed. Nothing reaches this below Fermi today, because the subscription is gated on FERMI_CHANNEL_GPFIFO and nothing kills a channel there. On Fermi and newer the window is real but narrow, since a kill has to land exactly while the channel is being destroyed. That is reason enough on its own, which is why this carries a Fixes: tag. The last patch in this series subscribes Tesla channels as well; nothing kills those today, so it does not widen the exposure now, but it is the groundwork for a recovery path that would, and the ordering is better fixed before that lands than alongside it. Drop the subscription before anything it depends on is torn down.",
      "published": "2026-09-16T11:16:45.227",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89803",
      "matched_terms": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "General Automotive Surface"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-89803"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-8986",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-8986",
      "description": "Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 is vulnerable to OS command injection when processing OCPP GetDiagnostics requests. A malicious or compromised OCPP server can supply a crafted diagnostics URL that results in arbitrary command execution on the charging station.",
      "published": "2026-07-21T22:19:11.023",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8986",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "diagnostics",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-8986"
      ],
      "severity": "Critical",
      "cvss": 9.8,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-9397",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-9397",
      "description": "A weakness has been identified in Besen BS20 EV Charging Station up to 20260426. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component OTA Update Installation Handler. This manipulation causes improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. A high degree of complexity is needed for the attack. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The original disclosure mentions, that \"[t]hese vulnerabilities have been reported to Besen and we have received their acknowlegement that they are reviewing this as of April 2026.\"",
      "published": "2026-05-24T21:16:32.767",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9397",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ota",
        "ota update"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "EV Charging",
        "OTA"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-9397"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.1,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-97212",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-97212",
      "description": "The WebSocket backend uses charging station identifiers to uniquely associate sessions but allows multiple endpoints to connect using the same session identifier. This implementation results in predictable session identifiers. This vulnerability may allow unauthorized users to authenticate as other users or enable a malicious actor to cause a denial-of-service condition by overwhelming the backend with valid session requests.",
      "published": "2026-10-02T22:16:56.760",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97212",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Backend",
        "EV Charging"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-97212"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 7.3,
      "cvss_version": "3.1",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-97898",
      "type": "cve",
      "title": "CVE-2026-97898",
      "description": "Insecure Direct Object Reference / missing object-level authorization in the Akia keyless entry cloud service. The unlock action is relying on a client-supplied room/door identifier that is not properly authorized server-side against the authenticated guest's booking. An authenticated guest could unlock rooms other than their own, resulting in unauthorized physical access to guest rooms at an affected property. As of 19th September 2026 the service is no more vulnerable to this attack (feedback received by the reporter). The attack is remote but the effect is local to an affected property.",
      "published": "2026-09-25T10:17:08.907",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97898",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "keyless entry"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "Keyless / Hardware"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2026-97898"
      ],
      "severity": "High",
      "cvss": 8.4,
      "cvss_version": "4.0",
      "pending_analysis": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2024-DE3FAB172383",
      "type": "incident",
      "title": "Overheid intensiveert samenwerking op waarschuwingen voor cyberdreigingen",
      "description": "Drie overheidsorganisaties op het gebied van cybersecurity openen één gezamenlijk loket voor meldingen van dreigingen en kwetsbaarheden. Deze stap past in de voorbereiding op de integratie van deze drie organisaties naar één nationale cyberorganisatie eind 2025. Het gaat om het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC), onderdeel van het ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, het Computer Security Incident Response Team voor digitale diensten (CSIRT-DSP) en het Digital Trust Center (DTC), beide onderdeel van het ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat. Het gezamenlijk doel: Nederland digitaal veiliger maken.",
      "published": "2024-10-03",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/overheid-intensiveert-samenwerking-op-waarschuwingen-voor-cyberdreigingen",
      "matched_terms": [
        "government",
        "cyber_attack",
        "incident",
        "real_world",
        "safety_risk"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "government"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-30F3A07AB044",
      "type": "incident",
      "title": "In het nieuws: cyberaanvallen op levensmiddelensector",
      "description": "Op dit moment spelen er meerdere cyberincidenten binnen de Europese levensmiddelensector. Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) ziet momenteel geen reden om aan te nemen dat deze incidenten verband houden met elkaar. In dit bericht geven we toelichting op de rol van het NCSC bij cyberincidenten.",
      "published": "2026-10-13",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/in-het-nieuws-cyberaanvallen-op-levensmiddelensector",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cyber_attack",
        "incident",
        "real_world"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-BEC7BF338A9D",
      "type": "incident",
      "title": "In het nieuws: cyberaanvallen op koelinstallaties in Europa",
      "description": "Momenteel vinden er in Europa, waaronder Nederland, meerdere cyberaanvallen plaats op koelinstallaties van diverse leveranciers. Het Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) monitort de situatie nauwlettend en doet onderzoek. In dit bericht geven we advies aan organisaties die in bezit zijn van koelinstallaties en geven we toelichting op de rol van het NCSC bij cyberincidenten.",
      "published": "2026-11-02",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/in-het-nieuws-cyberaanvallen-op-koelinstallaties-in-europa",
      "matched_terms": [
        "food",
        "cyber_physical",
        "supply_chain",
        "cyber_physical_attack",
        "incident",
        "real_world"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "food",
        "cyber_physical",
        "supply_chain"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [
        "third_party"
      ],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "INC-2026-F00F0D43AB0E",
      "type": "incident",
      "title": "Jaarbeeld Ransomware 2025",
      "description": "In 2025 is in Nederland van 65 ransomware incidenten aangifte gedaan bij de politie. Bij 40 incidenten schoten incident-response bedrijven te hulp. Toegang wordt meestal verkregen door misbruik van kwetsbaarheden en accountovernames. Relatief meer incidenten begonnen met een accountovername in 2025, ten opzichte van 2024. Niet elk slachtoffer van ransomware wordt bijgestaan door een van de incident response-bedrijven die hebben bijgedragen aan dit jaarbeeld, of doet aangifte. Het daadwerkelijke aantal incidenten ligt daarom waarschijnlijk hoger. In totaal zijn er het afgelopen jaar 39 unieke ransomware-families waargenomen. Welke families het meeste zijn waargenomen, en meer, lees je in het Ransomware Jaarbeeld 2025.",
      "published": "2026-02-26",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.nl/nieuws/jaarbeeld-ransomware-2025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "incident",
        "ransomware",
        "real_world"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC-NL)"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1508.00663",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Coordinated Electric Vehicle Charging Control with Aggregator Power Trading and Indirect Load Control",
      "description": "Due to the increasing concern for greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel security, electric vehicles (EVs) have attracted much attention in recent years. EVs can aggregate together constituting the vehicle-to-grid system. Coordination of EVs is beneficial to the power system in many ways. In this paper, we formulate a novel large-scale EV charging problem with energy trading in order to maximize the aggregator profit. This problem is non-convex and can be solved with a centralized iterative approach. To overcome the computation complexity issue brought by the non-convexity, we develop a distributed optimization-based heuristic. To evaluate our proposed approach, a modified IEEE 118 bus testing system is employed with 10 aggregators serving 30 000 EVs. The simulation results indicate that our proposed distributed heuristic with energy trading can effectively increase the total profit of aggregators. In addition, the proposed distributed optimization-based heuristic strategy can achieve near-optimal performance.",
      "published": "2015-08-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00663",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "James J. Q. Yu",
        "Junhao Lin",
        "Albert Y. S. Lam",
        "Victor O. K. Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1509.02153",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid-BCP: A Robust Load Balancing and Routing Protocol for Intra-Car Wired/Wireless Networks",
      "description": "With the emergence of connected and autonomous vehicles, sensors are increasingly deployed within cars to support new functionalities. Traffic generated by these sensors congest traditional intra-car networks, such as CAN buses. Furthermore, the large amount of wires needed to connect sensors makes it harder to design cars in a modular way. To alleviate these limitations, we propose, simulate, and implement a hybrid wired/wireless architecture, in which each node is connected to either a wired interface or a wireless interface or both. Specifically, we propose a new protocol, called Hybrid-Backpressure Collection Protocol (Hybrid-BCP), to efficiently collect data from sensors in intra-car networks. Hybrid-BCP is backward-compatible with the CAN bus technology, and builds on the BCP protocol, designed for wireless sensor networks. Hybrid-BCP achieves high throughput and shows resilience to dynamic network conditions, including adversarial interferences. Our testbed implementation, based on CAN and ZigBee transceivers, demonstrates the load balancing and routing functionalities of Hybrid-BCP and its resilience to DoS attacks. We further provide simulation results, obtained with the ns-3 simulator and based on real intra-car RSSI traces, that compare between the performance of Hybrid-BCP and a tree-based collection protocol. Notably, the simulations show that Hybrid-BCP can achieve the same performance as the tree-based protocol while reducing the radio transmission power by a factor of 10.",
      "published": "2015-09-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.02153",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wei Si",
        "David Starobinski",
        "Moshe Laifenfeld"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1512.08048",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using Data Analytics to Detect Anomalous States in Vehicles",
      "description": "Vehicles are becoming more and more connected, this opens up a larger attack surface which not only affects the passengers inside vehicles, but also people around them. These vulnerabilities exist because modern systems are built on the comparatively less secure and old CAN bus framework which lacks even basic authentication. Since a new protocol can only help future vehicles and not older vehicles, our approach tries to solve the issue as a data analytics problem and use machine learning techniques to secure cars. We develop a Hidden Markov Model to detect anomalous states from real data collected from vehicles. Using this model, while a vehicle is in operation, we are able to detect and issue alerts. Our model could be integrated as a plug-n-play device in all new and old cars.",
      "published": "2015-12-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.08048",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandeep Nair Narayanan",
        "Sudip Mittal",
        "Anupam Joshi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1609.02791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Online Charging Scheduling Algorithms of Electric Vehicles in Smart Grid: An Overview",
      "description": "As an environment-friendly substitute for conventional fuel-powered vehicles, electric vehicles (EVs) and their components have been widely developed and deployed worldwide. The large-scale integration of EVs into power grid brings both challenges and opportunities to the system performance. On one hand, the load demand from EV charging imposes large impact on the stability and efficiency of power grid. On the other hand, EVs could potentially act as mobile energy storage systems to improve the power network performance, such as load flattening, fast frequency control, and facilitating renewable energy integration. Evidently, uncontrolled EV charging could lead to inefficient power network operation or even security issues. This spurs enormous research interests in designing charging coordination mechanisms. A key design challenge here lies in the lack of complete knowledge of events that occur in the future. Indeed, the amount of knowledge of future events significantly impacts the design of efficient charging control algorithms. This article focuses on introducing online EV charging scheduling techniques that deal with different degrees of uncertainty and randomness of future knowledge. Besides, we highlight the promising future research directions for EV charging control.",
      "published": "2016-08-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.02791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wanrong Tang",
        "Suzhi Bi",
        "Ying Jun",
        "Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1704.05223",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Know Your Master: Driver Profiling-based Anti-theft Method",
      "description": "Although many anti-theft technologies are implemented, auto-theft is still increasing. Also, security vulnerabilities of cars can be used for auto-theft by neutralizing anti-theft system. This keyless auto-theft attack will be increased as cars adopt computerized electronic devices more. To detect auto-theft efficiently, we propose the driver verification method that analyzes driving patterns using measurements from the sensor in the vehicle. In our model, we add mechanical features of automotive parts that are excluded in previous works, but can be differentiated by drivers' driving behaviors. We design the model that uses significant features through feature selection to reduce the time cost of feature processing and improve the detection performance. Further, we enrich the feature set by deriving statistical features such as mean, median, and standard deviation. This minimizes the effect of fluctuation of feature values per driver and finally generates the reliable model. We also analyze the effect of the size of sliding window on performance to detect the time point when the detection becomes reliable and to inform owners the theft event as soon as possible. We apply our model with real driving and show the contribution of our work to the literature of driver identification.",
      "published": "2017-04-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.05223",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Byung Il Kwak",
        "JiYoung Woo",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1704.07216",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols",
      "description": "Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has produced a range of security mechanisms and protocols tailored for this domain, addressing both security and privacy. Typically, the security analysis of these proposals has largely been informal. However, formal analysis can be used to expose flaws and ultimately provide a higher level of assurance in the protocols. This paper focusses on the formal analysis of a particular element of security mechanisms for V2X found in many proposals: the revocation of malicious or misbehaving vehicles from the V2X system by invalidating their credentials. This revocation needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for vehicle privacy even in the context of vehicles regularly changing their pseudonyms. The REWIRE scheme by Forster et al. and its subschemes BASIC and RTOKEN aim to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and trusted hardware. Formal analysis using the TAMARIN prover identifies two flaws with some of the functional correctness and authentication properties in these schemes. We then propose Obscure Token (OTOKEN), an extension of REWIRE to enable revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach addresses the functional and authentication properties by introducing an additional key-pair, which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of successful revocation of vehicles without resolving the long-term identity. Moreover OTOKEN is the first V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed with a formal model.",
      "published": "2017-04-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.07216",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jorden Whitefield",
        "Liqun Chen",
        "Frank Kargl",
        "Andrew Paverd",
        "Steve Schneider",
        "Helen Treharne",
        "Stephan Wesemeyer"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1801.07741",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Who Killed My Parked Car?",
      "description": "We find that the conventional belief of vehicle cyber attacks and their defenses---attacks are feasible and thus defenses are required only when the vehicle's ignition is turned on---does not hold. We verify this fact by discovering and applying two new practical and important attacks: battery-drain and Denial-of-Body-control (DoB). The former can drain the vehicle battery while the latter can prevent the owner from starting or even opening/entering his car, when either or both attacks are mounted with the ignition off. We first analyze how operation (e.g., normal, sleep, listen) modes of ECUs are defined in various in-vehicle network standards and how they are implemented in the real world. From this analysis, we discover that an adversary can exploit the wakeup function of in-vehicle networks---which was originally designed for enhanced user experience/convenience (e.g., remote diagnosis, remote temperature control)---as an attack vector. Ironically, a core battery-saving feature in in-vehicle networks makes it easier for an attacker to wake up ECUs and, therefore, mount and succeed in battery-drain and/or DoB attacks. Via extensive experimental evaluations on various real vehicles, we show that by mounting the battery-drain attack, the adversary can increase the average battery consumption by at least 12.57x, drain the car battery within a few hours or days, and therefore immobilize/cripple the vehicle. We also demonstrate the proposed DoB attack on a real vehicle, showing that the attacker can cut off communications between the vehicle and the driver's key fob by indefinitely shutting down an ECU, thus making the driver unable to start and/or even enter the car.",
      "published": "2018-01-23",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.07741",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "key fob"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyong-Tak Cho",
        "Yuseung Kim",
        "Kang G. Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1808.10840",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploiting the Shape of CAN Data for In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on scores of electronic control units (ECUs) broadcasting messages over a few controller area networks (CANs). Bereft of security features, in-vehicle CANs are exposed to cyber manipulation and multiple researches have proved viable, life-threatening cyber attacks. Complicating the issue, CAN messages lack a common mapping of functions to commands, so packets are observable but not easily decipherable. We present a transformational approach to CAN IDS that exploits the geometric properties of CAN data to inform two novel detectors--one based on distance from a learned, lower dimensional manifold and the other on discontinuities of the manifold over time. Proof-of-concept tests are presented by implementing a potential attack approach on a driving vehicle. The initial results suggest that (1) the first detector requires additional refinement but does hold promise; (2) the second detector gives a clear, strong indicator of the attack; and (3) the algorithms keep pace with high-speed CAN messages. As our approach is data-driven it provides a vehicle-agnostic IDS that eliminates the need to reverse engineer CAN messages and can be ported to an after-market plugin.",
      "published": "2018-08-28",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.10840",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zachariah Tyree",
        "Robert A. Bridges",
        "Frank L. Combs",
        "Michael R. Moore"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of IEEE Connected and Autonomous Vehicles Symposium, VTC 2018",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1810.07063",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Catching Cheats: Detecting Strategic Manipulation in Distributed Optimisation of Electric Vehicle Aggregators",
      "description": "Given the rapid rise of electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide, and the ambitious targets set for the near future, the management of large EV fleets must be seen as a priority. Specifically, we study a scenario where EV charging is managed through self-interested EV aggregators who compete in the day-ahead market in order to purchase the electricity needed to meet their clients' requirements. With the aim of reducing electricity costs and lowering the impact on electricity markets, a centralised bidding coordination framework has been proposed in the literature employing a coordinator. In order to improve privacy and limit the need for the coordinator, we propose a reformulation of the coordination framework as a decentralised algorithm, employing the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM). However, given the self-interested nature of the aggregators, they can deviate from the algorithm in order to reduce their energy costs. Hence, we study the strategic manipulation of the ADMM algorithm and, in doing so, describe and analyse different possible attack vectors and propose a mathematical framework to quantify and detect manipulation. Importantly, this detection framework is not limited the considered EV scenario and can be applied to general ADMM algorithms. Finally, we test the proposed decentralised coordination and manipulation detection algorithms in realistic scenarios using real market and driver data from Spain. Our empirical results show that the decentralised algorithm's convergence to the optimal solution can be effectively disrupted by manipulative attacks achieving convergence to a different non-optimal solution which benefits the attacker. With respect to the detection algorithm, results indicate that it achieves very high accuracies and significantly outperforms a naive benchmark.",
      "published": "2018-10-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.07063",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alvaro Perez-Diaz",
        "Enrico Gerding",
        "Frank McGroarty"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1810.07305",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Probing Attacks on Physical Layer Key Agreement for Automotive Controller Area Networks (Extended Version)",
      "description": "Efficient key management for automotive networks (CAN) is a critical element, governing the adoption of security in the next generation of vehicles. A recent promising approach for dynamic key agreement between groups of nodes, Plug-and-Secure for CAN, has been demonstrated to be information theoretically secure based on the physical properties of the CAN bus. In this paper, we illustrate side-channel attacks, leading to nearly-complete leakage of the secret key bits, by an adversary that is capable of probing the CAN bus. We identify the fundamental characteristics that lead to such attacks and propose techniques to minimize the information leakage at the hardware, controller and system levels.",
      "published": "2018-10-16",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.07305",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shalabh Jain",
        "Qian Wang",
        "Md Tanvir Arafin",
        "Jorge Guajardo"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1811.08273",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security management for backhaul-aware 5G-V2X",
      "description": "Security is a primary concern for the networks aiming at the utilization of Cellular (C) services for connecting Vehicles to Everything (V2X). At present, C-V2X is observing a paradigm shift from Long Term Evolution (LTE) - Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) to Fifth Generation (5G) based functional architecture. However, security and credential management are still concerns to be resolved under 5G-V2X. A sizably voluminous number of key updates and non-availability of sub-functions at the edge cause adscititious overheads and decrement the performance while alarming the possibilities of variants of cyber attacks. In this paper, security management is studied as a principle of sustainability and its tradeoff is evaluated with the number of key-updates required to maintain an authenticated connection of a vehicle to the 5G-terminals keeping intact the security functions at the backhaul. A numerical study is presented to determine the claims and understand the proposed tradeoff.",
      "published": "2018-11-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.08273",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vishal Sharma",
        "Yongho Ko",
        "Jiyoon Kim",
        "Ilsun You"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1812.11596",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a CAN IDS based on a neural-network data field predictor",
      "description": "Modern vehicles contain a few controller area networks (CANs), which allow scores of on-board electronic control units (ECUs) to communicate messages critical to vehicle functions and driver safety. CAN provide a lightweight and reliable broadcast protocol but is bereft of security features. As evidenced by many recent research works, CAN exploits are possible both remotely and with direct access, fueling a growing CAN intrusion detection system (IDS) body of research. A challenge for pioneering vehicle-agnostic IDSs is that passenger vehicles' CAN message encodings are proprietary, defined and held secret by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Targeting detection of next-generation attacks, in which messages are sent from the expected ECU at the expected time but with malicious content, researchers are now seeking to leverage \"CAN data models\", which predict future CAN message contents and use prediction error to identify anomalous, hopefully malicious CAN messages. Yet, current works model CAN signals post-translation, i.e., after applying OEM-donated or reverse-engineered translations from raw data. In this work, we present initial IDS results testing deep neural networks used to predict CAN data at the bit level, thereby providing IDS capabilities but avoiding reverse engineering proprietary encodings. Our results suggest the method is promising for continuous signals in CAN data, but struggles for discrete, e.g., binary, signals.",
      "published": "2018-12-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.11596",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Krzysztof Pawelec",
        "Robert A. Bridges",
        "Frank L. Combs"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1903.05231",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TACAN: Transmitter Authentication through Covert Channels in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Nowadays, the interconnection of automotive systems with modern digital devices offers advanced user experiences to drivers. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) carry out a multitude of operations using the insecure Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). Therefore, dangerous attacks, such as disabling brakes, are possible and the safety of passengers is at risk. In this paper, we present TACAN (Transmitter Authentication in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs by exploiting the covert channels without introducing CAN protocol modifications or traffic overheads (i.e., no extra bits or messages are used). TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept of covert channels and exploits it to build an effective defensive technique that facilitates transmitter authentication via a trusted Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three different covert channels for ECU authentication: 1) Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based, leveraging the IATs of CAN messages; 2) offset-based, exploiting the clock offsets of CAN messages; 3) Least Significant Bit (LSB)-based, concealing authentication messages into the LSBs of normal CAN data. We implement the covert channels on the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR testbed and evaluate their performance through extensive experiments. We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN, highlighting no traffic overheads and attesting the regular functionality of ECUs. In particular, the bit error ratios are within 0.1% and 0.42% for the IAT-based and offset-based covert channels, respectively. Furthermore, the bit error ratio of the LSB-based covert channel is equal to that of a normal CAN bus, which is 3.1x10^-7%.",
      "published": "2019-03-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.05231",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuhang Ying",
        "Giuseppe Bernieri",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1904.01171",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient Blockchain-based Hierarchical Authentication Mechanism for Energy Trading in V2G Environment",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) networks have emerged as a new technology in modern electric power transmission networks. It allows bi-directional flow of communication and electricity between electric vehicles (EVs) and the Smart Grid (SG), in order to provide more sophisticated energy trading. However, due to the involvement of a huge amount of trading data and the presence of untrusted entities in the visiting networks, the underlying V2G infrastructure suffers from various security and privacy challenges. Although, several solutions have been proposed in the literature to address these problems, issues like lack of mutual authentication and anonymity, incapability to protect against several attack vectors, generation of huge overhead, and dependency on centralized infrastructures make security and privacy issues even more challenging. To address the above mentioned problems, in this paper, we propose a blockchain oriented hierarchical authentication mechanism for rewarding EVs. The overall process is broadly classified into the following phases: 1) System Initialization, 2) Registration, 3) Hierarchical Mutual Authentication, and 4) Consensus; wherein blockchain's distributed ledger has been employed for transaction execution in distributed V2G environments while Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) has been used for hierarchical authentication. The designed hierarchical authentication mechanism has been employed to preserve the anonymity of EVs and support mutual authentication between EVs, charging stations (CSs) and the central aggregator (CAG). Additionally, it also supports minimal communicational and computational overheads on resource constrained EVs. Further, formal security verification of the proposed scheme on widely accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool validates its safeness against different security attacks.",
      "published": "2019-04-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.01171",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "charging stations",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sahil Garg",
        "Kuljeet Kaur",
        "Georges Kaddoum",
        "François Gagnon",
        "Joel J. P. C. Rodrigues"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1904.03078",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unsupervised Time Series Extraction from Controller Area Network Payloads",
      "description": "This paper introduces a method for unsupervised tokenization of Controller Area Network (CAN) data payloads using bit level transition analysis and a greedy grouping strategy. The primary goal of this proposal is to extract individual time series which have been concatenated together before transmission onto a vehicle's CAN bus. This process is necessary because the documentation for how to properly extract data from a network may not always be available; passenger vehicle CAN configurations are protected as trade secrets. At least one major manufacturer has also been found to deliberately misconfigure their documented extraction methods. Thus, this proposal serves as a critical enabler for robust third-party security auditing and intrusion detection systems which do not rely on manufacturers sharing confidential information.",
      "published": "2019-04-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.03078",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brent J. Stone",
        "Scott Graham",
        "Barry Mullins",
        "Christine Schubert Kabban"
      ],
      "venue": "2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2018-Fall)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1904.08394",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The current state of affairs in 5G security and the main remaining security challenges",
      "description": "The first release of the 5G protocol specifications, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 15, were published in December 2017 and the first 5G protocol security specifications in March 2018. As one of the technology cornerstones for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2X), Vehicle-to-Everything (V2E) systems and other critical systems, 5G defines some strict communication goals, such as massive device connectivity, sub-10ms latency and ultra high bit-rate. Likewise, given the firm security requirements of certain critical applications expected to be deployed on this new cellular communications standard, 5G defines important security goals. As such, 5G networks are intended to address known protocol vulnerabilities present in both legacy GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) networks as well as current LTE (Long Term Evolution) mobile systems. This manuscript presents a summary and analysis of the current state of affairs in 5G protocol security, discussing the main areas that should still be improved further before 5G systems go live. Although the 5G security standard documents were released just a year ago, there is a number of research papers detailing security vulnerabilities, which are summarized in this manuscript as well.",
      "published": "2019-04-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.08394",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roger Piqueras Jover"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1905.01035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Integration of Electric Vehicles with the Power Grid",
      "description": "This paper focuses on the secure integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), especially pluggable electric vehicles (EVs), with the power grid. We consider the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) system where EVs are connected to the power grid through an aggregator. In this paper, we propose a novel Cyber-Physical Anomaly Detection Engine that monitors system behavior and detects anomalies almost instantaneously. This detection engine ensures that the critical power grid component (viz.,aggregator)remains secure by monitoring(a)cyber messages for various state changes and data constraints along with (b)power data on the V2G cyber network using power measurements from sensors on the physical/power distribution network. Since the V2G system is time-sensitive, the anomaly detection engine also monitors the timing requirements of the protocol messages to enhance the safety of the aggregator. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first piece of work that combines(a)the EV charging/discharging protocols, the(b)cyber network and(c)power measurements from physical network to detect intrusions in the EV to power grid system.",
      "published": "2019-05-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.01035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chaitra Niddodi",
        "Shanny Lin",
        "Sibin Mohan",
        "Hao Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1905.09555",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of 5G-V2X: Technologies, Standardization and Research Directions",
      "description": "Cellular-Vehicle to Everything (C-V2X) aims at resolving issues pertaining to the traditional usability of Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) networking. Specifically, C-V2X lowers the number of entities involved in vehicular communications and allows the inclusion of cellular-security solutions to be applied to V2X. For this, the evolvement of LTE-V2X is revolutionary, but it fails to handle the demands of high throughput, ultra-high reliability, and ultra-low latency alongside its security mechanisms. To counter this, 5G-V2X is considered as an integral solution, which not only resolves the issues related to LTE-V2X but also provides a function-based network setup. Several reports have been given for the security of 5G, but none of them primarily focuses on the security of 5G-V2X. This article provides a detailed overview of 5G-V2X with a security-based comparison to LTE-V2X. A novel Security Reflex Function (SRF)-based architecture is proposed and several research challenges are presented related to the security of 5G-V2X. Furthermore, the article lays out requirements of Ultra-Dense and Ultra-Secure (UD-US) transmissions necessary for 5G-V2X.",
      "published": "2019-05-23",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09555",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vishal Sharma",
        "Ilsun You",
        "Nadra Guizani"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1905.11026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fooling Detection Alone is Not Enough: Adversarial Attack against Multiple Object Tracking",
      "description": "Recent work in adversarial machine learning started to focus on the visual perception in autonomous driving and studied Adversarial Examples (AEs) for object detection models. However, in such visual perception pipeline the detected objects must also be tracked, in a process called Multiple Object Tracking (MOT), to build the moving trajectories of surrounding obstacles. Since MOT is designed to be robust against errors in object detection, it poses a general challenge to existing attack techniques that blindly target objection detection: we find that a success rate of over 98% is needed for them to actually affect the tracking results, a requirement that no existing attack technique can satisfy. In this paper, we are the first to study adversarial machine learning attacks against the complete visual perception pipeline in autonomous driving, and discover a novel attack technique, tracker hijacking, that can effectively fool MOT using AEs on object detection. Using our technique, successful AEs on as few as one single frame can move an existing object in to or out of the headway of an autonomous vehicle to cause potential safety hazards. We perform evaluation using the Berkeley Deep Drive dataset and find that on average when 3 frames are attacked, our attack can have a nearly 100% success rate while attacks that blindly target object detection only have up to 25%.",
      "published": "2020-04-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.11026.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunhan Jia",
        "Yantao Lu",
        "Junjie Shen",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Hao Chen",
        "Zhenyu Zhong",
        "Tao Wei"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1908.02487",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Open Federation of IoT Platforms Through Interledger Technologies -- The SOFIE Approach",
      "description": "The lack of interoperability among IoT platforms has led to a fragmented environment, where the users and society as a whole suffer from lock-ins, lack of privacy, and reduced functionality. This paper presents SOFIE, a solution for federating the existing IoT platforms in an open and secure manner using Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) and without requiring modifications to the IoT platforms, and describes how SOFIE is used to enable two complex real life pilots: food supply chain tracking from field to fork and electricity distribution grid balancing with guided electrical vehicle (EV) charging. SOFIE's main contribution is to provide interoperability between IoT systems while also enabling new functionality and business models.",
      "published": "2019-08-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.02487",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dmitrij Lagutin",
        "Francesco Bellesini",
        "Tommaso Bragatto",
        "Alessio Cavadenti",
        "Vincenzo Croce",
        "Yki Kortesniemi",
        "Helen C. Leligou",
        "Yannis Oikonomidis",
        "George C. Polyzos",
        "Giuseppe Raveduto",
        "Francesca Santori",
        "Panagiotis Trakadas"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1909.07568",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An optimal security management framework for backhaul-aware 5G-Vehicle to Everything (V2X)",
      "description": "Cellular (C) setups facilitate the connectivity amongst the devices with better provisioning of services to its users. Vehicular networks are one of the representative setups that aim at expanding their functionalities by using the available cellular systems like Long Term Evolution (LTE)-based Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) as well as the upcoming Fifth Generation (5G)-based functional architecture. The vehicular networks include Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P) and Vehicle to Network (V2N), all of which are referred to as Vehicle to Everything (V2X). 5G has dominated the vehicular network and most of the upcoming research is motivated towards the fully functional utilization of 5G-V2X. Despite that, credential management and edge-initiated security are yet to be resolved under 5G-V2X. To further understand the issue, this paper presents security management as a principle of sustainability and key-management. The performance tradeoff is evaluated with the key-updates required to maintain a secure connection between the vehicles and the 5G-terminals. The proposed approach aims at the utilization of high-speed mmWave-based backhaul for enhancing the security operations between the core and the sub-divided functions at the edge of the network through a dual security management framework. The evaluations are conducted using numerical simulations, which help to understand the impact on the sustainability of connections as well as identification of the fail-safe points for secure and fast operations. Furthermore, the evaluations help to follow the multiple tradeoffs of security and performance based on the metrics like mandatory key updates, the range of operations and the probability of connectivity.",
      "published": "2019-09-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.07568",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vishal Sharma",
        "Jiyoon Kim",
        "Yongho Ko",
        "Ilsun You",
        "Jung Taek Seo"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1911.10671",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANTO -- Covert AutheNtication with Timing channels over Optimized traffic flows for CAN",
      "description": "Previous research works have endorsed the use of delays and clock skews for detecting intrusions or fingerprinting ECUs on the CAN bus. Similar techniques have been also proposed for establishing a time-covert cryptographic authentication channel, in this way cleverly removing the need for cryptographic material inside the limited payload of CAN frames. The main shortcoming of such works is the limited security level that can be achieved under normal CAN-bus traffic. In this work we endeavour to test the limits of the achievable security level by relying on optimization algorithms for scheduling CAN frames. Under practical bus allocations that are based on real-world scenarios, we are able to extract around 4--5 bits of authentication data from each frame which leads to an efficient intrusion detection and authentication mechanism. By accumulating covert channel data over several consecutive frames, we can achieve higher security levels that are in line with current security demands. To prove the correctness of our approach, we present experiments on state-of-the-art automotive-grade controllers (Infineon Aurix) and bus measurements with the use of industry standard tools, i.e., CANoe.",
      "published": "2019-11-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.10671",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Lucian Popa",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1911.11052",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Message Time of Arrival Codes: A Fundamental Primitive for Secure Distance Measurement",
      "description": "Secure distance measurement and therefore secure Time-of-Arrival (ToA) measurement is critical for applications such as contactless payments, passive-keyless entry and start systems, and navigation systems. This paper initiates the study of Message Time of Arrival Codes (MTACs) and their security. MTACs represent a core primitive in the construction of systems for secure ToA measurement. By surfacing MTACs in this way, we are able for the first time to formally define the security requirements of physical-layer measures that protect ToA measurement systems against attacks. Our viewpoint also enables us to provide a unified presentation of existing MTACs (such as those proposed in distance-bounding protocols and in a secure distance measurement standard) and to propose basic principles for protecting ToA measurement systems against attacks that remain unaddressed by existing mechanisms. We also use our perspective to systematically explore the tradeoffs between security and performance that apply to all signal modulation techniques enabling ToA measurements.",
      "published": "2019-11-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.11052",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrick Leu",
        "Mridula Singh",
        "Marc Roeschlin",
        "Kenneth G. Paterson",
        "Srdjan Capkun"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:1912.04735",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Covert Channel-Based Transmitter Authentication in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "In recent years, the security of automotive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is facing urgent threats due to the widespread use of legacy in-vehicle communication systems. As a representative legacy bus system, the Controller Area Network (CAN) hosts Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are crucial vehicle functioning. In this scenario, malicious actors can exploit CAN vulnerabilities, such as the lack of built-in authentication and encryption schemes, to launch CAN bus attacks with life-threatening consequences (e.g., disabling brakes). In this paper, we present TACAN (Transmitter Authentication in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs on the legacy CAN bus by exploiting the covert channels, without introducing CAN protocol modifications or traffic overheads. TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept of covert channels and exploits it to build an effective defensive technique that facilitates transmitter authentication via a centralized, trusted Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three different covert channels for ECU authentication: 1) the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based; 2) the Least Significant Bit (LSB)-based; and 3) a hybrid covert channel, exploiting the combination of the first two. In order to validate TACAN, we implement the covert channels on the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR (Chevrolet Camaro 2016) testbed. We further evaluate the bit error, throughput, and detection performance of TACAN through extensive experiments using the EcoCAR testbed and a publicly available dataset collected from Toyota Camry 2010. We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN and the effectiveness of detecting CAN bus attacks, highlighting no traffic overheads and attesting the regular functionality of ECUs.",
      "published": "2019-12-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.04735",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "toyota"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "toyota"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuhang Ying",
        "Giuseppe Bernieri",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Linda Bushnell",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2003.10620",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Joint Optimization of Spectrum and Energy Efficiency Considering the C-V2X Security: A Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach",
      "description": "Cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) communication, as a part of 5G wireless communication, has been considered one of the most significant techniques for Smart City. Vehicles platooning is an application of Smart City that improves traffic capacity and safety by C-V2X. However, different from vehicles platooning travelling on highways, C-V2X could be more easily eavesdropped and the spectrum resource could be limited when they converge at an intersection. Satisfying the secrecy rate of C-V2X, how to increase the spectrum efficiency (SE) and energy efficiency (EE) in the platooning network is a big challenge. In this paper, to solve this problem, we propose a Security-Aware Approach to Enhancing SE and EE Based on Deep Reinforcement Learning, named SEED. The SEED formulates an objective optimization function considering both SE and EE, and the secrecy rate of C-V2X is treated as a critical constraint of this function. The optimization problem is transformed into the spectrum and transmission power selections of V2V and V2I links using deep Q network (DQN). The heuristic result of SE and EE is obtained by the DQN policy based on rewards. Finally, we simulate the traffic and communication environments using Python. The evaluation results demonstrate that the SEED outperforms the DQN-wopa algorithm and the baseline algorithm by 31.83 % and 68.40 % in efficiency. Source code for the SEED is available at https://github.com/BandaidZ/OptimizationofSEandEEBasedonDRL.",
      "published": "2020-03-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.10620",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhipeng Liu",
        "Yinhui Han",
        "Jianwei Fan",
        "Lin Zhang",
        "Yunzhi Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2005.02875",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Pay as You Go: A Generic Crypto Tolling Architecture",
      "description": "The imminent pervasive adoption of vehicular communication, based on dedicated short-range technology (ETSI ITS G5 or IEEE WAVE), 5G, or both, will foster a richer service ecosystem for vehicular applications. The appearance of new cryptography based solutions envisaging digital identity and currency exchange are set to stem new approaches for existing and future challenges. This paper presents a novel tolling architecture that harnesses the availability of 5G C-V2X connectivity for open road tolling using smartphones, IOTA as the digital currency and Hyperledger Indy for identity validation. An experimental feasibility analysis is used to validate the proposed architecture for secure, private and convenient electronic toll payment.",
      "published": "2020-05-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.02875",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Paulo Bartolomeu",
        "Emanuel Vieira",
        "Joaquim Ferreira"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2006.06993",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANOA: CAN Origin Authentication Through Power Side-Channel Monitoring",
      "description": "The lack of any sender authentication mechanism in place makes CAN (Controller Area Network) vulnerable to security threats. For instance, an attacker can impersonate an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) on the bus and send spoofed messages unobtrusively with the identifier of the impersonated ECU. To address this problem, we propose a novel sender authentication technique that uses power consumption measurements of the ECU to authenticate the sender of a message. When an ECU is transmitting, its power requirement is affected, and a characteristic pattern appears in its power consumption. Our technique exploits the power consumption of each ECU during the transmission of a message to determine whether the message actually originated from the purported sender. We evaluate our approach in both a lab setup and a real vehicle. We also evaluate our approach against factors that can impact the power consumption measurement of the ECU. The results of the evaluation show that the proposed technique is applicable in a broad range of operating conditions with reasonable computational power requirements and attaining good accuracy.",
      "published": "2020-06-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.06993",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shailja Thakur",
        "Carlos Moreno",
        "Sebastian Fischmeister"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2006.08723",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threats and Countermeasures of Cyber Security in Direct and Remote Vehicle Communication Systems",
      "description": "Traffic management, road safety, and environmental impact are important issues in the modern world. These challenges are addressed by the application of sensing, control and communication methods of intelligent transportation systems (ITS). A part of ITS is a vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) which means a wireless network of vehicles. However, communication among vehicles in a VANET exposes several security threats which need to be studied and addressed. In this review, firstly, the basic flow of VANET is illustrated focusing on its communication methods, architecture, characteristics, standards, and security facilities. Next, the attacks and threats for VANET are discussed. Moreover, the authentication systems are described by which vehicular networks can be protected from fake messages and malicious nodes. Security threats and counter measures are discussed for different remote vehicle communication methods namely, remote keyless entry system, dedicated short range communication, cellular scheme, Zigbee, Bluetooth, radio frequency identification, WiFi, WiMAX, and different direct vehicle communication methods namely on-board diagnosis and universal serial bus.",
      "published": "2020-06-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.08723",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Subrato Bharati",
        "Prajoy Podder",
        "M. Rubaiyat Hossain Mondal",
        "Md. Robiul Alam Robel"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Assurance and Security (ISSN 1554-1010), Volume 15 (2020), pp. 153-164, MIR Labs, www.mirlabs.net/jias/index.html",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2007.01052",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Mining Cluster Selection for Blockchain-based Cellular V2X Communications",
      "description": "Cellular vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is expected to herald the age of autonomous vehicles in the coming years. With the integration of blockchain in such networks, information of all granularity levels, from complete blocks to individual transactions, would be accessible to vehicles at any time. Specifically, the blockchain technology is expected to improve the security, immutability, and decentralization of cellular V2X communication through smart contract and distributed ledgers. Although blockchain-based cellular V2X networks hold promise, many challenges need to be addressed to enable the future interoperability and accessibility of such large-scale platforms. One such challenge is the offloading of mining tasks in cellular V2X networks. While transportation authorities may try to balance the network mining load, the vehicles may select the nearest mining clusters to offload a task. This may cause congestion and disproportionate use of vehicular network resources. To address this issue, we propose a game-theoretic approach for balancing the load at mining clusters while maintaining fairness among offloading vehicles. Keeping in mind the low-latency requirements of vehicles, we consider a finite channel blocklength transmission which is more practical compared to the use of infinite blocklength codes. The simulation results obtained with our proposed offloading framework show improved performance over the conventional nearest mining cluster selection technique.",
      "published": "2020-06-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.01052",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Furqan Jameel",
        "Muhammad Awais Javed",
        "Sherali Zeadally",
        "Riku Jantti"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2007.05596",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware Implementation of Keyless Encryption Scheme for Internet of Things Based on Image of Memristors",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly increasing the number of connected devices. This causes new concerns towards solutions for authenticating numerous IoT devices. Most of these devices are resource-constrained. Therefore, the use of long-secret keys, in traditional cryptography schemes can be hard to implement. Also, the key generation, distribution, and storage are very complex. Moreover, the goal of many reported cyber-attacks is accessing the key. Therefore, researchers have shown an increased interest in designing keyless encryption schemes recently. In this report, we are going to explain the details of the implementation of the keyless protocol by taking advantage of known technology modules such as microcontrollers (MCU), and hash functions. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been used in many cryptographic applications such as Password Management Systems, key exchange, Key Generation. In this report, we are going to explain the details of the hardware implementation of keyless encryption in the MCU. Different kinds of memristors have been used in the past. In this work, a look-up-table containing memristor cells value at the various current levels is used since the physical component is unavailable yet. The hardware that is used to implement the system is an evaluation-board of SAMV71 MCU, which is used to implement the control system and hardware hashing.",
      "published": "2020-07-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.05596",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Mohammadinodoushan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2009.00086",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ArchiveSafe: Mass-Leakage-Resistant Storage from Proof-of-Work",
      "description": "Data breaches-mass leakage of stored information-are a major security concern. Encryption can provide confidentiality, but encryption depends on a key which, if compromised, allows the attacker to decrypt everything, effectively instantly. Security of encrypted data thus becomes a question of protecting the encryption keys. In this paper, we propose using keyless encryption to construct a mass leakage resistant archiving system, where decryption of a file is only possible after the requester, whether an authorized user or an adversary, completes a proof of work in the form of solving a cryptographic puzzle. This proposal is geared towards protection of infrequently-accessed archival data, where any one file may not require too much work to decrypt, decryption of a large number of files-mass leakage-becomes increasingly expensive for an attacker. We present a prototype implementation realized as a user-space file system driver for Linux. We report experimental results of system behaviour under different file sizes and puzzle difficulty levels. Our keyless encryption technique can be added as a layer on top of traditional encryption: together they provide strong security against adversaries without the key and resistance against mass decryption by an attacker.",
      "published": "2020-08-31",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.00086",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moe Sabry",
        "Reza Samavi",
        "Douglas Stebila"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2011.13676",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Blockchain and Edge Computing applied to the Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "With the advent of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), data from diverse sensors either embedded into the vehicles or present along with the smart city infrastructure, are of utmost importance and require both processing power and efficient trust mechanisms for information exchange in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. To accomplish these requirements, both edge computing and blockchain have been recently adopted towards a secure, distributed, and computation empowered Internet of Vehicles (IoV). This paper surveys prominent solutions for blockchain-based vehicular edge computing (VEC), provides a taxonomy, highlights their main features, advantages, and limitations to provide subsidies for further proposals.",
      "published": "2020-11-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.13676",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anderson Queiroz",
        "Eduardo Oliveira",
        "Maria Barbosa",
        "Kelvin Dias"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2102.07801",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing the Spatio-temporal Observability of Grid-Edge Resources in Distribution Grids",
      "description": "Enhancing the spatio-temporal observability of distributed energy resources (DERs) is crucial for achieving secure and efficient operations in distribution grids. This paper puts forth a joint recovery framework for residential loads by leveraging the complimentary strengths of heterogeneous measurements in real time. The proposed framework integrates low-resolution smart meter data collected at every load node with fast-sampled feeder-level measurements from limited number of distribution phasor measurement units. To address the lack of data, we exploit two key characteristics for the loads and DERs, namely the sparse changes due to infrequent activities of appliances and electric vehicles (EVs) and the locational dependence of solar photovoltaic (PV) generation. Accordingly, meaningful regularization terms are introduced to cast a convex load recovery problem, which will be further simplified to reduce the computational complexity. The load recovery solutions can be utilized to identify the EV charging events at each load node and to infer the total behind-the-meter PV output. Numerical tests using real-world data have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed approaches in enhancing the visibility of grid-edge DERs.",
      "published": "2021-02-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.07801",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "exploit",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shanny Lin",
        "Hao Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2103.07118",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation Framework for Performance Limitation of Autonomous Systems under Sensor Attack",
      "description": "Autonomous systems such as self-driving cars rely on sensors to perceive the surrounding world. Measures must be taken against attacks on sensors, which have been a hot topic in the last few years. For that goal one must first evaluate how sensor attacks affect the system, i.e. which part or whole of the system will fail if some of the built-in sensors are compromised, or will keep safe, etc. Among the relevant safety standards, ISO/PAS 21448 addresses the safety of road vehicles taking into account the performance limitations of sensors, but leaves security aspects out of scope. On the other hand, ISO/SAE 21434 addresses the security perspective during the development process of vehicular systems, but not specific threats such as sensor attacks. As a result the safety of autonomous systems under sensor attack is yet to be addressed. In this paper we propose a framework that combines safety analysis for scenario identification, and scenario-based simulation with sensor attack models embedded. Given an autonomous system model, we identify hazard scenarios caused by sensor attacks, and evaluate the performance limitations in the scenarios. We report on a prototype simulator for autonomous vehicles with radar, cameras and LiDAR along with attack models against the sensors. Our experiments show that our framework can evaluate how the system safety changes as parameters of the attacks and the sensors vary.",
      "published": "2021-03-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.07118",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Koichi Shimizu",
        "Daisuke Suzuki",
        "Ryo Muramatsu",
        "Hisashi Mori",
        "Tomoyuki Nagatsuka",
        "Tsutomu Matsumoto"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2104.07409",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ransomware Detection Using Deep Learning in the SCADA System of Electric Vehicle Charging Station",
      "description": "The Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have been continuously leveraging the evolution of network architecture, communication protocols, next-generation communication techniques (5G, 6G, Wi-Fi 6), and the internet of things (IoT). However, SCADA system has become the most profitable and alluring target for ransomware attackers. This paper proposes the deep learning-based novel ransomware detection framework in the SCADA controlled electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) with the performance analysis of three deep learning algorithms, namely deep neural network (DNN), 1D convolution neural network (CNN), and long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network. All three-deep learning-based simulated frameworks achieve around 97% average accuracy (ACC), more than 98% of the average area under the curve (AUC), and an average F1-score under 10-fold stratified cross-validation with an average false alarm rate (FAR) less than 1.88%. Ransomware driven distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack tends to shift the SOC profile by exceeding the SOC control thresholds. The severity has been found to increase as the attack progress and penetration increases. Also, ransomware driven false data injection (FDI) attack has the potential to damage the entire BES or physical system by manipulating the SOC control thresholds. It's a design choice and optimization issue that a deep learning algorithm can deploy based on the tradeoffs between performance metrics.",
      "published": "2021-04-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.07409",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manoj Basnet",
        "Subash Poudyal",
        "Mohd. Hasan Ali",
        "Dipankar Dasgupta"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2105.02905",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) can help alleviate our reliance on fossil fuels for transport and electricity systems. However, charging millions of EV batteries requires management to prevent overloading the electricity grid and minimise costly upgrades that are ultimately paid for by consumers. Managed chargers, such as Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) chargers, allow control over the time, speed and direction of charging. Such control assists in balancing electricity supply and demand across a green electricity system and could reduce costs for consumers. Smart and V2G chargers connect EVs to the power grid using a charging device which includes a data connection to exchange information and control commands between various entities in the EV ecosystem. This introduces data privacy concerns and is a potential target for cyber-security attacks. Therefore, the implementation of a secure system is crucial to permit both consumers and electricity system operators to trust smart charging and V2G. In principle, we already have the technology needed for a connected EV charging infrastructure to be securely enabled, borrowing best practices from the Internet and industrial control systems. We must properly adapt the security technology to take into account the challenges peculiar to the EV charging infrastructure. Challenges go beyond technical considerations and other issues arise such as balancing trade-offs between security and other desirable qualities such as interoperability, scalability, crypto-agility, affordability and energy efficiency. This document reviews security and privacy topics relevant to the EV charging ecosystem with a focus on smart charging and V2G.",
      "published": "2021-05-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.02905",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cyber-security",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roberto Metere",
        "Myriam Neaimeh",
        "Charles Morisset",
        "Carsten Maple",
        "Xavier Bellekens",
        "Ricardo M. Czekster"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2106.02976",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fortifying Vehicular Security Through Low Overhead Physically Unclonable Functions",
      "description": "Within vehicles, the Controller Area Network (CAN) allows efficient communication between the electronic control units (ECUs) responsible for controlling the various subsystems. The CAN protocol was not designed to include much support for secure communication. The fact that so many critical systems can be accessed through an insecure communication network presents a major security concern. Adding security features to CAN is difficult due to the limited resources available to the individual ECUs and the costs that would be associated with adding the necessary hardware to support any additional security operations without overly degrading the performance of standard communication. Replacing the protocol is another option, but it is subject to many of the same problems. The lack of security becomes even more concerning as vehicles continue to adopt smart features. Smart vehicles have a multitude of communication interfaces would an attacker could exploit to gain access to the networks. In this work we propose a security framework that is based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs) and lightweight cryptography (LWC). The framework does not require any modification to the standard CAN protocol while also minimizing the amount of additional message overhead required for its operation. The improvements in our proposed framework results in major reduction in the number of CAN frames that must be sent during operation. For a system with 20 ECUs for example, our proposed framework only requires 6.5% of the number of CAN frames that is required by the existing approach to successfully authenticate every ECU.",
      "published": "2021-06-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.02976",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carson Labrado",
        "Himanshu Thapliyal",
        "Saraju P. Mohanty"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems, 2021",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2106.09826",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection and Localization for Networked Embedded Control Systems",
      "description": "Closed-loop control systems employ continuous sensing and actuation to maintain controlled variables within preset bounds and achieve the desired system output. Intentional disturbances in the system, such as in the case of cyberattacks, can compromise reachability of control goals, and in several cases jeopardize safety. The increasing connectivity and exposure of networked control to external networks has enabled attackers to compromise these systems by exploiting security vulnerabilities. Attacks against safety-critical control loops can not only drive the system over a trajectory different from the desired, but also cause fatal consequences to humans. In this paper we present a physics-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) aimed at increasing the security in control systems. In addition to conventional process state estimation for intrusion detection, since the controller cannot be trusted, we introduce a controller state estimator. Additionally, we make our detector context-aware by utilizing sensor measurements from other control loops, which allows to distinguish and characterize disturbances from attacks. We introduce adaptive thresholding and adaptive filtering as means to achieve context-awareness. Together, these methodologies allow detection and localization of attacks in closed-loop controls. Finally, we demonstrate feasibility of the approach by mounting a series of attacks against a networked Direct Current (DC) motor closed-loop speed control deployed on an ECU testbed, as well as on a simulated automated lane keeping system. Among other application domains, this set of approaches is key to support security in automotive systems, and ultimately increase road and passenger safety.",
      "published": "2021-06-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09826",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vuk Lesi",
        "Marcio Juliato",
        "Shabbir Ahmed",
        "Christopher Gutierrez",
        "Qian Wang",
        "Manoj Sastry"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2110.02280",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed Privacy-Preserving Electric Vehicle Charging Control Based on Secret Sharing",
      "description": "Cooperative electric vehicle (EV) charging control has emerged as a key component in grid-edge resource (GER) management. However, customers' privacy remains a major barrier to large-scale implementation of EV charging control. In this paper, we develop a distributed privacy-preserving EV charging control protocol based on secret sharing (SS) that 1) achieves scalability over EV population size; 2) enjoys higher computation efficiency compared to homomorphic encryption (HE) based methods; and 3) secures the privacy of the participating EVs against honest-but-curious adversaries and external eavesdroppers. The cooperative EV charging control is formulated to achieve overnight valley-filling and framed into the projected gradient algorithm (PGA) structure as a distributed optimization problem. SS is integrated into PGA to achieve secure updates of both primal and dual variables. Theoretical security analyses and simulations in a residential area are conducted to prove the privacy preservation guarantee as well as the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed privacy preservation method. Broadly, the proposed method can be readily extended to various GER control applications.",
      "published": "2021-10-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.02280",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiang Huo",
        "Mingxi Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2110.13681",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Malicious Mode Attack on EV Coordinated Charging Load and MIADRC Defense Strategy",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) provides a salient communication environment to facilitate the coordinated charging of electric vehicle (EV) load. However, as IoT is connected with the public network, the coordinated charging system is in a low-level cyber security and greatly vulnerable to malicious attacks. This paper investigates the malicious mode attack (MMA), which is a new cyberattack pattern that simultaneously attacks massive EV charging piles to generate continuous sinusoidal power disturbance with the same frequency as the poorly-damped wide-area electromechanical mode. Thereby, high amplitude forced oscillations could be stimulated by MMA, which seriously threats the power system stability. First, the potential threat of MMA is clarified by investigating the vulnerability of the IoT-based coordinated charging load control system, and an MMA process like Mirai is pointed out as an example. And then, based on the attack process, an MMA model is established for impact analysis where expressions of the mean and stochastic responses of the MMA forced oscillation are derived to discover main impact factors. Further, to mitigate the impact of MMA, a defense strategy based on multi-index information active disturbance rejection control is proposed to improve the stability and anti-disturbance ability of the power system, which considers the impact factors of both mode damping and disturbance compensation. Simulations are conducted to verify the existence and characteristics of MMA threats, and the efficiency of the proposed defense strategy is also validated.",
      "published": "2021-10-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.13681",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yichen Zhou",
        "Weidong Liu",
        "Jing Ma",
        "Xinghao Zhen",
        "Yonggang Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2111.04950",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Nash Equilibrium Control Policy against Bus-off Attacks in CAN Networks",
      "description": "A bus-off attack is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack which exploits error handling in the controller area network (CAN) to induce an honest node to disconnect itself from the CAN bus. This paper develops a stochastic transmission policy as a countermeasure for the controller-transmitter pair against the bus-off attack. We model this as a non-zero-sum linear-quadratic-Gaussian game between the controller-transmitter pair and the attacker. We derive Nash equilibria of the game for two different information structures of the attacker. We show that the attacker has a dominant attack strategy under both information structures. Under the dominant attack strategy, we show that the optimal control policy is linear in the system state. We further identify a necessary and a sufficient conditions on the transmission policy to have bounded average cost. The theoretical results are complemented by a detailed case study of a bus-off attack on a vehicular adaptive cruise control model.",
      "published": "2021-11-09",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.04950",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiacheng Tang",
        "Shiping Shao",
        "Jiguo Song",
        "Abhishek Gupta"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2111.11369",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Measurement Based Non-Line-Of-Sight Vehicular Visible Light Communication Channel Characterization",
      "description": "Vehicular visible light communication (V-VLC) aims to provide secure complementary vehicle to everything communications (V2X) to increase road safety and traffic efficiency. V-VLC provides directional transmissions, mainly enabling line-of-sight (LoS) communications. However, reflections due to nearby objects enable non-line-of-sight (NLoS) transmissions, extending the usage scenarios beyond LoS. In this paper, we propose a wide-band measurement-based NLoS channel characterization and evaluate the performance of direct current biased optical orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (DCO-OFDM) V-VLC scheme for NLoS channel. We propose a distance-based NLoS V-VLC channel path loss model considering reflection surface characteristics and NLoS V-VLC channel impulse response (CIR) incorporating the temporal broadening effect due to vehicle reflections through weighted double gamma function. The proposed path loss model yields higher accuracy up to 14 dB when compared to the single order reflection model whereas the CIR model estimates the full width at half maximum up to 2 ns accuracy. We further demonstrate that the target bit-error-rate of 10^-3 can be achieved up to 7.86 m, 9.79 m, and 17.62 m distances for black, orange, and white vehicle reflection induced measured NLoS V-VLC channels for DCO-OFDM transmissions.",
      "published": "2021-11-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.11369",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bugra Turan",
        "Omer Narmanlioglu",
        "Osman Nuri Koc",
        "Emrah Kar",
        "Sinem Coleri",
        "Murat Uysal"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2112.09229",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Generation of Wheel Lockup Attacks on Nonlinear Dynamics of Vehicle Traction",
      "description": "There is ample evidence in the automotive cybersecurity literature that the car brake ECUs can be maliciously reprogrammed. Motivated by such threat, this paper investigates the capabilities of an adversary who can directly control the frictional brake actuators and would like to induce wheel lockup conditions leading to catastrophic road injuries. This paper demonstrates that the adversary despite having a limited knowledge of the tire-road interaction characteristics has the capability of driving the states of the vehicle traction dynamics to a vicinity of the lockup manifold in a finite time by means of a properly designed attack policy for the frictional brakes. This attack policy relies on employing a predefined-time controller and a nonlinear disturbance observer acting on the wheel slip error dynamics. Simulations under various road conditions demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack policy.",
      "published": "2021-12-16",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.09229",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alireza Mohammadi",
        "Hafiz Malik",
        "Masoud Abbaszadeh"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2201.06680",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of the Architecture Alternatives for Real-time Intrusion Detection Systems for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Attackers demonstrated the use of remote access to the in-vehicle network of connected vehicles to launch cyber-attacks and remotely take control of these vehicles. Machine-learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) techniques have been proposed for the detection of such attacks. The evaluation of some of these IDS demonstrated their efficacy in terms of accuracy in detecting message injections but was performed offline, which limits the confidence in their use for real-time protection scenarios. This paper evaluates four architecture designs for real-time IDS for connected vehicles using Controller Area Network (CAN) datasets collected from a moving vehicle under malicious speed reading message injections. The evaluation shows that a real-time IDS for a connected vehicle designed as two processes, a process for CAN Bus monitoring and another one for anomaly detection engine is reliable (no loss of messages) and could be used for real-time resilience mechanisms as a response to cyber-attacks.",
      "published": "2022-01-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.06680",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mubark B Jedh",
        "Jian Kai Lee",
        "Lotfi ben Othmane"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4095,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2201.06680 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: confidence, loss, response, access, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2201.10563",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automating Safety and Security Co-Design through Semantically-Rich Architecture Patterns",
      "description": "During the design of safety-critical systems, safety and security engineers make use of architecture patterns, such as Watchdog and Firewall, to address identified failures and threats. Often, however, the deployment of safety patterns has consequences on security, e.g., the deployment of a safety pattern may lead to new threats. The other way around may also be possible, i.e., the deployment of a security pattern may lead to new failures. Safety and security co-design is, therefore, required to understand such consequences and trade-offs, in order to reach appropriate system designs. Currently, pattern descriptions, including their consequences, are described using natural language. Therefore, their deployment in system design is carried out manually, thus time-consuming and prone to human-error, especially given the high system complexity. We propose the use of semantically-rich architecture patterns to enable automated support for safety and security co-design by using Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KRR) methods. Based on our domain-specific language, we specify reasoning principles as logic specifications written as answer-set programs. KRR engines enable the automation of safety and security co-engineering activities, including the automated recommendation of which architecture patterns can address failures or threats and consequences of deploying such patterns. We demonstrate our approach on an example taken from the ISO 21434 standard.",
      "published": "2022-01-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.10563",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso 21434",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuri Gil Dantas",
        "Vivek Nigam"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2202.00005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G enabled Mobile Edge Computing security for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The world is moving into a new era with the deployment of 5G communication infrastructure. Many new developments are deployed centred around this technology. One such advancement is 5G Vehicle to Everything communication. This technology can be used for applications such as driverless delivery of goods, immediate response to emergencies and improving traffic efficiency. The concept of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) is built around this system which is completely autonomous. This paper studies the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack carried out over a 5G network and analyses security attacks, particularly the DDoS attack. The aim is to implement a machine learning model capable of classifying different types of DDoS attacks and predicting the quality of 5G latency. The initial steps of implementation involved the synthetic addition of 5G parameters into the dataset. Subsequently, the data was label encoded, and minority classes were oversampled to match the other classes. Finally, the data was split as training and testing, and machine learning models were applied. Although the paper resulted in a model that predicted DDoS attacks, the dataset acquired significantly lacked 5G related information. Furthermore, the 5G classification model needed more modification. The research was based on largely quantitative research methods in a simulated environment. Hence, the biggest limitation of this research has been the lack of resources for data collection and sole reliance on online data sets. Ideally, a Vehicle to Everything (V2X) project would greatly benefit from an autonomous 5G enabled vehicle connected to a mobile edge cloud. However, this project was conducted solely online on a single PC which further limits the outcomes. Although the model underperformed, this paper can be used as a framework for future research in Intelligent Transport System development.",
      "published": "2022-01-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daryll Ralph D'Costa",
        "Robert Abbas"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2202.00743",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring the consequences of cyber attacks on Powertrain Cyber Physical Systems",
      "description": "This paper proposes a novel approach for the study of cyber-attacks against the powertrain of a generic vehicle. The proposed model is composed by a a generic Internal Combustion engine and a speed controller, that communicate through a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. We consider a threat model composed by three representative attack scenarios designed to modify the output of the model, thus affecting the rotational speed of the engine. Two attack scenarios target both vehicle sensor systems and CAN communication, while one attack scenario only requires injection of CAN messages. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt of modeling the consequences of realistic cyber attacks against a modern vehicle.",
      "published": "2022-02-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.00743",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dario Stabili",
        "Raffaele Romagnoli",
        "Mirco Marchetti",
        "Bruno Sinopoli",
        "Michele Colajanni"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2202.02453",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicular Visible Light Communications for Automated Valet Parking",
      "description": "Visible light communication (VLC) is a promising Optical Wireless Communications (OWC) scheme that is demonstrated to provide secure, line-of-sight (LoS), and short-distance vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure(V2I) communications. Recently, automated driving applications, supported by V2I links are proposed to increase the reliability of the autonomous vehicles. To this regard, we propose a VLCbased V2I scheme to increase the V2I communication redundancy of autonomous valet parking (AVP) applications, through jam-free and location-based characteristics of VLC. In this paper, we demonstrate a novel architecture to support indoor parking-garage online-map update with vehicle on-board data transmissions and location-based map update dissemination through bidirectional VLC communications. The proposed system yields error-free LoS transmissions with Direct Current Biased Optical OFDM (DCO-OFDM) up to 33 m transmitter-receiver distance enabling vehicle CAN Bus data, infrastructure camera video, and LIDAR point cloud data sharing in an indoor parking garage.",
      "published": "2021-11-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.02453",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "secure",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bugra Turan",
        "Ali Uyrus",
        "Osman Nuri Koc",
        "Emrah Kar",
        "Sinem Coleri"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2203.10673",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G-Enabled Pseudonymity for Cooperative Intelligent Transportation System",
      "description": "Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) enable communications between vehicles, road-side infrastructures, and road-users to improve users' safety and to efficiently manage traffic. Most, if not all, of the intelligent vehicles-to-everything (V2X) applications, often rely on continuous collection and sharing of sensitive information such as detailed location information which raises privacy concerns. In this light, a common approach to concealing the long-term identity of C-ITS vehicles is using multiple temporary identifiers, called pseudonyms. However, the legacy pseudonyms management approach is prone to linking attacks. The introduction of 5G network to V2X offers enhanced location accuracy, better clock synchronisation, improved modular service-based architecture, and enhanced security and privacy preservation controls. Motivated by the above enhancements, we study 5G-enabled pseudonyms for protecting vehicle identity privacy in C-ITS. We highlight the gaps in the current standards of pseudonyms management. We further provide recommendations regarding the pseudonyms management life-cycle.",
      "published": "2022-03-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.10673",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nardine Basta",
        "Ming Ding",
        "Muhammad Ikram",
        "Mohamed Ali Kaafar"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2205.05866",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Cybersecurity Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles and Environments",
      "description": "In today's modern farm, an increasing number of agricultural systems and vehicles are connected to the Internet. While the benefits of networked agricultural machinery are attractive, this technological shift is also creating an environment that is conducive to cyberattacks. While previous research has focused on general cybersecurity concerns in the farming and agricultural industries, minimal research has focused on techniques for identifying security vulnerabilities within actual agricultural systems that could be exploited by cybercriminals. Hence, this paper presents STAVE - a Security Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles and Environments - as a potential solution to assist with the identification of cybersecurity vulnerabilities within commercially available off-the-shelf components used in certain agricultural systems. This paper reports ongoing research efforts to develop and refine the STAVE testbed, along with describing initial cybersecurity experimentation which aims to identify security vulnerabilities within wireless and Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus agricultural vehicle components.",
      "published": "2022-05-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.05866",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mark Freyhof",
        "George Grispos",
        "Santosh Pitla",
        "Cody Stolle"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2205.06496",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Application of NOMA in Vehicular Visible Light Communication Systems",
      "description": "In the context of an increasing interest toward reducing the number of traffic accidents and of associated victims, communication-based vehicle safety applications have emerged as one of the best solutions to enhance road safety. In this area, visible light communications (VLC) have a great potential for applications due to their relatively simple design for basic functioning, efficiency, and large geographical distribution. Vehicular Visible Light Communication (VVLC) is preferred as a vehicle to everything (V2X) communications scheme. Due to its highly secure, low complexity, and radio frequency (RF) interference-free characteristics, exploiting the line of sight (LoS) propagation of visible light and usage of already existing vehicle light-emitting diodes (LEDs). This research is addressing the application of the Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) technique in VLC based Vehicle-to- Vehicle (V2V) communication. The proposed system is simulated in almost realistic conditions and the performance of the system is analyzed under different scenarios.",
      "published": "2022-05-13",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.06496",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamed Alizadeh Ghazijahani"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2206.08278",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Automotive Architectures with Named Data Networking",
      "description": "As in-vehicle communication becomes more complex, the automotive community is exploring various architectural options such as centralized and zonal architectures for their numerous benefits. Zonal architecture reduces the wiring cost by physically locating related operations and ECUs near their intended functions and the number of physical ECUs through function consolidation. Centralized architectures consolidate the number of ECUs into few, powerful compute units. Common characteristics of these architectures include the need for high-bandwidth communication and security, which have been elusive with standard automotive architectures. Further, as automotive communication technologies evolve, it is also likely that multiple link-layer technologies such as CAN and Automotive Ethernet will co-exist. These alternative architectures promise to integrate these diverse sets of technologies. However, architectures that allow such co-existence have not been adequately explored. In this work we explore a new network architecture called Named Data Networking (NDN) to achieve multiple goals: provide a foundational security infrastructure and bridge different link layer protocols such as CAN, LIN, and automotive Ethernet into a unified communication system. We created a proof-of-concept bench-top testbed using CAN HATS and Raspberry PIs that replay real traffic over CAN and Ethernet to demonstrate how NDN can provide a secure, high-speed bridge between different automotive link layers. We also show how NDN can support communication between centralized or zonal high-power compute components. Security is achieved through digitally signing all Data packets between these components, preventing unauthorized ECUs from injecting arbitrary data into the network. We also demonstrate NDN's ability to prevent DoS and replay attacks between different network segments connected through NDN.",
      "published": "2022-06-16",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.08278",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zachariah Threet",
        "Christos Papadopoulos",
        "William Lambert",
        "Proyash Podder",
        "Spiros Thanasoulas",
        "Alex Afanasyev",
        "Sheikh Ghafoor",
        "Susmit Shannigrahi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2206.13055",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Decentralized Identifier-based Privacy-preserving Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Electric Vehicle Charging in Smart Grid",
      "description": "The popularity of Electric Vehicles (EVs) has been rising across the globe in recent years. Smart grids will be the backbone for EV charging and enable efficient consumption of electricity by the EVs. With the demand for EVs, associated cyber threats are also increasing. Users expose their personal information while charging their EVs, leading to privacy threats. This paper proposes a user-empowered, privacy-aware authenticated key exchange protocol for EV charging in smart grid. The proposed protocol is based on the concept of Decentralized Identifier (DID) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs). The use of DIDs empowers users by helping them to have complete control over their identities. The charging station and the user verify that the other party is legitimate before proceeding with the charging services using VC. Key recovery is another issue we address in this paper. A method to recover lost keys is incorporated into the proposed protocol. We present formal security proof and informal analysis to show that protocol's robustness against several attacks. We also provide a detailed performance analysis to show that the proposed protocol is efficient.",
      "published": "2022-06-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.13055",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rohini Poolat Parameswarath",
        "Prosanta Gope",
        "Biplab Sikdar"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2207.07041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning-Driven Mitigation of Adverse Effects of Cyber-Attacks on Electric Vehicle Charging Station",
      "description": "An electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) infrastructure is the backbone of transportation electrification. However, the EVCS has myriads of exploitable vulnerabilities in software, hardware, supply chain, and incumbent legacy technologies such as network, communication, and control. These standalone or networked EVCS open up large attack surfaces for the local or state-funded adversaries. The state-of-the-art approaches are not agile and intelligent enough to defend against and mitigate advanced persistent threats (APT). We propose the data-driven model-free distributed intelligence based on multiagent Deep Reinforcement Learning (MADRL)-- Twin Delayed Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (TD3) -- that efficiently learns the control policy to mitigate the cyberattacks on the controllers of EVCS. Also, we have proposed two additional mitigation methods: the manual/Bruteforce mitigation and the controller clone-based mitigation. The attack model considers the APT designed to malfunction the duty cycles of the EVCS controllers with Type-I low-frequency attack and Type-II constant attack. The proposed model restores the EVCS operation under threat incidence in any/all controllers by correcting the control signals generated by the legacy controllers. Also, the TD3 algorithm provides higher granularity by learning nonlinear control policies as compared to the other two mitigation methods. Index Terms: Cyberattack, Deep Reinforcement Learning(DRL), Electric Vehicle Charging Station, Mitigation.",
      "published": "2022-07-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.07041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Basnet",
        "MH Ali"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2208.00343",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Differential Signaling",
      "description": "Differential signaling is a method of data transmission that uses two complementary electrical signals to encode information. This allows a receiver to reject any noise by looking at the difference between the two signals, assuming the noise affects both signals in the same way. Many protocols such as USB, Ethernet, and HDMI use differential signaling to achieve a robust communication channel in a noisy environment. This generally works well and has led many to believe that it is infeasible to remotely inject attacking signals into such a differential pair. In this paper we challenge this assumption and show that an adversary can in fact inject malicious signals from a distance, purely using common-mode injection, i.e., injecting into both wires at the same time. We show how this allows an attacker to inject bits or even arbitrary messages into a communication line. Such an attack is a significant threat to many applications, from home security and privacy to automotive systems, critical infrastructure, or implantable medical devices; in which incorrect data or unauthorized control could cause significant damage, or even fatal accidents. We show in detail the principles of how an electromagnetic signal can bypass the noise rejection of differential signaling, and eventually result in incorrect bits in the receiver. We show how an attacker can exploit this to achieve a successful injection of an arbitrary bit, and we analyze the success rate of injecting longer arbitrary messages. We demonstrate the attack on a real system and show that the success rate can reach as high as $90\\%$. Finally, we present a case study where we wirelessly inject a message into a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, which is a differential signaling bus protocol used in many critical applications, including the automotive and aviation sector.",
      "published": "2022-07-31",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.00343",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Youqian Zhang",
        "Kasper Rasmussen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2208.10644",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Enabled Cyber Attack Prediction and Mitigation for EV Charging Stations",
      "description": "Safe and reliable electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) have become imperative in an intelligent transportation infrastructure. Over the years, there has been a rapid increase in the deployment of EVCSs to address the upsurging charging demands. However, advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) have rendered this cyber-physical system (CPS) vulnerable to suffering cyber threats, thereby destabilizing the charging ecosystem and even the entire electric grid infrastructure. This paper develops an advanced cybersecurity framework, where STRIDE threat modeling is used to identify potential vulnerabilities in an EVCS. Further, the weighted attack defense tree approach is employed to create multiple attack scenarios, followed by developing Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and Partially Observable Monte-Carlo Planning (POMCP) algorithms for modeling the security attacks. Also, potential mitigation strategies are suggested for the identified threats.",
      "published": "2022-08-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.10644",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mansi Girdhar",
        "Junho Hong",
        "Yongsik Yoo",
        "Tai-Jin Song"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2209.03630",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enabling Connectivity for Automated Mobility: A Novel MQTT-based Interface Evaluated in a 5G Case Study on Edge-Cloud Lidar Object Detection",
      "description": "Enabling secure and reliable high-bandwidth lowlatency connectivity between automated vehicles and external servers, intelligent infrastructure, and other road users is a central step in making fully automated driving possible. The availability of data interfaces, which allow this kind of connectivity, has the potential to distinguish artificial agents' capabilities in connected, cooperative, and automated mobility systems from the capabilities of human operators, who do not possess such interfaces. Connected agents can for example share data to build collective environment models, plan collective behavior, and learn collectively from the shared data that is centrally combined. This paper presents multiple solutions that allow connected entities to exchange data. In particular, we propose a new universal communication interface which uses the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol to connect agents running the Robot Operating System (ROS). Our work integrates methods to assess the connection quality in the form of various key performance indicators in real-time. We compare a variety of approaches that provide the connectivity necessary for the exemplary use case of edge-cloud lidar object detection in a 5G network. We show that the mean latency between the availability of vehicle-based sensor measurements and the reception of a corresponding object list from the edge-cloud is below 87 ms. All implemented solutions are made open-source and free to use. Source code is available at https://github.com/ika-rwth-aachen/ros-v2x-benchmarking-suite.",
      "published": "2022-09-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.03630",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lennart Reiher",
        "Bastian Lampe",
        "Timo Woopen",
        "Raphael van Kempen",
        "Till Beemelmanns",
        "Lutz Eckstein"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2209.04373",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimal $(0,1)$-Matrix Completion with Majorization Ordered Objectives (To the memory of Pravin Varaiya)",
      "description": "We propose and examine two optimal $(0,1)$-matrix completion problems with majorization ordered objectives. They elevate the seminal study by Gale and Ryser from feasibility to optimality in partial order programming (POP), referring to optimization with partially ordered objectives. We showcase their applications in electric vehicle charging, portfolio optimization, and secure data storage. Solving such integer POP (iPOP) problems is challenging because of the possible non-comparability among objective values and the integer requirements. Nevertheless, we prove the essential uniqueness of all optimal objective values and identify two particular ones for each of the two inherently symmetric iPOP problems. Furthermore, for every optimal objective value, we decompose the construction of an associated optimal~$(0,1)$-matrix into a series of sorting processes, respectively agreeing with the rule of thumb \"peak shaving\" or \"valley filling.\" We show that the resulting algorithms have linear time complexities and verify their empirical efficiency via numerical simulations compared to the standard order-preserving method for POP.",
      "published": "2022-09-09",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.04373",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yanfang Mo",
        "Wei Chen",
        "Keyou You",
        "Li Qiu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2211.02579",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2X Misbehavior in Maneuver Sharing and Coordination Service: Considerations for Standardization",
      "description": "Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV) use sensors and wireless communication to improve road safety and efficiency. However, attackers may target Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. Indeed, an attacker may send authenticated-but-wrong data to send false location information, alert incorrect events, or report a bogus object endangering safety of other CAVs. Standardization Development Organizations (SDO) are currently working on developing security standards against such attacks. Unfortunately, current standardization efforts do not include misbehavior specifications for advanced V2X services such as Maneuver Sharing and Coordination Service (MSCS). This work assesses the security of MSC Messages (MSCM) and proposes inputs for consideration in existing standards.",
      "published": "2022-11-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.02579",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jean-Philippe Monteuuis",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "Mohammad Raashid Ansari",
        "Cong Chen",
        "Seung Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2211.05854",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Test-time adversarial detection and robustness for localizing humans using ultra wide band channel impulse responses",
      "description": "Keyless entry systems in cars are adopting neural networks for localizing its operators. Using test-time adversarial defences equip such systems with the ability to defend against adversarial attacks without prior training on adversarial samples. We propose a test-time adversarial example detector which detects the input adversarial example through quantifying the localized intermediate responses of a pre-trained neural network and confidence scores of an auxiliary softmax layer. Furthermore, in order to make the network robust, we extenuate the non-relevant features by non-iterative input sample clipping. Using our approach, mean performance over 15 levels of adversarial perturbations is increased by 55.33% for the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) and 6.3% for both the basic iterative method (BIM) and the projected gradient method (PGD).",
      "published": "2022-11-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.05854",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abhiram Kolli",
        "Muhammad Jehanzeb Mirza",
        "Horst Possegger",
        "Horst Bischof"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2211.08530",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Attack Event Analysis for EV Charging Stations",
      "description": "Safe and secure electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) are important in smart transportation infrastructure. The prevalence of EVCSs has rapidly increased over time in response to the rising demand for EV charging. However, developments in information and communication technologies (ICT) have made the cyber-physical system (CPS) of EVCSs susceptible to cyber-attacks, which might destabilize the infrastructure of the electric grid as well as the environment for charging. This study suggests a 5Ws \\& 1H-based investigation approach to deal with cyber-attack-related incidents due to the incapacity of the current investigation frameworks to comprehend and handle these mishaps. Also, a stochastic anomaly detection system (ADS) is proposed to identify the anomalies, abnormal activities, and unusual operations of the station entities as a post cyber event analysis.",
      "published": "2022-11-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.08530",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mansi Girdhar",
        "Junho Hong",
        "Yongsik You",
        "Tai-jin Song",
        "Manimaran Govindarasu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2302.01744",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Communication Security in the Internet of Vehicles based Industrial Value Chain",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is formed by connecting vehicles to Internet of Things. It enables vehicles to ubiquitously access to the information of customers (drivers), suppliers, and even producers to structure an IoV-based industrial value chain. Nevertheless, with the increase in vehicle networking and the information exchange among drivers, suppliers, and producers, communication security is emerging as a serious issue. In this article, we provide an overview of the communication security, and a summary of security requirements. Moreover, we clarify how security solutions can be used to conquer security challenges in the value chain. Finally, an example of attack detection and identification in Electronic Control Units (ECUs) of vehicles is used to concretely illustrate the challenges.",
      "published": "2023-01-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.01744",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuanfang Chen",
        "Muhammad Alam",
        "Xiaohua Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2302.12890",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Edge-Based Detection and Localization of Adversarial Oscillatory Load Attacks Orchestrated By Compromised EV Charging Stations",
      "description": "In this paper, we investigate an edge-based approach for the detection and localization of coordinated oscillatory load attacks initiated by exploited EV charging stations against the power grid. We rely on the behavioral characteristics of the power grid in the presence of interconnected EVCS while combining cyber and physical layer features to implement deep learning algorithms for the effective detection of oscillatory load attacks at the EVCS. We evaluate the proposed detection approach by building a real-time test bed to synthesize benign and malicious data, which was generated by analyzing real-life EV charging data collected during recent years. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the implemented approach with the Convolutional Long-Short Term Memory model producing optimal classification accuracy (99.4\\%). Moreover, our analysis results shed light on the impact of such detection mechanisms towards building resiliency into different levels of the EV charging ecosystem while allowing power grid operators to localize attacks and take further mitigation measures. Specifically, we managed to decentralize the detection mechanism of oscillatory load attacks and create an effective alternative for operator-centric mechanisms to mitigate multi-operator and MitM oscillatory load attacks against the power grid. Finally, we leverage the created test bed to evaluate a distributed mitigation technique, which can be deployed on public/private charging stations to average out the impact of oscillatory load attacks while allowing the power system to recover smoothly within 1 second with minimal overhead.",
      "published": "2023-02-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.12890",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khaled Sarieddine",
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Sadegh Torabi",
        "Ribal Atallah",
        "Chadi Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2303.03535",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploration of For-Purpose Decentralized Algorithmic Cyber Attacks in EV Charging Control",
      "description": "Distributed and decentralized multi-agent optimization (DMAO) algorithms enable the control of large-scale grid-edge resources, such as electric vehicles (EV), to provide power grid services. Despite its great scalability, DMAO is fundamentally prone to cyber attacks as it is highly dependent on frequent peer-to-peer communications. Existing cyber-security research in this regard mainly focuses on \\emph{broad-spectrum} attacks aiming at jeopardizing the entire control system while losing the possibility of achieving specific attacking purposes. This paper, for the first time, explores novel \\emph{for-purpose} algorithmic attacks that are launched by participating agents and interface with DMAO to achieve self-interest attack purposes. A decentralized EV charging control problem is formulated as an illustrative use case. Theoretical \\emph{for-purpose} attack vectors with and without the stealthy feature are devised. Simulations on EV charging control show the practicability of the proposed algorithmic \\emph{for-purpose} attacks and the impacts of such attacks on distribution networks.",
      "published": "2023-03-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.03535",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cyber-security",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahan Fakouri Fard",
        "Xiang Huo",
        "Mingxi Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2304.04411",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum Cyber-Attack on Blockchain-based VANET",
      "description": "Blockchain-based Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is widely considered as secure communication architecture for a connected transportation system. With the advent of quantum computing, there are concerns regarding the vulnerability of this architecture against cyber-attacks. In this study, a potential threat is investigated in a blockchain-based VANET, and a corresponding quantum cyber-attack is developed. Specifically, a quantum impersonation attack using Quantum-Shor algorithm is developed to break the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) encrypted digital signatures of VANET and thus create a threat for the trust-based blockchain scheme of VANET. A blockchain-based VANET, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, and vehicular mobility are simulated using OMNET++, the extended INET library, and vehicles-in-network simulation (VEINS) along with simulation of urban mobility (SUMO), respectively. A small key RSA based message encryption is implemented using IBM Qiskit, which is an open-source quantum software development kit. The findings reveal that the quantum cyber-attack, example, impersonation attack is able to successfully break the trust chain of a blockchain-based VANET. This highlights the need for a quantum secured blockchain.",
      "published": "2023-04-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.04411",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kazi Hassan Shakib",
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "Mhafuzul Islam",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2305.08037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ChargeX: Exploring State Switching Attack on Electric Vehicle Charging Systems",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle (EV) has become one of the promising solutions to the ever-evolving environmental and energy crisis. The key to the wide adoption of EVs is a pervasive charging infrastructure, composed of both private/home chargers and public/commercial charging stations. The security of EV charging, however, has not been thoroughly investigated. This paper investigates the communication mechanisms between the chargers and EVs, and exposes the lack of protection on the authenticity in the SAE J1772 charging control protocol. To showcase our discoveries, we propose a new class of attacks, ChargeX, which aims to manipulate the charging states or charging rates of EV chargers with the goal of disrupting the charging schedules, causing a denial of service (DoS), or degrading the battery performance. ChargeX inserts a hardware attack circuit to strategically modify the charging control signals. We design and implement multiple attack systems, and evaluate the attacks on a public charging station and two home chargers using a simulated vehicle load in the lab environment. Extensive experiments on different types of chargers demonstrate the effectiveness and generalization of ChargeX. Specifically, we demonstrate that ChargeX can force the switching of an EV's charging state from ``stand by\" to ``charging\", even when the vehicle is not in the charging state. We further validate the attacks on a Tesla Model 3 vehicle to demonstrate the disruptive impacts of ChargeX. If deployed, ChargeX may significantly demolish people's trust in the EV charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2023-05-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.08037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ce Zhou",
        "Qiben Yan",
        "Zhiyuan Yu",
        "Eshan Dixit",
        "Ning Zhang",
        "Huacheng Zeng",
        "Alireza Safdari Ghanhdari"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2306.16728",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IoT Data Processing for Smart City and Semantic Web Applications",
      "description": "The world has been experiencing rapid urbanization over the last few decades, putting a strain on existing city infrastructure such as waste management, water supply management, public transport and electricity consumption. We are also seeing increasing pollution levels in cities threatening the environment, natural resources and health conditions. However, we must realize that the real growth lies in urbanization as it provides many opportunities to individuals for better employment, healthcare and better education. However, it is imperative to limit the ill effects of rapid urbanization through integrated action plans to enable the development of growing cities. This gave rise to the concept of a smart city in which all available information associated with a city will be utilized systematically for better city management. The proposed system architecture is divided in subsystems and is discussed in individual chapters. The first chapter introduces and gives overview to the reader of the complete system architecture. The second chapter discusses the data monitoring system and data lake system based on the oneM2M standards. DMS employs oneM2M as a middleware layer to achieve interoperability, and DLS uses a multi-tenant architecture with multiple logical databases, enabling efficient and reliable data management. The third chapter discusses energy monitoring and electric vehicle charging systems developed to illustrate the applicability of the oneM2M standards. The fourth chapter discusses the Data Exchange System based on the Indian Urban Data Exchange framework. DES uses IUDX standard data schema and open APIs to avoid data silos and enable secure data sharing. The fifth chapter discusses the 5D-IoT framework that provides uniform data quality assessment of sensor data with meaningful data descriptions.",
      "published": "2023-06-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.16728",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shubham Mante"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2307.04184",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Resilience Systems for Modern Vehicles",
      "description": "Current vehicular Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems either incur high false-positive rates or do not capture zero-day vulnerabilities, leading to safety-critical risks. In addition, prevention is limited to few primitive options like dropping network packets or extreme options, e.g., ECU Bus-off state. To fill this gap, we introduce the concept of vehicular Intrusion Resilience Systems (IRS) that ensures the resilience of critical applications despite assumed faults or zero-day attacks, as long as threat assumptions are met. IRS enables running a vehicular application in a replicated way, i.e., as a Replicated State Machine, over several ECUs, and then requiring the replicated processes to reach a form of Byzantine agreement before changing their local state. Our study rides the mutation of modern vehicular environments, which are closing the gap between simple and resource-constrained \"real-time and embedded systems\", and complex and powerful \"information technology\" ones. It shows that current vehicle (e.g., Zonal) architectures and networks are becoming plausible for such modular fault and intrusion tolerance solutions,deemed too heavy in the past. Our evaluation on a simulated Automotive Ethernet network running two state-of-the-art agreement protocols (Damysus and Hotstuff) shows that the achieved latency and throughout are feasible for many Automotive applications.",
      "published": "2023-07-09",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.04184",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "resilience",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali Shoker",
        "Vincent Rahli",
        "Jeremie Decouchant",
        "Paulo Esteves-Verissimo"
      ],
      "venue": "In the 97th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference: VTC2023",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2307.08788",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Uncovering Load-Altering Attacks Against N-1 Secure Power Grids: A Rare-Event Sampling Approach",
      "description": "Load-altering attacks targetting a large number of IoT-based high-wattage devices (e.g., smart electric vehicle charging stations) can lead to serious disruptions of power grid operations. In this work, we aim to uncover spatiotemporal characteristics of LAAs that can lead to serious impact. The problem is challenging since existing protection measures such as $N-1$ security ensures that the power grid is naturally resilient to load changes. Thus, strategically injected load perturbations that lead to network failure can be regarded as \\emph{rare events}. To this end, we adopt a rare-event sampling approach to uncover LAAs distributed temporally and spatially across the power network. The key advantage of this sampling method is the ability of sampling efficiently from multi-modal conditional distributions with disconnected support. Furthermore, we systematically compare the impacts of static (one-time manipulation of demand) and dynamic (attack over multiple time periods) LAAs. We perform extensive simulations using benchmark IEEE test simulations. The results show (i) the superiority and the need for rare-event sampling in the context of uncovering LAAs as compared to other sampling methodologies, (ii) statistical analysis of attack characteristics and impacts of static and dynamic LAAs, and (iii) cascade sizes (due to LAA) for different network sizes and load conditions.",
      "published": "2023-07-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.08788",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maldon Patrice Goodridge",
        "Subhash Lakshminarayana",
        "Alessandro Zocca"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2307.13759",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Computationally Efficient Group Signature for Anonymous and Secure V2X Communications",
      "description": "The use of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is expected to significantly improve road safety and traffic management. We present an efficient protocol, called the AEE protocol, for protecting data authenticity and user privacy in V2X applications. Our protocol provides event-based likability, which enables messages from a subject vehicle to be linked to a specific event in order to prevent Sybil attacks. Messages on different events are unlinkable to preserve the long-term privacy of vehicles. Moreover, our protocol introduces a new method for generating temporary public keys to reduce computing and transmission overheads. Such a temporary public key is bound with a certain event and is automatically revoked when the event is over. We describe how to apply our protocol in vehicular communications using two exemplar use cases. To further reduce the real-time computational complexity, our protocol enables us to decompose the cryptographic operations into offline processes for complex operations and real-time processes for fast computations.",
      "published": "2023-07-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.13759",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jia Liu",
        "Liqun Chen",
        "Mehrdad Dianati",
        "Carsten Maple",
        "Yan Yan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2308.01237",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LSF-IDM: Automotive Intrusion Detection Model with Lightweight Attribution and Semantic Fusion",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are more vulnerable to network attacks due to the high connectivity and diverse communication modes between vehicles and external networks. Deep learning-based Intrusion detection, an effective method for detecting network attacks, can provide functional safety as well as a real-time communication guarantee for vehicles, thereby being widely used for AVs. Existing works well for cyber-attacks such as simple-mode but become a higher false alarm with a resource-limited environment required when the attack is concealed within a contextual feature. In this paper, we present a novel automotive intrusion detection model with lightweight attribution and semantic fusion, named LSF-IDM. Our motivation is based on the observation that, when injected the malicious packets to the in-vehicle networks (IVNs), the packet log presents a strict order of context feature because of the periodicity and broadcast nature of the CAN bus. Therefore, this model first captures the context as the semantic feature of messages by the BERT language framework. Thereafter, the lightweight model (e.g., BiLSTM) learns the fused feature from an input packet's classification and its output distribution in BERT based on knowledge distillation. Experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in defending against several representative attacks from IVNs. We also perform the difference analysis of the proposed method with lightweight models and Bert to attain a deeper understanding of how the model balance detection performance and model complexity.",
      "published": "2023-08-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.01237",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pengzhou Cheng",
        "Lei Hua",
        "Haobin Jiang",
        "Gongshen Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2308.07526",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Protecting the Future Grid: An Electric Vehicle Robust Mitigation Scheme Against Load Altering Attacks on Power Grids",
      "description": "Due to the growing threat of climate change, the worlds governments have been encouraging the adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs). As a result, EV numbers have been growing exponentially which will introduce a large EV charging load into the power grid. On this basis, we present a scheme to utilize EVs as a defense mechanism to mitigate Load-Altering (LA) attacks against the grid. The developed scheme relies on robust control theory and Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs). Our EV-based defense mechanism is formulated as a feedback controller synthesized using H-2 and H-infinity control techniques to eliminate the impact of unknown LA attacks. The controller synthesis considers the grid topology and the uncertainties of the EV connection to the grid. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation scheme, it is tested against three types of LA attacks on the New England 39-bus grid. We test our mitigation scheme against 800 MW static, switching, and dynamic attacks in the presence of multiple sources of uncertainty that can affect the EV load during deployment. The results demonstrate how the grid remains stable under the LA attacks that would otherwise lead to serious instabilities.",
      "published": "2023-08-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.07526",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Mohsen Ghafouri",
        "Ribal Atallah",
        "Mourad Debbabi",
        "Chadi Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2309.06077",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "HoneyEVSE: An Honeypot to emulate Electric Vehicle Supply Equipments",
      "description": "To fight climate change, new \"green\" technology are emerging, most of them using electricity as a power source. Among the solutions, Electric Vehicles (EVs) represent a central asset in the future transport system. EVs require a complex infrastructure to enable the so-called Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) paradigm to manage the charging process between the smart grid and the EV. In this paradigm, the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), or charging station, is the end device that authenticates the vehicle and delivers the power to charge it. However, since an EVSE is publicly exposed and connected to the Internet, recent works show how an attacker with physical tampering and remote access can target an EVSE, exposing the security of the entire infrastructure and the final user. For this reason, it is important to develop novel strategies to secure such infrastructures. In this paper we present HoneyEVSE, the first honeypot conceived to simulate an EVSE. HoneyEVSE can simulate with high fidelity the EV charging process and, at the same time, enables a user to interact with it through a dashboard. Furthermore, based on other charging columns exposed on the Internet, we emulate the login and device information pages to increase user engagement. We exposed HoneyEVSE for 30 days to the Internet to assess its capability and measured the interaction received with its Shodan Honeyscore. Results show that HoneyEVSE can successfully evade the Shodan honeyscore metric while attracting a high number of interactions on the exposed services.",
      "published": "2023-09-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.06077",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Massimiliano Baldo",
        "Tommaso Bianchi",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Alessio Trevisan",
        "Federico Turrin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2310.11901",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Malicious Agent Detection for Robust Multi-Agent Collaborative Perception",
      "description": "Recently, multi-agent collaborative (MAC) perception has been proposed and outperformed the traditional single-agent perception in many applications, such as autonomous driving. However, MAC perception is more vulnerable to adversarial attacks than single-agent perception due to the information exchange. The attacker can easily degrade the performance of a victim agent by sending harmful information from a malicious agent nearby. In this paper, we extend adversarial attacks to an important perception task -- MAC object detection, where generic defenses such as adversarial training are no longer effective against these attacks. More importantly, we propose Malicious Agent Detection (MADE), a reactive defense specific to MAC perception that can be deployed by each agent to accurately detect and then remove any potential malicious agent in its local collaboration network. In particular, MADE inspects each agent in the network independently using a semi-supervised anomaly detector based on a double-hypothesis test with the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to control the false positive rate of the inference. For the two hypothesis tests, we propose a match loss statistic and a collaborative reconstruction loss statistic, respectively, both based on the consistency between the agent to be inspected and the ego agent where our detector is deployed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on a benchmark 3D dataset V2X-sim and a real-road dataset DAIR-V2X and show that with the protection of MADE, the drops in the average precision compared with the best-case \"oracle\" defender against our attack are merely 1.28% and 0.34%, respectively, much lower than 8.92% and 10.00% for adversarial training, respectively.",
      "published": "2023-10-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.11901",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous driving",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yangheng Zhao",
        "Zhen Xiang",
        "Sheng Yin",
        "Xianghe Pang",
        "Siheng Chen",
        "Yanfeng Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2310.12254",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Charge Manipulation Attacks Against Smart Electric Vehicle Charging Stations and Deep Learning-based Detection Mechanisms",
      "description": "The widespread deployment of \"smart\" electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) will be a key step toward achieving green transportation. The connectivity features of smart EVCSs can be utilized to schedule EV charging operations while respecting user preferences, thus avoiding synchronous charging from a large number of customers and relieving grid congestion. However, the communication and connectivity requirements involved in smart charging raise cybersecurity concerns. In this work, we investigate charge manipulation attacks (CMAs) against EV charging, in which an attacker manipulates the information exchanged during smart charging operations. The objective of CMAs is to shift the EV aggregator's demand across different times of the day. The proposed CMAs can bypass existing protection mechanisms in EV communication protocols. We quantify the impact of CMAs on the EV aggregator's economic profit by modeling their participation in the day-ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) electricity markets. Finally, we propose an unsupervised deep learning-based mechanism to detect CMAs by monitoring the parameters involved in EV charging. We extensively analyze the attack impact and the efficiency of the proposed detection on real-world EV charging datasets. The results highlight the vulnerabilities of smart charging operations and the need for a monitoring mechanism to detect malicious CMAs.",
      "published": "2023-10-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.12254",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamidreza Jahangir",
        "Subhash Lakshminarayana",
        "H. Vincent Poor"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2310.14471",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Electric Vehicle Control Strategy to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids",
      "description": "Due to growing environmental concerns, the world's governments have been encouraging the shift of the transportation sector towards the adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs). As a result, EV numbers have been growing exponentially and are expected to continue growing further which will add a large EV charging load to the power grid. To this end, this paper presents an EV-based defense mechanism against Load-Altering (LA) attacks targeting the grid. The developed mechanism utilizes H-infinity controllers and Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) to mitigate LA attacks. After the controller synthesis and presentation of the attack scenarios, we demonstrate the effectiveness and success of our defense mechanism against the three known types of LA attacks. The scenarios include three 800 MW LA attacks against the New England 39-bus grid. The results demonstrate how our EV-based mitigation scheme eliminates the attack impacts and maintains the grid's stability in face of an unknown persisting attack.",
      "published": "2023-10-23",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.14471",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Mohsen Ghafouri",
        "Ribal Atallah",
        "Mourad Debbabi",
        "Chadi Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2310.19113",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic V2X Autonomous Perception from Road-to-Vehicle Vision",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) perception is an innovative technology that enhances vehicle perception accuracy, thereby elevating the security and reliability of autonomous systems. However, existing V2X perception methods focus on static scenes from mainly vehicle-based vision, which is constrained by sensor capabilities and communication loads. To adapt V2X perception models to dynamic scenes, we propose to build V2X perception from road-to-vehicle vision and present Adaptive Road-to-Vehicle Perception (AR2VP) method. In AR2VP,we leverage roadside units to offer stable, wide-range sensing capabilities and serve as communication hubs. AR2VP is devised to tackle both intra-scene and inter-scene changes. For the former, we construct a dynamic perception representing module, which efficiently integrates vehicle perceptions, enabling vehicles to capture a more comprehensive range of dynamic factors within the scene.Moreover, we introduce a road-to-vehicle perception compensating module, aimed at preserving the maximized roadside unit perception information in the presence of intra-scene changes.For inter-scene changes, we implement an experience replay mechanism leveraging the roadside unit's storage capacity to retain a subset of historical scene data, maintaining model robustness in response to inter-scene shifts. We conduct perception experiment on 3D object detection and segmentation, and the results show that AR2VP excels in both performance-bandwidth trade-offs and adaptability within dynamic environments.",
      "published": "2023-10-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.19113",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiayao Tan",
        "Fan Lyu",
        "Linyan Li",
        "Fuyuan Hu",
        "Tingliang Feng",
        "Fenglei Xu",
        "Rui Yao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2311.06226",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MaDEVIoT: Cyberattacks on EV Charging Can Disrupt Power Grid Operation",
      "description": "This paper examines the feasibility of demand-side cyberattacks on power grids launched via internet-connected high-power EV Charging Stations (EVCSs). By distorting power grid frequency and voltage, these attacks can trigger system-wide outages. Our case study focuses on Manhattan, New York, and reveals that such attacks will become feasible by 2030 with increased EV adoption. With a single EVCS company dominating Manhattan, compromising a single EVCS server raises serious power grid security concerns. These attacks can overload power lines and trip over-frequency (OF) protection relays, resulting in a power grid blackout. This study serves as a crucial resource for planning authorities and power grid operators involved in the EV charging infrastructure roll-out, highlighting potential cyberthreats to power grids stemming from high-power EVCSs.",
      "published": "2023-11-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.06226",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samrat Acharya",
        "Hafiz Anwar Ullah Khan",
        "Ramesh Karri",
        "Yury Dvorkin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2311.16810",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Short Overview of 6G V2X Communication Standards",
      "description": "We are on the verge of a new age of linked autonomous cars with unheard-of user experiences, dramatically improved air quality and road safety, extremely varied transportation settings, and a plethora of cutting-edge apps. A substantially improved Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication network that can simultaneously support massive hyper-fast, ultra-reliable, and low-latency information exchange is necessary to achieve this ambitious goal. These needs of the upcoming V2X are expected to be satisfied by the Sixth Generation (6G) communication system. In this article, we start by introducing the history of V2X communications by giving details on the current, developing, and future developments. We compare the applications of communication technologies such as Wi-Fi, LTE, 5G, and 6G. we focus on the new technologies for 6G V2X which are brain-vehicle interface, blocked-based V2X, and Machine Learning (ML). To achieve this, we provide a summary of the most recent ML developments in 6G vehicle networks. we discuss the security challenges of 6G V2X. We address the strengths, open challenges, development, and improving areas of further study in this field.",
      "published": "2023-11-28",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.16810",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Donglin Wang",
        "Yann Nana Nganso",
        "Hans D. Schotten"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2312.00021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Technical Report relating to CVE-2022-46480, CVE-2023-26941, CVE-2023-26942, and CVE-2023-26943",
      "description": "The following technical report provides background information relating to four CVEs found in the following products: Ultraloq UL3 BT (CVE-2022-46480); Yale Conexis L1 Smart Lock (CVE-2023-26941); Yale IA-210 Intruder Alarm (CVE-2023-26942); Yale Keyless Smart Lock (CVE-2023-26943). The work discussed here was carried out by Ash Allen, Dr. Alexios Mylonas, and Dr. Stilianos Vidalis as part of a wider research project into smart device security. Responsible disclosure of all four issues has been made with the appropriate vendors, and they have been acknowledged as vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2023-11-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.00021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2022-46480",
        "CVE-2023-26941",
        "CVE-2023-26942",
        "CVE-2023-26943"
      ],
      "authors": [
        "Ashley Allen",
        "Alexios Mylonas",
        "Stilianos Vidalis"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2312.01720",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure-ISAC: Secure V2X Communication: An Integrated Sensing and Communication Perspective",
      "description": "In Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) systems, reliable and secure information exchange plays a pivotal role in road safety and traffic management. Due to the open nature of the wireless medium and the constant or intermittent mobility of vehicles, the security of transmissions in V2X is more challenging compared to traditional wireless networks. Physical layer security (PLS) leverages the inherent randomness of wireless communication channels to ensure the confidentiality and security of information transmission. Current PLS schemes in integrated communications and sensing (ISAC) enabled V2X systems is to utilize communication interference to significantly impact the eavesdropping channel more than the legitimate channel. However, in an ISAC-enabled V2X system, it is crucial to prioritize and address the issue of interference coupling as it significantly impacts the confidentiality and security of information exchange. This goes beyond simply relying on the communication interference. Until now, no discussions or studies on integrating security with ISAC (Seucue-ISAC) in ISAC-enabled V2X systems, specifically regarding the exploitation of sensing interference or coupling interference. In this article, we provide a comprehensive review on PLS metrics and security threats encountered in V2X communication. And then, we discuss and analyze four popular PLS techniques and the main challenges associated with their implementation in ISAC-enabled V2X systems. Finally, we share our vision for PLS studies in ISAC-based V2X systems to promote Secure-ISAC.",
      "published": "2023-12-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01720",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploitation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kan Yu",
        "Zhiyong Feng",
        "Dong Li",
        "Jiguo Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2312.02589",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ESP2CS: Securing Internet of Vehicles through Blockchain-enabled Communications and Payments",
      "description": "The burgeoning domain of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), a subset of the Internet of Things (IoT), promises to revolutionize transportation through enhanced safety, efficiency, and environmental sustainability. By amalgamating technologies like sensors and cloud computing, the IoV paves the way for optimized traffic management, heightened vehicle safety, and the birth of novel business paradigms. However, this growth is shadowed by significant security concerns, especially in the communication and payment sectors. Addressing the pressing need for secure Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communications and payments amidst rising cyber threats, this research introduces the Ethereum based Secure Payment and Communication Solution (ESP2CS). Utilizing Ethereum as a middleware, ESP2CS ensures robust and secure V2X interactions. The solution is complemented by an Android Auto application for vehicles, streamlining inter vehicle communication, parking space detection, and transaction management. Furthermore, dedicated Android applications are developed for parking space renters and the parking IoT system. Preliminary evaluations underscore ESP2CS's superior cost effectiveness, integrity and consistency over contemporary solutions, with Ethereum bolstering both security and efficiency.",
      "published": "2023-12-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.02589",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rateb Jabbar",
        "Mohamed Kharbeche"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2312.07898",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ensuring End-to-End Security with Fine-grained Access Control for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "As advanced V2X applications emerge in the connected and autonomous vehicle (CAV), the data communications between in-vehicle end-devices and outside nodes increase, which make the end-to-end (E2E) security to in-vehicle end-devices as the urgent issue to be handled. However, the E2E security with fine-grained access control still remains as a challenging issue for resource-constrained end-devices since the existing security solutions require complicated key management and high resource consumption. Therefore, we propose a practical and secure vehicular communication protocol for the E2E security based on a new attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme. In our scheme, the outsourced computation is provided for encryption, and the computation cost for decryption constantly remains small, regardless of the number of attributes. The policy privacy can be ensured by the proposed ABE to support privacy-sensitive V2X applications, and the existing identity-based signature for outsourced signing is newly reconstructed. Our scheme achieves the confidentiality, message authentication, identity anonymity, unlinkability, traceability, and reconfigurable outsourced computation, and we also show the practical feasibility of our protocol via the performance evaluation.",
      "published": "2023-12-13",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.07898",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Donghyun Yu",
        "Sungho Lee",
        "Ruei-Hau Hsu",
        "Jemin Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2401.01580",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Regression Based Anomaly Detection in Electric Vehicle State of Charge Fluctuations Through Analysis of EVCI Data",
      "description": "With the increase in the number of electric vehicles (EV), there is a need for the development of the EV charging infrastructure (EVCI) to facilitate fast charging, thereby mitigating the EV congestion at charging stations. The role of the public charging station depot is to charge the vehicle, prioritizing the achievement of the desired state of charge (SoC) value for the EV battery or charging till the departure of the EV, whichever occurs first. The integration of cyber and physical components within EVCI defines it as a cyber physical power system (CPPS), increasing its vulnerability to diverse cyber attacks. When an EV interfaces with the EVCI, mutual exchange of data takes place via various communication protocols like the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), and IEC 61850. Unauthorized access to this data by intruders leads to cyber attacks, potentially resulting in consequences like energy theft, and revenue loss. These scenarios may cause the EVCI to incur higher charges than the actual energy consumed or the EV owners to remit payments that do not correspond adequately to the amount of energy they have consumed. This article proposes an EVCI architecture connected to the utility grid and uses the EVCI data to identify the anomalies or outliers present in the EV transmitted data, particularly focusing on SoC irregularities.",
      "published": "2024-01-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01580",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mitikiri Sagar Babu",
        "Yash Tiwari",
        "vedantham Lakshmi Srinivas",
        "Mayukha Pal"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2401.02306",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Control of Connected and Automated Vehicles Using Trust-Aware Robust Event-Triggered Control Barrier Functions",
      "description": "We address the security of a network of Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) cooperating to safely navigate through a conflict area (e.g., traffic intersections, merging roadways, roundabouts). Previous studies have shown that such a network can be targeted by adversarial attacks causing traffic jams or safety violations ending in collisions. We focus on attacks targeting the V2X communication network used to share vehicle data and consider as well uncertainties due to noise in sensor measurements and communication channels. To combat these, motivated by recent work on the safe control of CAVs, we propose a trust-aware robust event-triggered decentralized control and coordination framework that can provably guarantee safety. We maintain a trust metric for each vehicle in the network computed based on their behavior and used to balance the tradeoff between conservativeness (when deeming every vehicle as untrustworthy) and guaranteed safety and security. It is important to highlight that our framework is invariant to the specific choice of the trust framework. Based on this framework, we propose an attack detection and mitigation scheme which has twofold benefits: (i) the trust framework is immune to false positives, and (ii) it provably guarantees safety against false positive cases. We use extensive simulations (in SUMO and CARLA) to validate the theoretical guarantees and demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed scheme to detect and mitigate adversarial attacks.",
      "published": "2024-01-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.02306",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "H M Sabbir Ahmad",
        "Ehsan Sabouni",
        "Akua Dickson",
        "Wei Xiao",
        "Christos G. Cassandras",
        "Wenchao Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4099,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2401.02306 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: targeted, sensor, extensive, trust, functions, studies, well, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2401.04916",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Retina for IoV Towards 6G: Architecture, Opportunities, and Challenges",
      "description": "Vehicles are no longer isolated entities in traffic environments, thanks to the development of IoV powered by 5G networks and their evolution into 6G. However, it is not enough for vehicles in a highly dynamic and complex traffic environment to make reliable and efficient decisions. As a result, this paper proposes a cloud-edge-end computing system with multi-streams for IoV, referred to as Vehicular Digital Retina (VDR). Local computing and edge computing are effectively integrated in the VDR system through the aid of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, resulting in a heterogeneous computing environment that improves vehicles' perception and decision-making abilities with collaborative strategies. Once the system framework is presented, various important functions in the VDR system are explained in detail, including V2X-aided collaborative perception, V2X-aided stream sharing for collaborative learning, and V2X-aided secured collaboration. All of them enable the development of efficient mechanisms of data sharing and information interaction with high security for collaborative intelligent driving. We also present a case study with simulation results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed VDR system.",
      "published": "2024-01-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.04916",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kan Zheng",
        "Jie Mei",
        "Haojun Yang",
        "Lu Hou",
        "Siwei Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2401.06638",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Prototype on the Feasibility of Learning Spatial Provenance in XBee and LoRa Networks",
      "description": "In Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) networks that involve multi-hop communication, the Road Side Units (RSUs) typically desire to gather the location information of the participating vehicles to provide security and network-diagnostics features. Although Global Positioning System (GPS) based localization is widely used by vehicles for navigation; they may not forward their exact GPS coordinates to the RSUs due to privacy issues. Therefore, to balance the high-localization requirements of RSU and the privacy of the vehicles, we demonstrate a new spatial-provenance framework wherein the vehicles agree to compromise their privacy to a certain extent and share a low-precision variant of its coordinates in agreement with the demands of the RSU. To study the deployment feasibility of the proposed framework in state-of-the-art wireless standards, we propose a testbed of ZigBee and LoRa devices and implement the underlying protocols on their stack using correlated Bloom filters and Rake compression algorithms. Our demonstrations reveal that low-to-moderate precision localization can be achieved in fewer packets, thus making an appealing case for next-generation vehicular networks to include our methods for providing real-time security and network-diagnostics features.",
      "published": "2024-01-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.06638",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manish Bansal",
        "Pramsu Shrivastava",
        "J. Harshan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2402.14862",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SISSA: Real-time Monitoring of Hardware Functional Safety and Cybersecurity with In-vehicle SOME/IP Ethernet Traffic",
      "description": "Scalable service-Oriented Middleware over IP (SOME/IP) is an Ethernet communication standard protocol in the Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR), promoting ECU-to-ECU communication over the IP stack. However, SOME/IP lacks a robust security architecture, making it susceptible to potential attacks. Besides, random hardware failure of ECU will disrupt SOME/IP communication. In this paper, we propose SISSA, a SOME/IP communication traffic-based approach for modeling and analyzing in-vehicle functional safety and cyber security. Specifically, SISSA models hardware failures with the Weibull distribution and addresses five potential attacks on SOME/IP communication, including Distributed Denial-of-Services, Man-in-the-Middle, and abnormal communication processes, assuming a malicious user accesses the in-vehicle network. Subsequently, SISSA designs a series of deep learning models with various backbones to extract features from SOME/IP sessions among ECUs. We adopt residual self-attention to accelerate the model's convergence and enhance detection accuracy, determining whether an ECU is under attack, facing functional failure, or operating normally. Additionally, we have created and annotated a dataset encompassing various classes, including indicators of attack, functionality, and normalcy. This contribution is noteworthy due to the scarcity of publicly accessible datasets with such characteristics.Extensive experimental results show the effectiveness and efficiency of SISSA.",
      "published": "2024-02-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.14862",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qi Liu",
        "Xingyu Li",
        "Ke Sun",
        "Yufeng Li",
        "Yanchen Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2403.03583",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Interactive Bayesian Generative Models for Abnormality Detection in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "The following paper proposes a novel Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) network abnormality detection scheme based on Bayesian generative models for enhanced network self-awareness functionality at the Base station (BS). In the learning phase, multi-modal data signals contrived by the vehicles' integrated and sensing module are imbued into data-driven Generalized Dynamic Bayesian network (GDBN) models. Following that, during the testing phase, an Interactive Modified Markov Jump Particle filter (IM-MJPF) is utilized to forecast forthcoming network states and vehicle trajectories by leveraging the assimilated semantics embedded in the coupled multi-GDBNs. This approach involves learning statistically correlated association between evolving trajectories and network communication links. Security and surveillance of Internet of Vehicles (IOVs) links are performed online with high detection probabilities by matching predicted with observed network connectivity maps (graphs).",
      "published": "2024-03-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.03583",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "surveillance",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nobel J. William",
        "Ali Krayani",
        "Lucio Marcenaro",
        "Carlo Regazzoni"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2404.06635",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Current Affairs: A Security Measurement Study of CCS EV Charging Deployments",
      "description": "Since its introduction in 2012, the Combined Charging System (CCS) has emerged as the leading technology for EV fast charging in Europe, North America and parts of Asia. The charging communication of CCS is defined by the ISO 15118 standards, which have been improved over the years. Most notably, in 2014, important security features such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and usability enhancements such as Plug and Charge were introduced. In this paper, we conduct the first measurement study of publicly deployed CCS DC charging stations to capture the state of deployment for different protocol versions and to better understand the attack surface of the EV charging infrastructure. In our evaluation, we examine 325 chargers manufactured between April 2013 and June 2023, and installed as late as May 2024 by 26 manufacturers across 4 European countries. We find that only 12% of the charging stations we analyzed implement TLS at all, leaving all others vulnerable to attacks that have already been demonstrated many years ago. We observe an increasing trend in support for ISO 15118-2 over the years, reaching 70% of chargers manufactured in 2023. We further notice that most chargers use a decade-old firmware for their HomePlug modems, which could contain vulnerabilities that have been patched since. Finally, we discuss design flaws with the Public Key Infrastructure system used in EV charging, and propose changes to improve the adoption and availability of TLS.",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/05c68448c6725be5b0375990849ebc5adace31ef",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Szakály",
        "Sebastian Köhler",
        "Ivan Martinovic"
      ],
      "venue": "USENIX Security Symposium",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2404.14022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Collaborative Perception Datasets in Autonomous Driving: A Survey",
      "description": "This survey offers a comprehensive examination of collaborative perception datasets in the context of Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X). It highlights the latest developments in large-scale benchmarks that accelerate advancements in perception tasks for autonomous vehicles. The paper systematically analyzes a variety of datasets, comparing them based on aspects such as diversity, sensor setup, quality, public availability, and their applicability to downstream tasks. It also highlights the key challenges such as domain shift, sensor setup limitations, and gaps in dataset diversity and availability. The importance of addressing privacy and security concerns in the development of datasets is emphasized, regarding data sharing and dataset creation. The conclusion underscores the necessity for comprehensive, globally accessible datasets and collaborative efforts from both technological and research communities to overcome these challenges and fully harness the potential of autonomous driving.",
      "published": "2024-04-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.14022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Melih Yazgan",
        "Mythra Varun Akkanapragada",
        "J. Marius Zoellner"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2405.00742",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated Graph Learning for EV Charging Demand Forecasting with Personalization Against Cyberattacks",
      "description": "Mitigating cybersecurity risk in electric vehicle (EV) charging demand forecasting plays a crucial role in the safe operation of collective EV chargings, the stability of the power grid, and the cost-effective infrastructure expansion. However, existing methods either suffer from the data privacy issue and the susceptibility to cyberattacks or fail to consider the spatial correlation among different stations. To address these challenges, a federated graph learning approach involving multiple charging stations is proposed to collaboratively train a more generalized deep learning model for demand forecasting while capturing spatial correlations among various stations and enhancing robustness against potential attacks. Firstly, for better model performance, a Graph Neural Network (GNN) model is leveraged to characterize the geographic correlation among different charging stations in a federated manner. Secondly, to ensure robustness and deal with the data heterogeneity in a federated setting, a message passing that utilizes a global attention mechanism to aggregate personalized models for each client is proposed. Thirdly, by concerning cyberattacks, a special credit-based function is designed to mitigate potential threats from malicious clients or unwanted attacks. Extensive experiments on a public EV charging dataset are conducted using various deep learning techniques and federated learning methods to demonstrate the prediction accuracy and robustness of the proposed approach.",
      "published": "2024-04-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.00742",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Li",
        "Renyou Xie",
        "Chaojie Li",
        "Yi Wang",
        "Zhaoyang Dong"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2406.10606",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Semantic Communication for Edge Intelligence Enabled Autonomous Driving System",
      "description": "Expected to provide higher transportation efficiency and security, autonomous driving has attracted substantial attentions from both industry and academia. Meanwhile, the emergence of edge intelligence has further introduced significant advancements to this field. However, the crucial demands of ultra-reliable and low-latency communications (URLLC) among the vehicles and edge servers have hindered the development of autonomous driving. In this article, we provide a brief overview of edge intelligence enabled autonomous driving system and current vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technologies. Moreover, challenges associated with massive data transmission in autonomous driving are highlighted from three perspectives: multi-modal data transmission and fusion, multi-user collaboration and connection, and multi-task training and execution. To cope with these challenges, we propose to incorporate semantic communication into autonomous driving to achieve highly efficient and task-oriented data transmission. Unlike traditional communications, semantic communication extracts task-relevant semantic feature from multi-sensory data. Specifically, a unified multi-user semantic communication system for transmitting multi-modal data and performing multi-task execution is designed for collaborative data transmission and decision making in autonomous driving. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed system can significantly reduce data transmission volume without compromising task performance, as evidenced by the realization of a cooperative multi-vehicle target classification and detection task.",
      "published": "2024-06-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10606",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunqi Feng",
        "Hesheng Shen",
        "Zhendong Shan",
        "Qianqian Yang",
        "Xiufang Shi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2407.00585",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Your Car Tells Me Where You Drove: A Novel Path Inference Attack via CAN Bus and OBD-II Data",
      "description": "Despite its well-known security issues, the Controller Area Network (CAN) is still the main technology for in-vehicle communications. Attackers posing as diagnostic services or accessing the CAN bus can threaten the drivers' location privacy to know the exact location at a certain point in time or to infer the visited areas. This represents a serious threat to users' privacy, but also an advantage for police investigations to gather location-based evidence. In this paper, we present On Path Diagnostic - Intrusion \\& Inference (OPD-II), a novel path inference attack leveraging a physical car model and a map matching algorithm to infer the path driven by a car based on CAN bus data. Differently from available attacks, our approach only requires the attacker to know the initial location and heading of the victim's car and is not limited by the availability of training data, road configurations, or the need to access other victim's devices (e.g., smartphones). We implement our attack on a set of four different cars and a total number of 41 tracks in different road and traffic scenarios. We achieve an average of 95% accuracy on reconstructing the coordinates of the recorded path by leveraging a dynamic map-matching algorithm that outperforms the 75% and 89% accuracy values of other proposals while removing their set of assumptions.",
      "published": "2024-06-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.00585",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tommaso Bianchi",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Andrea Valori"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2407.03729",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Charging Ahead: A Hierarchical Adversarial Framework for Counteracting Advanced Cyber Threats in EV Charging Stations",
      "description": "The increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates robust defenses against sophisticated cyber threats. A significant challenge arises when EVs intentionally provide false information to gain higher charging priority, potentially causing grid instability. While various approaches have been proposed in existing literature to address this issue, they often overlook the possibility of attackers using advanced techniques like deep reinforcement learning (DRL) or other complex deep learning methods to achieve such attacks. In response to this, this paper introduces a hierarchical adversarial framework using DRL (HADRL), which effectively detects stealthy cyberattacks on EV charging stations, especially those leading to denial of charging. Our approach includes a dual approach, where the first scheme leverages DRL to develop advanced and stealthy attack methods that can bypass basic intrusion detection systems (IDS). Second, we implement a DRL-based scheme within the IDS at EV charging stations, aiming to detect and counter these sophisticated attacks. This scheme is trained with datasets created from the first scheme, resulting in a robust and efficient IDS. We evaluated the effectiveness of our framework against the recent literature approaches, and the results show that our IDS can accurately detect deceptive EVs with a low false alarm rate, even when confronted with attacks not represented in the training dataset.",
      "published": "2024-07-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.03729",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Al-Mehdhar",
        "Abdullatif Albaseer",
        "Mohamed Abdallah",
        "Ala Al-Fuqaha"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2407.07065",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games",
      "description": "The widespread integration of IoT-controllable devices (e.g., smart EV charging stations and heat pumps) into modern power systems enhances capabilities but introduces critical cybersecurity risks. Specifically, these devices are susceptible to load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can compromise power system safety. This paper quantifies the impact of LAAs on nodal voltage constraint violations in distribution networks (DNs). We first present closed-form expressions to analytically characterize LAA effects and quantify the minimum number of compromised devices for a successful LAA. Based on these insights, we propose a reactive defense mechanism that mitigates LAAs through DN reconfiguration. To address strategic adversaries, we then formulate defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game, which models the knowledgeable and strategic attacker, accounting for the worst-case scenario and enabling the reactive defender to devise an efficient and robust defense. Further, our formulation also accounts for uncertainties in attack localization. A novel Bayesian optimization approach is introduced to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, significantly reducing computational burden efficiently. The game-theoretic strategy effectively mitigates the attack's impact while ensuring minimal system reconfiguration.",
      "published": "2024-07-09",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07065",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sajjad Maleki",
        "E. Veronica Belmaga",
        "Charalambos Konstantinou",
        "Subhash Lakshminarayana"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2407.16180",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Addressing Trust Issues for Vehicle to Grid in Distributed Power Grids Using Blockchains",
      "description": "While blockchain offers inherent security, trust issues among stakeholders in vehicle-to-grid (V2G) applications remain unresolved due to a lack of regulatory frameworks and standardization. Additionally, a tailored decentralized privacy-preserved coordination scheme for blockchain in V2G networks is needed to ensure user privacy and efficient energy transactions. This paper proposes a V2G trading and coordination scheme tailored to the decentralized nature of blockchain as well as the interests of stakeholders utilizing smart charging points (SCPs) and Stackelberg game model. Case studies using real-world data from Southern University of Science and Technology demonstrate the efficacy of proposed scheme in reducing EV charging costs and the potential for supporting auxiliary grid services.",
      "published": "2024-07-23",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.16180",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle to grid",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunwang Chen",
        "Xiang Lei",
        "Linni Jian"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2409.07505",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Anomaly Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECU) that are used for controlling important vehicle functions including safety-critical operations. ECUs exchange information via in-vehicle communication buses, of which the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) is by far the most widespread representative. Problems that may occur in the vehicle's physical parts or malicious attacks may cause anomalies in the CAN traffic, impairing the correct vehicle operation. Therefore, the detection of such anomalies is vital for vehicle safety. This paper reviews the research on anomaly detection for in-vehicle networks, more specifically for the CAN bus. Our main focus is the evaluation of methods used for CAN bus anomaly detection together with the datasets used in such analysis. To provide the reader with a more comprehensive understanding of the subject, we first give a brief review of related studies on time series-based anomaly detection. Then, we conduct an extensive survey of recent deep learning-based techniques as well as conventional techniques for CAN bus anomaly detection. Our comprehensive analysis delves into anomaly detection algorithms employed in in-vehicle networks, specifically focusing on their learning paradigms, inherent strengths, and weaknesses, as well as their efficacy when applied to CAN bus datasets. Lastly, we highlight challenges and open research problems in CAN bus anomaly detection.",
      "published": "2024-09-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.07505",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Övgü Özdemir",
        "M. Tuğberk İşyapar",
        "Pınar Karagöz",
        "Klaus Werner Schmidt",
        "Demet Demir",
        "N. Alpay Karagöz"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2410.00352",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Interleaved One-Shot SPS Performance under Smart DoS Attacks in C-V2X Networks",
      "description": "This paper evaluates the performance of the one-shot Semi-Persistent Scheduling (SPS) mechanism in Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) networks under Denial-of-Service (DoS) smart attack scenarios. The study focuses on the impact of these attacks on key performance metrics, including Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), Inter-Packet Gap (IPG), and Age of Information (AoI). Through extensive Monte Carlo simulations, we demonstrate that the one-shot mechanism significantly enhances network resilience by mitigating the adverse effects of smart DoS attacks. The findings reveal that while the one-shot mechanism improves the PDR and reduces the IPG and AoI tail values, its effectiveness diminishes slightly in high-density vehicular environments. Nevertheless, the one-shot mechanism proves to be a robust solution for maintaining the stability and reliability of C-V2X communications under adversarial conditions.",
      "published": "2024-10-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.00352",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zepei Sun",
        "Randall Berry"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2410.04063",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unique ID based Trust Scheme for Improved IoV Wireless Sensor Network Security Against Power Controlled Sybil Attacks",
      "description": "Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are widely used in vehicular networks to support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications. Wireless sensors in vehicular networks support sensing and monitoring of various environmental factors and vehicle movement, which can help to enhance traffic management, road safety, and transportation efficiency. However, WSNs face security challenges due to their distributed nature and resource limited modules. In Sybil attacks, attackers create multiple fake identities to disrupt network operations (e.g., denial-of-service (DoS)), which is one of the major security concerns in WSNs. Defensive techniques have been proposed, which recently include a received signal strength indicator (RSSI) profiling scheme that improves the performance and is not affected by internal forgeable information. However, even this new RSSI based robust detection scheme was found to be vulnerable when Sybil attackers are mobile or intentionally manipulate their radio transmission power in addition to their device address. In this paper, a unique identification based trust path routing scheme (UITrust) is proposed, which uses the device's physically invariable unique identifiers and routing path trust level estimations to avoid power-controlled Sybil attacks, where the simulation results show the proposed scheme can provide a significant improvement compared to existing schemes.",
      "published": "2024-10-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.04063",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jae-Dong Kim",
        "Dabin Kim",
        "Minseok Ko",
        "Jong-Moon Chung"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2410.05417",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "STOP! Camera Spoofing via the in-Vehicle IP Network",
      "description": "Autonomous driving and advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) rely on cameras to control the driving. In many prior approaches an attacker aiming to stop the vehicle had to send messages on the specialized and better-defended CAN bus. We suggest an easier alternative: manipulate the IP-based network communication between the camera and the ADAS logic, inject fake images of stop signs or red lights into the video stream, and let the ADAS stop the car safely. We created an attack tool that successfully exploits the GigE Vision protocol. Then we analyze two classes of passive anomaly detectors to identify such attacks: protocol-based detectors and video-based detectors. We implemented multiple detectors of both classes and evaluated them on data collected from our test vehicle and also on data from the public BDD corpus. Our results show that such detectors are effective against naive adversaries, but sophisticated adversaries can evade detection. Finally, we propose a novel class of active defense mechanisms that randomly adjust camera parameters during the video transmission, and verify that the received images obey the requested adjustments. Within this class we focus on a specific implementation, the width-varying defense, which randomly modifies the width of every frame. Beyond its function as an anomaly detector, this defense is also a protective measure against certain attacks: by distorting injected image patches it prevents their recognition by the ADAS logic. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the width-varying defense through theoretical analysis and by an extensive evaluation of several types of attack in a wide range of realistic road driving conditions. The best the attack was able to achieve against this defense was injecting a stop sign for a duration of 0.2 seconds, with a success probability of 0.2%, whereas stopping a vehicle requires about 2.5 seconds.",
      "published": "2024-10-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.05417",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dror Peri",
        "Avishai Wool"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2410.07591",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robustness and Security Enhancement of Radio Frequency Fingerprint Identification in Time-Varying Channels",
      "description": "Radio frequency fingerprint identification (RFFI) is becoming increasingly popular, especially in applications with constrained power, such as the Internet of Things (IoT). Due to subtle manufacturing variations, wireless devices have unique radio frequency fingerprints (RFFs). These RFFs can be used with pattern recognition algorithms to classify wireless devices. However, Implementing reliable RFFI in time-varying channels is challenging because RFFs are often distorted by channel effects, reducing the classification accuracy. This paper introduces a new channel-robust RFF, and leverages transfer learning to enhance RFFI in the time-varying channels. Experimental results show that the proposed RFFI system achieved an average classification accuracy improvement of 33.3 % in indoor environments and 34.5 % in outdoor environments. This paper also analyzes the security of the proposed RFFI system to address the security flaw in formalized impersonation attacks. Since RFF collection is being carried out in uncontrolled deployment environments, RFFI systems can be targeted with false RFFs sent by rogue devices. The resulting classifiers may classify the rogue devices as legitimate, effectively replacing their true identities. To defend against impersonation attacks, a novel keyless countermeasure is proposed, which exploits the intrinsic output of the softmax function after classifier training without sacrificing the lightweight nature of RFFI. Experimental results demonstrate an average increase of 0.3 in the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), with a 40.0 % improvement in attack detection rate in indoor and outdoor environments.",
      "published": "2024-10-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.07591",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "exploits",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lu Yang",
        "Seyit Camtepe",
        "Yansong Gao",
        "Vicky Liu",
        "Dhammika Jayalath"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2410.09839",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RISC-V Needs Secure 'Wheels': the MCU Initiator-Side Perspective",
      "description": "The automotive industry is experiencing a massive paradigm shift. Cars are becoming increasingly autonomous, connected, and computerized. Modern electrical/electronic (E/E) architectures are pushing for an unforeseen functionality integration density, resulting in physically separate Electronic Control Units (ECUs) becoming virtualized and mapped to logical partitions within a single physical microcontroller (MCU). While functional safety (FuSa) has been pivotal for vehicle certification for decades, the increasing connectivity and advances have opened the door for a number of car hacks and attacks. This development drives (cyber-)security requirements in cars, and has paved the way for the release of the new security certification standard ISO21434. RISC-V has great potential to transform automotive computing systems, but we argue that current ISA/extensions are not ready yet. This paper provides our critical perspective on the existing RISC-V limitations, particularly on the upcoming WorldGuard technology, to address virtualized MCU requirements in line with foreseen automotive applications and ISO21434 directives. We then present our proposal for the required ISA extensions to address such limitations, mainly targeting initiator-side protection. Finally, we explain our roadmap towards a full open-source proof-of-concept (PoC), which includes extending QEMU, an open-source RISC-V core, and building a complete software stack.",
      "published": "2024-10-13",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.09839",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandro Pinto",
        "Jose Martins",
        "Manuel Rodriguez",
        "Luis Cunha",
        "Georg Schmalz",
        "Uwe Moslehner",
        "Kai Dieffenbach",
        "Thomas Roecker"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2411.04365",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Secured Smart Grid 2.0: Exploring Security Threats, Protection Models, and Challenges",
      "description": "Many nations are promoting the green transition in the energy sector to attain neutral carbon emissions by 2050. Smart Grid 2.0 (SG2) is expected to explore data-driven analytics and enhance communication technologies to improve the efficiency and sustainability of distributed renewable energy systems. These features are beyond smart metering and electric surplus distribution in conventional smart grids. Given the high dependence on communication networks to connect distributed microgrids in SG2, potential cascading failures of connectivity can cause disruption to data synchronization to the remote control systems. This paper reviews security threats and defense tactics for three stakeholders: power grid operators, communication network providers, and consumers. Through the survey, we found that SG2's stakeholders are particularly vulnerable to substation attacks/vandalism, malware/ransomware threats, blockchain vulnerabilities and supply chain breakdowns. Furthermore, incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) into autonomous energy management in distributed energy resources of SG2 creates new challenges. Accordingly, adversarial samples and false data injection on electricity reading and measurement sensors at power plants can fool AI-powered control functions and cause messy error-checking operations in energy storage, wrong energy estimation in electric vehicle charging, and even fraudulent transactions in peer-to-peer energy trading models. Scalable blockchain-based models, physical unclonable function, interoperable security protocols, and trustworthy AI models designed for managing distributed microgrids in SG2 are typical promising protection models for future research.",
      "published": "2024-11-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.04365",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "malware"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lan-Huong Nguyen",
        "Van-Linh Nguyen",
        "Ren-Hung Hwang",
        "Jian-Jhih Kuo",
        "Yu-Wen Chen",
        "Chien-Chung Huang",
        "Ping-I Pan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2412.02539",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Graph-Powered Defense: Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles",
      "description": "The network of services, including delivery, farming, and environmental monitoring, has experienced exponential expansion in the past decade with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Yet, UAVs are not robust enough against cyberattacks, especially on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. The CAN bus is a general-purpose vehicle-bus standard to enable microcontrollers and in-vehicle computers to interact, primarily connecting different Electronic Control Units (ECUs). In this study, we focus on solving some of the most critical security weaknesses in UAVs by developing a novel graph-based intrusion detection system (IDS) leveraging the Uncomplicated Application-level Vehicular Communication and Networking (UAVCAN) protocol. First, we decode CAN messages based on UAVCAN protocol specification; second, we present a comprehensive method of transforming tabular UAVCAN messages into graph structures. Lastly, we apply various graph-based machine learning models for detecting cyber-attacks on the CAN bus, including graph convolutional neural networks (GCNNs), graph attention networks (GATs), Graph Sample and Aggregate Networks (GraphSAGE), and graph structure-based transformers. Our findings show that inductive models such as GATs, GraphSAGE, and graph-based transformers can achieve competitive and even better accuracy than transductive models like GCNNs in detecting various types of intrusions, with minimum information on protocol specification, thus providing a generic robust solution for CAN bus security for the UAVs. We also compared our results with baseline single-layer Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and found that all our graph-based models perform better without using any decoded features based on the UAVCAN protocol, highlighting higher detection performance with protocol-independent capability.",
      "published": "2024-12-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.02539",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Reek Majumder",
        "Gurcan Comert",
        "David Werth",
        "Adrian Gale",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury",
        "M Sabbir Salek"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2502.00035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding the Future of Mobility: Cybersecurity Issues and Solutions for Infrastructure Associated with Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "The development of an ecosystem that balances consumer convenience and security is imperative given the expanding market for electric vehicles (EVs). The vast amount of data that EV charging station management systems (EVCSMSs) give is powered by the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), which track network traffic to spot potentially dangerous data exchanges in IT and IoT contexts, are constantly improving in terms of efficacy and accuracy. Intrusion detection is becoming a major topic in academia because of the acceleration of IDS development caused by machine learning and deep learning techniques. The goal of the research presented in this paper is to use a machine-learning-based intrusion detection system with low false-positive rates and high accuracy to safeguard the ecosystem of EV charging stations (EVCS).",
      "published": "2025-01-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.00035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Rakibul Karim Akanda",
        "Joao Raimundo Queiroz Pires Santana De Oliveira Lima",
        "Amaya Alexandria Holmes",
        "Christina Bonner"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2502.02537",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Uncertainty Quantification for Collaborative Object Detection Under Adversarial Attacks",
      "description": "Collaborative Object Detection (COD) and collaborative perception can integrate data or features from various entities, and improve object detection accuracy compared with individual perception. However, adversarial attacks pose a potential threat to the deep learning COD models, and introduce high output uncertainty. With unknown attack models, it becomes even more challenging to improve COD resiliency and quantify the output uncertainty for highly dynamic perception scenes such as autonomous vehicles. In this study, we propose the Trusted Uncertainty Quantification in Collaborative Perception framework (TUQCP). TUQCP leverages both adversarial training and uncertainty quantification techniques to enhance the adversarial robustness of existing COD models. More specifically, TUQCP first adds perturbations to the shared information of randomly selected agents during object detection collaboration by adversarial training. TUQCP then alleviates the impacts of adversarial attacks by providing output uncertainty estimation through learning-based module and uncertainty calibration through conformal prediction. Our framework works for early and intermediate collaboration COD models and single-agent object detection models. We evaluate TUQCP on V2X-Sim, a comprehensive collaborative perception dataset for autonomous driving, and demonstrate a 80.41% improvement in object detection accuracy compared to the baselines under the same adversarial attacks. TUQCP demonstrates the importance of uncertainty quantification to COD under adversarial attacks.",
      "published": "2025-02-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.02537",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huiqun Huang",
        "Cong Chen",
        "Jean-Philippe Monteuuis",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "Fei Miao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2502.07807",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CP-Guard+: A New Paradigm for Malicious Agent Detection and Defense in Collaborative Perception",
      "description": "Collaborative perception (CP) is a promising method for safe connected and autonomous driving, which enables multiple vehicles to share sensing information to enhance perception performance. However, compared with single-vehicle perception, the openness of a CP system makes it more vulnerable to malicious attacks that can inject malicious information to mislead the perception of an ego vehicle, resulting in severe risks for safe driving. To mitigate such vulnerability, we first propose a new paradigm for malicious agent detection that effectively identifies malicious agents at the feature level without requiring verification of final perception results, significantly reducing computational overhead. Building on this paradigm, we introduce CP-GuardBench, the first comprehensive dataset provided to train and evaluate various malicious agent detection methods for CP systems. Furthermore, we develop a robust defense method called CP-Guard+, which enhances the margin between the representations of benign and malicious features through a carefully designed Dual-Centered Contrastive Loss (DCCLoss). Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on both CP-GuardBench and V2X-Sim, and demonstrate the superiority of CP-Guard+.",
      "published": "2025-02-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.07807",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "v2x",
        "vulnerability",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Senkang Hu",
        "Yihang Tao",
        "Zihan Fang",
        "Guowen Xu",
        "Yiqin Deng",
        "Sam Kwong",
        "Yuguang Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2502.18697",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "H-FLTN: A Privacy-Preserving Hierarchical Framework for Electric Vehicle Spatio-Temporal Charge Prediction",
      "description": "The widespread adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) poses critical challenges for energy providers, particularly in predicting charging time (temporal prediction), ensuring user privacy, and managing resources efficiently in mobility-driven networks. This paper introduces the Hierarchical Federated Learning Transformer Network (H-FLTN) framework to address these challenges. H-FLTN employs a three-tier hierarchical architecture comprising EVs, community Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems (DERMS), and the Energy Provider Data Centre (EPDC) to enable accurate spatio-temporal predictions of EV charging needs while preserving privacy. Temporal prediction is enhanced using Transformer-based learning, capturing complex dependencies in charging behavior. Privacy is ensured through Secure Aggregation, Additive Secret Sharing, and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Sharing with Augmentation, which allow only secret shares of model weights to be exchanged while securing all transmissions. To improve training efficiency and resource management, H-FLTN integrates Dynamic Client Capping Mechanism (DCCM) and Client Rotation Management (CRM), ensuring that training remains both computationally and temporally efficient as the number of participating EVs increases. DCCM optimises client participation by limiting excessive computational loads, while CRM balances training contributions across epochs, preventing imbalanced participation. Our simulation results based on large-scale empirical vehicle mobility data reveal that DCCM and CRM reduce the training time complexity with increasing EVs from linear to constant. Its integration into real-world smart city infrastructure enhances energy demand forecasting, resource allocation, and grid stability, ensuring reliability and sustainability in future mobility ecosystems.",
      "published": "2025-02-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.18697",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Robert Marlin",
        "Raja Jurdak",
        "Alsharif Abuadbba"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2503.00659",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CATS: A framework for Cooperative Autonomy Trust & Security",
      "description": "With cooperative perception, autonomous vehicles can wirelessly share sensor data and representations to overcome sensor occlusions, improving situational awareness. Securing such data exchanges is crucial for connected autonomous vehicles. Existing, automated reputation-based approaches often suffer from a delay between detection and exclusion of misbehaving vehicles, while majority-based approaches have communication overheads that limits scalability. In this paper, we introduce CATS, a novel automated system that blends together the best traits of reputation-based and majority-based detection mechanisms to secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications for cooperative perception, while preserving the privacy of cooperating vehicles. Our evaluation with city-scale simulations on realistic traffic data shows CATS's effectiveness in rapidly identifying and isolating misbehaving vehicles, with a low false negative rate and overheads, proving its suitability for real world deployments.",
      "published": "2025-03-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.00659",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Namo Asavisanu",
        "Tina Khezresmaeilzadeh",
        "Rohan Sequeira",
        "Hang Qiu",
        "Fawad Ahmad",
        "Konstantinos Psounis",
        "Ramesh Govindan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2503.02281",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Kolmogorov-Arnold Network for Explainable Detection of Cyberattacks on EV Chargers",
      "description": "The increasing adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) and the expansion of charging infrastructure and their reliance on communication expose Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) to cyberattacks. This paper presents a novel Kolmogorov-Arnold Network (KAN)-based framework for detecting cyberattacks on EV chargers using only power consumption measurements. Leveraging the KAN's capability to model nonlinear, high-dimensional functions and its inherently interpretable architecture, the framework effectively differentiates between normal and malicious charging scenarios. The model is trained offline on a comprehensive dataset containing over 100,000 cyberattack cases generated through an experimental setup. Once trained, the KAN model can be deployed within individual chargers for real-time detection of abnormal charging behaviors indicative of cyberattacks. Our results demonstrate that the proposed KAN-based approach can accurately detect cyberattacks on EV chargers with Precision and F1-score of 99% and 92%, respectively, outperforming existing detection methods. Additionally, the proposed KANs's enable the extraction of mathematical formulas representing KAN's detection decisions, addressing interpretability, a key challenge in deep learning-based cybersecurity frameworks. This work marks a significant step toward building secure and explainable EV charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2025-03-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.02281",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Mohammad Saber",
        "Max Mauro Dias Santos",
        "Mohammad Al Janaideh",
        "Amr Youssef",
        "Deepa Kundur"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2503.15730",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Systems: A Systematic Review",
      "description": "This paper presents a systematic review of recent advancements in V2G cybersecurity, employing the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) framework for detailed searches across three journal databases and included only peer-reviewed studies published between 2020 and 2024 (June). We identified and reviewed 133 V2G cybersecurity studies and found five important insights on existing V2G cybersecurity research. First, most studies (103 of 133) focused on protecting V2G systems against cyber threats, while only seven studies addressed the recovery aspect of the CRML (Cybersecurity Risk Management Lifecycle) function. Second, existing studies have adequately addressed the security of EVs and EVCS (EV charging stations) in V2G systems (112 and 81 of 133 studies, respectively). However, none have focused on the linkage between the behaviour of EV users and the cybersecurity of V2G systems. Third, physical access, control-related vulnerabilities, and user behaviour-related attacks in V2G systems are not addressed significantly. Furthermore, existing studies overlook vulnerabilities and attacks specific to AI and blockchain technologies. Fourth, blockchain, artificial intelligence (AI), encryption, control theory, and optimisation are the main technologies used, and finally, the inclusion of quantum safety within encryption and AI models and AI assurance (AIA) is in a very early stage; only two and one of 133 studies explicitly addressed quantum safety and AIA through explainability. By providing a holistic perspective, this study identifies critical research gaps and outlines future directions for developing robust end-to-end cybersecurity solutions to safeguard V2G systems and support global sustainability goals.",
      "published": "2025-03-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.15730",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad A Razzaque",
        "Shafiuzzaman K Khadem",
        "Sandipan Patra",
        "Glory Okwata",
        "Md. Noor-A-Rahim"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2503.21496",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing CAN Network Security through RBM-Based Synthetic Attack Data Generation for Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "The rapid development of network technologies and industrial intelligence has augmented the connectivity and intelligence within the automotive industry. Notably, in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), the Controller Area Network (CAN), which is crucial for the communication of electronic control units but lacks inbuilt security measures, has become extremely vulnerable to severe cybersecurity threats. Meanwhile, the efficacy of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is hampered by the scarcity of sufficient attack data for robust model training. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a novel methodology leveraging the Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) to generate synthetic CAN attack data, thereby producing training datasets with a more balanced sample distribution. Specifically, we design a CAN Data Processing Module for transforming raw CAN data into an RBM-trainable format, and a Negative Sample Generation Module to generate data reflecting the distribution of CAN data frames denoting network intrusions. Experimental results show the generated data significantly improves IDS performance, with CANet accuracy rising from 0.6477 to 0.9725 and EfficientNet from 0.1067 to 0.1555. Code is available at https://github.com/wangkai-tech23/CANDataSynthetic.",
      "published": "2025-03-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.21496",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huacheng Li",
        "Jingyong Su",
        "Kai Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2504.00319",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Methodology for Detecting Energy Anomalies due to Multi-Replay Attacks on Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "The increasing deployment of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructures (EVCIs) introduces cybersecurity challenges, particularly due to inherent vulnerabilities, making them susceptible to cyberattacks. The vulnerable points in EVCI are charging ports, which serve as the links between the EVs and the EVCI as they transfer the data along with the power. Data spoofing attacks targeting these ports can compromise security, reliability, and overall system performance by introducing anomalies in operational data. An efficient method for identifying the charging port current magnitude variations is presented in this research. The MATLAB/SIMULINK environment simulates an EVCI system for various data generating scenarios. A Temporal Convolution Network - Autoencoder (TCN-AE) model is used in training the multivariate time series data of EVCI and reconstructing it. The abnormalities in data are that various charging port current magnitudes are replaced with their respective data of different durations, thus enabling the replay attack scenarios. To detect anomalies, the error between the original and reconstructed data is computed, and these error values are used for detecting the anomalies. With the help of the mean vector and covariance matrices of the errors, the anomaly score is computed in the form of Mahalanobis distance. The threshold is obtained from the short sub-sequence of the errors and optimized for the whole time series data. The obtained optimal threshold is compared with the anomaly score to detect the anomaly. The model demonstrates robust performance in data reconstruction by identifying anomalies with an accuracy of 99.64%, to enhance the reliability and security in operations of EVCI.",
      "published": "2025-04-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.00319",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sagar Babu Mitikiri",
        "Vedantham Lakshmi Srinivas",
        "Mayukha Pal"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2505.06749",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-CDA4All: Democratizing Cooperative Autonomous Driving for All Drivers via Affordable Dash-cam Hardware and Open-source AI Software",
      "description": "As transportation technology advances, the demand for connected vehicle infrastructure has greatly increased to improve their efficiency and safety. One area of advancement, Cooperative Driving Automation (CDA) still relies on expensive autonomy sensors or connectivity units and are not interoperable across existing market car makes/models, limiting its scalability on public roads. To fill these gaps, this paper presents a novel approach to democratizing CDA technology, it leverages low-cost, commercially available edge devices such as vehicle dash-cams and open-source software to make the technology accessible and scalable to be used in transportation infrastructure and broader public domains. This study also investigates the feasibility of utilizing cost-effective communication protocols based on LTE and WiFi. These technologies enable lightweight Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, facilitating real-time data exchange between vehicles and infrastructure. Our research and development efforts are aligned with industrial standards to ensure compatibility and future integration into existing transportation ecosystems. By prioritizing infrastructure-oriented applications, such as improved traffic flow management, this approach seeks to deliver tangible societal benefits without directly competing with vehicle OEMs. As recent advancement of Generative AI (GenAI), there is no standardized integration of GenAI technologies into open-source CDAs, as the current trends of muiltimodal large language models gain popularity, we demonstrated a feasible locally deployed edge LLM models can enhance driving experience while preserving privacy and security compared to cloud-connected solutions. The proposed system underscores the potential of low-cost, scalable solutions in advancing CDA functionality, paving the way for smarter, safer, and more inclusive transportation networks.",
      "published": "2025-05-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.06749",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shengming Yuan",
        "Hao Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2505.11551",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Learning-Based Intrusion Detection Systems for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) enhance mobility but face cybersecurity threats, particularly through the insecure Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Cyberattacks can have devastating consequences in connected vehicles, including the loss of control over critical systems, necessitating robust security solutions. In-vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) offer a promising approach by detecting malicious activities in real time. This survey provides a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art research on learning-based in-vehicle IDSs, focusing on Machine Learning (ML), Deep Learning (DL), and Federated Learning (FL) approaches. Based on the reviewed studies, we critically examine existing IDS approaches, categorising them by the types of attacks they detect - known, unknown, and combined known-unknown attacks - while identifying their limitations. We also review the evaluation metrics used in research, emphasising the need to consider multiple criteria to meet the requirements of safety-critical systems. Additionally, we analyse FL-based IDSs and highlight their limitations. By doing so, this survey helps identify effective security measures, address existing limitations, and guide future research toward more resilient and adaptive protection mechanisms, ensuring the safety and reliability of CAVs.",
      "published": "2025-05-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.11551",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muzun Althunayyan",
        "Amir Javed",
        "Omer Rana"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4585,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2505.11551 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: activities, loss, unknown, studies, safety, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2505.14924",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SecCAN: An Extended CAN Controller with Embedded Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Recent research has highlighted the vulnerability of in-vehicle network protocols such as controller area networks (CAN) and proposed machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) as an effective mitigation technique. However, their efficient integration into vehicular architecture is non-trivial, with existing methods relying on electronic control units (ECUs)-coupled IDS accelerators or dedicated ECUs as IDS accelerators. Here, initiating IDS requires complete reception of a CAN message from the controller, incurring data movement and software overheads. In this paper, we present SecCAN, a novel CAN controller architecture that embeds IDS capability within the datapath of the controller. This integration allows IDS to tap messages directly from within the CAN controller as they are received from the bus, removing overheads incurred by existing ML-based IDSs. A custom-quantised machine-learning accelerator is developed as the IDS engine and embedded into SecCAN's receive data path, with optimisations to overlap the IDS inference with the protocol's reception window. We implement SecCAN on AMD XCZU7EV FPGA to quantify its performance and benefits in hardware, using multiple attack datasets. We show that SecCAN can completely hide the IDS latency within the CAN reception window for all CAN packet sizes and detect multiple attacks with state-of-the-art accuracy with zero software overheads on the ECU and low energy overhead (73.7 uJ per message) for IDS inference. Also, SecCAN incurs limited resource overhead compared to a standard CAN controller (< 30% LUT, < 1% FF), making it ideally suited for automotive deployment.",
      "published": "2025-05-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14924",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Shreejith Shanker"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2506.05355",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Zero-Trust Mobility-Aware Authentication Framework for Secure Vehicular Fog Computing Networks",
      "description": "Vehicular Fog Computing (VFC) is a promising paradigm to meet the low-latency and high-bandwidth demands of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). However, dynamic vehicle mobility and diverse trust boundaries introduce critical security challenges. This paper presents a novel Zero-Trust Mobility-Aware Authentication Framework (ZTMAF) for secure communication in VFC networks. The framework employs context-aware authentication with lightweight cryptographic primitives, a decentralized trust evaluation system, and fog node-assisted session validation to combat spoofing, replay, and impersonation attacks. Simulation results on NS-3 and SUMO demonstrate improved authentication latency, reduced computational overhead, and better scalability compared to traditional PKI and blockchain-based models. Our findings suggest that ZTMAF is effective for secure, real-time V2X interactions under adversarial and mobility-variant scenarios.",
      "published": "2025-05-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.05355",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Taimoor Ahmad"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2506.06556",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SDN-Based False Data Detection With Its Mitigation and Machine Learning Robustness for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "As the development of autonomous and connected vehicles advances, the complexity of modern vehicles increases, with numerous Electronic Control Units (ECUs) integrated into the system. In an in-vehicle network, these ECUs communicate with one another using an standard protocol called Controller Area Network (CAN). Securing communication among ECUs plays a vital role in maintaining the safety and security of the vehicle. This paper proposes a robust SDN-based False Data Detection and Mitigation System (FDDMS) for in-vehicle networks. Leveraging the unique capabilities of Software-Defined Networking (SDN), FDDMS is designed to monitor and detect false data injection attacks in real-time. Specifically, we focus on brake-related ECUs within an SDN-enabled in-vehicle network. First, we decode raw CAN data to create an attack model that illustrates how false data can be injected into the system. Then, FDDMS, incorporating a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)-based detection model, is used to identify false data injection attacks. We further propose an effective variant of DeepFool attack to evaluate the model's robustness. To countermeasure the impacts of four adversarial attacks including Fast gradient descent method, Basic iterative method, DeepFool, and the DeepFool variant, we further enhance a re-training technique method with a threshold based selection strategy. Finally, a mitigation scheme is implemented to redirect attack traffic by dynamically updating flow rules through SDN. Our experimental results show that the proposed FDDMS is robust against adversarial attacks and effectively detects and mitigates false data injection attacks in real-time.",
      "published": "2025-06-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06556",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Long Dang",
        "Thushari Hapuarachchi",
        "Kaiqi Xiong",
        "Yi Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2506.09512",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on the Role of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in 6G-V2X Applications",
      "description": "The rapid advancement of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is transforming Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), with 6G networks expected to provide ultra-reliable, low-latency, and high-capacity connectivity for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs). Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) have emerged as key enablers in optimizing V2X communication by enhancing network management, predictive analytics, security, and cooperative driving due to their outstanding performance across various domains, such as natural language processing and computer vision. This survey comprehensively reviews recent advances in AI and ML models applied to 6G-V2X communication. It focuses on state-of-the-art techniques, including Deep Learning (DL), Reinforcement Learning (RL), Generative Learning (GL), and Federated Learning (FL), with particular emphasis on developments from the past two years. Notably, AI, especially GL, has shown remarkable progress and emerging potential in enhancing the performance, adaptability, and intelligence of 6G-V2X systems. Despite these advances, a systematic summary of recent research efforts in this area remains lacking, which this survey aims to address. We analyze their roles in 6G-V2X applications, such as intelligent resource allocation, beamforming, intelligent traffic management, and security management. Furthermore, we explore the technical challenges, including computational complexity, data privacy, and real-time decision-making constraints, while identifying future research directions for AI-driven 6G-V2X development. This study aims to provide valuable insights for researchers, engineers, and policymakers working towards realizing intelligent, AI-powered V2X ecosystems in 6G communication.",
      "published": "2025-06-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.09512",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Donglin Wang",
        "Anjie Qiu",
        "Qiuheng Zhou",
        "Hans D. Schotten"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2506.16000",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum Artificial Intelligence for Secure Autonomous Vehicle Navigation: An Architectural Proposal",
      "description": "Navigation is a very crucial aspect of autonomous vehicle ecosystem which heavily relies on collecting and processing large amounts of data in various states and taking a confident and safe decision to define the next vehicle maneuver. In this paper, we propose a novel architecture based on Quantum Artificial Intelligence by enabling quantum and AI at various levels of navigation decision making and communication process in Autonomous vehicles : Quantum Neural Networks for multimodal sensor fusion, Nav-Q for Quantum reinforcement learning for navigation policy optimization and finally post-quantum cryptographic protocols for secure communication. Quantum neural networks uses quantum amplitude encoding to fuse data from various sensors like LiDAR, radar, camera, GPS and weather etc., This approach gives a unified quantum state representation between heterogeneous sensor modalities. Nav-Q module processes the fused quantum states through variational quantum circuits to learn optimal navigation policies under swift dynamic and complex conditions. Finally, post quantum cryptographic protocols are used to secure communication channels for both within vehicle communication and V2X (Vehicle to Everything) communications and thus secures the autonomous vehicle communication from both classical and quantum security threats. Thus, the proposed framework addresses fundamental challenges in autonomous vehicles navigation by providing quantum performance and future proof security. Index Terms Quantum Computing, Autonomous Vehicles, Sensor Fusion",
      "published": "2025-06-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.16000",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hemanth Kannamarlapudi",
        "Sowmya Chintalapudi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2507.02400",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DigiT4TAF -- Bridging Physical and Digital Worlds for Future Transportation Systems",
      "description": "In the future, mobility will be strongly shaped by the increasing use of digitalization. Not only will individual road users be highly interconnected, but also the road and associated infrastructure. At that point, a Digital Twin becomes particularly appealing because, unlike a basic simulation, it offers a continuous, bilateral connection linking the real and virtual environments. This paper describes the digital reconstruction used to develop the Digital Twin of the Test Area Autonomous Driving-Baden-Württemberg (TAF-BW), Germany. The TAF-BW offers a variety of different road sections, from high-traffic urban intersections and tunnels to multilane motorways. The test area is equipped with a comprehensive Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication infrastructure and multiple intelligent intersections equipped with camera sensors to facilitate real-time traffic flow monitoring. The generation of authentic data as input for the Digital Twin was achieved by extracting object lists at the intersections. This process was facilitated by the combined utilization of camera images from the intelligent infrastructure and LiDAR sensors mounted on a test vehicle. Using a unified interface, recordings from real-world detections of traffic participants can be resimulated. Additionally, the simulation framework's design and the reconstruction process is discussed. The resulting framework is made publicly available for download and utilization at: https://digit4taf-bw.fzi.de The demonstration uses two case studies to illustrate the application of the digital twin and its interfaces: the analysis of traffic signal systems to optimize traffic flow and the simulation of security-related scenarios in the communications sector.",
      "published": "2025-07-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02400",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maximilian Zipfl",
        "Pascal Zwick",
        "Patrick Schulz",
        "Marc Rene Zofka",
        "Albert Schotschneider",
        "Helen Gremmelmaier",
        "Nikolai Polley",
        "Ferdinand Mütsch",
        "Kevin Simon",
        "Fabian Gottselig",
        "Michael Frey",
        "Sergio Marschall"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2508.02805",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-World Evaluation of Protocol-Compliant Denial-of-Service Attacks on C-V2X-based Forward Collision Warning Systems",
      "description": "Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technology enables low-latency, reliable communications essential for safety applications such as a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) system. C-V2X deployments operate under strict protocol compliance with the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and the Society of Automotive Engineers Standard (SAE) J2735 specifications to ensure interoperability. This paper presents a real-world testbed evaluation of protocol-compliant Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks using User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding and oversized Basic Safety Message (BSM) attacks that 7 exploit transport- and application-layer vulnerabilities in C-V2X. The attacks presented in this study transmit valid messages over standard PC5 sidelinks, fully adhering to 3GPP and SAE J2735 specifications, but at abnormally high rates and with oversized payloads that overload the receiver resources without breaching any protocol rules such as IEEE 1609. Using a real-world connected vehicle 11 testbed with commercially available On-Board Units (OBUs), we demonstrate that high-rate UDP flooding and oversized payload of BSM flooding can severely degrade FCW performance. Results show that UDP flooding alone reduces packet delivery ratio by up to 87% and increases latency to over 400ms, while oversized BSM floods overload receiver processing resources, delaying or completely suppressing FCW alerts. When UDP and BSM attacks are executed simultaneously, they cause near-total communication failure, preventing FCW warnings entirely. These findings reveal that protocol-compliant communications do not necessarily guarantee safe or reliable operation of C-V2X-based safety applications.",
      "published": "2025-08-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.02805",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "exploit",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jean Michel Tine",
        "Mohammed Aldeen",
        "Abyad Enan",
        "M Sabbir Salek",
        "Long Cheng",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2508.04845",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Stage Knowledge-Distilled VGAE and GAT for Robust Controller-Area-Network Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is a standard for in-vehicle communication but remains susceptible to cyber-attacks due to its lack of built-in security. This paper presents a multi-stage intrusion detection framework leveraging unsupervised anomaly detection and supervised graph learning tailored for automotive CAN traffic. Our architecture combines a Variational Graph Autoencoder (VGAE) for structural anomaly detection with a Knowledge-Distilled Graph Attention Network (KD-GAT) for robust attack classification. CAN bus activity is encoded as graph sequences to model temporal and relational dependencies. The pipeline applies VGAE-based selective undersampling to address class imbalance, followed by GAT classification with optional score-level fusion. The compact student GAT achieves 96% parameter reduction compared to the teacher model while maintaining strong predictive performance. Experiments on six public CAN intrusion datasets--Car-Hacking, Car-Survival, and can-train-and-test--demonstrate competitive accuracy and efficiency, with average improvements of 16.2% in F1-score over existing methods, particularly excelling on highly imbalanced datasets with up to 55% F1-score improvements.",
      "published": "2025-08-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.04845",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Robert Frenken",
        "Sidra Ghayour Bhatti",
        "Hanqin Zhang",
        "Qadeer Ahmed"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2508.08945",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Load-Altering Attacks Against Power Grids: A Case Study Using the GB-36 Bus System Open Dataset",
      "description": "The growing digitalization and the rapid adoption of high-powered Internet-of-Things (IoT)-enabled devices (e.g., EV charging stations) have increased the vulnerability of power grids to cyber threats. In particular, the so-called Load Altering Attacks (LAAs) can trigger rapid frequency fluctuations and potentially destabilize the power grid. This paper aims to bridge the gap between academic research and practical application by using open-source datasets released by grid operators. It investigates various LAA scenarios on a real-world transmission network, namely the Great Britain (GB)-36 Zone model released by the UK's National Electricity System Operator (NESO). It evaluates the threshold of LAA severity that the grid can tolerate before triggering cascading effects. Additionally, it explores how Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) based fast frequency response services can mitigate or prevent such impacts. Simulations are conducted using DIgSILENT PowerFactory to ensure realistic system representation. The analysis provides several useful insights to grid operators on the LAA impact, such as the influence of the relative locations of BESS and LAA, as well as how delays in attack execution can influence the overall system response.",
      "published": "2025-08-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.08945",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Syed Irtiza Maksud",
        "Subhash Lakshminarayana"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2508.18155",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "$AutoGuardX$: A Comprehensive Cybersecurity Framework for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The rapid integration of Internet of Things (IoT) and interconnected systems in modern vehicles not only introduced a new era of convenience, automation, and connected vehicles but also elevated their exposure to sophisticated cyber threats. This is especially evident in US and Canada, where cyber-enabled auto theft has surged in recent years, revealing the limitations of existing security measures for connected vehicles. In response, this paper proposes $AutoGuardX$, a comprehensive cybersecurity framework designed specifically for connected vehicles. $AutoGuardX$ combines key elements from existing recognized standards for vehicle security, such as ISO/SAE 21434 and ISO 26262, with advanced technologies, including machine learning-based anomaly detection, IoT security protocols, and encrypted communication channels. The framework addresses major attack vectors like relay attacks, controller area network (CAN) bus intrusions, and vulnerabilities introduced by emerging technologies such as 5G and quantum computing. $AutoGuardX$ is extensively evaluated through security simulations across a mix of Sedans and SUVs from four major vehicle brands manufactured between 2019 and 2023. The results demonstrate the framework's adaptability, scalability, and practical effectiveness against existing and emerging threats.",
      "published": "2025-08-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.18155",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Ali Nadeem",
        "Bishwo Prakash Pokharel",
        "Naresh Kshetri",
        "Achyut Shankar",
        "Gokarna Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4416,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2508.18155 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: encrypted, exposure, response, like, where, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2508.19465",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Addressing Weak Authentication like RFID, NFC in EVs and EVCs using AI-powered Adaptive Authentication",
      "description": "The rapid expansion of the Electric Vehicles (EVs) and Electric Vehicle Charging Systems (EVCs) has introduced new cybersecurity challenges, specifically in authentication protocols that protect vehicles, users, and energy infrastructure. Although widely adopted for convenience, traditional authentication mechanisms like Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and Near Field Communication (NFC) rely on static identifiers and weak encryption, making them highly vulnerable to attack vectors such as cloning, relay attacks, and signal interception. This study explores an AI-powered adaptive authentication framework designed to overcome these shortcomings by integrating machine learning, anomaly detection, behavioral analytics, and contextual risk assessment. Grounded in the principles of Zero Trust Architecture, the proposed framework emphasizes continuous verification, least privilege access, and secure communication. Through a comprehensive literature review, this research evaluates current vulnerabilities and highlights AI-driven solutions to provide a scalable, resilient, and proactive defense. Ultimately, the research findings conclude that adopting AI-powered adaptive authentication is a strategic imperative for securing the future of electric mobility and strengthening digital trust across the ecosystem. Keywords: weak authentication, RFID, NFC, ML, AI-powered adaptive authentication, relay attacks, cloning, eavesdropping, MITM attacks, Zero Trust Architecture",
      "published": "2025-08-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.19465",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Onyinye Okoye"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2509.11761",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On Spatial-Provenance Recovery in Wireless Networks with Relaxed-Privacy Constraints",
      "description": "In Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) networks with multi-hop communication, Road Side Units (RSUs) intend to gather location data from the vehicles to offer various location-based services. Although vehicles use the Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation, they may refrain from sharing their exact GPS coordinates to the RSUs due to privacy considerations. Thus, to address the localization expectations of the RSUs and the privacy concerns of the vehicles, we introduce a relaxed-privacy model wherein the vehicles share their partial location information in order to avail the location-based services. To implement this notion of relaxed-privacy, we propose a low-latency protocol for spatial-provenance recovery, wherein vehicles use correlated linear Bloom filters to embed their position information. Our proposed spatial-provenance recovery process takes into account the resolution of localization, the underlying ad hoc protocol, and the coverage range of the wireless technology used by the vehicles. Through a rigorous theoretical analysis, we present extensive analysis on the underlying trade-off between relaxed-privacy and the communication-overhead of the protocol. Finally, using a wireless testbed, we show that our proposed method requires a few bits in the packet header to provide security features such as localizing a low-power jammer executing a denial-of-service attack.",
      "published": "2025-09-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11761",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manish Bansal",
        "Pramsu Shrivastava",
        "J. Harshan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2509.12233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Trustworthy Agentic IoEV: AI Agents for Explainable Cyberthreat Mitigation and State Analytics",
      "description": "The Internet of Electric Vehicles (IoEV) envisions a tightly coupled ecosystem of electric vehicles (EVs), charging infrastructure, and grid services, yet it remains vulnerable to cyberattacks, unreliable battery-state predictions, and opaque decision processes that erode trust and performance. To address these challenges, we introduce a novel Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AAI) framework tailored for IoEV, where specialized agents collaborate to deliver autonomous threat mitigation, robust analytics, and interpretable decision support. Specifically, we design an AAI architecture comprising dedicated agents for cyber-threat detection and response at charging stations, real-time State of Charge (SoC) estimation, and State of Health (SoH) anomaly detection, all coordinated through a shared, explainable reasoning layer; develop interpretable threat-mitigation mechanisms that proactively identify and neutralize attacks on both physical charging points and learning components; propose resilient SoC and SoH models that leverage continuous and adversarial-aware learning to produce accurate, uncertainty-aware forecasts with human-readable explanations; and implement a three-agent pipeline, where each agent uses LLM-driven reasoning and dynamic tool invocation to interpret intent, contextualize tasks, and execute formal optimizations for user-centric assistance. Finally, we validate our framework through comprehensive experiments across diverse IoEV scenarios, demonstrating significant improvements in security and prediction accuracy. All datasets, models, and code will be released publicly.",
      "published": "2025-09-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.12233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meryem Malak Dif",
        "Mouhamed Amine Bouchiha",
        "Abdelaziz Amara Korba",
        "Yacine Ghamri-Doudane"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2509.16489",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "End-to-End Co-Simulation Testbed for Cybersecurity Research and Development in Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) have been widely deployed across major metropolitan regions worldwide to improve roadway safety, optimize traffic flow, and reduce environmental impacts. These systems integrate advanced sensors, communication networks, and data analytics to enable real-time traffic monitoring, adaptive signal control, and predictive maintenance. However, such integration significantly broadens the ITS attack surface, exposing critical infrastructures to cyber threats that jeopardize safety, data integrity, and operational resilience. Ensuring robust cybersecurity is therefore essential, yet comprehensive vulnerability assessments, threat modeling, and mitigation validations are often cost-prohibitive and time-intensive when applied to large-scale, heterogeneous transportation systems. Simulation platforms offer a cost-effective and repeatable means for cybersecurity evaluation, and the simulation platform should encompass the full range of ITS dimensions - mobility, sensing, networking, and applications. This chapter discusses an integrated co-simulation testbed that links CARLA for 3D environment and sensor modeling, SUMO for microscopic traffic simulation and control, and OMNeT++ for V2X communication simulation. The co-simulation testbed enables end-to-end experimentation, vulnerability identification, and mitigation benchmarking, providing practical insights for developing secure, efficient, and resilient ITS infrastructures. To illustrate its capabilities, the chapter incorporates a case study on a C-V2X proactive safety alert system enhanced with post-quantum cryptography, highlighting the role of the testbed in advancing secure and resilient ITS infrastructures.",
      "published": "2025-09-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.16489",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "resilience",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Minhaj Uddin Ahmad",
        "Akid Abrar",
        "Sagar Dasgupta",
        "Mizanur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2509.18126",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection in Electric Vehicle Charging Stations Using Federated Learning",
      "description": "Federated Learning (FL) is a decentralized training framework widely used in IoT ecosystems that preserves privacy by keeping raw data local, making it ideal for IoT-enabled cyber-physical systems with sensing and communication like Smart Grids (SGs), Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV), and Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS). With the rapid expansion of electric vehicle infrastructure, securing these IoT-based charging stations against cyber threats has become critical. Centralized Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) raise privacy concerns due to sensitive network and user data, making FL a promising alternative. However, current FL-based IDS evaluations overlook practical challenges such as system heterogeneity and non-IID data. To address these challenges, we conducted experiments to evaluate the performance of federated learning for anomaly detection in EV charging stations under system and data heterogeneity. We used FedAvg and FedAvgM, widely studied optimization approaches, to analyze their effectiveness in anomaly detection. Under IID settings, FedAvg achieves superior performance to centralized models using the same neural network. However, performance degrades with non-IID data and system heterogeneity. FedAvgM consistently outperforms FedAvg in heterogeneous settings, showing better convergence and higher anomaly detection accuracy. Our results demonstrate that FL can handle heterogeneity in IoT-based EVCS without significant performance loss, with FedAvgM as a promising solution for robust, privacy-preserving EVCS security.",
      "published": "2025-09-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.18126",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bishal K C",
        "Amr Hilal",
        "Pawan Thapa"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2509.20830",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trustworthy Semantic Communication for Vehicular Networks: Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": "Semantic communication (SemCom) has the potential to significantly reduce communication delay in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications within vehicular networks (VNs). However, the deployment of vehicular SemCom networks (VN-SemComNets) faces critical trust challenges in information transmission, semantic encoding, and communication entity reliability. This paper proposes an innovative three-layer trustworthy VN-SemComNet architecture. Specifically, we introduce a semantic camouflage transmission mechanism leveraging defensive adversarial noise for active eavesdropping defense, a robust federated encoder-decoder training framework to mitigate encoder-decoder poisoning attacks, and an audit game-based distributed vehicle trust management mechanism to deter untrustworthy vehicles. A case study validates the effectiveness of the proposed solutions. Lastly, essential future research directions are pointed out to advance this emerging field.",
      "published": "2025-09-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.20830",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yanghe Pan",
        "Yuntao Wang",
        "Shaolong Guo",
        "Chengyu Yin",
        "Ruidong Li",
        "Zhou Su",
        "Yuan Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2509.25566",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Zero Trust Decentralized Identity Management System for Secure Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on pervasive connectivity to enable cooperative and safety-critical applications, but this connectivity also exposes them to a wide range of cybersecurity threats. Existing perimeter-based security and centralized identity management approaches are inadequate for highly dynamic V2X environments, as they depend on implicit trust and suffer from scalability and single-point-of-failure limitations. This paper proposes D-IM, a Zero Trust-based decentralized identity management and authentication framework for secure V2X communication. D-IM integrates continuous verification with a permissioned blockchain to eliminate centralized trust assumptions and enforce explicit, verifiable identity relationships among vehicles and infrastructure. The framework is designed around clear Zero Trust-aligned goals, including mutual authentication, decentralization, privacy protection, non-repudiation, and traceability, and addresses a comprehensive attacker model covering identity, data integrity, collusion, availability, and accountability threats. We present the D-IM system architecture and identification and authorization protocol, and validate its security properties through both qualitative analysis and a formal BAN logic-based verification. Simulation results in urban and highway scenarios using DSRC and C-V2X demonstrate that D-IM introduces limited overhead while preserving network performance, supporting its practicality for real-world AV deployments.",
      "published": "2025-09-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.25566",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amal Yousseef",
        "Shalaka Satam",
        "Banafsheh Saber Latibari",
        "Mai Abdel-Malek",
        "Soheil Salehi",
        "Pratik Satam"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2510.18123",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SafeCoop: Unravelling Full Stack Safety in Agentic Collaborative Driving",
      "description": "Collaborative driving systems leverage vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication across multiple agents to enhance driving safety and efficiency. Traditional V2X systems take raw sensor data, neural features, or perception results as communication media, which face persistent challenges, including high bandwidth demands, semantic loss, and interoperability issues. Recent advances investigate natural language as a promising medium, which can provide semantic richness, decision-level reasoning, and human-machine interoperability at significantly lower bandwidth. Despite great promise, this paradigm shift also introduces new vulnerabilities within language communication, including message loss, hallucinations, semantic manipulation, and adversarial attacks. In this work, we present the first systematic study of full-stack safety and security issues in natural-language-based collaborative driving. Specifically, we develop a comprehensive taxonomy of attack strategies, including connection disruption, relay/replay interference, content spoofing, and multi-connection forgery. To mitigate these risks, we introduce an agentic defense pipeline, which we call SafeCoop, that integrates a semantic firewall, language-perception consistency checks, and multi-source consensus, enabled by an agentic transformation function for cross-frame spatial alignment. We systematically evaluate SafeCoop in closed-loop CARLA simulation across 32 critical scenarios, achieving 69.15% driving score improvement under malicious attacks and up to 67.32% F1 score for malicious detection. This study provides guidance for advancing research on safe, secure, and trustworthy language-driven collaboration in transportation systems. Our project page is https://xiangbogaobarry.github.io/SafeCoop.",
      "published": "2025-10-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.18123",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiangbo Gao",
        "Tzu-Hsiang Lin",
        "Ruojing Song",
        "Yuheng Wu",
        "Kuan-Ru Huang",
        "Zicheng Jin",
        "Fangzhou Lin",
        "Shinan Liu",
        "Zhengzhong Tu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2510.22024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Analysis of LTE Connectivity in Connected Cars: A Case Study of Tesla",
      "description": "Modern connected vehicles rely on persistent LTE connectivity to enable remote diagnostics, over-the-air (OTA) updates, and safety-relevant services. While mobile network vulnerabilities are well documented in the smartphone ecosystem, their impact in safety-relevant automotive settings remains insufficiently examined. We conduct a black-box case study of LTE security in Tesla's Model 3 and Cybertruck, revealing systemic protocol weaknesses and architectural misconfigurations in connected vehicles. We find that Tesla's telematics stack is susceptible to IMSI catching, rogue base station hijacking, and insecure fallback mechanisms that may silently degrade service availability. Furthermore, legacy control-plane configurations allow for silent SMS injection and broadcast message spoofing without driver awareness. While the vulnerabilities are grounded in Tesla, this case study suggests broader implications for connected-vehicle telematics and for regulatory frameworks such as ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155/R156, which assume secure, traceable, and resilient telematics in modern vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-10-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.22024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "spoofing",
        "telematics",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Evangelos Bitsikas",
        "Jason Veara",
        "Aanjhan Ranganathan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3904,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2510.22024 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: persistent, regulatory, case, service, well, without, impact, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2510.25856",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Critical Roadmap to Driver Authentication via CAN Bus: Dataset Review, Introduction of the Kidmose CANid Dataset (KCID), and Proof of Concept",
      "description": "Modern vehicles remain vulnerable to unauthorized use and theft despite traditional security measures including immobilizers and keyless entry systems. Criminals exploit vulnerabilities in Controller Area Network (CAN) bus systems to bypass authentication mechanisms, while social media trends have expanded auto theft to include recreational joyriding by underage drivers. Driver authentication via CAN bus data offers a promising additional layer of defense-in-depth protection, but existing open-access driver fingerprinting datasets suffer from critical limitations including reliance on decoded diagnostic data rather than raw CAN traffic, artificial fixed-route experimental designs, insufficient sampling rates, and lack of demographic information. This paper provides a comprehensive review of existing open-access driver fingerprinting datasets, analyzing their strengths and limitations to guide practitioners in dataset selection. We introduce the Kidmose CANid Dataset (KCID), which addresses these fundamental shortcomings by providing raw CAN bus data from 16 drivers across four vehicles, including essential demographic information and both daily driving and controlled fixed-route data. Beyond dataset contributions, we present a driver authentication anti-theft framework and implement a proof-of-concept prototype on a single-board computer. Through live road trials with an unaltered passenger vehicle, we demonstrate the practical feasibility of CAN bus-based driver authentication anti-theft systems. Finally, we explore diverse applications of KCID beyond driver authentication, including driver profiling for insurance and safety assessments, mechanical anomaly detection, young driver monitoring, and impaired driving detection. This work provides researchers with both the data and methodological foundation necessary to develop robust, deployable driver authentication systems...",
      "published": "2025-10-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.25856",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Elizabeth Kidmose",
        "Andreas Brasen Kidmose",
        "Cliff C. Zou"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2511.11028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SALT-V: Lightweight Authentication for 5G V2X Broadcasting",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication faces a critical authentication dilemma: traditional public-key schemes like ECDSA provide strong security but impose 2 ms verification delays unsuitable for collision avoidance, while symmetric approaches like TESLA achieve microsecond-level efficiency at the cost of 20-100 ms key disclosure latency. Neither meets 5G New Radio (NR)-V2X's stringent requirements for both immediate authentication and computational efficiency. This paper presents SALT-V, a novel hybrid authentication framework that reconciles this fundamental trade-off through intelligent protocol stratification. SALT-V employs ECDSA signatures for 10% of traffic (BOOT frames) to establish sender trust, then leverages this trust anchor to authenticate 90% of messages (DATA frames) using lightweight GMAC operations. The core innovation - an Ephemeral Session Tag (EST) whitelist mechanism - enables 95% of messages to achieve immediate verification without waiting for key disclosure, while Bloom filter integration provides O(1) revocation checking in 1 us. Comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that SALT-V achieves 0.035 ms average computation time (57x faster than pure ECDSA), 1 ms end-to-end latency, 41-byte overhead, and linear scalability to 2000 vehicles, making it the first practical solution to satisfy all safety-critical requirements for real-time V2X deployment.",
      "published": "2025-11-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.11028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "tesla",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liu Cao",
        "Weizheng Wang",
        "Qipeng Xie",
        "Dongyu Wei",
        "Lyutianyang Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2511.13859",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Targeted Algorithmic Purpose-Driven Cyber Attacks in Distributed Multi-Agent Optimization",
      "description": "Distributed multi-agent optimization (DMAO) enables the scalable control and coordination of a large population of edge resources in complex multi-agent environments. Despite its great scalability, DMAO is prone to cyber attacks as it relies on frequent peer-to-peer communications that are vulnerable to malicious data injection and alteration. Existing cybersecurity research mainly focuses on \\emph{broad-spectrum} attacks that aim to jeopardize the overall environment but fail to sustainably achieve specific or targeted objectives. This paper develops a class of novel strategic purpose-driven algorithmic attacks that are launched by participating agents and interface with DMAO to achieve self-interested attacking purposes. Theoretical foundations, in both primal and dual senses, are established for these attack vectors with and without stealthy features. Simulations on electric vehicle charging control validate the efficacy of the proposed algorithmic attacks and show the impacts of such attacks on the power distribution network.",
      "published": "2025-11-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13859",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahan FakouriFard",
        "Mingxi Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2511.17978",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated Anomaly Detection and Mitigation for EV Charging Forecasting Under Cyberattacks",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure faces escalating cybersecurity threats that can severely compromise operational efficiency and grid stability. Existing forecasting techniques are limited by the lack of combined robust anomaly mitigation solutions and data privacy preservation. Therefore, this paper addresses these challenges by proposing a novel anomaly-resilient federated learning framework that simultaneously preserves data privacy, detects cyber-attacks, and maintains trustworthy demand prediction accuracy under adversarial conditions. The proposed framework integrates three key innovations: LSTM autoencoder-based distributed anomaly detection deployed at each federated client, interpolation-based anomalous data mitigation to preserve temporal continuity, and federated Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks that enable collaborative learning without centralized data aggregation. The framework is validated on real-world EV charging infrastructure datasets combined with real-world DDoS attack datasets, providing robust validation of the proposed approach under realistic threat scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that the federated approach achieves superior performance compared to centralized models, with 15.2% improvement in R2 accuracy while maintaining data locality. The integrated cyber-attack detection and mitigation system produces trustworthy datasets that enhance prediction reliability, recovering 47.9% of attack-induced performance degradation while maintaining exceptional precision (91.3%) and minimal false positive rates (1.21%). The proposed architecture enables enhanced EV infrastructure planning, privacy-preserving collaborative forecasting, cybersecurity resilience, and rapid recovery from malicious threats across distributed charging networks.",
      "published": "2025-11-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.17978",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Oluleke Babayomi",
        "Dong-Seong Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.00765",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Outline of Deception: Physical Adversarial Attacks on Traffic Signs Using Edge Patches",
      "description": "Intelligent driving systems are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks on traffic signs. These attacks can cause misclassification, leading to erroneous driving decisions that compromise road safety. Moreover, within V2X networks, such misinterpretations can propagate, inducing cascading failures that disrupt overall traffic flow and system stability. However, a key limitation of current physical attacks is their lack of stealth. Most methods apply perturbations to central regions of the sign, resulting in visually salient patterns that are easily detectable by human observers, thereby limiting their real-world practicality. This study proposes TESP-Attack, a novel stealth-aware adversarial patch method for traffic sign classification. Based on the observation that human visual attention primarily focuses on the central regions of traffic signs, we employ instance segmentation to generate edge-aligned masks that conform to the shape characteristics of the signs. A U-Net generator is utilized to craft adversarial patches, which are then optimized through color and texture constraints along with frequency domain analysis to achieve seamless integration with the background environment, resulting in highly effective visual concealment. The proposed method demonstrates outstanding attack success rates across traffic sign classification models with varied architectures, achieving over 90% under limited query budgets. It also exhibits strong cross-model transferability and maintains robust real-world performance that remains stable under varying angles and distances.",
      "published": "2025-11-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.00765",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Te Hu",
        "Haowen Li",
        "Long Jin",
        "Chongshi Xin",
        "Yuchi Yao",
        "Jiarui Xiao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.11887",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing Autonomous Driving System Testing: Demands, Challenges, and Future Directions",
      "description": "Autonomous driving systems (ADSs) promise improved transportation efficiency and safety, yet ensuring their reliability in complex real-world environments remains a critical challenge. Effective testing is essential to validate ADS performance and reduce deployment risks. This study investigates current ADS testing practices for both modular and end-to-end systems, identifies key demands from industry practitioners and academic researchers, and analyzes the gaps between existing research and real-world requirements. We review major testing techniques and further consider emerging factors such as Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication and foundation models, including large language models and vision foundation models, to understand their roles in enhancing ADS testing. We conducted a large-scale survey with 100 participants from both industry and academia. Survey questions were refined through expert discussions, followed by quantitative and qualitative analyses to reveal key trends, challenges, and unmet needs. Our results show that existing ADS testing techniques struggle to comprehensively evaluate real-world performance, particularly regarding corner case diversity, the simulation to reality gap, the lack of systematic testing criteria, exposure to potential attacks, practical challenges in V2X deployment, and the high computational cost of foundation model-based testing. By further analyzing participant responses together with 105 representative studies, we summarize the current research landscape and highlight major limitations. This study consolidates critical research gaps in ADS testing and outlines key future research directions, including comprehensive testing criteria, cross-model collaboration in V2X systems, cross-modality adaptation for foundation model-based testing, and scalable validation frameworks for large-scale ADS evaluation.",
      "published": "2025-12-09",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.11887",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yihan Liao",
        "Jingyu Zhang",
        "Jacky Keung",
        "Yan Xiao",
        "Yurou Dai"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.14958",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection in Internet of Vehicles Using Machine Learning",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has evolved modern transportation through enhanced connectivity and intelligent systems. However, this increased connectivity introduces critical vulnerabilities, making vehicles susceptible to cyber-attacks such Denial-ofService (DoS) and message spoofing. This project aims to develop a machine learning-based intrusion detection system to classify malicious Controller Area network (CAN) bus traffic using the CiCIoV2024 benchmark dataset. We analyzed various attack patterns including DoS and spoofing attacks targeting critical vehicle parameters such as Spoofing-GAS - gas pedal position, Spoofing-RPM, Spoofing-Speed, and Spoofing-Steering\\_Wheel. Our initial findings confirm a multi-class classification problem with a clear structural difference between attack types and benign data, providing a strong foundation for machine learning models.",
      "published": "2025-12-16",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.14958",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hop Le",
        "Izzat Alsmadi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.15503",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attention in Motion: Secure Platooning via Transformer-based Misbehavior Detection",
      "description": "Vehicular platooning promises transformative improvements in transportation efficiency and safety through the coordination of multi-vehicle formations enabled by Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. However, the distributed nature of platoon coordination creates security vulnerabilities, allowing authenticated vehicles to inject falsified kinematic data, compromise operational stability, and pose a threat to passenger safety. Traditional misbehaviour detection approaches, which rely on plausibility checks and statistical methods, suffer from high False Positive (FP) rates and cannot capture the complex temporal dependencies inherent in multi-vehicle coordination dynamics. We present Attention In Motion (AIMformer), a transformer-based framework specifically tailored for real-time misbehaviour detection in vehicular platoons with edge deployment capabilities. AIMformer leverages multi-head self-attention mechanisms to capture intra-vehicle temporal dynamics, with a spatio-temporal variant that further models inter-vehicle spatial correlations. It incorporates global positional encoding with vehicle-specific temporal offsets to handle join/exit maneuvers. We propose a Precision-Focused Binary Cross-Entropy (PFBCE) loss function that penalizes FPs to meet the requirements of safety-critical vehicular systems. Extensive evaluation across 4 platoon controllers, multiple attack vectors, and diverse mobility scenarios demonstrates superior performance ($\\geq$ 0.93) compared to state-of-the-art baseline architectures. A comprehensive deployment analysis utilizing TensorFlow Lite (TFLite), Open Neural Network Exchange (ONNX), and TensorRT achieves sub-millisecond inference latency, making it suitable for real-time operation on resource-constrained edge platforms. Hence, validating AIMformer is viable for both in-vehicle and roadside deployment.",
      "published": "2025-12-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.15503",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Konstantinos Kalogiannis",
        "Ahmed Mohamed Hussain",
        "Hexu Li",
        "Panos Papadimitratos"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.19711",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PHANTOM: PHysical ANamorphic Threats Obstructing Connected Vehicle Mobility",
      "description": "Connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) rely on vision-based deep neural networks (DNNs) and low-latency (Vehicle-to-Everything) V2X communication to navigate safely and efficiently. Despite their advances, these systems remain vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks. In this paper, we introduce PHANTOM (PHysical ANamorphic Threats Obstructing connected vehicle Mobility), a novel framework for crafting and deploying perspective-dependent adversarial examples using \\textit{anamorphic art}. PHANTOM exploits geometric distortions that appear natural to humans but are misclassified with high confidence by state-of-the-art object detectors. Unlike conventional attacks, PHANTOM operates in black-box settings without model access and demonstrates strong transferability across four diverse detector architectures (YOLOv5, SSD, Faster R-CNN, and RetinaNet). Comprehensive evaluation in CARLA across varying speeds, weather conditions, and lighting scenarios shows that PHANTOM achieves over 90\\% attack success rate under optimal conditions and maintains 60-80\\% effectiveness even in degraded environments. The attack activates within 6-10 meters of the target, providing insufficient time for safe maneuvering. Beyond individual vehicle deception, PHANTOM triggers network-wide disruption in CAV systems: SUMO-OMNeT++ co-simulation demonstrates that false emergency messages propagate through V2X links, increasing Peak Age of Information by 68-89\\% and degrading safety-critical communication. These findings expose critical vulnerabilities in both perception and communication layers of CAV ecosystems.",
      "published": "2025-12-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.19711",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Nahid Hasan Shuvo",
        "Moinul Hossain"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.21681",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring the Security Threats of Retriever Backdoors in Retrieval-Augmented Code Generation",
      "description": "Retrieval-Augmented Code Generation (RACG) is increasingly adopted to enhance Large Language Models for software development, yet its security implications remain dangerously underexplored. This paper conducts the first systematic exploration of a critical and stealthy threat: backdoor attacks targeting the retriever component, which represents a significant supply-chain vulnerability. It is infeasible to assess this threat realistically, as existing attack methods are either too ineffective to pose a real danger or are easily detected by state-of-the-art defense mechanisms spanning both latent-space analysis and token-level inspection, which achieve consistently high detection rates. To overcome this barrier and enable a realistic analysis, we first developed VenomRACG, a new class of potent and stealthy attack that serves as a vehicle for our investigation. Its design makes poisoned samples statistically indistinguishable from benign code, allowing the attack to consistently maintain low detectability across all evaluated defense mechanisms. Armed with this capability, our exploration reveals a severe vulnerability: by injecting vulnerable code equivalent to only 0.05% of the entire knowledge base size, an attacker can successfully manipulate the backdoored retriever to rank the vulnerable code in its top-5 results in 51.29% of cases. This translates to severe downstream harm, causing models like GPT-4o to generate vulnerable code in over 40% of targeted scenarios, while leaving the system's general performance intact. Our findings establish that retriever backdooring is not a theoretical concern but a practical threat to the software development ecosystem that current defenses are blind to, highlighting the urgent need for robust security measures.",
      "published": "2025-12-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.21681",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tian Li",
        "Bo Lin",
        "Shangwen Wang",
        "Yusong Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.22381",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PHANTOM: Physics-Aware Adversarial Attacks against Federated Learning-Coordinated EV Charging Management System",
      "description": "The rapid deployment of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS) within distribution networks necessitates intelligent and adaptive control to maintain the grid's resilience and reliability. In this work, we propose PHANTOM, a physics-aware adversarial network that is trained and optimized through a multi-agent reinforcement learning model. PHANTOM integrates a physics-informed neural network (PINN) enabled by federated learning (FL) that functions as a digital twin of EVCS-integrated systems, ensuring physically consistent modeling of operational dynamics and constraints. Building on this digital twin, we construct a multi-agent RL environment that utilizes deep Q-networks (DQN) and soft actor-critic (SAC) methods to derive adversarial false data injection (FDI) strategies capable of bypassing conventional detection mechanisms. To examine the broader grid-level consequences, a transmission and distribution (T and D) dual simulation platform is developed, allowing us to capture cascading interactions between EVCS disturbances at the distribution level and the operations of the bulk transmission system. Results demonstrate how learned attack policies disrupt load balancing and induce voltage instabilities that propagate across T and D boundaries. These findings highlight the critical need for physics-aware cybersecurity to ensure the resilience of large-scale vehicle-grid integration.",
      "published": "2025-12-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.22381",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Zakaria Haider",
        "Amit Kumar Podder",
        "Prabin Mali",
        "Aranya Chakrabortty",
        "Sumit Paudyal",
        "Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.23778",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SyncGait: Robust Long-Distance Authentication for Drone Delivery via Implicit Gait Behaviors",
      "description": "In recent years, drone delivery, which utilizes unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for package delivery and pickup, has gradually emerged as a crucial method in logistics. Since delivery drones are expensive and may carry valuable packages, they must maintain a safe distance from individuals until user-drone mutual authentication is confirmed. Despite numerous authentication schemes being developed, existing solutions are limited in authentication distance and lack resilience against sophisticated attacks. To this end, we introduce SyncGait, an implicit gait-based mutual authentication system for drone delivery. SyncGait leverages the user's unique arm swing as he walks toward the drone to achieve mutual authentication without requiring additional hardware or specific authentication actions. We conducted extensive experiments on 14 datasets collected from 31 subjects. The results demonstrate that SyncGait achieves an average accuracy of 99.84\\% at a long distance ($>18m$) and exhibits strong resilience against various spoofing attacks, making it a robust, secure, and user-friendly solution in real-world scenarios.",
      "published": "2025-12-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.23778",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zijian Ling",
        "Man Zhou",
        "Hongda Zhai",
        "Yating Huang",
        "Lingchen Zhao",
        "Qi Li",
        "Chao Shen",
        "Qian Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2512.24345",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FedSecureFormer: A Fast, Federated and Secure Transformer Framework for Lightweight Intrusion Detection in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "This works presents an encoder-only transformer built with minimum layers for intrusion detection in the domain of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles using Federated Learning.",
      "published": "2025-12-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.24345",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devika S",
        "Vishnu Hari",
        "Pratik Narang",
        "Tejasvi Alladi",
        "F. Richard Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.00384",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Engineering Attack Vectors and Detecting Anomalies in Additive Manufacturing",
      "description": "Additive manufacturing (AM) is rapidly integrating into critical sectors such as aerospace, automotive, and healthcare. However, this cyber-physical convergence introduces new attack surfaces, especially at the interface between computer-aided design (CAD) and machine execution layers. In this work, we investigate targeted cyberattacks on two widely used fused deposition modeling (FDM) systems, Creality's flagship model K1 Max, and Ender 3. Our threat model is a multi-layered Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) intrusion, where the adversary intercepts and manipulates G-code files during upload from the user interface to the printer firmware. The MitM intrusion chain enables several stealthy sabotage scenarios. These attacks remain undetectable by conventional slicer software or runtime interfaces, resulting in structurally defective yet externally plausible printed parts. To counter these stealthy threats, we propose an unsupervised Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that analyzes structured machine logs generated during live printing. Our defense mechanism uses a frozen Transformer-based encoder (a BERT variant) to extract semantic representations of system behavior, followed by a contrastively trained projection head that learns anomaly-sensitive embeddings. Later, a clustering-based approach and a self-attention autoencoder are used for classification. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach effectively distinguishes between benign and compromised executions.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.00384",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Mahbub Hasan",
        "Marcus Sternhagen",
        "Krishna Chandra Roy"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.00627",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Understanding and Characterizing Vulnerabilities in Intelligent Connected Vehicles through Real-World Exploits",
      "description": "Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) are a core component of modern transportation systems, and their security is crucial as it directly relates to user safety. Despite prior research, most existing studies focus only on specific sub-components of ICVs due to their inherent complexity. As a result, there is a lack of systematic understanding of ICV vulnerabilities. Moreover, much of the current literature relies on human subjective analysis, such as surveys and interviews, which tends to be high-level and unvalidated, leaving a significant gap between theoretical findings and real-world attacks. To address this issue, we conducted the first large-scale empirical study on ICV vulnerabilities. We began by analyzing existing ICV security literature and summarizing the prevailing taxonomies in terms of vulnerability locations and types. To evaluate their real-world relevance, we collected a total of 649 exploitable vulnerabilities, including 592 from eight ICV vulnerability discovery competitions, Anonymous Cup, between January 2023 and April 2024, covering 48 different vehicles. The remaining 57 vulnerabilities were submitted daily by researchers. Based on this dataset, we assessed the coverage of existing taxonomies and identified several gaps, discovering one new vulnerability location and 13 new vulnerability types. We further categorized these vulnerabilities into 6 threat types (e.g., privacy data breach) and 4 risk levels (ranging from low to critical) and analyzed participants' skills and the types of ICVs involved in the competitions. This study provides a comprehensive and data-driven analysis of ICV vulnerabilities, offering actionable insights for researchers, industry practitioners, and policymakers. To support future research, we have made our vulnerability dataset publicly available.",
      "published": "2026-01-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.00627",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "exploits",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuelin Wang",
        "Yuqiao Ning",
        "Yanbang Sun",
        "Xiaofei Xie",
        "Zhihua Xie",
        "Yang Chen",
        "Zhen Guo",
        "Shihao Xue",
        "Junjie Wang",
        "Sen Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4433,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2601.00627 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: fleet_scale, privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: locations, large-scale, location, studies, user, there, significant, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.01068",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Post-Quantum Cryptography for Intelligent Transportation Systems: An Implementation-Focused Review",
      "description": "As quantum computing advances, the cryptographic algorithms that underpin confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) face increasing vulnerability to quantum-enabled attacks. To address these risks, governments and industry stakeholders are turning toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a class of algorithms designed to resist adversaries equipped with quantum computing capabilities. However, existing studies provide limited insight into the implementation-focused aspects of PQC in the ITS domain. This review addresses that gap by evaluating the readiness of vehicular communication and security standards for adopting PQC. It examines in-vehicle networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interfaces, and investigates vulnerabilities at the physical implementation layer of cryptographic hardware and embedded platforms, primarily exposure to side-channel and fault injection attacks. The review identifies thirteen research gaps: non-PQC-ready standards; constraints in embedded implementation and hybrid cryptography; interoperability and certificate-management barriers; a lack of real-world PQC deployment data in ITS; and physical-attack vulnerabilities in PQC-enabled vehicular communication. We present several future research directions, including updating vehicular communication and security standards, optimizing PQC for low-power devices, enhancing interoperability and certificate-management frameworks for PQC integration, conducting real-world evaluations of PQC-enabled communication and control functions across ITS deployments, and strengthening defenses against AI-assisted physical attacks. A phased roadmap is presented that aligns PQC deployment with regulatory, performance, and safety requirements, thereby guiding the secure evolution of ITS in the quantum computing era.",
      "published": "2026-01-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.01068",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdullah Al Mamun",
        "Akid Abrar",
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "M Sabbir Salek",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.10413",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LADFA: A Framework of Using Large Language Models and Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Personal Data Flow Analysis in Privacy Policies",
      "description": "Privacy policies help inform people about organisations' personal data processing practices, covering different aspects such as data collection, data storage, and sharing of personal data with third parties. Privacy policies are often difficult for people to fully comprehend due to the lengthy and complex legal language used and inconsistent practices across different sectors and organisations. To help conduct automated and large-scale analyses of privacy policies, many researchers have studied applications of machine learning and natural language processing techniques, including large language models (LLMs). While a limited number of prior studies utilised LLMs for extracting personal data flows from privacy policies, our approach builds on this line of work by combining LLMs with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and a customised knowledge base derived from existing studies. This paper presents the development of LADFA, an end-to-end computational framework, which can process unstructured text in a given privacy policy, extract personal data flows and construct a personal data flow graph, and conduct analysis of the data flow graph to facilitate insight discovery. The framework consists of a pre-processor, an LLM-based processor, and a data flow post-processor. We demonstrated and validated the effectiveness and accuracy of the proposed approach by conducting a case study that involved examining ten selected privacy policies from the automotive industry. Moreover, it is worth noting that LADFA is designed to be flexible and customisable, making it suitable for a range of text-based analysis tasks beyond privacy policy analysis.",
      "published": "2026-01-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.10413",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "personal data",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haiyue Yuan",
        "Nikolay Matyunin",
        "Ali Raza",
        "Shujun Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.12284",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "How Safe Is Your Data in Connected and Autonomous Cars: A Consumer Advantage or a Privacy Nightmare ?",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of the automobile sector, driven by advancements in connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), has transformed how vehicles communicate, operate, and interact with their surroundings. Technologies such as Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication enable autonomous cars to generate and exchange substantial amounts of data with real-world entities, enhancing safety, improving performance, and delivering personalized user experiences. However, this data-driven ecosystem introduces significant challenges, particularly concerning data privacy, security, and governance. The absence of transparency and comprehensive regulatory frameworks exacerbates issues of unauthorized data access, prolonged retention, and potential misuse, creating tension between consumer benefits and privacy risks. This review paper explores the multifaceted nature of data sharing in CAVs, analyzing its contributions to innovation and its associated vulnerabilities. It evaluates data-sharing mechanisms and communication technologies, highlights the benefits of data exchange across various use cases, examines privacy concerns and risks of data misuse, and critically reviews regulatory frameworks and their inadequacies in safeguarding user privacy. By providing a thorough analysis of the current state of data sharing in the automotive sector, the paper emphasizes the urgent need for robust policies and ethical data management practices. It calls for striking a balance between fostering technological advancements and ensuring secure, consumer-friendly solutions, paving the way for a trustworthy and innovative automotive future.",
      "published": "2026-01-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12284",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit Chougule",
        "Vinay Chamola",
        "Norbert Herencsar",
        "Fei Richard Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.12311",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-reality location privacy protection in 6G-enabled vehicular metaverses: an LLM-enhanced hybrid generative diffusion model-based approach",
      "description": "The emergence of 6G-enabled vehicular metaverses enables Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) to operate across physical and virtual spaces through space-air-ground-sea integrated networks. The AVs can deploy AI agents powered by large AI models as personalized assistants, on edge servers to support intelligent driving decision making and enhanced on-board experiences. However, such cross-reality interactions may cause serious location privacy risks, as adversaries can infer AV trajectories by correlating the location reported when AVs request LBS in reality with the location of the edge servers on which their corresponding AI agents are deployed in virtuality. To address this challenge, we design a cross-reality location privacy protection framework based on hybrid actions, including continuous location perturbation in reality and discrete privacy-aware AI agent migration in virtuality. In this framework, a new privacy metric, termed cross-reality location entropy, is proposed to effectively quantify the privacy levels of AVs. Based on this metric, we formulate an optimization problem to optimize the hybrid action, focusing on achieving a balance between location protection, service latency reduction, and quality of service maintenance. To solve the complex mixed-integer problem, we develop a novel LLM-enhanced Hybrid Diffusion Proximal Policy Optimization (LHDPPO) algorithm, which integrates LLM-driven informative reward design to enhance environment understanding with double Generative Diffusion Models-based policy exploration to handle high-dimensional action spaces, thereby enabling reliable determination of optimal hybrid actions. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate that the proposed framework effectively mitigates cross-reality location privacy leakage for AVs while maintaining strong user immersion within 6G-enabled vehicular metaverse scenarios.",
      "published": "2026-01-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12311",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaofeng Luo",
        "Jiayi He",
        "Jiawen Kang",
        "Ruichen Zhang",
        "Zhaoshui He",
        "Ekram Hossain",
        "Dong In Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.12875",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SWORD: A Secure LoW-Latency Offline-First Authentication and Data Sharing Scheme for Resource Constrained Distributed Networks",
      "description": "While many resource-constrained networks, such as Internet of Things (IoT) and Internet of Vehicles (IoV), are inherently distributed, the majority still rely on central servers for fast authentication and data sharing. Blockchain-based solutions offer decentralized alternatives but often struggle to meet the stringent latency requirements of real-time applications. Even with the rollout of 5G, network latency between servers and peers remains a significant challenge. To address this, we introduce SWORD, a novel offline-first authentication and data-sharing scheme designed specifically for resource-constrained networks. SWORD utilizes a proximity-based clustering approach to enable offline authentication and data sharing, ensuring low-latency, secure operations even in intermittently connected scenarios. Our experimental results show that SWORD outperforms traditional blockchain-based solutions while offering similar resource efficiency and authentication latency to central-server-based solutions. Additionally, we provide a comprehensive security analysis, demonstrating that SWORD is resilient against spoofing, impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks.",
      "published": "2026-01-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12875",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Faisal Haque Bappy",
        "Tahrim Hossain",
        "Raiful Hasan",
        "Kamrul Hasan",
        "Mohamed Younis",
        "Tariqul Islam"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.15515",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DCeption: Real-world Wireless Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Against CCS EV Charging",
      "description": "The adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) is happening at a rapid pace. To ensure fast and safe charging, complex communication is required between the vehicle and the charging station. In the globally used Combined Charging System (CCS), this communication is carried over the HomePlug Green PHY (HPGP) physical layer. However, HPGP is known to suffer from wireless leakage, which may expose this data link to nearby attackers. In this paper, we examine active wireless attacks against CCS, and study the impact they can have. We present the first real-time Software-Defined Radio (SDR) implementation of HPGP, granting unprecedented access to the communications within the charging cables. We analyze the characteristics of 2,750 real-world charging sessions to understand the timing constraints for hijacking. Using novel techniques to increase the attacks' reliability, we design a robust wireless Man-in-the-Middle evaluation framework for CCS. We demonstrate full control over TLS usage and CCS protocol version negotiation, including TLS stripping attacks. We investigate how real devices respond to safety-critical MitM attacks, which modify power delivery information, and found target vehicles to be highly permissive. First, we caused a vehicle to display charging power exceeding 900 kW on the dashboard, while receiving only 40 kW. Second, we remotely overcharged a vehicle, at twice the requested current for 17 seconds before the vehicle triggered the emergency shutdown. Finally, we propose a backwards-compatible, downgrade-proof protocol extension to mitigate the underlying vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2026-01-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.15515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcell Szakály",
        "Martin Strohmeier",
        "Ivan Martinovic",
        "Sebastian Köhler"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2601.18754",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "$α^3$-SecBench: A Large-Scale Evaluation Suite of Security, Resilience, and Trust for LLM-based UAV Agents over 6G Networks",
      "description": "Autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems are increasingly deployed in safety-critical, networked environments where they must operate reliably in the presence of malicious adversaries. While recent benchmarks have evaluated large language model (LLM)-based UAV agents in reasoning, navigation, and efficiency, systematic assessment of security, resilience, and trust under adversarial conditions remains largely unexplored, particularly in emerging 6G-enabled settings. We introduce $α^{3}$-SecBench, the first large-scale evaluation suite for assessing the security-aware autonomy of LLM-based UAV agents under realistic adversarial interference. Building on multi-turn conversational UAV missions from $α^{3}$-Bench, the framework augments benign episodes with 20,000 validated security overlay attack scenarios targeting seven autonomy layers, including sensing, perception, planning, control, communication, edge/cloud infrastructure, and LLM reasoning. $α^{3}$-SecBench evaluates agents across three orthogonal dimensions: security (attack detection and vulnerability attribution), resilience (safe degradation behavior), and trust (policy-compliant tool usage). We evaluate 23 state-of-the-art LLMs from major industrial providers and leading AI labs using thousands of adversarially augmented UAV episodes sampled from a corpus of 113,475 missions spanning 175 threat types. While many models reliably detect anomalous behavior, effective mitigation, vulnerability attribution, and trustworthy control actions remain inconsistent. Normalized overall scores range from 12.9% to 57.1%, highlighting a significant gap between anomaly detection and security-aware autonomous decision-making. We release $α^{3}$-SecBench on GitHub: https://github.com/maferrag/AlphaSecBench",
      "published": "2026-01-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.18754",
      "matched_terms": [
        "resilience",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamed Amine Ferrag",
        "Abderrahmane Lakas",
        "Merouane Debbah"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.00270",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RVDebloater: Mode-based Adaptive Firmware Debloating for Robotic Vehicles",
      "description": "As the number of embedded devices grows and their functional requirements increase, embedded firmware is becoming increasingly larger, thereby expanding its attack surface. Despite the increase in firmware size, many embedded devices, such as robotic vehicles (RVs), operate in distinct modes, each requiring only a small subset of the firmware code at runtime. We refer to such devices as mode-based embedded devices. Debloating is an approach to reduce attack surfaces by removing or restricting unneeded code, but existing techniques suffer from significant limitations, such as coarse granularity and irreversible code removal, limiting their applicability. To address these limitations, we propose RVDebloater, a novel adaptive debloating technique for mode-based embedded devices that automatically identifies unneeded firmware code for each mode using either static or dynamic analysis, and dynamically debloats the firmware for each mode at the function level at runtime. RVDebloater introduces a new software-based enforcement approach that supports diverse mode-based embedded devices. We implemented RVDebloater using the LLVM compiler and evaluated its efficiency and effectiveness on six different RVs, including both simulated and real ones, with different real-world missions. We find that device requirements change throughout its lifetime for each mode, and that many critical firmware functions can be restricted in other modes, with an average of 85% of functions not being required. The results showed that none of the missions failed after debloating with RVDebloater, indicating that it neither incurred false positives nor false negatives. Further, RVDebloater prunes the firmware call graph by an average of 45% across different firmware. Finally, RVDebloater incurred an average performance overhead of 3.9% and memory overhead of 4% (approximately 0.25 MB) on real RVs.",
      "published": "2026-01-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.00270",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohsen Salehi",
        "Karthik Pattabiraman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.02781",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluating False Alarm and Missing Attacks in CAN IDS",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on electronic control units (ECUs) interconnected through the Controller Area Network (CAN), making in-vehicle communication a critical security concern. Machine learning (ML)-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are increasingly deployed to protect CAN traffic, yet their robustness against adversarial manipulation remains largely unexplored. We present a systematic adversarial evaluation of CAN IDS using the ROAD dataset, comparing four shallow learning models with a deep neural network-based detector. Using protocol-compliant, payload-level perturbations generated via FGSM, BIM and PGD, we evaluate adversarial effects on both benign and malicious CAN frames. While all models achieve strong baseline performance under benign conditions, adversarial perturbations reveal substantial vulnerabilities. Although shallow and deep models are robust to false-alarm induction, with the deep neural network (DNN) performing best on benign traffic, all architectures suffer significant increases in missed attacks. Notably, under gradient-based attacks, the shallow model extra trees (ET) demonstrates improved robustness to missed-attack induction compared to the other models. Our results demonstrate that adversarial manipulation can simultaneously trigger false alarms and evade detection, underscoring the need for adversarial robustness evaluation in safety-critical automotive IDS.",
      "published": "2026-02-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nirab Hossain",
        "Pablo Moriano"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.02914",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FaceLinkGen: A Re-evaluation of Identity Leakage in Privacy-Preserving Face Recognition and Face Anonymization Systems Using Simple Distillation",
      "description": "Privacy-preserving face recognition (PPFR) and face anonymization have different goals, but both must retain some identity-related information for their intended use. We show that an adaptive attacker can learn this information. We propose FaceLinkGen, a simple distillation-based attack that trains a face recognition model to map protected inputs back to standard face embeddings. FaceLinkGen applies to keyless PPFR systems and perception-preserving face de-identification (De-ID) systems. For PPFR, the recovered embeddings can be used to regenerate faces that match the original person. Across MinusFace, PartialFace, and DecoyFace, the regenerated faces achieve acceptance rates of 81.0--99.4\\% on Face++ and 74.9--99.6\\% on Amazon. For De-ID, FaceLinkGen links protected faces to unprotected images of the same person, reaching Recall@1 values of 48.4--89.6\\% in the one-side-protected setting across the evaluated methods. FaceLinkGen exposes identity leakage across all evaluated methods, including DecoyFace and WDP, whose protection resists the tested U-Net attacks on face recovery and protected-to-unprotected linkage, respectively. The attack also remains effective when trained with limited paired data. Code is available at https://github.com/weathon/FaceLinkGenRelease.",
      "published": "2026-02-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02914",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenqi Guo",
        "Qingyun Qian",
        "Mohamed Shehata",
        "Shan Du"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.04991",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CVA6-CFI: A First Glance at RISC-V Control-Flow Integrity Extensions",
      "description": "This work presents the first design, integration, and evaluation of the standard RISC-V extensions for Control-Flow Integrity (CFI). The Zicfiss and Zicfilp extensions aim at protecting the execution of a vulnerable program from control-flow hijacking attacks through the implementation of security mechanisms based on shadow stack and landing pad primitives. We introduce two independent and configurable hardware units implementing forward-edge and backward-edge control-flow protection, fully integrated into the open-source CVA6 core. Our design incurs in only 1.0% area overhead when synthesized in 22 nm FDX technology, and up to 15.6% performance overhead based on evaluation with the MiBench automotive benchmark subset. We release the complete implementation as open source.",
      "published": "2026-02-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.04991",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simone Manoni",
        "Emanuele Parisi",
        "Riccardo Tedeschi",
        "Davide Rossi",
        "Andrea Acquaviva",
        "Andrea Bartolini"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.07249",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Beyond Crash: Hijacking Your Autonomous Vehicle for Fun and Profit",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), especially vision-based AVs, are rapidly being deployed without human operators. As AVs operate in safety-critical environments, understanding their robustness in an adversarial environment is an important research problem. Prior physical adversarial attacks on vision-based autonomous vehicles predominantly target immediate safety failures (e.g., a crash, a traffic-rule violation, or a transient lane departure) by inducing a short-lived perception or control error. This paper shows a qualitatively different risk: a long-horizon route integrity compromise, where an attacker gradually steers a victim AV away from its intended route and into an attacker-chosen destination while the victim continues to drive ``normally.'' This will not pose a danger to the victim vehicle itself, but also to potential passengers sitting inside the vehicle, who may not notice the route changes. In this paper, we design and implement the first adversarial framework, called JackZebra, which performs route-level hijacking of a vision-based end-to-end driving stack using a physically plausible attacker vehicle with a reconfigurable display and a camera sensor mounted on the rear. The central challenge is temporal persistence: adversarial influence must remain effective in changing viewpoints, lighting, weather, traffic, and the victim's continual replanning -- without triggering conspicuous failures. Our key insight is to treat route hijacking as a closed-loop control problem and to convert adversarial patches into steering primitives that can be selected online via an interactive adjustment loop based on observed victim behavior using the rear camera. Our evaluations in both simulated and real-world scenarios show that JackZebra can successfully hijack victim vehicles to deviate from original routes and stop at places designated by the adversary with a high success rate.",
      "published": "2026-02-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.07249",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qi Sun",
        "Ahmed Abdo",
        "Luis Burbano",
        "Ziyang Li",
        "Yaxing Yao",
        "Alvaro Cardenas",
        "Yinzhi Cao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.10397",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilient Voltage Estimation for Battery Packs Using Self-Learning Koopman Operator",
      "description": "Cloud-based battery management systems (BMSs) rely on real-time voltage measurement data to coordinate bi-directional electric vehicle (EV) charging in vehicle-to-grid (V2G) applications. Unfortunately, an adversary can corrupt the transmitted measurement data, leading to disrupted charging/discharging of EVs. To ensure reliable voltage data under such sensor attacks, this paper proposes a secure voltage estimation scheme for large-format battery packs based on a self-learning Koopman operator with two-stage error corrections. The first stage compensates for the Koopman approximation error, and the second stage aims to recover the error amassed from the lack of higher-order battery dynamics information in the self-learning feedback. The latter is obtained from two alternative methods: an adaptable heuristic correction that leverages cell-level open-circuit voltage to state-of-charge mapping, and a Gaussian process regression-based correction. We tested our proposed secure estimator using the high-fidelity battery simulation package 'PyBaMM-liionpack', and the results show high accuracy under varying pack topologies, charging settings, battery aging, and attack policies. These findings highlight the scalability and adaptability of our algorithm to diverse battery configurations and operating conditions without requiring significant modifications, excessive data, or sensor redundancy.",
      "published": "2026-02-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.10397",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanchita Ghosh",
        "Tanushree Roy"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.11472",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Future Mining: Learning for Safety and Security",
      "description": "Mining is rapidly evolving into an AI driven cyber physical ecosystem where safety and operational reliability depend on robust perception, trustworthy distributed intelligence, and continuous monitoring of miners and equipment. However, real world mining environments impose severe constraints, including poor illumination, GPS denied conditions, irregular underground topologies and intermittent connectivity. These factors degrade perception accuracy, disrupt situational awareness and weaken distributed learning systems. At the same time, emerging cyber physical threats such as backdoor triggers, sensor spoofing, label flipping attacks, and poisoned model updates further jeopardize operational safety as mines adopt autonomous vehicles, humanoid assistance, and federated learning for collaborative intelligence. Energy constrained sensors also experience uneven battery depletion, creating blind spots in safety coverage and disrupting hazard detection pipelines. This paper presents a vision for a Unified Smart Safety and Security Architecture that integrates multimodal perception, secure federated learning, reinforcement learning, DTN enabled communication, and energy aware sensing into a cohesive safety framework. We introduce five core modules: Miner Finder, Multimodal Situational Awareness, Backdoor Attack Monitor, TrustFed LFD, and IoT driven Equipment Health Monitoring. These modules collectively address miner localization, hazard understanding, federated robustness, and predictive maintenance. Together, they form an end to end framework capable of guiding miners through obstructed pathways, identifying compromised models or sensors, and ensuring mission critical equipment reliability. This work outlines a comprehensive research vision for building a resilient and trustworthy intelligent mining system capable of maintaining operational continuity under adversarial conditions.",
      "published": "2026-02-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11472",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Sazedur Rahman",
        "Mizanur Rahman Jewel",
        "Sanjay Madria"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.13898",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing Cybersecurity Risks and Traffic Impact in Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Given the promising future of autonomous vehicles, it is foreseeable that self-driving cars will soon emerge as the predominant mode of transportation. While autonomous vehicles offer enhanced efficiency, they remain vulnerable to external attacks. In this research, we sought to investigate the potential impact of cyberattacks on traffic patterns. To achieve this, we conducted simulations where cyberattacks were simulated on connected vehicles by disseminating false information to either a single vehicle or vehicle platoons. The primary objective of this research is to assess the cybersecurity challenges confronting connected and automated vehicles and propose practical solutions to minimize the adverse effects of malicious external information. In the simulation, we have implemented an innovative car-following model for the simulation of connected self-driving vehicles. This model continually monitors data received from preceding vehicles and optimizes various actions, such as acceleration, and deceleration, with the aim of maximizing overall traffic efficiency and safety.",
      "published": "2026-02-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13898",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "self-driving",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Saurav Silwal",
        "Lu Gao",
        "Ph. D. Yunpeng Zhang",
        "Ph. D. Ahmed Senouci",
        "Ph. D. Yi-Lung Mo",
        "Ph. D.",
        "P. E"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4026,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2602.13898 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information., primary, remain, where, risks, impact, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.13926",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVECTOR: An orchestrator for analysing attacks in electric vehicles charging system",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure is critical for the widespread adoption of EVs, ensuring efficient and secure charging processes. Evaluating the security and performance of EV charging systems in real-world infrastructure poses significant challenges due to the diversity of information exchange between vehicles and charging stations/Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), including complex network protocols, scale of deployment and a variety of potential threats. Existing simulation frameworks are unable to handle complex security scenarios across these differing data exchange protocols. In this paper, we propose a novel EV orchestration framework: EVECTOR, which addresses the limitations of existing simulation systems by enabling both quantitative and qualitative analyses of EV charging scenarios. EVECTOR also provides a flexible attack orchestrator to simulate realistic attack behaviours on EV charging infrastructure. We validate the EVECTOR framework through two case studies: (a) cyber-physical attacks such as broken wire; and (b) cyber-specific attacks such as frame fuzzification. The case studies highlight the effectiveness of EVECTOR in providing deeper insights into the security and performance of EV charging systems.",
      "published": "2026-02-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13926",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devki Nandan Jha",
        "Tomasz Szydlo",
        "Nima Valizadeh",
        "Ringo Sham",
        "Aleksandra Edwards",
        "Amrit Kumar",
        "Amanjot Kaur",
        "Bo Wei",
        "Vijay Kumar",
        "Kai Li Lim",
        "Rajiv Ranjan",
        "Omer Rana"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.16722",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Real-Time Approach to Autonomous CAN Bus Reverse Engineering",
      "description": "This paper introduces a real-time method for reverse engineering a vehicle's CAN bus without prior knowledge of the vehicle or its CAN system. By comparing inertial measurement and CAN data during significant vehicle events, the method accurately identified the CAN channels associated with the accelerator pedal, brake pedal, and steering wheel. Utilizing an IMU, CAN module, and event-driven software architecture, the system was validated using prerecorded serialized data from previous studies. This data, collected during multiple vehicle drives, included synchronized IMU and CAN recordings. By using these consistent datasets, the improvements made in this work were tested and validated under the same conditions as in the previous studies, enabling direct comparison to earlier results. Faster processing times were produced and less computational power was needed, as compared to the earlier methods. This work could have potential application to making aftermarket autonomous vehicle kits and for cybersecurity applications. It is a scalable and adaptable solution for autonomous CAN reverse engineering in near real-time.",
      "published": "2026-02-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.16722",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kevin Setterstrom",
        "Jeremy Straub"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.17345",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "What Breaks Embodied AI Security:LLM Vulnerabilities, CPS Flaws,or Something Else?",
      "description": "Embodied AI systems (e.g., autonomous vehicles, service robots, and LLM-driven interactive agents) are rapidly transitioning from controlled environments to safety critical real-world deployments. Unlike disembodied AI, failures in embodied intelligence lead to irreversible physical consequences, raising fundamental questions about security, safety, and reliability. While existing research predominantly analyzes embodied AI through the lenses of Large Language Model (LLM) vulnerabilities or classical Cyber-Physical System (CPS) failures, this survey argues that these perspectives are individually insufficient to explain many observed breakdowns in modern embodied systems. We posit that a significant class of failures arises from embodiment-induced system-level mismatches, rather than from isolated model flaws or traditional CPS attacks. Specifically, we identify four core insights that explain why embodied AI is fundamentally harder to secure: (i) semantic correctness does not imply physical safety, as language-level reasoning abstracts away geometry, dynamics, and contact constraints; (ii) identical actions can lead to drastically different outcomes across physical states due to nonlinear dynamics and state uncertainty; (iii) small errors propagate and amplify across tightly coupled perception-decision-action loops; and (iv) safety is not compositional across time or system layers, enabling locally safe decisions to accumulate into globally unsafe behavior. These insights suggest that securing embodied AI requires moving beyond component-level defenses toward system-level reasoning about physical risk, uncertainty, and failure propagation.",
      "published": "2026-02-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.17345",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Boyang Ma",
        "Hechuan Guo",
        "Peizhuo Lv",
        "Minghui Xu",
        "Xuelong Dai",
        "YeChao Zhang",
        "Yijun Yang",
        "Yue Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.18079",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic Deception: When Pedestrians Team Up to Fool Autonomous Cars",
      "description": "Many adversarial attacks on autonomous-driving perception models fail to cause system-level failures once deployed in a full driving stack. The main reason for such ineffectiveness is that once deployed in a system (e.g., within a simulator), attacks tend to be spatially or temporally short-lived, due to the vehicle's dynamics, hence rarely influencing the vehicle behaviour. In this paper, we address both limitations by introducing a system-level attack in which multiple dynamic elements (e.g., two pedestrians) carry adversarial patches (e.g., on cloths) and jointly amplify their effect through coordination and motion. We evaluate our attacks in the CARLA simulator using a state-of-the-art autonomous driving agent. At the system level, single-pedestrian attacks fail in all runs (out of 10), while dynamic collusion by two pedestrians induces full vehicle stops in up to 50\\% of runs, with static collusion yielding no successful attack at all. These results show that system-level failures arise only when adversarial signals persist over time and are amplified through coordinated actors, exposing a gap between model-level robustness and end-to-end safety.",
      "published": "2026-02-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.18079",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Masoud Jamshidiyan Tehrani",
        "Marco Gabriel",
        "Jinhan Kim",
        "Paolo Tonella"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2602.20521",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Secure and Efficient DNN Accelerators via Hardware-Software Co-Design",
      "description": "The rapid deployment of deep neural network (DNN) accelerators in safety-critical domains such as autonomous vehicles, healthcare systems, and financial infrastructure necessitates robust mechanisms to safeguard data confidentiality and computational integrity. Existing security solutions for DNN accelerators, however, suffer from excessive hardware resource demands and frequent off-chip memory access overheads, which degrade performance and scalability. To address these challenges, this paper presents a secure and efficient memory protection framework for DNN accelerators with minimal overhead. First, we propose a bandwidth-aware cryptographic scheme that adapts encryption granularity based on memory traffic patterns, striking a balance between security and resource efficiency. Second, we observe that both the overlapping regions in the intra-layer tiling's sliding window pattern and those resulting from inter-layer tiling strategy discrepancies introduce substantial redundant memory accesses and repeated computational overhead in cryptography. Third, we introduce a multi-level authentication mechanism that effectively eliminates unnecessary off-chip memory accesses, enhancing performance and energy efficiency. Experimental results show that this work decreases performance overhead by over 12% and achieves 87% energy efficiency improvement for both server and edge neural processing units (NPUs), while ensuring robust scalability.",
      "published": "2026-02-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20521",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wei Xuan",
        "Zihao Xuan",
        "Rongliang Fu",
        "Ning Lin",
        "Kwunhang Wong",
        "Zikang Yuan",
        "Lang Feng",
        "Zhongrui Wang",
        "Tsung-Yi Ho",
        "Yuzhong Jiao",
        "Luhong Liang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.01173",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Extending Adaptive Cruise Control with Machine Learning Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "An Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system automatically adjusts the host vehicle's speed to maintain a safe following distance from a lead vehicle. In typical implementations, a feedback controller (e.g., a Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller) computes the host vehicle's acceleration using a target speed and a spacing error, defined as the difference between the measured inter-vehicle distance and a desired safe distance. ACC is often assumed to be resilient to fault-injection attacks because a Kalman filter (KF) can smooth noisy speed measurements. However, we show--through analytical proofs and simulation results--that a KF can tolerate injected speed values only up to a bounded threshold. When injected values exceed this threshold, the filter can be driven off track, causing the ACC controller to make unsafe acceleration decisions and potentially leading to collisions. Our main contribution is to augment the PID-based controller with Intrusion Detection System (IDS) outputs, yielding Intrusion Detection Systems-Based Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC-IDS). The ACC-IDS controller is simple and implementable: a binary intrusion flag switches the control law to emergency braking. We prove that augmenting ACC with an IDS, under assumed detection-performance and latency constraints, can mitigate these attacks and help preserve ACC's collision-avoidance guarantees.",
      "published": "2026-03-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01173",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lotfi Ben Othmane",
        "Yasaswini Konapalli",
        "Naga Prudhvi Mareedu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.01876",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Survey on Privacy-Preserving Architectures for IoT and Vehicular Data Sharing: Techniques, Challenges, and Future Directions",
      "description": "The proliferation of IoT and V2X systems generates unprecedented sensitive data at the network edge, demanding privacy-preserving architectures that enable secure sharing without exposing raw information. Contemporary solutions face a fundamental privacy-efficiency-trust trilemma: achieving strong privacy guarantees, computational efficiency for resource-constrained devices, and decentralized trust simultaneously remains intractable with single-paradigm approaches. This survey systematically analyzes 75 technical papers (2007--2025) through a novel three-dimensional taxonomy classifying architectures into Decentralized Computation, Cryptography-based, and Distributed Ledger approaches. Temporal analysis reveals dramatic acceleration during 2024--2025, with 48% of all papers published in this period -- Decentralized Computation dominates at 44% of contributions and 59% of 2025 publications. Comprehensive Security Threat Mapping and Technology Maturity Assessment demonstrate that mature solutions occupy narrow design regions excelling in one or two dimensions while compromising others, conclusively validating the trilemma hypothesis. We identify emerging hybrid architectures combining complementary paradigms as the essential path forward. Critical challenges including security guarantee composition across layers, multi-layer coordination overhead minimization, and post-quantum security integration must be addressed for practical deployment in next-generation intelligent transportation systems and IoT ecosystems.",
      "published": "2026-03-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.01876",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Phat T. Tran-Truong",
        "Vinh X. Q. Nguyen",
        "Ha X. Son",
        "Phien Nguyen-Ngoc",
        "Khanh H. Vo",
        "Triet M. Nguyen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.03376",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comparison of Credential Management Systems Based on the Standards of IEEE, ETSI, and YD/T 3957-2021",
      "description": "As V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) technology becomes increasingly prevalent, the security of V2X networks has garnered growing attention worldwide. In North America, the IEEE 1609 series standards are primarily used, while Europe adopts the ETSI series standards, and China has also established its industry standard, YD/T 3957-2021, among others. Although these standards share some commonalities, they also exhibit differences. To achieve compatibility across these standards, analyzing their similarities and differences is a crucial issue. Therefore, this study focuses on analyzing the three major standards mentioned above, discussing aspects such as certificate formats, signed message formats, and certificate request processes. Additionally, this research evaluates the efficiency of different cryptographic methods, including NIST P-256 and SM2-256, SHA-256 and SM3-256, as well as AES-128 and SM4-128. Finally, the study implements these three major standards on V2X devices and compares the efficiency of message signing and signature verification in V2X systems, providing a reference for the development of a secure certificate management system for V2X networks.",
      "published": "2026-03-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.03376",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel C. H. Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.04662",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "When Connectivity Is Not Enough: Cross-Layer Attacks on UAV C2 over 5G",
      "description": "Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations increasingly use 5G standalone (SA) networks for command and control (C2) between the UAV and the ground control station (GCS). The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified mechanisms for authentication and authorization of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in this architectural setting. As a result, operators may treat registration state, Protocol Data Unit (PDU) session status, and IP reachability as evidence that the C2 path is available. In practice, however, these connectivity indicators alone do not guarantee that closed-loop control remains operationally safe. Attacks can degrade UAS C2 when timeliness degrades under shared User Plane contention, mobility continuity fails during Control Plane instability, or command integrity is violated at a trusted next-generation Node B (gNodeB). Such failures undermine connectivity as the central security indicator for UAV operations. In this paper, we demonstrate these issues using three distinct threat models on a reproducible Open5GS and UERANSIM testbed that carries Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) over the 5G User Plane, and we use a commercial Nokia core to ground deployment assumptions. We address timeliness, availability, and integrity through experiments in which attack success is defined as forcing an unsafe closed-loop state without a clean disconnect. We observe stale telemetry and heavy-tailed delay under co-tenant User Plane contention, failsafe after handover under Control Plane instability, and navigation hijacking after command rewriting at a compromised gNodeB. We further discuss why each threat model arises and evaluate mitigations for these cross-layer failures. Across the study, we disclosed five robustness issues: three CVEs have already been assigned, and two additional CVE requests are pending.",
      "published": "2026-03-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.04662",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wagner Comin Sonaglio",
        "Ágney Lopes Roth Ferraz",
        "André Elias Melo",
        "Murray Evangelista de Souza",
        "Guevara Noubir",
        "Lourenço Alves Pereira Júnior"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.06299",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Integrated Failure and Threat Mode and Effect Analysis (FTMEA) Framework with Quantified Cross-Domain Correlation Factors for Automotive Semiconductors",
      "description": "The automotive industry faces increasing challenges in ensuring both functional safety (FuSa) and cybersecurity for complex semiconductor devices. Traditional Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) primarily addresses safety-related failure modes, often overlooking synergistic vulnerabilities and shared consequences with cybersecurity threats. This paper introduces an Integrated Failure and Threat Mode and Effect Analysis (FTMEA) framework that systematically co-analyzes FuSa and cybersecurity. A cornerstone of this framework is the introduction of rigorously defined Cross-Domain Correlation Factors (CDCFs), which quantify the interdependencies and mutual influences between safety-related failures and cybersecurity threats. These factors are derived from a combination of structured expert knowledge, static structural analysis metrics (e.g., Controllability/Observability), and validated against empirical data from fault/attack injection campaigns. We propose a modified Risk Priority Number (RPN) calculation that systematically integrates these correlation factors, enabling a more accurate and transparent prioritization of risks that span both domains. A detailed case study involving an automotive ASIC configuration register proves the practical application of the FTMEA. We present explicit mapping tables, quantitative CDCF values, and a comparative analysis against a baseline FMEA/TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment), illustrating how the integrated approach uncovers previously masked cross-domain risks, improves mitigation strategy effectiveness, and provides a clear quantitative justification for the derived correlation values. This framework offers a unified, traceable, methodology for risk assessment in critical automotive systems, thereby overcoming the limitations of conventional analyses and promoting optimized, cross-disciplinary development.",
      "published": "2026-03-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.06299",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antonino Armato",
        "Marzana Khatun",
        "Sebastian Fischer"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.11433",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Reinforcement Learning for Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Vehicular Routing",
      "description": "In modern transportation networks, adversaries can manipulate routing algorithms using false data injection attacks, such as simulating heavy traffic with multiple devices running crowdsourced navigation applications, to mislead vehicles toward suboptimal routes and increase congestion. To address these threats, we formulate a strategically zero-sum game between an attacker, who injects such perturbations, and a defender, who detects anomalies based on the observed travel times of network edges. We propose a computational method based on multi-agent reinforcement learning to compute a Nash equilibrium of this game, providing an optimal detection strategy, which ensures that total travel time remains within a worst-case bound, even in the presence of an attack. We present an extensive experimental evaluation that demonstrates the robustness and practical benefits of our approach, providing a powerful framework to improve the resilience of transportation networks against false data injection. In particular, we show that our approach yields approximate equilibrium policies and significantly outperforms baselines for both the attacker and the defender.",
      "published": "2026-03-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.11433",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Taha Eghtesad",
        "Yevgeniy Vorobeychik",
        "Aron Laszka"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.11876",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Possible Detectability of Image-in-Image Steganography",
      "description": "This paper investigates the detectability of popular imagein-image steganography schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In this paradigm, the payload is usually an image of the same size as the Cover image, leading to very high embedding rates. We first show that the embedding yields a mixing process that is easily identifiable by independent component analysis. We then propose a simple, interpretable steganalysis method based on the first four moments of the independent components estimated from the wavelet decomposition of the images, which are used to distinguish between the distributions of Cover and Stego components. Experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed method, with eight-dimensional input vectors attaining up to 84.6% accuracy. This vulnerability analysis is supported by two other facts: the use of keyless extraction networks and the high detectability w.r.t. classical steganalysis methods, such as the SRM combined with support vector machines, which attains over 99% accuracy.",
      "published": "2026-03-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.11876",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antoine Mallet",
        "Patrick Bas"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.12968",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Requirement-Based Framework for Engineering Adaptive Authentication",
      "description": "Authentication is crucial to confirm that an individual or entity trying to perform an action is actually who or what they claim to be. In dynamic environments such as the Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Vehicles (IoV), healthcare, and smart cities, security risks can change depending on varying contextual factors (e.g., user attempting to authenticate, location, device type). Thus, authentication methods must adapt to mitigate changing security risks while meeting usability and performance requirements. However, existing adaptive authentication systems provide limited guidance on (a) representing contextual factors, requirements, and authentication methods (b) understanding the influence of contextual factors and authentication methods on the fulfilment of requirements, and (c) selecting effective authentication methods that reduce security risks while maximizing the satisfaction of the requirements. This paper proposes a framework for engineering adaptive authentication systems that dynamically select effective authentication methods to address changes in contextual factors and security risks. The framework leverages a contextual goal model to represent requirements and the influence of contextual factors on security risks and requirement priorities. It uses an extended feature model to represent potential authentication methods and their impacts on mitigating security risks and satisfying requirements. At runtime, when contextual factors change, the framework employs a Fuzzy Causal network encoded using the Z3 SMT solver to analyze the goal and feature models, enabling the selection of effective authentication methods. We demonstrate and evaluate our framework through its application to real-world authentication scenarios in the IoV and the healthcare domains.",
      "published": "2026-03-13",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.12968",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alzubair Hassan",
        "Alkabashi Alnour",
        "Bashar Nuseibeh",
        "Liliana Pasquale"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.14124",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Experimental Evaluation of Security Attacks on Self-Driving Car Platforms",
      "description": "Deep learning-based perception pipelines in autonomous ground vehicles are vulnerable to both adversarial manipulation and network-layer disruption. We present a systematic, on-hardware experimental evaluation of five attack classes: FGSM, PGD, man-in-the-middle (MitM), denial-of-service (DoS), and phantom attacks on low-cost autonomous vehicle platforms (JetRacer and Yahboom). Using a standardized 13-second experimental protocol and comprehensive automated logging, we systematically characterize three dimensions of attack behavior:(i) control deviation, (ii) computational cost, and (iii) runtime responsiveness. Our analysis reveals that distinct attack classes produce consistent and separable \"fingerprints\" across these dimensions: perception attacks (MitM output manipulation and phantom projection) generate high steering deviation signatures with nominal computational overhead, PGD produces combined steering perturbation and computational load signatures across multiple dimensions, and DoS exhibits frame rate and latency degradation signatures with minimal control-plane perturbation. We demonstrate that our fingerprinting framework generalizes across both digital attacks (adversarial perturbations, network manipulation) and environmental attacks (projected false features), providing a foundation for attack-aware monitoring systems and targeted, signature-based defense mechanisms.",
      "published": "2026-03-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.14124",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Viet K. Nguyen",
        "Nathan Lee",
        "Mohammad Husain"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.17757",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On Securing the Software Development Lifecycle in IoT RISC-V Trusted Execution Environments",
      "description": "RISC-V-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are gaining traction in the automotive and IoT sectors as a foundation for protecting sensitive computations. However, the supporting infrastructure around these TEEs remains immature. In particular, mechanisms for secure enclave updates and migrations - essential for complete enclave lifecycle management - are largely absent from the evolving RISC-V ecosystem. In this paper, we address this limitation by introducing a novel toolkit that enables RISC-V TEEs to support critical aspects of the software development lifecycle. Our toolkit provides broad compatibility with existing and emerging RISC-V TEE implementations (e.g., Keystone and CURE), which are particularly promising for integration in the automotive industry. It extends the Security Monitor (SM) - the trusted firmware layer of RISC-V TEEs - with three modular extensions that enable secure enclave update, secure migration, state continuity, and trusted time. Our implementation demonstrates that the toolkit requires only minimal interface adaptation to accommodate TEE-specific naming conventions. Our evaluation results confirm that our proposal introduces negligible performance overhead: our state continuity solution incurs less than 1.5% overhead, and enclave downtime remains as low as 0.8% for realistic applications with a 1 KB state, which conforms with the requirements of most IoT and automotive applications.",
      "published": "2026-03-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.17757",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Annika Wilde",
        "Samira Briongos",
        "Claudio Soriente",
        "Ghassan Karame"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.19101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FedTrident: Resilient Road Condition Classification Against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning",
      "description": "FL has emerged as a transformative paradigm for ITS, notably camera-based Road Condition Classification (RCC). However, by enabling collaboration, FL-based RCC exposes the system to adversarial participants launching Targeted Label-Flipping Attacks (TLFAs). Malicious clients (vehicles) can relabel their local training data (e.g., from an actual uneven road to a wrong smooth road), consequently compromising global model predictions and jeopardizing transportation safety. Existing countermeasures against such poisoning attacks fail to maintain resilient model performance near the necessary attack-free levels in various attack scenarios due to: 1) not tailoring poisoned local model detection to TLFAs, 2) not excluding malicious vehicular clients based on historical behavior, and 3) not remedying the already-corrupted global model after exclusion. To close this research gap, we propose FedTrident, which introduces: 1) neuron-wise analysis for local model misbehavior detection (notably including attack goal identification, critical feature extraction, and GMM-based model clustering and filtering); 2) adaptive client rating for client exclusion according to the local model detection results in each FL round; and 3) machine unlearning for corrupted global model remediation once malicious clients are excluded during FL. Extensive evaluation across diverse FL-RCC models, tasks, and configurations demonstrates that FedTrident can effectively thwart TLFAs, achieving performance comparable to that in attack-free scenarios and outperforming eight baseline countermeasures by 9.49% and 4.47% for the two most critical metrics. Moreover, FedTrident is resilient to various malicious client rates, data heterogeneity levels, complicated multi-task, and dynamic attacks.",
      "published": "2026-03-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.19101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sheng Liu",
        "Panos Papadimitratos"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.20981",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Deception for Mission Surveillance via Hypergame-Theoretic Deep Reinforcement Learning",
      "description": "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are valuable for mission-critical systems like surveillance, rescue, or delivery. Not surprisingly, such systems attract cyberattacks, including Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to overwhelm the resources of mission drones (MDs). How can we defend UAV mission systems against DoS attacks? We adopt cyber deception as a defense strategy, in which honey drones (HDs) are proposed to bait and divert attacks. The attack and deceptive defense hinge upon radio signal strength: The attacker selects victim MDs based on their signals, and HDs attract the attacker from afar by emitting stronger signals, despite this reducing battery life. We formulate an optimization problem for the attacker and defender to identify their respective strategies for maximizing mission performance while minimizing energy consumption. To address this problem, we propose a novel approach, called HT-DRL. HT-DRL identifies optimal solutions without a long learning convergence time by taking the solutions of hypergame theory into the neural network of deep reinforcement learning. This achieves a systematic way to intelligently deceive attackers. We analyze the performance of diverse defense mechanisms under different attack strategies. Further, the HT-DRL-based HD approach outperforms existing non-HD counterparts up to two times better in mission performance while incurring low energy consumption.",
      "published": "2026-03-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.20981",
      "matched_terms": [
        "surveillance",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zelin Wan",
        "Jin-Hee Cho",
        "Mu Zhu",
        "Ahmed H. Anwar",
        "Charles Kamhoua",
        "Munindar P. Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2603.25763",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANGuard: A Spatio-Temporal CNN-GRU-Attention Hybrid Architecture for Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle CAN Networks",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has become an essential component of smart transportation systems, enabling seamless interaction among vehicles and infrastructure. In recent years, it has played a progressively significant role in enhancing mobility, safety, and transportation efficiency. However, this connectivity introduces severe security vulnerabilities, particularly Denial-of-Service (DoS) and spoofing attacks targeting the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, which could severely inhibit communication between the critical components of a vehicle, leading to system malfunctions, loss of control, or even endangering passengers' safety. To address this problem, this paper presents CANGuard, a novel spatio-temporal deep learning architecture that combines Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), and an attention mechanism to effectively identify such attacks. The model is trained and evaluated on the CICIoV2024 dataset, achieving competitive performance across accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score and outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods. A comprehensive ablation study confirms the individual and combined contributions of the CNN, GRU, and attention components. Additionally, a SHAP analysis is conducted to interpret the decision-making process of the model and determine which features have the most significant impact on intrusion detection. The proposed approach demonstrates strong potential for practical and scalable security enhancements in modern IoV environments, thereby ensuring safer and more secure CAN bus communications.",
      "published": "2026-03-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.25763",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rakib Hossain Sajib",
        "Md. Rokon Mia",
        "Prodip Kumar Sarker",
        "Abdullah Al Noman",
        "Md Arifur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.00674",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Managing the Mismatch: The Role of Flexibility on the Path to a Carbon-Neutral Energy System",
      "description": "A rapid expansion of system flexibility is essential to integrate increasing shares of renewable energy into future energy systems. However, flexibility needs and technology-specific contributions to flexibility remain poorly quantified in energy system modelling. Existing methods are not widely applied, leaving key questions unanswered: which flexibility technologies are critical for climate neutrality, and what are the cost implications of alternative deployment strategies? To address this gap, we apply a correlation-based flexibility metric to a high-resolution, sector-coupled model of the German energy system, covering its transformation towards climate neutrality. For our default scenario, we find that daily flexibility needs increase by a factor of 3.7 between 2025 and 2045, driven primarily by the expansion of solar PV. By 2045, stationary batteries provide 38% of daily flexibility, while flexible electric vehicle charging contributes 30%. Systems with constrained flexibility increase system costs by 6.9%, electricity prices by 14 EUR/MWh and trigger 47% higher hydrogen and e-fuel imports compared to an unconstrained system in 2045. In contrast, scenarios with high shares of flexible electric vehicle charging, vehicle-to-grid, and industrial demand-side management achieve system cost reductions of 3.3%, while also reducing import dependence. Higher flexibility also reduces electricity price ranges, decreases average electricity prices by 3 EUR/MWh, and reduces backup capacity by 22% (22 GW). Overall, our results highlight the decisive role of specific flexibility technologies in achieving cost-efficient and energy-secure climate-neutral energy systems, providing quantitative guidance for policy and investment decisions.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.00674",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Julian Geis",
        "Michael Lindner",
        "Tom Brown"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.01346",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in World Models",
      "description": "World models - learned internal simulators of environment dynamics - are rapidly becoming foundational to autonomous decision-making in robotics, autonomous vehicles, and agentic AI. By predicting future states in compressed latent spaces, they enable sample-efficient planning and long-horizon imagination without direct environment interaction. Yet this predictive power introduces a distinctive set of safety, security, and cognitive risks. Adversaries can corrupt training data, poison latent representations, and exploit compounding rollout errors to cause significant degradation in safety-critical deployments. At the alignment layer, world model-equipped agents are more capable of goal misgeneralisation, deceptive alignment, and reward hacking. At the human layer, authoritative world model predictions foster automation bias, miscalibrated trust, and planning hallucination. This paper surveys the world model landscape; introduces formal definitions of trajectory persistence and representational risk; presents a five-profile attacker taxonomy; and develops a unified threat model drawing on MITRE ATLAS and the OWASP LLM Top 10. We provide an empirical proof-of-concept demonstrating trajectory-persistent adversarial attacks on a GRU-based RSSM ($\\mathcal{A}_1 = 2.26\\times$ amplification, $-59.5\\%$ reward reduction under adversarial fine-tuning), validate architecture-dependence via a stochastic RSSM proxy ($\\mathcal{A}_1 = 0.65\\times$), and probe a real DreamerV3 checkpoint (non-zero action drift confirmed). We propose interdisciplinary mitigations spanning adversarial hardening, alignment engineering, NIST AI RMF and EU AI Act governance, and human-factors design, arguing that world models require the same rigour as flight-control software or medical devices.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.01346",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manoj Parmar"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.02457",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Street-Legal Physical-World Adversarial Rim for License Plates",
      "description": "Automatic license plate reader (ALPR) systems are widely deployed to identify and track vehicles. While prior work has demonstrated vulnerabilities in ALPR systems, far less attention has been paid to their legality and physical-world practicality. We investigate whether low-resourced threat actors can engineer a successful adversarial attack against a modern open-source ALPR system. We introduce the Street-legal Physical Adversarial Rim (SPAR), a physically realizable white-box attack against the popular ALPR system fast-alpr. SPAR requires no access to ALPR infrastructure during attack deployment and does not alter or obscure the attacker's license plate. Based on prior legislation and case law, we argue that SPAR is street-legal in the state of Texas. Under optimal conditions, SPAR reduces ALPR accuracy by 60% and achieves an 18% targeted impersonation rate. SPAR can be produced for under $100, and it was implemented entirely by commercial agentic coding assistants. These results highlight practical vulnerabilities in modern ALPR systems under realistic physical-world conditions and suggest new directions for both attack and defense.",
      "published": "2026-04-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.02457",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nikhil Kalidasu",
        "Sahana Ganapathy"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.03278",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safe Decentralized Operation of EV Virtual Power Plant with Limited Network Visibility via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning",
      "description": "As power systems advance toward net-zero targets, behind-the-meter renewables are driving rapid growth in distributed energy resources (DERs). Virtual power plants (VPPs) increasingly coordinate these resources to support power distribution network (PDN) operation, with EV charging stations (EVCSs) emerging as a key asset due to their strong impact on local voltages. However, in practice, VPPs must make operational decisions with only partial visibility of PDN states, relying on limited, aggregated information shared by the distribution system operator. This work proposes a safety-enhanced VPP framework for coordinating multiple EVCSs under such realistic information constraints to ensure voltage security while maintaining economic operation. We develop Transformer-assisted Lagrangian Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization (TL-MAPPO), in which EVCS agents learn decentralized charging policies via centralized training with Lagrangian regularization to enforce voltage and demand-satisfaction constraints. A transformer-based embedding layer deployed on each EVCS agent captures temporal correlations among prices, loads, and charging demand to improve decision quality. Experiments on a realistic 33-bus PDN show that the proposed framework reduces voltage violations by approximately 45% and operational costs by approximately 10% compared to representative multi-agent DRL baselines, highlighting its potential for practical VPP deployment.",
      "published": "2026-03-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.03278",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chenghao Huang",
        "Jiarong Fan",
        "Weiqing Wang",
        "Hao Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.04015",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enabling Deterministic User-Level Interrupts in Real-Time Processors via Hardware Extension",
      "description": "The growing complexity of real-time embedded systems demands strong isolation of software components into separate protection domains to reduce attack surfaces and limit fault propagation. However, application-supplied device interrupt handlers -- even untrusted -- have to remain in the kernel to minimize interrupt latency, undermining security and burdening manual certifications. Current hardware extensions accelerate interrupts only when the target protection domain is scheduled by the kernel; consequently, they are limited to improving average-case performance but not worst-case latency, and do not meet the requirements of critical real-time applications such as autonomous vehicles or robots. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel hardware extension that enables direct, deterministic switching to the appropriate protection domain upon user-level interrupt arrival -- without kernel intervention -- even when that domain is dormant. Our hardware extension reduces worst-case latency by more than 50x with a 19% increase in core area (2% of total die area) and 4.1% increase in dynamic power. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first integrated mechanism to guarantee user-level interrupt delivery with a nanosecond-scale yet bounded worst-case latency.",
      "published": "2026-04-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04015",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hongbin Yang",
        "Huanle Zhang",
        "Runyu Pan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.04262",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Agents for Agents: An Interrogator-Based Secure Framework for Autonomous Internet of Underwater Things",
      "description": "Autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and sensor nodes increasingly support decentralized sensing and coordination in the Internet of Underwater Things (IoUT), yet most deployments rely on static trust once authentication is established, leaving long-duration missions vulnerable to compromised or behaviorally deviating agents. In this paper, an interrogator based structure is presented that incorporates the idea of behavioral trust monitoring into underwater multi-agent operation without interfering with autonomy. Privileged interrogator module is a passive communication metadata analyzer that uses a lightweight transformer model to calculate dynamic trust scores, which are used to authorize the forwarding of mission critical data. Suspicious agents cause proportional monitoring and conditional restrictions, which allow fast containment and maintain network continuity. The evidence of trust is stored in a permissioned blockchain consortium which offers identity management which is not tampered and is decentralized without causing the overhead of public consensus mechanisms. Simulation based analysis shows that the evaluation of the result compares to a relative improvement of 21.7% in the detection accuracy compared to the static trust baselines with limited energy overhead. These findings suggest that behavior driven validation has the capability of reinforcing underwater coordination without compromising scalability and deployment.",
      "published": "2026-04-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04262",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali Akarma",
        "Toqeer Ali Syed",
        "Abdul Khadar Jilani",
        "Salman Jan",
        "Hammad Muneer",
        "Muazzam A. Khan",
        "Changli Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.04757",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Undetectable Conversations Between AI Agents via Pseudorandom Noise-Resilient Key Exchange",
      "description": "AI agents are increasingly deployed to interact with other agents on behalf of users and organizations. We ask whether two such agents, operated by different entities, can carry out a parallel secret conversation while still producing a transcript that is computationally indistinguishable from an honest interaction, even to a strong passive auditor that knows the full model descriptions, the protocol, and the agents' private contexts. Building on recent work on watermarking and steganography for LLMs, we first show that if the parties possess an interaction-unique secret key, they can facilitate an optimal-rate covert conversation: the hidden conversation can exploit essentially all of the entropy present in the honest message distributions. Our main contributions concern extending this to the keyless setting, where the agents begin with no shared secret. We show that covert key exchange, and hence covert conversation, is possible even when each model has an arbitrary private context, and their messages are short and fully adaptive, assuming only that sufficiently many individual messages have at least constant min-entropy. This stands in contrast to previous covert communication works, which relied on the min-entropy in each individual message growing with the security parameter. To obtain this, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive, which we call pseudorandom noise-resilient key exchange: a key-exchange protocol whose public transcript is pseudorandom while still remaining correct under constant noise. We study this primitive, giving several constructions relevant to our application as well as strong limitations showing that more naive variants are impossible or vulnerable to efficient attacks. These results show that transcript auditing alone cannot rule out covert coordination between AI agents, and identify a new cryptographic theory that may be of independent interest.",
      "published": "2026-04-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04757",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "exploit",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vinod Vaikuntanathan",
        "Or Zamir"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.07532",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IPEK: Event-Criticality-Aware Evidential Trust Management against Strategic Insider Attacks in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks",
      "description": "Event-based trust management in vehicular ad hoc networks is vulnerable to strategic insider attackers who report trivial events correctly to build reputation, falsify reports on safety-critical events, and corrupt the trust feedback they provide about other vehicles. This paper proposes IPEK, an event-criticality-aware evidential trust management framework. IPEK combines an asymmetric local trust that scales rewards and penalties with event severity and location criticality, a reporter-credibility test that discounts feedback deviating systematically from the consensus of witnesses, and a Dempster-Shafer global trust that fuses feedback with Yager's rule, historical combination and risk accentuation. Closed-form properties quantify how quickly trust is lost and regained and show why Yager's rule keeps the global state revisable. IPEK is evaluated in simulation against a trust cascading-based dissemination scheme and the beta reputation system under eight attacks, with severity-, location-, on-off- and continuously triggered attackers falsifying their reports alone or also their feedback, at attacker ratios from 10% to 40%. Threshold-free separation measures are complemented by closed-loop revocation with frozen thresholds. With up to 25% attackers, IPEK achieves a significantly higher F1-score than both baselines under all attacks, with false positive rates of 0.9-15.5% against 7.8-49.7% and 26.0-41.4%, and it remains robust up to 40% attackers when only reports are falsified. Under fully colluding attackers that also corrupt feedback, all methods break down beyond about one third of attackers; this envelope and a longer detection delay are reported as limitations.",
      "published": "2026-04-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.07532",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "İpek Abasıkeleş Turgut"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.07552",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SAFE: Spatially-Aware Feedback Enhancement for Fault-Tolerant Trust Management in Event-Based VANETs",
      "description": "In event-based trust management for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), vehicles that witness a road event broadcast its state, and vehicles that later witness the same event score the earlier broadcasters in feedback reports sent to a central decision unit (CDU). When the event state changes, an honest vehicle that reported the previous state receives negative feedback, as the evaluator compares an out-of-date message with the new state. This stale-witness problem is hypothesised to be a major source of unfair penalisation of honest vehicles. To address it, SAFE (Spatially-Aware Feedback Enhancement) is proposed. In SAFE, vehicles continue to record event messages after their decision and throughout the witness area, and send an updated feedback report when they leave it. SAFE was compared with the trust cascading-based emergency message dissemination model (TCEMD) in attack-free highway scenarios simulated with OMNeT++, Veins and Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO). In the single-event scenario, the negative-feedback rate in the two update rounds after the state change decreased from 53.8% to 24.7% and from 55.6% to 8.3%, and the number of distinct honest vehicles blacklisted decreased from 20 to 6. In the multi-event scenario, the negative-feedback rate remained at or below 1.3% in SAFE, compared with up to 77.6% in TCEMD, and the share of trust evaluations ending in an untrusted label decreased from 22.7% to at most 1.7%. These gains required 2.3 to 5.0 times more feedback entries. Experiments with two decision distances showed that a shorter gap between the decision and witness distances reduced stale feedback in both schemes, supporting the stale-witness hypothesis",
      "published": "2026-04-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.07552",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "İpek Abasıkeleş Turgut"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.10052",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of Intelligent Technologies on IoV Security: Integrating Edge Computing and AI",
      "description": "The rapid development and integration of intelligent technologies in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) have revolutionized transportation systems by enhancing connectivity, automation, and safety. However, the complexity and connectivity of IoV networks also introduce security challenges, including data privacy concerns, cyber threats, and system vulnerabilities. This paper surveys the role of Edge Computing (EC), Machine Learning (ML), and Deep Learning (DL) in strengthening IoV security frameworks. It examines the synergy between these technologies, highlighting their individual capabilities and their collective impact on enhancing threat detection, response times, and adaptive security. Through real world case studies and practical deployments, we demonstrate how EC, ML, and DL are currently improving security and operational efficiency in IoV systems. The paper also identifies key research gaps and future directions for further advancements in IoV security, including the need for scalable, privacy preserving solutions and robust defense mechanisms against emerging cyber threats. By integrating EC, ML, and DL, this work lays the groundwork for developing adaptive, efficient, and resilient IoV security infrastructures capable of addressing evolving challenges in the transportation ecosystem.",
      "published": "2026-04-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.10052",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Awais Bilal",
        "Kashif Sharif",
        "Liehuang Zhu",
        "Chang Xu",
        "Fan Li",
        "Sadaf Bukhari",
        "Sujit Biswas"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.12408",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Resilience in Autonomous Vehicles: A Proactive Design Approach",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) promise efficient, clean and cost-effective transportation systems, but their reliance on sensors, wireless communications, and decision-making systems makes them vulnerable to cyberattacks and physical threats. This chapter presents novel design techniques to strengthen the security and resilience of AVs. We first provide a taxonomy of potential attacks across different architectural layers, from perception and control manipulation to Vehicle-to-Any (V2X) communication exploits and software supply chain compromises. Building on this analysis, we present an AV Resilient architecture that integrates redundancy, diversity, and adaptive reconfiguration strategies, supported by anomaly- and hash-based intrusion detection techniques. Experimental validation on the Quanser QCar platform demonstrates the effectiveness of these methods in detecting depth camera blinding attacks and software tampering of perception modules. The results highlight how fast anomaly detection combined with fallback and backup mechanisms ensures operational continuity, even under adversarial conditions. By linking layered threat modeling with practical defense implementations, this work advances AV resilience strategies for safer and more trustworthy autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-04-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.12408",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploits",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chieh Tsai",
        "Murad Mehrab Abrar",
        "Salim Hariri"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.13635",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Look One Step Ahead: Forward-Looking Incentive Design with Strategic Privacy for Proactive Service Provisioning over Air-Ground Integrated Edge Networks",
      "description": "In air-ground integrated networks (AGINs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provide on-demand edge services to ground vehicles. Realizing this vision requires carefully designed incentives to coordinate interactions among self-interested participants. This is exacerbated by the dynamic nature of AGINs, where spatio-temporal variations introduce significant uncertainty in matching UAVs and vehicles. Existing real-time service provisioning typically relies on precise trajectory information, raising privacy concerns and incurring decision latency. To address these challenges, we propose look one-step ahead (LOSA), a novel framework for efficient and privacy-aware service provisioning. By exploiting predictable vehicle travel times between intersections, LOSA decomposes the process into two coupled phases: (i) a privacy-aware look-ahead phase and (ii) a lightweight real-time execution phase. The look-ahead phase allows vehicles to adaptively adjust privacy budgets based on historical utility, balancing trajectory exposure and matching accuracy. Leveraging this, a double auction mechanism establishes binding one-step-ahead agreements (OSAAs) through trajectory similarity clustering, while constructing preference lists to hedge against mobility uncertainty. The execution phase then enforces pre-established OSAAs and preference lists, resolving real-time resource conflicts without costly re-negotiations. This design reduces computational overhead and preserves robustness. We analytically corroborate that LOSA guarantees truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance. Experiments on real-world datasets (DAIR-V2X, HighD, and RCooper) demonstrate that LOSA achieves superior privacy protection while lowering transaction latency compared to baseline approaches.",
      "published": "2026-04-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.13635",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sicheng Wu",
        "Minghui Liwang",
        "Yangyang Gao",
        "Deqing Wang",
        "Wenbo Zhu",
        "Yiguang Hong",
        "Wei Ni",
        "Seyyedali Hosseinalipour"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.17391",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RISC-V Functional Safety for Autonomous Automotive Systems: An Analytical Framework and Research Roadmap for ML-Assisted Certification",
      "description": "RISC-V is emerging as a viable platform for automotive-grade embedded computing, with recent ISO 26262 ASIL-D certifications demonstrating readiness for safety-critical deployment in autonomous driving systems. However, functional safety in automotive systems is fundamentally a certification problem rather than a processor problem. The dominant costs arise from diagnostic coverage analysis, toolchain qualification, fault injection campaigns, safety-case generation, and compliance with ISO 26262, ISO 21448 (SOTIF), and ISO/SAE 21434. This paper analyzes the role of RISC-V in automotive functional safety, focusing on ISA openness, formal verifiability, custom extension control, debug transparency, and vendor-independent qualification. We examine autonomous driving safety requirements and map them to RISC-V architectural challenges such as lockstep execution, safety islands, mixed-criticality isolation, and secure debug. Rather than proposing a single algorithmic breakthrough, we present an analytical framework and research roadmap centered on certification economics as the primary optimization objective. We also discuss how selected ML methods, including LLM-assisted FMEDA generation, knowledge-graph-based safety case automation, reinforcement learning for fault injection, and graph neural networks for diagnostic coverage, can support certification workflows. We argue that the strongest outcome is not a faster core, but an ASIL-D-ready certifiable RISC-V platform.",
      "published": "2026-04-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.17391",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nick Andreasyan",
        "Mikhail Struve",
        "Alexey Popov",
        "Maksim Nikolaev",
        "Vadim Vashkelis"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.20621",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SoK: The Next Frontier in AV Security: Systematizing Perception Attacks and the Emerging Threat of Multi-Sensor Fusion",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) increasingly rely on multi-sensor perception pipelines that combine data from cameras, lidar, radar, and other modalities to interpret the environment. This SoK systematizes 48 peer-reviewed studies on perception-layer attacks against AVs, tracking the field's evolution from single-sensor exploits to complex cross-modal threats that compromise multi-sensor fusion (MSF). We develop a unified taxonomy of 20 attack vectors organized by sensor type, attack stage, medium, and perception module, revealing patterns that expose underexplored vulnerabilities in fusion logic and cross-sensor dependencies. Our analysis identifies key research gaps, including limited real-world testing, short-term evaluation bias, and the absence of defenses that account for inter-sensor consistency. To illustrate one such gap, we validate a fusion-level vulnerability through a proof-of-concept simulation combining infrared and lidar spoofing. The findings highlight a fundamental shift in AV security: as systems fuse more sensors for robustness, attackers exploit the very redundancy meant to ensure safety. We conclude with directions for fusion-aware defense design and a research agenda for trustworthy perception in autonomous systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20621",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahriar Rahman Khan",
        "Tariqul Islam",
        "Raiful Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.21606",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Process-Mining of Hypertraces: Enabling Scalable Formal Security Verification of (Automotive) Network Architectures",
      "description": "The automotive domain is transitioning: vehicles act as rolling servers, persistently connected to numerous external entities. This connectivity, combined with rising on-board computing power for advanced driver assistance systems and similar use cases, creates escalating challenges for securing automotive network architectures. This work advances the security analysis of internet-connected automotive network architectures and their protocols. We introduce a strong, active adversary model tailored to the automotive domain. We substantially extend security protocol verification possible based on Attack Resilience Hyperproperties (ARHs) by introducing a verification-orchestration algorithm. Furthermore, we provide methods for comparative attribution of security property invalidations to specific, ne-grained component compromises. We present a novel integration of formal verification and process mining. By utilizing ARH counterexample traces for process mining, we systematically identify and aggregate attacker behavior that causes security property invalidations. This pipeline enables in-depth understanding of root causes and attack paths leading to protocol-security invalidations. We demonstrate real-world applicability through a prototype and case study on the secure transmission of battery management system data within an automotive network architecture.",
      "published": "2026-04-23",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.21606",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Julius Figge",
        "David Knuplesch",
        "Andreas Maletti",
        "Dragan Zuvic"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.21841",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-Modal Phantom: Coordinated Camera-LiDAR Spoofing Against Multi-Sensor Fusion in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) increasingly depend on Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) to combine complementary modalities such as cameras and LiDAR for robust perception. While this redundancy is intended to safeguard against single-sensor failures, the fusion process itself introduces a subtle and underexplored vulnerability. In this work, we investigate whether an attacker can bypass MSF's redundancy by fabricating cross-sensor consistency, making multiple sensors agree on the same false object. We design a coordinated, data-level (early-fusion) attack that emulates the outcome of two synchronized physical spoofing sources: an infrared (IR) projection that induces a false camera detection and a LiDAR signal injection that produces a matching 3D point cluster. Rather than implementing the physical attack hardware, we simulate its sensor-level outcomes by inserting perspective-aware image patches and synthetic LiDAR point clusters aligned in 3D space. This approach preserves the perceptual effects that real IR and IEMI-based spoofing would create at the sensor output. Using 400 KITTI scenes, our large-scale evaluation shows that the coordinated spoofing deceives a state-of-the-art perception model with an 85.5% successful attack rate. These findings provide the first quantitative evidence that malicious cross-modal consistency can compromise MSF-based perception, revealing a critical vulnerability in the core data-fusion logic of modern autonomous vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-23",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.21841",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahriar Rahman Khan",
        "Raiful Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.23617",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Vehicle May Be Sick: Denial of Diagnostic Services by Exploiting the CAN Transport Protocol",
      "description": "Vehicle diagnostics has become essential for detecting in-vehicle errors and ensuring safety. While the Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) protocol is widely adopted for diagnostic operations, it relies on the ISO 15765-2 standard as the transport protocol over the Controller Area Network (CAN), which was designed without inherent security considerations. In this paper, we identify eight novel attack scenarios that exploit specific transport layer mechanisms in the ISO 15765-2 standard, including Flow Control manipulation, Sequence Number violations, and error handling abuses. We evaluate these attacks on a real passenger vehicle using two distinct diagnostic tools to demonstrate their practical impact. Our results confirm that three of these attack scenarios successfully induce denial of diagnostic services, leading to abnormal diagnostic results such as concealed faults and manipulated sensor readings. These findings highlight critical vulnerabilities that can deceive technicians and drivers, potentially exposing vehicles to significant safety risks.",
      "published": "2026-04-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.23617",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seungjin Baek",
        "Seonghoon Jeong",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.23669",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategically Robust Aggregative Games",
      "description": "In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete information, limited computation, or bounded rationality, ultimately impacting the aggregate behavior. To tackle this challenge, we follow recent work on strategically robust game theory and postulate that agents seek protection directly against deviations around the emergent behavior, as opposed to explicitly modeling all sources of uncertainty. Specifically, we propose that each agent protects itself against the worst-case aggregate behavior within an optimal-transport-based ambiguity set centered at the emergent aggregate population behavior. This leads to a novel equilibrium concept, called strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium, that enables one to interpolate between standard Wardrop equilibria (no robustness) and security strategies (maximum robustness). In the setting of convex aggregative games, we establish the existence of a pure strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium and provide tractable computational tools for computing it. Through an application in electric vehicle charging, we demonstrate that strategically robust Wardrop equilibria lead to better decisions, protecting agents against the uncertain aggregate behavior of the population. Remarkably, we also observe that strategic robustness can lead to lower equilibrium costs for all agents, uncovering a \"coordination-via-robustification\" effect.",
      "published": "2026-04-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.23669",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Feik",
        "Nicolas Lanzetti",
        "Saverio Bolognani",
        "Florian Dörfler",
        "Dario Paccagnan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2604.24935",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-QA: A Question-Answering Benchmark for Reasoning over In-Vehicle CAN Traffic",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a safety-critical in-vehicle communication protocol that lacks built-in security mechanisms, making intrusion detection essential. Existing approaches predominantly formulate CAN intrusion detection as a classification task, mapping complex traffic patterns to attack labels. However, this formulation abstracts away the temporal and relational structure of CAN traffic and misaligns with real-world forensic workflows, which require systematic reasoning about traffic behavior. To address this gap, we introduce CAN-QA, the first benchmark that reformulates CAN traffic analysis as a question-answering (QA) task. CAN-QA converts raw CAN logs into temporally segmented windows and applies deterministic rule-based templates to generate natural-language questions paired with automatically derived ground-truth answers. The resulting dataset comprises 33,128 QA pairs across 10 categories, each targeting distinct semantic and temporal properties of CAN traffic. Using CAN-QA, we evaluate large language models across both True/False and multiple-choice formats. Our results indicate that, although these models capture superficial statistical regularities, they struggle with temporal reasoning, multi-condition inference, and higher-level behavioral interpretation. Our code is available at https://github.com/Kriiiiss/CAN-QA.",
      "published": "2026-04-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.24935",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jing Chen",
        "Abhijay Deevi",
        "Onat Gungor",
        "Tajana Rosing"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.00279",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comparative Analysis of Machine Learning Models for Intrusion Detection in Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "description": "AI-powered edge computing security is moving Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) from passive, rule-based protections to proactive, smart, zero-touch, self-sufficient safeguards that neutralize threats in milliseconds. As transportation becomes more connected with edge computing, massive IoT, and advanced 5G for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) connectivity, AI at the edge computing nodes plays a crucial role in protecting against sophisticated threats, enabling URLLC (ultra-low-latency communications) for smart transport, and enhancing infrastructure capabilities and safety. This research applies edge computing to improve latency, bandwidth efficiency, and service responsiveness by moving processing closer to devices, gateways, and users. However, this shift also expands the cyberattack surface because edge nodes are distributed, heterogeneous, and often resource-constrained. The paper proposes a trust-aware federated hybrid intrusion detection framework in which a random forest, a decision tree, and a linear SVM network learn complementary traffic representations at each edge site, while a server performs trust-aware aggregation of local model updates.",
      "published": "2026-04-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00279",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zawad Yalmie Sazid",
        "Robert Abbas",
        "Sasa Maric"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.01301",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Stealthy Data Fabrication to Unsafe Driving: Realistic Scenario Attacks on Collaborative Perception",
      "description": "Collaborative perception allows connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) to improve perception by sharing sensory data, but it also introduces security risks from manipulated inputs. Prior work shows that attackers can spoof or remove objects by fabricating shared data, yet the practicality of such attacks in real-world driving remains unclear. Existing attacks are often detectable or evaluated in manually constructed scenarios, leaving open whether they can induce safety-critical outcomes in dynamic environments. To bridge this gap, we present a stealthy, scenario-realistic data fabrication attack that induces unsafe driving behaviors through end-to-end system effects. Instead of creating large, easily detectable anomalies, our attack subtly manipulates the poses of existing objects in shared perception results, keeping perturbations below detection thresholds. These small errors are then propagated through downstream modules, including object tracking and trajectory prediction, leading to significant deviations in predicted behaviors and ultimately unsafe driving decisions. We further design an online, scenario-aware attack framework that adapts to dynamic traffic conditions and optimizes attack strategies at runtime. Experiments on OPV2V and V2X-Real demonstrate that the attack achieves over 90% success in inducing detection errors and triggers safety-critical behaviors, such as unnecessary hard braking, in up to 50% of scenarios, while largely evading state-of-the-art defenses. We also propose a mitigation that focuses on detecting anomalies in localized, safety-critical regions, achieving an 80% detection rate on the small pose perturbation compared to 11% for the best existing methods.",
      "published": "2026-05-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.01301",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qingzhao Zhang",
        "Runting Zhang",
        "Z. Morley Mao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.06833",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PAMPOS: Causal Transformer-based Trajectory Prediction for Attack-Agnostic Misbehavior Detection in V2X Networks",
      "description": "Misbehavior detection in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) networks is a second line of defense against insider falsification attacks that cryptographic mechanisms alone cannot address. Existing learning-based Misbehavior Detection Schemes (MDSs) are supervised, requiring labeled attack samples at training time, thus failing to counter unseen falsification attacks. We present PAMPOS, a causal transformer-decoder trained on benign VeReMi++ trajectories to learn normal mobility patterns. At inference time, misbehavior is identified as a deviation from the model's next-step kinematic predictions using a top-K normalized anomaly scoring mechanism that localizes falsification to specific kinematic features, without requiring attack-labeled training data. We evaluate PAMPOS across all 19 attack types in VeReMi++ under rush-hour and afternoon scenarios, achieving Area Under the Curve (AUC) values of up to 0.98 and F1-scores of up to 0.95 for most attack categories.",
      "published": "2026-05-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.06833",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Konstantinos Kalogiannis",
        "Ahmed Mohamed Hussain",
        "Panos Papadimitratos"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.07370",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MORPH-U: Multi-Objective Resilient Motion Planning for V2X-Enabled Autonomous Driving in High-Uncertainty Environments via Simulation",
      "description": "V2X can warn an autonomous vehicle about hazards beyond line-of-sight, but it also brings uncertainty: messages may be delayed, dropped, or even forged. Meanwhile, map knowledge may change during a trip, forcing the vehicle to replan under tight real-time budgets. This paper studies how to make motion planning and low-level control robust to such uncertain, event-driven updates. We present MORPH-U, a CARLA-based closed-loop stack that fuses LiDAR/radar/camera with V2X (CAM/DENM) into a Local Dynamic Map (LDM) and triggers Hybrid-A* replanning when validated hazards or map changes affect the planned route. We expose the planning/control trade-offs via a multi-objective formulation over tracking error, safety margin (minimum TTC), responsiveness, and smoothness, and select operating points using Pareto-frontier analysis. To avoid unsafe replanning from faulty V2X triggers, MORPH-U adds a lightweight Byzantine-inspired acceptance gate that combines a quorum rule with an on-board sensor veto. Experiments in dynamic CARLA scenarios show that V2X-augmented LDM improves downstream safety, Pareto tuning provides controllable accuracy-comfort trade-offs, and the gate prevents replanning under saturated false-DENM injection ($p_{\\text{attack}}=1.0$).",
      "published": "2026-05-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.07370",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "tracking",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shih-Yu Lai"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.07742",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Benchmarking of the Data Distribution Service for Real-Time Interoperable Agricultural Machinery Communications",
      "description": "Inter-manufacturer plug-and-play communication in agricultural machinery is currently based on the ISO 11783 standard series, which specifies a 250 kbit/s CAN bus communication layer. To support higher-bandwidth use cases, the ISO~23870 series is being developed for next-generation Ethernet-based agricultural machine-to-machine communication. Modern Ethernet/IP-based architectures often make use of a middleware for discovery, data exchange, quality of service configuration, and security. This paper evaluates the Data Distribution Service (DDS) as a candidate middleware for secure, plug-and-play agricultural machinery networking. DDS-based proof-of-concept communication design is presented for a representative Task Controller (TC) and implement scenario, including implement-description topics and separate best-effort and reliable topics for runtime process data. Design was implemented in C++ using the FastDDS library and benchmarked on embedded hardware representative of agricultural machinery. Runtime throughput was evaluated for one-to-one and one-to-two TC-implement scenarios under four DDS security configurations. The results show that DDS security mechanisms substantially reduce maximum throughput on embedded hardware. In the tested best-effort scenarios, signing and encryption reduced mean throughput by approximately 70-84% compared with the unsecured configuration. Encrypted one-to-one best-effort case achieved approximately 4980 received process data updates per second on both the TC and implement, corresponding to about 50 process data updates per second per simulated section for 100 rate-controllable sections. These results indicate that DDS is a technically plausible middleware candidate for secure Ethernet-based agricultural machinery interoperability, while further work is required to evaluate latency, scalability, vendor interoperability, and lower-power devices.",
      "published": "2026-05-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.07742",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samuel Brodie",
        "Henri Hornburg",
        "Daniel Ostermeier",
        "Maksim Pavlov",
        "Timo Oksanen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.12743",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Still Camouflage, Moving Illusion: View-Induced Trajectory Manipulation in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Existing physical adversarial attacks on vision-based autonomous driving induce time-evolving perception errors, including biased object tracking or trajectory prediction, through (i) sophisticated physical patch inducing detection box drift when entering the view distance, or (ii) dynamically changing patches that cause different perception errors at different time. In both cases, viewing-angle variation is treated as a challenge, requiring adversarial patches to remain effective across frames under varying views, leading to complex multi-view optimization. In contrast, we show that viewing-angle variation itself can be turned into an attack tool. We design a new attack paradigm where a static, passive adversarial camouflage is mounted on a vehicle whose view-dependent appearance naturally evolves with relative motion, inducing consistent feature drift across frames. This causes the system to infer a physically plausible but incorrect trajectory, such as a false cut-in, which propagates to downstream decision-making and triggers unnecessary braking. Unlike prior approaches that require multi-view robustness or active intervention, our attack emerges from normal driving dynamics and is easy to deploy: a parked vehicle with a natural camouflage can induce hard braking in passing autonomous vehicles. We demonstrate the novel attack on nuScenes dataset, showing the effectiveness with an end-to-end success rate of up to 87.5%, measured by hard-braking events, and robustness across different scene backgrounds, victim vehicle speeds, and perception models.",
      "published": "2026-05-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12743",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuo Ju",
        "Qingzhao Zhang",
        "Huashan Chen",
        "Xuheng Wang",
        "Haotang Li",
        "Wanqian Zhang",
        "Feng Liu",
        "Kebin Peng",
        "Sen He"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.14204",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Day-to-Day Traffic Network Modeling under Route-Guidance Misinformation: Endogenous Trust and Resilience in CAV Environments",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles and smart mobility services increasingly use digital route guidance as an operational input to traffic network management. When this information becomes unreliable or adversarial, day-to-day traffic models must represent not only flow adaptation but also the evolution of user trust in the information source. This paper develops a coupled day-to-day traffic assignment and trust-evolution framework for route-guidance misinformation. Within-day congestion is represented by Lighthill-Whitham-Richards network loading, while day-to-day route choice follows bounded-rationality logit learning with trust-dependent reliance on external guidance. Trust is modeled as an aggregate class-level behavioral reliance state encoded by a Beta evidence model and updated from repeated guidance errors. Theoretical analysis establishes stationary equilibria, a conservative stability guide, a weighted compliance index for population-level vulnerability, and an asymmetric recovery law that explains post-attack trust hysteresis. Numerical experiments on Sioux Falls, with an Anaheim robustness check, show that endogenous trust creates a threshold-based resilience mechanism. Below the trust-activation threshold, the attack remains behaviorally stealthy and dynamic trust provides almost no attenuation. Above the threshold, trust erosion reduces the impact of the fixed-trust attack by about 91 percent in Sioux Falls and 85 percent in Anaheim. The experiments also show that CAV penetration increases fixed-trust vulnerability while preserving dynamic attenuation, and that traffic performance can recover before trust, resulting in a 77-day hidden vulnerability window. The results provide a trust-aware modeling basis for resilience analysis in CAV-enabled traffic networks.",
      "published": "2026-05-13",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.14204",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eunhan Ka",
        "Satish V. Ukkusuri"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.14396",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Discovery of Semantic Attacks in Online Map Construction through Conditional Diffusion",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles depend on online HD map construction to perceive lane boundaries, dividers, and pedestrian crossings -- safety-critical road elements that directly govern motion planning. While existing pixel perturbation attacks can disrupt the mapping, they can be neutralized by standard adversarial defenses. We present MIRAGE, a framework for systematic discovery of semantic attacks that bypass adversarial defenses and degrade mapping predictions by finding plausible environmental variation (e.g. shadows, wet roads). MIRAGE exploits the latent manifold of real-world data learned by diffusion models, and searches for semantically mutated scenes neighboring the ground truth with the same road topology yet mislead the mapping predictions. We evaluate MIRAGE on nuScenes and demonstrate two attacks: (1) boundary removal, suppressing 57.7% of detections and corrupting 96% of planned trajectories; and (2) boundary injection, the only method that successfully injects fictitious boundaries, while pixel PGD and AdvPatch fail entirely. Both attacks remain potent under various adversarial defenses. We use two independent VLM judges to quantify realism, where MIRAGE passes as realistic 80--84% of the time (vs. 97--99% for clean nuScenes), while AdvPatch only 0--9%. Our findings expose a categorical gap in current adversarial defenses: semantic-level perturbations that manifest as legitimate environmental variation are substantially harder to mitigate than pixel-level perturbations.",
      "published": "2026-05-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.14396",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chenyi Wang",
        "Ruoyu Song",
        "Raymond Muller",
        "Jean-Philippe Monteuuis",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "Z. Berkay Celik",
        "Ryan Gerdes",
        "Ming F. Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.15750",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fairness-Guaranteed Online Power Allocation Policies for EV Fast Charging Stations",
      "description": "The rapid expansion of electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates scalable fast charging station (FCS) infrastructure. These stations are often oversubscribed, with total port rating exceeding a station-level power cap. In such settings, fair real-time power allocation is essential to secure equitable access while maximizing infrastructure utilization. Existing methods typically assume conventional FCS architectures, depend on prior battery or charge curve data, and lack theoretical guarantees in online settings. To address these limitations, this paper proposes computationally efficient, fairness-guaranteed online power allocation policies for both conventional and modular FCSs that use only instantaneous power requests. Drawing from fair division theory, we formalize a fairness framework with envy-freeness, Pareto efficiency, and proportionality as per-slot criteria, together with a fairness criterion defined over the charging session. For conventional FCSs, Fair-Opap-C follows the classical progressive filling algorithm and guarantees a fair allocation, and we prove that, under a mild condition on the charge curve, it also satisfies the session-level fairness criterion. For modular FCSs, we propose Fair-Opap-M, a novel policy that guarantees a fair allocation, and establish bounds on its session-level fairness under conditions on EV power requests. Simulations against seven benchmarks from EV charging and fair division literature show that the proposed policies satisfy all per-slot fairness criteria and attain the highest session-level fairness among policies that fully utilize station capacity. Both scale as O(n log n) in the number of connected EVs and run below 1.3 ms with 500 connected EVs, orders of magnitude faster than optimization-based approaches.",
      "published": "2026-05-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15750",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Can Berk Saner",
        "Yong-Sheng Soh",
        "Antonios Varvitsiotis"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.19233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum Machine Learning for Cyber-Physical Anomaly Detection in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: A Leakage-Free Evaluation with Proxy-Audited Feature Sets",
      "description": "Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are cyber-physical systems whose attack surface spans networked avionics and on-board sensor fusion: a compromised GPS or battery module can mimic a benign mission segment and evade naive anomaly detectors. We present a leakage-free evaluation of quantum machine learning for UAV anomaly detection on the multi-sensor TLM:UAV benchmark. Three contributions support the study. (i) A group-aware temporal protocol (B2) partitions the dataset into ten contiguous TimeUS blocks and evaluates over ten seeds, eliminating the inflation produced by random stratified splits that mix neighbouring samples. (ii) A three-mode feature audit (full/loose/strict) quantifies how much accuracy stems from instantaneous physical signals versus contextual proxies (cumulative energy, battery state, GPS trajectory). (iii) A hybrid XGBoost + Data Reuploading (DRU) classifier is benchmarked against five paired non-linear controls (raw, PCA, polynomial-2, random-RBF, and an untrained DRU map) under identical budgets. The standalone DRU does not consistently match the strongest classical baseline across seeds; however, the trained-DRU hybrid is the only model whose mean F1 macro shifts upward from full to strict (+0.05), a directional signal that the per-seed standard deviations prevent from being interpreted as a statistically established difference. The trained-DRU hybrid also records the lowest mean false-alarm rate under proxy-free evaluation, subject to the inter-seed variance reported. We frame this as an incremental, reproducible quantum-enhanced hybrid benefit, and provide an open Qiskit 2.x implementation as a benchmark for cybersecurity analytics in NISQ-era aerospace systems.",
      "published": "2026-05-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carlos A. Durán Paredes",
        "Javier E. León Calderón",
        "Nicolás Sánchez Perea",
        "Germán Darío Díaz",
        "Camilo Segura Quintero"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.19328",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RoboJailBench: Benchmarking Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Embodied Robotic Agents",
      "description": "Recent advances in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) facilitate a new class of embodied AI systems, where these models are integrated into physical platforms, e.g. robots and autonomous vehicles, to interpret visual scenes and execute natural language commands in diverse environments. Previous research has introduced jailbreak attacks and defenses for embodied AI. Their evaluations, however, rely on ad-hoc datasets, limited metrics, and emphasize attack success while neglecting the trade-off between security and the ability to follow benign commands. Existing benchmarks and evaluation frameworks either target traditional chat-based models or focus on non-adversarial safety evaluation for embodied AI; neither captures the adversarial risks, inputs, consequences, and evaluation criteria necessary for jailbreak attacks in embodied AI systems. In this paper, we address this gap with RoboJailBench, which consists of three core components. We establish a security taxonomy derived from ISO standards, regulatory rules, and documented incidents. This effort yields 18 categories of security violation consequences for embodied AI. We introduce an intent contrast dataset pipeline that augments existing datasets with paired adversarial and benign goals to measure both security and utility. Lastly, we provide an evolving repository with standardized metrics and a unified process for assessing and integrating new attacks and defenses. With this benchmark, we construct a new taxonomy-balanced dataset and augment five existing datasets. We integrate four attacks and two defenses to evaluate their performance on leading embodied VLMs. This benchmark provides the first standardized evaluation framework for jailbreak attacks in embodied AI and supports future research. We release our code, datasets, and artifacts, and maintain a leaderboard at https://purseclab.github.io/benchmark-for-robotics-security.",
      "published": "2026-05-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19328",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Doguhuan Yeke",
        "Yanming Zhou",
        "Leo Y. Lin",
        "Hongyu Cai",
        "Antonio Bianchi",
        "Z. Berkay Celik"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.22122",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Trust Poisoning in Vehicular Collaborative Perception",
      "description": "Collaborative perception (CP) enables connected and autonomous vehicles to share sensor data and jointly reason about their environment. To defend against adversaries that fabricate or manipulate shared data, existing systems employ cross-vehicle inconsistency detection and trust estimation, penalizing vehicles whose observations conflict with the majority. In this work, we show that these defenses themselves introduce a new attack surface. We present TrustFlip, a novel attack that weaponizes consistency-based defenses to poison the trust assigned to benign vehicles. Instead of injecting false data into the collaboration pipeline, it deploys physical adversarial objects that are genuine but induce inconsistent observations among benign vehicles. The resulting inconsistencies are misattributed by the defense to the targeted vehicle, causing its trust score to degrade and eventually leading to its downweighting or exclusion from collaboration. Consequently, the system loses reliable sensing contributors, degrading perception capability and potentially inducing safety-critical failures. We evaluate TrustFlip across multiple collaborative perception architectures and defense mechanisms. Our results show that state-of-the-art defenses can be significantly affected: the attack removes the targeted benign vehicle from collaboration in up to 87.7% of scenarios and drops Average Precision (AP) by up to 13%. As an initial mitigation, we introduce TrustReflect, a lightweight self-reflection mechanism that marks disputed regions as uncertain and excludes them from trust evaluation, reducing the attack success rate by 35-100%.",
      "published": "2026-05-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.22122",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yutong Liu",
        "Chenyi Wang",
        "Ming F. Li",
        "Qingzhao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.22151",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Market-Analysis-Driven Methodology for Assessing Charging Station Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Modern charging communication standards for electric vehicles include optional security controls such as TLS-based authentication and encryption. However, with tens of thousands of fast charging points deployed in any given country, individually testing each one for security control support is infeasible. This paper proposes a scalable, extrapolation-based methodology for assessing charging station cybersecurity at a national level. A market analysis identifies operator-manufacturer pairs, enabling the targeted selection of charging stations for field testing, whose results can then be extrapolated to all stations sharing the same combination. We demonstrate this methodology for Germany, covering over 40000 CCS charging points as of December 2025. With a manageable number of field tests, our extrapolated data examines 51.9\\% of german CCS charging stations. It shows that only 27.4\\% of charging stations in our scope provide TLS-protected communication, despite widespread theoretical support.",
      "published": "2026-05-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.22151",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jakob Löw",
        "Lukas Eder",
        "Alexander Müller",
        "Hans-Joachim Hof"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.24190",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: Recent Advances, Open Challenges, and Future Directions",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) have emerged as significant disruptors in the transportation sector over the past decade. Their growing popularity and adoption are accompanied by capital expenditures to deploy charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure sits at the intersection of the power grid, the network, and the vehicular client, creating an attractive surface for cyberattacks. Many machine learning-based cybersecurity countermeasures have been developed using various public and private datasets. These countermeasures, often intrusion detection systems, are limited in performance by the quality and expressivity of the training data. This work explores the most common datasets and modeling methods, identifies key limitations and open challenges, and proposes future directions to continue catalyzing innovation in the field. By addressing these data limitations, intrusion detection systems are better positioned to address the constantly evolving cyberthreat landscape of EV charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2026-05-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.24190",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joshua Bean",
        "Dimitrios Michael Manias"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.24206",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FALCON-C: Flow-based Analysis and Labeling for Connected Vehicular Network Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Along with the recent rise in popularity of Electric Vehicles (EVs), Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) has emerged as a new target for cyber attacks. Therefore, ensuring the security and integrity of network communication between EVSE components and vehicular clients is a significant challenge that must be addressed. To this end, this paper proposes a Flow-based Analysis and Labeling for COnnected vehicular Network Cybersecurity (FALCON-C) framework. The FALCON-C framework leverages an autoencoder for anomaly detection and is trained on a small number of benign flows from the CICEVSE2024 dataset. The model's objective is to model benign flow behavior and identify malicious flows by detecting statistically different reconstruction error profiles. The results demonstrate that the model can successfully identify malicious flows, achieving 100% accuracy. Initially, some benign flows were misclassified as malicious, resulting in a suboptimal false positive rate. A thorough analysis of the autoencoder's performance and the nature of misclassified flows led to the development of a refined decision boundary, improving the framework's performance by 8.6%. FALCON-C is intended to support Security Operations Center activities by automating flow labeling, leading to the enhanced curation of reliable datasets that can be used for various activities, including threat modeling and hunting, decision auditing, and intrusion detection system refinement.",
      "published": "2026-05-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.24206",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "evse",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joshua Bean",
        "Dimitrios Michael Manias"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.25791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Distribution Statistics Analytics on Mobile Spatial Data",
      "description": "With the rapid development of mobile computing technology, massive amounts of spatial data are continuously generated from various mobile terminals and sensing devices, such as smartphones, connected vehicles, and drones. Performing efficient distributed statistical analysis on this data is crucial for real-time mobile computing applications. However, the constrained and dynamic nature of mobile environments exacerbates the privacy challenge: centralizing sensitive data for analysis risks severe privacy leaks, while existing privacy-preserving techniques often introduce excessive overhead or inaccuracies. In this paper, we design, implement, and evaluate the first system that supports efficient and privacy-preserving distribution statistics analysis for mobile spatial data. First, we propose eSpat-B, which leverages two non-colluding servers and a newly designed improved distributed point functions (DPF) with octree partitioning. Furthermore, considering the frequent updates of spatial data, we propose another more efficient scheme, eSpat+. The core idea of this scheme is to utilize a K-Dimensional tree for spatial partitioning, combine it with incremental DPF for performing statistics analysis, and design an efficient update algorithm. Security analysis demonstrates that our schemes effectively protect data privacy throughout the statistical process. Extensive experiments on real-world trajectory datasets demonstrate that the proposed schemes significantly outperform existing approaches, reducing computation overhead by up to 1.2x and communication overhead by up to 20x while maintaining 100% statistical accuracy.",
      "published": "2026-05-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuhao Ren",
        "Chuan Zhang",
        "Mingyang Zhao",
        "Meng Li",
        "Liehuang Zhu",
        "Bin Xiao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4124,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2605.25791 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: servers, frequent, continuously, sensitive, nature, extensive, functions, risks."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.26351",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Context-Aware Metric Differential Privacy for Vehicle Trajectory Data",
      "description": "Metric Differential Privacy (mDP) generalizes differential privacy by allowing privacy guarantees to be expressed with respect to an arbitrary distance metric over secrets. While mDP has been adopted in geo-location protection, most existing mechanisms perturb each location record in isolation and do not model how contextual information (e.g., recent mobility history) affects the utility of the released data. This mismatch is particularly pronounced for vehicle mobility traces, where service quality often depends on temporally correlated locations. In this paper, we propose Context-aware mDP (C-mDP), a framework for vehicle location privacy that incorporates contextual dependencies into both the utility model and the privacy notion. C-mDP treats the protected secret as a context-augmented record and enforces metric indistinguishability over this augmented domain. We formulate optimal C-mDP mechanism design as a linear program (LP) that minimizes expected utility loss subject to C-mDP constraints. To improve scalability, we exploit conditional-independence structure between the current location and contextual variables to derive a reduced formulation with substantially fewer decision variables and constraints. We evaluate C-mDP on real-world vehicle mobility datasets and compare it with standard mDP baselines. The results show that C-mDP consistently achieves higher utility under the same privacy budget while satisfying the required metric privacy guarantees.",
      "published": "2026-05-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.26351",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "privacy",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gaoyi Chen",
        "Yan Huang",
        "Chenxi Qiu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.26876",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure UAV Swarms in Low-Altitude Wireless Networks: Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": "Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms are increasingly deployed in vast low-altitude applications, owing to their capabilities in distributed sensing, flexible communication, and autonomous coordination. Nevertheless, the open and highly dynamic operating environment of UAV swarms introduces serious security risks, including GPS spoofing, insider threats, and multi-hop intrusion. These threats are aggravated by limited on-board resources, frequently changing network topology, and the presence of intelligent adversaries. To tackle these issues, this paper proposes a cloud-edge-end collaborative defense framework for UAV swarms. Based on this framework, three complementary mechanisms are developed. First, a cooperative perception scheme is designed to resist GPS spoofing via interactive attack-defense game modeling. Second, a behavior-driven authentication method with trust evaluation is developed to mitigate insider threats. Third, a multi-agent attack forensics framework is devised to intelligently trace the propagation paths of multi-hop attacks in UAV networks. Experimental results validate the effectiveness of the proposed approaches. Finally, several open research directions are outlined.",
      "published": "2026-05-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.26876",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuntao Wang",
        "Haojia Yang",
        "Han Liu",
        "Jianle Ba",
        "Zhou Su"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2605.27804",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Patchlings: Safety-Preserving Flash-Based Hotpatching for Automotive Microcontrollers",
      "description": "The increasing presence of software in modern automobiles has created a growing need to deliver software updates throughout a vehicle's entire lifespan. Traditional update methods are slow and require months of re-validation to comply with stringent safety standards like ISO 26262. Although hotpatching offers a path to faster updates, existing solutions for real-time embedded systems are unsuitable for the automotive domain: they overlook regulatory compliance, demand extensive safety validation, and lack support for the flash-based Execute-in-Place (XIP) architecture commonly used in automotive electronic control units (ECUs). We introduce Patchlings, the first hotpatching framework designed for compliance, safety, and persistence in automotive systems. It fills the gap in applying hotpatching to automotive systems and fundamentally reduces the mean-time-to-mitigate (MTTM) for vulnerabilities and bugs. We implement and evaluate a complete prototype of Patchlings on an automotive-grade hardware platform, NXP S32K148EVB, with both FreeRTOS and Zephyr. Our results demonstrate low and deterministic overhead (e.g., 3.3 $μ$s when a patch is applied), small firmware size increase (e.g., as low as 6.34%), and successful patching of different types of real CVEs, proving its real-world applicability and effectiveness.",
      "published": "2026-05-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27804",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuxin \"Myles\" Liu",
        "Sekar Kulandaivel",
        "Ardalan Amiri Sani",
        "Jorge Guajardo"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.03611",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Q-FE: A Quantum-Native 6G Far-Edge Architecture Securing Industrial IoT Digital Twins via CSIDH-PQC and Asynchronous Federated Learning",
      "description": "Sixth-generation (6G) wireless networks will underpin ultra-dense Industrial IoT (IIoT) ecosystems in which resource-constrained Far-Edge devices -- autonomous mobile robots, industrial actuators, connected vehicles -- must simultaneously satisfy sub-millisecond latency, $10^{-7}$-class reliability, and decades-long cryptographic security. Current architectures delegate Digital Twin (DT) computation to centralised cloud or Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers, incurring prohibitive round-trip latency, and rely on classical public-key cryptography vulnerable to quantum attacks under the harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat model. We propose Q-FE, a Quantum-Native 6G Far-Edge architecture integrating three co-designed components: (i) Micro-Digital Twins ($μ$DTs) co-located with 6G base stations and high-capability endpoints; (ii) a Cross-Layer Post-Quantum Key Exchange module embedding CSIDH-512 isogeny key material directly within MAC-layer control frames, exploiting the scheme's uniquely compact keys ($\\le 64$ bytes) to avoid packet fragmentation; and (iii) an Asynchronous Federated Learning (AFL) protocol governed by lightweight DAG smart contracts at MEC nodes, eliminating straggler bottlenecks and preventing model-poisoning and Sybil attacks without exposing raw data. End-to-end simulations (NS-3 + PySyft) demonstrate that Q-FE reduces MAC-layer overhead by 62% versus ML-KEM/Kyber-1024, maintains P99.9 URLLC latency at 0.78 ms, and accelerates global-model convergence by 31% over synchronous Federated Learning. Protocol complexity analysis confirms $O(N \\log R)$ per aggregation round, and $μ$DT handover migration completes in $1.9 \\pm 0.3$ ms across $10^4$ simulated events. A formal threat model confirms resilience against quantum eavesdropping, model-poisoning, and Sybil attacks.",
      "published": "2026-06-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.03611",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vincenzo Sammartino"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4053,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2606.03611 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: servers, digital, without, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.07796",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Amplitude-Belief Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Cyber Defense in Partially Observable V2X Networks",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) creates a partially observable and adversarial V2X communication environment in which malicious vehicles may evade defensive mechanisms. Existing IoV intrusion-detection methods provide limited support for sequential mitigation under adaptive attacker behavior. This paper formulates IoV cyber defense as a partially observable sequential decision problem and proposes Quantum Belief-Integrated Reinforcement Defense (Q-BIRD), an amplitude-belief reinforcement learning framework. Q-BIRD represents uncertainty over hidden attacker intent through a normalized complex-valued belief state and converts amplitudes into intent probabilities. The resulting belief features are used by a Proximal Policy Optimization defender to select cost-aware mitigation actions. Experiments are conducted in a SUMO-OMNeT++ and Veins V2X co-simulation environment. Q-BIRD reduces mean cumulative damage from 36.0 +- 5.5 to 28.0 +- 3.0 and damage variance from 12.0 +- 2.8 to 6.0 +- 1.5 compared with PPO using classical Bayesian belief. The attack success rate decreases to 0.05 +- 0.02, while survival probability increases to 0.96 +- 0.02. Communication-level results show that Q-BIRD maintains a packet delivery ratio of 0.94 +- 0.02, latency of 45 +- 6 ms, throughput of 3.60 +- 0.15 Mbps, and service availability of 0.95 +- 0.02. Explainability analysis using SHAP, LIME, and Grad-CAM suggests that belief-related features contribute strongly to mitigation decisions. These results indicate that amplitude-based belief modeling can improve both cyber-defense stability and V2X communication reliability under partial observability.",
      "published": "2026-06-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.07796",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anwar Shah",
        "Rohan Farooq",
        "Sajid Anwer",
        "Tallha Akram",
        "Usman Ghous",
        "Sajid Ullah Khan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.07804",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Communication-Aware Quantum-Inspired Reinforcement Learning for Cyber-Resilient V2X Intrusion Detection and Mitigation",
      "description": "Smart cities rely on Internet of Vehicles (IoV) networks for critical services. However, this vast connectivity enlarges the attack surface, exposing vehicular systems to evolving cyber threats. Conventional static defenses struggle to autonomously adapt to these dynamic, multi-stage intrusions. To address this, we propose the Communication Aware Quantum Inspired Reinforcement Learning (CA-QIRL) framework, built on a lightweight deep Q-Network architecture for autonomous cyber defense. V2X defense is formulated as a communication-aware Markov Decision Process (MDP). The agent observes intrusion, mobility, Road Side Unit (RSU), and communication metrics to select optimal mitigation actions. CA-QIRL integrates quantum-inspired encoding, rotation exploration, and an interference reward, combined with a cost function penalizing false negatives, false positives, delay, packet loss, and RSU overload. Experimental evaluations on vehicular intrusion datasets and a mobility-aware V2X simulation demonstrate robust performance. CA-QIRL achieves competitive detection accuracies of 97.89% on CICIDS2017 and 80.31% on CAN-MIRGU, outperforming state-of-the-art ensemble methods in inference latency. Furthermore, end-to-end delay and Channel Busy Ratio (CBR) drop by up to 95.7% and 90%. Statistical significance is confirmed on ROAD and VeReMi. These findings establish CA-QIRL as a highly practical and resilient defense mechanism for next-generation V2X and IoV networks.",
      "published": "2026-06-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.07804",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "intrusion",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sajid Anwer",
        "Rohan Farooq",
        "Anwar Shah",
        "Tallha Akram"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.08173",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Native Closed-Loop Security for 6G-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems: From Edge Detection to Network-Wide Mitigation",
      "description": "In sixth-generation (6G) networks, billions of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) - autonomous vehicles, smart grids, industrial robots, and remote-surgical equipment - will run over ultra-reliable low-latency slices, collapsing the gap between a remote breach and physical harm to milliseconds, a budget perimeter firewalls and centralised security operations centres cannot meet. This survey reframes 6G CPS security as a closed-loop, AI-native pipeline that senses at the multi-access edge computing (MEC) tier, using minute-scale call-detail records (CDRs) for baseline learning and sub-millisecond RAN/Open-RAN (O-RAN) telemetry for the latency-critical path. It decides locally with compressed deep models, mitigates network-wide via SDN, NFV, and O-RAN controllers, and retrains through federated learning (FL) and digital-twin (DT) replay. We formalise a per-slice, tail-bounded latency contract on the sense, detect, and mitigate stages, enforced at a slice-dependent tail percentile (p99 for safety-critical URLLC slices). Organising 128 peer-reviewed studies (2017-2026) under a PRISMA 2020 protocol, we (i) map the 6G/CPS threat surface to MITRE ATT&CK and a CDR-observable feature space; (ii) unify edge anomaly detection and DDoS classification across twelve datasets and statistical, graph, and transformer models; (iii) synthesise SDN/NFV/O-RAN primitives into one closed-loop reference architecture; (iv) treat FL, large language models (LLMs), DT, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), zero-trust architecture (ZTA), and explainable AI as cross-cutting enablers, not parallel pillars; and (v) consolidate open problems into five directions spanning data, latency, trust, standardisation, and evaluation.",
      "published": "2026-06-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.08173",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bilal Hussain",
        "Muhammad Bilal",
        "Tan Li",
        "Haris Pervaiz",
        "Xiao Tang",
        "Qinghe Du",
        "Fawad Ahmad",
        "Muhammad Azhar",
        "Jun Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.11667",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Robust Framework for Sybil Attack Detection in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks",
      "description": "Sybil attacks create an illusion of traffic congestion by utilizing fake identities, which undermines the reliable and safe operation of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Existing detection mechanisms struggle to effectively handle Sybil attacks as they are (i) susceptible to high false positive rates (FPR) due to the overlapping trajectories of both Sybil and legitimate vehicles, (ii) not practical for real-world deployment due to manual calibrations with ground data, (iii) ineffective for sparse distribution of roadside units (RSUs) and vehicles as they depend heavily on the presence of both, and (iv) inefficient due to computational overheads. This paper addresses these shortcomings and proposes a robust framework to handle Sybil attacks. The proposed scheme reduces the FPR by utilizing Global Positioning System (GPS) location data, enabling the construction of more accurate and distinguishable trajectories. Besides, it employs DBSCAN clustering to identify Sybil vehicles, facilitating unsupervised parameter selection. GPS data eliminates the dependency on RSUs and vehicles, making this scheme effective in both sparse and dense regions. Additionally, the proposed scheme is lightweight and consistent across vehicles with heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme reduces the FPR by approximately 72% in both dense and sparse regions and lowers the false negative rate (FNR) by 52% in sparse regions. Besides, it exceeds existing works by achieving a detection rate of 99% in sparse regions. Additionally, the proposed scheme decreases the detection time by almost 76% in dense regions and 43% in sparse ones.",
      "published": "2026-06-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.11667",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md. Sadmin Tahmid Khan",
        "Md. Saim Ahmmed Utsho",
        "Mosarrat Jahan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.17119",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Graph neural networks at war: integrating cybersecurity and drone intelligence in the Israeli-Iranian conflict",
      "description": "Physical cyber systems have brought about new threats and challenges in detection and immediate response. This study examines how Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) can be used to aid cybersecurity and drone management in a physical cyber system comprising of cyber intrusions and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By providing a bridge between structural understanding of graphical neural networks, this work has provided an integrated procedure that allows intrusion detection systems to educate on underlying network structures, identify malicious activity, and facilitates drone response measures. Based on an emulation-based case study, cyberattacks models were created to provoke the responses of the drones, which proved that graph-based learning can assist with the situational awareness, swarm coordination, and adaptive maneuver. According to the performance valuation, this method has a detection rate of 94.2, average area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of 0.955 and an average response time of 1.4 seconds. Comparative experiments reveal that proposed GraphSAGE network is more effective than the Graphical Convolutional Networks (GCNs) and Graphical Attention Networks (GATs) in the identical situation. Such findings prove that graphical neural networks can be used to avert intrusion and response of dynamic cyber-physical systems.",
      "published": "2026-06-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.17119",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sozan Sulaiman Maghdid",
        "Tarik Ahmed Rashid",
        "Shavan Askar"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.17562",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anywhere, Any-Stymie: Remote Activation of Trojan Malware on LiDAR with Modulated Signals",
      "description": "LiDAR sensors are widely deployed in autonomous systems for safety-critical 3D perception. We identify a previously unexplored attack surface in which dormant malware, embedded in the LiDAR sensing pipeline, remains inactive during normal operation and is triggered externally after deployment, without access to sensor hardware or networking at attack time. This malware was developed in a closed research test environment with vendor technical support, rather than by exploiting an inherent production supply-chain vulnerability. To trigger the malware, we repurpose the sensor's own native dual-return signal processing as a covert channel for a modulated optical signal delivered into the environment. Once triggered, the malware performs false data injection and suppression on static and mobile platforms. Unlike optical spoofing, where the transmitted signal is itself the attack, here it carries only a small key that the sensor decodes with existing signal processing. We establish feasibility with static triggering at 300~ft and drive-by runs reaching 35 mph, and verify that injected artifacts are taken up as detections by a fine-tuned 3D object detector. On a deployed tactical autonomous vehicle running an unmodified production autonomy stack, we demonstrate both fail-safe and fail-dangerous impact: emergency stop, mission abort, and collision. These results motivate stronger integrity guarantees across LiDAR development and deployment pipelines.",
      "published": "2026-06-16",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.17562",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "malware",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. Spencer Hallyburton",
        "Miroslav Pajic"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.18599",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MIDS: Detecting Stealthy Masquerade and Tampering Attacks on CAN Bus via Bidirectional Mamba",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the primary communication standard for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles, but its lack of encryption and authentication exposes it to a range of security threats. Existing intrusion detection systems are largely tuned to fabrication-style attacks (DoS, fuzzing, ID spoofing realised by frame injection), in which detection signals such as per-ID inter-arrival statistics are readily available. We instead address the harder \\emph{masquerade} setting~\\cite{b37}, in which an internal adversary substitutes a legitimate frame in-situ at its original transmission slot, preserving traffic periodicity and rendering traffic-statistic defences ineffective. We propose the Mamba Intrusion Detection System (MIDS), an innovative dual-stream framework that processes CAN identifiers and payloads in parallel and reconstructs their joint temporal semantics through bidirectional selective state-space modelling. To evaluate MIDS, we collected over 100 million CAN frames from a physical Tesla Model 3 across three driving regimes and synthesised 54 masquerade attack variants spanning ID-only, data-only, and combined modifications. MIDS attains an F1 of 96.94\\% on this dataset, exceeding the strongest reproducible baseline by more than 8 percentage points, while sustaining a 1.147~ms single-window inference latency -- ample headroom for real-time onboard deployment. To verify generalisation, we further evaluate MIDS on four public benchmarks (ROAD, CrySyS, OTIDS, CT\\&T) covering both masquerade and injection scenarios; MIDS attains F1 from 93.70\\% to 99.61\\%, outperforming the strongest of eight reproduced baselines by up to 13.94 percentage points under a unified 5-fold protocol.",
      "published": "2026-06-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.18599",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qiqi Liu",
        "Runhan Song",
        "Lei Cui",
        "Heng Zhang",
        "Yuyan Sun",
        "Limin Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.20215",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GNSS Spoofing Threat for V2X communications",
      "description": "Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) constitute a core technology for delivering crucial positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services in the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) domain, where they are indispensable for generating Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM) that uphold network reliability and vehicular safety. Yet, GNSS signals are acutely exposed to spoofing, an advanced attack in which an adversary transmits crafted signals that replicate legitimate satellite characteristics, misleading the receiver into computing a false position. This work presents a methodology for conducting physical spoofing with inexpensive Software Defined Radio (SDR), describing a coordinate generation pipeline that employs Haversine-based distance calculations, temporal discretization to emulate constant velocity, and linear interpolation to produce high-fidelity GPS baseband signals. The proposed attack is experimentally validated on real Commsignia OnBoard Unit (OBU) and RoadSide Unit (RSU) devices using a HackRF One across three scenarios that emulate synthetic trajectories at steady speeds of 90 km/h, 145 km/h, and 200 km/h. The most significant contribution of this paper is the demonstration that V2X communications are not secured, as they are susceptible to GNSS spoofing attacks, which cause service degradation without being detected.",
      "published": "2026-06-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.20215",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "spoofing",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adolfo P. Jimenez",
        "Juan Arquero-Gallego",
        "Mario P. Luna",
        "Jose E. Naranjo",
        "Felipe Jimenez Alonso"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.21487",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Longitudinal Study of Android Apps Signing Key Protection",
      "description": "Android app signing relies on developer-managed credentials, making secure key protection essential for the integrity of the software supply chain. A recent platform key leakage incident involving two major OEM manufacturers demonstrates that even robustly designed signing mechanisms can be compromised due to developers' oversight. In this work, we conduct a longitudinal ecosystem study to characterize this threat by mining public repositories for Android signing credentials, recovering compromised keys via exposed passwords, and matching them against signatures from over 4,000 apps collected from major stores and OEM system images. Our analysis identifies 5,673 compromised keystores on GitHub and 26 unique certificates linked to 278 real-world apps. These include 26 third-party apps in public app stores and 252 preinstalled apps from seven manufacturers, collectively affecting over 10 billion users. We demonstrate the practical exploitability of these leaks through a proof-of-concept app replacement attack and identify spillover risks in non-smartphone platforms, including a popular automotive head-unit platform installed in over 1,100 vehicle models. Our results reveal that signing-key mismanagement is a systemic risk, underscoring the need for a more rigorous key-management support in Android release engineering and distribution infrastructures.",
      "published": "2026-06-19",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.21487",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mark Huasong Meng",
        "Qing Zhang",
        "Weirao Lu",
        "Chunyang Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.22115",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Game-Theoretic Framework for Private Data Sharing in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "We present a novel game-theoretic framework designed to enhance privacy and scalability in decentralized vehicular data collection systems. The proposed hybrid architecture comprises vehicles that supply sensor data, independent servers that process data via secure multiparty computation, a coordinator node that manages data flow, and data consumers that set economic incentives. Crucially, our framework ensures that only the data consumer can access the fully aggregated data, preventing individual raw data exposure and significantly reducing privacy risks. By integrating principles of the Stackelberg competition from game theory, our approach dynamically balances privacy and economic incentives, enabling vehicles to make participation decisions based on perceived privacy risks and incentives. We empirically validate our framework using real-world vehicular location data, quantifying privacy risks by evaluating the accuracy with which a potential adversary can reconstruct a vehicle's path using only a subset of the shared data. This paper details the development and deployment of a data-trading platform within this framework, introducing a practical and privacy-preserving marketplace for profitable vehicle data sharing. Through experiments and simulations, we evaluate the effectiveness of the system in preserving privacy and explore the dynamics that influence vehicle participation. Our findings highlight the robustness of the proposed framework in preserving privacy while supporting an active data market.",
      "published": "2026-06-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.22115",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yousef AlSaqabi",
        "Yinan Zhou",
        "Faisal Nawab",
        "Bhaskar Krishnamachari"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4618,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2606.22115 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: servers, exposure, collection, economic, location, sensor, risks, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.22593",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Difference Without a Distinction: A Measurement Study of Release Trust Evidence in Package Registries",
      "description": "A stolen npm token or account lets an attacker publish a malicious version of a popular package. Such uploads skip the project's CI workflow and can lack its provenance, so since November 2025 an opt-in pnpm policy refuses any release with weaker evidence than an earlier one. Maintainers also publish backports by hand; how often the policy blocks them and which attacks it flags is unknown. We test the policy on the latest versions of 1,997 popular and recently updated npm packages, replay its variants and identity pins on reconstructed stolen-credential incidents, and analyze an npm malware advisory census. We also compare publication evidence across five package registries: npm, PyPI, Maven Central, crates.io, and RubyGems. With pnpm 10.29.3, 1.6% of popular and 7.6% of recently updated installs are blocked, mostly by backports, and one security fix backported by hand, semver 6.3.1, causes 14 of the 16 popular failures. The policy can flag an attack only if an earlier release of the same package carried stronger evidence. In the census, 17.5% of attacked packages had earlier evidence; two campaigns supply about half of these. Attackers with the observed access could have passed 15 of the 17 flagged releases by adding evidence. Pins on the full signing identity alert on 75.8% of packages with at least two keyless-signed releases, largely because certificates name the Git branch or tag. No variant tells a recent backport and an attack apart: comparing per line or declaring manual lines at the registry admits both, and an age cutoff exempts only old releases.",
      "published": "2026-06-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.22593",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Igor Santos-Grueiro"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.23197",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The EVerest Dataset for Secure Software Engineering",
      "description": "End-to-end security verification, from requirements through architecture to code, requires datasets that span all three artifact types with fine-grained security labels. No existing dataset provides this combination. We present the EVerest dataset, a multi-artifact resource based on EVerest, an industry-driven open-source software stack for electric vehicle charging stations. The dataset includes 84 manually elicited security requirements annotated with security objectives, 1,445 fine-grained security elements (components, entities, data, data flows, states, etc.), acceptance windows, coreferences, and architectural trace links, as well as the EVerest software architecture model, source code, and natural language documentation. It enables research on security requirements classification, named entity recognition, architectural trace linking, and design-time or code-level security verification. During dataset creation, a real security weakness (CWE-1295) was identified, disclosed to the project maintainers, and subsequently fixed. The dataset is publicly available. A short video is available at https://youtu.be/pnn1uqpomvQ.",
      "published": "2026-06-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.23197",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sophie Corallo",
        "Debora Grupp",
        "Dominik Fuchß",
        "Jan Keim",
        "Frederik Reiche",
        "Tobias Hey",
        "Anne Koziolek"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.26746",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G NR-V2X Scheduling Approaches for CPM Variable Size Traffic",
      "description": "Collective perception messages (CPMs) introduce significant packet size variability due to dynamic object inclusion and periodic security overhead. While 5G NR-V2X Mode 2 typically employs semi-persistent scheduling (SPS) designed for periodic traffic with relatively stable packet sizes, the impact of realistic CPM-driven size fluctuations on distributed resource allocation remains insufficiently understood. This paper presents a comparative system-level evaluation of NR-V2X Mode 2 scheduling strategies under variable-size CPM traffic reconstructed from real-world perception datasets. We analyze dynamic scheduling and multiple SPS-based approaches, including padding-based allocation, aggressive size-driven reselection, and modulation and coding scheme (MCS) adaptation. Results show that packet size variability can significantly degrade reliability when scheduling stability is compromised. In particular, dynamic scheduling and aggressive reselection increase collision probability due to frequent resource reallocations. In contrast, SPS with padding converges to a stable resource allocation and provides robust performance, while MCS adaptation achieves the highest average packet reception ratio but with uneven reliability across packet types. The findings demonstrate that, under realistic CPM traffic, stability of resource usage is more critical than instantaneous load optimization, and provide design guidelines for CPS deployment over NR-V2X Mode 2.",
      "published": "2026-06-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.26746",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vittorio Todisco",
        "Mattia Andreani",
        "Maria Luisa Merani",
        "Alessandro Bazzi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.27028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Performance Evaluation of Secure RF and WiFi-Based Communication in Drone Swarms via Testbed Implementation",
      "description": "Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms rely on distributed coordination and cooperative communication to support scalable operations, extended coverage, and applications such as surveillance and real-time data exchange. Wireless technologies such as radio frequency (RF) and WiFi are widely used for UAV-to-UAV and UAV-to-ground control station (GCS) communication but introduce significant security challenges. MAVLink, the predominant communication protocol in UAV systems, provides message integrity and authentication but lacks built-in encryption, leaving telemetry traffic vulnerable to eavesdropping. In our previous work, we proposed MAVShield, a lightweight encryption framework for MAVLink communications. In this paper, MAVShield, AES-CTR, Speck-CTR, ChaCha20, and Rabbit are integrated into four custom-built UAVs to establish secure communication links over RF and WiFi channels. Their performance is evaluated through flight experiments using a UAV swarm testbed. Encrypted telemetry data enable autonomous formation control and collision avoidance during flight. For collision avoidance, we develop a modified artificial potential field (APF) algorithm that computes attractive and repulsive forces directly in geodetic coordinates, eliminating Cartesian transformations and reducing trajectory oscillations while avoiding local-minimum trapping. CPU utilization, memory consumption, and packet delivery ratio (PDR) are measured for each encryption scheme. Results show that MAVShield achieves performance comparable to unencrypted communication while outperforming AES-CTR, Speck-CTR, ChaCha20, and Rabbit in overall efficiency. Algebraic cryptanalysis and Wireshark-based traffic analysis demonstrate resistance to key-recovery attacks and protection of telemetry confidentiality. The results indicate that MAVShield is an efficient and secure solution for UAV swarm communication.",
      "published": "2026-06-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.27028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bhavya Dixit",
        "Aayushi Rajgor",
        "Subham Kumar",
        "Rushikesh Patil",
        "Ananthapadmanabhan A.",
        "Gaurav S. Kasbekar",
        "Arnab Maity"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.28625",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Digital Twin-Based Collision Warning Framework with Sybil Attack Detection",
      "description": "Connected Vehicles (CVs) rely extensively on communication technologies to enable data-driven predictive analyses for enhancing performance and safety. These communication channels can be exploited by adversaries to launch cyberattacks such as Sybil attacks, which could threaten both safety-critical and mobility applications, leaving CVs vulnerable and putting human lives at risk. As CV deployment continues to expand, the need to detect and mitigate cyberattacks in real-time becomes increasingly urgent. This study presents an in-vehicle Digital Twin (DT)-based collision warning framework with built-in capabilities for Sybil attacks detection. The framework integrates a Temporal Convolutional Network (TCN) for learning temporal dependencies in vehicle trajectory data and Hierarchical Navigable Small World (HNSW) algorithms for efficient similarity-based classification. Our framework is evaluated on real-world Sybil attack data, collected through field experiments. The framework achieved accuracy, recall, and F1 scores of 0.984, 1.00, and 0.944, respectively, in detecting Sybil-generated fake vehicles. During the safety evaluation, the framework reduced the mean Time Exposed Time-To-Collision (TET) and mean Time Integrated Time-To-Collision (TIT) of near-collision events by 88% and 72%, respectively. Furthermore, real-world feasibility evaluation shows that the framework conformed to the standardized maximum allowable latency for safety applications and operated well within the capacity of modern processors -- demonstrating the promise of an in-vehicle DT-based framework as an attack mitigation mechanism against Sybil attacks for next-generation CVs.",
      "published": "2026-06-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.28625",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Imtiaz Hasan",
        "Abyad Enan",
        "Jean Michel Tine",
        "Araf Rahman",
        "M Sabbir Salek",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4496,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2606.28625 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: threaten, digital, well, applications, safety, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.30153",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Spectrum Strikes Back: Infrared POV Attacks on Traffic Sign Classification",
      "description": "Traffic sign classification is a crucial task for autonomous vehicles, and numerous attacks against it have been identified. A majority of physical adversarial attacks involve attaching patches to traffic signs or projecting perturbations on them. While they demonstrate high effectiveness, they are perceptible to humans. At the same time, light-based attacks outside the human visible spectrum are known but have limitations in their dynamic adaptability. We propose a persistence-of-vision-based attack that operates in the near-infrared light spectrum. With the possibility of showing dynamic, remotely triggered content, this allows a stealthy physical adversarial attack against traffic sign classification. By identifying the optimal position through digital simulation, we conduct extensive real-world evaluations using two different traffic signs, 12 machine learning models from different families, multiple distances up to 20 meters, and varying illumination conditions. Our evaluation shows high attack success rates across our test scenarios. We propose near-infrared cutoff filters and a software-based detection mechanism as defenses, and tackle limitations of the near-infrared persistence of vision display by prototyping a human-visible RGB version of it.",
      "published": "2026-06-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.30153",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael Kühr",
        "Mevlüt Yildirim",
        "Maximilian Luedecke",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.30430",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN We Trust Your Results? A Cross-Dataset Study of Automotive IDS Evaluation",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity of modern vehicles has made securing in-vehicle communication networks a critical challenge. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been widely studied as a defense mechanism for detecting malicious activities on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. However, the evaluation of CAN IDS methods remains difficult due to inconsistencies in experimental setups and the lack of standardized benchmarking frameworks. As a result, reported performance often depends on dataset-specific characteristics and may not reflect how detection methods behave in different environments. This work introduces a benchmarking framework for consistent evaluation of CAN IDSs across multiple datasets. Using the proposed framework, we integrate seven publicly available CAN IDS datasets collected under different experimental conditions and perform cross-dataset evaluation of five conceptually different IDS approaches. Our results highlight how detection performance can vary significantly across datasets, demonstrating the importance of cross-dataset benchmarking for assessing the robustness and generalization capabilities of CAN IDS methods.",
      "published": "2026-06-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.30430",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Beatrix Koltai",
        "Gergely Acs",
        "Andras Gazdag"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2606.30564",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Role of Vehicles in Digital Forensic Investigations: A Structured Synthesis of Digital Vehicle Forensic Characteristics",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are cyber-physical, networked systems that may contain valuable digital traces for accident reconstruction, crime investigation, warranty analysis, and cybersecurity incident response. However, digital vehicle forensics (DVF) remains less mature than computer, mobile, and cloud forensics because relevant data is distributed across in-vehicle components, mobile devices, manufacturer back ends, third-party services, and physical evidence. This article addresses this gap through a structured synthesis of academic literature, standards, and practitioner-oriented sources. First, we define DVF as the identification, preservation, acquisition, verification, interpretation, and reporting of vehicle-related digital evidence under safety, legal, privacy, and forensic-soundness constraints. Second, we formalize the DVF triage problem as the selection and correlation of evidence sources subject to volatility, accessibility, safety, integrity, and authorization constraints. Third, we explain how eight characteristics were derived from the literature and case material: multiple users, massively networked, cyber-physical system, dependencies between components, functional data, safety implications, accessibility, and limited abstraction. Finally, we add an adversarial perspective and a characteristic-driven triage procedure that helps investigators prioritize evidence sources while documenting assumptions, limitations, and failure cases. The resulting contribution is not an algorithmic performance claim; it is a reproducible conceptual framework for understanding, planning, and communicating DVF investigations.",
      "published": "2026-06-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.30564",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kevin Mayer"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.00186",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Non-Line-of-Sight, Multi-Modality-based Side-Channel IP Theft Attack on Additive Manufacturing Using Dual Smartphones",
      "description": "Additive Manufacturing (AM) has revolutionized major sectors, including aerospace, automotive, and healthcare, by enabling adjustable production. As the usage of AM increases, so does the risk of Intellectual Property (IP) leakage during the printing process due to unintended side-channel emissions. Current studies and attack scenarios on 3D printers face three challenges: low success and accuracy rates in final G-code reconstruction, limited distance range for attacking the 3D printer's IP, and reliance on specialized, overt data-collection tools. This paper presents a side-channel attack that addresses the noted limitations by using two smartphones' internal sensors. We position the smartphones 60 cm away in a non-line-of-sight setup to collect the 3D printer's acoustic and magnetic emissions. Our attack successfully reconstructs the G-code commands of the final objects at a rate of 98.89% on command-level reconstruction accuracy. Additionally, we evaluate the transferability of our attack strategy by applying it to another 3D printer in a different environment. Our proven unauthorized access to the reconstructed G-code and thus to the IP of the AM system indicates the security weaknesses in 3D printing, highlighting the need for mitigating side-channel attacks.",
      "published": "2026-06-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.00186",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amirhossein Jamarani",
        "Diba Afroze",
        "Yazhou Tu",
        "Mark Yampolskiy",
        "Xiali Hei"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.01356",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Chameleon: Recovering Cyber-Physical Systems from Memory Corruption Attacks via ML Surrogates",
      "description": "Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can be compromised through memory corruption vulnerabilities, which can result in safety violations. Existing techniques mostly focus on detecting such attacks but respond by terminating or halting execution upon attack detection, which is not acceptable in CPSs as interrupted tasks can have catastrophic consequences. Other techniques replace compromised CPS components with simplified defaults that degrade system behavior, or reboot the system upon attack detection, which are not suitable for CPS deployed in safety-critical domains. We propose Chameleon, a novel framework for automatically recovering CPSs from memory corruption attacks using machine learning (ML)-based surrogates trained at compartment granularity that nearly replicate their original compartments' behavior but are implemented differently, and hence are unlikely to have the same memory corruption vulnerabilities. Upon attack detection, Chameleon replaces the compromised compartment with its trained ML surrogate. We implemented Chameleon using the LLVM compiler, and evaluated its efficiency and effectiveness on seven different robotic vehicles (RVs), including simulated and real ones. We found that Chameleon can generate surrogates that closely approximate the original compartments (with an average R$^2$=0.96), successfully recover the system despite real-world memory corruption attacks and complete their tasks while incurring low performance and memory overheads on real RVs.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.01356",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohsen Salehi",
        "Karthik Pattabiraman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.08137",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Autonomous Vehicle Systems via Twin-Aware Federated Reinforcement Learning",
      "description": "Federated reinforcement learning (FRL) is crucial for enabling collaborative learning across multiple agents without sharing raw data, thereby enhancing privacy and scalability in the decision-making process within dynamic vehicular environments. However, poisoning attacks pose a significant threat to the security and reliability of FRL-based systems, particularly in safety-critical autonomous driving, where this vulnerability remains largely unexplored. These attacks can compromise the global control model by subtly injecting malicious system parameters, leading to potential hazards. To counter these challenges, we present \\alg (\\underline{Sec}ure \\underline{A}ggregation with \\underline{p}oisoning-\\underline{p}revention and historical reinforcement) as a defensive framework aimed at enhancing the robustness of FRL systems designed for safety-critical driving scenarios. \\alg strategically integrates digital twins for rehearsal-based learning and leverages historical aggregated model parameters along with a selected central gradient to ensure that only benign data is aggregated, effectively mitigating the influence of malicious agents. Theoretical guarantees are provided for the convergence performance of \\alg in the presence of poisoning attacks. We also validate the effectiveness of \\alg using developed digital twins that model realistic highway environments to evaluate the control of autonomous vehicles under adversarial conditions.",
      "published": "2026-07-09",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.08137",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zifan Zhang",
        "Minghong Fang",
        "Dianwei Chen",
        "Zhuqing Liu",
        "Prashant Khanduri",
        "Xianfeng Yang",
        "Anupam Das",
        "Yuchen Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.10712",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed Denial of Science: How Indirect Data Poisoning of AI Systems Can Industrialize Scientific Fraud",
      "description": "Scientific fraud is the instrument of doubt that malicious entities can use to establish controversy in science. Historically, it required the resources of a company: deep pockets, ghostwritten articles, and corrupt academics. Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly automating scientific research, so we ask: Can a remote adversary weaponize the honest use of AI in science to compromise scientific integrity? We envision and empirically evaluate a new attack, indirect data poisoning, in which an adversary corrupts an open dataset and uploads the poisoned variant to a public repository. Autonomous research agents may independently retrieve and process this data, turning honest scientists into the unpaid and unwitting distributors of fraud at scale. Across five socially-salient topics, from hiring discrimination to the safety of autonomous vehicles, three widely used frontier AI systems (Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.7, Codex with GPT-5.5, Gemini CLI with Gemini 3.1 Pro), and 450 ethically contained experimental runs, we find that poisoning succeeds in 49.56% of runs, while the rate of poisoning detection is only 6.0%. The attack requires no topic-specific trigger-words, agent access, indirect prompt injection, or fabricated papers, only the open data ecosystem and misleading metadata. To mitigate the attacks, we propose and evaluate two measures: a scientist persona and a data provenance audit with five checks (referencing papers, social markers, statistical anomalies, related datasets, poisoning caution). We find that the persona still leaves 16.67% of runs with a poisoned conclusion, but provenance auditing reduces attack success rate to zero. Our results suggest that indirect data poisoning may enable scientific fraud at unprecedented scale, but these attacks can be mitigated with suitable auditing by agents during data retrieval.",
      "published": "2026-07-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10712",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bálint Gyevnár",
        "Atoosa Kasirzadeh",
        "Nihar B. Shah"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.10914",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SoK: Federated Learning for Intrusion Detection in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Modern vehicular networks face an expanding attack surface across internal Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and external Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a decentralized paradigm to deploy Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) without compromising data privacy. However, the vehicular FL-IDS literature suffers from fragmented methodologies and unrealistic experimental setups. This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) that unifies the taxonomy of vehicular attack surfaces, evaluates FL topologies, and maps adversarial threats such as poisoning and inference attacks. By auditing over 60 publications, we identify recurring pitfalls: artificial IID data splits, reliance on trivial benchmarks, weak adversarial evaluation, and omission of real-time CAN constraints. Finally, we define a forward-looking research agenda and outline minimum benchmarking requirements necessary to transition vehicular FL-IDS from optimistic simulations to secure, real-world deployment.",
      "published": "2026-07-12",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10914",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yahya Shahsavari",
        "Reza Nourmohammadi",
        "Sara Rouhani",
        "Kaiwen Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.12481",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Scenario-Free Uncertainty-Aware DLMP-Based Bilevel Coordination of EV Charging and Reactive Power Support in Distribution Networks",
      "description": "This paper develops a scenario-free uncertainty-aware bilevel optimization framework for coordinated electric vehicle (EV) charging and reactive power support in distribution networks using distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs). The upper-level EV aggregator jointly schedules active and reactive charging power to minimize charging costs, while the lower-level energy management system performs network-constrained economic dispatch and determines DLMPs subject to feeder and voltage constraints. To capture uncertainties in load demand and photovoltaic (PV) generation, a compact robust counterpart (RC) reformulation is developed that avoids the computational burden of large-scale stochastic programming and conventional robust optimization. Unlike existing robust counterpart methods that primarily assume Gaussian uncertainties, the proposed approach derives a deterministic reformulation for net-demand uncertainty modeled by a normal-minus-beta distribution, providing a more realistic representation of asymmetric load and renewable variability. An exactness lemma preserves the economic interpretation of DLMPs after KKT reformulation and Big-M linearization. EV chargers also provide reactive power support through non-unity power factor operation to improve voltage regulation. Simulation results on the IEEE 33-bus distribution system demonstrate improved voltage security, effective uncertainty-aware EV coordination, and significantly lower computational complexity than conventional stochastic and robust optimization approaches.",
      "published": "2026-07-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.12481",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arash Baharvandi",
        "Duong Tung Nguyen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.16175",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluating Open-Weight LLMs for Generating Structured Threat Information for Autonomous Vehicle Vulnerabilities",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) rely on interconnected software and hardware components, including sensors, Electronic Control Units, in-vehicle infotainment systems, and telematics units, where vulnerabilities can compromise assets, users, and vehicle operations. These vulnerabilities are commonly documented as plain text in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database; however, security practitioners require structured information about affected assets, types of weaknesses, and attack behaviors to effectively mitigate the risks from these vulnerabilities. To this end, we evaluate open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) for generating Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX), a well-known structured format for representing threat information, for CAV-related CVEs. We construct a dataset called CAV-STIXGen that maps CAV vulnerability descriptions to STIX domain objects (SDO), STIX relationship objects (SRO), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), and MITRE ATT&CK techniques mappings. Using this dataset, we evaluated 11 open-weight LLMs (4B to 120B parameters) across various prompting strategies and temperatures. Single-model configurations achieve F1 scores of 0.94 for SDO, 0.63 for SRO, and 0.99 for CWE mapping, while complete MITRE ATT&CK mapping remains challenging. In a multi-agent setup, Gemma-4-31B and Codestral-22B achieve F1 scores of 0.91 for SDOs and 0.43 for SROs, respectively. Lastly, we analyze CWE and MITRE ATT&CK co-occurrences to identify recurring threat patterns in the CAV domain, demonstrating how AI-assisted vulnerability-to-STIX translation can automate threat intelligence and prioritize defense in transportation security.",
      "published": "2026-07-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.16175",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Erfan",
        "Ahmed Ryan",
        "Md Kamal Hossain Chowdhury",
        "Md Rayhanur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.18108",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GARAGE: Characterizing the Automation Boundary in LLM-based Attack Graph Generation",
      "description": "While modern vehicle security depends on effective Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) synthesis, current automated tools struggle with unstructured data and automotive-specific architectural nuances. To bridge this gap, we introduce GARAGE, a RAG-powered framework that converts fragmented CTI into an actionable, domain-specific knowledge base for automated attack graph generation. GARAGE synthesizes a dataset of 12,786 CVEs and 140 incident reports into a STIX 2.1 and Auto-ISAC ATM-compliant knowledge base. By formalizing tactical-pattern-level scenarios through granular kill chain analysis, GARAGE achieves threat generation capabilities. Our 320 Leave-One-Out experiments reveal that the framework can accurately transfer security knowledge to entirely unseen vehicle architectures. Furthermore, we position GARAGE as a scalable TARA support tool within human-in-the-loop workflows, offering a comprehensive cost-performance analysis to guide its deployment across various LLM tiers.",
      "published": "2026-07-20",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.18108",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daekwon Pi",
        "Sangho Lee",
        "Young Hun Lee",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.18684",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "When to Trust the Map: Confidence-Aware LLM Routing for Automotive CVE-to-ATM Mapping",
      "description": "Public CVE descriptions report the technical conditions and impact of vulnerabilities, whereas the Auto-ISAC Automotive Threat Matrix (ATM) expresses an adversary's tactics and techniques. Because the two representations are not directly aligned, incorrect automated mappings in safety-critical environments may distort threat interpretation and mitigation prioritization, motivating a confidence-aware approach that distinguishes auto-confirmable mappings from uncertain cases. This paper reformulates automotive CVE-to-ATM mapping as a selective automation problem. The proposed framework generates candidate mappings via hierarchical in-context learning, then fuses self-consistency and LLM-based evidence verification signals into a calibrated meta-model. The resulting calibrated confidence score routes each candidate into AUTO, REVIEW, or HOLD. On the evaluation set, the proposed system substantially improved candidate-set precision at matched recall over a Flat zero-shot GPT-5.2 baseline. In the High-Confidence operating mode, the AUTO tier achieved a precision of 0.878, more than double the candidate-set base rate, and the calibrated confidence score achieved an AUROC of 0.868 in distinguishing correct from incorrect candidates. These results show that the framework can support selective automation by isolating auto-confirmable mappings from those requiring analyst review.",
      "published": "2026-07-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.18684",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "threat",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heeyun Heo",
        "Sangmin Park",
        "Huy Kang Kim",
        "Sanghoon Jeon"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.19146",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sarus: Privacy-Preserving Multi-Vendor Perception Fusion via Homomorphic Encryption",
      "description": "Cooperative perception enables autonomous vehicles (AVs) to improve situational awareness by aggregating detection outputs from multiple agents and sensing platforms, often via a shared fusion service in multi-vendor deployments. However, sharing such outputs at inference time exposes proprietary model behavior and sensitive environmental information, creating significant privacy and security concerns. In this paper, we present Sarus, a privacy-preserving framework for multi-vendor perception fusion via homomorphic encryption (HE), enabling aggregation without revealing individual vendor outputs. Each vendor encodes detections as compact Gaussian moment vectors over a shared spatial lattice and transmits encrypted payloads to a fusion server, which aggregates them directly in the encrypted domain. The fused result is then decrypted and reconstructed into final detections through class-wise bin merging. We analyze the computational complexity, showing linear scaling for vendor payload construction and $O(BV)$ server-side fusion with the number of occupied bins $B$ and vendors $V$, while postprocessing scales as $O(B + \\sum_{c\\in \\mathcal{C}} B_c^2)$, where $\\mathcal{C}$ denotes the set of object classes and $B_c$ is the number of occupied bins for class $c$. Experiments demonstrate linear scaling in practice with only a bounded constant-factor overhead from HE, with decryption dominating postprocessing cost. Experiments on the KITTI dataset using camera (YOLOv8) and LiDAR (PointPillars, PV-RCNN) detectors show that Sarus improves scene-level coverage by effectively aggregating complementary detections, particularly in distance-dependent regimes where individual modalities degrade. These results indicate that privacy-preserving multi-vendor perception fusion is feasible for real-time deployment when statistical compression and spatial sparsity are jointly exploited.",
      "published": "2026-07-21",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.19146",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Munawar Hasan",
        "Apostol Vassilev"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2607.23962",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development of Vision-Language Model-based GNSS Spoofing Detection for Autonomous Vehicle Navigation",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) depend on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for localization and navigation, making them vulnerable to spoofing attacks that can covertly redirect vehicles or induce unsafe maneuvers. In this paper, we develop the first Vision-Language Model (VLM)-based framework for GNSS spoofing detection for autonomous vehicles by fusing front-camera visual data with in-vehicle sensor readings (e.g., speed, acceleration, yaw rate) against GNSS-derived maneuvers. Our approach introduces a three-stage fine-tuning process that first grounds visual cues, and then calibrates sensor data within a shared semantic space to detect discrepancies between predicted and GNSS-derived maneuvers across three attack scenarios. We also generated an independent real-world dataset by driving an instrumented vehicle on public roads in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, equipped with time-synchronized GNSS, IMU, and camera logs to validate cross-regional generalization of our fine-tuned model on unseen data from training data. On this dataset, we then generated intelligent spoofing attacks, including trajectory mirroring with road-network snapping for wrong-turn attacks, position freezing for overshoot scenarios, and drift generation for stop attacks. On this validation dataset, the zero-shot VLMs baseline F1-score ranges from 23% to 32%, whereas our fine-tuned model achieves an F1-score ranging from 94% to 95%. Results show that our VLM-based approach correctly classified every wrong-turn and stop attacks, and attains 88%-93% accuracy for overshoot attacks. Furthermore, we introduce an adaptive inference policy that reduces VLM invocations to 14% (~86% computational reduction) and yields 65ms-73ms per 4s window. These results point to a practical, on-road layer of defense that complements signal-level integrity checks with the use of VLMs.",
      "published": "2026-07-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.23962",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Aldeen",
        "Muhammad Sami Irfan",
        "Sagar Dasgupta",
        "Long Cheng",
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.02274",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multi-Objective AutoML-based Efficient Intrusion Detection System for EV Charging Networks",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle Charging Systems (EVCSs) are increasingly connected with Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which improves charging intelligence but also expands their exposure to cyber-attacks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are essential for securing EV charging networks; however, conventional Machine Learning (ML)-based IDSs often rely on manual model design and mainly optimize detection performance without fully considering inference latency and model size. In this paper, a Multi-Objective Automated ML (MOO-AutoML)-based efficient IDS is proposed for EVCS security. The proposed framework uses a lightweight training strategy and a LightGBM-based automated feature selection method to select compact feature subsets based on accumulated feature importance. Then, Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm III (NSGA-III) jointly optimizes the feature selection threshold and key LightGBM hyperparameters under three objectives: maximizing weighted F1-score, minimizing 99th percentile inference latency ratio, and minimizing model size ratio. Experiments on CICEVSE2024 and CICIDS2017 show that the proposed MOO-AutoML IDS achieves competitive weighted F1-scores, lower P99 inference latency, and smaller model sizes than the compared methods. Overall, the results indicate that the proposed method can support accurate and efficient intrusion detection for EVCS and IoT security under practical deployment constraints.",
      "published": "2026-08-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02274",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.02806",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fast Object Removal Attacks on Safety-Critical Video-based Perception Systems",
      "description": "By leveraging data from video-based perception systems, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) support safety-critical applications that improve road safety. However, adversaries may manipulate video frames to compromise downstream perception modules, causing failures in safety-critical functions and increasing risks to vulnerable road users. This paper presents a novel attack model and an end-to-end framework for near-real-time targeted object removal attack on a video-based safety-critical system. The end-to-end attack pipeline consists of four stages: localizing targets in each frame, retrieving coherent patches from earlier frames, blending them using context-aware alpha compositing, and reconstructing attacked frames. Experiments at an intersection on the South Carolina Connected Vehicle Testbed (SC-CVT) show that reconstructed frames have high global similarity to the originals, with frame-level Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) above 40 dB and Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM) above 0.996. Using the YOLO-based detector, the attack reduces object detections by up to 97.59% and achieves a frame-level attack success rate of 94.48%. Across the evaluated detectors and frame resolutions, the mean execution time ranges from 0.074 to 0.172 seconds per frame on GPU hardware, indicating near-real-time performance in testing. The forensic evaluation using several pretrained tamper-detection models shows limited ability to distinguish reconstructed from authentic frames. The findings suggest that video-based perception is vulnerable to stealthy object removal attacks that can degrade the performance of safety-critical applications by reducing object detectability. These findings can help develop mitigation strategies against adversarial object removal attacks that threaten safety-critical applications, such as vision-based pedestrian safety systems.",
      "published": "2026-08-03",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02806",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Imtiaz Hasan",
        "M Sabbir Salek",
        "Nathan Jones",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury",
        "Rong Ge"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.03590",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Long-Range Autonomous Valet Parking: A Reservation Scheme With Three-Factor Authentication and Key Agreement",
      "description": "Long-range autonomous valet parking (LAVP) is increasingly adopted to alleviate traffic congestion and parking difficulties. For large-scale parking demand, reservation can improve parking management. However, existing schemes mainly focus on parking request verification and parking check-in, and do not adequately protect identity legitimacy and communication security during passenger drop-off and pick-up. To address this problem, we propose SecLAVP, a provably secure three-factor authentication and key agreement protocol for LAVP reservation services. SecLAVP combines passwords, biometrics, and smart cards. With assistance from the drop-off/pick-up point (DP), the passenger and the autonomous vehicle (AV) achieve mutual authentication and establish a session key for secure communication. In the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model, we formally prove that SecLAVP provides session-key security. AVISPA simulations show that SecLAVP resists man-in-the-middle attacks, while informal analysis demonstrates that it satisfies 15 defined security goals. Finally, performance evaluation in terms of communication overhead, computational overhead, and scheduling shows that SecLAVP is feasible for practical deployment.",
      "published": "2026-08-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03590",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Di Wang",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Fei Yan",
        "Yining Liu",
        "Daxin Tian",
        "Yuan Zhuang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.04065",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Inline Control Architecture for Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems increasingly incorporate large language models (LLMs) for semantic tasks such as message summarization, operator assistance, and decision support at roadside units and edge nodes. Although these components are not part of safety-critical control loops, they introduce prompt-level attack surfaces that are not addressed by traditional V2X security mechanisms focused on authentication and message integrity. This paper presents Guarded-V2X, an inline semantic guardrail architecture for securing LLM-enabled V2X services under real-time constraints. The proposed system integrates rule-based ingress filtering, a lightweight safety classifier, policy-constrained structured generation, trusted-only retrieval, and post-decision adjudication to enforce machine-checkable safety boundaries prior to downstream execution. Guarded-V2X is evaluated using a four-stage experimental pipeline encompassing intrusion vulnerability analysis, calibration and latency benchmarking, guardrail validation, and robustness under adversarial stress. Experiments are conducted on a V2X-aligned simulated dataset derived from RSU advisories, operator messages, and annotated V2X message summaries. Results show that unguarded and prompt-only baselines retain residual vulnerability under multi-turn adversarial trials, while Guarded-V2X consistently reduces intrusion acceptance success rates and eliminates observed unsafe completions in two-turn settings, without exceeding latency budgets for V2X semantic advisory paths.",
      "published": "2026-08-04",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04065",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narendra Kumar Dewangan",
        "Mounira Msahli"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.05087",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deployment Feasibility Analysis of Post-Quantum Digital Signatures in Safety-Critical C-V2X Communication for Urban Mobility Scenario",
      "description": "The transition from the classical ECDSA to PQC creates substantially larger authentication payloads for safety-critical C-V2X sidelink communication. This study determines which NIST post-quantum signature algorithms are compatible with the current SAE J3161 deployment profile and quantifies their communication-level effects. A transport-block feasibility analysis was performed using IEEE 1609.2 secured-message structures, SAE J3161 radio parameters, and the signature and public-key sizes of ECDSA P-256, Falcon-512, Dilithium-2, and SPHINCS+. Falcon-512, the only post-quantum candidate that fit the applicable transport-block constraints, was compared with ECDSA P-256 through full-stack C-V2X PC5 Mode 4 co-simulation. The evaluation covered 24 scenarios spanning six traffic levels-of-service with line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight propagation. PDR and end-to-end latency were evaluated at a roadside unit receiver. Dilithium-2 and SPHINCS+ exceeded the available transport-block capacity, whereas Falcon-512 remained physically feasible. Falcon-512 maintained mean latency near 52 ms and 95th-percentile latency within 97-98 ms, but met the 90% packet-delivery threshold only at traffic level-of-service A, under line-of-sight propagation. ECDSA met the threshold through traffic level-of-service C. Neither algorithm met the threshold under non-line-of-sight propagation. The study provides a standards-grounded cross-layer evaluation that identifies both algorithm feasibility and traffic-dependent deployment boundaries for post-quantum signatures on C-V2X Mode 4 sidelink. The results show that spectrum efficiency, rather than cryptographic computation time, is the primary deployment constraint. They support standards development concerning payload structure, resource allocation, certificate transmission, and migration strategies for quantum-resistant vehicular communication.",
      "published": "2026-08-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05087",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Akid Abrar",
        "Sagar Dasgupta",
        "Abdullah Al Mamun",
        "Minhaj Uddin Ahmad",
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury",
        "Ahmad Alsharif"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.05350",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "S12X Patch Diffing with QBinDiff",
      "description": "This paper presents a reverse engineering analysis of a firmware update for a commercial vehicle Brake ECU. We analyze the updater executable to extract firmware and perform differential binary analysis of the S12X architecture firmware images. Our research identifies specific changes in the recall that address undocumented vulnerabilities in legacy protocol processing. We demonstrate that the patched functionality contained critical flaws. The findings confirm the safety recall remediation was also a security patch.",
      "published": "2026-08-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05350",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ecu",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ben Gardiner"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.05548",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Behavioral Residualization for Unsupervised Intrusion Detection in Automotive CAN Networks",
      "description": "Modern vehicles exchange safety-critical messages over the Controller Area Network (CAN), a bus designed for low cost and real-time operation that offers neither authentication nor encryption. Once an attacker reaches the network, arbitrary frames can be injected. Existing detectors frequently rely on surface cues (previously unseen identifiers, constant payload bytes, or irregular DLC values). These cues yield near-perfect scores on public corpora whose attacks are separable by exactly those rules, yet they collapse when the adversary simply reuses legitimate identifiers. We introduce per-ID behavioral residualization (PIRD). Fourteen temporal, protocol and payload statistics are extracted from sliding windows belonging to each arbitration ID and then expressed as standardized residuals relative to that ID's own benign baseline. When the resulting residual vectors are supplied to six standard unsupervised detectors, mean F1 rises in the majority of experimental cells (21 of 24 on HCRL, 30 of 36 on ROAD, five random seeds). On targeted legitimate-ID attacks the method attains recall >= 0.99 and ROC-AUC near 0.99. A deployment-oriented Phase-1 protocol (cross-condition transfer, global threshold, alternative residualization strategies, window/latency sweep) additionally reports Recall at fixed FPR, FPR at target recall, false alarms per hour and detection latency. Two clear failure modes, novel-ID flooding (HCRL DoS, F1 = 0.02) and cross-ID fuzzing (ROAD, F1 = 0.27), are quantified and left as open problems.",
      "published": "2026-08-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05548",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chandan Hegde",
        "Mukundh R Reddy",
        "Dr Kumaresh Sheelavant"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.06651",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CyberLLM: A Multi-Agent LLM Framework for Autonomous Detection and Guarded Response in Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) expand the automotive attack surface across source code, runtime logs, and deployment topologies, while safety constraints forbid autonomous agents from acting without oversight. This paper presents CyberLLM, a multi-agent, LLM-orchestrated framework that autonomously detects vulnerabilities and executes remediations under a formal, runtime safety guard. Detection combines a deterministic layer (regex rules, AST analyzers, and topology graph checks) with an LLM refinement pass, so a high-recall floor is complemented by high-precision reasoning. A decision agent aggregates findings, tags them with a human-centric asset taxonomy, and selects a tiered response, ratcheting its confidence with signed cross-session memory and re-planning feedback. Every action is validated against four contextual security properties and an independent action-alignment oracle before it is allowed to run, and refused actions trigger escalation and re-planning. A symmetric attack pipeline generates and replays exploits so both sides can be exercised on the same scenarios. On an independent, ground-truthed benchmark of nine original automotive ECU modules in C, C++, and Rust seeding 47 layered vulnerabilities plus clean controls, the always-on deterministic layer covers 34\\% of the labeled vulnerabilities at perfect precision, and adding the grounded LLM refinement and completeness passes roughly doubles coverage to about 70\\% (F1 $0.83$) while producing zero false positives on the clean controls. The results indicate that LLM agents can perform useful autonomous cyber-defense when wrapped in a deterministic, auditable safety envelope.",
      "published": "2026-08-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06651",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nenad Petrovic",
        "Oussama Jeddou",
        "Feres Ben Fraj",
        "Vahid Zolfaghari",
        "Fengjunjie Pan",
        "Andre Schamschurko",
        "Alois Knoll"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.07143",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "\"Operator, can you hear me?\" A Faithful Line into the UNISOC Baseband",
      "description": "Baseband processors are reachable over the radio at all times. Their most security-relevant logic runs deep inside protocol state machines: the control-plane handlers that gate registration, authentication, and session setup. Analyzing that logic systematically requires introspecting the firmware as it runs, which makes re-hosting the baseband necessary. Existing re-hosting work approximates the execution environment and under-approximates the SoC complexity of the baseband processor together with its surrounding components, bringing this state practically out of reach. We instead model each surrounding component, co-processors, SIM, application processor, from what a real device does, and step them in lockstep with the baseband on one shared clock. That makes faithfulness checkable at component interfaces, rather than assumed. We call this method Unislop and demonstrate it on the UNISOC UDX710, a platform in an estimated 10-15% of cellular modems and in automotive systems, not systematically analyzed before. Starting from a Quectel RM500U-CNV module, we gain code execution, defeat its firmware-integrity check, instrument the baseband, and recover its peripheral environment from the running device. The resulting re-host reaches the same control-plane states as the real device, establishes a full PDU session, and carries real IP traffic on both ingress and egress. The recovered components are shared across UNISOC's baseband lineup, so with additional reverse-engineering effort the same design extends to further targets.",
      "published": "2026-08-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07143",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eduard Vlad",
        "Philipp Mao",
        "Marcel Busch",
        "Haitham Hassanieh",
        "Mathias Payer"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.09094",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VUPER: Verified ASN.1 UPER Parser",
      "description": "ASN.1 is a widely used interface description language, and UPER (Unaligned Packed Encoding Rules) is one of its key encoding rules, particularly popular in security-critical domains such as cellular networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. To ensure the correctness and security of this foundational infrastructure, we present VUPER, a framework for generating verified ASN.1 UPER parsers. We first formalize the notion of a bit-precise parser and identify properties that prove round-trip consistency for parsers and serializers, while accounting for ASN.1 features such as backward/forward compatibility. We then implement and verify parser and serializer combinators for ASN.1 basic types and structures, while adhering to the UPER specification. We also develop a compiler that translates ASN.1 definitions into verified parsers. Finally, we develop a dynamic testing framework using the VUPER parser as a test oracle. To empirically evaluate our approach, we test 7 open-source and 4 commercial ASN.1 parsers using 5G and V2X communication protocols. VUPER uncovers 20 types of inconsistencies in popular parsers and demonstrates stricter compliance with ASN.1 UPER standards. Additionally, we demonstrate concrete attacks by exploiting these parser vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2026-08-10",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09094",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaotian Zhou",
        "Kai Tu",
        "Ali Ranjbar",
        "Yilu Dong",
        "Gang Tan",
        "Syed Rafiul Hussain"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.11286",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Benchmarking Cyberattack Detection in Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure with Benign User Updates",
      "description": "Cyberattack detection in electric vehicle charging infrastructure is complicated by legitimate post-activation revisions to requested energy and departure time. Charging manipulation attacks can exploit the same interface and variables; therefore, detecting a request change alone does not establish malicious intent. This paper develops a leakage-controlled session-level benchmark that preserves the ordered inputs of real Adaptive Charging Network (ACN) sessions and models legitimate revisions as normal behavior. A fixed pool keeps each generated attack in its source session's split and contains six physically motivated attacks and their coordinated variants. We compare 22 profile-only, transition-aware, and context-stratified model families under common source-grouped folds, attack data, and operating constraints. The proposed Dual-Branch Masked-Autoencoder (Masked-AE) Transition Boost model evaluates whether the current request is normal and whether its producing transition resembles an observed benign update. Its state branch combines masked reconstruction with a radial-basis-function one-class support boundary, while its transition branch combines masked reconstruction with shrinkage covariance distance. Source-grouped five-fold cross-validation selects complete configurations under explicit overall-normal and benign-update acceptance constraints; disjoint normal data then calibrate the final threshold before one test evaluation. The developed dual-branch model provides the strongest robust validation performance while detecting malicious request manipulations without learning to reject legitimate user choices.",
      "published": "2026-08-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11286",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hannan Chen",
        "Roshni Anna Jacob",
        "Jie Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.11489",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Runtime Decentralized Attestation and Coordinated Repair Framework for Securing Automotive ECUs",
      "description": "The evolution of automotive technology increasingly integrates components, transforming vehicles into interconnected systems of systems. Modern vehicles are controlled by a distributed system of computing devices, known as electronic control units (ECUs). However, this interconnectedness means that any error poses significant risks to the vehicle operator. In particular, malware can be injected into ECUs, threatening vehicle safety. To address this, we need mechanisms to detect compromised ECUs then repair them to a benign state. Existing approaches mainly focus on detection and do not address the challenge of integrating detection with runtime ECU repair. This integration is nontrivial because runtime repair involves both local rollback and reboot with timing determined from global vehicle context to avoid unsafe behavior. In this work, we have designed DACER, a runtime decentralized attestation and coordinated repair framework for automotive ECUs. DACER is the first approach that co-designs attestation and repair to unify the ``local'' nature of firmware rollback with the ``global'' nature of ECU reboot. In DACER, each ECU performs efficient local self-attestation and self-repair functions, enabling low-overhead coordination for distributed operations. In addition, DACER takes advantage of the hierarchical vehicle computing architecture. Our resulting DACER design checks the entire state of the vehicle, resists single points of failure, conforms to real-time constraints, and enables firmware restoration during runtime. The key functions are enabled by the ARM TrustZone equipped within each ECU and the secure flash memory controller embedded in the storage device. We implemented DACER on real-world hardware and experimentally demonstrated its low overhead.",
      "published": "2026-08-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11489",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "malware",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Josh Dafoe",
        "Niusen Chen",
        "Bo Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.14592",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Low-Latency Spatial-Provenance Recovery Methods for Privacy-Constrained Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "In multihop Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) networks, Road Side Units (RSUs) intend to collect information on vehicles' location in a low-latency manner while respecting their privacy constraints to support real-time location-based services. To facilitate data collection, provenance is known to ensure trust and accountability of data. Although existing joint data- and spatial-provenance techniques preserve the privacy of vehicles up to a certain granularity with respect to the RSU and other vehicles, they are unsuitable when stringent deadlines are imposed on the end-to-end delay on the packets. As a consequence, there is a need for designing spatial-provenance methods for V2X networks that satisfy stringent deadlines on the end-to-end delays while managing the privacy concerns. To fill this research gap, we propose two novel protocols, namely: Bi-Segment Embedding (BSE) and Tri-Segment Embedding (TSE), which provide a skipping mechanism for joint data- and spatial-provenance while trading off privacy features among the vehicles. Through an extensive theoretical framework, we provide an analysis of the proposed schemes in terms of reliability, privacy, and communication overhead. When compared to the baselines, our protocols offer lower end-to-end delay, higher reliability in provenance reconstruction, and the same level of privacy with respect to the RSU. We validate latency gains using practical radio parameters, and our study reveals that our proposed protocols offer significant benefits in latency when implemented over a 5G stack.",
      "published": "2026-06-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14592",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manish Bansal",
        "J. Harshan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.17092",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Structured Driving-State Narratives for Small Language Model-Based GNSS Spoofing Detection",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) depend on reliable Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) positioning. However, spoofed GNSS signals can induce plausible but incorrect vehicle states. This study develops a small language model (SLM)-based framework for detecting and classifying GNSS spoofing attacks by comparing vehicle behaviors independently derived from GNSS and other sensing sources. The framework converts independent driving states from GNSS and other sensing sources into structured semantic narratives that are provided to an SLM for spoofing detection and attack classification. The performance of the SLM-based framework is compared with large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on identical training data and evaluated on the same test set. The evaluation considers five classes: no attack, overshoot attack, stopped attack, turn-by-turn attack, and wrong-turn attack. The framework is also evaluated with geographically unseen field data collected in Clemson, South Carolina, United States. Experimental results indicate that the evaluated SLMs achieve performance similar to the LLMs, achieving an average accuracy of 96.99%, precision of 99.05%, recall of 95.59%, and F1-score of 97.18%. In terms of computational efficiency and resource utilization, the SLMs demonstrate advantages over the LLMs by requiring lower inference latency and less GPU memory during both fine-tuning and inference. Evaluation using field data collected in a geographically distinct location further demonstrated its efficacy. The presented framework can detect and classify GNSS spoofing attacks in real-time while requiring relatively low computational and memory resources, and is therefore suitable for deployment on resource-constrained vehicular computing platforms.",
      "published": "2026-08-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17092",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "spoofing",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abyad Enan",
        "Sagar Dasgupta",
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.25216",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive HSMs - Architectural Challenges and Security Implications",
      "description": "Automotive electronic control units (ECUs) increasingly depend on hardware-rooted security to protect software integrity, authenticity, and lifecycle management in the presence of remote and physical threats. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) have become a key building block in automotive system-on-chips (SoCs), providing isolated cryptographic services, secure key storage, and controlled execution under stringent real-time and cost constraints. This paper presents an architectural analysis of automotive HSMs and examines their role in establishing secure boot and hardware roots of trust. We first survey common HSM integration models used in production ECUs and discuss their flexibility and current automotive use cases. We then introduce realistic threat models to motivate hardware-backed security controls and analyze how HSM design choices influence secure boot chains of trust, secure storage, secure execution, and software signing mechanisms. Key tradeoffs between isolation, performance, updateability, and attack surface are discussed, with optional consideration of side-channel implications. The paper concludes by highlighting open challenges and future directions for scalable and resilient automotive hardware security. Finally, we discuss emerging challenges such as cryptographic agility and post-quantum readiness that are likely to shape the next generation of automotive HSM architectures.",
      "published": "2026-08-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.25216",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Krishna Teja Medam",
        "Austin Bruce"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2608.27604",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FlyBlind: Cross-Slice Timeliness Attacks on UAV Situational Awareness over 5G",
      "description": "Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) operating over 5G Standalone (SA) networks use a shared User Plane for both command-and-control (C2) data and video feedback. Operators assess link quality through latency and availability, relying on soft isolation between network slices. However, the risk that an authorized co-tenant could make the Ground Control Station (GCS) state outdated without disrupting the connection remains underexplored. This work introduces FlyBlind, a timeliness attack in which an authorized co-tenant on a neighboring slice maintains legitimate uplink demand, causing state aging at the GCS without a rogue gNB or direct interference with C2 traffic. Our key insight is that, under soft isolation, sharing idle resources turns authorized competition for grants into state aging that conventional link monitors fail to detect. We formalize this effect, termed Silent State Staleness, as a falsifiable false-healthy predicate. On a dedicated testbed, telemetry age at the GCS saturates at approximately 12 seconds, with discrepancies of tens of meters between the GCS position estimate and ground truth, while the one-way delay (OWD) p99 remains in the tens of milliseconds, availability exceeds 99.9%, and the vehicle keeps operating in GUIDED mode without triggering failsafe mechanisms. These findings indicate that, in deployments with asymmetric uplink enforcement, verifying state freshness at the destination is essential rather than relying solely on link health.",
      "published": "2026-08-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27604",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wagner Comin Sonaglio",
        "Ágney Lopes Roth Ferraz",
        "Sidnei Barbieri",
        "André Elias Melo",
        "Guevara Noubir",
        "Lourenço Alves Pereira Júnior"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.02971",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning: Gradient-Based Client Identity Inference and Defenses for Inertial Sensing in Vehicular Edge Networks",
      "description": "As vehicular networks move toward 5G/6G edge intelligence, federated learning (FL) is widely promoted as a privacy-preserving way for vehicles and infrastructure to train shared models without exposing raw sensor data. Yet the updates clients transmit still leak enough information to identify who sent them, which threatens the anonymity that safety-critical V2X applications assume and adds to existing concerns over adversarial ML, model poisoning, and backdoor attacks. We study server-side client identity inference from transmitted weight deltas using inertial (IMU) measurements, evaluated on the UCI Human Activity Recognition (HAR) benchmark as an accessible proxy for the IMU streams produced onboard connected vehicles. Across five attack classifiers and five non-IID partitions, an honest-but-curious server recovers client identity with near-perfect accuracy (approximately 1.000) from undefended updates, confirming a concrete identifiability risk. We then quantify the privacy-utility trade-off of a lightweight clip-then-noise defense by sweeping Gaussian noise (sigma in {0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50, 1.00}) at fixed clipping (C=1.0), and report formal (epsilon, delta)-DP budgets through Renyi accounting. A practical region (sigma in [0.1, 0.2]) drives attack accuracy to near-random while costing under 5% relative FL accuracy. Ensemble FL supplies complementary structural privacy with a 1/K anonymity-set bound and no noise penalty. Results are supported by cryptographic (SHA-256) train/evaluation gradient disjointness, three seeds, and a count-normalized attacker-advantage metric. We position HAR explicitly as a proxy and discuss what validation on true vehicular telemetry would require.",
      "published": "2026-09-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02971",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "connected vehicles",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali Akarma",
        "Toqeer Ali Syed",
        "Muhammad Khan",
        "Qurat-ul-ain Mastoi",
        "Adeel Ahmad"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5049,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2609.02971 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: onboard, activity, five, sensor, intelligence, without, applications, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.09386",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LLMSec-AV: A Vulnerability Taxonomy and LLM-Driven Software Weakness Discovery Framework for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Automated vehicles rely on millions of lines of safety-critical software, yet general-purpose analyzers do not understand which code can affect vehicle motion. This study asks whether large language models (LLMs) with explicit automated-vehicle (AV) security knowledge improve weakness detection beyond rule-based tools. We developed an AV vulnerability taxonomy with 18 weakness classes from vulnerability records, security advisories, and AV-security literature, and integrated it into LLM-based Security Analysis for Automated Vehicles (LLMSec-AV). Evaluated on Autoware, the framework decomposed 770 translation units into 4,673 functions and analyzed 161 functions under four prompting conditions involving taxonomy context, retrieval from 374 prior disclosures, and multi-step analysis. Findings were compared with 46 weakness locations mined from upstream fixes and a flag-volume-matched permutation baseline. CodeQL, Semgrep, cppcheck, and the Clang Static Analyzer evaluated the same code, with AV-specific rules added to CodeQL and Semgrep. Generated fuzzing harnesses were tested using AFL++ and sanitizers. LLM conditions recovered up to 76% of the 46 known weakness locations, outperforming conventional analyzers. CodeQL, Semgrep, and the Clang Static Analyzer matched none, while cppcheck matched one despite 1,301 alerts. Unaided prompting achieved similar detection performance, showing that the taxonomy did not drive recall. However, taxonomy context increased the share of findings assigned to a weakness class from near zero to over 80%, improving interpretability and triage. Six of the 18 classes could not be directly represented as static-analysis rules. LLMSec-AV introduces an AV-specific, machine-readable vulnerability taxonomy for weakness discovery and shows that LLMs can complement conventional analyzers by identifying and organizing safety-relevant findings in real AV software.",
      "published": "2026-09-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09386",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md. Wasiul Haque",
        "Sagar Dasgupta",
        "Mizanur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.17856",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigating Adversarial Robustness of Heterogeneous Cooperative Perception",
      "description": "Heterogeneous cooperative perception (CP) enables connected vehicles with diverse sensor setups to share spatial awareness via compact feature maps, where receivers reconcile these maps using learned translation modules for fusion and inference. Prior attacks against CP in a homogeneous setting reveal that the data exchange introduces a critical attack surface: a single malicious agent can transmit crafted features that erase real objects from a neighbor's fused scene. Yet, it is widely hypothesized that heterogeneity naturally defends against these attacks, as the attacker lacks knowledge of the victim's detector and the translation module scrambles adversarial gradients. We demonstrate that this protection is largely an illusion. Using a matched-objective harness to standardize the perturbation budget, objective, and forward path, we show that properly tuned iterative attacks close or reverse the apparent robustness gap. However, these optimization-based attacks require ground-truth labels and iterative backpropagation, meaning they do not represent a practical field threat running in real-time. To bridge this gap, we introduce HetPoison, a learned generator that crafts a removal perturbation in a single, label-free forward pass. HetPoison transfers across major heterogeneous designs without requiring access to the victim's detector, matching or exceeding the effectiveness of expensive optimizer-based attacks. Since heterogeneity itself is not a defense, we propose HetShield, a lightweight trust layer that validates the spatiotemporal consistency across features, recovering 83--95% of the accuracy degraded by attacks, outperforming prior art.",
      "published": "2026-09-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17856",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chenyi Wang",
        "Yutong Liu",
        "Qingzhao Zhang",
        "Ming F. Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.19791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sybil-TraceGuard: Traceability-enhanced Sybil Guardian for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles Using Dynamic Semi-supervised GNN",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) face severe Sybil attacks, where attackers exploit privacy-preserving pseudonym-switching mechanisms to anomaly alternate identities while forging Basic Safety Messages (BSMs). Although existing schemes can flag suspicious behaviors, these temporally fragmented Sybil identities render traditional single-point and sequence-based deep learning methods ineffective. Linking these fragmented identities back to the source attacker is essential for root-cause elimination, particularly under extreme label scarcity. Therefore, the Sybil-TraceGuard is proposed as a dynamic semi-supervised spatio-temporal GNN framework for Sybil Guardian, prioritizing \"who is responsible\" over \"whether an attack is happening\". It comprises four tightly coupled modules: Incremental Stream Attack Detection (ISAD) for efficient Sybil attack pre-screening; the Dynamic Topology-aware Constructor (DTC) for constructing spatio-temporal dynamic graphs; the Spatial GAT-Encoder with Multi-head Attention (SGEM) to capture multi-identity logical conflicts in spatial interactions; and the Multi-scale Spatio-Temporal Audit (MSTA) to audit short-term and long-term temporal inconsistencies. These modules are optimized within a semi-supervised Mean-Teacher framework via feature-edge shuffling perturbations, regularizing the latent feature space using minimal labels. Experiments across four Sybil attack scenarios demonstrate that Sybil-TraceGuard effectively links fragmented pseudonyms to source attackers. It outperforms state-of-the-art baselines across unlabeled ratios of 0.70-0.95, maintaining high stability and sensitivity despite extreme class imbalance and varying hyperparameter settings.",
      "published": "2026-09-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qian Xu",
        "Jiaxun Zhang",
        "Chengyue Wang",
        "Zhenning Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.20480",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Worst-Case Hidden-Vehicle Trajectory Search in Spatiotemporal Occlusion Regions",
      "description": "Occlusion creates fundamental uncertainty in autonomous driving. Existing methods often propagate frame-wise hypotheses or optimize ego behavior against prescribed hidden-agent predictions, leaving the worst history-consistent interaction unexplored. We introduce History-Conditioned Minimax Trajectory Search (HC-MTS), which combines temporal occlusion reasoning with response-aware search. First, HC-MTS constructs finite hidden-state modes, each certified by a backward witness satisfying multi-frame visibility, occupancy, semantic-map support, and class-specific kinematic constraints. It then solves a bilevel minimax problem: an inner finite oracle maximizes the ego driving score over destination attainment and ride comfort, while the outer search selects the legal hidden-vehicle trajectory that minimizes this best-response value. Across eight Waymo Open Motion Dataset scenarios, increasing the visibility-memory horizon from K=1 to K=20 reduces the mean per-scenario vehicle, pedestrian, and total retained hidden-seed counts by 18.12%, 21.67%, and 18.45%, respectively. HC-MTS identifies six avoidable counterexamples, while no legal collision-producing attacker is found in the remaining two scenes within the finite search budget.",
      "published": "2026-09-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20480",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ruichen Tan",
        "Zengxiang Lei",
        "Satish Ukkusuri"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.20601",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Weather Data Spoofing Attacks on Rain-Adaptive Millimeter-Wave Frequency Selection in V2X Communication Networks",
      "description": "Connected vehicles use millimeter-wave (mmWave) sidelinks for the data rates cooperative driving demands, and emerging designs select the carrier band from sensed rainfall. We show that this weather awareness is an attack surface: an adversary who spoofs only the rainfall input dictates the victim's carrier frequency, and through it its communication range, without transmitting on the channel. We evaluate the attack in MilliCar, an ns-3 module that runs the selected band as the real 3GPP NR V2X carrier with per-band propagation, beamforming, and blockage. Forcing the band up to 73 GHz holds an eight-vehicle platoon's reliable range at 38 m while the honest baseline doubles it to 82 m; forcing it down to 5 GHz sustains 97% long-range reception but collapses the transport block to a third and quadruples long-range latency to 12.5 ms. We then implement the defense the mechanism implies. Rain loss grows linearly with distance while path loss grows logarithmically, so a receiver that tests measured SINR against the attenuation its reported weather predicts flags force-up with 98% probability within 1.5 s at a 1% false-alarm rate, and re-selection then restores long-range reception from 60% to 75%. The same test is structurally blind to force-down, because the 5 GHz fallback is nearly rain-immune. An advecting rain cell that swings the local rate from 15 to 81 mm/h leaves every result unchanged. Weather-aware band selection therefore requires an authenticated meteorological input; physical cross-checking covers one half of the threat.",
      "published": "2026-09-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20601",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "spoofing",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rasheed Bello",
        "Idreez Yusuf",
        "Justice Adjei Owusu",
        "Oluwatobiloba Aiyewunmi",
        "Gurcan Comert",
        "Judith Mwakalonge",
        "Esmail Abuhdima",
        "Abdulmajid Mrebit",
        "Rajab Ataai",
        "Vaidyan Varghese"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.20982",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ASGARD: Action-Space Guard for UAV Resilience via Reinforcement Learning",
      "description": "Reinforcement learning (RL) controllers have been recently adopted for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) navigation and control. However, they are susceptible to action-space attacks that overwrite the action commands after the policy generates them and before the actuators execute them. While most existing defenses target attacks on the policy's inputs, those addressing action-space attacks retrain the policy at training time and are not resilient to corrupted actions at runtime. We propose ASGARD, a two-phase teacher-student pipeline for making RL-based UAV control resilient to action-space attacks. In the teacher phase, an encoder combines the UAV's physical state with action-attack-related privileged information to produce an action-attack-aware latent that trains the RL control policy and a monitor that outputs corrected action commands to the actuators. In the student phase, both the encoder and the monitor are trained via supervised learning from their teacher counterparts to run on-board using only the UAV's physical state history. We evaluate ASGARD across attack scenarios targeting different action commands on UAV. We find that ASGARD is resilient to action-space attacks and completes the missions despite the attack. We further find that ASGARD generalizes to unseen attacks and remains resilient against stealthy attacks.",
      "published": "2026-09-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20982",
      "matched_terms": [
        "resilience",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohsen Salehi",
        "Karthik Pattabiraman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.21206",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Human Driver Temperament and the Safety Impact of a C-V2X Denial-of-Service Flooding Attack in Mixed-Autonomy Traffic",
      "description": "Cooperative and connected automated vehicles (CAVs) rely on Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages to cross signalized intersections; a denial-of-service (DoS) flood that blocks SPaT forces CAVs into a fail-safe mode. Because human-driven vehicles share the intersection, the safety consequence depends not only on the attack and the CAV fail-safe policy, but on how the surrounding human drivers behave. We investigate this human-factors dimension with a coupled OMNeT++/INET (5G NR-V2X) and SUMO microsimulation of a signalized corridor, sweeping CAV market penetration (10-90%), four calibrated driver temperaments (cautious to aggressive) and two standards-based fail-safe policies, a minimal-risk maneuver (MRM) and an adaptive cruise control (ACC) keep-driving fallback, with each attack arm differenced against its policy-matched no-attack baseline. Temperament's effect on the attack is specific and modest rather than a blanket amplification. Aggressive surroundings worsen one metric, the hard-braking a keep-driving fail-safe forces on nearby drivers (p = 0.03), rising from near zero to +8 episodes/1000 veh-s. They appear to dampen rear-end conflicts, but only because the flood clears the queues aggressive drivers build, so the gain is in flow, not safety. On the attack's primary signatures, CAV red-light running and crossing conflicts, temperament has no detectable effect. It instead dominates baseline risk, producing a 13- to 18-fold cautious-to-aggressive gradient far larger than the attack itself, which acts through a channel already congested by CAV adoption. Human driver populations determine how dangerous the intersection is but do not systematically amplify this attack, so fail-safe design cannot assume a cautious test population bounds the risk.",
      "published": "2026-09-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21206",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "penetration",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rasheed Bello",
        "Gurcan Comert",
        "Varghese Vaidyan",
        "Akinbobola Jegede",
        "Vijay Bendigeri",
        "Judith Mwakalonge"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.21217",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "X-SPUR: Explainable Surprisal-Based Protocol-Aware Unsupervised Reasoning for Automotive Ethernet Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Automotive Ethernet carries heterogeneous multi-protocol traffic in modern in-vehicle networks, where labeled attack data are rarely available and the strongest prior unsupervised detector still relies on handcrafted traffic features. This article presents X-SPUR, an explainable, surprisal-based, protocol-aware unsupervised reasoning framework that instead represents raw packet fields as token sequences, learns benign traffic patterns through causal language modeling, and detects anomalies from per-token cross-entropy surprisal. To incorporate temporal context, we introduce a bimodal fusion architecture that combines payload-token embeddings with inter-packet timing through additive fusion and a Hadamard interaction. To handle the heterogeneous score distributions of different protocol families, we further propose a dual top-$k$% per-protocol $Z$-score calibration that jointly captures moderately distributed and sparse anomaly signatures. On the TOW-IDS dataset, X-SPUR achieves an AUC of 0.9987. This is marginally higher than the 0.9969 reported for AERO. X-SPUR also eliminates handcrafted feature engineering. We train a separate CarDS model using the same architecture and training hyperparameters. This model retains strong performance on the second automotive Ethernet dataset. Beyond detection, per-token surprisal provides fine-grained explainability by attributing anomaly scores to specific protocol fields, supporting interpretable security analysis in heterogeneous in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2026-09-18",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21217",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jisoo Kim",
        "Seonghoon Jeong"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.26295",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the security and privacy of LLMs in Mobility",
      "description": "The mobility sector is undergoing a paradigm shift driven by advances in Generative Artificial Intelligence. With a global market valued at approximately 2.9 trillion dollars annually, considering only cars, the integration of these technologies has the potential to impact more than 1.5 billion vehicles worldwide. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in mobility, concerns about cybersecurity, privacy, and reliability emerge. Accordingly, this paper surveys current applications and assesses these challenges. Since the European AI Act classifies transportation AI as high risk, we derive nine technical classes from its requirements to assess current research and future deployments. Our findings show that research mainly studies GPT and Llama models (over 50\\% of reviewed works) and traffic applications while largely neglecting security, privacy, and reliability. This gap extends to AI Act compliance: among 35 reviewed works, only one includes a partial vulnerability assessment and one a partial risk management system. We identify a clear gap between strong optimization performance and regulatory adherence, suggesting compliance is limited less by technology than by a focus on static performance over lifecycle safety, and underscoring an urgent need for security-by-design in safety-critical intelligent transportation systems.",
      "published": "2026-09-22",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26295",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Lorenzo Perinello",
        "Umberto Salviati"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.27803",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The hidden life of signals: Time-domain inferences and other privacy attacks on everyday devices",
      "description": "In privacy research on radiofrequency-based protocols, the dominant focus has remained on Bluetooth, WiFi, and Zigbee, while a broader and arguably more consequential attack surface has gone largely unnoticed: the privacy risks created by the composition of everyday wireless protocols. Widely deployed systems such as KeeLoq remotes, vehicle TPMS sensors, and other sub-GHz devices continuously emit metadata and timing structure that, when analyzed jointly rather than in isolation, enable powerful behavioral inference. This work-in-progress paper argues that privacy leakage in these environments is not merely a property of individual protocols, but an emergent property of their interaction, correlation, and composition across devices, spaces, and routines. The resulting attack surface arises both from protocol metadata that directly degrades privacy and from the latent relationships between devices and the ways users move among and interact with them over time. We present preliminary evidence that these composed signals expose underappreciated opportunities for inference and tracking, and we outline a research agenda for characterizing and mitigating this broader class of privacy failures.",
      "published": "2026-08-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27803",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "tpms"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Larry Hernandez"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.29178",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Poster: FedWM-Guard: Thwarting Imagination Poisoning in Federated World Model-based Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Federated learning (FL) can improve world model (WM)-based autonomous driving (AD) without centralizing raw private vehicle data, but it also turns model aggregation into a safety-critical integrity boundary. We introduce a new threat in federated WM-AD, namely \\emph{imagination poisoning}: compromised vehicles submit bounded WM updates that preserve benign short-horizon predictions yet corrupt long-horizon rollouts (e.g., trigger-conditioned) during training, thereby misleading a downstream planner. We present \\emph{FedWM-Guard}, to the best of our knowledge, the first defense to characterize planner-facing rollouts in federated WM-AD, screen authenticated updates in hidden-canary scenarios, audit predicted futures against later observations, and invoke a WM-independent safety shield when persistent inconsistency is detected. Unlike parameter-space defenses, it scores what an update makes the model \\emph{imagine}, not only how the update looks. We also outline how we plan to evaluate it under non-IID (not independent and identically distributed) data, adaptive attacks, and benign distribution shift. This work highlights an unexplored domain, federated WM-AD, and its threat surface and potential countermeasures.",
      "published": "2026-09-24",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29178",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sheng Liu",
        "Panos Papadimitratos"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.31110",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AuthGuard-R: Safety-Compliant Mission Hijacking and Dual-Gate Defense for LLM-Controlled Robots",
      "description": "Large language models are increasingly used as high-level planners for mobile robots, robot manipulators, and autonomous vehicles. Recent studies show that these systems can be influenced through malicious text, speech, visual instructions, retrieved documents, and poisoned sensory context. Most defenses ask whether a proposed action is physically safe. This paper studies a different problem: an action may be physically safe and still violate the mission authorized by the user. An attacker may redirect a delivery robot, replace an approved object, extend a robot's operating region, activate an unnecessary sensor, or delay a mission without creating an immediate physical hazard. We call this attack \\emph{safety-compliant mission hijacking}. We propose MissionPAIR, an adaptive attack framework that searches for executable plans that pass a safety gate while violating an authenticated mission. We also propose AuthGuard-R, a deterministic authorization layer that binds every executable action to a signed mission, robot identity, object and region scope, current state, time, and input provenance. AuthGuard-R operates with an independent safety gate, giving a dual-gate architecture. We formalize mission policies over robot traces, define security games, and prove authorization soundness, mission non-escalation, replay resistance, robot binding, provenance separation, threshold-approval security, audit-log tamper evidence, and trace-level composition. We report a preliminary cross-model evaluation with Claude Haiku~4.5 and the open-source Qwen2.5~7B planner. Across 240 live attack trials, the planners followed an injected mission deviation in 109 trials; AuthGuard-R rejected all 109 resulting unauthorized actions. A separate hand-constructed suite of eleven protocol- and policy-level attacks was also blocked completely.",
      "published": "2026-09-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31110",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Saidattu Chepuri",
        "Vikas Srivastava"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.31217",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Reinforcement Learning for Misbehavior Detection Under Partially Observable V2X Data",
      "description": "Misbehavior detection in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems is essential for ensuring the semantic correctness of exchanged messages and preventing the dissemination of falsified information. Existing data-centric misbehavior detection approaches largely rely on statistical validation or supervised machine learning models under the implicit assumption of fully observable V2X streams. In practice, however, vehicular environments are inherently partially observable due to hardware failures, intermittent connectivity, and environmental occlusions. Moreover, missingness itself can be strategically exploited by adversaries to evade detection. In this paper, we study misbehavior detection under incomplete V2X observations and propose a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based detection framework that learns adaptive policies with incomplete data. We further introduce an adversarial threat model in which attackers exploit or deliberately induce missingness to evade detection, including evasion via natural occlusions and adversarial feature suppression. Extensive experiments conducted on the VeReMi dataset under various missingness patterns demonstrate that DRL significantly outperforms a powerful XGBoost baseline under natural partial observability. However, results also reveal a critical vulnerability: DRL policies can be highly susceptible to evasion attacks that strategically exploit natural missingness. In contrast, DRL exhibits more gradual degradation under direct feature suppression compared to static tree-based models.",
      "published": "2026-09-25",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31217",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roshan Sedar",
        "Charalampos Kalalas"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.36732",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning Latency Attacks and Defenses: A Cross-Domain Survey of Availability Threats",
      "description": "Adversarial machine learning has focused mainly on integrity, but availability is an increasingly consequential complement. Latency attacks (also energy-latency attacks) increase inference-time work, energy, or response time, causing deadline misses, throughput collapse, or resource exhaustion in vehicle controllers, interactive services, or battery-powered sensors, sometimes while preserving the nominal prediction. This survey unifies a fragmented literature spanning perception pipelines (including physical attacks on autonomous-driving detection and tracking), input-adaptive neural inference (sponge examples, dynamic networks), and autoregressive and agentic systems (output-length, verbose-image, and reasoning denial-of-service attacks on LLMs, VLMs, mixture-of-experts models, and tool-using agents). We organize attacks by exploited computational bottleneck rather than formulation, separating what makes a computation expensive from how the attacker triggers it; the delivery channel (input, prompt or retrieved content, message, poisoning, or weight tampering) is an orthogonal attribute. Many attacks share one mechanism, intermediate-work amplification, motivating a work-budget defense abstraction; we distinguish caps on the work entering an expensive stage from caps on the results leaving it. We further analyze when a model-level cost increase becomes a system-level availability failure, which depends on critical-path share, slack, existing ceilings, accumulation, resource sharing, and fallback policy, not on the amplification factor alone. We also provide a threat-model taxonomy, consolidated quantitative comparisons, a defense review by control mechanism, and open challenges such as standardized evaluation, physical realizability, and whole-system availability. Companion website: https://github.com/guzonghua/awesome-latency-attacks.",
      "published": "2026-09-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36732",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "threats",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zonghua Gu",
        "Zeyu Gao",
        "Amin Saremi",
        "Samarjit Chakraborty"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2609.37742",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lights, Camera, Attack: Exploiting Temporal HDR Fusion with Pulsed Light",
      "description": "Modern cameras widely use temporal High Dynamic Range (HDR) to improve visibility by capturing a sequence of exposures with different integration times and fusing them into a single image. This process implicitly assumes that scene illumination remains sufficiently stable during capture. We introduce FLASH (Fusion-Level Attack by Saturating HDR), an external pulsed-light attack that deliberately attacks this assumption by creating cross-exposure inconsistency before downstream perception. FLASH exploits an algorithmic assumption rather than relying on sensor damage or hardware failure, and requires neither physical camera access, access to raw exposure brackets, knowledge of the fusion algorithm, nor exact phase lock to the camera. Across eight physical camera platforms spanning embedded, surveillance, photography, smartphone, and automotive use cases, and matched optical controls, FLASH causes pipeline-dependent darkening, overexposure, and visibility loss. This includes extreme-darkening rates of 50.0% on an iPhone 16 Pro and 33.7% on a Wyze Battery Cam Pro. On the Wyze camera, FLASH triggers the system-level low-visibility response in 10/10 trials, compared with 0/10 continuous-light and randomized-frequency flashing controls. In a controlled stationary OpenPilot case study, 23.0% of frames exhibit severe darkening in the traffic-cone target region, with target-background CNR decreasing by up to 90.8%. Under FLASH, the OpenPilot interface also fails to display the system-level path state observed in the corresponding control trials. In a controlled night-only HDR reconstruction stress test, a proof-of-concept exposure-rejection defense reduces median output-brightness deviation by 79.16%. These results show that temporal HDR fusion itself requires security-aware validation of exposure evidence.",
      "published": "2026-09-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37742",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alkim Domeke",
        "Michael Kuhr",
        "Roman Gilliatt",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst",
        "Bing Li",
        "Long Cheng",
        "Mert D. Pesé"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.02605",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Rateless Nested Lattice Codes for Secure Cooperative V2X Broadcast over Fading and Erasure Channels",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) sidelink and uplink broadcast must deliver safety-critical and application-layer data reliably under fast time-varying fading, intermittent packet erasures, and exposure to passive eavesdroppers. Fixed-rate physical-layer codes are poorly matched to these conditions because link quality and the number of successfully received symbols vary across vehicles and over time. This paper proposes a unified vehicular communication framework that combines rateless Construction-D' Raptor lattices, nested-lattice physical-layer security (PLS) with direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), and blockchain-assisted trust management for decode-and-forward (DF) cooperative relaying. At the physical layer, Raptor codes provide incremental redundancy over unreliable V2X links; multilevel lattice decoding enables power-efficient joint coding and modulation; nested shaping and spread spectrum limit fine-lattice recovery by eavesdroppers; and a distributed ledger records decoding success at relays to support reputation-aware relay selection. We model the vehicular air interface as a block-Rayleigh fading channel with additive Gaussian noise and random symbol erasures, representative of urban V2X sidelink behavior. The proposed code concatenates Luby-transform (LT) codes with quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) precodes within Construction-D', with girth-4 cycle removal on the Tanner graph. AWGN benchmarks show competitive symbol error rate (SER) and improved frame error rate (FER) versus matched-length LDPC and LDLC lattices. Under block-Rayleigh fading with erasures, for n=995 at average VNR of 1.5 dB and erasure probability 0.15, rateless Raptor reception achieves 0.3% outage with about 2.3 packets on average, outperforming LDLC and LDPC under identical channels, while an eavesdropper with 8 dB combined SNR and spreading loss fails in 62% of sessions.",
      "published": "2026-10-01",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02605",
      "matched_terms": [
        "relay",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pegah Sharifi",
        "Hassan Khodaiemehr",
        "Khadijeh Bagheri",
        "Chen Feng"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.03073",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SecJev: Bringing Security Expertise to System One Decision Models",
      "description": "Security workflows need models that turn complex observations and explicit policies into decisions. System One models introduced by Jev return typed predictions and probabilities; security specialization supplies the domain expertise behind those predictions. We introduce SecJev, to our knowledge the first family of Jev-style decision models specialized for security, spanning 0.8B to 9B parameters. Built on Kev's single-pass candidate scorer, SecJev learns Boolean, choice, and ordered decisions from text, telemetry, and observation histories. We develop SecJev-Corpus to unify source-label prediction and explicit-policy evaluation across 14 tasks and eight sources. It covers tool outputs, traffic, federated updates, consensus, authentication, and vehicle messages. Scene-weighted training adapts the models across these domains while preserving a shared typed decision interface. Security specialization improves every model in the family; SecJev-0.8B outperforms general Kev-9B by 20.51 percentage points in task-macro accuracy. At 0.8B and 4B, SecJev achieves accuracy and latency close to answer-only generative fine-tuning with lower peak allocated GPU memory. SecJev-4B improves on Kev-4B and security-trained generation in prompt-injection and traffic transfer tests. We release adapters, decision heads, SecJev-Corpus, and training and inference code.",
      "published": "2026-10-02",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03073",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zheng Chen",
        "Fei Yu",
        "Haohao Huang",
        "Yang Li",
        "Anlong Chen",
        "Lei Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.06517",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GCTAuto-encoder: A Cross modal Framework for Security Flaw Detection in IoT Networks",
      "description": "IoT encompasses diverse physical entities, from smart home devices to autonomous vehicles, creating a complex environment with heterogeneous security models. This heterogeneity makes IoT sub-systems vulnerable to various network attacks. Modern security systems must therefore be more robust to ensure security and privacy for IoT applications. A highly secure IoT system also demands real time insight, requiring data collection at the edge of the computing layer. This diversity calls for a unified security model applied at the foundational level. Edge intelligence offers a direct approach to handling device diversity. A key goal of edge intelligence in IoT is to extract insight from local data; security models can then use this data to build local node protections, and integrating AI models yields an advanced security solution. This research proposes a novel deep learning algorithm for effective intrusion detection at the edge, supported by a cloud-based IoT framework. We evaluate the proposed cross modal deep learning algorithm against baseline models. The contribution is a cross domain Deep Neural Network (DNN) algorithm for intrusion detection. The objective is to assess a multi-method deep learning model to detect intrusions in IoT systems at the edge via community detection with modeled attention. We evaluate GCT auto-encoder, a novel framework integrating edge intelligence to identify security flaws. The model significantly improves performance and efficiency. On a network intrusion IoT dataset covering multiple attack scenarios, it achieved 0.908 accuracy, reduced learning loss to 0.00156, and outperformed existing approaches.",
      "published": "2026-10-05",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06517",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Najmieh Sadat Safarabadi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.07571",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Models of Electric Vehicle Charging Demands in Distribution Grid Operation: A Review",
      "description": "The rapid integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into the transportation system has introduced a new class of load into power distribution systems (PDS), i.e., EV charging demand (EVCD). The spatiotemporal variability of EVCD poses fundamental challenges for distribution system operators (DSOs), particularly in ensuring secure and reliable network operation. Accurately representing EVCD as a parameter within the distribution optimal power flow (DOPF) problem is a prerequisite for reliable, cost-efficient PDS operation, yet no universally accepted modeling framework has emerged. The existing contributions span a wide spectrum of assumptions, mathematical formulations, and solution paradigms. This article presents a systematic review of methods and models employed to represent EVCD within DOPF frameworks from the DSO's operational perspective. The existing EVCD modeling methods are classified into two primary categories based on EVCD representation: deterministic models and uncertainty-aware models. The two main categories are further divided into several subcategories. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive review on models for integrating EVCD into PDS operation and planning.",
      "published": "2026-10-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07571",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dipayan Sarkar",
        "Qifeng Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.07875",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Don't Let One Lie Survive A Hundred Truths: A Selective Bayesian Trust Estimator for Collaborative Perception",
      "description": "Collaborative perception (CP) enables connected vehicles to see beyond their own sensors but makes them dependent on messages they cannot independently verify. A compromised collaborator can surgically conceal a single safety-critical object or inject a non-existing one while correctly reporting many others. Existing Bayesian trust mechanisms pool agreement across objects, which, while effective against blatant untargeted attacks, either incurs high false-positive rates (FPR), or allows unrelated correct reports to dilute persistent attack evidence for stealthy single-object attackers. To address this problem, we propose SABER, a selective two-tier Bayesian trust estimator. The first tier maintains broad agent and object trust, preserving the ability to downweight benign but low-quality contributors. Cumulative-sum screening selects agent--object pairs with persistent omissions or unsupported reports for focused Bayesian assessment. The second tier checks these pairs against other agents' evidence and maintains a separate, reference-weighted Beta state for each. The lowest pair score constrains agent trust, preventing unrelated reports from diluting a targeted attack. We establish sufficient conditions for stronger attacker-side trust reductions with bounded additional benign false alarms at fixed thresholds. Compared with state-of-the-art CP defenses, SABER improves attack detection while reducing benign FPRs. On OPV2V, SABER improves defense ROC-AUC over MATE by up to 0.427 in late fusion and 0.337 in intermediate fusion. Against advanced intermediate-fusion data fabrication attacks, it increases detection rates over ROBOSAC and LUCIA by up to 96.40 and 67.07 percentage points, respectively, while reducing FPRs.",
      "published": "2026-10-06",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07875",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yutong Liu",
        "Chenyi Wang",
        "Ming F. Li",
        "Qingzhao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3954,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between arxiv:2610.07875 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: persistent, targeted, points, ability, makes, trust, sensors, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.10360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Receiver-Domain Behavioral Probing for Backdoor-Resilient Federated GPS Spoofing Detection in UAV Networks",
      "description": "Federated learning (FL) allows unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) fleets to train a shared GPS spoofing detector without exchanging raw receiver observations. Some UAV-FL schemes use client-reported performance to determine aggregation weights, which allows compromised clients to manipulate their influence on the global model. We study an attack in which two of ten clients poison part of their data, scale their model updates, and inflate their reported accuracy. The accuracy-weighted rule produces a backdoor lift of +0.3036, compared with +0.2415 for attacked FedAvg. To address this vulnerability, we develop receiver-domain behavioral probing. The coordinator evaluates submitted models on counterfactual spoofed samples constructed by assigning benign values to discriminative GPS features and computes trust from the models' responses without using reported accuracy. With independent and identically distributed (IID) client data, our method reduces backdoor lift to -0.0265 and flags the compromised clients. It assumes an honest majority but does not require a configured Byzantine-tolerance parameter. When the number of attackers exceeds the tolerance configured for Multi-Krum, its lift increases from +0.0061 to +0.2837, whereas our method remains close to the honest baseline. We evaluate the approach using a public single-receiver dataset partitioned into simulated UAV clients and examine its limitations under strong client heterogeneity.",
      "published": "2026-10-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "spoofing",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Will Jedrzejczak",
        "Cole Walther",
        "Dilpreet Gill",
        "Moh Khalid Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.10613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Temporal transformer CAN encoder with federated lightweight heads for anomaly detection",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on large numbers of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that constantly exchange information over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Due to the rapidity, structure, and repetition of this communication, even slight variations in timing, payload values, or message patterns can point to unusual activity. Whether due to errors, malfunctions, or deliberate interference, these anomalies are frequently subtle and challenging to identify with conventional methods that handle messages separately or rely on manually created rules. Motivated by this gap, we present a privacy-preserving framework for anomaly detection in in-vehicle networks, based on a Temporal Transformer CAN Encoder with Federated Lightweight Heads, to better capture these irregularities. The detection of subtle temporal and contextual anomalies is made possible by a lightweight Transformer encoder that learns how these signals evolve over time, while a federated learning mechanism enables several vehicles or ECUs to work together to improve a shared model without exchanging raw CAN data. This combination of federated learning and temporal sequence modeling provides robust anomaly detection performance while maintaining efficiency and privacy, according to experiments conducted on open-source datasets.",
      "published": "2026-10-07",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Konstantinos Gyftodimos",
        "Kyriakos Chiotis",
        "Elena Politi",
        "George Dimitrakopoulos",
        "Eirini Liotou"
      ],
      "venue": "Presented at ITS European Congress 2025",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.11490",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Zero-Knowledge Signature Framework for Efficient Post-Quantum Message Authentication in Cooperative Automated Driving",
      "description": "Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV) rely on authenticated Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications to exchange safety-critical information among vehicles and roadside infrastructure. As the automotive industry transitions toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC), the significantly larger public keys and signatures of standardized PQC digital signature algorithms introduce substantial communication overhead, which challenges the scalability of certificate-based V2X authentication, particularly for high-frequency cooperative awareness messages (CAM). This paper presents ZKS-PQC, a zero-knowledge signature framework that enables communication-efficient post-quantum message authentication for cooperative V2X systems. Instead of transmitting complete post-quantum public keys and signatures, the proposed framework replaces this authentication material with a compact Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) while preserving compatibility with existing certificate-based trust architectures. This approach supports incremental migration and backward compatibility with the legacy ECDSA. The framework is implemented using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) and ZKP (Bulletproofs) libraries, and we evaluated the performance of standardized NIST PQC signature algorithms and additional candidate algorithms. Experimental validation on both a Linux platform and a commercial On-Board Unit (OBU) demonstrates substantial reductions in message size exceeding 95% for all algorithms, while limiting additional processing overhead by staying within the order of milliseconds at both sender and receiver in many algorithms, consistent with the latency requirements of real-time V2X operation. By decoupling communication overhead from the size characteristics of post-quantum signature algorithms, ZKS-PQC offers a practical migration strategy for scalable, quantum-resilient message authentication in future CAV systems.",
      "published": "2026-10-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11490",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takahito Yoshizawa",
        "Aysajan Abidin",
        "Edoardo Pena-Gonzalez",
        "Bart Preneel"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.11996",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Moving Target Defense in SDN-enabled EV Charging Network",
      "description": "Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is emerging as a promis- ing technology for EV Charging infrastructure (EVCI) since it enables flexible, programmable control of EVCI networks, yet its security gain to EVCI remains underexplored. SDN-enabled EVCI faces an increas- ing number of cyber threats arising from the convergence of IT and OT components; in particular, low-rate Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Ear- lier works identify a trend toward low-rate attacks in OT networks that may exhaust SDN switch flow tables and which can result in disabling the entire charging sites without triggering volume-based defenses. In this paper, we propose CS-SHIELD, a Moving Target Defense mecha- nism for SDN-enabled EVCI communication. We showcase the imple- mentation of the proposed mechanism that detects malicious flow table rules via cross-layer identity verification and responds by reassigning virtual IP addresses to all active chargers. Experiments on an emulated SDN testbed with a real charging protocol implementation demonstrate that CS-SHIELD maintains full site availability under attack, responds quickly, adds only a negligible delay under normal conditions. The reas- signing (shuffle) approach at each reaction makes the earlier reconnais- sance knowledge by the attacker rendered worthless.",
      "published": "2026-10-08",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11996",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roland Plaka",
        "Mikael Asplund",
        "Simin Nadjm-Tehran"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.15390",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Acoustic Sensing to Physical Actions: A Comprehensive Survey of Security Risks in Edge-Deployed Audio LLM-Based Agents",
      "description": "Audio Large Language Models (Audio LLMs) are embedded in agents for smart homes, vehicles, wearables, and embodied systems, where acoustic inputs can propagate from perception into persistent state and consequential execution. This setting extends security analysis beyond model behavior to the system conditions that determine how acoustic inputs can influence agent behavior and external actions. Existing surveys examine acoustic security, LLM-based agents, and edge deployment in isolation, leaving their security interactions in deployed Audio LLM-based agents insufficiently characterized. This survey introduces an Acoustic Sensing-to-Action (S2A) system model that traces these security implications along the path from acoustic sensing to external execution, while accounting for edge-cloud runtime and lifecycle transformation. We use the model to synthesize attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods across the acoustic, agent, and edge-system literature. The synthesis shows that security gaps can emerge within components and at the transitions between stages, where protections developed for one stage do not necessarily provide end-to-end assurance in the deployed system. These findings motivate security evaluation that follows acoustic influence from sensing to action across persistent state, system boundaries, and changing deployment conditions in real-world agents.",
      "published": "2026-10-11",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15390",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Binhong Wang",
        "Haidong Kang",
        "Yanfeng Zhang",
        "Hong-Ning Dai",
        "Guo Yu",
        "Shangce Gao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.19566",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mission (Im)Possible: Towards Autonomous Discovery of Autopilot Logic Flaws in Open-Source Drone Frameworks",
      "description": "Autonomous drones are increasingly deployed in safety-critical tasks, yet their autopilot software can still contain subtle logic flaws that lead to unsafe behaviors. These flaws are difficult to discover with existing techniques because they often depend on semantic relationships across modules, commands, and runtime state, and rarely manifest as crashes or detectable failures. With recent advances in LLMs, we observe that, when equipped with essential domain knowledge and carefully crafted context, LLMs demonstrate strong capabilities in understanding the high-level semantics of autopilot systems, making them suitable for logic flaw discovery. However, LLMs are limited by their context and can be biased to the vulnerabilities frequently occurs in training dataset, while logic flaws often require higher-level semantic bug oracles to identify their existence. To bridge the gap, we present Impossible Mission Finder (IMF), a multi-agent system combining static analysis, dynamic execution and log analysis, that supports fully automated identify, test, and validate logic flaws in autonomous vehicles. IMF primarily contains three LLM agents, it first uses the auditor agent to propose logic flaw hypothesis based on carefully-crafted program slicing, then it launches tester agents to write and execute test cases for each candidate, and finally it spawns the log analyzer agent to validate the execution log against the flaw hypothesis. This enables IMF dynamically validate bug oracles in a case-by-case manner, making it suitable for discovering logic flaws that do not have a unified pattern. We evaluated IMF on two widely used open-source autopilot systems, PX4 and Ardupilot, leading to 105 previously unknown logic flaws, that can cause unsafe behaviors including mission interruption failures, invalid actions, entering into restricted fly zones etc.",
      "published": "2026-10-14",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19566",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ziyi Liang",
        "Zichuan Li",
        "Bin Yuan",
        "Deqing Zou",
        "Luyi Xing"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.21034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Can Autonomous Vehicles Keep Their Cool? A Survey of Thermal Side-Channel and Perception Attacks",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) couple safety-critical perception to thermally constrained compute. Physical adversaries can spoof thermal infrared (IR) sensors used for night driving, while unprivileged software co-tenants can fingerprint perception workloads from thermal, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS), and thermal event interrupt (TEI) telemetry required for package safety. These paths differ in mechanism and privilege, but both exploit interfaces that AV stacks cannot disable without compromising Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF). Existing microarchitectural and CPS surveys cover cache timing, adversarial ML, and camera or LiDAR spoofing; none frames physical thermal IR attacks and unprivileged silicon thermal telemetry as one residual-risk class. This survey systematizes thirteen works into thermal perception integrity, telemetry leakage, and model-information extraction, comparing them by privilege, timescale, co-tenancy, deployability, and AV relevance while mapping defenses to residual risk. A commodity proxy supports the software co-tenant branch only; physical IR evidence comes from cited literature. We identify open problems in on-target automotive evaluation, fusion trust under IR spoofing, chiplet thermal coupling, capability-based telemetry, and standards-ready threat analysis, motivating co-design across sensors, operating systems, silicon, and automotive standards.",
      "published": "2026-10-15",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Harsh Aaryan",
        "Ce Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.24810",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Trust Scores to Driver Decisions: An Abstaining Evidential Decision Layer for Event Validation in VANETs",
      "description": "Trust management in vehicular ad hoc networks is highly active, yet the decision that a driver needs, whether a reported event is real, has received far less attention; the schemes that make it force every decision into two outcomes, even on thin or conflicting evidence. This paper presents CREST, a vehicle-side event-decision framework that can withhold a decision its evidence does not support. Each vehicle weights the reports it holds by the trust, proximity and freshness of their senders, fuses them with Yager's rule, and decides only when the fused margin reaches an abstention threshold. Abstention is a waiting state: a vehicle still unsure at the event is resolved by an explicit application policy, which makes the trade-off between missed hazards and unnecessary detours visible. CREST requires only a scalar trust per reporter and is built here on an evidential trust model whose consensus and revocation steps are updated to support the decision layer. A single report is shown to change the decision margin by at most its weight, which bounds the influence of an attacker coalition by its trust. In a pre-registered simulation study with fourteen attacks, including position spoofing and trust-gated camouflage, and with all unspecified parameters of all systems tuned by the same procedure, CREST reduces the decision error of two published trust-based dissemination systems from 0.162 and 0.106 to 0.051. With the best-guess policy it also lowers both missed and unnecessary reroutes and outperforms the forced binary rule on both error types in every cell.",
      "published": "2026-10-17",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.24810",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "spoofing",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "İpek Abasıkeleş Turgut"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.32626",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy-Preserving Federated Loss Exploration for Vision-Based Perception under Non-IID Data",
      "description": "Vision-based image classification models benefit from Federated Learning (FL) across vehicles, however learning accurate models from distributed vehicular cameras is challenging due to data heterogeneity and privacy concerns. To improve performance on non-IID data, advanced FL optimization approaches have emerged that share auxiliary insights, such as client gradient behaviors. While these gradient-guided optimized FL methods improve the model accuracy, their reliance on sharing additional gradient information introduces a previously unexplored privacy vulnerability. In our empirical privacy-leakage experiment, we show that a malicious server can infer clients' label sets from shared guidance matrices under heterogeneous client label distributions (simulated via Dirichlet-based label partitions), between 50% and 84% accuracy. To address this privacy leakage, we propose PPFLex that replaces the central server with three Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) servers to securely compute the global guidance matrix and perform federated averaging under semi-honest and malicious MPC server assumptions. We evaluate PPFLex on widely used traffic-sign classification datasets (e.g., GTSRB and BTSC) as representative autonomous vehicle perception benchmarks, comparing against baselines. Our results show that PPFLex achieves accuracy comparable to the plain-text FedLEx pipeline while preventing privacy leakage, incurring acceptable MPC overhead.",
      "published": "2026-10-23",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32626",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nergiz Yuca",
        "Christian Internò",
        "Nikolay Matyunin",
        "Markus Olhofer",
        "Barbara Hammer",
        "Stefan Katzenbeisser"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.32902",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVSEFuzz : A Tool for Automated Testing of Protocol Implementations",
      "description": "The rapid adoption and development of electric vehicle (EV) networks has required the expansive deployment of EV charging infrastructure (EVCI) which relies on communication protocols such as the open charge point protocol (OCPP) to coordinate data transfer between charging network operators and the EV supply equipment. In this paper, we present EVSEFuzz, a tool for automatically building fuzzers to test the security of protocol implementations. To achieve this we make a novel use of Python datatype validation packages and tools to ``understand'' datatypes and message structures and generate both compliant and non-compliant messages. To date, EVSEFuzz has been tested successfully with several open and closed-source implementations and has found several vulnerabilities leading to the publication of two CVEs.",
      "published": "2026-10-23",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7375f159838b949cf1912405c112f0c8c2d460a2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soham Gumaste",
        "Michael Khan",
        "Roland Varriale",
        "Rigel Gjomemo"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.33526",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security evaluation of 6G-oriented and O-RAN networks through targeted attacks",
      "description": "The sixth generation (6G) of networks is supported by increased bandwidth, automation through the use of O-RAN technologies. Simultaneously though autonomous operation leads to an extensive threat surface and sophisticated attacks. Understanding the attack impact, the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures that are used by attackers is extremely challenging, but however is crucial for developing defense and mitigation strategies against them. This paper evaluates a targeted attack chain against a virtualized, 6G-oriented O-RAN testbed in which the F1 midhaul interface is accessible to an attacker and transport-layer protection is not enabled. The attack disrupts the legitimate O-DU association, introduces a rogue O-DU using observed configuration parameters, and intercepts user-plane traffic. The attack was evaluated in a fully virtualized testbed based on Open5GS, the srsRAN Project, FlexRIC, and an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure based on OCPP 1.6.",
      "published": "2026-10-24",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/230e52346f83355632430a7add8d20e5680edc77",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Apostolos Valiakos",
        "D. Psaltis",
        "Alexios Lekidis",
        "Nikolaos Kekatos",
        "Elpiniki I. Papageorgiou"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.35521",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PRISMA: Differentially Private Synthetic In-Car Telemetry via Differentiable Simulation",
      "description": "Differentially private synthesis of in-car energy consumption data is challenging because the output is high-dimensional, and known lower bounds show that the privacy-utility trade-off degrades with the square root of the number of output dimensions. However, we observe that the intrinsic dimensionality of in-car energy consumption is much lower than that of the raw trace: given a small set of contextual personal variables-such as start point, end point, the car model, and the driving behavior-the consumption profile can be largely explained by publicly available map data (including elevation) combined with a physical model of vehicle energy use. We exploit this low intrinsic dimensionality in PRISMA, a Privacy-preserving In-car Synthesis and Modelling Algorithm. PRISMA involves three stages: (i) energy consumption traces are encoded into a low-dimensional latent space; (ii) the distribution of latent vectors is synthesized using the differentially private tabular data synthesis algorithm AIM, and (iii) samples drawn from this distribution are decoded back into full energy consumption traces via a differentiable physics-based simulation, a step that consumes no additional privacy budget since it uses only public information. By using a compact, physically-grounded latent representation of the traces, PRISMA significantly reduces the effective output dimension. Our experimental results show that PRISMA achieves for a competitive $\\varepsilon = 0.5$ a better data synthesis performance than prior tabular and marginal-based DP synthesis baselines by preserving the diversity of the original power consumption profiles without collapsing to a small set of modes.",
      "published": "2026-10-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.35521",
      "matched_terms": [
        "car",
        "exploit",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kilian Zeiseweis",
        "Nele Sophie Brügge",
        "Marven Kummerfeldt",
        "Ali Raza",
        "Esfandiar Mohammadi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.35729",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Category-Selective Encryption Framework for Privacy Protection of UAV Images",
      "description": "Imagery captured by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems increasingly raises privacy concerns, as UAV aerial surveillance routinely captures sensitive objects such as pedestrians and vehicles alongside ordinary scene content. Existing privacy-preserving approaches typically employ class-agnostic saliency detection to indiscriminately obfuscate all visually salient regions, leading to unnecessary information loss and hindering downstream scene analysis. This paper proposes a category-selective encryption framework for privacy-preserving UAV surveillance. The core advance over prior class-agnostic approaches is semantic-level selectivity: the system first recognizes what is present in the scene via an 80-class detector, then encrypts only user-specified sensitive categories while leaving non-sensitive objects and background intact for downstream analytics. The framework supports two complementary encryption schemes: Thumbnail-Preserving Encryption (TPE), which applies adaptive pixelation with a learnable blend parameter and recovers content through a jointly trained Enhanced U-Net, and XOR stream cipher encryption, which offers parameter-free, mathematically exact reversibility. The architectural design, composite loss formulation, and joint training methodology are presented in detail, establishing a foundation for practical privacy-preserving UAV surveillance that balances protection strength and scene utility.",
      "published": "2026-10-26",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.35729",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "vehicle",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ting Yan",
        "Minghui Shang",
        "Haolang Sun",
        "Xu Wang",
        "Yamin Han",
        "Mingze He"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.37059",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Janus Vehicles: Entity-Centric Threat Modelling of Protocol-Conformant Vehicles under a Malicious-Manufacturer Assumption",
      "description": "Automotive cybersecurity commonly assumes benign end-product manufacturers and design authorities, focusing on supply-chain threats, external attacks, and compromised network participants observable through misbehaviour. This assumption overlooks malicious-by-design vehicles that remain authentic and protocol-conformant while performing undeclared sensing, communication, or context-triggered actuation. We formulate an Entity-Centric Threat Model spanning three subcomponents. The first, Malign Entity Archetypes, describes four types of malign entity: peer-benign, purpose-malicious vehicles; compromised vehicles; reappropriated genuine components; and imitated vehicles or components. The model exposes two assurance gaps: authenticity does not establish declared-purpose conformance, while malicious functionality can evade detection based on behavioural history or peer-visible evidence. Reappropriated components can remain genuine and retain usable identities or capabilities outside authorised contexts, reducing the effectiveness of signal fingerprinting and certificate-based authentication. To structure this threat space, we introduce a Behaviour-Locus Matrix that maps covert, overt, and concealment actions across hardware, software, and network loci. For peer-benign, purpose-malicious vehicles, we further present a Behavioural Interaction Model that represents how hidden capabilities are contextually activated, realised through actions, manifested within the vehicle and its environment, and potentially observed or concealed.",
      "published": "2026-10-27",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaeung Franciskus Yoo",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.38557",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Minimally Informed Black-Box Fake-Report Attack on DRL Traffic-Signal Control",
      "description": "Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) traffic-signal controllers may use vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) reports, exposing their perception layer to false-data injection. Existing demonstrations typically assume either white-box access to the controller's weights or full observability of the traffic state. We study the impact of a weaker and more realistic adversary who has no access to the RL model and whose traffic observations are limited to her own approach. This black-box, minimally informed attacker trains an imitation surrogate of the controller. She then crafts bounded fake reports, restricted to inflating vehicle counts on her own approach, that transfer to the real controller. We demonstrate that despite the loss of accuracy relative to an attacker who can observe the entire state and action space, this limited attacker can significantly increase the average waiting time for other approaches while barely changing the waiting time on her own approach, i.e. externalizing the added delay onto the other approaches. Because the only realizable move is to inflate one's own reported queue, we find that a zero-knowledge attacker that simply reports the maximum feasible queue is as damaging as the surrogate-based one, while an unstructured random inflation is not: the surrogate is not required to reproduce the degradation, and the exposed vulnerability is the V2I sensing channel itself. The surrogate's role is directional control, selecting a disruptive or a selfish objective at the same budget. The attack persists under +/-20% uniform demand variation. Finally, on a common per-lane budget we place the attacker on a knowledge ladder against white-box adversaries, and find the black-box surrogate matches a realizable white-box attacker that uses the victim's own gradients; only abandoning realizability raises the damage further.",
      "published": "2026-10-28",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38557",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amro Saleh",
        "Loukas Lazos",
        "Mohammad J. Abdel-Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.38632",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The use of post-quantum cryptography in the automotive context",
      "description": "This study comparatively evaluates post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in automotive communication scenarios, considering the threat posed by quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's algorithms. The simulations use OMNeT++, Veins, INET, and SUMO on two hardware platforms and examine ML-KEM/CRYSTALS-Kyber, ML-DSA/CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and FALCON. ML-KEM and ML-DSA are finalized NIST standards, whereas FALCON is a NIST-selected candidate pending final standardization. The evaluation considers a rural V2V scenario and an urban V2X scenario supported by a roadside unit. Kyber exhibits low {key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)}\\color{black} operation latency, Dilithium provides balanced signature performance, and FALCON has high key-generation and signing costs but efficient verification. The results are interpreted as a comparative assessment among the evaluated PQC schemes under the reported simulation conditions; {a conventional ECDSA/ECDH baseline measured in the same simulation setup is also reported for reference.}\\color{black} The resulting dataset can support future studies of cryptographic selection in automotive systems.",
      "published": "2026-10-28",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38632",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "threat",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mariana do Carmo Barata Gonçalves",
        "Valderi Reis Quietinho Leithardt"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.41055",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Communication-Efficient Private Federated Reinforcement Learning with Post-Quantum Authentication for Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Federated reinforcement learning supports cooperative vehicular routing without centralizing trajectory data, but model updates may reveal private information and incur communication overhead over intermittent vehicle-to-infrastructure links, particularly when post-quantum authentication is required. We study correlated private quantization, using complementary shared randomness between paired vehicles to reduce aggregation mean squared error while preserving the marginal parameter-level local differential privacy and one-bit communication cost of independent quantization. A tunable extension mixes shared and independent randomness to bound privacy leakage given paired outputs and shared-randomness side information. For this extension, Rényi differential privacy accounting establishes vector-level local differential privacy for one model upload even when pairings are revealed. Under matched vector-level privacy and identical local and global parameters, the extension yields 16.5% lower analytical aggregation mean squared error than independent quantization. We evaluate cooperative routing by coupling traffic simulation with packet-level simulation of post-quantum-authenticated vehicle-to-infrastructure communication. Compared to full-precision updates, one-bit uploads reduce authenticated uplink size by 92.4% and increase mean verified updates aggregated per round from 19.6 to 26.5. Under mobility-constrained communication at a parameter-level privacy budget of 1, correlated private quantization reduces mean travel time by 14.3% relative to independent quantization at the same budget and communication cost. At a parameter-level privacy budget of 0.3, a vehicle-origin inference attack trained on independent simulations reaches 30% accuracy with correlated private quantization and 22% with independent quantization after 100 rounds, versus 91% without privacy and 10% for random guessing.",
      "published": "2026-10-29",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41055",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hojat Allah Salehi",
        "Devrim Aras",
        "Md Jueal Mia",
        "M. Hadi Amini",
        "Imtiaz Karim",
        "Mashrur Chowdhury",
        "Bhavani Thuraisingham"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "arxiv:2610.42032",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Beyond Smart Homes: Characterizing IoT Vulnerabilities Across Sectors, Vendors, and Products",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) has expanded beyond consumer smart homes to sectors, such as industrial systems, healthcare, and smart cities, broadening the IoT attack surface. Prior empirical work has focused on studying aggregate IoT vulnerability characteristics or specific protocols, so patching is directed by aggregate security guidance. However, if dominant weaknesses differ substantially across sectors or products, such uniform guidance misdirects the remediation effort. To address this gap, we present a fine-grained, data-driven analysis of IoT vulnerabilities using a dataset of more than 15,000 IoT specific CVEs. We design a pipeline to enrich noisy CPE (Common Platform Enumeration) metadata, normalizing vendors and products, then assigning product type and sector labels using lexical matching, fuzzy clustering, and LLM-assisted classification. We find meaningful differences in the weakness profile of IoT sectors. For example, healthcare is dominated by authentication and credential weaknesses, while automotive faces memory issues. More importantly, we find that weakness profiles are more similar across different product types from the same vendor than across the same product type built by different vendors. This suggests vendor-level factors such as shared code and development practices dominate weakness inheritance, making a vendor's disclosure history informative about its other products. Our findings suggest weakness classes should be used to prioritize remediation efforts.",
      "published": "2026-10-30",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42032",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tina Rezaei",
        "Suzan Bayhan",
        "Andrea Continella",
        "Jeroen van der Ham-de Vos",
        "Roland van Rijswijk-Deij"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/047134608x.w8452",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection and Prevention for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract Vehicular Ad Hoc NETworks (VANETs) have contributed to the progress of connected vehicles by forming the core of intelligent transportation systems. VANETs improve road safety and driving conditions by offering a wide range of services. Malicious or rogue vehicles in VANETs may launch diverse security attacks on these networks. The security of VANETs from malicious entities is critical considering their potentially harmful impacts on public safety. Intrusion detection and prevention in VANETs are challenging due to the dynamic nature of VANETs and their distinguishing characteristics such as high mobility and dynamic topology. In this article, we introduce the architecture and characteristics of VANETs, discuss the challenges and requirements involved in intrusion detection and prevention, and explain different security attacks and types of attackers in VANETs. We also discuss some recent approaches for two specific types of security attacks in VANETs, false information attacks and Sybil attacks that use different technologies to deal with these attacks. We further analyze the advantages and limitations of these approaches and conclude the article by discussing some open issues in intrusion detection in VANETs based on the limitations of the existing intrusion detection approaches.",
      "published": "2025-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/047134608x.w8452",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abinash Borah",
        "Gideon Adele",
        "Anirudh Paranjothi"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1002/047134608x.w8452",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4047,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1002/047134608x.w8452 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: nature, information, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc157",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Politainment",
      "description": "Abstract The term politainment refers to the intertwining of politics and entertainment, and encompasses two processes: (1) political entertainment—how the entertainment industry exploits political topics in various entertainment formats; and (2) entertaining politics—how political actors capitalize on their celebrity (staging photo‐ops, party convention spectacle, talk‐show appearances, etc.) in order to enhance their images and to promote certain issues. When broadly defined, politainment moves beyond its association with infotainment to consider popular culture as a potential space for political insight and activity, and to acknowledge entertainment formats as sources of political knowledge, value orientation, and civic engagement. As a growing body of international scholarship attests, new hybrid media formats increasingly engage “political reality” across genres, conventional and new, in new television formats such as political satire and realityTV, fictionalized realism (in film, television, telenovelas, and interactive video games), and new variations of the celebrity media event genre. Such research recognizes that pleasures found in popular cultural formats of everyday life can also be ways of cultivating audiences' conscious motivations for political participation.",
      "published": "2015-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc157",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploits",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kristina Riegert",
        "Sue Collins"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc157",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781118894774.ch5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security Risk Analysis for Intelligent Transport Systems and In‐vehicle Networks",
      "description": "This chapter describes investigations of cyber security for in-vehicle networks by considering the external networks that the vehicle will need to interact with for intelligent transport systems (ITS) and telematics purposes. In order to define security and safety requirements it is first necessary to have an understanding of both the intended behaviour of the system and the intended operating environment. This can be achieved through analysis of a range of representative use cases. Risk analysis is essential for cost-effective security engineering, as it provides an objective basis for judging whether the implementation of security features to address the security requirements identified from the threat analysis is justified in terms of the perceived risks. The chapter explains a unified approach to risk analysis that takes account of both security and security-related safety aspects, and cyber security risk management.",
      "published": "2015-10-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118894774.ch5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alastair R. Ruddle",
        "David Ward"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781118894774.ch5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119244400.ch15",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security in V2X Communications",
      "description": "This chapter identifies some of the major challenges and possible solutions for security in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. The wireless technologies in V2X communications are mostly based on either dedicated short range communications or cellular technologies. Security and privacy are vital in V2X communications. The chapter lists the security requirements, possible attacks, and an overview of the basic solutions. The primary security services in V2X communications include authentication of information, authorization of entities, privacy of users, and availability of systems. IEEE Standard 1609.2 defines security services for applications and management for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE). The WAVE Security Services consist of internal security services and higher layer security services. Cellular based V2X communications are mostly based on long-term evolution and future fifth generation wireless networks. The chapter focuses on the schemes targeting scalability and privacy in V2X communications. It highlights some of the major challenges and future research directions towards secure V2X communications.",
      "published": "2021-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119244400.ch15",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Qian",
        "Feng Ye",
        "Hsiao‐Hwa Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119244400.ch15",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119444565.ch26",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "InsurTech Trends – Why Regionalization Matters",
      "description": "This chapter explores what prospects each trend of InsurTech has and how they may evolve depending on regional differences. Technology infrastructure is gradually increasing; this enables Peer-to-Peer (P2P) insurance companies to reach uninsured regions and use the opportunities there. The insurance industry is transforming at a fast pace. This is primarily due to the impact of a variety of breakthrough technologies, such as cloud computing, the Internet of Things (IoT), telematics, the blockchain, and artificial intelligence (AI). Microinsurance will continue to grow in markets in developing countries. On-demand insurance allows policy-holders to quickly insure their life, health, homes, objects, and vehicles for a short time using a mobile application. The most market-ready solutions could be constructed using a blockchain stack, where claims validation is electronically simple, like flight delay or cyber attacks. In the near future, it is expected that more countries will try to lay down rules for cyber insurance.",
      "published": "2018-03-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119444565.ch26",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vasyl Soloshchuk",
        "Yuri Kartashov"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119444565.ch26",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119579663.ch8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Reduction for Automotive Applications",
      "description": "Risk reduction has been important in the automotive industry since long before the ISO 26262 standard was released. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) techniques were being used in the automotive industry, and they were standardized by the Automotive Industry Action Group and then by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). The automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) decomposition is intended to provide a more economical approach to satisfy the requirements of an ASIL. There are three potential sources for safety requirements: requirements that flow down from the safety goals and customer-provided system safety requirements; requirements derived from safety analyses; and interface requirements. ISO 26262 requires communication between the domains of cybersecurity and functional safety to prevent the neglect of information elicited by each that may be useful to the other. Automotive timing for a launch-critical program that targets a model year is obtained through diligent program management.",
      "published": "2019-12-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119579663.ch8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joseph D. Miller"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119579663.ch8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119710783.ch12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Continuous Cybersecurity Monitoring, Vulnerability Management, Incident Response, and Secure OTA Updates",
      "description": "This chapter explains the need for cybersecurity monitoring and secure over-the-air (OTA) updates based on the current state of the automotive industry and automotive software development. The continuous cybersecurity monitoring activity covers vulnerability management and incident response, thus the automotive organization must have the capabilities to manage and respond to detected vulnerabilities and attacks based on the criticality and relevance. The chapter discusses common challenges for automotive organizations in terms of software inventory, monitoring vulnerabilities, and vulnerable vehicles. It presents an overall solution for securing vehicles after production consisting of release management, monitoring and tracking, and secure OTA updates. The Secure OTA Platform uses best practices for secure communication, and encryption and digital signatures to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the software update packages.",
      "published": "2021-03-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119710783.ch12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119710783.ch12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119710783.ch2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Introduction to Security in the Automotive Software Development Lifecycle",
      "description": "This chapter analyzes the current automotive development lifecycle and existing challenges. It provides recommendations on how to address security at each step in the automotive software development lifecycle. The traditional development process in the automotive industry follows the Automotive Software Process Improvement and Capability determination V-model. This development process shows the different activities and steps included in the automotive development lifecycle. For each step in the V-model there are security solutions that automotive organizations can employ. To reduce the risk of software vulnerabilities, the following recommendations on how to address security in each stage of the software development cycle are provided. The chapter discusses new technical challenges and presents suggestions for how to tackle such challenges. An example that may introduce new technical challenges is adopting the fuzz testing activity in the development lifecycle.",
      "published": "2021-03-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119710783.ch2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119710783.ch2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119710783.ch4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Need for Automated Security Solutions in the Automotive Software Development Lifecycle",
      "description": "Recent results from a survey conducted on the cybersecurity posture in the automotive industry provide valuable insight into the current challenges the automotive industry is facing. This chapter reviews the main challenges in the automotive industry leading to vulnerabilities in automotive systems, including challenges related to coding, testing and the use of open-source software. To overcome the challenges, automotive organizations can apply a number of automated security solutions in the product development phases as presented in this chapter. These solutions comprise static code analysis, software composition analysis, and security testing approaches including security functional testing, vulnerability scanning, and fuzz testing. The chapter discusses some examples of security solutions that automotive organizations can apply during the operation and maintenance phases. These solutions and activities encompass cybersecurity monitoring, vulnerability management, incident response, and over-the-air updates.",
      "published": "2021-03-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119710783.ch4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119710783.ch4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119710783.ch7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overview of Automotive Security Testing Approaches",
      "description": "This chapter explores practical security testing approaches in more detail. It provides an overview of practical security testing for automotive systems focusing on security functional testing, vulnerability scanning, fuzz testing, and penetration testing. The chapter also provides insights into establishing a framework for security testing to allow for systematic and efficient testing based on defined processes, test tools, and test approaches. It discusses the processes involved in performing a deep-dive on fuzz testing for automotive systems and the parts required in a fuzz testing environment, including the fuzz engine, injector, and monitor. One crucial aspect for automotive systems fuzzing is to monitor the target system for unexpected behavior. The monitor can be based on in-band instrumentation, where the same protocol that is being fuzzed is observed, or external instrumentation, where separate means for monitoring the target system is used.",
      "published": "2021-03-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119710783.ch7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "fuzzing",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119710783.ch7",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781119871989.ch9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security and Threat Analysis in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119871989.ch9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siddhant Dash",
        "Chandrashekhar Azad"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781119871989.ch9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781394284795.ch12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Moving Smart",
      "description": "A key component of modern cities’ sustainable development, urban mobility has a significant impact on environmental outcomes, public health, and economic progress. To address the complexity of urban transportation systems and enhance creative transportation planning, this chapter examines the application of spatial intelligence by combining telematics, real-time routing, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and spatial data. It explores the spatial intelligence contributions to resource allocation, dynamic traffic management, and accessibility enhancements, especially in economically disadvantaged regions. To support inclusive and adaptable transportation networks, issues of integrity, spatial justice, and data-driven decision-making are emphasised. Scholarly interest in urban mobility has increased with global shifts in transportation technologies and urban planning priorities, as revealed through a bibliometric analysis of publication trends from 2010 to 2023. It highlights the significance of local citizen participation and the relevance of cultural identity, while also addressing data privacy, technical integration, and the interoperability of systems.",
      "published": "2026-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394284795.ch12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashi Kant Gupta",
        "Hind Hammouch",
        "Adnène Arbi",
        "Kudratjon Zohirov",
        "Catalino N. Mendoza",
        "Sushobhan Majumdar"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781394284795.ch12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781394340828.app01",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Driving Legal Frameworks of the European Union and China: A Comparative Study",
      "description": "This appendix employs the methodology of comparative legal analysis to examine how the European Union (EU) and China have addressed the legal challenges brought by autonomous driving. 1 The EU and China are chosen for comparison because of their global significance in the development of the autonomous driving industry and their contrasting approaches.Among the EU Member States, Germany is at the forefront of the legislative process and is discussed in detail.The rest of this appendix first outlines the legislative progress of the two jurisdictions in regulating autonomous vehicles and compares the legislative approaches of the EU and China.It then conducts a further comparative analysis in three major legal areas of autonomous driving: product approval and road operation, liability attribution for traffic accidents, and data governance. A.1 Legislative Progress Overview A.1.1 European UnionOn the international level, EU Member States are contracting parties to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic (Vienna Convention), which is an international treaty on road traffic ratified by 86 contracting parties worldwide.Article 8 of the Convention was amended in March 2016 to recognize the legality of an automated driving system as being in conformity with the human driver control requirement.The EU is also a contracting party to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which is, among other things, responsible for developing standards for transportation issues.The EU generally incorporates the technical regulations of the UNECE directly into its legislation, including UNECE Regulation No. 13-H on Brakes, No. 79 on Steering Equipment, No. 155 on cybersecurity, No. 156 on Software Updates, and No. 157 on Automated Lane",
      "published": "2026-09-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394340828.app01",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jianxin Zhao",
        "Liang Wang",
        "Alexey Vinel"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781394340828.app01",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/9781405186407.wbieca032",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Affects and Media Exposure",
      "description": "This entry covers the role of affect, mood, and emotions in exposure to media content. The influence of affect, mood, and emotions in media exposure on the impact of media is indisputable (Döveling et al. 2010; Konijn 2013). Formerly, the emphasis was largely on cognitive aspects such as recall, learning, thoughts, and beliefs. The affective aspects were reserved for entertainment media, mostly limited to processes of involvement and gratifications (→ Involvement with Media Content; Entertainment, Effects of). Nowadays, the borders between entertainment and → news and information are blurred. Entertainment programs likeThe SimpsonsandSurvivalclaim to be reality‐based (→ Reality TV), whereas news items and information programming (e.g., → Infotainment) increasingly make use of emotionalizing cues such as personal anecdotes and zooming in on “crying faces” (→ Narrative News Story; Soft News). For example, the Fox News broadcast of the invasion of Iraq by the US army in the Second Gulf War appeared like a → video game such as America's Army, including the upbeat music. The attack on the World Trade Center towers in New York (9/11) seemed a gruesome science fiction at first hand, whereas fiction‐based TV shows likeERinform on real‐life hospital affairs. Recently, Internet clips from the Islamic State (IS) showing beheadings are another example where “news” and “entertainment” become blurred.",
      "published": "2015-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405186407.wbieca032",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elly A. Konijn"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiley eBooks",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1002/9781405186407.wbieca032",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/adma.202110463",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Holographic Head‐Up Displays",
      "description": "Driver's access to information about navigation and vehicle data through in-car displays and personal devices distract the driver from safe vehicle management. The discrepancy between road safety and infotainment must be addressed to develop safely operated modern vehicles. Head-up displays (HUDs) aim to introduce a seamless uptake of visual information for the driver while securely operating a vehicle. HUDs projected on the windshield provide the driver with visual navigation and vehicle data within the comfort of the driver's personal eye box through a customizable extended display space. Windshield HUDs do not require the driver to shift the gaze away from the road to attain road information. This article presents a review of technological advances and future perspectives in holographic HUDs by analyzing the optoelectronics devices and the user experience of the driver. The review elucidates holographic displays and full augmented reality in 3D with depth perception when projecting the visual information on the road within the driver's gaze. Design factors, functionality, and the integration of personalized machine learning technologies into holographic HUDs are discussed. Application examples of the display technologies regarding road safety and security are presented. An outlook is provided to reflect on display trends and autonomous driving.",
      "published": "2022-02-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/adma.202110463",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jana Skirnewskaja",
        "Timothy D. Wilkinson"
      ],
      "venue": "Advanced Materials",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1002/adma.202110463",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 81,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/asjc.2980",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lateral control for autonomous wheeled vehicles: A technical review",
      "description": "Abstract Autonomous driving has the ability to reshape mobility and transportation by reducing road accidents, traffic jams, and air pollution. This can yield energy efficiency, convenience, and more productivity as significant driving time will be gained and used in other activities instead. Autonomous vehicles are complex systems consisting of several modules that perform perception, decision‐making, planning, and control. Control is essential for achieving automatic driving; it is basically divided into longitudinal control that handles speed tracking and lateral control which ensures accurate steering. The latter is primordial in path tracking applications and recent research has witnessed a huge leap in this field. The aim of this paper is to provide a technical survey of the latest research on the lateral control of autonomous vehicles as well as to highlight technical challenges and limits for further developments.",
      "published": "2022-11-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/asjc.2980",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yassine Kebbati",
        "Naïma Ait Oufroukh",
        "Dalil Ichalal",
        "Vincent Vigneron"
      ],
      "venue": "Asian Journal of Control",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1002/asjc.2980",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/er.7358",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An intelligent decentralized energy management strategy for the optimal electric vehicles' charging in low‐voltage islanded microgrids",
      "description": "The expected significant growth in global electricity demand, followed by the adoption of green energy sources, led to the modernization of the energy distribution grids, such as the development of microgrids that can improve the reliability of the electric power system. Meanwhile, the increased integration of electric vehicles is expected to have a negative impact on power quality, normal operation, and investment costs of the microgrid. In this paper, a microgrid topology was studied for the islanded operation of a low-voltage distribution network. The deployment of such energy management systems is essential to guarantee the safe and reliable operation of isolated microgrids. Hence, a decentralized energy management system, based on multi-agent systems, was developed for the efficient charging of electric vehicles, by expanding a state-of-the-art fuzzy logic controller-based energy management strategy, in combination with a charging power controller, based on fuzzy cognitive maps. According to the authors' best knowledge, this is the first time that fuzzy cognitive maps theory is introduced in EVs' charging management problems. The performance of the proposed multi-agent decentralized energy management system presented significant reduction in the investment costs of the microgrid, as compared with the use of a sole fuzzy logic controller-based energy management strategy. The total cost of the microgrid for a 20-year investment period is decreased by approximately 8.8%. Furthermore, the incorporation of the fuzzy cognitive maps-based charging power controller leads to a significant amount of chargeable EVs. The mean chargeable EVs increased by 31%. Finally, the proposed energy management system reduces the peak load and load variances approximately 17% and 29%, respectively, without shifting and delaying the charging of the EVs. Hence, the proposed novel charging management system offers an intelligence approach for islanding distribution grids including the high penetration of electric vehicles by presenting operational and financial benefits.",
      "published": "2021-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/er.7358",
      "matched_terms": [
        "penetration",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vasileios Boglou",
        "Christos-Spyridon G. Karavas",
        "Athanasios D. Karlis",
        "Konstantinos G. Arvanitis"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Energy Research",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1002/er.7358",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 71,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/ett.4088",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ensemble Adaboost classifier for accurate and fast detection of botnet attacks in connected vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract The key characteristic of smart cities (ie, connectivity and intelligence) has enabled connected vehicles to work together to accomplish complex jobs that they are unable to perform individually. Connectivity not only being an inevitable blessing but also poses growing cybersecurity challenges for connected vehicles. The overall risk of connected vehicles is wide as the cybercriminals are nowadays applying versatile approaches (botnets, phishing, zero‐days, rootkits, etc) to disrupt their communication. The botnet, capable of launching distributed denial of service attack, is a potential threat for any connected ecosystem due to its excessive capabilities of using maximum compromised devices. Hence, the detection of botnet attacks has become a pinnacle point for cybersecurity analysts. Existing studies lack in detecting botnet at the earliest and accurately. This article presents an approach to detect the botnet attacks at an early stage and accurately utilizing typical network traffic and temporal features. The proposed approach use machine learning algorithms for the detection of botnet attack(s) and present a detailed comparison of the decision tree, probabilistic neural network, sequential minimal optimization, and Adaboost classifiers, as well as comparison of the proposed approach with existing studies in this domain, is also done. Furthermore, it investigates the role of temporal features for botnet detection. The proposed approach accomplishes the promising true positive rate of 99.7%. Results show that our methodology is efficient compared with the existing studies.",
      "published": "2020-08-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/ett.4088",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdul Rehman Javed",
        "Zunera Jalil",
        "Syed Atif Moqurrab",
        "Sidra Abbas",
        "Xuan Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1002/ett.4088",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 115,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.396,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1002/ett.4088 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: studies, service, intelligence, well, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/iis2.70193",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Architecting Trust in Heavy‐Vehicle Digital Evidence",
      "description": "Abstract Modern heavy vehicles generate high‐fidelity digital evidence across diagnostics, safety systems, video, and sensor networks. As Ethernet‐based in‐vehicle architectures such as Diagnostic over Internet Protocol (DoIP) become standard, the volume, heterogeneity, and legal relevance of this data increase substantially. While these technologies improve insight into vehicle behavior, they also introduce evidentiary risks related to fragmented data streams, timestamp desynchronization, ambiguous provenance, and expanded cybersecurity attack surfaces during legal discovery. This paper presents a model‐based framework for secure intake, validation, and governance of DoIP‐derived heavy‐vehicle evidence. Using SysML and model‐based systems engineering (MBSE) techniques, the proposed DoIP Evidence Intake and Security (DoIP‐EIS) architecture integrates structural, behavioral, and state‐based models to enforce integrity, access control, auditability, and synchronization constraints across the evidence lifecycle. Threat identification is guided by the STRIDE taxonomy and aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity engineering principles, while selected NIST SP 800‐53 controls inform evidentiary‐specific security requirements. The framework evaluates nominal and misuse scenarios, including desynchronization, unauthorized access, and selective disclosure, demonstrating how architectural constraints reduce ambiguity and support defensible chain‐of‐custody. Although validated through model‐based analysis rather than empirical deployment, this work establishes a scalable foundation for improving trust, consistency, and resilience in heavy‐vehicle digital evidence used in adversarial legal contexts.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/iis2.70193",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sean Bumgarner",
        "Sarah Rudder",
        "Jeremy S. Daily"
      ],
      "venue": "INCOSE International Symposium",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1002/iis2.70193",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/iis2.70208",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deployment of a Multi‐Domain Model DSM based Approach for Automotive System Development: Improving Traceability and Security Impact Analysis",
      "description": "Abstract Modern automotive systems have become increasingly complex, comprising multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs), sophisticated communication networks, and diverse software components developed across organizational boundaries. This complexity creates significant challenges for systems engineers in maintaining traceability, performing impact analysis, ensuring comprehensive verification coverage, and managing cybersecurity vulnerabilities across interconnected vehicle systems. This paper proposes solutions to these challenges, through the application of a novel Multi Domain Model (MDM) technique integrated with an AI‐assisted approach based on the Model Context Protocol (MCP). It is applied in a new context to cybersecurity vulnerability impact analysis, enabling quantitative assessment of how security issues propagate through system dependencies—critical for ISO/SAE 21434 compliance. New AI assistants perform conversational architecture analysis, automated refactoring recommendations, and continuous architectural improvement. The approach enables shift‐left verification strategies and can provide stakeholders across the organization with visibility into system interdependencies, ultimately improving the efficiency and effectiveness of automotive system development processes. Results from a pilot deployment at a European automotive OEM demonstrate improved traceability gap detection, automated impact analysis across domain boundaries, and optimized test prioritization for body control architectures. This paper also evaluates the application of a Multi‐Domain Model (MDM) approach in pilot projects at automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), extending traditional Design Structure Matrix (DSM) techniques to integrate multiple engineering domains including requirements, electrical/electronic (E/E) architecture, software, and verification. The MDM platform consolidates information from heterogeneous sources such as AUTOSAR configurations, CAN database files, requirements management systems, and source code repositories into a unified dependency model.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/iis2.70208",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Neil Langmead",
        "J. Padget",
        "Frank Waldman",
        "Thomas Keeble"
      ],
      "venue": "INCOSE International Symposium",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1002/iis2.70208",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/itl2.25",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anonymous Group Message Authentication Protocol for LTE‐based V2X Communications",
      "description": "Abstract Cellular technologies, in particular the current long‐term evolution (LTE) and future 5G, are suitable for implementing vehicle‐to‐everything (V2X) services, due to the existing network infrastructure, device‐to‐device (D2D) communication capability, and guaranteed end‐to‐end delay. In LTE‐based V2X (LTE‐V), vehicle grouping plays an important role for improving LTE spectrum utilization and providing group‐oriented proximity‐based services (ProSe). However, the flourishing of LTE‐V group communications introduces unique privacy challenges. In this letter, the state‐of‐art standardization and research efforts are first reviewed, and their limitations are identified on achieving trajectory privacy for LTE‐V group communications. Then, an efficient and anonymous group message authentication protocol is proposed to support message batch verification. Security analysis and performance evaluation demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed protocol.",
      "published": "2017-12-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/itl2.25",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dongxiao Liu",
        "Jianbing Ni",
        "Xiaodong Lin",
        "Xuemin Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "Internet Technology Letters",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1002/itl2.25",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/j.2334-5837.2019.00588.x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Evaluation Ontology Applied to Connected Vehicle Security Assurance",
      "description": "Abstract Connected vehicles have great potential to benefit society, yet create huge challenges. Vehicles, infrastructure and enterprise activities combine to form massively complex systems of systems (SoSs) that are vulnerable to cyber‐attacks. Security is ill‐defined, making it difficult to achieve a consistent, common understanding of security capabilities across the diverse industries that collaborate to develop connected vehicles. Rigorous evaluation is essential for developing strong security assurance cases. This paper contributes a model‐based systems engineering (MBSE) ontology that enables integrated evaluation processes in enterprise SoSs. The Evaluation Ontology allows diverse types of evaluation to be captured in a single integrated model. A connected vehicle security story is presented to demonstrate the value of the approach. Benefits include enhanced business intelligence that can provide a quantifiable, reportable level of confidence in security‐related processes and technologies. Further work will extend the ontology to develop a customisable suite of enabling patterns for security.",
      "published": "2019-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2334-5837.2019.00588.x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stephen Powley",
        "Simon A Perry",
        "Jon D. Holt",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans"
      ],
      "venue": "INCOSE International Symposium",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1002/j.2334-5837.2019.00588.x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/net.70087",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Maximum τ‐Persistent Bipartition Problem: An Optimization Approach for Intrusion Detection in Heterogeneous In‐Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "ABSTRACT The vulnerability of in‐vehicle communication networks to cyber threats has turned intrusion detection into a core research priority. Analyzing temporal communication patterns offers a powerful solution, given that normal vehicle operations rely on highly predictable, quasi‐periodic message exchanges. Consequently, any deviation from these regularities provides a reliable indicator of anomalous or malicious activity. Building on this observation, we propose a new approach that combines temporal analysis with a structural representation of network interactions. Specifically, we model interactions between electronic control units (ECUs) as a temporal graph , where nodes represent ECUs and time‐dependent edges capture communication patterns inferred from observed traffic. This representation enables the joint analysis of temporal and structural properties of the system. We observe that Denial of Service or flooding attack scenarios induce structured interaction patterns that can be naturally interpreted as bipartite graphs, where a set of compromised nodes systematically communicates with a distinct set of target nodes. Such persistent and asymmetric communication behaviors deviate from normal operation and provide a structural signature of malicious activity. Motivated by this insight, we introduce the maximum ‐persistent bipartition problem , an optimization problem that identifies a maximum‐cardinality bipartite subgraph that persists for at least timestamps in the temporal graph. We model it using integer programming and solve it through the state‐of‐the‐art solver Gurobi. Experiments on real in‐vehicle instances show that the method effectively detects attacks that directly affect communication timing, while experiments on synthetic temporal graphs compare the proposed approach with a degree‐based baseline and assess its computational scalability.",
      "published": "2026-11-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/net.70087",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arcangelo Castiglione",
        "Martina Cerulli",
        "Teresa Elia",
        "Francesco Palmieri",
        "Carmine Sorgente"
      ],
      "venue": "Networks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1002/net.70087",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/sec.1610",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security in automotive telematics: a survey of threats and risk mitigation strategies to counter the existing and emerging attack vectors",
      "description": "Abstract This manuscript surveys a variety of topics related to the security of connected vehicles and their associated services, often referred to as telematics. Current challenges as well as emerging and future security risks are discussed. A number of specific technologies and implementations are discussed, such as Next Generation Telematics Patterns, KeeLoq, vehicular ad hoc networks, and controller area network. Principles and practices are outlined to counter or minimize risks associated with the existing and potential attack vectors as well as reducing risks both on the internal vehicle network and the telematics service delivery platforms. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.",
      "published": "2016-09-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/sec.1610",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alex Oyler",
        "Hossein Saiedian"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1002/sec.1610",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/smr.1956",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in safety‐critical systems",
      "description": "Abstract 2016 saw cybersecurity standards appear in both automotive and medical device industries. Both standards are understandably based on processes that already exist in the respective industries. The automotive J3061 standard is very much focussed on existing categories for defining the cybersecurity threats, ie, systems, hardware and software. Cybersecurity is very much a multifaceted topic, and by restricting the scope to these 3 subject areas there is the risk that many significant threats could be overlooked, in particular the malicious acts of employees within an organisation. The medical cybersecurity report AAMI TIR 57 takes the approach based on ISO 14971 the medical device risk management standard, which encourages a more open‐minded approach to evaluating cybersecurity threats. Both of these documents, which are discussed in this paper, are short of practical examples or techniques for assessing and mitigating threats; the topic is handled in a more theoretical manner. Key issues such as trojan circuits in microcontrollers are not well represented in either document. Generally, software topics such as authentication and encryption are given good coverage in international standards; however, this not the case when reviewing hardware concerns. Both TIR 57 and J3061 are good starting documents for the topic of cybersecurity, but both could benefit from expansion to cover the wider topics affecting cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/smr.1956",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alastair Walker"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Software Evolution and Process",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1002/smr.1956",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/smr.2407",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a security‐driven automotive development lifecycle",
      "description": "Abstract Cybersecurity has become one of the most crucial challenges in the automotive development lifecycle. The upcoming ISO/SAE 21434 standard provides only a generic framework that is insufficient to derive concrete design methods. This article proposes an actionable cybersecurity development lifecycle model that provides concrete action and work product guidance aligned with the ISO/SAE 21434 and Automotive SPICE® extension for cybersecurity. The model has been inspired by action research in “next” industry practice pilot projects, which ensures that it is actionable. It has been augmented by insights gained from literature research in cybersecurity development for embedded systems. The proposed lifecycle model complements the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and provides the basis for the company‐specific process and practice specifications. It has been validated through the integration of cybersecurity‐related aspects in an electric power steering system. A core characteristic of the model is the central role of threat modeling, vulnerability analyses, and cybersecurity requirements derivation on both system and subsystem levels. Without concrete practice guidelines, the ISO/SAE 21434 is very difficult to understand and apply at this stage. This contribution aims to fill this gap through a model inspired by cutting‐edge embedded cybersecurity practices interpreted for the current and near‐future automotive electronic architectures.",
      "published": "2021-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/smr.2407",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jürgen Dobaj",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Andreas Riel",
        "Richard Messnarz"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Software Evolution and Process",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1002/smr.2407",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/smr.2519",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Experiences with the automotive SPICE for cybersecurity assessment model and tools",
      "description": "Abstract In August 2021 the ISO 21434:2021 standard for Road vehicles—Cybersecurity Engineering has been published. At the same time the blue book from VDA (Verein der Deutschen Automobilgesellschaft; German Automotive Association) for Automotive SPICE cybersecurity assessments has been released. In addition in the period September–December 2021 the training material for iNTACS (INTernational Assessor Certification Schema) certified Automotive SPICE for cybersecurity assessors has been developed. Since February 2022 the upgrade training of assessors worldwide has started. Beside the ASPICE (Automotive SPICE) for cybersecurity blue book also a red book from VDA has been published. The red book describes the questions to check in an ACSMS (Automotive CyberSecurity Management System) audit. This paper explains the main strategy and content for ASPICE for Cybersecurity assessments and how such assessments are integrated to the overall ACSMS strategy. Also, the paper outlines an example method and tool used in ASPICE for cybersecurity assessments and how such assessment results will look like.",
      "published": "2022-11-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/smr.2519",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Richard Messnarz",
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Alexander Much",
        "Tobias Zehetner",
        "Laura Aschbacher"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Software Evolution and Process",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1002/smr.2519",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/smr.70060",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multilevel Approach to TARA: Proposals for Attack Feasibility in Interference‐Free Scenarios",
      "description": "ABSTRACT Automotive SPICE for Cybersecurity incorporates the Cybersecurity Risk Management process (MAN.7), aligning with the Risk Assessment methods defined in ISO/SAE 21434:2021 (Clause 15). Both standards provide guidance on conducting Threat Analysis and Risk Assessments (TARA). However, they do not specify how to integrate the determination of attack feasibility when multiple TARAs emerge across different development phases. This paper explores how the concept of freedom from interference can facilitate a unified approach to determining attack feasibility in such scenarios.",
      "published": "2025-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/smr.70060",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Liedtke",
        "Richard Messnarz",
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Alexander Much"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Software Evolution and Process",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1002/smr.70060",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/spy2.387",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure and lightweight message dissemination framework for internet of vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) revolutionizes vehicle communication in dynamic networks. Message dissemination in IoV involves sharing critical information for the safety and convenience of the IoV network. It is very crucial to secure message dissemination due to potential cyber‐attacks, traffic disruptions, and privacy breaches. Data integrity, authentication, and privacy are vital to maintaining trust and safety in the IoV network. This network consists of resource‐constrained IoV devices with limited resources due to the availability of embedded components in vehicular systems. Therefore, optimizing algorithms and protocols is crucial for efficient vehicle‐to‐everything (V2X) communication, enhancing safety and transportation efficiency. Solutions often include lightweight protocols and secure message exchange. This paper proposes a machine learning (ML) based secure and lightweight message dissemination framework for resource‐constrained IoV. First, we present an ML‐based threat classification model capable of effectively categorizing adversarial and nonadversarial data streams and delivering an optimized model with superior accuracy. Furthermore, we also propose a secure message dissemination scheme using lightweight cryptographic primitives, which significantly reduces computational, communication, and energy overhead. To validate the robustness of our proposed ML‐based secure and lightweight message dissemination framework, we evaluate it using various security parameters and performance measures such as computation cost, communication cost, energy cost, accuracy, precision, recall, and F1‐score. Our contributions promise to significantly enhance the security and efficiency of message dissemination in IoV environments and advance lightweight, secure, and reliable transportation systems for the future.",
      "published": "2024-03-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/spy2.387",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Umesh Bodkhe",
        "Sudeep Tanwar"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Privacy",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1002/spy2.387",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/spy2.483",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Scheme for Intrusion Detection in CAN‐Driven Artificial Intelligence of Things",
      "description": "The Artificial Intelligence of Things (AIoT) is applicable for various domains, that is, smart healthcare, smart cities, industrial sectors, transportation systems, and many more. Controller area network (CAN) facilitates the integration of the sensing devices, thus enables them to send their data for analysis to various artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. CAN also provides reliability and fault tolerance to the AIoT applications, as it has been designed to deal with noisy environments. Thus, CAN‐driven AIoT improves the efficiency, reliability, and functionalities of the devices and systems, which is very much needed for various AIoT applications. However, it is vulnerable to various cyber‐attacks like message replay, modification attack, fuzzy attack, denial of service, and spoofing the RPM gauge or drive gear. Therefore, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is required to detect attacks on the CAN bus. In this paper, we propose a lightweight and efficient intrusion detection system which successfully detects multiple intrusions based on the type of attack on CAN bus without causing additional traffic overhead to the ongoing communications (in short, ACID‐CAN). The presented mechanism is very much needed for the CAN‐driven AIoT applications. Experimental results show that the proposed ACID‐CAN successfully detects intrusions even when the amount of intrusion data is reduced to 5%$$ 5\\% $$ of normal data. The obtained results were compared with those of previous studies in the field of CANs intrusion detection, and it has been noted that the proposed ACID‐CAN offers comparable and better results.",
      "published": "2024-12-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/spy2.483",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gagan Dangwal",
        "Mohammad Wazid",
        "Sarah Nizam",
        "Vinay Chamola",
        "Ashok Kumar Das"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Privacy",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1002/spy2.483",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/sys.21509",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Conceptualizing the key features of cyber‐physical systems in a multi‐layered representation for safety and security analysis",
      "description": "Abstract Many safety‐related systems are evolving into cyber‐physical systems (CPSs), integrating information technologies in their control architectures and modifying the interactions among automation and human operators. Particularly, a promising potential exists for enhanced efficiency and safety in applications such as autonomous transportation systems, control systems in critical infrastructures, smart manufacturing and process plants, robotics, and smart medical devices, among others. However, the modern features of CPSs are ambiguous for system designers and risk analysts, especially considering the role of humans and the interactions between safety and security. The sources of safety risks are not restricted to accidental failures and errors anymore. Indeed, cybersecurity attacks can now cascade into safety risks leading to physical harm to the system and its environment. These new challenges demand system engineers and risk analysts to understand the security vulnerabilities existing in CPS features and their dependencies with physical processes. Therefore, this paper (a) examines the key features of CPSs and their relation with other system types; (b) defines the dependencies between levels of automation and human roles in CPSs from a systems engineering perspective; and (c) applies systems thinking to describe a multi‐layered diagrammatic representation of CPSs for combined safety and security risk analysis, demonstrating an application in the maritime sector to analyze an autonomous surface vehicle.",
      "published": "2019-08-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/sys.21509",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nelson H. Carreras Guzman",
        "Morten Wied",
        "IGOR O. KOZINE",
        "Mary Ann Lundteigen"
      ],
      "venue": "Systems Engineering",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1002/sys.21509",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 113,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1002/sys.70082",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Decentralized Over‐the‐Air Software Updates: A Secure, Scalable and Anonymous Approach for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "ABSTRACT As autonomous vehicles rapidly evolve, ensuring the security and scalability of Over‐the‐Air (OTA) software updates is crucial for maintaining vehicle performance and safety. Traditional centralized systems often face challenges, including security issues, limited scalability, and delays in real‐time synchronization. This paper introduces a novel decentralized approach that integrates Merkle Trees, Ring Signatures, and State Channels to address these challenges. Merkle Trees provide a tamper‐evident structure for verifying the integrity of update data, while Ring Signatures authenticate update sources, preserving developer anonymity and preventing unauthorized modifications. State Channels enhance scalability and efficiency by enabling real‐time communication and progress tracking during the update process. We present a detailed technical implementation of the proposed system, including the smart contract architecture and the OTA update procedure. Additionally, we evaluate the performance and efficiency of our approach. This work introduces a secure, scalable, and anonymous method for OTA software updates in autonomous vehicles, setting a new benchmark for future advancements in automotive technology.",
      "published": "2026-07-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1002/sys.70082",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Inas Hasnaoui",
        "Maria Zrikem",
        "Anas Hatim",
        "Claude Baron"
      ],
      "venue": "Systems Engineering",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1002/sys.70082",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-2468-4_10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Security and Privacy in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2468-4_10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lotfi ben Othmane",
        "Harold Weffers",
        "Mohd Murtadha Mohamad",
        "Marko Wolf"
      ],
      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-1-4939-2468-4_10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 89,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4171,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-2468-4_10 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03748-2_38",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of DoS Attacks on Vehicle CAN Bus System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-11-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03748-2_38",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shi-Huang Chen",
        "Chun‐Hung Richard Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "Smart innovation, systems and technologies",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-03748-2_38",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-04503-6_20",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Payload-Based Statistical Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04503-6_20",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takuya Kuwahara",
        "Yukino Baba",
        "Hisashi Kashima",
        "Takeshi Kishikawa",
        "Junichi Tsurumi",
        "Tomoyuki Haga",
        "Yoshihiro Ujiie",
        "Takamitsu Sasaki",
        "Hideki Matsushima"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-04503-6_20",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-05345-1_26",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Passive Keyless Entry and Start System Using Machine Learning",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05345-1_26",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Usman Ahmad",
        "Hong Song",
        "Awais Bilal",
        "Mamoun Alazab",
        "Alireza Jolfaei"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-05345-1_26",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11196-0_63",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Study on Three Modes of Connection for a Connected Car and Attack Simulation",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11196-0_63",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kawtar Jellid",
        "Tomader Mazri"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in intelligent transportation and infrastructure",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-11196-0_63",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12085-6_4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting In-vehicle CAN Message Attacks Using Heuristics and RNNs",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12085-6_4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahroz Tariq",
        "Sangyup Lee",
        "Huy Kang Kim",
        "Simon S. Woo"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-12085-6_4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12143-3_15",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical Security Exploits of the FlexRay In-Vehicle Communication Protocol",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12143-3_15",
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      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-77185-0_6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Communication Model for Intelligent Transportation System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77185-0_6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mariya Ouaissa",
        "Mariyam Ouaissa",
        "Meriem Houmer",
        "Sara El Hamdani",
        "Zakaria Boulouard"
      ],
      "venue": "EAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-77185-0_6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-82199-9_49",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting CAN Bus Intrusion by Applying Machine Learning Method to Graph Based Features",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-08-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82199-9_49",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rafi Ud Daula Refat",
        "Abdulrahman Abu Elkhail",
        "Azeem Hafeez",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-82199-9_49",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-83903-1_6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ISO/SAE 21434-Based Risk Assessment of Security Incidents in Automated Road Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83903-1_6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dominik Püllen",
        "Jonas Liske",
        "Stefan Katzenbeisser"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-83903-1_6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-83906-2_2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Rule-Based Threat Analysis and Mitigation for the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83906-2_2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelkader Magdy Shaaban",
        "Stefan Jakšić",
        "Omar Veledar",
        "Thomas Mauthner",
        "Edin Arnautović",
        "Christoph Schmittner"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-83906-2_2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-85521-5_36",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Asset Driven ISO/SAE 21434 Compliant Automotive Cybersecurity Analysis with ThreatGet",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85521-5_36",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Bernhard Schrammel",
        "Sandra König"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-85521-5_36",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-93975-5_31",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Competition, Security, and Transparency: Data in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract State-of-the-art cars are increasingly becoming computers on wheels, constantly collecting, storing, and transmitting data. This goes hand in hand with better market opportunities for certain service providers with access to the data. There is still no clear legal regulation on who the customer can share their data with—and in what way—nor how transparency and security can be guaranteed for such data in the process. Without legal regulation of data access, there will be no way to ensure a level playing field among providers and freedom of choice for consumers in the future. Three basic principles apply to the access to vehicle data: Third-party service providers should be able to develop new services without depending on car manufacturers. Independent service providers, such as independent workshops, insurers, and automobile clubs, should be able to reach customers through the same channels as the vehicle manufacturers. Vehicle manufacturers should not be allowed to monitor vehicle users or the service providers selected by vehicle owners.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93975-5_31",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "connected vehicles",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karsten Schulze"
      ],
      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-93975-5_31",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4092,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1007/978-3-030-93975-5_31 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: providers, services, service, there, car, without, access, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-030-99587-4_51",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comparative Study of Ensemble Learning Techniques for Fuzzy Attack Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99587-4_51",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dorsaf Swessi",
        "Hanen Idoudi"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-030-99587-4_51",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-09357-9_4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection for the CAN Bus",
      "description": "Abstract Previous attacks have shown that in-vehicle networks have vulnerabilities and a successful attack could lead to significant financial loss and danger to life. In this paper, we propose a Pearson correlation based anomaly detection algorithm to detect CAN message modification attacks. The algorithm does not need a priori information about the communication: it identifies signals based on statistical properties, finds the important correlation coefficients for the correlating signals, and detects attacks as deviations from a previously learned normal state.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09357-9_4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "András Gazdag",
        "György Lupták",
        "Levente Buttyán"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-09357-9_4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-14862-0_6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Assessment Prospects as Part of Vehicle Regulations",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14862-0_6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mona Gierl",
        "Reiner Kriesten",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-14862-0_6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_23",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive SPICE for Cybersecurity – MAN.7 Cybersecurity Risk Management and TARA",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_23",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Richard Messnarz",
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Svatopluk Štolfa",
        "Jakub Štolfa",
        "Alexander Much"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_23",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_28",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Utilization of Automotive SPICE Assessments with Cybersecurity Extension",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_28",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Engy Zinhom"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_28",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_37",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Auditing and Assessment - Presenting the ISO PAS 5112",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_37",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christoph Schmittner"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_37",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_38",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Regulations and Standards in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_38",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Schober",
        "Gerhard Grießnig"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-15559-8_38",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-16815-4_14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Framework for Calculating Residual Cybersecurity Risk of Threats to Road Vehicles in Alignment with ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16815-4_14",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Nawaz Khan",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Giedre Sabaliauskaite"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-16815-4_14",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-17140-6_24",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVExchange: A Relay Attack on Electric Vehicle Charging System",
      "description": "Abstract To support the increasing spread of Electric Vehicles (EVs), Charging Stations (CSs) are being installed worldwide. The new generation of CSs employs the Vehicle-To-Grid (V2G) paradigm by implementing novel standards such as the ISO 15118. This standard enables high-level communication between the vehicle and the charging column, helps manage the charge smartly, and simplifies the payment phase. This novel charging paradigm, which connects the Smart Grid to external networks (e.g., EVs and CSs), has not been thoroughly examined yet. Therefore, it may lead to dangerous vulnerability surfaces and new research challenges. In this paper, we present EVExchange , the first attack to steal energy during a charging session in a V2G communication: i.e., charging the attacker’s car while letting the victim pay for it. Furthermore, if reverse charging flow is enabled, the attacker can even sell the energy available on the victim’s car! Thus, getting the economic profit of this selling, and leaving the victim with a completely discharged battery. We developed a virtual and a physical testbed in which we validate the attack and prove its effectiveness in stealing the energy. To prevent the attack, we propose a lightweight modification of the ISO 15118 protocol to include a distance bounding algorithm. Finally, we validated the countermeasure on our testbeds. Our results show that the proposed countermeasure can identify all the relay attack attempts while being transparent to the user.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17140-6_24",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "relay",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Denis Donadel",
        "Radha Poovendran",
        "Federico Turrin"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-17140-6_24",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20029-8_13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real Vehicle-Based Attack Dataset for Security Threat Analysis in a Vehicle",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20029-8_13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yeji Koh",
        "Yoonji Kim",
        "Munkhdelgerekh Batzorig",
        "Kangbin Yim"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-20029-8_13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20096-0_24",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bayesian Based Security Detection Method for Vehicle CAN Bus Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20096-0_24",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shen Jiang",
        "Hailan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-20096-0_24",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20099-1_14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Priv-IDS: A Privacy Protection and Intrusion Detection Framework for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20099-1_14",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simin Li",
        "Mu Han"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-20099-1_14",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-27041-3_1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Preventing Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Driving Models",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27041-3_1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junaid Sajid",
        "Bareera Anam",
        "Hasan Ali Khattak",
        "Asad Waqar Malik",
        "Assad Abbas",
        "Samee U. Khan"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-27041-3_1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-27481-7_34",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Systematic Approach to Automotive Security",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27481-7_34",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Masoud Ebrahimi",
        "Stefan Marksteiner",
        "Dejan Ničković",
        "Roderick Bloem",
        "David Schögler",
        "Philipp Eisner",
        "Samuel Sprung",
        "Thomas Schober",
        "Sebastian Chlup",
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Sandra König"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-27481-7_34",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-Time Intrusion Detection in Automotive Cyber-Physical Systems with Recurrent Autoencoders",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vipin Kumar Kukkala",
        "Sooryaa Vignesh Thiruloga",
        "Sudeep Pasricha"
      ],
      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical Layer Intrusion Detection and Localization on CAN Bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay",
        "Adriana Berdich",
        "Bogdan Groza"
      ],
      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Spatiotemporal Information Based Intrusion Detection Systems for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_14",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiangxue Li",
        "Yue Bao",
        "Xintian Hou"
      ],
      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_14",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security-Aware Design of Time-Critical Automotive Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vipin Kumar Kukkala",
        "Thomas H. Bradley",
        "Sudeep Pasricha"
      ],
      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure by Design Autonomous Emergency Braking Systems in Accordance with ISO 21434",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso 21434",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adriana Berdich",
        "Bogdan Groza"
      ],
      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-28016-0_5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-29860-8_75",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementation and Demonstration of Threat Over CAN Bus for Automotive Embedded System Equipped with ADAS",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29860-8_75",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soufian Zerouali",
        "Abdelhafid Messaoudi",
        "Abdelhamid Rabhi",
        "Mohammed Karrouchi",
        "Ismail Nasri"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-29860-8_75",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_11",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Intrusion Detection System on In-Vehicle Network Using Polynomial Features",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_11",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Baatarsuren Sukhbaatar",
        "Md Rezanur Islam",
        "Kamronbek Yuspov",
        "Insu Oh",
        "Kangbin Yim"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes on data engineering and communications technologies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_11",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fuzz Testing and Safe Framework Development for Vehicle Security Analysis",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tugsmandakh Nyamdelger",
        "Munkhdelgerekh Batzorig",
        "Esam Ali Albhelil",
        "Yeji Koh",
        "Kangbin Yim"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes on data engineering and communications technologies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Universal Intrusion Detection System on In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Rezanur Islam",
        "Insu Oh",
        "Kangbin Yim"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes on data engineering and communications technologies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-35836-4_9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-36889-9_12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing Security of Internal Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36889-9_12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anas Alkoutli",
        "Joakim Anderlind",
        "Carl-Johan Björnson",
        "Mathias Drage",
        "Morgan Thowsen",
        "Antonia Welzel",
        "Miroslaw Staron"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-36889-9_12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-42307-9_22",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Open Software-Based Framework for Automotive Cybersecurity Testing",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42307-9_22",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Faschang",
        "Georg Macher"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-42307-9_22",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-42307-9_24",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Consistency of Cybersecurity Process and Product Assessments in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42307-9_24",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Schläger",
        "Richard Messnarz",
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Tobias Danmayr",
        "Laura Aschbacher",
        "Almin Iriskic",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Eugen Brenner"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-42307-9_24",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-45651-0_34",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning for Automotive Security in Technology Transfer",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45651-0_34",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Christian Catalano",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Anibrata Pal"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-45651-0_34",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-47448-4_34",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicle Cybersecurity: A Pre-test",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47448-4_34",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Warren King",
        "Leila Halawi"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-47448-4_34",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-49187-0_5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VNGuard: Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49187-0_5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yan Lin Aung",
        "Shanshan Wang",
        "Wang Cheng",
        "Sudipta Chattopadhyay",
        "Jianying Zhou",
        "Anyu Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-49187-0_5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-51630-6_1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring Vulnerabilities in Voice Command Skills for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51630-6_1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenbo Ding",
        "Song Liao",
        "Keyan Guo",
        "Fuqiang Zhang",
        "Long Cheng",
        "Ziming Zhao",
        "Hongxin Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-51630-6_1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-54776-8_6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Self-sovereign Identity for Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) are more and more charged at public Charge Points (CPs) using Plug-and-Charge (PnC) protocols such as the ISO 15118 standard which eliminates user interaction for authentication and authorization. Currently, this requires a rather complex Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and enables driver tracking via the included unique identifiers. In this paper, we propose an approach for using Self-Sovereign Identities (SSIs) as trusted credentials for EV charging authentication and authorization which overcomes the privacy problems and the issues of a complex centralized PKI. Our implementation shows the feasibility of our approach with ISO 15118. The security and privacy of the proposed approach is shown in a formal analysis using the Tamarin prover.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54776-8_6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adrian Kailus",
        "Dustin Kern",
        "Christoph Krauß"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-54776-8_6",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-60487-4_12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Risk Assessment Approach in Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60487-4_12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcielo Bell",
        "June C. Wei",
        "Guillermo Francia"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-60487-4_12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_23",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CV2XFuzzer: C-V2X Parsing Vulnerability Discovery System Based on Fuzzing",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_23",
      "matched_terms": [
        "fuzzing",
        "v2x",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuxuan Wang",
        "Yishen Li",
        "Jihu Zheng",
        "Jianwei Zhuge"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_23",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-65172-4_11",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing EV Charging Station Security Using a Multi-dimensional Dataset: CICEVSE2024",
      "description": "Abstract The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) is fundamentally transforming the automotive industry, prompting a surge in the installation of charging stations to accommodate the growing number of EVs and enhance overall mobility and user experience. Efforts to conduct machine learning-based cybersecurity research and develop solutions to address the growing threats and vulnerabilities in EV charging station infrastructure face challenges stemming from the unavailability of suitable datasets. The primary contribution of this study is addressing these challenges by publishing a multi-dimensional dataset that comprises power consumption data, network traffic and host activities of the EVSE in both benign and attack conditions. The experimental testbed utilizes a real EVSE, Raspberry Pi and standard industry communication protocols for EV charging infrastructure, with the scenarios observing the EVSE in both idle and charging states. The results of statistical analysis and machine learning classification tasks demonstrate the suitability of this dataset for baseline behavioral profiling, classification and anomaly detection tasks.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-65172-4_11",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emmanuel Dana Buedi",
        "Ali Akbar Ghorbani",
        "Sajjad Dadkhah",
        "Raphael Ferreira"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-65172-4_11",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-69201-7_21",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey: Cyber-Security in Connected & Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-69201-7_21",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cyber-security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aysegul Kandefer",
        "Tankut Acarman"
      ],
      "venue": "Information systems engineering and management",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-69201-7_21",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-70896-1_14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Keyless Multi-party Storage Scheme",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-70896-1_14",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pascal Lafourcade",
        "Lola-Baie Mallordy",
        "Charles Olivier-Anclin",
        "Léo Robert"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-70896-1_14",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_21",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Consistency for More Than One TARA and Security Element Out of Context Experiences",
      "description": "Automotive SPICE® for Cybersecurity contains Cybersecurity Risk Management process (MAN.7) corresponding to Risk Assessment Methods (ISO/SAE 21434:2021-clause 15). Both standards describe how a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) should be carried out. However, they leave open how, in the event that several TARAs arise at different levels/different points in a life cycle model or a supply chain, these can be synchronized. This paper will outline different scenarios how to perform and synchronize different TARAs performed.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_21",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Liedtke",
        "Richard Messnarz",
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Alexander Much"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_21",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_23",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Paving the Road Towards Cybersecurity Compliance: Navigating ISO 21434 and ASPICE from Organizational- to Project-Level Compliance",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_23",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Darius Barmayoun",
        "Martin Kemeter"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_23",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_29",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering Standardization and Regulation: An Integrated Model",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_29",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Adel Mohamed",
        "Heba Kamal Aslan",
        "Tamer Arafa"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-71139-8_29",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-73344-4_48",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Temporal Logic-Based Intrusion Detection for Securing Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-73344-4_48",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehmet Bozdal"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-73344-4_48",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4053,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1007/978-3-031-73344-4_48 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-77489-8_35",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Security in the Digital Era: A Comprehensive Survey of Attacks and Defenses for Keyless Entry System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-77489-8_35",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yong Zheng",
        "Man Zhang",
        "Xianfeng Li",
        "Xingchi Chen",
        "Zhourui Zhang",
        "Jiaming Zhu",
        "Chun Shan",
        "Guo–Cheng Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Mechanisms and machine science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-77489-8_35",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-80020-7_9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Paving the Way: Advancing V2X Safety Through Innovative Attack Generation and Analysis Framework (V2X-SAF)",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-80020-7_9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shubham Tomar",
        "Meenakshi Tripathi"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-80020-7_9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-81799-1_33",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANComa: Shutdown Attack on Automotive Control Units over Controller Area Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-81799-1_33",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Balázs Benedek",
        "Adrian Coleşa"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-81799-1_33",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-82031-1_13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Threat Landscape of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-82031-1_13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Don Nalin Dharshana Jayaratne",
        "Qian Lu",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Muhamad Azfar Ramli",
        "Rakhi Manohar Mepparambath",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Suraj Harsha Kamtam"
      ],
      "venue": "Advanced sciences and technologies for security applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-82031-1_13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-84100-2_52",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "HARDNESS: Hardware-Supported Post Quantum Over-the-Air Software Update and Intrusion Detection System for Next Generation Secure Cars",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-84100-2_52",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cars",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cinzia Bernardeschi",
        "Nicasio Canino",
        "Gianluca Dini",
        "Pierpaolo Dini",
        "Daniele Rossi",
        "Federico Rossi",
        "Sergio Saponara"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-84100-2_52",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-84394-5_4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Driving System Based on Deep Q-Learning: A Survey of Attacks and Defenses",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-84394-5_4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ritu Gupta",
        "Nishtha Arora",
        "Kangan",
        "Reeya Ottalwar",
        "Kriti Upadhyay",
        "Lithiga Jayaprakash"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-84394-5_4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-86637-1_35",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reverse Engineering the CAN Bus: Vulnerability Analysis in the Tesla Model 3",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-86637-1_35",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "tesla",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Matthew A. Telfor",
        "Bryson R. Payne",
        "Tamirat T. Abegaz"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-86637-1_35",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-92719-5_54",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Security Barrier as a Counter-Measure Facility Against Deliberate and Accidental Vehicle Impact",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-92719-5_54",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tat-Seng Lok",
        "Clara Ong",
        "Alistair Crooks"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in civil engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-92719-5_54",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-94924-1_13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Car Hacking Mini-unit for High School Cybersecurity Education",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-94924-1_13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "car",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cooper Dean",
        "Brian Almaguer",
        "Timothy Buck",
        "Nichole Kunkle",
        "Christian Nguyen",
        "Preet Patel",
        "Anne Roberts",
        "Marti Shirley",
        "Huirong Fu",
        "Xiaoyan Sun",
        "Jun Dai"
      ],
      "venue": "IFIP advances in information and communication technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-94924-1_13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-031-95764-2_17",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANTXSec: A Deterministic Intrusion Detection and Prevention System for CAN Bus Monitoring ECU Activations",
      "description": "Despite being a legacy protocol with various known security issues, Controller Area Network (CAN) still represents the de-facto standard for communications within vehicles, ships, and industrial control systems. Many research works have designed Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to identify attacks by training machine learning classifiers on bus traffic or its properties. Actions to take after detection are, on the other hand, less investigated, and prevention mechanisms usually include protocol modification (e.g., adding authentication). An effective solution has yet to be implemented on a large scale in the wild. The reasons are related to the effort to handle sporadic false positives, the inevitable delay introduced by authentication, and the closed-source automobile environment that does not easily permit modifying Electronic Control Units (ECUs) software. In this paper, we propose CANTXSec, the first deterministic Intrusion Detection and Prevention system based on physical ECU activations. It employs a new classification of attacks based on the attacker's need in terms of access level to the bus, distinguishing between Frame Injection Attacks (FIAs) (i.e., using frame-level access) and Single-Bit Attacks (SBAs) (i.e., employing bit-level access). CANTXSec detects and prevents classical attacks in the CAN bus, while detecting advanced attacks that have been less investigated in the literature. We prove the effectiveness of our solution on a physical testbed, where we achieve 100% detection accuracy in both classes of attacks while preventing 100% of FIAs. Moreover, to encourage developers to employ CANTXSec, we discuss implementation details, providing an analysis based on each user's risk assessment.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-95764-2_17",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Denis Donadel",
        "Kavya Balasubramanian",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Bhaskar Ramasubramanian",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-031-95764-2_17",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-00639-4_1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Road Ahead: Supporting Decision Making in Automotive Cybersecurity Risk Treatment",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-00639-4_1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manfred Vielberth",
        "Robin Siepmann",
        "Magdalena Glas",
        "Günther Pernul"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-00639-4_1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-03558-5_39",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Threats and Vulnerabilities - A Growing Challenge in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-03558-5_39",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Priti Kulkarni",
        "Tanmay Siddharth",
        "Samaya Pillai",
        "Pankaj Pathak",
        "Venkataswamy Naidu Gangineni",
        "Vikash Yadav"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-03558-5_39",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-04288-0_23",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Safety Interrelationships in the V2X Context",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-08-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-04288-0_23",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hüseyin Rahmi Gök",
        "Elaheh Gol Hashem",
        "Walter Sebron"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-04288-0_23",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-04288-0_25",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Automotive TARA: The Role of Attacker Motivation in Attack Feasibility Levels",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-08-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-04288-0_25",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Faschang",
        "Omar Veledar",
        "Georg Macher"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-04288-0_25",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-09572-5_24",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Based Authentication Protocol Integrated with PUFs for Secure Vehicular Communication",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-09572-5_24",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brijmohan Lal Sahu",
        "Preeti Chandrakar",
        "Rajat Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-09572-5_24",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-10209-6_30",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Payload Image-Based Model for Automotive Intrusion Detection on STM32 Platform",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-11-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-10209-6_30",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Quoc-Tuan Le",
        "Le-Minh-Quan Dinh",
        "Le-Khanh-Trinh Phan",
        "Hoang-Anh Pham"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-10209-6_30",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-12869-0_21",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Connected Vehicles Against DDoS Attacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-12869-0_21",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khadija El Fellah",
        "Ikram El Azami",
        "Adil El Makrani",
        "Habiba Bouijij"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-12869-0_21",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-19300-1_20",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Autonomous EV Future: Cybersecurity Frameworks for Driverless Cars",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-19300-1_20",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cars",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karthik Varma Pericharla",
        "Tapan Nahar",
        "Chandra Prakash Gupta",
        "Vishal Das"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-19300-1_20",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-23450-6_16",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Few-Shot-Based Model-Agnostic Meta-learning for Intrusion Detection in Secure of In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-23450-6_16",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yingjie Xu",
        "Yufeng Li",
        "G Y Zhang",
        "Jun Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-23450-6_16",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-33701-6_4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Applying Cyber Informed Engineering Principles to Secure SoC Design for Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-33701-6_4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Mahmudul Kabir Peyal",
        "Benjamin Lampe",
        "Sin Ming Loo",
        "Benjamin C. Johnson"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-33701-6_4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-35506-5_48",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Integrated Design Specification Approach Using SCDL for the Co-engineering of Functional Safety and Cybersecurity in Automotive Control Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-09-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35506-5_48",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Akira Takada",
        "Kiyoshi SASAKI",
        "Keishi Okamoto",
        "Shuhei Yamashita",
        "文昭 河野",
        "Toyokazu Ogasawara",
        "Ryo Kurachi"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-35506-5_48",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-36813-3_19",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Entropy to Decommissioning: Cryptographic Key Management Strategies Across the Automotive Supply Chain",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-36813-3_19",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahmoud Saad",
        "Mohamed Hegazy",
        "Abdelrahman Ahmed"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-36813-3_19",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-36813-3_23",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two Regulatory Worlds, One Component: Bridging Automotive Cybersecurity Compliance and the Cyber Resilience Act",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-36813-3_23",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Ayhan Mehmed",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Omar Veledar",
        "Abdelkader Magdy Shaaban",
        "Eugen Brenner"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-36813-3_23",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-38692-2_30",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "When Authentication Is Not Enough: Breaking Behavior-Based Driver Authentication Systems",
      "description": "Researchers extensively explored behavior-based driver authentication systems in vehicles. Pushed by advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), these systems employ powerful models to identify drivers based on unique biometric behaviors. However, existing work prioritizes AI performance metrics, neglecting secure integration with real-world automotive environments and the threat of adversarial attacks that can fool the authentication system. In this paper, we propose for the first evasion attacks against behavior-based driver authentication systems, allowing an attacker to impersonate the legitimate driver. Our attacks exploit long-standing CAN bus weaknesses that allow the injection of forged frames without jeopardizing the attacker's safety while stealing the vehicle. When legitimate data samples are available, we propose \\textbf{SMARTCAN}, a safety-aware replay attack. If the attacker can only use the authenticator as an oracle, we propose \\textbf{GANCAN}, which trains a Generative Adversarial Network's generator using reinforcement learning on the authenticator's responses. Our attacks achieve a success rate up to 100\\% against all the considered models and, in the worst case, require 22 minutes to steal a vehicle. Acknowledging our identified vulnerabilities, we discuss the requirements for a safe and effective deployment of these systems in real-world scenarios.",
      "published": "2023-06-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-38692-2_30",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emad Efatinasab",
        "Francesco Marchiori",
        "Denis Donadel",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2026), 2026, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 16968",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-38692-2_30",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-032-42936-0_17",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unveiling Operator-Induced Vulnerabilities in OCPP: From Deployment Misconfigurations to Message-Processing Exploits",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-42936-0_17",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploits",
        "ocpp",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiawei Dong",
        "Ribal F. Atallah",
        "Danial Jafarigiv",
        "Mohsen Ghafouri",
        "Chadi M. Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-032-42936-0_17",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19818-7_2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Security Testing—The Digital Crash Test",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-09-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19818-7_2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stephanie Bayer",
        "Thomas Enderle",
        "Dennis Kengo Oka",
        "Marko Wolf"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in mobility",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-19818-7_2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20855-8_20",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Need for Safety and Cyber-Security Co-engineering and Standardization for Highly Automated Automotive Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-06-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20855-8_20",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Erwin Schoitsch",
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Zhendong Ma",
        "Thomas Gruber"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in mobility",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-20855-8_20",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22425-1_18",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Analysis Platform for the Information Security of In-Vehicle Networks Connected with External Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22425-1_18",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takaya Ezaki",
        "Tomohiro Date",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-22425-1_18",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25645-0_38",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Let’s Get Mobile: Secure FOTA for Automotive System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25645-0_38",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hafizah Mansor",
        "Konstantinos Markantonakis",
        "Raja Naeem Akram",
        "Keith E. Mayes"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-25645-0_38",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_11",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review of Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Methods in the Automotive Context",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_11",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Georg Macher",
        "Eric Armengaud",
        "Eugen Brenner",
        "Christian Kreiner"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_11",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 82,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-47364-2_60",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comparison of Computer-Based Technologies Suitable for Cryptographic Attacks",
      "description": "Developed initially for tasks related to computer graphics, GPUs are increasingly being used for general purpose processing, including scientific and engineering applications. In this contribution, we have analysed the performance of three graphics cards that belong to the parallel computing CUDA platform with two C++ and Java multi-threading implementations, using as an example of computation a brute-force attack on KeeLoq, one of the best known remote keyless entry applications. As it was expected, these implementations are not able to break algorithms with 64-bit keys, but the results allow us to provide valuable information regarding the compared capabilities of the tested platforms.",
      "published": "2016-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47364-2_60",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Víctor Gayoso Martínez",
        "Luis Hernández Encinas",
        "Agustin Martin",
        "Óscar Martínez-Graullera",
        "Javier Villazón-Terrazas"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in intelligent systems and computing",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-47364-2_60",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49806-5_2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical DoS Attacks on Embedded Networks in Commercial Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49806-5_2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Subhojeet Mukherjee",
        "Hossein Mozdorani Shirazi",
        "Indrakshi Ray",
        "Jeremy S. Daily",
        "Rose Gamble"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-49806-5_2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 62,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Stealth, Selective, Link-Layer Denial-of-Service Attack Against Automotive Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrea Palanca",
        "Eric Evenchick",
        "Federico Maggi",
        "Stefano Zanero"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 145,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_20",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Threat Analysis Approach Intertwining Safety and Security for the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_20",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jürgen Dürrwang",
        "Kristian Beckers",
        "Reiner Kriesten"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_20",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_22",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Pattern Approach for Safety and Security Co-engineering in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_22",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tiago Amorim",
        "Helmut Martin",
        "Zhendong Ma",
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Daniel Schneider",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Bernhard Winkler",
        "Martin Krammer",
        "Christian Kreiner"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-66266-4_22",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_18",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detailed Analysis of Security Evaluation of Automotive Systems Based on JASO TP15002",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-09-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_18",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yasuyuki Kawanishi",
        "Hideaki Nishihara",
        "Daisuke Souma",
        "Hirotaka Yoshida"
      ],
      "venue": "SAFECOMP Workshops",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_18",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_22",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Illusion and Dazzle: Adversarial Optical Channel Exploits Against Lidars for Automotive Applications",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_22",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "automotive",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hocheol Shin",
        "Dohyun Kim",
        "Yujin Kwon",
        "Yongdae Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_22",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 261,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_24",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Security of Carrier Phase-Based Ranging",
      "description": "Multicarrier phase-based ranging is fast emerging as a cost-optimized solution for a wide variety of proximity-based applications due to its low power requirement, low hardware complexity and compatibility with existing standards such as ZigBee and 6LoWPAN. Given potentially critical nature of the applications in which phase-based ranging can be deployed (e.g., access control, asset tracking), it is important to evaluate its security guarantees. Therefore, in this work, we investigate the security of multicarrier phase-based ranging systems and specifically focus on distance decreasing relay attacks that have proven detrimental to the security of proximity-based access control systems (e.g., vehicular passive keyless entry and start systems). We show that phase-based ranging, as well as its implementations, are vulnerable to a variety of distance reduction attacks. We describe different attack realizations and verify their feasibility by simulations and experiments on a commercial ranging system. Specifically, we successfully reduced the estimated range to less than \\(3\\, \\mathrm {m}\\) even though the devices were more than 50 m apart. We discuss possible countermeasures against such attacks and illustrate their limitations, therefore demonstrating that phase-based ranging cannot be fully secured against distance decreasing attacks.",
      "published": "2016-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_24",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hildur Ólafsdóttir",
        "Aanjhan Ranganathan",
        "Srđjan Čapkun"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_24",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66972-4_12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Wireless Automotive Software Updates Using Blockchains: A Proof of Concept",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66972-4_12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco Steger",
        "Ali Dorri",
        "Salil S. Kanhere",
        "Kay Römer",
        "Raja Jurdak",
        "Michael Karner"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in mobility",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-66972-4_12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-72359-4_38",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Security of In-Vehicle Hybrid Network: Status and Challenges",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72359-4_38",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tianxiang Huang",
        "Jianying Zhou",
        "Yi Wang",
        "Anyu Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-72359-4_38",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-3-319-72359-4_39",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IoVShield: An Efficient Vehicular Intrusion Detection System for Self-driving (Short Paper)",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-12-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72359-4_39",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhuo Wei",
        "Yan-Jiang Yang",
        "Yasmin Rehana",
        "Yong-Dong Wu",
        "J. Weng",
        "R. Deng"
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      "authors": [
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        "Le Guan",
        "Minghui Zhu",
        "Peng Liu"
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        "Seokjun Lee",
        "Byungho Chung",
        "Seong-Il Jin"
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      "authors": [
        "Khaled Karray",
        "Jean‐Luc Danger",
        "Sylvain Guilley",
        "M. Abdelaziz Elaabid"
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      "venue": "Springer eBooks",
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        "secure"
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        "OTA / updates"
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      "authors": [
        "Thomas Chowdhury",
        "Eric Lesiuta",
        "Kerianne Rikley",
        "Chung‐Wei Lin",
        "Eunsuk Kang",
        "BaekGyu Kim",
        "Shinichi Shiraishi",
        "Mark S. Lawford",
        "Alan Wassyng"
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      "year": 2018,
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      "authors": [
        "Armin Happel",
        "Christof Ebert"
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      "authors": [
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        "Benjamin Glas"
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      "authors": [
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        "Bernd Reh"
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      "authors": [
        "Joongyong Choi",
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    {
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      "authors": [
        "Sokjoon Lee",
        "Byungho Chung",
        "Joongyong Choi",
        "Hyeokchan Kwon"
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      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-13-1328-8_91",
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      "title": "Keyless, Robust and Cost-Effective Privacy Protection Algorithm for Videos Using Steganography",
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      "published": "2020-01-01",
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      "authors": [
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      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-15-1084-7_41",
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        "openalex"
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      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-15-2693-0_14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Impact of Different Feature Scaling Methods on Intrusion Detection for in-Vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN)",
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      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siti-Farhana Lokman",
        "Abu Talib Othman",
        "Muhamad Husaini Abu Bakar",
        "Shahrulniza Musa"
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      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
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      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shiho Kim",
        "Rakesh Shrestha"
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      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-15-8053-6",
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      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CVNNs-IDS: Complex-Valued Neural Network Based In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_19",
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        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
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      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mu Han",
        "Peng-Zhou Cheng",
        "Shi-Dian Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Security and Privacy in Digital Economy",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_19",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
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    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-15-9739-8_3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Low-Speed Injection Attack Detection on CAN Bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9739-8_3",
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        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
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      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chundong Wang",
        "Chuang Li",
        "Tongle An",
        "Xiaochun Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-15-9739-8_3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
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    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-19-3089-8_51",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning Approach for Anamoly Detection in CAN Bus Network: An Intelligent LSTM-Based Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3089-8_51",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ch. Ravi Kishore",
        "D. Chandrasekhar Rao",
        "Himansu Sekhar Behera"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-19-3089-8_51",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
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    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-19-5751-2_14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection System for Connected Automobiles Security",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5751-2_14",
      "matched_terms": [
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        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
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      "authors": [
        "Abdul Majid Jamil",
        "Jian-Hua Zhou",
        "Di Wang",
        "Hassan Jalil Hadi",
        "Yue Cao"
      ],
      "venue": "Recent advancements in connected autonomous vehicle technologies",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-19-5751-2_14",
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        "openalex"
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      "cited_by": 0,
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    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-19-6223-3_58",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Demonstrate an Attack Strategy to Control a Vehicle’s Computer by Targeting Its Electrical Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6223-3_58",
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        "attack",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
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      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Karrouchi",
        "Abdelhafid Messaoudi",
        "Kamal Kassmi",
        "Ismail Nasri",
        "Ilias Atmane",
        "Jalal Blaacha"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-19-6223-3_58",
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        "openalex"
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    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-19-7982-8_51",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "KDS: Keyless Data Security for Wireless Sensor Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7982-8_51",
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      "authors": [
        "Charu Sharma",
        "Rohit Vaid",
        "Kavita Gupta"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-19-7982-8_51",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-95-1334-5_17",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Evolution of Connected Vehicles: Innovations, Integration Complexities, and Security Imperatives",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-08-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-1334-5_17",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qian Huang",
        "Li Liang",
        "Jiao Peng",
        "Keqiao Yang",
        "Yujia Tao",
        "Shuangli Deng"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-95-1334-5_17",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-95-3072-4_1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on CAN Bus Intrusion Detection Method Based on Feature Fusion of Fourier Transform and Wavelet Transform",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-3072-4_1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zixin Liu",
        "Xiangsen Sun",
        "Daohua Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-95-3072-4_1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-95-6860-4_33",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Image-Based Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks Via MobileNetV3-GRU and Hierarchical Distillation",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-6860-4_33",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhihui Cai",
        "Guangfu Wu",
        "Changqin Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-95-6860-4_33",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-96-0294-0_16",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN Bus Attack Detection Based on Entropy and CNN-SVM",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-12-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-0294-0_16",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ziqing Wang",
        "Yuanjie Fang",
        "Mingfei Yue",
        "Jing Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-96-0294-0_16",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-96-1624-4_17",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reverse Engineering-Guided Fuzzing for CAN Bus Vulnerability Detection",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-1624-4_17",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "fuzzing",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manu Jo Varghese",
        "Frank Jiang",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Robin Doss",
        "Adnan Anwar"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-96-1624-4_17",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-96-2256-6_44",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Fuzzing of Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-2256-6_44",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pengcheng Wang",
        "Si-Miao Gao",
        "Zhonghao Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-96-2256-6_44",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-96-2395-2_2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on Security Countermeasures Against Autonomous Driving Hacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-2395-2_2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seung-Yong Oh",
        "Cheolhee Yoon"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-96-2395-2_2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-96-5566-3_15",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessment of Automotive Attack Feasibility Methods in Comparison to Railway and Aviation Methods",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-5566-3_15",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Johannes von Richthofen",
        "Christoph Krauß",
        "Johann Altgenug",
        "Dominik Spychalski",
        "Wolfgang Hommel"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-96-5566-3_15",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-96-7441-1_12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Testing Practice of Cybersecurity Validation of Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-7441-1_12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Keyi Zhu",
        "Daxin Tian",
        "Bosong Zou",
        "Pinlong Cai",
        "Yuran Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-96-7441-1_12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-97-0744-7_11",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Graph-Based Strategy for Intrusion Detection in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0744-7_11",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. S. Sreelekshmi",
        "S.M. Aji"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-97-0744-7_11",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4061,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1007/978-981-97-0744-7_11 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-97-3591-4_4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Vulnerability Assessment: Mapping Architecture Flow and Ranking Components for Vulnerability in Connected Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-3591-4_4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vinay Sharma",
        "Samaya Pillai",
        "Pankaj Pathak",
        "Venkatesh Iyengar",
        "Vikash Yadav"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-97-3591-4_4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-97-4522-7_17",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated Learning-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network Using Statistics of Controller Area Network Messages",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-4522-7_17",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaojie Lin",
        "Dandi Ai",
        "Baihe Ma",
        "Xu Wang",
        "Guangsheng Yu",
        "Ying He",
        "Wei Ni",
        "Ren Ping Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-97-4522-7_17",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-97-4522-7_22",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Fuzz Testing Method for Information Security of Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-4522-7_22",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jinjian He",
        "Chengwen Liu",
        "Lirong Chen",
        "Xiyu Fang",
        "Yun Li",
        "Huanyu Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in computer and information science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-97-4522-7_22",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-97-4727-6_10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Future of Connected Cars: Investigating Vulnerabilities and Preventing Cyberattacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-4727-6_10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joy Winston James",
        "Abdul Khadar Jilani"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-97-4727-6_10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-97-5609-4_40",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Requirements Optimization Method for Automotive Cyber Security Assurance",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-5609-4_40",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhengshu Zhou",
        "Xinqi Yang",
        "Qian Long",
        "Gaihua Wang",
        "Qiang Zhi"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in computer science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-97-5609-4_40",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-97-6726-7_13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Monitoring and Evaluating ECU Communication Data for Vulnerabilities Detection",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-6726-7_13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ecu",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sayak Samanta",
        "Rahul Biswas",
        "Sushruta Mishra",
        "Anil Kumar",
        "Ali Hasan Dheidan"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-97-6726-7_13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-99-1365-7_43",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Trade-off Design Approach for Integrating Cybersecurity, Safety, and Other Aspects of Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1365-7_43",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jinghua Yu",
        "Feng Luo",
        "Geguang Pu",
        "Mingsong Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in electrical engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-99-1365-7_43",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/978-981-99-6550-2_19",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Protocol for Mutual Authentication in Remote Keyless Entry Systems that Employs Random Variables",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6550-2_19",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Nguyen Thi Thuy"
      ],
      "venue": "Lecture notes in networks and systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/978-981-99-6550-2_19",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s00371-022-02660-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey on adversarial attacks and defenses for object detection and their applications in autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-09-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00371-022-02660-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdollah Amirkhani",
        "Mohammad Parsa Karimi",
        "Amin Banitalebi-Dehkordi"
      ],
      "venue": "The Visual Computer",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s00371-022-02660-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s00450-017-0342-y",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A threat analysis of the vehicle-to-grid charging protocol ISO 15118",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00450-017-0342-y",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso 15118",
        "threat",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaibin Bao",
        "Hristo Valev",
        "Manuela Wagner",
        "Hartmut Schmeck"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science - Research and Development",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/s00450-017-0342-y",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 78,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s00450-017-0348-5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy-preserving blockchain-based electric vehicle charging with dynamic tariff decisions",
      "description": "Electric vehicles are gaining widespread adoption and are a key component in the establishment of the smart grid. Beside the increasing number of electric vehicles, a dense and widespread charging infrastructure will be required. This offers the opportunity for a broad range of different energy providers and charging station operators, both of which can offer energy at different prices depending on demand and supply. While customers benefit from a liberalized market and a wide selection of tariff options, such dynamic pricing use cases are subject to privacy issues and allow to detect the customer’s position and to track vehicles for, e.g., targeted advertisements. In this paper we present a reliable, automated and privacy-preserving selection of charging stations based on pricing and the distance to the electric vehicle. The protocol builds on a blockchain where electric vehicles signal their demand and charging stations send bids similar to an auction. The electric vehicle owner then decides on a particular charging station based on the supply-side offers it receives. This paper shows that the use of blockchains increases the reliability and the transparency of this approach while preserving the privacy of the electric vehicle owners.",
      "published": "2017-09-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00450-017-0348-5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fabian Knirsch",
        "Andreas Unterweger",
        "Dominik Engel"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science - Research and Development",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/s00450-017-0348-5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 239,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s00500-024-10313-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attention-CNN-LSTM based intrusion detection system (ACL-IDS) for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-11-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-024-10313-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit Taneja",
        "Gulshan Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "Soft Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s00500-024-10313-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s00521-023-08233-5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Transfer learning-based self-learning intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-023-08233-5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuhang Wang",
        "Yingxu Lai",
        "Ye Chen",
        "Jingwen Wei",
        "Zhaoyi Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Neural Computing and Applications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/s00521-023-08233-5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10207-023-00698-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OCPP in the spotlight: threats and countermeasures for electric vehicle charging infrastructures 4.0",
      "description": "Abstract Undoubtedly, Industry 4.0 in the energy sector improves the conditions for automation, generation and distribution of energy, increasing the rate of electric vehicle manufacturing in recent years. As a result, more grid-connected charging infrastructures are being installed, whose charging stations (CSs) can follow standardized architectures, such as the one proposed by the open charge point protocol (OCPP). The most recent version of this protocol is v.2.0.1, which includes new security measures at device and communication level to cover those security issues identified in previous versions. Therefore, this paper analyzes OCPP-v2.0.1 to determine whether the new functions may still be susceptible to specific cyber and physical threats, and especially when CSs may be connected to microgrids. To formalize the study, we first adapted the well-known threat analysis methodology, STRIDE, to identify and classify threats in terms of control and energy, and subsequently we combine it with DREAD for risk assessment. The analyses indicate that, although OCPP-v2.0.1 has evolved, potential security risks still remain, requiring greater protection in the future.",
      "published": "2023-05-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-023-00698-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ocpp",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cristina Alcaraz",
        "Jesus Cumplido",
        "Alicia Triviño"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Information Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10207-023-00698-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10207-025-01055-7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber defense in OCPP for EV charging security risks",
      "description": "Abstract The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) is a widely adopted communication standard that enables vendor-independent communication between charging points and Electric Vehicle (EV) charging station management systems. OCPP has significant cyber risks in terms of weak authentication mechanisms and improper session handling, exposing it to potential EV charging-related security threats. The backward incompatibility of the recent version of OCPP also poses challenges in the seamless adoption of the protocol. This paper introduces a comprehensive cyber defense framework to mitigate the security risks associated with OCPP. Through a detailed analysis of its vulnerabilities, the framework proposes targeted enhancements and mitigation strategies to further strengthen its security. The results demonstrate that the proposed OCPP significantly enhances both security and performance, surpassing its predecessor and current state-of-the-art security solutions for EV charging.",
      "published": "2025-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-025-01055-7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Safa Hamdare",
        "David Joseph Brown",
        "Devki Nandan Jha",
        "Mohammad Aljaidi",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Sushil Kumar",
        "Rupak Kharel",
        "Manish Jugran",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Information Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10207-025-01055-7",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10462-024-10968-z",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Over-the-air upgrading for enhancing security of intelligent connected vehicles: a survey",
      "description": "Abstract The continuous improvement in the connectivity, automation and autonomy levels of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) significantly increases the probability of potential security threats. Over-the-Air (OTA) is a promising technique for upgrading features of ICVs and enhancing their reliability and security against environmental disturbances as well as malicious attacks. To better understand the potential security risks and possible countermeasures, we survey research works in ICV security during OTA from cloud upgrade, terminal upgrade, and object upgrade. We also summarize existing methods in OTA upgrading techniques and systematically investigate the overall framework of OTA upgrading methods from the perspectives of Software-Over-the-Air (SOTA) and Firmware-Over-the-Air (FOTA).We further discuss possible mitigation strategies and open issues yet to be resolved in this research direction. This survey shows that OTA provides a powerful technique for upgrading the ICV features and improving ICV security.",
      "published": "2024-10-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10462-024-10968-z",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Beibei Li",
        "Wei Hu",
        "Lemei Da",
        "Yibing Wu",
        "Xinxin Wang",
        "Yiwei Li",
        "Chaoxuan Yuan"
      ],
      "venue": "Artificial Intelligence Review",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10462-024-10968-z",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10462-024-11014-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep learning adversarial attacks and defenses in autonomous vehicles: a systematic literature review from a safety perspective",
      "description": "The integration of Deep Learning (DL) algorithms in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) has revolutionized their precision in navigating various driving scenarios, ranging from anti-fatigue safe driving to intelligent route planning. Despite their proven effectiveness, concerns regarding the safety and reliability of DL algorithms in AVs have emerged, particularly in light of the escalating threat of adversarial attacks, as emphasized by recent research. These digital or physical attacks present formidable challenges to AV safety, relying extensively on collecting and interpreting environmental data through integrated sensors and DL. This paper addresses this pressing issue through a systematic survey that meticulously explores robust adversarial attacks and defenses, specifically focusing on DL in AVs from a safety perspective. Going beyond a review of existing research papers on adversarial attacks and defenses, the paper introduces a safety scenarios taxonomy matrix Inspired by SOTIF designed to augment the safety of DL in AVs. This matrix categorizes safety scenarios into four distinct areas and classifies attacks into those areas in three scenarios, along with two defense scenarios. Furthermore, the paper investigates the testing and evaluation measurements critical for assessing attacks in the context of DL for AVs. It further explores the dynamic landscape of datasets and simulation platforms. This contribution significantly enriches the ongoing discourse surrounding the assurance of safety and reliability in autonomous vehicles, especially in the face of continually evolving adversarial challenges.",
      "published": "2024-11-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10462-024-11014-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Dawod Mohammed Ibrahum",
        "Manzoor Hussain",
        "Jang‐Eui Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "Artificial Intelligence Review",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10462-024-11014-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 88,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10489-022-03412-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust anomaly-based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle network by graph neural network framework",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-022-03412-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junchao Xiao",
        "Lin Forrest Yang",
        "Fuli Zhong",
        "Hongbo Chen",
        "Xiangxue Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Intelligence",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10489-022-03412-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10515-024-00461-w",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TM-fuzzer: fuzzing autonomous driving systems through traffic management",
      "description": "Abstract Simulation testing of Autonomous Driving Systems (ADS) is crucial for ensuring the safety of autonomous vehicles. Currently, scenarios searched by ADS simulation testing tools are less likely to expose ADS issues and highly similar. In this paper, we propose TM-fuzzer, a novel approach for searching ADS test scenarios, which utilizes real-time traffic management and diversity analysis to search security-critical and unique scenarios within the infinite scenario space. TM-fuzzer dynamically manages traffic flow by manipulating non-player characters near autonomous vehicle throughout the simulation process to enhance the efficiency of test scenarios. Additionally, the TM-fuzzer utilizes clustering analysis on vehicle trajectory graphs within scenarios to increase the diversity of test scenarios. Compared to the baseline, the TM-fuzzer identified 29 unique violated scenarios more than four times faster and enhanced the incidence of ADS-caused violations by 26.26%. Experiments suggest that the TM-fuzzer demonstrates improved efficiency and accuracy.",
      "published": "2024-07-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10515-024-00461-w",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shenghao Lin",
        "Fansong Chen",
        "Laile Xi",
        "Gaosheng Wang",
        "Rongrong Xi",
        "Yuyan Sun",
        "Hongsong Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "Automated Software Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10515-024-00461-w",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10586-022-03821-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigating voltage fingerprint spoofing attacks on the controller area network bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-11-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-022-03821-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wassila Lalouani",
        "Yi Dang",
        "Mohamed Younis"
      ],
      "venue": "Cluster Computing",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10586-022-03821-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10664-025-10795-y",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SecMLOps: A Comprehensive Framework for Integrating Security Throughout the MLOps Lifecycle",
      "description": "Machine Learning (ML) has emerged as a pivotal technology in the operation of large and complex systems, driving advancements in fields such as autonomous vehicles, healthcare diagnostics, and financial fraud detection. Despite its benefits, the deployment of ML models brings significant security challenges, such as adversarial attacks, which can compromise the integrity and reliability of these systems. To address these challenges, this paper builds upon the concept of Secure Machine Learning Operations (SecMLOps), providing a comprehensive framework designed to integrate robust security measures throughout the entire ML operations (MLOps) lifecycle. SecMLOps builds on the principles of MLOps by embedding security considerations from the initial design phase through to deployment and continuous monitoring. This framework is particularly focused on safeguarding against sophisticated attacks that target various stages of the MLOps lifecycle, thereby enhancing the resilience and trustworthiness of ML applications. A detailed advanced pedestrian detection system (PDS) use case demonstrates the practical application of SecMLOps in securing critical MLOps. Through extensive empirical evaluations, we highlight the trade-offs between security measures and system performance, providing critical insights into optimizing security without unduly impacting operational efficiency. Our findings underscore the importance of a balanced approach, offering valuable guidance for practitioners on how to achieve an optimal balance between security and performance in ML deployments across various domains.",
      "published": "2026-01-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10664-025-10795-y",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xinrui Zhang",
        "Pincan Zhao",
        "Jason Jaskolka",
        "Heng Li",
        "Rongxing Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10664-025-10795-y",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10773-018-3908-y",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum Identity Authentication Scheme of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10773-018-3908-y",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhiya Chen",
        "Kunlin Zhou",
        "Qin Liao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Theoretical Physics",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10773-018-3908-y",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10836-021-05973-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of Security Vulnerability Levels of In-Vehicle Network Topologies Applying Graph Representations",
      "description": "Abstract This article investigates cybersecurity issues related to in-vehicle communication networks. In-vehicle communication network security is evaluated based on the protection characteristics of the network components and the topology of the network. The automotive communication network topologies are represented as undirected weighted graphs, and their vulnerability is estimated based on the specific characteristics of the generated graph. Thirteen different vehicle models have been investigated to compare the vulnerability levels of the in-vehicle network using the Dijkstra's shortest route algorithm. An important advantage of the proposed method is that it is in accordance with the most relevant security evaluation models. On the other hand, the newly introduced approach considers the Secure-by-Design concept principles.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10836-021-05973-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zsombor Pethő",
        "Intiyaz Khan",
        "Árpád Török"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Electronic Testing",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10836-021-05973-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s10922-025-09907-2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cost-Sensitive Detection of DoS Attacks in Automotive Cybersecurity Using Artificial Neural Networks and CatBoost",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10922-025-09907-2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. Nissar",
        "N. Naja",
        "Abdellah Jamali"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Network and Systems Management",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s10922-025-09907-2",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11036-023-02284-7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sensor Spoofing Detection On Autonomous Vehicle Using Channel-spatial-temporal Attention Based Autoencoder Network",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles heavily rely on various sensors to evaluate their surroundings and issue essential control commands. Nonetheless, these sensors are susceptible to false data injection and spoofing attacks, posing a significant security threat. In response, this paper proposes a channel-spatial-temporal attention-based autoencoder network to detect sensor spoofing attacks on autonomous vehicles. The innovative network utilizes the reconstruction error based on the autoencoder to detect abnormalities in input time series data collected from multiple sensors. The proposed model consists of a memory-augmented based spatial-attention block and PSE-Res2Net block-based encoder and decoder. PSE-Res2Net block initially adopts Res2Net module to generate a multi-scale feature graph and enhance multi-dimensional representation ability of neural network, then applies the PSENet module to capture location-aware channel information and channel-sensitive spatial information through the interaction of channel attention and spatial attention. Moreover, the memory-augmented based temporal-attention block is developed to integrate multi-scale features and aggregate global sequence information of sensor measurements. Experimental evaluations conducted on the comma2k19, KITTI, and CCSAD datasets illustrate the superiority of the proposed detection model over baseline technologies. It exhibits enhanced performance in terms of mPre, mRe, mF1 score, and showcases heightened resilience against noise and attacks.",
      "published": "2023-12-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11036-023-02284-7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Man Zhou",
        "Lan-Sheng Han"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal on spesial topics in mobile networks and applications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11036-023-02284-7",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11042-020-09807-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the security and robustness of “Keyless dynamic optimal multi-bit image steganography using energetic pixels”",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-09-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-020-09807-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Longfei Ke",
        "Zhaoxia Yin"
      ],
      "venue": "Multimedia Tools and Applications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11042-020-09807-4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11042-023-15771-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A lightweight intrusion detection system for internet of vehicles based on transfer learning and MobileNetV2 with hyper-parameter optimization",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-023-15771-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ying-Qing Wang",
        "Gui-He Qin",
        "Mi Zou",
        "Yan-Hua Liang",
        "Guo-Feng Wang",
        "Kunpeng Wang",
        "Yao Feng",
        "Zi-Zhan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Multimedia tools and applications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11042-023-15771-6",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11071-023-08508-5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating cyber-attacks on the continuous delay effect in coupled map car-following model under connected vehicles environment",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-05-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-023-08508-5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guanghan Peng",
        "Keke Wang",
        "Hongzhuan Zhao",
        "Huili Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "Nonlinear Dynamics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11071-023-08508-5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 65,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11219-017-9393-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A tour of secure software engineering solutions for connected vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11219-017-9393-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antonia Bertolino",
        "Antonello Calabrò",
        "Félicita Di Giandomenico",
        "Giuseppe Lami",
        "Francesca Lonetti",
        "Eda Marchetti",
        "Fabio Martinelli",
        "Ilaria Matteucci",
        "Paolo Mori"
      ],
      "venue": "Software Quality Journal",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11219-017-9393-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11219-025-09723-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Enhanced threat analysis and risk assessment for connected and autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-06-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11219-025-09723-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Usman Ahmad",
        "Mu Han",
        "Shahid Mahmood"
      ],
      "venue": "Software Quality Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11219-025-09723-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11219-026-09787-y",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mapping the landscape of software vulnerabilities in connected vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract The increased level of connectivity for vehicles leads to sophisticated and challenging software security concerns for automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers. With a Connected Vehicle (CV) communicating with multiple entities (road infrastructure, other vehicles, OEMs, cloud, etc.), new attack surfaces are exposed to intruders. For instance, in 2023, ethical hackers demonstrated remote access to critical vehicle controls like steering and braking through vulnerabilities in infotainment and telematics systems. Several OEMs also reported production disruptions due to ransomware targeting software development infrastructure. Additionally, the current state of the art fails to provide a holistic view of a secure software development process for CVs. This paper presents a survey of automotive software vulnerabilities and associated attack vectors and analyzes the significant changes in security trends. Moreover, the vulnerabilities are tracked across the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC). We include 413 new automotive software vulnerabilities identified within the last 2 years and 9 months in our study. Additionally, 20 automotive software repositories with 827 vulnerable libraries are identified by scanning sources such as repositories, SBOMs (Software Bill of Materials), images, and manifest files. We provide several security recommendations for software engineering teams based on the findings. Our findings are a step forward to support the maintenance of automotive software quality in terms of security across its entire life cycle.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11219-026-09787-y",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srijita Basu",
        "Miroslaw Staron",
        "Magnus Almgren",
        "Jennifer Horkoff",
        "Christian Berger"
      ],
      "venue": "Software Quality Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11219-026-09787-y",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4692,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1007/s11219-026-09787-y and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: like, significant, access, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11227-019-03049-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing smart vehicles from relay attacks using machine learning",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-019-03049-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "relay",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Usman",
        "Hong Song",
        "Awais Bilal",
        "Mamoun Alazab",
        "Alireza Jolfaei"
      ],
      "venue": "The Journal of Supercomputing",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11227-019-03049-4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11227-026-08325-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Online clustering-based unsupervised intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-02-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-026-08325-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wei Wang",
        "Guihe Qin",
        "Yutao Bie",
        "Yanhua Liang",
        "Yingqing Wang",
        "Xiang Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "The Journal of Supercomputing",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11227-026-08325-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11227-026-08772-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection systems for the internet of vehicles: a systematic survey of techniques and challenges across CAN bus and vehicular networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-026-08772-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Duygu KAYAOGLU",
        "Eyüp Emre Ülkü",
        "Önder Demir"
      ],
      "venue": "The Journal of Supercomputing",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11227-026-08772-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11276-022-03084-9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PIER: cyber-resilient risk assessment model for connected and autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract As more vehicles are being connected to the Internet and equipped with autonomous driving features, more robust safety and security measures are required for connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). Therefore, threat analysis and risk assessment are essential to prepare against cybersecurity risks for CAVs. Although prior studies have measured the possibility of attack and damage from attack as risk assessment indices, they have not analyzed the expanding attack surface or risk assessment indices that rely upon real-time resilience. This study proposes the PIER method to evaluate the cybersecurity risks of CAVs. We implemented cyber resilience for CAVs by presenting new criteria, such as exposure and recovery, in addition to probability and impact, as indices for the threat analysis and risk assessment of vehicles. To verify its effectiveness, the PIER method was evaluated with respect to software update over-the-air and collision avoidance features. Furthermore, we found that implementing security requirements that mitigate serious risks successfully diminishes the risk indices. Using the risk assessment matrix, the PIER method can shorten the risk determination time through high-risk coverage and a simple process.",
      "published": "2022-08-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11276-022-03084-9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seunghyun Park",
        "Hyunhee Park"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11276-022-03084-9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11277-016-3618-9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerabilities of Android OS-Based Telematics System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016-08-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-016-3618-9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Seoung Yeop Na",
        "Samuel Woo",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Personal Communications",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11277-016-3618-9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11277-022-09571-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hybrid Approach to Enhance Data Security in Wireless Vehicle Firmware Update Process",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-02-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-022-09571-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kathiresh Mayilsamy",
        "Neelaveni Ramachandran",
        "B. Moses",
        "A. Ravi Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless personal communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11277-022-09571-8",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11416-022-00430-5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reversing Kia Motors Head Unit to discover and exploit software vulnerabilities",
      "description": "Abstract Modern vehicles resemble four-wheels computers connected to the Internet via their In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems. As with PCs in the past, cars, being connected to the Internet can be potentially vulnerable. The IVI system of a car is part of the intra-vehicle network and can be the entry-point of offensive cybersecurity attacks. The intra-vehicle network, based on the CAN protocol, is vulnerable by design: messages are exchanged in clear. Thus, the uncontrolled access to the CAN bus may have serious impact on the vehicle itself and its passengers. In this paper, we present a vulnerability assessment, through a reverse engineering process, of Kia vehicles IVI system. In particular, we focused on reverse engineer the Kia IVI system to discover vulnerabilities that may allow an attacker to compromise the IVI functionalities and inject CAN frames into the CAN bus to alter the behaviour of (part of) the vehicle. By reverse engineering the IVI, we identified four important vulnerabilities that affect all Kia vehicles that embed the studied IVI. Finally, we show how an attacker can easily control the IVI and inject CAN bus frames by means of a Metasploit module that we wrote.",
      "published": "2022-05-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-022-00430-5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "kia"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11416-022-00430-5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11416-023-00486-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Potential cyber threats of adversarial attacks on autonomous driving models",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-06-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-023-00486-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eldar Boltachev"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11416-023-00486-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11416-024-00522-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A vehicle firmware security vulnerability: an IVI exploitation",
      "description": "Abstract In the last years, the increasing vehicular technology has led to a surge in cybersecurity attacks, particularly regarding connected vehicles and their vulnerable infotainment systems. This paper explores the vulnerabilities within an In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system firmware, focusing on the Gen5W_L multimedia device utilized in Hyundai, Kia, and Genesis vehicles. Leveraging reverse engineering techniques, the study uncovers several security issues within the firmware, allowing for the creation and installation of custom firmware. The paper introduces Chimaera, a reverse engineering attack targeting the IVI system firmware, which exploits a vulnerability introduced by statically compiling the mbedtls library. After a reverse engineering analysis and injecting malicious assembly code directly in the IVI firmware, the attack enables the extraction of sensitive information from the firmware files like the cryptographic keys to install a customized firmware. The research shows that exploiting these vulnerabilities facilitates the installation of insecure firmware, granting attackers unauthorized access to vehicle functionalities. This includes the possibility to inject CAN bus messages, potentially compromising critical vehicle systems such as radio controls and safety features. The findings underscore the need for robust cybersecurity measures within automotive systems and highlight the significance of vulnerability assessment to mitigate security risks in connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-05-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-024-00522-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hyundai",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "kia",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "hyundai",
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11416-024-00522-4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4702,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1007/s11416-024-00522-4 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: sensitive, unauthorized, like, risks, access, information, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11416-026-00673-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "XGBoost-guided bidirectional GRU with attention mechanism for intrusion detection in CAN bus vehicular networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-026-00673-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "G. Dakshayani",
        "R. Sakthi Vignesh"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11416-026-00673-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s11633-026-1667-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Visual Adversarial Attack on Vision-language Models for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-07-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11633-026-1667-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tianyuan Zhang",
        "Lu Wang",
        "Xinwei Zhang",
        "Yitong Zhang",
        "Boyi Jia",
        "Siyuan Liang",
        "Shengshan Hu",
        "Qiang Fu",
        "Aishan Liu",
        "Xianglong Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Machine Intelligence Research",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s11633-026-1667-4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s12198-020-00208-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving CAN bus security by assigning dynamic arbitration IDs",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-04-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-020-00208-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Riadul Islam",
        "Rafi Ud Daula Refat"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Transportation Security",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1007/s12198-020-00208-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s12198-026-00336-z",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability assessment of vehicle access system using software-defined radio (SDR): attacks, testing, comparative analysis and future countermeasures",
      "description": "Abstract Remote Keyless Entry systems have become an integral component of contemporary vehicles, enhancing user convenience while simultaneously posing potential security challenges. However, with this convenience comes a growing concern over potential security vulnerabilities, particularly those involving radio frequency (RF) attacks such as replay attacks, relay attacks, and signal jamming. This research paper investigates the vulnerabilities of RKE systems across multiple car models, evaluating their susceptibility to RF-based exploits. Our testing results reveal significant disparities in the security robustness of different car models, highlighting the need for improved encryption protocols and signal authentication mechanisms. This study provides a comparative analysis of RKE vulnerabilities, offering insights into the current state of automotive security and proposing recommendations for mitigating risks associated with RF attacks. By offering a comparative analysis of performance and security parameters, this research aims to inform automotive manufacturers, cybersecurity experts, and consumers about the inherent risks associated with current RKE implementations and to advocate for the development and adoption of more secure vehicular access technologies.",
      "published": "2026-03-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-026-00336-z",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "keyless",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iram Shaikh",
        "Vedant Sakinal",
        "Vedashree Bhongale",
        "Sheetal Borde",
        "Rupali S. Kamathe",
        "Vandana Hanchate"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Transportation Security",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s12198-026-00336-z",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s12239-018-0085-1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review of Secure Communication Approaches for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-09-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s12239-018-0085-1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qiang Hu",
        "Feng Luo"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Automotive Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1007/s12239-018-0085-1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s12239-021-0003-9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Implementation of Security Function According to Routing Method in Automotive Gateway",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s12239-021-0003-9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Seo Park",
        "Dae Hyun Kim",
        "Il Hong Suh"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Automotive Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/s12239-021-0003-9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s12525-015-0211-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Can privacy concerns for insurance of connected cars be compensated?",
      "description": "Internet-of-things technologies enable service providers such as insurance companies to collect vast amounts of privacy-sensitive data on car drivers. This paper studies whether and how privacy concerns of car owners can be compensated by offering monetary benefits. We study the case of usage based car insurance services for which the insurance fee is adapted to measured mileage and driving behaviour. A conjoint experiment shows that consumers prefer their current insurance products to usage based car insurance. However, when offered a minor financial compensation, they are willing to give up their privacy to car insurers. Consumers find privacy of behaviour and action more valuable than privacy of location and space. The study is a first to compare different forms of privacy in the acceptance of connected car services. Hereby, we contribute to more fine-grained understanding of privacy concerns in the acceptance of digital services, which will become more important in the upcoming Internet-of-things era.",
      "published": "2015-12-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s12525-015-0211-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sebastian Derikx",
        "Mark de Reuver",
        "Maarten Kroesen"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronic Markets",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1007/s12525-015-0211-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s12652-016-0442-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security risk assessment framework for smart car using the attack tree analysis",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s12652-016-0442-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "car",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hee-Kyung Kong",
        "M.K. Hong",
        "Tae-Sung Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1007/s12652-016-0442-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 76,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s13042-024-02465-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep learning-based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks with knowledge graph and statistical methods",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13042-024-02465-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamed Alqahtani",
        "Gulshan Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s13042-024-02465-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s13042-026-03315-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced cyber security system for vehicular wireless network using AI-powered blockchain security structures based on intrusion detection systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13042-026-03315-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "K. Santhosh",
        "J. Ponsam"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s13042-026-03315-x",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s35658-021-0741-5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity mit der ISO 21434 in der Praxis",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s35658-021-0741-5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christof Ebert",
        "Jerome John"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelektronik",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s35658-021-0741-5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38311-018-0116-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Attack Scenarios on Connected Cars",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38311-018-0116-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected cars"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefan Postler"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZ - Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38311-018-0116-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38311-021-0786-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ISO/SAE 21434 - The Standard for Security in Connected Cars",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-03-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38311-021-0786-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Udo Schneider"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZ - Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38311-021-0786-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38314-015-0569-y",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Car Defense Strategies in the Battle against Cyber Attacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38314-015-0569-y",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected car"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giuseppe Serio",
        "Dirk Wollschläger"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelectronics worldwide",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38314-015-0569-y",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38314-018-0091-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security for Connected Vehicles throughout the Entire Life Cycle",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38314-018-0091-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Martin Boehner"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelectronics worldwide",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38314-018-0091-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38314-019-0050-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Establishing Security Operation Centers for Connected Cars",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-05-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38314-019-0050-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian M. Olt"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelectronics worldwide",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38314-019-0050-4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38314-021-0629-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Penetration Testing for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38314-021-0629-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "C. Ebert",
        "Ruschil Ray"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelectronics worldwide",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38314-021-0629-4",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38314-021-0741-5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical Cybersecurity with ISO 21434",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38314-021-0741-5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christof Ebert",
        "Jerome John"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelectronics worldwide",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38314-021-0741-5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38314-023-1564-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Generative Artificial Intelligence for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38314-023-1564-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christof Ebert",
        "Maximilian Beck"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelectronics worldwide",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38314-023-1564-3",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s38314-025-1977-2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Holistic Security Concept for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s38314-025-1977-2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Frank Bartel"
      ],
      "venue": "ATZelectronics worldwide",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s38314-025-1977-2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s40031-023-00987-9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Intrusion Detection Framework for Anomaly-Based CAN Bus Network Using Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s40031-023-00987-9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ch. Ravi Kishore",
        "D. Chandrasekhar Rao",
        "Janmenjoy Nayak",
        "Himansu Sekhar Behera"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of The Institution of Engineers (India) Series B",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s40031-023-00987-9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s41403-024-00491-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Data-Driven Solutions for Next-Generation Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s41403-024-00491-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suprabhath Koduru",
        "Siva Prasad Chowdary Machina",
        "Sreedhar Madichetty",
        "Sukumar Mishra"
      ],
      "venue": "Transactions of Indian National Academy of Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s41403-024-00491-6",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s41635-019-00076-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "External Monitoring Changes in Vehicle Hardware Profiles: Enhancing Automotive Cyber-Security",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-08-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-019-00076-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Constantinos Patsakis",
        "Kleanthis Dellios",
        "Jose Maria De Fuentes",
        "Fran Casino",
        "Agustí Solanas"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Hardware and Systems Security",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1007/s41635-019-00076-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s41635-022-00126-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PAKAMAC: A PUF-based Keyless Automotive Entry System with Mutual Authentication",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-022-00126-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Swapnil Gade",
        "Urbi Chatterjee",
        "Debdeep Mukhopadhyay"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Hardware and Systems Security",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1007/s41635-022-00126-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s41870-025-02582-1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing machine learning-driven cybersecurity solutions for secure electric vehicle charging in smart grids",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-05-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s41870-025-02582-1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Poorani",
        "Selligoundanur Subramaniyam Sivaraju",
        "G. Arthy",
        "M. Manjusha"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Information Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s41870-025-02582-1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42154-021-00140-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Systematic Risk Assessment Framework of Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Abstract The increasingly intelligent and connected vehicles have brought many unprecedented automotive cybersecurity threats, which may cause privacy breaches, personal injuries, and even national security issues. Before providing effective security solutions, a comprehensive risk assessment of the automotive cybersecurity must be carried out. A systematic cybersecurity risk assessment framework for automobiles is proposed in this study. It consists of an assessment process and systematic assessment methods considering the changes of threat environment, evaluation target, and available information in vehicle lifecycle. In the process of risk identification and risk analysis, the impact level and attack feasibility level are assessed based on the STRIDE model and attack tree method. An automotive cybersecurity risk matrix using a global rating algorithm is then constructed to create a quantitative risk metric. Finally, the applicability and feasibility of the proposed risk assessment framework are demonstrated through a use case, and the results prove that the proposed framework is effective. The proposed assessment framework helps to systematically derive automotive cybersecurity requirements.",
      "published": "2021-03-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42154-021-00140-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunpeng Wang",
        "Yinghui Wang",
        "Hongmao Qin",
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Yanan Zhang",
        "Jian Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Automotive Innovation",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42154-021-00140-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 59,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.414,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1007/s42154-021-00140-6 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: injuries, personal, national, even, case, impact, privacy, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42154-021-00153-1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Attack Detection for Autonomous Driving Using Vehicle Dynamic State Estimation",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-07-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42154-021-00153-1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dong Zhang",
        "Chen Lv",
        "Tianci Yang",
        "Peng Hang"
      ],
      "venue": "Automotive Innovation",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42154-021-00153-1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42154-023-00273-w",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Network Injection Attacks Detection Based on Feature Selection and Classification",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42154-023-00273-w",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Liyong Wang",
        "Hongmao Qin",
        "Yinghui Wang",
        "Junjie Zhang",
        "Biao Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Automotive Innovation",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42154-023-00273-w",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42452-025-07333-2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Data authorisation and validation in autonomous vehicles: a critical review",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are becoming increasingly prevalent due to their potential to improve road safety and reduce environmental impact. These vehicles rely on Automated Driving Systems (ADS), which integrate multiple sensors and actuators. While some AVs operate with minimal human intervention, fully autonomous systems eliminate the need for human control entirely. Despite advances in AV technologies, secure and trustworthy data management remains a significant challenge. This survey focuses on two relatively underexplored aspects in AV environments: data authorisation and validation. It examines the key related challenges and reviews existing solutions. The findings highlight critical gaps in current approaches and suggest future research directions to enhance AV data authorisation and validation.",
      "published": "2025-07-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42452-025-07333-2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Reem Alhabib",
        "Poonam Yadav"
      ],
      "venue": "Discover Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42452-025-07333-2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42488-026-00167-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LR-ResNet-IDS: a lightweight reduced inception-ResNet framework for real-time CAN bus intrusion detection",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-09-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42488-026-00167-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Rizwan Rashid Rana",
        "Muhammad Imran"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Data Information and Management",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42488-026-00167-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42979-024-03465-1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Intrusion Detection for Securing In-Vehicle CAN Bus Communication",
      "description": "Modern cars are now much more connected than they were a few years ago, thanks to the rapid development of embedded technology. This had made them more vulnerable to attacks. The controller area network (CAN) bus, a widely used communication standard in automotive systems, plays a crucial role in the interconnection of onboard electronic components. However, the lack of inherent security mechanisms in the CAN bus makes it a prime target for malicious attacks, compromising the system such as the denial of service (DoS), fuzzy, spoofing, and replay attacks. In this paper, we propose a machine learning-based intrusion detection system for identifying attacks on in-vehicle CAN bus communication. We train and test long short-term memory (LSTM) and convolutional neural network (CNN) models on two public datasets (Car-Hacking and CAN-Intrusion) and our self-created dataset, named Bus-CAN-Attack, which was generated using the ICSim simulation tool. Using the selected hyper parameters, we achieve impressive detection accuracy with the fine-tuned models varying from 89% to 99% for the different datasets.",
      "published": "2024-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-024-03465-1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sherif Samir",
        "Martin Raissa",
        "Haifa Touati",
        "Mohamed Hadded",
        "Hakim Ghazzai"
      ],
      "venue": "SN Computer Science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42979-024-03465-1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42979-025-03703-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Initial Risk Assessment for Multimodal with LSTM-Based Trust Evaluation Framework for Autonomous Vehicle Security",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-02-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-025-03703-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "P. N. Renjith",
        "S. Balasubramani",
        "K. Ramesh",
        "Eswar Patnala"
      ],
      "venue": "SN Computer Science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42979-025-03703-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s42979-026-04725-y",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain for Secure and Scalable Internet of Vehicles: A Comprehensive Survey on Architectures, Consensus Mechanisms, and Privacy",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-026-04725-y",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amira Zaimia",
        "Jalel Eddine Hajlaoui",
        "Mohamed Nazih Omri"
      ],
      "venue": "SN Computer Science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s42979-026-04725-y",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s44163-026-00951-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial manipulation of CAN bus IDS",
      "description": "Recently, the automotive sector has experienced innovation driven by the increasing connectivity of vehicles not only with each other but also with integrated smart city systems. Due to this upgrade, the vehicle’s attack surface can extend to unexpected boundaries enabling complex attacks and providing access to a critical infrastructure’s network for government and military organizations for the \"Country System\". Considering the Machine Learning (ML) based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) as the target of these attacks, it’s essential to investigate the possible execution, risk, and impact of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) attacks on the IDS performance in the most likely scenario for attackers i.e. the black-box one. Therefore, this work aims to verify the applicability of some black-box decision-based AML attacks in the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus frame detection task. The victim is a Supervised ML-based IDS (assumed to be resident in the vehicle itself) considering various Technology Transfer state-of-the-art ML models. The evasion attacks are Boundary and HopSkipJump, often exploited in image classification tasks. The results show the evasion attacks impact (in terms of weighted accuracy loss) is about 70% and it is approximately the same. However, the time needed for the attacks is profoundly different making the Boundary attack more appropriate in this context. In addition, it is possible to control the needed generation adversarial examples’ time through an hyperparameter related to some ML ensemble models. Adversarial Training (AT) proves to be a Security by Design and by Default countermeasure useful to prefer the Random Forest model.",
      "published": "2026-04-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s44163-026-00951-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Christian Catalano",
        "Samuele Del Vescovo",
        "Antonio Piccinno"
      ],
      "venue": "Discover Artificial Intelligence",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1007/s44163-026-00951-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1007/s44443-025-00273-2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driveshield: Unmasking stealthy attacks on CAN bus via adversarial spatiotemporal feature learning",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) for inter-module communication, yet its inherent lack of security exposes it to cyber-attacks that can compromise vehicle safety. Among these, stealthy attacks, such as masquerade and sophisticated injection attacks, are particularly pernicious as they mimic normal traffic patterns, evading many conventional detection systems. To address this critical challenge, this paper introduces DriveShield, a novel unsupervised intrusion detection framework designed to unmask such evasive threats. The core of DriveShield is its unique approach to adversarial spatiotemporal feature learning. It begins by fusing granular time-interval data with physical signal data to create a rich, comprehensive representation of network behavior. This fused data is then fed into an adversarial autoencoder, which is trained not only to precisely reconstruct normal data but also to fool a discriminator. This adversarial process compels the model to learn the intricate, underlying distribution of legitimate traffic, making it highly sensitive to subtle anomalies that signal an attack. Extensive experiments on public CAN datasets demonstrate that DriveShield significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, especially in its ability to identify complex, stealthy attacks. This research provides a robust defense mechanism for in-vehicle networks, advancing the state of automotive cybersecurity against modern, adaptive threats.",
      "published": "2025-10-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s44443-025-00273-2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haoyang Jia",
        "Xiaobing Xiong",
        "Haibin Luo",
        "Yan Cao"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of King Saud University - Computer and Information Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1007/s44443-025-00273-2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-809715-1.00006-7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Data Privacy of Modern Automobiles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-809715-1.00006-7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Juan Deng",
        "Lu Yu",
        "Yu Fu",
        "Oluwakemi Hambolu",
        "Richard R. Brooks"
      ],
      "venue": "Elsevier eBooks",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1016/b978-0-12-809715-1.00006-7",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-815032-0.00016-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Cars: Automotive Cybersecurity and Privacy for Smart Cities",
      "description": "Abstract This chapter examines the cybersecurity and privacy of the twin notions of smart transportation and intelligent transportation systems with a focus on the role of personal automobiles. Smart transportation encompasses the individual and joint capabilities of connected cars, or more generally, vehicles, and so comprises the internal workings of autonomous vehicles and the complex interdependencies introduced by vehicle-to-vehicle communications. An intelligent transportation system introduces smart technology to civil transportation infrastructure, and the connected car further creates the opportunity for vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. We identify threats and attacks enabled by smart transportation and intelligent transportation systems, and survey methods for providing security and privacy.",
      "published": "2018-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-815032-0.00016-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "Elsevier eBooks",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/b978-0-12-815032-0.00016-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/b978-0-44-329032-9.00016-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing cyber-attack detection for in-vehicle networks: a comparative study of a machine learning-based intrusion detection system",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-44-329032-9.00016-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Linxi Zhang",
        "Di Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "Elsevier eBooks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/b978-0-44-329032-9.00016-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-13223-0.00093-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Cyber Attacks and Defenses on Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-443-13223-0.00093-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. M. Istiak Chowdhury",
        "Mohammad Aminul Hoque",
        "Ragib Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "Elsevier eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/b978-0-443-13223-0.00093-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.aap.2020.105837",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-attacks in the next-generation cars, mitigation techniques, anticipated readiness and future directions",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-10-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2020.105837",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cars"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shah Khalid Khan",
        "Nirajan Shiwakoti",
        "Peter Stasinopoulos",
        "Yilun Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Accident Analysis & Prevention",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.aap.2020.105837",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 169,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.aap.2021.106515",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A conceptual system dynamics model for cybersecurity assessment of connected and autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-12-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2021.106515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shah Khalid Khan",
        "Nirajan Shiwakoti",
        "Peter Stasinopoulos"
      ],
      "venue": "Accident Analysis & Prevention",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.aap.2021.106515",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 85,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.10.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A taxonomy and survey of cyber-physical intrusion detection approaches for vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-10-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.10.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "George Loukas",
        "Eirini Karapistoli",
        "Emmanouil Panaousis",
        "Panagiotis G. Sarigiannidis",
        "Anatolij Bezemskij",
        "Tuan Phan Vuong"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.10.002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 138,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.12.006",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A review on safety failures, security attacks, and available countermeasures for autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-12-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.12.006",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Tao Cui",
        "Lin Shen Liew",
        "Giedre Sabaliauskaite",
        "Fengjun Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.12.006",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 299,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2019.02.001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An intrusion detection system for connected vehicles in smart cities",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-02-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2019.02.001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moayad Aloqaily",
        "Safa Otoum",
        "Ismaeel Al Ridhawi",
        "Yaser Jararweh"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2019.02.001",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 394,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4072,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2019.02.001 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2019.101974",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection system using deep learning for in-vehicle security",
      "description": "Abstract With the development of vehicle intelligence technology, the combination of network and vehicle becomes inevitable, which brings much convenience to people. At the same time, hackers can also use technical vulnerabilities to attack vehicles, leading to severe traffic accidents and even vehicle crash. Based on this situation, the vehicle information security protection techniques have drawn great attention from researchers. This paper studies the vehicle intrusion detection system (IDS) based on the neural network algorithm in deep learning, and uses gradient descent with momentum (GDM) and gradient descent with momentum and adaptive gain (GDM/AG) to improve the efficiency and accuracy of IDS. The accuracy and efficiency of the proposed model are validated and evaluated by using real vehicles at the end of the paper. Experiments show that the GDM/AG algorithm can achieve faster convergence in comparison with the GDM algorithm in vehicle anomaly detection, and can detect anomaly data at the level of milliseconds. At the same time, the proposed model can adapt itself to detect unknown attacks. The veracity rate ranges from 97% to 98% in directing the adaptation when facing unknown attack types.",
      "published": "2019-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2019.101974",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiayan Zhang",
        "Fei Li",
        "Haoxi Zhang",
        "Ruxiang Li",
        "Yalin Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2019.101974",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 88,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2024.103737",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing real-time intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks by employing novel feature engineering techniques and lightweight modeling",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2024.103737",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wael Aljabri",
        "Abdul Hamid",
        "Rayan Mosli"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2024.103737",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2025.104108",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RAG-HIDS: A multi-relational graph-based hierarchical intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2025.104108",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hai Lin",
        "Xi Yu",
        "Zhihong Chen",
        "Yue Cao"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2025.104108",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2026.104224",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight temporal and spatial fusion for intrusion detection in automotive controller area network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-03-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2026.104224",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyunjun Jo",
        "Deok‐Hwan Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2026.104224",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2026.104279",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FedLiTeCAN: A federated lightweight transformer for fast and robust CAN bus intrusion detection",
      "description": "This work implements a lightweight Transformer model for IDS in the domain of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "published": "2025-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2026.104279",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devika S",
        "Pratik Narang",
        "Tejasvi Alladi"
      ],
      "venue": "Ad Hoc Networks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.adhoc.2026.104279",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.04.040",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric vehicle charging in China’s power system: Energy, economic and environmental trade-offs and policy implications",
      "description": "This work investigates different scenarios for electric vehicle (EV) deployment in China and explores the implications thereof with regard to energy portfolio, economics and the environment. Specifically, we investigate how to better deliver the value of EVs by improving designs in the power system and charging strategies, given expected developments by 2030 in both the power system and EV penetration levels. The impact of EV charging is quantified by applying an integrated transportation-power system model on a set of scenarios which represent uncertainties in charging strategies. We find that deploying EVs essentially shifts the use of gasoline to coal-fired power generation in China, thus leading to more coal consumption and CO2 emissions of the power system. Economically, EVs outperform gasoline-powered vehicles in terms of average fueling costs. However, the impact of EVs in terms of CO2 emissions at the national level largely depends on the charging strategy. Specifically, controlled charging results in more CO2 emissions associated with EVs than uncontrolled charging, as it tends to feed EVs with electricity produced by cheap yet low-efficiency coal power plants located in regions where coal prices are low. Still, compared with uncontrolled charging, controlled charging shows absolute advantages in: (1) mitigating the peak load arising from EV charging; (2) facilitating RES generation; and (3) reducing generation costs and EV charging costs. Hence, in light of this trade-off of controlled charging with the goals of energy security, economic efficiency and reducing environmental impacts, policy interventions in the Chinese power system should opt for controlled charging strategies in order to best realize the benefits of EVs. Accordingly, this paper proposes that increasing the use of cleaner forms of electricity generation, such as RES power and gas power, and establishing energy efficiency and CO2 emission regulations in power dispatch are critical for China. Lastly, this work illustrates what the optimized charging profiles from the power system perspective look like for different regions. These results can inform Chinese policy makers in creating a better integration of the transportation and the power system.",
      "published": "2016-04-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.04.040",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ying Li",
        "Chris B. Davis",
        "Zofia Lukszo",
        "Margot Weijnen"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Energy",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.04.040",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 123,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.125034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-time Hosting Capacity Assessment for Electric Vehicles: A Sequential Forecast-then-Optimize Method",
      "description": "Hosting capacity (HC) assessment for electric vehicles (EVs) is crucial for EV secure integration and reliable power system operation. Existing methods primarily focus on a long-term perspective (e.g., system planning), and consider the EV charging demands as scalar values, which introduces inaccuracies in real-time operations due to the inherently stochastic nature of EVs. In this regard, this paper proposes a real-time HC assessment method for EVs through a three-step process, involving real-time probabilistic forecasting, risk analysis and probabilistic optimization. Specifically, we conduct real-time probabilistic forecasting to capture the stochastic nature of EV charging demands across multiple charging stations by performing deterministic forecasting and fitting the distribution of forecasting errors. The deterministic forecasting is conducted using an adaptive spatio-temporal graph convolutional network (ASTGCN). ASTGCN leverages adaptive spatial feature extraction, attention-based temporal feature extraction, and second-order graph representation to improve the forecasting performance. Subsequently, based on the probabilistic forecasting of EV charging demands, we conduct real-time risk analysis and operational boundary identification by utilizing probabilistic power flow calculations to assess potential violations of secure operation constraints. Furthermore, we present the formulation of real-time HC of EVs considering expected satisfaction of stochastic EV charging demands, and propose an optimization model for real-time HC assessment of EVs. Numerical experiments on a real-world dataset demonstrate that the proposed ASTGCN model outperforms state-of-the-art forecasting models by achieving the lowest root mean square error of 0.0442, and the real-time HC is improved by 64% compared to long-term HC assessment.",
      "published": "2024-08-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.125034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yingrui Zhuang",
        "Lin Cheng",
        "Ning Qi",
        "Xinyi Wang",
        "Yue Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.125034",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.asoc.2024.111265",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Interval-valued fermatean fuzzy based risk assessment for self-driving vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asoc.2024.111265",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Murat Ki̇ri̇şçi̇"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Soft Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.asoc.2024.111265",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 44,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cell.2026.03.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Convergent uPAR-Positive Tumor Ecosystem Creates Broad Vulnerability to CAR T Cell Therapy",
      "description": "CAR T cells have transformed hematologic cancer therapy but remain limited in solid tumors by antigen heterogeneity and a suppressive, profibrotic microenvironment. We previously identified the urokinase plasminogen activator receptor (uPAR) as broadly upregulated in senescent, profibrotic cells and showed that uPAR-directed CAR T cells safely reverse fibrosis in mice. Integrative analyses now reveal that uPAR is broadly expressed in solid tumors enriched for TP53 and RAS pathway mutations, that adopt a progenitor-like state supported by a niche of uPAR-positive stromal cells with senescence features. Human uPAR CAR T cells eliminate tumor cells and their stromal support, induce durable regressions across diverse models, eradicate systemic metastases, and are potentiated by senescence-inducing therapies. Importantly, these cells achieve robust antitumor activity without sustained myelosuppression in mice reconstituted with human immune systems. Together, these findings establish uPAR as a broadly-applicable CAR T target capable of overcoming major barriers in solid tumor therapy.",
      "published": "2026-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2026.03.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "car",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ze-Da Zhang",
        "Yu-Jui Ho",
        "Xin Fang",
        "Minseo Kim",
        "Marguerite Li",
        "W. Luan",
        "Clemens Hinterleitner",
        "Sascha Haubner",
        "Friederike Kogel",
        "Edwin Pratt",
        "E. Ozcelik",
        "José Reyes"
      ],
      "venue": "Cell",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cell.2026.03.002",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117147",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Jamming transition in intelligent driver model integrating fault-tolerant control to counteract cyber-attacks within cellular vehicle-to-everything environments",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117147",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "jamming",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huili Tan",
        "Yuanlong Sun",
        "Dongxue Xia",
        "Guanghan Peng"
      ],
      "venue": "Chaos Solitons & Fractals",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117147",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cnsns.2020.105667",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Designing continuous delay feedback control for lattice hydrodynamic model under cyber-attacks and connected vehicle environment",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-12-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2020.105667",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cong Zhai",
        "Weitiao Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cnsns.2020.105667",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 123,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2018.09.010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and privacy for innovative automotive applications: A survey",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-10-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2018.09.010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Van Huynh Le",
        "Jerry den Hartog",
        "Nicola Zannone"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Communications",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comcom.2018.09.010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 110,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2021.08.027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security on in-vehicle communication protocols: Issues, challenges, and future research directions",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-09-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2021.08.027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alfonso Martínez-Cruz",
        "Kelsey Alejandra Ramírez-Gutiérrez",
        "Claudia Feregrino-Uribe",
        "Alicia Morales-Reyes"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Communications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comcom.2021.08.027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2025.108158",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey on security enhancing Digital Twins: Models, applications and tools",
      "description": "A Digital Twin (DT) is a virtual representation of both cyber and physical objects. Initially, the concept was introduced to optimize manufacturing products, aimed at validating and verifying their behavior along their lifecycle. However, in the recent years and with the advent of Industry 4.0, it has also gained huge attention in the cybersecurity arena. Indeed, using a DT is seen as an strategy to automate, monitor, simulate, and diagnose cyber–physical systems behavior, aimed at making them to be secure. The DT can provide security in multiple domains such as manufacturing, aerospace, automotive, construction, smart grid, smart cities, and smart transportation. The fundamentals of a DT is a combination of data and a model of the system. To this end, this survey aims to explore current efforts on DT modeling techniques, and how these DT models capture the behavior of the system to enhance cybersecurity. The study focuses on the construction of behavioral models, techniques, tools, and technologies of DT used for specific security applications. The purpose of the discussion carried out in this survey is to illustrate the reader on how these behavioral models adapt to different security applications. In addition, the paper also analyzes and classifies current DT literature based on use cases, type of DT study, tools, and various DT operation modes with their specific security application. The findings of this survey describe security applications being enhanced by DT, and how the combination of key technologies facilitating Industry 4.0 (i.e., AI, IoT, Big Data and Cloud Computing, among others), are accelerating the adoption of DT as a solution for next generation security applications. Finally, this survey highlights relevant research gaps that need to be addressed before the wide adoption of DT in cybersecurity. • Provides a review of the DT modeling techniques applied to cyber security. • An in-depth analysis of recent work related to DT in enhancing security applications. • Discussion is provided on security applications, tools and architecture through DT literature analysis. • Future directions for security enhancing DT are also described.",
      "published": "2025-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2025.108158",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A Qureshi",
        "A. Asensio",
        "Muhammad Ali Imran",
        "Jordi García",
        "Xavi Masip‐Bruin"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Communications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comcom.2025.108158",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100053",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Importance of the reputation of data manager in the acceptance of connected vehicles",
      "description": "With the known evidence that potential connected vehicle (CV) users are worried about sharing data because of the associated data privacy and security issues, this study investigates the importance of the reputation of the data manager (who collects, stores, and owns the data) of CV technology (CVT). Based on a questionnaire survey of 2400 US adults, this study asserts that the data manager's reputation has a significant impact on the public perception of data privacy and security issues in CVT along with overall CV acceptance. The results show that data privacy issues have a more negative impact on CV acceptance than data security issues. In addition, the reputation of a data manager has a bigger role in the eyes of the public in shaping their perception of data privacy in comparison to data security. Based on the results, the public considers data privacy as the responsibility of the data manager to protect their data from unauthorized/illegal third-party access, whereas data security is the technological strength of CVT to protect the data from hacking. Finally, it is recommended that CV stakeholders take actions to improve potential CV users' confidence in the privacy of data shared by disclosing the data management process, data privacy protection efforts, building public trust in the data manager, and introducing/enforcing laws regarding data privacy protection.",
      "published": "2022-03-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100053",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hacking",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sailesh Acharya",
        "Michelle M. Mekker"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in Transportation Research",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100053",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4091,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100053 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: confidence, trust, impact, significant, access, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100056",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Future connected vehicles: Communications demands, privacy and cyber-security",
      "description": "Future connected vehicles: Communications demands, privacy and cyber-security Cyber-security and privacyKey challenges when implementing all these new services are how to guarantee privacy, security and implement authentication and owner protection of the information sources.Safety work for vehicles has in the past focused on hardware and software failures but with the increased",
      "published": "2022-03-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100056",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tomas Olovsson",
        "Tommy Svensson",
        "Jiaming Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications in Transportation Research",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100056",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4109,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.commtr.2022.100056 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: services, privacy, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2018.12.018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber security challenges and solutions for V2X communications: A survey",
      "description": "In recent years, vehicles became able to establish connections with other vehicles and infrastructure units that are located in the roadside. In the near future, the vehicular network will be expanded to include the communication between vehicles and any smart devices in the roadside which is called Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. The vehicular network causes many challenges due to heterogeneous nodes, various speeds and intermittent connection, where traditional security methods are not always efficacious. As a result, an extensive variety of research works has been done on optimizing security solutions whilst considering network requirements. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey and taxonomy of the existing security solutions for V2X communication technology. Then, we provide discussions and comparisons with regard to some pertinent criteria. Also, we present a threat analysis for V2X enabling technologies. Finally, we point out the research challenges and some future directions.",
      "published": "2019-01-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2018.12.018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "threat",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljawharah Alnasser",
        "Hongjian Sun",
        "Jing Sai Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2018.12.018",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 170,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2019.107093",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security issues and challenges in V2X: A Survey",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-01-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2019.107093",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amrita Ghosal",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2019.107093",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 227,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107283",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A privacy preserving scheme for vehicle-to-everything communications using 5G mobile edge computing",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107283",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iftikhar Rasheed",
        "Lin Zhang",
        "Fei Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107283",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107343",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure over-the-air software updates in connected vehicles: A survey",
      "description": "Abstract Current trends forecast that Over-the-Air (OTA) software updates will be highly significant for future connected vehicles. The OTA update will enable upgrading the vehicle functionalities or bug fixations in the embedded software installed on its Electronic Control Units (ECUs) remotely. The introduction of OTA updates in the automotive industry has brought many advantages for both the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and the driver/owner. However, in terms of security, OTA updates are highly critical as they need complete access to the in-vehicle communication network. This survey highlights and discusses OTA software updates in the automotive sector, mainly from the security perspective. The major objective of this survey is to deliver a comprehensive outline of various research directions and approaches in OTA update technologies in vehicles. At first, we discuss the connected vehicle technology and then integrate the relationship of OTA update features with the connected vehicle. We further discuss both promising and secure OTA update approaches, that have gained a lot of attention recently. Furthermore, we present a comprehensive comparative study of the existing OTA update approaches on the basis of strengths, weaknesses and evaluation setup. The survey also focuses on the existing vehicle features that support OTA updates, and customer satisfaction and usability. Finally, we identify possible future research directions of OTA updates for automobiles, particularly in the area of security.",
      "published": "2020-06-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107343",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Subir Halder",
        "Amrita Ghosal",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107343",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 188,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109230",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GPS spoofing detection via crowd-sourced information for connected vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicular systems rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to provide accurate and timely services. However, the GPS has been proved to be characterized by an intrinsic insecure design, thus being subject to several security attacks. Current solutions can reliably detect GPS spoofing attacks leveraging the physical features of the received GPS signals or resorting to multiple antennas. However, these techniques cannot be deployed when the physical properties of the received signals cannot be accessed, which is the most general case for commercial GPS receivers. Alternative solutions in the literature rely on the cross-check of the received signal with information coming from additional sources. However, such proposals are typically limited to a single source, are rarely supported by experimental results, and do not provide insights on the impact of several parameters, such as detection accuracy, time, false-positives, and robustness to malicious information. To overcome the cited limitations, in this paper, we propose an innovative approach, resorting to combined crowd-sourced information from the mobile cellular infrastructure and the WiFi networks to detect GPS spoofing attacks. Our analysis leverages an extensive experimental dataset, available online for the research community, gathered by driving around a car in urban, suburban, and rural scenarios, for around 5 h and covering more than 196 km. Our solution allows for a tunable tradeoff between detection delay and false positive; for instance, we can detect an attack in approximately 6 s, when leveraging the information coming from only the WiFi, while the delay increases to 30 s when using the information from the mobile cellular network, still achieving a false positive probability strictly less than 0.01. We also show the limitations and trade-offs of our approach, in terms of minimum detection accuracy, time, and robustness to malicious information. The data adopted in this work are publicly released to allow results replicability and foster further research in the highlighted directions.",
      "published": "2022-07-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109230",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gabriele Oligeri",
        "Savio Sciancalepore",
        "Omar Adel Ibrahim",
        "Roberto Di Pietro"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109230",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3998,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109230 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information., commercial, extensive, limited, case, car, impact, physical."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109394",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure over-the-air software update for connected vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109394",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amrita Ghosal",
        "Subir Halder",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109394",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110855",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Network Anomaly Detection in Cars: A Case for Time-Sensitive Stream Filtering and Policing",
      "description": "Connected vehicles are threatened by cyber-attacks as in-vehicle networks technologically approach (mobile) LANs with several wireless interconnects to the outside world. Malware that infiltrates a car today faces potential victims of constrained, barely shielded Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Many ECUs perform critical driving functions, which stresses the need for hardening security and resilience of in-vehicle networks in a multifaceted way. Future vehicles will comprise Ethernet backbones that differentiate services via Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN). The well-known vehicular control flows will follow predefined schedules and TSN traffic classifications. In this paper, we exploit this traffic classification to build a network anomaly detection system. We show how filters and policies of TSN can identify misbehaving traffic and thereby serve as distributed guards on the data link layer. On this lowest possible layer, our approach derives a highly efficient network protection directly from TSN. We classify link layer anomalies and micro-benchmark the detection accuracy in each class. Based on a topology derived from a real-world car and its traffic definitions we evaluate the detection system in realistic macro-benchmarks based on recorded attack traces. Our results show that the detection accuracy depends on how exact the specifications of in-vehicle communication are configured. Most notably for a fully specified communication matrix, our anomaly detection remains free of false-positive alarms, which is a significant benefit for implementing automated countermeasures in future vehicles.",
      "published": "2021-12-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110855",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Philipp Meyer",
        "Timo Häckel",
        "Sandra Reider",
        "Franz Korf",
        "Thomas C. Schmidt"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks, vol. 255, p. 110855, Dec. 2024",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110855",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3828,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110855 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serve, depends, functions, case, services, car, significant, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2026.112031",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey of learning-based intrusion detection systems for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) have advanced modern transportation by improving the efficiency, safety, and convenience of mobility through automation and connectivity, yet they remain vulnerable to cybersecurity threats, particularly through the insecure Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Cyberattacks can have devastating consequences in connected vehicles, including the loss of control over critical systems, necessitating robust security solutions. In-vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) offer a promising approach by detecting malicious activities in real time. This survey provides a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art research on learning-based in-vehicle IDSs, focusing on Machine Learning (ML), Deep Learning (DL), and Federated Learning (FL) approaches. Based on the reviewed studies, we critically examine existing IDS approaches, categorising them by the types of attacks they detect—known, unknown, and combined known-unknown attacks—while identifying their limitations. We also review the evaluation metrics used in research, emphasising the need to consider multiple criteria to meet the requirements of safety-critical systems. Additionally, we analyse FL-based IDSs and highlight their limitations. By doing so, this survey helps identify effective security measures, address existing limitations, and guide future research toward more resilient and adaptive protection mechanisms, ensuring the safety and reliability of CAVs.",
      "published": "2026-01-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2026.112031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muzun Althunayyan",
        "Amir Javed",
        "OMER F. RANA"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Networks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.comnet.2026.112031",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4593,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2026.112031 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: activities, loss, unknown, remain, studies, safety, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2018.08.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An integrated approach for data security in vehicle diagnostics over internet protocol and software update over the air",
      "description": "Abstract An integrated approach that uses a combination of cryptography and steganography to enhance the data security in automotive applications is proposed in this paper. In this method, the data is encrypted using the modified RSA cryptographic algorithm and the encrypted data is embedded along the edges of the image using Least Significant Bit (LSB) technique. The edges are detected using fuzzy logic approach. This integrated approach is proposed mainly for Diagnostics over Internet Protocol (DoIP) and Software Update over the Air (SOTA) as they involve exchange of highly sensitive data. In addition, the authenticity of the source of software update is verified using Hash Algorithm in SOTA. The proposed method is implemented in MATLAB with Python as back-end platform and the data integrity is validated against various attempts to hack the data using online simulators.",
      "published": "2018-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2018.08.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "K. Mayilsamy",
        "Neelaveni Ramachandran",
        "Vismitha Sunder Raj"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Electrical Engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.compeleceng.2018.08.002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2020.106717",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-based security attack resilience schemes for autonomous vehicles in industry 4.0: A systematic review",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2020.106717",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rajesh Gupta",
        "Sudeep Tanwar",
        "Neeraj Kumar",
        "Sudhanshu Tyagi"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Electrical Engineering",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.compeleceng.2020.106717",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 174,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2021.107517",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Context-aware security for the Intra-Electric Vehicle Network under energy constraints",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-11-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2021.107517",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yosra Fraiji",
        "Lamia Ben Azzouz",
        "Wassim Trojet",
        "Ghaleb Hoblos",
        "Leı̈la Azouz Saı̈dane"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Electrical Engineering",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.compeleceng.2021.107517",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2022.108447",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A deep learning-based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-11-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2022.108447",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamed Alqahtani",
        "Gulshan Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Electrical Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.compeleceng.2022.108447",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 55,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2024.109512",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure ultra fast authentication protocol for electric vehicle charging",
      "description": "In recent years, Electric Vehicles (EVs) are becoming popular due to their positive effects on the environment. The EVs receive charging service from the power grids, and also act as a charge reservoir to provide services to power grids as and when required. In this communication, the users' credentials, like identity and credit/debit card details, may be exchanged while providing and receiving services. Since the users' credentials are very sensitive, we need to protect the communications against any Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) adversary. Therefore, authentication plays a vital role in protecting such sensitive information. In this paper, we analyse the recently proposed authentication protocol by Wang \\textit{et} al. (2022) for EV charging. It has been observed that, this protocol is vulnerable to the \\emph{Man-In-the-Middle-Attack} against any PPT-adversary under the Dolev-Yao threat model. Thus, Wang \\textit{et} al.'s protocol is not suitable for industrial applications. We then propose an enhanced authentication protocol that provide security against all well-known attacks under the widely accepted CK-adversary model. We present a thorough security analysis using the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model to prove the security of the proposed protocol. We also compare our protocol with the existing related protocols to demonstrate the efficiency. The results show that the proposed protocol is efficient and provides high security, and therefore, it is more suitable for industrial applications.",
      "published": "2024-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2024.109512",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srijanee Mookherji",
        "Vanga Odelu",
        "Rajendra Prasath"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Electrical Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.compeleceng.2024.109512",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2018.04.008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Building an automotive security assurance case using systematic security evaluations",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-04-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.04.008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Madeline Cheah",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Paul Wooderson"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2018.04.008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 46,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2020.101857",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-ADF: The controller area network attack detection framework",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-04-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2020.101857",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahroz Tariq",
        "Sangyup Lee",
        "Huy Kang Kim",
        "Simon S. Woo"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2020.101857",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 93,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2020.102150",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity for autonomous vehicles: Review of attacks and defense",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-01-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2020.102150",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyounggon Kim",
        "Jun Seok Kim",
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Jo-Hee Park",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2020.102150",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 412,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2021.102269",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey on security attacks and defense techniques for connected and autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-06-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2021.102269",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Minh Pham",
        "Kaiqi Xiong"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2021.102269",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 191,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.102717",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MGA-IDS: Optimal feature subset selection for anomaly detection framework on in-vehicle networks-CAN bus based on genetic algorithm and intrusion detection approach",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2022.102717",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Doğukan Aksu",
        "Muhammed Ali Aydın"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2022.102717",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103091",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Flooding attack mitigator for in-vehicle CAN using fault confinement in CAN protocol",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103091",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sung Bum Park",
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2023.103091",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103166",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANova: A hybrid intrusion detection framework based on automatic signal classification for CAN",
      "description": "Over the years, vehicles have become increasingly complex and an attractive target for malicious adversaries. This raised the need for effective and efficient Intrusion Detection Systemss (IDSs) for onboard networks able to work with the stringent requirements and the heterogeneity of information transmitted on the Controller Area Network. While state-of-the-art solutions are effective in detecting specific types of anomalies and work on a subset of the CAN signals, no single method can perform better than the others on all types of attacks, particularly if they need to provide predictions to comply with the domain’s real-time constraints. In this paper, we present CANova, a modular framework that exploits the characteristics of the different Controller Area Network (CAN) packets to select the Intrusion Detection Systemss (IDSs) that better fits them. In particular, it uses flow- and payload-based IDSs to analyze the packets’ content and arrival time. We evaluate CANova by comparing its performance against state-of-the-art Intrusion Detection Systemss (IDSs) for in-vehicle network and a comprehensive set of synthetic and real attacks in real-world CAN datasets. We demonstrate that our approach can achieve good performances in terms of detection, false positive rates, and temporal performances.",
      "published": "2023-02-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103166",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alessandro Nichelini",
        "Carlo Alberto Pozzoli",
        "Stefano Longari",
        "Michele Carminati",
        "Stefano Zanero"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2023.103166",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103391",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "STRIDE threat model-based framework for assessing the vulnerabilities of modern vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-07-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2023.103391",
      "matched_terms": [
        "threat",
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zaina Abuabed",
        "Ahmad Alsadeh",
        "Adel Taweel"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2023.103391",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.103712",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DivaCAN: Detecting in-vehicle intrusion attacks on a controller area network using ensemble learning",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2024.103712",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muneeb Hassan Khan",
        "Abdul Rehman Javed",
        "Zafar Iqbal",
        "Muhammad Asim",
        "Ali Ismail Awad"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2024.103712",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 69,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.103777",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "can-train-and-test: A curated CAN dataset for automotive intrusion detection",
      "description": "When it comes to in-vehicle networks (IVNs), the controller area network (CAN) bus dominates the market; automobiles manufactured and sold worldwide depend on the CAN bus for safety-critical communications between various components of the vehicle (e.g., the engine, the transmission, the steering column). Unfortunately, the CAN bus is inherently insecure; in fact, it completely lacks controls such as authentication, authorization, and confidentiality (i.e., encryption). Therefore, researchers have travailed to develop automotive security enhancements. The automotive intrusion detection system (IDS) is especially popular in the literature—due to its relatively low cost in terms of money, resource utilization, and implementation effort. That said, developing and evaluating an automotive IDS is often challenging; if researchers do not have access to a test vehicle, then they are forced to depend on publicly available CAN data—which is not without limitations. Lack of access to adequate CAN data, then, becomes a barrier to entry into automotive security research. We seek to lower that barrier to entry by introducing a new CAN dataset to facilitate the development and evaluation of automotive IDSs. Our datasets—dubbed can-dataset, can-log, can-csv, can-ml, and can-train-and-test—provide CAN data from four different vehicles produced by two different manufacturers. The attack captures for each vehicle model are equivalent, enabling researchers to assess the ability of a given IDS to generalize to different vehicle models and even different vehicle manufacturers. Our datasets contain replayable .log files as well as labeled and unlabeled .csv files, thereby meeting a variety of development and evaluation needs. In particular, the can-train-and-test dataset offers nine unique attacks, ranging from denial of service (DoS) to gear spoofing to standstill; as such, researchers can select a subset of the attacks for training and save the remainder for testing in order to assess a given IDS against unseen attacks. Many of our attacks, particularly the spoofing-related attacks, were conducted during live, on-the-road experiments with real vehicles. These attacks have known physical impacts. As a benchmark, we pit a number of machine learning IDSs against our dataset and analyze the results. We present our datasets—especially can-train-and-test—as a contribution to the existing catalogue of open-access datasets in hopes of filling in the gaps left by those datasets.",
      "published": "2023-08-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2024.103777",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Lampe",
        "Weizhi Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2024.103777",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 98,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.103798",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TOMSAC - Methodology for trade-off management between automotive safety and cyber security",
      "description": "Safety and security interdependencies have been of interest for researchers for several decades. However, in practice, they are not given the necessary consideration yet due to various reasons, such as lack of understanding and reluctance to change current practices. This research is aimed at advancing the state of the art in this area by developing a practical, easy to adapt and to use methodology for managing interdependencies and trade-offs throughout the development lifetime of cyber physical systems. The methodology is named TOMSAC, short for Trade-Off Management between Safety And Cyber security.",
      "published": "2024-03-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2024.103798",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giedre Sabaliauskaite",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Hesamaldin Jadidbonab",
        "Farhan Ahmad",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Paul Wooderson"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2024.103798",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.104018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards zero trust security in connected vehicles: A comprehensive survey",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-07-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2024.104018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Malak Annabi",
        "Abdelhafid Zeroual",
        "Nadhir Messai"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2024.104018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.104268",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An adaptable security-by-design approach for ensuring a secure Over the Air (OTA) update in modern vehicles",
      "description": "The increase in Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) and Intelligence Transport Systems (ITSs) by OEMs has increased the requirement for modern vehicle sophistication comprising various software capabilities and functionality embedded in over 100 ECUs in a vehicle. This has led to the need for over-the-air (OTA) updates. OTA updates can be delivered wirelessly, eliminating the need to bring vehicles to the garage for updates. This is more convenient for owners, reduces costs for OEMs, and lowers greenhouse gas emissions. Researchers, Industrial partners, and OEMs have developed several OTA technology standards, such as the Uptane framework, Open Mobile Alliance Device Management (OMA-DM), ISO 24089, and ISO 21434 standards. However, the systematic implementation of security-by-design applying ISO 21434 in OTA systems is not well-known, and there remains a gap in this practice of security-by-design that the automotive industry can adapt to ensure a systematic approach to secure OTA update technology. OTA update security hinges on identifying vulnerability pathways for potential malicious attacks. Therefore, identifying and mitigating potential vulnerabilities throughout the OTA update process is critical for robust security. This paper proposes a secure OTA update technique with an adaptable security-by-design approach built and extended from our work in Iyieke et al. (2023). The adaptable security-by-design approach is then applied to a developed prototype OTA update system based on the Uptane framework as implemented by Toradex. Security-by-design is a wellestablished concept in enterprise systems, but it is still developing in the cyber-physical system of automotive cybersecurity. Our proposed approach covers the security engineering lifecycle, logical security layered concept, and security architecture. A threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) is conducted based on the international automotive cybersecurity standard ISO/SAE 21434. The highest threats identified from the TARA are formalized, and corresponding mitigation actions are defined according to UNECE WP29. Penetration testing is conducted to verify the approach’s capability to reinforce the security of the OTA update systems against some of the identified risks and threats. Our proposed approach provides a systematic, adaptable security-by-design approach for ensuring secure OTA updates in modern vehicles; OEMs and other stakeholders can use it to develop secure OTA systems regardless of the OTA framework used.",
      "published": "2024-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2024.104268",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso 21434",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Victormills Iyieke",
        "Hesamaldin Jadidbonab",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Don Dhaliwal",
        "Odysseas Kosmas"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2024.104268",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3805,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.104268 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: costs, transport, vehicle., intelligence, there, risks, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104352",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding connected autonomous vehicle communication: Protocols, intra- and inter-vehicular attacks and defenses",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2025.104352",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Aledhari",
        "Rehma Razzak",
        "Mohamed Rahouti",
        "Abbas Yazdinejad",
        "Reza M. Parizi",
        "Basheer Qolomany",
        "Mohsen Guizani",
        "Junaid Qadir",
        "Ala Al‐Fuqaha"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2025.104352",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104549",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "WOLVES: Window of Opportunity attack feasibility likelihood value estimation through a simulation-based approach",
      "description": "The Road Vehicles Cybersecurity Engineering Standard, ISO/SAE 21434, provides a framework for road vehicle Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA). The TARA framework must include Connected Vehicles (CVs) and their connectivity with external interfaces. However, assessing cyber-attack feasibility on CVs is a significant challenge, as traditionally, qualitative and subjective expert opinions are the norm. Additionally, there is a need for historical data on security-related incidents and dynamically evolving interconnected vehicle-to-everything (V2X) entities for feasibility assessment, which is not readily available. To address this problem, this paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first simulation-based TARA framework designed to characterise, quantify, and assess the Window of Opportunity (WO) for attackers—a metric that indicates the likelihood of an attack. A case study involving Bluetooth, with one attacker and one target, is modelled to demonstrate the proposed framework WOLVES’s applicability. Two scenarios have been investigated using different motorway roads in the UK. The primary outcome is the WOLVES framework, which employs a data-driven approach using both prior and likelihood information to estimate the probability of a successful cyber attack on a given technology in CVs. The findings from this research could assist threat analysts, decision-makers, and planners involved in CV risk assessment by enhancing the modelling of attack feasibility for cybersecurity threats in dynamic scenarios and developing appropriate mitigation strategies.",
      "published": "2025-06-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2025.104549",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suraj Harsha Kamtam",
        "Qian Lu",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Muhamad Azfar Ramli",
        "Rakhi Manohar Mepparambath",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2025.104549",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4069,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104549 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: successful, primary, case, there, significant, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104729",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A quantitative methodology for systemic impact assessment of cyber threats in connected vehicles",
      "description": "The increasing integration of digital technologies in connected vehicles introduces cybersecurity risks that extend beyond individual vehicles, with the potential to disrupt entire transportation systems. Current practice (e.g., ISO/SAE 21434 TARA) focuses on threat identification and qualitative impact ratings at the vehicle boundary, with limited systemic quantification. This study presents a systematic, simulation-based methodology for quantifying the systemic operational and safety impacts of cyber threats on connected vehicles, evaluating cascading effects across the transport network. Three representative scenarios are examined: (I) telematics-induced sudden braking causing a cascading collision, (II) remote disabling on a motorway (M25) segment, and (III) a compromised Roadside Unit (RSU) spoofing Variable Speed Limit (VSL) and phantom lane closure messages to connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). The results highlight the potential for cascading safety incidents and systemic operational degradation, as evidenced by the defined systemic operational and safety vectors, factors that are insufficiently addressed in the current scope of the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, which primarily focuses on individual vehicle-level threats. The findings underscore the need to incorporate systemic evaluation into existing frameworks to enhance cyber resilience across connected vehicle ecosystems. The framework complements ISO/SAE 21434 by supplying quantitative, reproducible evidence for the impact rating step at a systemic scale, reducing assessor subjectivity and supporting policy and operations, enabling more data-driven evaluations of systemic cyber risks.",
      "published": "2025-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2025.104729",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "resilience",
        "spoofing",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Don Nalin Dharshana Jayaratne",
        "Qian Lu",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Muhamad Azfar Ramli",
        "Rakhi Manohar Mepparambath",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2025.104729",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4423,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104729 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: scale, transport, operational, limited, digital, risks, impact, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104781",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Temporal-spatial feature fusion based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-11-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2025.104781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhihua Yin",
        "Zixuan Li",
        "Youtong Zhang",
        "Jianxi Li",
        "Dong Liu",
        "Hongqian Wei"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2025.104781",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2026.104923",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security risk assessment of android automotive OS software supply chain using firmware reverse engineering",
      "description": "As Android Automotive OS (AAOS) becomes the in-vehicle platform of choice for infotainment and domain-controller functions in modern passenger cars, its software supply chain has emerged as a critical security frontier. AAOS spans both infotainment and vehicle-control domains within the automotive electronics architecture by supporting media streaming, over-the-air updates, navigation, and sensor fusion. Its open-source foundations and reliance on third-party libraries introduce risks, from outdated components to malicious modules, that can undermine vehicle functionality and passenger safety. In recognition of these threats, ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE WP.29 R155 mandate structured security assessments for vehicular systems to prevent software-chain vulnerabilities from compromising safety. In this study, we apply a shift-right security analysis via firmware reverse engineering to AAOS images from four leading OEMs. We unpack each firmware image, extract software bills of materials (SBOMs), map Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) to components, and characterize system-level attack surfaces across infotainment and control subsystems. Proof-of-concept exploits were developed for high-risk vulnerabilities. One critical CVE was successfully triggered, while others were mitigated by missing dependencies or built-in protections. Our work delivers a reproducible firmware-analysis workflow for automotive supply-chain risk assessment, a comparative survey of third-party and proprietary component management, and the evidence of inconsistent security postures in AAOS-based vehicular electronics. These vulnerabilities underscore the need for harmonized SBOM practices and targeted hardening in next-generation in-vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.104923",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "vehicular",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hanbo Yu",
        "Faiyaz Khan",
        "Steven H. H. Ding",
        "Junjie Wu",
        "Natalia Stakhanova",
        "Benjamin C. M. Fung"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2026.104923",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2026.105133",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MSTE-CAN: Multi-channel Spatial-Temporal Encoding and Coordinate Attention-based ResNet for high-efficiency CAN bus intrusion detection",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105133",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lu Jia",
        "Jian Zhang",
        "Ling-Xuan Li",
        "Ling-Yun Yan",
        "Da-Fei Lin",
        "Zhong-Yi Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2026.105133",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.cose.2026.105175",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Android Automotive OS under the hood: Architecture and security threat classification",
      "description": "Android Automotive OS (AAOS) is becoming one of the most widely used in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems. Integrated into the Android ecosystem, it interfaces with vehicle functions to support advanced applications and third-party development. Despite its rapid adoption as the core platform for modern IVI systems, a comprehensive understanding of its security challenges remains lacking, and existing surveys have not thoroughly addressed these issues. To bridge this gap, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of AAOS by statically examining five consecutive releases (versions 11–15). Our study explores its layered architecture, from applications and system services down to the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL), and contrasts the actual implementation with official documentation, with a focus on security mechanisms. We also survey and analyze threats specific to Android Automotive, proposing a novel categorization framework that organizes these threats along three dimensions and classifies existing research accordingly. By mapping known vulnerabilities into our framework, we identify recurring issues such as inconsistent documentation, weak permission enforcement, and vendor-specific extensions, factors that may lead to privacy breaches or safety risks.",
      "published": "2026-09-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105175",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Faiyaz Khan",
        "Hanbo Yu",
        "Junjie Wu",
        "Natalia Stakhanova",
        "Benjamin C. M. Fung"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers & Security",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.cose.2026.105175",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.csa.2024.100037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the road ahead: Machine learning-driven DDoS attack detection in VANET cloud environments",
      "description": "Vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) technology has gained prominence, especially in the context of the emerging field of VANET Cloud as an integral part of connected and autonomous vehicles. The automotive industry’s move towards automation and the integration of vehicles into the digital ecosystem has revolutionized wireless network communications. Nevertheless, security remains a paramount concern in these advanced technological landscapes. Safeguarding system integrity and data privacy is of utmost importance before the widespread adoption of VANET Cloud solutions. This study addresses the critical challenge of security within the context of VANET Cloud. Specifically, the focus is on anticipating and mitigating Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which can potentially disrupt the functioning of connected vehicles and associated cloud-based services. To tackle this issue, an innovative architectural framework is proposed to capture and analyze network flows within the VANET Cloud environment. Additionally, it leverages machine learning techniques for classification and predictive analytics with an accuracy of 99.59%. The architecture presented in this research offers the potential to significantly enhance security measures in VANET Cloud deployments. Its adaptability ensures practical applicability to real-world systems, enabling timely responses to security threats and breaches.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csa.2024.100037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Himanshu Setia",
        "Amit Chhabra",
        "Sarjana Singh",
        "Sudhakar Kumar",
        "Sarita Sharma",
        "Varsha Arya",
        "Brij Bhooshan Gupta",
        "Jinsong Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Cyber Security and Applications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.csa.2024.100037",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 81,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4403,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.csa.2024.100037 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: concern, digital, service, applications, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.csi.2021.103539",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A taxonomy of attack mechanisms in the automotive domain",
      "description": "In the last decade, the automotive industry incorporated multiple electronic components into vehicles introducing various capabilities for adversaries to generate diverse types of attacks. In comparison to older types of vehicles, where the biggest concern was physical security, modern vehicles might be targeted remotely. As a result, multiple attack vectors aiming to disrupt different vehicle components emerged. Research and practice lack a comprehensive attack taxonomy for the automotive domain. In this regard, we conduct a systematic literature study, wherein 48 different attacks were identified and classified according to the proposed taxonomy of attack mechanisms. The taxonomy can be utilized by penetration testers in the automotive domain as well as to develop more sophisticated attacks by chaining multiple attack vectors together. In addition, we classify the identified attack vectors based on the following five dimensions: (1) AUTOSAR layers, (2) attack domains, (3) information security principles, (4) attack surfaces, and (5) attacker profile. The results indicate that the most applied attack vectors identified in literature are GPS spoofing, message injection, node impersonation, sybil, and wormhole attack, which are mostly applied to application and services layers of the AUTOSAR architecture.",
      "published": "2021-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2021.103539",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Irdin Pekaric",
        "Clemens Sauerwein",
        "Stefan Haselwanter",
        "Michael Felderer"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Standards & Interfaces",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.csi.2021.103539",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.dcan.2020.04.007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attacks and defences on intelligent connected vehicles: a survey",
      "description": "Intelligent vehicles are advancing at a fast speed with the improvement of automation and connectivity, which opens up new possibilities for different cyber-attacks, including in-vehicle attacks (e.g., hijacking attacks) and vehicle-to-everything communicationattacks (e.g., data theft). These problems are becoming increasingly serious with the development of 4G LTE and 5G communication technologies. Although many efforts are made to improve the resilience to cyber attacks, there are still many unsolved challenges. This paper first identifies some major security attacks on intelligent connected vehicles. Then, we investigate and summarize the available defences against these attacks and classify them into four categories: cryptography, network security, software vulnerability detection, and malware detection. Remaining challenges and future directions for preventing attacks on intelligent vehicle systems have been discussed as well.",
      "published": "2020-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcan.2020.04.007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "malware",
        "resilience",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahdi Dibaei",
        "Xi Zheng",
        "Kun Jiang",
        "Hassan Abbas",
        "Shigang Liu",
        "Yuexin Zhang",
        "Yang Xiang",
        "Shui Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Communications and Networks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.dcan.2020.04.007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 221,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4108,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.dcan.2020.04.007 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: well., serious, digital, there, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.dcan.2022.04.021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A novel intrusion detection model for the CAN bus packet of in-vehicle network based on attention mechanism and autoencoder",
      "description": "The attacks on in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) bus messages severely disrupt normal communication between vehicles. Therefore, researches on intrusion detection models for CAN have positive business value for vehicle security, and the intrusion detection technology for CAN bus messages can effectively protect the in-vehicle network from unlawful attacks. Previous machine learning-based models are unable to effectively identify intrusive abnormal messages due to their inherent shortcomings. Hence, to address the shortcomings of the previous machine learning-based intrusion detection technique, we propose a novel method using Attention Mechanism and AutoEncoder for Intrusion Detection (AMAEID). The AMAEID model first converts the raw hexadecimal message data into binary format to obtain better input. Then the AMAEID model encodes and decodes the binary message data using a multi-layer denoising autoencoder model to obtain a hidden feature representation that can represent the potential features behind the message data at a deeper level. Finally, the AMAEID model uses the attention mechanism and the fully connected layer network to infer whether the message is an abnormal message or not. The experimental results with three evaluation metrics on a real in-vehicle CAN bus message dataset outperform some traditional machine learning algorithms, demonstrating the effectiveness of the AMAEID model.",
      "published": "2022-05-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcan.2022.04.021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pengcheng Wei",
        "Bo Wang",
        "Xiaojun Dai",
        "Li Li",
        "Fangcheng He"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Communications and Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.dcan.2022.04.021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.dib.2026.112805",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GEM-CAN: A real-world dataset of CAN-bus attack scenarios on an autonomous vehicle for intrusion-detection research",
      "description": "This paper presents GEM-CAN, a labelled Controller Area Network (CAN) dataset captured from an autonomous GEM e6 platform under both normal operation and controlled cyber-attack conditions. The dataset contains ∼143 K frames comprising (i) ∼ nominal autonomous operation (∼100k messages), (ii) DoS floods using arbitration ID 0 × 00000000 (∼41 K messages), and (iii) data-tampering injections that reuse legitimate IDs for brake and steering-lock (∼1.3 K messages). Each record includes timestamp, arbitration ID (11/29-bit), DLC, eight payload bytes, and a Normal/Attack label. A companion metadata file enumerates attack windows, PCAN bus-load traces, bitrate, and test conditions. Data were collected with PCAN-View via PCAN-USB on a closed campus rural track. Attacks were injected while the vehicle remained in autonomous mode and stationary for safety; bus utilization and actuation responsiveness were monitored. The dataset offers real-vehicle evidence of availability and integrity attacks (e.g., bus-load surges from 20% to 100% and ∼20 s steering-lock delays during DoS), enabling reproducible benchmarking of lightweight, on-device IDS-particularly relevant for rural deployments with intermittent connectivity.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2026.112805",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahsa Tavasoli",
        "Abdolhossein Sarrafzadeh",
        "Ali Karimoddini",
        "Tienake Phuapaiboon",
        "Milad Khaleghi",
        "Daniel Tobias"
      ],
      "venue": "Data in Brief",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.dib.2026.112805",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.egyr.2020.05.019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Stochastic management of hybrid AC/DC microgrids considering electric vehicles charging demands",
      "description": "The high growth of the automotive industry reveals the very bright future of this technology and its high penetration effects on the human society. No doubt that the random and volatile charging demand of these devices would affect the power grid optimal operation and scheduling which may be regarded as a new challenge. Therefore, this paper investigates the stochastic scheduling of hybrid AC/DC microgrids considering the plugin hybrid electric vehicles charging demands, distributed all over the grid. Three different charging patterns, called coordinated, uncoordinated and smart charging models with different characteristics for the charger type, capacity and market share are proposed. Moreover, different types of renewable energy sources including wind turbine, solar panel and fuel cell are modeled and considered in the scheduling process of the hybrid microgrid. In order to mitigate the charging effects of electric vehicles on the hybrid AC–DC microgrid operation, some remotely switches are considered in the system which make it possible for changing the topology and power flow way. In order to model the uncertainty effects, a data-driven framework based on point estimate method and support vector machine is developed. This would make it possible to extract out the standard deviation value of the uncertain parameters and reflect their impacts on the microgrid operation problem through the limited concentration points. A novel evolving solution based on flower pollination algorithm is also proposed to solve the problem optimally. An IEEE standard test system is used as the hybrid AC/DC microgrid case study to assess the performance of proposed model.",
      "published": "2020-05-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2020.05.019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Peng Wang",
        "Dan Wang",
        "Chengliang Zhu",
        "Yan Tao Yang",
        "Heba M. Abdullah",
        "Mohamed A. Mohamed"
      ],
      "venue": "Energy Reports",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.egyr.2020.05.019",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 135,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.egyr.2022.07.145",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A review on electric vehicle: Technologies, energy trading, and cyber security",
      "description": "The energy transition is an essential effort from a variety of sectors and levels to achieve a carbon-neutral, larger-renewable integrated civilization. The transportation industry, which is largely concentrated in urban areas, emits more than 20% of total greenhouse gas emissions. Various technological difficulties are confronted and resolved as a result of this focus. Consequently, pursuit and research focusing on the integration of electric vehicles (EVs) powered by renewable energy sources are currently a viable option for combating climate change and advancing energy transition. According to current trends, this type of service will diminish the use of internal combustion engines in the future months. A study of the global market scenario for EVs and their future prospects is conducted. Whether energy storage devices and power electronics converters are properly interfaced determines the efficiency of EVs. Moreover, we provide our thoughts on what to expect in the near future in this domain and even the research areas that are still accessible to both industrial and academics.",
      "published": "2022-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.07.145",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohan Bharathidasan",
        "Vairavasundaram Indragandhi",
        "Vishnu Suresh",
        "Michał Jasiński",
        "Zbigniew M. Leonowicz"
      ],
      "venue": "Energy Reports",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.egyr.2022.07.145",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 115,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.egyr.2024.03.025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributionally robust PV planning and curtailment considering cyber attacks on electric vehicle charging under PV/load uncertainties",
      "description": "A manipulated charging behavior of electric vehicles (EVs) due to an adversary along with the uncertain photovoltaic (PV) generation outputs and loads may lead to unstable power distribution system operations with voltage and current violations. To resolve this issue, this paper proposes an optimization framework where the following two types of uncertainties are addressed: (i) the natural uncertainties of PV generation outputs/loads and (ii) artificial uncertainties of load altering attacks (LAAs) on EV charging stations (EVCSs) via the manipulation of EV charging control signals. The proposed framework is formulated as a Wasserstein metric-integrated distributionally robust optimization (DRO)-based Volt/VAR optimization (VVO) problem. The proposed DRO-based VVO framework combined with PV planning and curtailment aims to minimize substation energy and voltage imbalance along with the complete removal of the constraint violations while handling uncertain PV generation outputs/loads and LAAs. To use off-the-shelf optimization solvers, tractable reformulation of the chance constraints of the voltage, current, and curtailed PV real power of the original DRO problem is provided. Numerical examples tested over IEEE 13-bus and 37-bus systems with PV systems and EVCSs show the efficiency of the proposed DRO framework in terms of substation energy, voltage imbalance, and PV planning/curtailment cost under stochastic LAAs.",
      "published": "2024-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2024.03.025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Panggah Prabawa",
        "Dae‐Hyun Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "Energy Reports",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.egyr.2024.03.025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.eij.2025.100687",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and hardware implementation of LED block cipher for vehicles keyless entry systems",
      "description": "Security is paramount in vehicle keyless entry systems, as they are increasingly targeted by various attacks, including relay attacks, theft, and espionage. Keyless entry systems are particularly vulnerable to relay attacks, where attackers intercept and amplify the signal from the key fob, granting unauthorized access to the vehicle. This compromises the integrity of the system, emphasizing the need for robust encryption mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access and safeguard sensitive vehicle data. In this work, we propose an optimized hardware design for the Light Encryption Device (LED) cipher, aimed at enhancing both the security and efficiency of keyless entry systems. The proposed security system is evaluated using security metrics such as NPCR, UACI, entropy, and correlation analysis, demonstrating its robust protection against potential attacks. The obtained results show that the proposed hardware implementation delivers higher efficiency and enhanced security compared to existing designs, making it a promising solution for securing keyless vehicle entry systems. The real-world test scenarios assess the performance of the proposed hardware system, demonstrating its effectiveness in terms of execution time, power consumption, and battery drain time across different platforms, including Dual Core ARM Cortex-A9 and Zynq XC7Z020. The results reveal that the proposed designs offer improved efficiency and security, positioning them as a viable solution for safeguarding keyless entry systems against unauthorized access. This work underscores the potential of lightweight cryptography to tackle both security and performance challenges in modern automotive systems, ensuring the safety and integrity of vehicle access control.",
      "published": "2025-04-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eij.2025.100687",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "espionage",
        "key fob",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Espionage / sovereignty"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ayoub Mhaouch",
        "Wafa Gtifa",
        "Abdesslem Abdeali",
        "Anis Sakly",
        "Mohsen Machhout"
      ],
      "venue": "Egyptian Informatics Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.eij.2025.100687",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4716,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.eij.2025.100687 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: espionage., espionage, sensitive, targeted, platforms, unauthorized, vehicle., making."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.enbuild.2025.115558",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysing the impact of electric vehicle charging on households: An interrelated load profile generation approach",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have drawn considerable attention for their role in energy security and efficiency at the household, building and grid levels. As consumers coordinate indoor activities and outdoor trips, their cohesive activity profiles lead to interrelated residential loads and EV charging loads. However, these two types of loads are often generated separately, neglecting the connection between them. This separate EV load generation approach can lead to inaccurate estimations of peak loads and demand flexibility at the household, building and residential grid levels. This study develops a bottom-up approach to simulate interrelated load profiles including the EV charging load and the loads from indoor household appliances. This approach extracts both travel activities and indoor appliance-related activities from the same individuals’ time use surveys to maintain the interconnection between them. Conversion factors, such as appliance load patterns, travel patterns, and EV charging rates, are derived from diverse data sources to translate household activities into load profiles. The output not only provides an accurate estimation of peak loads but also facilitates demand flexibility management for households and residential buildings. In a dataset comprising about 200 households, our load profile simulation indicates that a 100% EV penetration rate may increase the total electricity consumption by 12.9% to 19.0% across three charging scenarios, while peak load increases the range from 14.9% to 35.0%. Furthermore, simple rule-based EV charging power rate limitations are shown to mitigate peak load surges without significantly influencing EV usage. The validation against meter-recorded electricity measurements reveals that the generated household appliance loads capture the fluctuation of the average daily load profiles. This study presents a straightforward method for generating interrelated EV charging loads and indoor household appliance loads, offering valuable inputs and insights for impact analysis, policy-making and demand response.",
      "published": "2025-03-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2025.115558",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Han Wang",
        "Fangce Guo",
        "Aruna Sivakumar"
      ],
      "venue": "Energy and Buildings",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.enbuild.2025.115558",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.eng.2023.10.005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Toward Trustworthy Decision-Making for Autonomous Vehicles: A Robust Reinforcement Learning Approach with Safety Guarantees",
      "description": "While autonomous vehicles are vital components of intelligent transportation systems, ensuring the trustworthiness of decision-making remains a substantial challenge in realizing autonomous driving. Therefore, we present a novel robust reinforcement learning approach with safety guarantees to attain trustworthy decision-making for autonomous vehicles. The proposed technique ensures decision trustworthiness in terms of policy robustness and collision safety. Specifically, an adversary model is learned online to simulate the worst-case uncertainty by approximating the optimal adversarial perturbations on the observed states and environmental dynamics. In addition, an adversarial robust actor-critic algorithm is developed to enable the agent to learn robust policies against perturbations in observations and dynamics. Moreover, we devise a safety mask to guarantee the collision safety of the autonomous driving agent during both the training and testing processes using an interpretable knowledge model known as the Responsibility-Sensitive Safety model. Finally, the proposed approach is evaluated through both simulations and experiments. These results indicate that the autonomous driving agent can make trustworthy decisions and drastically reduce the number of collisions through robust safety policies.",
      "published": "2023-11-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eng.2023.10.005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiangkun He",
        "Wenhui Huang",
        "Chen Lv"
      ],
      "venue": "Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.eng.2023.10.005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 65,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2024.110181",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart electric vehicle charging for reducing photovoltaic energy curtailment",
      "description": "The increased diffusion of Photovoltaic (PV) generation could be limited by the grid capacity to host the power input from PV systems, especially in mid-day hours on sunny days. This paper proposes a framework of analysis to determine the mitigation of the PV energy curtailment in the grid, based on a novel smart charging strategy for electric vehicles (EVs) that operate in the grid-to-vehicle mode. This framework adopts a combination of methods and techniques, with a clustering procedure to group the EV charging stations with some PV systems based on the electrical distance, a novel smart charging strategy for the EVs based on the definition of fuzzy weights, and the exploitation of the blockchain technology with a Proof-of-Authority consensus protocol to reinforce network security and achieve decentralization. The blockchain provides full traceability of EV charging operations and grid status monitoring during time. The proposed framework contains novel indicators of avoided PV power reduction and energy curtailment. To account for the EV-related uncertainty, these indicators are determined from a Monte Carlo-based assessment of the three-phase power flow results. The results are presented on a three-phase unbalanced 123-node system with given locations of PV systems and EV charging stations.",
      "published": "2024-02-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2024.110181",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploitation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soheil Saadatmandi",
        "Gianfranco Chicco",
        "Alfredo Favenza",
        "Alessandro Mozzato",
        "Francesco Giordano",
        "Maurizio Arnone"
      ],
      "venue": "Electric Power Systems Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.epsr.2024.110181",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2026.113537",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Defending the power grid by segmenting the EV charging cyber infrastructure",
      "description": "This paper examines defending the power grid against load-altering attacks using electric vehicle charging. It proposes to preventively segment the cyber infrastructure that charging station operators (CSOs) use to communicate with and control their charging stations, thereby limiting the impact of successful cyber-attacks. Using real German charging station data and a reconstructed transmission grid model, a threat analysis shows that without segmentation, the successful hack of just two CSOs can overload two transmission grid branches, exceeding the N-1 security margin and necessitating defense measures. A novel defense design problem is then formulated that minimizes the number of imposed segmentations while bounding the number of branch overloads under worst-case attacks. The resulting IP-MILP bi-level problem can be solved with an exact column and constraint generation algorithm and with heuristics for fast computation on large-scale instances. For the near-real-world Germany case, the applicability of the heuristics is demonstrated and validated under relevant load and dispatch scenarios. It is found that the simple scheme of segmenting CSOs evenly by their installed capacity leads to only 23% more segments compared to the heuristic optimization result, suggesting potential relevance as a regulatory measure.",
      "published": "2026-03-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2026.113537",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kirill Kuroptev",
        "Florian Steinke",
        "Efthymios Karangelos"
      ],
      "venue": "Electric Power Systems Research",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.epsr.2026.113537",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2026.113680",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attention-boosted DistilBERT and Bi-GRU for cyber-attacks detection in electric vehicle charging networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2026.113680",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hassam Ishfaq",
        "Nermish Mushtaq",
        "Iqra Nazir",
        "Waqas Amin",
        "Abdullah Aman Khan",
        "Qi Huang"
      ],
      "venue": "Electric Power Systems Research",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.epsr.2026.113680",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2023.119771",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey of deep learning-based intrusion detection in automotive applications",
      "description": "Modern automobiles depend on internal vehicle networks (IVNs) to control systems from the anti-lock brakes to the transmission to the locks on the doors. Many IVNs, particularly the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, were developed with little regard for security, since the IVNs of the past were isolated from the outside world. In the present day, the assumption of isolation no longer applies. Cellular service, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth are just a few examples of the connectivity of contemporary automobiles. Researchers have explored a number of automotive security enhancements, but such enhancements are often roadblocked by implementation challenges, complexity, and expense. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a promising automotive security enhancement that requires little, if any, adjustment to a vehicle’s existing infrastructure. Deep learning techniques can augment the capability of automotive IDSs, improving detection accuracy and precision. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of deep learning-based IDSs in automotive networks. We assemble various deep learning schemes, categorize them according to their topologies and techniques, and highlight their distinct contributions. In addition, we analyze each scheme’s evaluation in terms of datasets, attack types, and metrics. We summarize the results of the schemes and assess the advantages and disadvantages of different deep learning architectures.",
      "published": "2023-02-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2023.119771",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Lampe",
        "Weizhi Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "Expert Systems with Applications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.eswa.2023.119771",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 138,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2023.122181",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Supervised contrastive ResNet and transfer learning for the in-vehicle intrusion detection system",
      "description": "High-end vehicles have been equipped with several electronic control units (ECUs), which provide upgrading functions to enhance the driving experience. The controller area network (CAN) is a well-known protocol that connects these ECUs because of its modesty and efficiency. However, the CAN bus is vulnerable to various types of attacks. Although the intrusion detection system (IDS) is proposed to address the security problem of the CAN bus, most previous studies only provide alerts when attacks occur without knowing the specific type of attack. Moreover, an IDS is designed for a specific car model due to diverse car manufacturers. In this study, we proposed a novel deep learning model called supervised contrastive (SupCon) ResNet, which can handle multiple attack classification on the CAN bus. Furthermore, the model can be used to improve the performance of a limited-size dataset using a transfer learning technique. The capability of the proposed model is evaluated on two real car datasets. When tested with the Car Hacking dataset, the experiment results show that the SupCon loss reduces the overall false-negative rates of four types of attack by an average of five times compared to the vanilla cross-entropy loss. In addition, the model achieves the highest F1 score on both the vehicle models of the survival dataset by utilizing transfer learning. Finally, the model can adapt to hardware constraints in terms of memory size and running time to be deployed in real devices.",
      "published": "2022-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2023.122181",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thien-Nu Hoang",
        "Daehee Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Expert Systems with Applications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.eswa.2023.122181",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 78,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.127547",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ResNet-Swin Transformer based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2025.127547",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhongqiang Wu",
        "Mengting Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Expert Systems with Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.eswa.2025.127547",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.128441",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced TARA model for heavy-duty vehicles using ISO/SAE 21434 and Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP)",
      "description": "In recent years, the automotive industry has increasingly recognized the importance of Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) as a critical first step in cybersecurity planning. While standards such as ISO/SAE 21,434 provide a structured framework, they are primarily designed for light-duty vehicles and do not fully address the unique characteristics, operational environments, and vulnerabilities of heavy-duty (HD) commercial vehicles—despite their crucial role in public transportation, freight systems, and the supply chain. This study addresses that gap by customizing the ISO/SAE 21,434 risk assessment model specifically for HD vehicles. It employs a Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) methodology to assign weights to the severity and feasibility criteria using expert input through the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP). Expert-driven pairwise comparisons were conducted to evaluate the relative importance of each criterion separately for severity and feasibility assessment. The resulting model provides a tailored and robust approach for analyzing and assessing cybersecurity threats in HD vehicles, reflecting their distinct needs and risk profiles.",
      "published": "2025-06-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2025.128441",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narges Rahimi",
        "Beth‐Anne Schuelke‐Leech",
        "Mitra Mirhassani"
      ],
      "venue": "Expert Systems with Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.eswa.2025.128441",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.131039",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent resilience testing of vehicle control systems via learning-guided fuzzing",
      "description": "Ensuring functional safety and cybersecurity in modern automotive systems requires robust validation techniques that can address increasingly complex Electronic Control Units (ECU) and in-vehicle communication networks. Traditional fuzz testing–sending random, malformed, or unexpected inputs to a system–has proven effective in uncovering vulnerabilities and stability issues. However, its efficiency in identifying critical faults and security weaknesses remains limited. To overcome these challenges, this work introduces an intelligent test framework that leverages reinforcement learning (RL) to optimize fuzzing strategies. The proposed RL-based method dynamically explores the stability of vehicle control systems, evaluates sensor signal conditioning algorithms, and assesses resilience against external interventions while maintaining baseline functionality. By learning an optimized test schedule, the framework systematically identifies worst-case controller performance scenarios and can reuse these schedules across different test setups and integration levels. This approach enhances both safety and security validation by targeting control algorithms and their supporting infrastructure, including signal processing and protection mechanisms. The methodology is validated in an ABS controller model-in-the-loop (MIL) environment using a detailed passenger vehicle plant model, demonstrating its potential to improve efficiency and coverage in automotive testing.",
      "published": "2025-12-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2025.131039",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gábor Lóránt",
        "Zsolt Szalay",
        "Árpád Török"
      ],
      "venue": "Expert Systems with Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.eswa.2025.131039",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.fsidi.2025.301909",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "I know where you have been last summer: Extracting privacy-sensitive information via forensic analysis of the Mercedes-Benz NTG5*2 infotainment system",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are equipped with In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems that offers different functions, such as typical radio and multimedia services, navigation and internet browsing. To operate properly, IVI systems have to store locally different types of data, reflecting user preferences and behaviors. If stored and managed insecurely, these data might expose sensitive information and represent a privacy risk. In this paper we address this issue by presenting a methodology for the extraction of privacy-sensitive information from the popular N T G 5 COMMAND IVI system (specifically, the N T G 5 ⁎ 2 version by Harman), deployed in some Mercedes-Benz vehicles from 2013 to 2019. We show that it is possible to extract information related to geographic locations and various vehicles events (such as ignition and doors opening and closing) dating back to the previous 8 months, and that these data can be cross-referenced to precisely identify the activities and habits of the driver. Moreover, we develop a novel forensic tool to automate this task. 1 Given the past usage of the N T G 5 system, our work might have real life implications for the privacy of millions of drivers, owners and passengers. As a final contribution, we develop a novel technique for SQLite data carving specifically designed to identify deleted data. Comparison with existing state-of-the-art tools for SQLite3 data recovery demonstrates that our approach is more effective in recovering deleted traces than general purpose tools. • Unencrypted disks used in IVI systems allow the extraction of privacy-sensitive information from GPS logs. • Proprietary formats used to encode GPS trails in IVI systems can be reverse engineered with some initial assumptions. • Cross-referencing extracted GPS trails with OSINT sources enable detailed reconstruction of daily usage of a vehicle.",
      "published": "2025-03-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsidi.2025.301909",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "mercedes-benz",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "mercedes-benz"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dario Stabili",
        "F. Valgimigli",
        "Mirco Marchetti"
      ],
      "venue": "Forensic Science International Digital Investigation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.fsidi.2025.301909",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.future.2017.12.041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driverless vehicle security: Challenges and future research opportunities",
      "description": "Abstract As self-driving vehicles become increasingly popular, new generations of attackers will seek to exploit vulnerabilities introduced by the technologies that underpin such vehicles for a range of motivations (e.g. curiosity, criminally-motivated, financially-motivated and state-sponsored). For example, vulnerabilities in self-driving vehicles may be exploited to be used in terrorist attacks such as driving into places of mass gatherings (i.e. using driverless vehicles as weapons to cause death or serious bodily injury). This survey presents a categorized summary of security methodologies developed to secure sensing, positioning, vision, and network technologies that can be equipped in driverless-vehicles. These technologies have the potential to benefit their security from tailored machine learning models. Future research opportunities are also identified.",
      "published": "2020",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2017.12.041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "exploit",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gonzalo de la Torre",
        "P. Rad",
        "Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo"
      ],
      "venue": "Future generations computer systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.future.2017.12.041",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 162,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.geits.2025.100262",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing security in the ISO 15118–20 EV charging system",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle (EV) ‘DC Fast Charging’ systems directly connect an EV's battery to an external charger. A compromised EV charger may damage the EV or be used as part of a demand-side power grid attack. We show that the newest charging standard ISO 15118–20 is not sufficient to prevent charging attacks, as it provides no mechanism to verify charger integrity. We present system and threat models for the attack, before defining an extension to ISO 15118–20 that adds support for firmware integrity verification through remote attestation, while remaining interoperable with non-supporting devices. A proof of concept implementation demonstrates the security improvement by protecting against the specified attack while requiring only 85 bytes of secure storage, 8 ​kB of working memory, and adding less than 0.5 ​s to the length of a charging session. Backwards compatibility with an implementation of the original standard is also demonstrated.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geits.2025.100262",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ross Porter",
        "Morteza Biglari-Abhari",
        "Benjamin Tan",
        "Duleepa J. Thrimawithana"
      ],
      "venue": "Green Energy and Intelligent Transportation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.geits.2025.100262",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100203",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial robustness analysis of LiDAR-included models in autonomous driving",
      "description": "In autonomous driving systems, perception is pivotal, relying chiefly on sensors like LiDAR and cameras for environmental awareness. LiDAR, celebrated for its detailed depth perception, is being increasingly integrated into autonomous vehicles. In this article, we analyze the robustness of four LiDAR-included models against adversarial points under physical constraints. We first introduce an attack technique that, by simply adding a limited number of physically constrained adversarial points above a vehicle, can make the vehicle undetectable by the LiDAR-included models. Experiments reveal that adversarial points adversely affect the detection capabilities of both LiDAR-only and LiDAR-camera fusion models, with a tendency for more adversarial points to escalate attack success rates. Notably, voxel-based models are more susceptible to deception by these adversarial points. We also investigated the impact of the distance and angle of the added adversarial points on the attack success rate. Typically, the farther the victim object to be hidden and the closer to the front of the LiDAR, the higher the attack success rate. Additionally, we have experimentally proven that our generated adversarial points possess good cross-model adversarial transferability and validated the effectiveness of our proposed optimization method through ablation studies. Furthermore, we propose a new plug-and-play, model-agnostic defense method based on the concept of point smoothness. The ROC curve of this defense method shows an AUC value of approximately 0.909, demonstrating its effectiveness.",
      "published": "2024-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100203",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bo Yang",
        "Zizhi Jin",
        "Yushi Cheng",
        "Xiaoyu Ji",
        "Wenyuan Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "High-Confidence Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100203",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100207",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Traffic anomaly detection algorithm for CAN bus using similarity analysis",
      "description": "Recently, vehicles have experienced a rise in networking and informatization, leading to increased security concerns. As the most widely used automotive bus network, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is vulnerable to attacks, as security was not considered in its original design. This paper proposes SIDuBzip2, a traffic anomaly detection method for the CAN bus based on the bzip2 compression algorithm. The proposed method utilizes the pseudo-periodic characteristics of CAN bus traffic, constructing time series of CAN IDs and calculating the similarity between adjacent time series to identify abnormal traffic. The method consists of three parts: the conversion of CAN ID values to characters, the calculation of similarity based on bzip2 compression, and the optimal solution of model parameters. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed SIDuBzip2 method effectively detects various attacks, including Denial of Service , replay, basic injection, mixed injection, and suppression attacks. In addition, existing CAN bus traffic anomaly detection methods are compared with the proposed method in terms of performance and delay, demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed method.",
      "published": "2024-01-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100207",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chao Wang",
        "X. Q. Xu",
        "Ke Xiao",
        "Yunhua He",
        "Guangcan Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "High-Confidence Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100207",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.hcc.2025.100375",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Seeing the unseen: Intrusion attack detection in connected autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) are becoming increasingly common, and their popularity is expected to increase further, especially due to the ease and convenience they provide. An important component of CAVs is the Electronic Control Unit or the ECU; these ECUs are connected to each other through the Controller Area Network or CAN bus. The increasing use of CAVs has significantly expanded its threat landscape with several security vulnerabilities that can be severely damaging, especially when the ECUs or CAN are compromised. Existing security mechanisms are largely designed for known vulnerabilities, leaving the potential for unknown attacks high. In order to address this gap in detecting previously unknown attacks, we propose a novel autoencoder and payload fragmentation-based in-vehicle unknown intrusion method. For the precise prediction of attack and sub-attack, the data payload is fragmented into one-byte fragments, and the prediction dependency is analyzed for each fragment. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that our proposed method shows improved performance with an attack classification accuracy of 99.88% and sub-attack accuracy of 99.98%.",
      "published": "2025-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hcc.2025.100375",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Talea Huraysi",
        "Rui Sun",
        "Haoran Duan",
        "Kwabena Adu-Duodu",
        "Rajiv Ranjan",
        "Bo Wei",
        "Tejal Shah"
      ],
      "venue": "High-Confidence Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.hcc.2025.100375",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.ifacol.2025.12.356",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Transfer Learning Assisted XgBoost For Adaptable Cyberattack Detection In Battery Packs",
      "description": "Optimal charging of electric vehicle (EVs) depends heavily on reliable sensor measurements from the battery pack to the cloud-controller of the smart charging station. However, an adversary could corrupt the voltage sensor data during transmission, potentially causing local to wide-scale disruptions. Therefore, it is essential to detect sensor cyberattacks in real-time to ensure secure EV charging, and the developed algorithms must be readily adaptable to variations, including pack configurations. To tackle these challenges, we propose adaptable fine-tuning of an XgBoost-based cell-level model using limited pack-level data to use for voltage prediction and residual generation. We used battery cell and pack data from high-fidelity charging experiments in PyBaMM and `liionpack' package to train and test the detection algorithm. The algorithm's performance has been evaluated for two large-format battery packs under sensor swapping and replay attacks. The simulation results also highlight the adaptability and efficacy of our proposed detection algorithm.",
      "published": "2025-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2025.12.356",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanchita Ghosh",
        "Tanushree Roy"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.ifacol.2025.12.356",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.ijepes.2021.107784",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle Attack Impact on Power Grid Operation",
      "description": "The increasing need for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the drive for green cities have promoted the use of electric vehicles due to their environmental benefits. In fact, countries have set their own targets and are offering incentives for people to purchase EVs as opposed to traditional gasoline-powered cars. Manufacturers have been hastily deploying charging stations to meet the charging requirements of the EVs on the road. This rapid deployment has contributed to the EV ecosystem's lack of proper security measures, raising multiple questions related to the power grid security and vulnerability. In this paper, we offer a complete examination of the EV ecosystem from the vulnerability to the attacks and finally the solutions. We start by examining the existing vulnerabilities in the EV ecosystem that can be exploited to control the EV charging and launch attacks against the power grid. We then discuss the non-linear nature of the EV charging load and simulate multiple attacks that can be launched against the power grid using these EVs. EV loads have high reactive power demand which can have a larger impact on the grid compared to residential loads. We perform simulations on two power grids and demonstrate that while the grid can recover after a 48 MW attack utilizing traditional residential loads, a smaller 30 MW EV load attack can completely destabilize the system. Finally, we suggest several patches for the existing vulnerabilities and discuss two methods aimed at detecting EV attacks.",
      "published": "2021-11-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2021.107784",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Ribal Atallah",
        "Chadi Assi",
        "Mourad Debbabi"
      ],
      "venue": "Int J Electr Power Energy Syst, vol. 137, 2022",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.ijepes.2021.107784",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.ins.2020.05.130",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Transfer learning based intrusion detection scheme for Internet of vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-07-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2020.05.130",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xinghua Li",
        "Zhongyuan Hu",
        "Mengfan Xu",
        "Yunwei Wang",
        "Jianfeng Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "Information Sciences",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.ins.2020.05.130",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 122,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.ins.2021.10.032",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Event triggered control of connected vehicles under multiple cyber attacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2021.10.032",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yangguang Xu",
        "Ge Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "Information Sciences",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.ins.2021.10.032",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.iot.2023.100809",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security issues in Internet of Vehicles (IoV): A comprehensive survey",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-05-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2023.100809",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamideh Taslimasa",
        "Sajjad Dadkhah",
        "Euclides Carlos Pinto Neto",
        "Pulei Xiong",
        "Suprio Ray",
        "Ali Akbar Ghorbani"
      ],
      "venue": "Internet of Things",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.iot.2023.100809",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 192,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.iot.2024.101209",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CICIoV2024: Advancing realistic IDS approaches against DoS and spoofing attack in IoV CAN bus",
      "description": "Considering the complexity of network traffic in IoV operations, methods that can identify complex patterns become useful. Machine learning fosters several techniques to enhance the detection, prevention, and mitigation of cyberattacks. However, important features are not addressed in the current state-of-the-art security datasets for IoV. For example, in the case of intra-vehicle communications, it is critical to consider the interaction among multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Also, mimicking a realistic IoV environment is not simple since establishing a test environment requires considerable financial investment. Hence, there is a need for a testbed composed of several real ECUs in an IoV environment comprising network traffic. Thereupon, the main goal of this research is to propose a realistic benchmark dataset to foster the development of new cybersecurity solutions for IoV operations. To accomplish this, five attacks were executed against the fully intact inner structure of a 2019 Ford car, complete with all ECUs. However, the vehicle was immobile and incapable of causing any potential harm or injuries. Hence, all attacks were carried out on the vehicle without endangering the car’s driver or passengers. These attacks are classified as spoofing and Denial-of-Service (Dos) and were carried out through the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. This effort establishes a baseline complementary to existing contributions and supports researchers in proposing new IoV solutions to strengthen overall security using different techniques (e.g., Machine Learning - ML). The CICIoV2024 dataset has been published on CIC’s dataset page.",
      "published": "2024-05-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2024.101209",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Euclides Carlos Pinto Neto",
        "Hamideh Taslimasa",
        "Sajjad Dadkhah",
        "Shahrear Iqbal",
        "Pulei Xiong",
        "Taufiq Rahman",
        "Ali Akbar Ghorbani"
      ],
      "venue": "Internet of Things",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.iot.2024.101209",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 172,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.iot.2026.101918",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A mamba-based lightweight and dynamically adaptive intrusion detection framework for in-vehicle CAN bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2026.101918",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bocheng Xu",
        "Qing-Bao Li",
        "Fei Cao",
        "Yuanlong Gao"
      ],
      "venue": "Internet of Things",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.iot.2026.101918",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.isatra.2022.11.007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards robust autonomous driving systems through adversarial test set generation",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-11-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isatra.2022.11.007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devrim Ünal",
        "Ferhat Özgür Çatak",
        "Mohammad Talal Houkan",
        "Mohammed Mudassir",
        "Mohammad Ali A. Hammoudeh"
      ],
      "venue": "ISA Transactions",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.isatra.2022.11.007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.ject.2024.01.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A review of cyber attacks on sensors and perception systems in autonomous vehicle",
      "description": "Vehicle automation has been in the works for a long time now. Automatic brakes, cruise control, GPS satellite navigation, etc. are all common features seen in today's automobiles. Automation and artificial intelligence breakthroughs are likely to lead to an increase in the usage of automation technologies in cars. Because of this, mankind will be more reliant on computer-controlled equipment and car systems in our daily lives. All major corporations have begun investing in the development of self-driving cars because of the rapid advancement of advanced driver support technologies. However, the level of safety and trustworthiness is still questionable. Imagine what the assailants could do if they had access to a car. Control of braking, acceleration and even steering by an attacker can have disastrous results. Most of the assaults against autonomous vehicle software and hardware are covered in this study, along with their prospective consequences. This work explores an extended analysis of the security threat and cyber-attacks on different sensors and perception systems in autonomous vehicles. This work also showed machine learning-based possible defensive techniques to prevent the security threat. An overview of most of the conceivable assaults against autonomous vehicle software and hardware and their prospective consequences is presented in this study.",
      "published": "2023-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ject.2024.01.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Taminul Islam",
        "Md. Alif Sheakh",
        "Anjuman Naher Jui",
        "Omar Sharif",
        "Md Zobaer Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Economy and Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.ject.2024.01.002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jfranklin.2022.02.036",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilient observer-based sliding mode control of connected vehicles with denial-of-service attacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-03-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfranklin.2022.02.036",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yangguang Xu",
        "Ge Guo",
        "Shuanghe Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of the Franklin Institute",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jfranklin.2022.02.036",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2017.08.005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber security attacks to modern vehicular systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2017.08.005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lei Pan",
        "Xi Zheng",
        "HuiHong Chen",
        "Tom H. Luan",
        "H. Bootwala",
        "Lynn Batten"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Security and Applications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jisa.2017.08.005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 80,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104015",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CyberROAD: A cybersecurity risk assessment ontology for automotive domain aligned with ISO/SAE 21434:2021",
      "description": "The automotive domain is becoming increasingly complex through the integration of new technologies. As a result, cybersecurity is recognized as a pressing issue. This study focuses on the ISO/SAE 21434:2021 standard for road vehicles cybersecurity engineering, evaluating the effectiveness of the standard’s risk assessment approach. The standard suggests a set of assessment steps, and previous research has shown that practitioners often face challenges during assessment execution. The absence of clear, structured guidelines within the standard leads to different interpretations, resulting in inconsistent assessment approaches. This inconsistency makes it difficult to compare and measure the quality of the assessments. Our study uses design science methodology to create a new cybersecurity risk assessment ontology in the automotive domain, describing the relationships and interdependencies between cybersecurity risk assessment activities, stakeholders, and work packages. The ontology model is evaluated in a case study at a leading automotive systems supplier to validate the model’s suitability for developing a cybersecurity risk assessment method. The findings indicate that the ontology model provides an improved understanding of the underlying risk assessment activities and allows for a structured method for extracting procedural steps according to the standard. This systematic approach increases the cybersecurity risk assessment conformity and the consistency of assessment results. In conclusion, this paper gives valuable insights and actionable recommendations for stakeholders, researchers, and organizations seeking to improve the cybersecurity risk assessment process in the automotive domain. • Knowledge representation of cybersecurity risk assessment in the automotive domain. • Formal ontology model for the ISO/SAE 21434:2021 standard risk assessment activities. • Defining inherent dependencies to process documentation and stakeholder roles. • Applying ontology model structures to develop risk assessment method in a case study. • Workflow diagrams are applied to improve the consistency of the analysis activities.",
      "published": "2025-03-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104015",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karim Khalil",
        "Christian Gehrmann",
        "Günther Vogel"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Security and Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104015",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104361",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RL-IDS: A robust and lightweight intrusion detection system for in-vehicle network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104361",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jianjun Yuan",
        "Hong Sun",
        "Rong Cao",
        "Guojun Huang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Security and Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104361",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104408",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PeTARA : A privacy-enhanced threat analysis and risk assessment method for intelligent connected vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-02-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104408",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Zhihao Li",
        "Yingpeng Tong",
        "Zeqi Liao",
        "Zhouping Zhang",
        "Qin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Security and Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104408",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4177,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104408 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: applications, privacy, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104606",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic wavelet watermarking intrusion detection system for message detection and resistance to model attacks in CAN bus communications",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-08-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104606",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anyu Cheng",
        "Yuanjian Cai",
        "Changqing Li",
        "HaiHang Zhao",
        "Shanshan Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Security and Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104606",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104647",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BAsyncFed-IDS: A buffered asynchronous federated learning-based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gaoxiang Lan",
        "Yingqing Wang",
        "Yutao Bie",
        "Yubo Jin",
        "Guihe Qin",
        "Minghui Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Security and Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jisa.2026.104647",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jksuci.2021.05.005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "eUF: A framework for detecting over-the-air malicious updates in autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract Software updates are highly significant in autonomous vehicles. These updates are utilized to provide enhanced features and updated security mechanisms. In order to ensure scalability and smooth roll-out Over-the-air (OTA) mechanism is a preferred option to propagate a software update. However, this approach is vulnerable to security attacks because of existence of wireless communication channel between the vehicle and the manufacturer. In that, an attacker can replace the legitimate software with a malicious software with an intent to get control over the vehicle. In this work, we are motivated to address this problem. We develop an enhanced uptane framework for detection of malicious OTA software updates in autonomous vehicles. For enhancing security, we incorporate convolutional neural network (CNN) in the uptane framework. The proposed framework is able to distinguish between malicious and benign software executables with high accuracy. For training and testing, we create two datasets by collecting executables of Windows and Linux operating system. We encourage the use of transfer learning by exploiting the developed CNN models in order to detect malicious executable designed for autonomous vehicles. We also benchmark the CNN models against state-of-the art models. Our work is highly beneficial for the community in providing a secure mechanism for software updates.",
      "published": "2021-05-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2021.05.005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anam Qureshi",
        "Murk Marvi",
        "Jawwad Ahmed Shamsi",
        "Adnan Aijaz"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of King Saud University - Computer and Information Sciences",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jksuci.2021.05.005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jksuci.2023.03.020",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BV-ICVs: A privacy-preserving and verifiable federated learning framework for V2X environments using blockchain and zkSNARKs",
      "description": "As part of vehicle to everything (V2X) environments, intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) generate a large amount of data, which can be exploited securely and effectively through decentralized techniques such as federated learning (FL). Existing FL systems, however, are vulnerable to attacks and barely meet the security requirements for real-world applications. If malicious or compromised ICVs upload inaccurate or low-quality local model updates to the central aggregator, they may reduce the accuracy of the global model, thereby reducing drivers safety and efficiency. This paper aims to alleviate these concerns by presenting BV-ICVs, a blockchain-enabled and privacy-preserving FL framework for ICVs in an edge-envisioned V2X environment. This system uses Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zkSNARKs) verification that is compiled as smart contracts to prevent malicious, compromised or even rational ICVs from uploading unreliable, erroneous or low-quality model updates. The verification process is embedded within the consensus of the underlying permissioned blockchain, which maximizes both the efficiency of the process and the utilization of computer resources. As demonstrated by discussions, security analysis, and numerical results, BV-ICVs reduced data poisoning attacks and increased the privacy protection and accuracy of FL.",
      "published": "2023-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2023.03.020",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abla Smahi",
        "Hui Li",
        "Yong Yang",
        "Xin Yang",
        "Ping Lu",
        "Yong Zhong",
        "Caifu Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of King Saud University - Computer and Information Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jksuci.2023.03.020",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4063,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.jksuci.2023.03.020 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: large, even, privacy, information, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jlamp.2022.100812",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A formal framework for security testing of automotive over-the-air update systems",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are comparable to desktop computers due to the increase in connectivity. This fact also extends to potential cyber-attacks. A solution for preventing and mitigating cyber attacks is Over-The-Air (OTA) updates. This solution has also been used for both desktops and mobile phones. The current de facto OTA security system for vehicles is Uptane, which is developed to solve the unique issues vehicles face. The Uptane system needs to have a secure method of updating; otherwise, attackers will exploit it. To this end, we have developed a comprehensive and model-based security testing approach by translating Uptane and our attack model into formal models in Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). These are combined and verified to generate an exhaustive list of test cases to see to which attacks Uptane may be susceptible. Security testing is then conducted based on these generated test cases, on a test-bed running an implementation of Uptane. The security testing result enables us to validate the security design of Uptane and some vulnerabilities to which it is subject.",
      "published": "2022-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2022.100812",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rhys Kirk",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "C. E. Wartnaby"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jlamp.2022.100812",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2020.102908",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A privacy-preserving consensus mechanism for an electric vehicle charging scheme",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-11-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2020.102908",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaoshuai Zhang",
        "Chao Liu",
        "Kok Keong Chai",
        "Stefan Poslad"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Network and Computer Applications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jnca.2020.102908",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.jnlssr.2023.12.004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unsupervised intrusion detection system for in-vehicle communication networks",
      "description": "In-vehicle communication has been optimized day to day to keep updated of the technologies. Control area network (CAN) is used as a standard communication method because of its efficient and reliable connection. However, CAN is prone to several network level attacks because of its lack in security mechanisms. Various methods have been introduced to incorporate this in CAN. We proposed an unsupervised method of intrusion detection for in-vehicle communication networks by combining the optimal feature extracting ability of autoencoders and more precise clustering using fuzzy C-means (FCM). The proposed method is light weight and requires less computation time. We performed an extensive experiment and achieved an accuracy of 75.51% with the ML350 in-vehicle intrusion dataset. By experimental result, the proposed method also works better for other intrusion detection problems like wireless intrusion detection datasets such as WNS-DS with accuracy of 84.05% and network intrusion detection datasets such as KDDCup with accuracy 60.63% , UNSW_NB15 with accuracy 73.62% and Information Security Center of Excellence (ISCX) with accuracy 74.83%. Overall, the proposed method outperforms the existing methods and avoids labeled datasets when training an in-vehicle intrusion detection model. The results of the experiment of our proposed method performed on various intrusion detection datasets indicate that the proposed approach is generalized and robust in detecting intrusions and can be effectively deployed in real time to monitor CAN traffic in vehicles and proactively alert during attacks.",
      "published": "2024-02-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnlssr.2023.12.004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. Kabilan",
        "Vinayakumar Ravi",
        "V. Sowmya"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Safety Science and Resilience",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jnlssr.2023.12.004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.kjs.2026.100566",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A dual-branch temporal-spatial deep learning architecture for efficient and accurate CAN bus intrusion detection",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjs.2026.100566",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guo-Hong Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Maǧallaẗ Al-Kuwayt li-l-ʿulūm",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.kjs.2026.100566",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2024.112091",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-classification in-vehicle intrusion detection system using packet- and sequence-level characteristics from time-embedded transformer with autoencoder",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-06-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2024.112091",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tien-Dat Le",
        "Hoang Bao Huy Truong",
        "Van Phu Pham",
        "Daehee Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Knowledge-Based Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.knosys.2024.112091",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2024.112563",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Semi-supervised intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks based on variational autoencoder and adversarial reinforcement learning",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-09-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2024.112563",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thi Xuan Nguyen",
        "Jeongho Cho",
        "Daehee Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Knowledge-Based Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.knosys.2024.112563",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.micpro.2022.104461",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ThreatSurf: A method for automated Threat Surface assessment in automotive cybersecurity engineering",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2022.104461",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel Zelle",
        "Christian Plappert",
        "R. Rieke",
        "D. Scheuermann",
        "C. Krauß"
      ],
      "venue": "Microprocessors and microsystems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.micpro.2022.104461",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.micpro.2022.104726",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion, anomaly, and attack detection in smart vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-11-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2022.104726",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samira Tahajomi Banafshehvaragh",
        "Amir Masoud Rahmani"
      ],
      "venue": "Microprocessors and Microsystems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.micpro.2022.104726",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.mlwa.2026.100859",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DAIRE: A lightweight AI model for real-time detection of Controller Area Network attacks in the Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is advancing modern transportation by improving safety, efficiency, and intelligence. However, the reliance on the Controller Area Network (CAN) introduces critical security risks, as CAN-based communication is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. Addressing this challenge, we propose DAIRE (Detecting Attacks in IoV in REal-time), a lightweight machine learning framework designed for real-time detection and classification of CAN attacks. DAIRE is built on a lightweight artificial neural network (ANN) where each layer contains Ni = i x c neurons, with Ni representing the number of neurons in the ith layer and c corresponding to the total number of attack classes. Other hyperparameters are determined empirically to ensure real-time operation. To support the detection and classification of various IoV attacks, such as Denial-of-Service, Fuzzy, and Spoofing, DAIRE employs the sparse categorical cross-entropy loss function and root mean square propagation for loss minimization. In contrast to more resource-intensive architectures, DAIRE leverages a lightweight ANN to reduce computational demands while still delivering strong performance. Experimental results on the CICIoV2024 and Car-Hacking datasets demonstrate DAIRE's effectiveness, achieving an average detection rate of 99.88%, a false positive rate of 0.02%, and an overall accuracy of 99.96%. Furthermore, DAIRE significantly outperforms state-of-the-art approaches in inference speed, with a classification time of just 0.03 ms per sample. These results highlight DAIRE's effectiveness in detecting IoV cyberattacks and its practical suitability for real-time deployment in vehicular systems, underscoring its vital role in strengthening automotive cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2026-04-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mlwa.2026.100859",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahid Alam",
        "Amina Jameel",
        "Zahida Parveen",
        "Ehab Alnfrawy",
        "Adeela Ashraf",
        "Raza Uddin",
        "Jamal Aqib"
      ],
      "venue": "Machine Learning with Applications (2026): 100859",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.mlwa.2026.100859",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2021.09.027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial point cloud perturbations against 3D object detection in autonomous driving systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-09-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2021.09.027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xupeng Wang",
        "Mumuxin Cai",
        "Ferdous Ahmed Sohel",
        "Nan Sang",
        "Zhengwei Chang"
      ],
      "venue": "Neurocomputing",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.neucom.2021.09.027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.patrec.2024.01.010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Time-aware and task-transferable adversarial attack for perception of autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2024.01.010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yantao Lu",
        "Haining Ren",
        "Weiheng Chai",
        "Senem Velipasalar",
        "Yilan Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Pattern Recognition Letters",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.patrec.2024.01.010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.procir.2022.05.252",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Why make it hard? - Usage of aggregated statistical data for risk assessment of damage scenarios in the context of ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "ISO/SAE 21434 \"Road vehicles - Cybersecurity engineering\" is a standard for cyber security, which has been published since August 2021. The standard covers the concept phase. The concept phase is characterized by the cooperation of various mostly high-level stakeholders from different disciplines, departments and possibly companies. The cooperation takes place mainly in workshops. ISO/SAE 21434 requires a Threat and Risk Assessment (TARA) to be carried out for the concept phase. Within TARA, damage scenarios are to be identified for the vehicle/components to be developed. Furthermore, the effects of these damage scenarios are to be assessed. In this context, ISO/SAE 21434 refers to the risk classification scheme ASIL of ISO 26262, which is established in the automotive industry. For the effective application of these schemes, expert knowledge is necessary on the one hand, and verified data on accident types and accident causes are required on the other hand. Access to this data is often difficult and the data itself is not suitable for direct use in workshops. In this paper we present tools for the assessment of damage scenarios. For this purpose, we use data from the Federal Statistical Office (StBA) with over 2 million registered traffic accidents in Germany per year. We have analyzed the StBA data and evaluated them according to their usefulness for workshops. The result of this work are several concrete ASIL tables which address different types of accidents and causes of accidents. In two workshop with 17 experts from the automotive sector and with experts from product development, we applied the elaborated tables to evaluate different damage scenarios.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2022.05.252",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sergej Japs",
        "Frank Kargl",
        "Harald Anacker",
        "Roman Dumitrescu"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia CIRP",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.procir.2022.05.252",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.procs.2016.02.055",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review on the Various Security Techniques for VANETs",
      "description": "Vehicular systems (VANETs) are a developing research area with an extensive number of utilization cases. Anticipated applications incorporate safety applications, infotainment services, etc. VANETs connect vehicle into a huge mobile ad hoc network share data on a bigger scale. The attributes of VANET posture both difficulties and opportunities in accomplishing security objectives. Giving security to VANET is essential in terms of giving client validation, anonymity, honesty and protection of information. In this paper we have talked about the different techniques related to security in VANET. After going through all the techniques, a comparison has been made between the various techniques and the security concerns.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2016.02.055",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amandeep Singh",
        "Sandeep Kad"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Computer Science",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.procs.2016.02.055",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.procs.2016.04.268",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat and Risk Assessment Methodologies in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "Safety and security are both qualities that concern the overall system. However, these disciplines are traditionally treated independently in the automotive domain. Replacement of classical mechanical systems with safety-critical embedded systems raised the awareness of the safety attribute and caused the introduction of the ISO 26262 standard. In contrast to this, security topics are traditionally seen as attacks of a mechanical nature and as only affecting single vehicles (e.g. door lock and immobilizer related). Due to the increasing interlacing of automotive systems with networks (such as Car2X), new features like autonomous driving, and online software updates, it is no longer acceptable to assume that car fleets are immune to security risks and automated remote attacks. Consequently, future automotive systems development requires appropriate systematic approaches to support cyber security and safety aware development. Therefore, this paper examines threat and risk assessment techniques that are available for the automotive domain and presents an approach to classify cyber-security threats, which can be used to determine the appropriate number of countermeasures that need to be considered. Furthermore, we present a combined approach for safety and security analysis to be applied in early development phases, which is a pre-requisite for consistent engineering throughout the development lifecycle.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2016.04.268",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cyber-security",
        "immobilizer",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Georg Macher",
        "Eric Armengaud",
        "Eugen Brenner",
        "Christian Kreiner"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Computer Science",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.procs.2016.04.268",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.procs.2019.09.448",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unique Message Authentication Security Approach based Controller Area Network (CAN) for Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) in Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is one of the standard communication bus protocols used for intercommunication between electronics control units (ECUs) in vehicle network. However, due to its various security vulnerabilities, safety critical system connected to the network are most susceptible to malicious internal or external attacks. This paper proposes a new method to introduce a Message Authentication System to improve security features of CAN. The proposed method is implemented in a CAN based in-vehicle network (IVN) model with anti-lock braking system (ABS) designed in MATLAB and Simulink. The model employs message authentication security feature for detection of any third-party intrusion by incorporating each transmitted CAN frame with additional security characteristic information unique to the frame. The result analysis from the proposed method demonstrated that the additional security feature has proved to be effective by successfully detecting and preventing third party intrusions interfering with the ABS via CAN bus, therefore, maintaining the integrity of the connected ECUs.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2019.09.448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in vehicle network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamad Khairi Ishak",
        "Faizan Kaleem Khan"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Computer Science",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.procs.2019.09.448",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.procs.2021.09.013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploiting Supervised Machine Learning for Driver Detection in a Real-World Environment",
      "description": "The proliferation of info-entertainment systems in today’s vehicles has provided a really cheap and easy-to-deploy platform with the ability to gather information about the vehicle under analysis. Ultra-response connectivity networks with a latency below 10 milliseconds are providing the perfect infrastructure in which this information can be sent to improve safety and security. With the purpose of providing an architecture to increase safety and security in an automotive context, we in this paper propose a method for detecting the driver in real-time exploiting supervised machine learning techniques. The experimental analysis performed on real-world data shows that the proposed method obtains encouraging results.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2021.09.013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Umberto Di Giacomo",
        "Rosangela Casolare",
        "Oliver Eigner",
        "Fabio Martinelli",
        "Francesco Mercaldo",
        "Torsten Priebe",
        "Antonella Santone"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Computer Science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.procs.2021.09.013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.procs.2021.12.240",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Authentication Scheme for 5G-based V2X Communications",
      "description": "Information and communication technologies applied to means of transport allow the design and development of new applications and bring new solutions for the mobility of people. All these applications are grouped within the field of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) and improve user mobility in terms of safety, reliability, capacity, and quality. Vehicle to Everything is a novel technology of ITS which aims to enhance the security and efficiency of road traffic by using wireless communications. Cellular communications networks such as LTE-V2X and 5G NR, integrated into the Vehicle to Everything (V2X) architecture designed to support vehicular communications and deployed on a large scale, appear in particular to be a relevant solution. They could indeed guarantee reliable geographic distribution and acceptable performance (latency, bandwidth, packet loss). In this context, we propose a secure authentication scheme for 5G-based V2X communication. Our solution aims to guarantee a high level of security in different types of vehicular communication (V2V, V2I, V2N) to achieve the security requirements using lightweight cryptographic methods and to support vehicles to receive securely all keys and messages from RSU, other vehicles, or network. To validate our proposal, we utilize the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool to achieve the security goals, also we evaluate the performance according to the operational cost which demonstrates that our model has a less computational cost.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2021.12.240",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meriem Houmer",
        "Mariyam Ouaissa",
        "Mariya Ouaissa"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Computer Science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.procs.2021.12.240",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.procs.2024.06.088",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comparative Analysis of Time-Based and Hybrid Pricing Models for Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "The accelerated adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) necessitates innovative and effective pricing strategies for charging infrastructure. This study leverages the MATSim (Multi-Agent Transport Simulation) framework to meticulously evaluate the performance of two distinctive EV charging pricing models: time-based charging and a hybrid model integrating both usage-based and time-based components. Driven by the pivotal question of how EV charging should be optimally priced—whether contingent on energy consumption or charging duration—the research endeavors to conduct two simulations. These simulations aim to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis, evaluating metrics such as total power derived from grids, utility revenue, charging station queues and served vehicles. In the time-based charging scenario, EVs incur charges based on their plugged-in duration, reflecting a pricing approach that correlates directly with the time a vehicle remains connected to the charging station. In contrast, in the hybrid model, EVs undergo initial billing based on usage until a predetermined battery charge point is reached, such as achieving a full battery. Subsequently, time-based pricing takes effect until the user disconnects the vehicle. The findings indicate that, in the combined approach, utility owners have the potential to generate more revenue. Conversely, the time-based approach demonstrates a capacity to serve a higher number of electric EVs, with comparable queue lengths observed in both approaches. Importantly, using the results of this paper, policymakers can suggest pricing schemes that maximize benefits for utility owners, reduce queues at charging stations, and ensure the security of power grids.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2024.06.088",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arsham Bakhtiari",
        "Ashraf Uz Zaman Patwary",
        "Francesco Ciari",
        "Ali Moeini",
        "Ali Hajebrahimi"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Computer Science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.procs.2024.06.088",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.promfg.2015.07.290",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safety and Security Management with Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in Oil and Gas Industry",
      "description": "We describe a mathematical model for UAV aided security operations in the oil and gas industry. Operating UAVs can provide seamless awareness on possible emergency situations such as oil spills, shipping incidents, industrial accidents, acts of terrorism, and so on. The primary goal of this model is to generate an optimal UAV operational schedule to meet surveillance needs in the areas of interest in each time period. The performance of these UAVs depends on the risk assessment on spatio-and-temporal characteristics of threats, specifications of available UAVs, and decision makers’ critical information requirements. The models are designed to provide insights into issues associated with designing and operating UAVs for strengthened maritime and port security.",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.promfg.2015.07.290",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "surveillance",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaeyoung Cho",
        "Gino J. Lim",
        "Taofeek Biobaku",
        "Seonjin Kim",
        "Hamid R. Parsaei"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Manufacturing",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.promfg.2015.07.290",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.promfg.2018.10.158",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware Trojan Enabled Denial of Service Attack on CAN Bus",
      "description": "The trend of technological advances in the vehicle industry illustrates that future cars would have added functionalities with smart features, better connectivity and autonomous behaviour. These naturally involve a higher number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) being connected using existing conventional in-vehicle network protocols such as Controller Area Network (CAN). In this context, security of systems is now becoming a major concern while industry’s primary interest in the manufacturing of cars is reliability and safety. It is now in daily news that smart cars are being hacked due to weaknesses in their embedded electronics that provides ways of hardware attacks [1] [2]. Hardware Trojan (HT) is the threat that has been recently recognised as one of the primary sources of backdoor access that enables hackers to attack systems. As trouble, HT remains silent until a rare function/event triggers it for activation. This paper contributes to the challenge of demonstration of disruption in CAN buses raised from hidden Hardware Trojan. In this regard, it is presented how just a small size Hardware Trojan disrupts the CAN bus communication without an adversary having physical access to the bus. The attack is neither detectable via frame analysis, nor can be prevented via network segmentation; additionally, a rare triggering mechanism activates HT to process untraceable faults.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.promfg.2018.10.158",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehmet Bozdal",
        "Maulana Randa",
        "Mohammad Samie",
        "Ian K Jennions"
      ],
      "venue": "Procedia Manufacturing",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.promfg.2018.10.158",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.ress.2026.113669",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity risk assessment in autonomous transport systems: A semi-quantitative framework incorporating logistics disruption propagation",
      "description": "The increasing reliance of autonomous transport systems on vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, fleet-management platforms, positioning services, and warehouse coordination creates cybersecurity risks that may extend beyond an individual vehicle and affect logistics continuity. This study develops a scenario-based, semi-quantitative framework for the comparative assessment of cybersecurity risks in an SAE Level 4 autonomous freight corridor. The framework adapts the threat-analysis logic of ISO/SAE 21434 and combines attack feasibility with four consequence dimensions: safety impact, financial impact, operational disruption, and disruption propagation. Seven standardised cyber threat scenarios were evaluated using author-assigned ratings based on an operational five-point scoring rubric. Criterion weights were specified as structured case-study assumptions through a pairwise-comparison procedure, and the resulting risk scores were examined using five alternative weighting configurations, ablation of the disruption-propagation criterion, one-at-a-time input perturbations, Spearman rank correlations, and sensitivity analysis of the risk-classification thresholds. Under the baseline assumptions, V2I/ETA falsification obtained the highest risk score (R=16.80) and was classified as Critical, while denial-of-service affecting telematics and fleet-management systems ranked second (R=15.20) and was classified as High. These two scenarios retained their positions under all weighting configurations. Removing the disruption-propagation criterion did not change the ordinal ranking of the seven scenarios, but it changed the magnitude of the risk scores, particularly for scenarios affecting shared communication and coordination processes. The framework is designed as an exploratory semi-quantitative prioritisation tool. Dynamic network propagation, node-to-node transition probabilities, time-dependent cascade trajectories, and recovery processes fall outside the analytical scope of the study. The framework instead supports transparent comparison of cyber threat scenarios and links baseline risk, propagation-related consequences, proposed controls, and illustrative residual risk under explicitly stated case-study assumptions.",
      "published": "2026-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2026.113669",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Justyna Żywiołek",
        "Artur Szymonik",
        "Jacek Szymonik"
      ],
      "venue": "Reliability Engineering & System Safety",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.ress.2026.113669",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.rineng.2023.101243",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A new method for the detection and identification of the replay attack on cars using SDR technology and classification algorithms",
      "description": "Currently, a wide variety of cars use Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) to activate the security system by radio frequency. RKE systems have security vulnerabilities with attacks such as brute force, replay, spoofing, and replay. This study proposes a replay-type attack detection system using SDR and intelligent algorithms. The present dataset was obtained from an RKES type Key-fob of a 2016 model vehicle taken with different antenna polarizations at different distances. There were used three test and configuration systems based on two neural network identification models. The proposed designs with the different classification models were able to detect replay-type vulnerabilities. In the first system, retransmitted indicators were detected with a maximum identification percentage of 90.9% and original signs of 90.9%; for the second system, 100% of the retransmitted signals and 89% of the original ones were detected, and for the third system, detected 100% of the retransmitted signals and 89.09% of the first signs. The models used in the system's design showed an identification percentage of more than 87% in all cases, managing to detect and identify the replay-type attack on the vehicles. System 1 presented better results with the VGG 16 system than in system 2, within the VGG 16 and SVM models having identical identification percentages obtained and, in system 3, which has the characteristics of the previous two, attained better results with SVM. The reception of signals with SDR is an effective tool for detecting vulnerabilities in vehicle security systems.",
      "published": "2023-06-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rineng.2023.101243",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Juan Carlos Martínez Quintero",
        "Edith Paola Estupiñán Cuesta",
        "Leonardo Juan Ramírez López"
      ],
      "venue": "Results in Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.rineng.2023.101243",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.rineng.2024.103171",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "XAIEnsembleTL-IoV: A new eXplainable Artificial Intelligence ensemble transfer learning for zero-day botnet attack detection in the Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a network of interconnected vehicles that use modern communication technologies to communicate with each other and the surrounding infrastructure. The IoV is a novel network that experiences a continuous emergence and evolution of various forms of attacks. This research addresses the growing challenge of detecting zero-day botnet attacks within the IoV, a complex network that enhances real-time communication among vehicles and surrounding infrastructure to improve traffic management, safety, and driving experiences. Traditional machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) for IoV face two key limitations: the requirement for large labeled datasets and the “black box” issue, where the reasoning behind model decisions is not transparent, reducing user and stakeholder confidence. To solve these problems, this research proposes an eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) Ensemble Transfer Learning (TL) model specifically for detecting zero-day attacks in IoV. The proposed model integrates deep Shapley Additive Explanations (SHAP), providing transparency and making decisions understandable to cybersecurity professionals. Additionally, the model employs hybrid bidirectional long-short-term memory with autoencoders (BiLAE) to reduce the dimensionality of IoV network traffic, improving computational efficiency. It also uses Barnacle Mating Optimizer (BMO) to optimize the hyper-parameters of deep learning models such as ResNet , Inception, Inception ResNet, and MobileNet Convolution neural network-transfer learning architecture (CNN-TL), enhancing detection capabilities without needing vast amounts of labeled data. Experimental results showed that the model performed with an accuracy of 100 %, precision of 100 %, recall of 100 %, F1-score of 100 %, and Matthew Correlation Coefficient of 100 % in binary-class situations for internal vehicular (CAN) networks and achieved 99.88 % accuracy and similarly high metrics in multi-class scenarios for external vehicular networks(N-BaIoT). Compared to state-of-the-art techniques, the model proved to be more effective in detecting zero-day botnet attacks, reducing reliance on large datasets. Unlike traditional black-box models, the XAI component of the ensemble model offers insight into the decision-making process. It allows network administrators and security experts to understand how specific patterns in the data contribute to detection, making the system more transparent. The solution is highly adaptable and scalable for real-time application, designed to operate efficiently even on IoV gateway electronic control units with limited computational power.",
      "published": "2024-10-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rineng.2024.103171",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yakub Kayode Saheed",
        "Joshua Ebere Chukwuere"
      ],
      "venue": "Results in Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.rineng.2024.103171",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 98,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3935,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.rineng.2024.103171 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: patterns, large, limited, making, even, user, intelligence, where."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.rineng.2025.107179",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-resilient autonomous vehicles: securing networks and enhancing decision-making with next-gen security measures",
      "description": "• Explores critical threats such as spoofing, jamming, and data injection targeting LiDAR, radar, cameras, and V2X communication networks. Highlights the risk of remote attacks that could compromise essential functions like braking and steering. • It uses how attacks on sensor networks can disrupt real-time data processing, affecting the vehicle's ability to perceive its surroundings accurately and respond safely. • It examines how OTA updates and cloud-based AI introduce vulnerabilities, enabling potential adversarial attacks and remote code execution threats. • It introduces robust countermeasures, including machine learning-based intrusion detection, anomaly detection, cryptographic protocols, and behavioral analysis to enhance AV cybersecurity. • It emphasizes the importance of Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) and Hardware Security Modules (HSM) in securing the physical and digital layers of AV systems. The rise of autonomous vehicles (AVs) has transformed the automotive industry, enhancing safety, efficiency, and driving convenience through technologies like adaptive cruise control, automatic emergency braking, and artificial intelligence (AI)-powered navigation. However, this reliance on interconnected systems and AI introduces significant cybersecurity risks. AVs depend on complex software, real-time data processing, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, making them vulnerable to cyberattacks that can compromise critical functions such as braking or steering. This study examines key cybersecurity threats in AVs, focusing on vulnerabilities in sensor networks, perception systems, and onboard control units. Attacks such as spoofing, jamming, and data injection can disrupt sensors like Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), radar, and cameras. Moreover, over-the-air (OTA) updates and cloud-based AI models present risks like remote code execution and adversarial attacks. To counter these threats, the study explores solutions including machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS), anomaly detection, cryptographic protocols, and behavioral analysis. Hardware-based protections like Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) and Hardware Security Modules (HSM) also play a crucial role. The findings highlight the need for a multi-layered security framework combining real-time monitoring, AI-driven threat detection, and strong encryption. Collaboration between manufacturers and regulators is essential to ensure the safe and secure deployment of AV technologies.",
      "published": "2025-09-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rineng.2025.107179",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Deepak George",
        "S. Pavithra",
        "Jeeshu Das"
      ],
      "venue": "Results in Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.rineng.2025.107179",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.scico.2020.102414",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Beyond connected cars: A systems of systems perspective",
      "description": "The automotive domain is rapidly changing in the last years. Among the different challenges OEMs (i.e. the vehicle manufacturers) are facing, vehicles are evolving into systems of systems. In fact, over the last years vehicles have evolved from disconnected and “blind” systems to systems that are (i) able to sense the surrounding environment and (ii) connected with other vehicles, the city, pedestrians, cyclists, etc. Future transportation systems can be seen as a System of Systems (SoS). In an SoS, constituent systems, i.e. the units that compose an SoS, can act as standalone systems, but their cooperation enables new emerging and promising scenarios. While this trend creates new opportunities, it also poses a risk to compromise key qualities such as safety, security, and privacy. In this paper we focus on the automotive domain and we investigate how to engineer and architect cars in order to build them as constituents of future transportation systems. Our contribution is an architectural viewpoint for System of Systems, which we demonstrate based on an automotive example. Moreover, we contribute a functional reference architecture for cars as constituents of an SoS. This reference architecture can be considered as an imprinting for the implementations that would be devised in specific projects and contexts. We also point out the necessity for a collaboration among different OEMs and with other relevant stakeholders, such as road authorities and smart cities, to properly engineer systems of systems composed of cars, trucks, roads, pedestrians, etc. This work is realized in the context of two Swedish projects coordinated by Volvo Cars and involving some universities and research centers in Sweden and many suppliers of the OEM, including Autoliv, Arccore, Combitech, Cybercom, Knowit, Prevas, ÅF-Technology, Semcom, and Qamcom.",
      "published": "2020-02-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2020.102414",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "volvo cars"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "volvo cars"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrizio Pelliccione",
        "Eric Knauss",
        "S. Magnus Ågren",
        "Rogardt Heldal",
        "Carl Bergenhem",
        "Alexey V. Vinel",
        "Oliver Brunnegård"
      ],
      "venue": "Science of Computer Programming",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.scico.2020.102414",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.segan.2021.100477",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Disrupting the power grid via EV charging: The impact of the SMS Phishing attacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.segan.2021.100477",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elif Üstündağ Soykan",
        "Mustafa Bağrıyanık",
        "Gürkan Soykan"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainable Energy Grids and Networks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.segan.2021.100477",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 46,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.simpat.2024.103005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A simulation framework for automotive cybersecurity risk assessment",
      "description": "Human-initiated disruptions such as cyberattacks on connected vehicles have the potential to cause cascading failures in transport systems, leading to systemic risks. ‘ISO/SAE 21434:2021 Road vehicles - Cybersecurity engineering’ is the current standard for risk management of road vehicles. However, the threat analysis and risk assessment framework given in the standard focuses on asset-level analysis and assessment. Hence, this study develops a novel simulation-based framework to perform threat analysis and risk assessment on connected vehicles from a transport network perspective. The proposed framework is developed based on the ISO/SAE 21434 threat analysis and risk assessment methodology. We demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the framework through a remote attack via the cellular network on the in-vehicle communication bus system of a connected vehicle to show the potential impacts on the transport network. Based on the findings of our case studies, we exemplify how cyberattacks on individual system components of a connected vehicle have the potential to cause systemic failures.",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.simpat.2024.103005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Don Nalin Dharshana Jayaratne",
        "Suraj Harsha Kamtam",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Muhamad Azfar Ramli",
        "Qian Lu",
        "Rakhi Manohar Mepparambath",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Abdur Rakib"
      ],
      "venue": "Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.simpat.2024.103005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4071,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.simpat.2024.103005 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: transport, studies, case, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.suscom.2023.100936",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sustainable and lightweight domain-based intrusion detection system for in-vehicle network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.suscom.2023.100936",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Edy Kristianto",
        "Po‐Ching Lin",
        "Ren‐Hung Hwang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainable Computing Informatics and Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.suscom.2023.100936",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2020.101761",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards holistic secure networking in connected vehicles through securing CAN-bus communication and firmware-over-the-air updating",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-03-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sysarc.2020.101761",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "George Kornaros",
        "Othon Tomoutzoglou",
        "Dimitris Mbakoyiannis",
        "N. Karadimitriou",
        "Marcello Coppola",
        "Emanuele Montanari",
        "Ioannis Deligiannis",
        "Giovanni Gherardi"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Systems Architecture",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.sysarc.2020.101761",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2024.103285",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BIDS: An efficient Intrusion Detection System for in-vehicle networks using a two-stage Binarised Neural Network on low-cost FPGA",
      "description": "Automotive networks are crucial for ensuring safety as the number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) grows to support vehicle intelligence. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is commonly used for efficient in-vehicle communication among ECUs. However, its broadcast nature and lack of a dedicated security layer make it vulnerable to attacks. This paper proposes a novel CAN bus Intrusion Detection System (IDS), named BNN-based IDS (BIDS), which efficiently provides both unknown attack detection and known attack classification using a hierarchical two-stage Binarised Neural Network (BNN) and Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). BIDS was validated on three datasets, and its implementation achieves an average inference time of less than 0.170 ms with minimal resource utilisation on a low-cost Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). This rapid inference speed enables real-time inference on individual CAN messages using a sliding window technique, eliminating the need to wait for multiple accumulated CAN messages required for data preprocessing . Evaluation metrics demonstrate that our IDS achieves high accuracy in both identifying unseen attacks and categorising known attacks. Furthermore, our FPGA implementation consumes merely 2.09 W, which is a 57% reduction compared to a cutting-edge FPGA-based IDS that is capable of detecting unknown attacks using the same dataset.",
      "published": "2024-10-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sysarc.2024.103285",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Auangkun Rangsikunpum",
        "Sam Amiri",
        "Luciano Copello Ost"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Systems Architecture",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.sysarc.2024.103285",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2025.103567",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LUFT-CAN: A lightweight unsupervised learning based intrusion detection system with frequency-time analysis for vehicular CAN bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sysarc.2025.103567",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yu Xin",
        "Xiao-Hang Wang",
        "Li Lu",
        "Shuguo Zhuo",
        "Ying-Tao Jiang",
        "Amit Kumar Singh",
        "Kui Ren",
        "Mei Yang",
        "Kai-Wei Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of systems architecture",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.sysarc.2025.103567",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2025.103646",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EF-IDS: An efficient intrusion detection system with enriched features for CAN bus in modern vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sysarc.2025.103646",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aya El-Fatyany",
        "Xiaohang Wang",
        "Lu Li",
        "Kui Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Systems Architecture",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.sysarc.2025.103646",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.03.023",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The peak oil and oil vulnerability discourse in urban transport policy: A comparative discourse analysis of Hong Kong and Brisbane",
      "description": "The nexus of transport, energy and household expenditure garnered increasing academic attention during the period of increased oil prices during the decade from 2000 to 2010. Peak oil emerged as a widely discussed ‘storyline’ advocated by a globally connected discourse coalition. This study explores the effects of the peak oil discourse in influencing urban transport policy. Two distinct cases are examined in this paper: high density and public transport dominant Hong Kong; and, low density and car dependent Brisbane. Data was obtained from interviews with stakeholders, public documents and media concerning the period between 2003 and 2015 when oil prices were high. This study combines analytical tools from Kingdon's multiple streams framework and Hajer's discourse analysis to assess the effects of the peak oil discourse in Brisbane and Hong Kong. While different urban settings are likely to be major differentiators in the responses of participants from the two cities, higher oil prices have bolstered the voice of ‘affordability’ storylines that have emerged in both cities. Yet only Brisbane exhibited official usage of ‘peak oil’ storylines. Counter storylines are found to have been adopted by opposing discourse coalitions, either focusing on the need to develop and deploy technical solutions which can resolve ‘peak oil’ or to simply ‘wait-and-see’. The framing of the issue of heightened oil prices can be seen as acting as a political catalyst, as evidenced by the rise of fall of the response to ‘peak oil’ and ‘oil vulnerability’ in Brisbane. As oil prices crashed after 2015, the affordability pressure on urban transport also reduced. When oil prices are low, policy makers or interested stakeholders should expect to adapt other storylines that feature climate and economic resilience which promote sustainable transport and measures to reduce oil vulnerability, no matter how car, or oil, dependent a local environment is.",
      "published": "2017-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.03.023",
      "matched_terms": [
        "car",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abraham Leung",
        "M. Burke",
        "A. Perl",
        "Jian-Qiang Cui"
      ],
      "venue": "Transport Policy",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.03.023",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trc.2023.104453",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy-preserving adaptive traffic signal control in a connected vehicle environment",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2023.104453",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chaopeng Tan",
        "Kaidi Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation Research Part C Emerging Technologies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trc.2023.104453",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trc.2024.104797",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A qualitative AI security risk assessment of autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "This paper systematically analyzes the security risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI) components in autonomous vehicles (AVs). Given the increasing reliance on AI for various AV functions, from perception to control, the potential for security breaches presents a significant challenge. We focus on AI security, including attacks like adversarial examples , backdoors, privacy breaches and unauthorized model replication , reviewing over 170 papers. To evaluate the practical implications of such vulnerabilities we introduce qualitative measures for assessing the exposure and severity of potential attacks. Our findings highlight a critical need for more realistic security evaluations and a balanced focus on various sensors, learning paradigms, threat models, and studied attacks. We also pinpoint areas requiring more research, such as the study of training time attacks, transferability, system-based studies and development of effective defenses. By also outlining implications for the automotive industry and policymakers, we not only advance the understanding of AI security risks in AVs, but contribute to the development of safer and more reliable autonomous driving technologies.",
      "published": "2024-09-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2024.104797",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kathrin Grosse",
        "Alexandre Alahi"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation Research Part C Emerging Technologies",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trc.2024.104797",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trf.2020.09.019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring expert perceptions about the cyber security and privacy of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: A thematic analysis approach",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) constitute an automotive development carrying paradigm-shifting potential that may soon be embedded into a dynamically changing urban mobility landscape. The complex machine-led dynamics of CAVs make them more prone to data exploitation and vulnerable to cyber attacks than any of their predecessors increasing the risks of privacy breaches and cyber security violations for their users. This can adversely affect the public acceptability of CAVs, give them a bad reputation at this embryonic stage of their development, create barriers to their adoption and increased use, and complicate the business models of their future operations. Therefore, it is vital to identify and create an in-depth understanding of the cyber security and privacy issues associated with CAVs, and of the way these can be prioritised and addressed. This work employs 36 semi-structured elite interviews to explore the diverse dimensions of user acceptance through the lens of the well-informed CAV experts that already anticipate problems and look for their solutions. Our international interviewee sample represents academia, industry and policy-making so that all the key stakeholder voices are heard. Thematic analysis was used to identify and contextualise the factors that reflect and affect CAV acceptance in relation to the privacy and cyber security agendas. Six core themes emerged: awareness, user and vendor education, safety, responsibility, legislation, and trust. Each of these themes has diverse and distinctive dimensions and are discussed as sub-themes. We recommend that mitigating the cyber security and privacy risks embedded in CAVs require inter-institutional cooperation, awareness campaigns and trials for trust-building purposes, mandatory educational training for manufacturers and perhaps more importantly for end-users, balanced and fair responsibility-sharing, two-way dynamic communication channels and a clear consensus on what constitutes threats and solutions.",
      "published": "2020-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.2020.09.019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploitation",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Na Liu",
        "Alexandros Nikitas",
        "Simon Parkinson"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation Research Part F Traffic Psychology and Behaviour",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trf.2020.09.019",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 194,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2018.10.103",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous vehicles: theoretical and practical challenges",
      "description": "Autonomous driving is expected to revolutionize road traffic attenuating current externalities, especially accidents and congestion. Carmakers, researchers and administrations have been working on autonomous driving for years and significant progress has been made. However, the doubts and challenges to overcome are still huge, as the implementation of an autonomous driving environment encompasses not only complex automotive technology, but also human behavior, ethics, traffic management strategies, policies, liability, etc. As a result, carmakers do not expect to commercially launch fully driverless vehicles in the short-term. From the technical perspective, the unequivocal detection of obstacles at high speeds and long distances is one of the greatest difficulties to face. Regarding traffic management strategies, all approaches share the vision that vehicles should behave cooperatively. General V2V cooperation and platooning are options being discussed, both with multiple variants. Various strategies, built from different standpoints, are being designed and validated using simulation. Besides, legal issues have already been arisen in the context of highly-automated driving. They range from the need for special driving licenses to much more intricate topics like liability in the event of an accident or privacy issues. All these legal and ethical concerns could hinder the spread of autonomous vehicles once technologically feasible. This paper provides an overview of the current state of the art in the key aspects of autonomous driving. Based on the information received in situ from top research centers in the field and on a literature review, authors highlight the most important advances and findings reached so far, discuss different approaches regarding autonomous traffic and propose a framework for future research.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2018.10.103",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Margarita Martínez‐Díaz",
        "Francesc Soriguera"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation research procedia",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trpro.2018.10.103",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 262,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2020.02.031",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research of basic issues of autonomous mobility",
      "description": "Autonomous driving represents one of the innovations that will fundamentally change the automotive world in the future. Thanks to it, one will not have to worry about driving a car and will be able to leave everything fully to the machine. It will make transportation smoother, but the question is whether it will make it safer. Vehicle automation raises questions concerning the security of the overall process and accountability. With modern technology, the decision-making power comes into the hands of the car, even at critical moments such as sudden change of direction or braking. The aim of this paper is to present possible advantages and problems related to autonomous vehicles and to the impact not only on those who use them, but also on people who will come into contact with such a system.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2020.02.031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ladislav Bartuška",
        "Remigiusz Łabudzki"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation research procedia",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trpro.2020.02.031",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2020.03.014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity and its integration with safety for transport systems: not a formal fulfillment but an actual commitment",
      "description": "Vulnerabilities and hacking cases in transport systems are already documented. In the last two or three years guidelines and methods for cybersecurity in transport systems have been drafted and the importance of convergence of safety and cybersecurity has been stressed. Many companies today offer products and services for this field. There is the risk, however, that such an important matter will be considered as a formal fulfillment. In order to promote a real awareness about vulnerabilities affecting transport systems technologies, which rely mostly on embedded devices, and about the attacks that can exploit them, we use as an example a real incident involving a safety-critical subsystem of a railway vehicle (that we think of as a “cyber-physical system”) to develop a case study concerning a cyberattack, aiming to show that devices and technological systems vulnerabilities must not be neglected in risk analysis. Conversely, they must be taken into account the same way as hazards in safety assessments for an effective integration between cybersecurity and safety. Therefore we propose an attack-fault tree for the case study as an example of integrated risk analysis.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2020.03.014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giorgio Pizzi A"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation research procedia",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trpro.2020.03.014",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2021.01.038",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A benchmarking framework for cyber-attacks on autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "In this paper, a novel framework for a benchmark system for autonomous vehicles focusing on their security and reliability is proposed. Computer vision and networking technologies are improving offering solutions towards automation in connected autonomous vehicles. These systems are using sensor technologies, including vision and communication, providing information and measurements for the environment and other connected vehicles. As a result, unlike conventional vehicles, autonomous vehicles have to communicate with other vehicles as well as other external network infrastructure. However, such requirements make autonomous vulnerable to the attack. This may also motivate diverse types of cyber threats and attacks like traffic signs modification, GPS spoofing, and Vehicular Adhoc network distributed denial of service. Hence, this paper explores various aspects of security issues, vulnerabilities, exploitation methods and the adverse effect of them on connected autonomous vehicles and propose a novel benchmark framework focusing on physical and communication-based attack to evaluate and assets the state-of-the-art technologies that are currently use during cyber-attack.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2021.01.038",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "exploitation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anish Khadka",
        "Paris Alexandros Karypidis",
        "Anastasios Lytos",
        "Georgios Efstathopoulos"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation research procedia",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trpro.2021.01.038",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2021.01.039",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of False Data Injection attacks on Decentralized Electric Vehicle Charging Protocols",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) gain great attention nowadays since the electrification of private and public transport has a great potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate oil dependency. However, the influx of a large number of electrical loads without any coordination could have adverse affects to the electrical grid. More importantly, the complexity in the coordination of a large number of EVs, pose critical challenges in ensuring overall system integrity. A typical attack found in the controllers of connected EVs is false data injection (FDI), which can be utilized to distort real energy demand and supply figures. Energy distribution requests may therefore be erroneous, which results in additional costs or more devastating hazards. The lack of a proper coordination scheme, robust to such cyber attacks could cause voltage magnitude drops and unacceptable load peaks. In this work, we study the impact of FDI attacks, on various decentralized charging protocols with reduced computational requirements. The proposed decentralized EV charging algorithms only require from each EV to solve a local problem, hence the proposed implementation require low computational resources. An extensive evaluation study highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the presented solutions which are based on iterative convex optimization solvers.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2021.01.039",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nikos Piperigkos",
        "Aris S. Lalos"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation research procedia",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trpro.2021.01.039",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2021.07.138",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategy Management of Telematics Systems in the Transport Sector with Regard to Safety",
      "description": "Transport has an impact on the daily lives of the population. Currently once more people use daily mode of transport on the roads. It is the increase of participants that creates a higher risk of crisis occurrence in transport. Security has long been one of the most felt human needs, and it is in transport that needs to be given particular attention. Different road systems can be used to increase safety. These include telematics systems. They are an important tool for traffic management and regulation, which ultimately affects safety itself. In the article, we focused on their use with a view to reducing the likelihood of crisis phenomena in transport. We focused on their positive impact in increasing the transport safety and flow. The use of these systems reduces the occurrence of crisis phenomena and, in the event of emerging crisis phenomena, contributes to a more effective solution.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2021.07.138",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jozef Kubás",
        "Katarína Hollá",
        "Katarína Repková Štofková",
        "Michal Ballay",
        "Mária Polorecká"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation research procedia",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.trpro.2021.07.138",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.02.008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a systematic security evaluation of the automotive Bluetooth interface",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.02.008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Madeline Cheah",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Olivier C. L. Haas",
        "Alastair R. Ruddle"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.02.008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 47,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.07.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mini-MAC: Raising the bar for vehicular security with a lightweight message authentication protocol",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.07.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jackson Schmandt",
        "Alan T. Sherman",
        "Nilanjan Banerjee"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.07.002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.10.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and privacy in vehicular communications: Challenges and opportunities",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.10.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "César Bernardini",
        "Muhammad Rizwan Asghar",
        "Bruno Crispo A"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2017.10.002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 96,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2018.01.008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey on existing authentication issues for cellular-assisted V2X communication",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-02-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2018.01.008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mujahid Muhammad",
        "Ghazanfar Ali Safdar"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2018.01.008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 187,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2018.09.004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly intrusion detection method for vehicular networks based on survival analysis",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-09-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2018.09.004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mee Lan Han",
        "Byung Il Kwak",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2018.09.004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 189,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100198",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-vehicle network intrusion detection using deep convolutional neural network",
      "description": "Abstract The implementation of electronics in modern vehicles has resulted in an increase in attacks targeting in-vehicle networks; thus, attack detection models have caught the attention of the automotive industry and its researchers. Vehicle network security is an urgent and significant problem because the malfunctioning of vehicles can directly affect human and road safety. The controller area network (CAN), which is used as a de facto standard for in-vehicle networks, does not have sufficient security features, such as message encryption and sender authentication, to protect the network from cyber-attacks. In this paper, we propose an intrusion detection system (IDS) based on a deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) to protect the CAN bus of the vehicle. The DCNN learns the network traffic patterns and detects malicious traffic without hand-designed features. We designed the DCNN model, which was optimized for the data traffic of the CAN bus, to achieve high detection performance while reducing the unnecessary complexity in the architecture of the Inception-ResNet model. We performed an experimental study using the datasets we built with a real vehicle to evaluate our detection system. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed IDS has significantly low false negative rates and error rates when compared to the conventional machine-learning algorithms.",
      "published": "2019-10-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100198",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyun Min Song",
        "Jiyoung Woo",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100198",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 665,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100201",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SecMonQ: An HSM based security monitoring approach for protecting AUTOSAR safety-critical systems",
      "description": "Abstract Many attacks on vehicle systems that result in a safety hazard follow a general pattern in which ECU firmware is modified, or code is injected in order to send spoofed CAN messages to safety-critical components causing an unsafe driving situation. There is a general consensus that protecting vehicles requires a defense in depth approach where protections are added at each layer of the vehicle data architecture. At the vehicle CAN bus layer, two powerful countermeasures exist: message authentication/encryption and network intrusion detection systems. The two approaches assume that an attacker has already managed to reach the CAN bus and therefore attempt to limit his impact. To defend against CAN injection attacks, we propose an alternative approach which aims at stopping a CAN injection attack before it reaches the vehicle bus. The proposed approach, working at the ECU level, leverages the embedded hardware security module (HSM), available in modern automotive ECUs, to implement four security monitors (SecMonQ) that run within the HSM firmware. SecMonQ performs continuous monitoring activities of the ECU firmware integrity, communication peripherals, periodic task timing, and flow sequence of certain critical functions. It is designed to detect an active attack and bring the system back to a safe state within the safety defined fault tolerant time. We implement SecMonQ on an automotive development environment which consists of an Elektrobit AUTOSAR stack and a Renesas RH850 F1KM micro-controller. We evaluate SecMonQ against the CAN masquerading attack to demonstrate efficacy while maintaining compatibility with AUTOSAR.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100201",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad M. K. Nasser",
        "Di Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100201",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3857,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100201 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: activities, requires, where, there, safety, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100214",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity challenges in vehicular communications",
      "description": "As modern vehicles are capable to connect to an external infrastructure and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication technologies mature, the necessity to secure communications becomes apparent. There is a very real risk that today's vehicles are subjected to cyber-attacks that target vehicular communications. This paper proposes a three-layer framework (sensing, communication and control) through which automotive security threats can be better understood. The sensing layer is made up of vehicle dynamics and environmental sensors, which are vulnerable to eavesdropping, jamming, and spoofing attacks. The communication layer is comprised of both in-vehicle and V2X communications and is susceptible to eavesdropping, spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and sybil attacks. At the top of the hierarchy is the control layer, which enables autonomous vehicular functionality, including the automation of a vehicle's speed, braking, and steering. Attacks targeting the sensing and communication layers can propagate upward and affect the functionality and can compromise the security of the control layer. This paper provides the state-of-the-art review on attacks and threats relevant to the communication layer and presents countermeasures.",
      "published": "2019-12-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100214",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "jamming",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zeinab El-Rewini",
        "Karthikeyan Sadatsharan",
        "Daisy Flora Selvaraj",
        "Siby Jose Plathottam",
        "Prakash Ranganathan"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2019.100214",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 337,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2020.100266",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep reinforcement learning approach for autonomous vehicle systems for maintaining security and safety using LSTM-GAN",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-05-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2020.100266",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iftikhar Rasheed",
        "Fei Hu",
        "Lin Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2020.100266",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 65,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2020.100281",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical-layer authentication based on adaptive Kalman filter for V2X communication",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2020.100281",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jian Wang",
        "Yameng Shao",
        "Yuming Ge",
        "Rundong Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2020.100281",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2021.100442",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GGNB: Graph-based Gaussian naive Bayes intrusion detection system for CAN bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2021.100442",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Riadul Islam",
        "Maloy Kumar Devnath",
        "Manar D. Samad",
        "Syed Md Jaffrey Al Kadry"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2021.100442",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 65,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100468",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic threat assessment and security testing of automotive over-the-air (OTA) updates",
      "description": "Modern cars host numerous special-purpose computing and connectivity devices facilitating the correct functioning of various in-vehicle systems. These devices host complex software systems with over 100-million lines of code, requiring regular and timely updates for functional and security improvements. Addressing the shortcomings of the legacy update system, over-the-air (OTA) software update system has emerged as an efficient, cost-effective, and convenient solution for delivering updates to automobiles remotely. While OTA offers several benefits, it introduces new security challenges requiring immediate attention, as attackers can abuse these update systems to undermine the vehicle security and safety. There are numerous studies investigating various aspects of the automotive cybersecurity; however, security testing of automotive OTA has not been covered adequately, with most of the prior work primarily focusing on proposing improved techniques for securing automotive OTA updates. In order to ensure these update systems are effectively secure, thorough security assessment needs to be performed. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no study that proposes or employs a systematic security testing approach for evaluating the security of automotive OTA update systems. This study closes this gap by presenting an in-depth security evaluation of Uptane framework, by employing a structured threat analysis approach to constructing attack trees and applying a model-based security testing approach for generating effective security test cases. We implement a software tool that generates the security test cases by analysing the structure of the attack trees and ultimately executing those test cases against the target system. We carry out several experimental attacks on the Uptane reference implementation. While many of the experimental results showed that the reference implementation is secure against different threats and cyberattacks, some findings suggest that the implementation is vulnerable to the denial-of-service and eavesdropping attacks.",
      "published": "2022-03-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100468",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahid Mahmood",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100468",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100470",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Rec-CNN: In-vehicle networks intrusion detection using convolutional neural networks trained on recurrence plots",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-03-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100470",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100470",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 113,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100471",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A hybrid deep learning based intrusion detection system using spatial-temporal representation of in-vehicle network traffic",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-03-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100471",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wei Lo",
        "Hamed Alqahtani",
        "Kutub Thakur",
        "Ahmad S. Almadhor",
        "Subhash Chander",
        "Gulshan Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100471",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 152,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100515",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A systematic survey of attack detection and prevention in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-08-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Trupil Limbasiya",
        "Ko Zheng Teng",
        "Sudipta Chattopadhyay",
        "Jianying Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100515",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100520",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting in-vehicle intrusion via semi-supervised learning-based convolutional adversarial autoencoders",
      "description": "With the development of autonomous vehicle technology, the controller area network (CAN) bus has become the de facto standard for an in-vehicle communication system because of its simplicity and efficiency. However, without any encryption and authentication mechanisms, the in-vehicle network using the CAN protocol is susceptible to a wide range of attacks. Many studies, which are mostly based on machine learning, have proposed installing an intrusion detection system (IDS) for anomaly detection in the CAN bus system. Although machine learning methods have many advantages for IDS, previous models usually require a large amount of labeled data, which results in high time and labor costs. To handle this problem, we propose a novel semi-supervised learning-based convolutional adversarial autoencoder model in this paper. The proposed model combines two popular deep learning models: autoencoder and generative adversarial networks. First, the model is trained with unlabeled data to learn the manifolds of normal and attack patterns. Then, only a small number of labeled samples are used in supervised training. The proposed model can detect various kinds of message injection attacks, such as DoS, fuzzy, and spoofing, as well as unknown attacks. The experimental results show that the proposed model achieves the highest F1 score of 0.9984 and a low error rate of 0.1% with limited labeled data compared to other supervised methods. In addition, we show that the model can meet the real-time requirement by analyzing the model complexity in terms of the number of trainable parameters and inference time. This study successfully reduced the number of model parameters by five times and the inference time by eight times, compared to a state-of-the-art model.",
      "published": "2022-04-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100520",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thien-Nu Hoang",
        "Daehee Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100520",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 90,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100548",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards secure intra-vehicle communications in 5G advanced and beyond: Vulnerabilities, attacks and countermeasures",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100548",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huimin Chen",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Jiadai Wang",
        "Yijie Xun"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2022.100548",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2023.100639",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security assessment of in-vehicle communication protocols",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2023.100639",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A.M. Shahed Anwar",
        "Anika Anwar",
        "Lama J. Moukahal",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2023.100639",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2023.100658",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A novel and failsafe blockchain framework for secure OTA updates in connected autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2023.100658",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sadia Yeasmin",
        "Anwar Haque",
        "Amir A. Sayegh"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2023.100658",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100784",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "How secure are our roads? An in-depth review of authentication in vehicular communications",
      "description": "Intelligent transportation systems are pivotal in enhancing road safety by enabling intra-vehicle communication. Due to the nature of the wireless communication link, several potential risks of attacks exist, including impersonation, modification, and replay. To ensure the security of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) against malicious activities, secure data exchange between inter-communicating terminals, specifically vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, becomes a critical technological challenge that requires attention. Existing authentication methods for VANET applications mainly rely on crypto-based techniques. The emergence of physical (PHY)-layer authentication has gained prominence, leveraging the inherent characteristics of wireless channels and hardware imperfections to distinguish between wireless devices. The PHY-layer-based authentication is not a standalone alternative to cryptographic methods, but it shows potential as a supplementary approach for re-authentication in VANETs, referred to as “cross-layer authentication”. This comprehensive survey thoroughly evaluates the state-of-the-art of crypto-based, PHY-layer-based, and cross-layer-based authentication methods in VANETs. Furthermore, this survey delves into integrating different sixth-generation (6G) and beyond technologies, such as reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) and federated learning, for enhancing PHY-layer authentication performance in the presence of active attackers. Furthermore, in-depth insights into the advantages of cross-layer authentication methods are presented, along with exploring various state-of-the-art VANET security techniques. A detailed technical discussion is provided on these advanced approaches, and it is concluded that they can significantly enhance the security of intelligent transportation systems, ensuring safer and more efficient vehicular communications.",
      "published": "2024-04-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100784",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahmoud A. Shawky",
        "Syed Tariq Shah",
        "Mohammed Aly Abdrabou",
        "Muhammad Usman",
        "Qammer H. Abbasi",
        "David Flynn",
        "Muhammad Ali Imran",
        "Shuja Ansari",
        "Ahmad Taha"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100784",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100786",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fast and efficient context-aware embedding generation using fuzzy hashing for in-vehicle network intrusion detection",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-05-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100786",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moon Jeong Choi",
        "Ik Rae Jeong",
        "Hyun Min Song"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100786",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100810",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid cryptography-based scheme with conditional privacy-preserving authentication and memory-based DOS resilience in V2X",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100810",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelkrim Imghoure",
        "Fouzia Omary",
        "Ahmed El-Yahyaoui"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100810",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100830",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IDS-DEC: A novel intrusion detection for CAN bus traffic based on deep embedded clustering",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100830",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiahao Shi",
        "Zhijun Xie",
        "Li Dong",
        "Xianliang Jiang",
        "Xing Jin"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100830",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100837",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A robust multi-stage intrusion detection system for in-vehicle network security using hierarchical federated learning",
      "description": "As connected and autonomous vehicles proliferate, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus has become the predominant communication standard for in-vehicle networks due to its speed and efficiency. However, the CAN bus lacks basic security measures such as authentication and encryption, making it highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. To ensure in-vehicle security, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) must detect seen attacks and provide a robust defense against new, unseen attacks while remaining lightweight for practical deployment. Previous work has relied solely on the CAN ID feature or has used traditional machine learning (ML) approaches with manual feature extraction. These approaches overlook other exploitable features, making it challenging to adapt to new unseen attack variants and compromising security. This paper introduces a cutting-edge, novel, lightweight, in-vehicle, IDS-leveraging, deep learning (DL) algorithm to address these limitations. The proposed IDS employs a multi-stage approach: an artificial neural network (ANN) in the first stage to detect seen attacks, and a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) autoencoder in the second stage to detect new, unseen attacks. To understand and analyze diverse driving behaviors, update the model with the latest attack patterns, and preserve data privacy, we propose a theoretical framework to deploy our IDS in a hierarchical federated learning (H-FL) environment. Experimental results demonstrate that our IDS achieves an F1-score exceeding 0.99 for seen attacks and exceeding 0.95 for novel attacks, with a detection rate of 99.99%. Additionally, the false alarm rate (FAR) is exceptionally low at 0.016%, minimizing false alarms . Despite using DL algorithms known for their effectiveness in identifying sophisticated and zero-day attacks, the IDS remains lightweight, ensuring its feasibility for real-world deployment. This makes our model robust against seen and unseen attacks.",
      "published": "2024-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100837",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muzun Althunayyan",
        "Amir Javed",
        "OMER F. RANA"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100837",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 85,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100845",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANival: A multimodal approach to intrusion detection on the vehicle CAN bus",
      "description": "Vehicles of today are composed of over 100 electronic embedded devices known as Electronic Control Units (ECU), each of which controls a different component of the vehicle and communicates via the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. However, unlike other network protocols, the CAN bus communication protocol lacks security features, which is a growing concern as more vehicles become connected to the Internet. To enable the detection of intrusions on the CAN bus, numerous intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been proposed. Although some are able to achieve high accuracy in detecting specific attacks, no IDS has been able to accurately detect all types of attacks against the CAN bus. To overcome the aforementioned issues, we propose a multimodal analysis framework named CANival , which consists of time interval-based and signal-based analyzers developed by designing a novel Time Interval Likelihood (TIL) model and optimizing an existing model CANet. Experimental results show that our multimodal IDS outperforms the base models and enhances the detection performance testing on two recent datasets, X-CANIDS Dataset and SynCAN, achieving average true positive rates of 0.960 and 0.912, and true negative rates of 0.997 and 0.996, respectively.",
      "published": "2024-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100845",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyunjae Kang",
        "Thanh Vo",
        "Huy Kang Kim",
        "Jin B. Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100845",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100871",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A review of smart vehicles in smart cities: Dangers, impacts, and the threat landscape",
      "description": "The humble, mechanical automobile has gradually evolved into our modern connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs)—also known as “smart vehicles.” Similarly, our cities are gradually developing into “smart cities,” where municipal services from transportation networks to utilities to recycling to law enforcement are integrated. The idea, with both smart vehicles and smart cities, is that more data leads to better, more informed decisions. Smart vehicles and smart cities would acquire data from their own equipment (e.g., cameras, sensors) and from their connections—e.g., connections to fellow smart vehicles, to road-side infrastructure, to smart transportation systems (STSs), etc. Unfortunately, the paradigm of smart vehicles in smart cities is rife with danger and ripe for misuse. One vulnerable system or service could become an attacker's entry point, facilitating access to every connected vehicle, device, etc. Worse, smart vehicles and smart cities are inherently cyber-physical; a cyberattack can have physical consequences, including destruction of infrastructure and loss of life. Lastly, to leverage all the benefits of smart vehicles in smart cities, we would need to accept exorbitant levels of data collection and surveillance, which, in the absence of ironclad privacy protections, could lead to total lack of privacy. In this work, we define the automotive context—i.e., smart vehicles—within the larger context of smart cities as our threat landscape. Then, we enumerate and describe all of the (1) threats, (2) attack surfaces & targets, (3) areas of concern (indirect vulnerabilities & threats), and (4) impacts of smart vehicles in smart cities. Our objective is to demonstrate that the dangers are real and imminent—in the hope that they will be addressed before an attack on the “smart vehicles in smart cities” paradigm results in loss of life.",
      "published": "2024-12-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100871",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Lampe"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100871",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4048,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2024.100871 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: indirect, surveillance, collection, concern, loss, services, sensors, service."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2025.100956",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MetaCAN: An optimized adaptive hybrid metaheuristic-based intrusion detection system for CAN bus security",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a message-based protocol widely used in modern vehicles to facilitate communication between various Electronic Control Units (ECUs). However, its simplistic design lacks fundamental security measures, making it highly susceptible to cyberattacks. These vulnerabilities pose significant risks to vehicle safety, highlighting the critical need for implementation of effective intrusion detection systems (IDS). Therefore, in this paper, a machine learning based IDS optimized through an adaptive hybrid metaheuristic approach, named MetaCAN, is proposed to secure the CAN bus. MetaCAN leverages the complementary strengths of particle swarm optimization (PSO) for fast convergence and cuckoo search (CS) for robust global search to ensure effective hyperparameter tuning and model optimization. MetaCAN is evaluated using three real-world datasets including Survival Analysis, Car Hacking: Attack & Defense Challenge 2020, and OTIDS. Unlike traditional binary detection systems, MetaCAN offers multi-class attack detection by identifying five distinct attack types including Denial of Service (DoS), fuzzy, masquerade, malfunction, and replay attacks. Moreover, the detection accuracy of the system is enhanced through a feature engineering process that introduces two effective features such as Time Interval and ID Repetition Count. The experimental results show that MetaCAN consistently outperforms existing IDS solutions targeted the same datasets, making it a promising solution for securing the CAN bus in real-world vehicular environments .",
      "published": "2025-07-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2025.100956",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kadir İleri",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Soufiene Djahel"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2025.100956",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2025.100998",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges and opportunities of synthetic data generation for machine learning-based intrusion detection systems in in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "Machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (ML-IDS) are increasingly deployed to protect in-vehicle networks (IVNs) from cyber threats. However, their effectiveness depends on the availability of high-quality, diverse datasets, which are scarce due to privacy and data-collection challenges. This survey systematically examines the role of synthetic data generation (SDG) in addressing these limitations for automotive IDS. We review existing ML-IDS models, synthetic datasets, and SDG methods, highlighting challenges specific to the automotive domain, including temporal fidelity, real-time requirements, and data imbalance. Unlike prior surveys, this paper focuses on the intersection of SDG and IVN security, identifying research gaps and proposing a multidimensional evaluation framework. We introduce a novel quantitative evaluation framework and apply it to comparative analysis of synthetic (SynCAN) and real (CAN-MIRGU) datasets. Our finding reveals that current synthetic approaches exhibit critical limitations including substantially reduced identifier coverage and unrealistic temporal patterns that may compromise ML-IDS training efficiency. SDG can be considered as a promising, scalable path toward practical IDS solutions in future connected vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2025.100998",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junhui Li",
        "Nikolaos Th. Ersotelos",
        "Michail‐Antisthenis Tsompanas",
        "Gregory Epiphaniou"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2025.100998",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2026.101024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing automotive data flow: A survey of telematics security across intra-vehicle, V2X, and cloud layers",
      "description": "This survey systematically analyzes 77 studies on automotive telematics security, examining solutions across Intra-Vehicle Networks, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, and Cloud/IoT (Internet of Things) integration. Through comparison with 13 prior surveys, we identify a critical research gap: existing literature predominantly addresses these layers in isolation, failing to adequately secure data flows across architectural boundaries. Our cross-layer analysis reveals that hybrid intrusion detection systems achieve up to 99.5% accuracy against CAN bus attacks, federated learning frameworks attain 99% DDoS detection while preserving privacy, and secure interface mechanisms enable sub-100 μ s latency transitions with 52% reduced overhead for over-the-air updates. We closely examine intrusion detection systems, secure communication protocols, privacy protection techniques, and attack resilience strategies, identifying both the strengths and limitations of current approaches. Additionally, we evaluate how emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning can improve the resilience of telematics systems against advanced cyber threats. Our findings indicate that securing automotive data requires a unified, cross-layer cybersecurity strategy to ensure data integrity, confidentiality, and availability, guiding future research in this vital area.",
      "published": "2026-03-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vehcom.2026.101024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "telematics",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junjie Wu",
        "Benjamin C. M. Fung",
        "Natalia Stakhanova",
        "Faiyaz Khan",
        "Hanbo Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicular Communications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1016/j.vehcom.2026.101024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/s1353-4858(15)30100-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected cars – the next targe tfor hackers",
      "description": "Not so long ago, the idea of us all motoring around in driverless and crash-proof cars seemed about as believable as the 1960s Jetsons cartoon family zipping around in their Aerocar. But today's petrol-heads are rapidly getting used to the fact that next-generation ‘connected' cars, whose wifi-like crash-avoidance systems beacon out to track nearby vehicles, will start appearing on our roads in 2017/18. Driverless and crash-proof cars are no longer science fiction but fact. They promise a revolution in car safety, saving hundreds of thousands of lives a year. But most of these cars will be sharing data via the web. This raises real security concerns. But just how real is this car hacking threat and how much is hype? Tim Ring finds out, and reports on what security researchers are doing to push car makers to accelerate their drive to take car security seriously. He also asks what car drivers can do to protect themselves and their passengers.",
      "published": "2015-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/s1353-4858(15)30100-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "hacking",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tim Ring"
      ],
      "venue": "Network Security",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1016/s1353-4858(15)30100-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1016/s1353-4858(20)30005-2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Upstream Security: 2020 Global Automotive Cyber security Report",
      "description": "Not very long ago, the concept of having to perform software updates for your car would have seemed bizarre. Today's vehicles, however, are just more nodes on the network. From streaming music, providing traffic data and keyless operation through to battery management and telematics, cars now bristle with computers and communications capabilities.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/s1353-4858(20)30005-2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "Network Security",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1016/s1353-4858(20)30005-2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1017/pds.2023.268",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING USING SECURITY DESIGN PATTERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "Abstract The development of modern vehicles is complex, especially regarding compliance with security and safety. ISO/SAE 21434 considers security and safety along the entire product life cycle. According to the standard, a system architecture, a risk analysis, and the application of countermeasures are carried out in the early system design. Design patterns are solutions to known design problems. Security Design Patterns (SDP) describe countermeasures and are used to reduce risk. After our literature review, we did not find a suitable approach that presents SDPs that would be applicable in early system design. In this paper, we present 10 SDPs for early system design, which we evaluated during an 11-week student project with 28 teams. We present the results of the quantitative analysis and the evaluation of the feedback.",
      "published": "2023-06-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1017/pds.2023.268",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sergej Japs",
        "Faizan Faheem",
        "Harald Anacker",
        "Stephan Husung",
        "Roman Dumitrescu"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the Design Society",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1017/pds.2023.268",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41467-021-21007-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent driving intelligence test for autonomous vehicles with naturalistic and adversarial environment",
      "description": "Driving intelligence tests are critical to the development and deployment of autonomous vehicles. The prevailing approach tests autonomous vehicles in life-like simulations of the naturalistic driving environment. However, due to the high dimensionality of the environment and the rareness of safety-critical events, hundreds of millions of miles would be required to demonstrate the safety performance of autonomous vehicles, which is severely inefficient. We discover that sparse but adversarial adjustments to the naturalistic driving environment, resulting in the naturalistic and adversarial driving environment, can significantly reduce the required test miles without loss of evaluation unbiasedness. By training the background vehicles to learn when to execute what adversarial maneuver, the proposed environment becomes an intelligent environment for driving intelligence testing. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed environment in a highway-driving simulation. Comparing with the naturalistic driving environment, the proposed environment can accelerate the evaluation process by multiple orders of magnitude.",
      "published": "2021-02-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-21007-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuo Feng",
        "Xintao Yan",
        "Haowei Sun",
        "Yiheng Feng",
        "Henry X. Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Nature Communications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41467-021-21007-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 413,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41597-025-04982-1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A high-resolution electric vehicle charging transaction dataset with multidimensional features in China",
      "description": "The charging transaction data of electric vehicle (EV) users is crucial for studying charging market dynamics and formulating effective policies. However, due to factors such as the privacy of EV users and the complex coupling relationships between charging dealers, existing EV charging transaction datasets are plagued by issues such as incompleteness, significant bias, and a lack of real-time information. To address these issues, a real-time charging transaction dataset has been created, comprising 441,077 charging transactions collected from 13 charging stations in China over a 2-year period. The dataset includes detailed data of EV user charging transaction time, price and charging status, as well as the charging termination reasons and weather data for each charging session. This dataset offers references for identifying EV user behaviors and extracting charging fault factors from multiple aspects, supporting research applications in EV charging facility planning, EV charging and discharging management, and charging economic evaluation.",
      "published": "2025-04-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-025-04982-1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuanshi Zhang",
        "Tongxin Xu",
        "Tao Chen",
        "Qinran Hu",
        "Hongrui Chen",
        "Xukun Hu",
        "Zilv Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Data",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41597-025-04982-1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-018-37045-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Semi-Quantum Point-to-point Communication Protocol with Low Resource Requirements",
      "description": "Full quantum capability devices can provide secure communications, but they are challenging to make portable given the current technology. Besides, classical portable devices are unable to construct communication channels resistant to quantum computers. Hence, communication security on portable devices cannot be guaranteed. Semi-Quantum Communication (SQC) attempts to break the quandary by lowering the receiver's required quantum capability so that secure communications can be implemented on a portable device. However, all SQC protocols have low qubit efficiency and complex hardware implementations. The protocols involving quantum entanglement require linear Entanglement Preservation Time (EPT) and linear quregister size. In this paper, we propose two new keyless SQC protocols that address the aforementioned weaknesses. They are named Economic Keyless Semi-Quantum Point-to-point Communication (EKSQPC) and Rate Estimation EKSQPC (REKSQPC). They achieve theoretically constant minimal EPT and quregister size, regardless of message length. We show that the new protocols, with low overhead, can detect Measure and Replay Attacks (MRAs). REKSQDC is tolerant to transmission impairments and environmental perturbations. The protocols are based on a new quantum message transmission operation termed Tele-Fetch. Like QKD, their strength depends on physical principles rather than mathematical complexity.",
      "published": "2018-10-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-37045-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haoye Lu",
        "Michel Barbeau",
        "Amiya R. Nayak"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-018-37045-0",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-022-08810-z",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Potential risk assessment for safe driving of autonomous vehicles under occluded vision",
      "description": "This study aimed to explore how autonomous vehicles can predict potential risks and efficiently pass through the dangerous interaction areas in the face of occluded scenes or limited visual scope. First, a Dynamic Bayesian Network based model for real-time assessment of potential risks is proposed, which enables autonomous vehicles to observe the surrounding risk factors, and infer and quantify the potential risks at the visually occluded areas. The risk distance coefficient is established to integrate the perception interaction ability of traffic participants into the model. Second, the predicted potential risk is applied to vehicle motion planning. The vehicle movement is improved by adjusting the speed and heading angle control. Finally, a dynamic simulation platform is built to verify the proposed model in two specific scenarios of view occlusion. The model has been compared with the existing methods, the autonomous vehicles can accurately assess the potential danger of the occluded areas in real-time and can safely, comfortably, and effectively pass through the dangerous interaction areas.",
      "published": "2022-03-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-08810-z",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Denggui Wang",
        "Weiping Fu",
        "Qingyuan Song",
        "Jincao Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-022-08810-z",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 64,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-024-58694-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain integration for in-vehicle CAN bus intrusion detection systems with ISO/SAE 21434 compliant reporting",
      "description": "The development of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for in-vehicle buses has gained a lot of momentum in recent years as the number of reported vulnerabilities and the degree of interconnectivity for modern vehicles are on the rise. Since intrusion detection is resource consuming, it can be performed on computationally capable Android head units that are now present inside vehicles. Moreover, these units are connected to the internet, which enables the use of more complex algorithms that run in cloud environments. In this work we develop one such approach: an IDS that consists of a locally installed copy, running on head units, and a centralized instance of it that runs in the cloud and monitors traffic for groups of similar vehicles. Additionally, the centralized instance is part of a cloud service for intrusion detection which is continuously updated with the most recent types of attacks. The classification results of the cloud-based service are further analyzed by an incident response team which confirms the presence of known attacks, analyzes new types of attacks and assesses their impact. The output of this activity is stored on the Blockchain as ISO/SAE 21434 compliant reports, ensuring the transparency and traceability of the reported incidents.",
      "published": "2024-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-58694-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tudor Andreica",
        "Adrian Musuroi",
        "Alfred Anistoroaei",
        "Camil Jichici",
        "Bogdan Groza"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-024-58694-4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-024-70095-1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-objective economic operation of smart distribution network with renewable-flexible virtual power plants considering voltage security index",
      "description": "This paper discusses the simultaneous management of active and reactive power of a flexible renewable energy-based virtual power plant placed in a smart distribution system, based on the economic, operational, and voltage security objectives of the distribution system operator. The formulated problem aims to specify the minimum weighted sum of energy cost, energy loss, and voltage security index, considering the optimal power flow model, voltage security formulation, and the operating model of the virtual power plant. The virtual unit includes renewable sources, like wind systems, photovoltaic, and bio-waste units. Flexibility resources include electric vehicle parking lot and price-based demand response. In the mentioned scheme, parameters of load, renewable sources, electric vehicles, and energy prices are uncertain. This paper utilizes the Unscented Transformation method for modeling uncertainties. Fuzzy decision-making is utilized to extract a compromised solution. The suggested approach innovatively considers the simultaneous management of active and reactive power of a virtual unit with electric vehicles and price-based demand response. This is performed to promote economic, operational, and network security objectives. According to numerical results, the approach with optimal power management of renewable virtual units is capable of boosting the economic, operation, and voltage security status of the network by approximately 43%, 47–62%, and 26.9%, respectively, to power flow studies. Only price-based demand response can improve the voltage security, operation, and economic states of the network by about 19.5%, 35–47%, and 44%, respectively, compared to the power flow model.",
      "published": "2024-08-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-70095-1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "E. Akbari",
        "Ahad Faraji Naghibi",
        "M. Veisi",
        "Amirabbas Shahparnia",
        "S. Pirouzi"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-024-70095-1",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 118,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-024-82257-2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimizing demand response and load balancing in smart EV charging networks using AI integrated blockchain framework",
      "description": "The integration of Electric Vehicles (EVs) into power grids introduces several critical challenges, such as limited scalability, inefficiencies in real-time demand management, and significant data privacy and security vulnerabilities within centralized architectures. Furthermore, the increasing demand for decentralized systems necessitates robust solutions to handle the growing volume of EVs while ensuring grid stability and optimizing energy utilization. To address these challenges, this paper presents the Demand Response and Load Balancing using Artificial intelligence (DR-LB-AI) framework. The proposed framework leverages Artificial intelligence (AI) for predictive demand forecasting and dynamic load distribution, enabling real-time optimization of EV charging infrastructure. Furthermore, Blockchain technology is employed to facilitate decentralized, secure communication, ensuring tamper-proof energy transactions while enhancing transparency and trust among stakeholders. The DR-LB-AI framework significantly enhances energy distribution efficiency, reducing grid overload during peak periods by 20%. Through advanced demand forecasting and autonomous load adjustments, the system improves grid stability and optimizes overall energy utilization. Blockchain integration further strengthens security and privacy, delivering a 97.71% improvement in data protection via its decentralized framework. Additionally, the system achieves a 98.43% scalability improvement, effectively managing the growing volume of EVs, and boosts transparency and trust by 96.24% through the use of immutable transaction records. Overall, the findings demonstrate that DR-LB-AI not only mitigates peak demand stress but also accelerates response times for Load Balancing, contributing to a more resilient, scalable, and sustainable EV charging infrastructure. These advancements are critical to the long-term viability of smart grids and the continued expansion of electric mobility.",
      "published": "2024-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-82257-2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arvind Rajdeo Singh",
        "Rangu Seshu Kumar",
        "K. Reddy Madhavi",
        "Faisal Khalid Alsaif",
        "Mohit Bajaj",
        "Євген Олександрович ЗАЙЦЕВ"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-024-82257-2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 98,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-024-82313-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection system for V2X communication in VANET networks using machine learning-based cryptographic protocols",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication has many benefits. It improves fuel efficiency, road safety, and traffic management. But it raises privacy and security concerns. These include the risk of cyberattacks and the loss of drivers' personal data. Eavesdropping, data manipulation, and unauthorized vehicle monitoring are major problems that need immediate attention. This paper proposes a new approach to intrusion detection in V2X communications. It uses machine learning-based cryptographic protocols for intrusion detection (ML-CPIDSs). The goal is to improve privacy and security in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). The ML-CPIDS combines advanced cryptographic protocols with machine learning. It provides strong authentication, encryption, and real-time threat detection. Robust authentication and encryption techniques in modern cryptographic systems protect sensitive information. Using machine learning algorithms, it is feasible to identify and address security risks in real-time. The proposed technology solves key privacy and security issues. It has applications in many areas, including autonomous vehicle networks, urban traffic management, and vehicle communication systems. Extensive simulations show the ML-CPIDS works in different VANET environments. Privacy, security, and the ability to identify threats in real time are some of the areas that are evaluated in these simulations. The proposed ML-CPIDS approach outperforms current methods on several metrics. It has better privacy and authentication, lower latency, and stronger threat detection. It also improves the integrity and efficiency of V2X communications in VANET networks.",
      "published": "2024-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-82313-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "personal data",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thiruppathy Kesavan V",
        "Md. Jakir Hossen",
        "Gopi Ramasamy",
        "Nor Hidayati Abdul Aziz"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-024-82313-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-025-02474-1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A lightweight intrusion detection approach for CAN bus using depthwise separable convolutional Kolmogorov Arnold network",
      "description": "Ensuring the cybersecurity of modern vehicles is paramount as connected and autonomous systems become increasingly prevalent. However, existing intrusion detection systems (IDS) often face challenges such as imbalanced datasets and high computational demands, limiting their practical deployment in automotive environments. To address these limitations, we employ spectral normalization GAN to synthesize anomalous data, achieving a balanced distribution across four attack categories and normal traffic. We further propose a lightweight classification model, named Depthwise Separable Convolutional Kolmogorov-Arnold network (DSC-KAN), which incorporates Kolmogorov-Arnold (K-A) theorem to enhance efficiency while maintaining high classification performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach outperforms existing methods in accuracy and computational efficiency, offering a robust and practical IDS solution. The proposed method has the potential to significantly improve vehicle network security, ensuring safer and more reliable deployment of connected and autonomous driving technologies.",
      "published": "2025-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-02474-1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenwen Zhao",
        "Yikun Yang",
        "Hao Hu",
        "Yanzhan Chen",
        "Fan Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-025-02474-1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-025-18401-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A hybrid intrusion detection model based on dynamic spatial-temporal graph neural network in in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "With the increasing complexity of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) architecture and the continuous evolution of attack techniques, in-vehicle networks are confronted with unprecedented security challenges, while existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) still exhibit multiple limitations in IoV scenarios. First, traditional IDSs often neglect potential spatial-temporal dependencies in network traffic, leading to insufficient modeling capability for sophisticated attack behaviors. Second, there remains a lack of hybrid IDS capable of simultaneously addressing both intra-vehicle and external network attacks, as their detection capabilities are typically confined to a single environment or attack type. This paper proposes GCN-2-Former, an innovative spatial-temporal model that utilizes a Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) and a transformer. The model employs a sliding window mechanism and dynamic graph construction strategy to map heterogeneous network traffic into spatial-temporal graph structures. Local spatial features are extracted via GCN, while multi-layer Transformer modules are introduced to model global temporal dependencies. Furthermore, a graph-level feature fusion strategy is adopted to effectively integrate spatial and temporal characteristics. Experimental results indicate that the proposed model achieves an accuracy and F1-score of 99.98% on the CICIDS2017 dataset, which represents external network attacks, and a detection rate of 100% on the Car Hacking dataset, which represents intra-vehicle network attacks. It significantly outperforms existing mainstream methods, demonstrating excellent detection capability, robustness, and cross-domain generalization performance.",
      "published": "2025-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-18401-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jingkang Zhang",
        "Xinjian Fan",
        "Zhixin Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-025-18401-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-025-23351-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain driven trust management for intelligent transportation systems in VANETs",
      "description": "Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are a key component of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), enabling vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication to improve traffic efficiency and road safety. However, maintaining strong network performance and user privacy requires robust security mechanisms. Unlike existing blockchain-VANET solutions that address isolated aspects, our framework uniquely integrates Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for lightweight authentication, an Enhanced Quantified role-based Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EQPBFT) consensus mechanism for efficient and secure block creation, and a Deep Neural Network (DNN)-based intrusion detection system into a unified trust management pipeline. The EQPBFT algorithm improves network resilience by efficiently identifying and mitigating malicious nodes during block creation. In addition, a DNN-based intrusion detection system enhances threat classification and strengthens attack detection accuracy. Simulation results demonstrate reduced computation time (up to 25% lower than PBFT), faster block creation (5.2 ms vs. 6.6 ms for 200 nodes), and higher intrusion detection accuracy (95%) compared to baseline models. These quantitative outcomes validate the robustness and efficiency of the proposed system.",
      "published": "2025-11-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-23351-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "H. V",
        "V. P",
        "Elizabeth Chang"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-025-23351-x",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-025-26326-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing e-governance against shadow attacks with blockchain technology",
      "description": "Contracts and invoices commonly utilize digitally signed PDFs to ensure content validity and integrity. These signatures enable PDF viewers to issue warnings if a document is altered after signing. However, vulnerabilities in PDF viewers have enabled a class of attacks known as shadow attacks, which undermine the integrity of digitally signed PDFs. Unlike prior attacks exploiting implementation flaws, shadow attacks leverage the flexibility of the PDF specification to embed malicious shadow documents that remain compliant with the standard. The first real-world instance of such an attack, documented under CVE-2022-25641, highlighted the inadequacy of existing defense mechanisms. This paper introduces a blockchain-based validation framework to secure PDF document exchange in e-government ecosystems. The approach integrates keyless signature infrastructure to strengthen authentication while preserving confidentiality. Experimental evaluation shows that the proposed model effectively blocks shadow-infected documents with 100% detection accuracy, while maintaining low latency (0.464-0.687 ms block creation time) and high throughput (≈100 transactions per second) in private blockchain deployments. Scalability tests confirm 95-97% detection efficiency under simulated DoS and MiTM conditions. Furthermore, integration with decentralized storage (IPFS/Filecoin) enables large-scale handling of documents up to 50 MB with negligible overhead and achieves a 30% reduction in storage costs compared to conventional PDF filtering mechanisms. Taken together, these results demonstrate that the proposed framework offers a secure, cost-efficient, and scalable foundation for enhancing digital trust in e-government services.",
      "published": "2025-11-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-26326-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2022-25641"
      ],
      "authors": [
        "Priyanka Mishra",
        "R. Ganesan"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-025-26326-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-025-92895-9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of cyber attacks in electric vehicle charging systems using a remaining useful life generative adversarial network",
      "description": "Abstract Cybersecurity attacks targeting electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) and the broader electric vehicle (EV) ecosystem have become an escalating concern with the increasing adoption of EVs and the growing connectivity of the infrastructure supporting them. The present research aims to contribute to continuing cybersecurity studies on electric vehicle charging stations. In line with this objective, this study proposes the remaining useful life (RUL) approach to demonstrate the potential impact of estimating the remaining time of a cyber attack on EVSE and what revolutionary changes it can bring to cyber security strategies using a generative adversarial network (GAN). By taking a proactive stance, the manuscript will increase security and reduce the economic and reputational losses associated with cyber incidents. Accurate RUL estimates present valuable information about the status of the EVSE infrastructure. Thus, informed decisions on maintenance and crew scheduling are taken. To test the technique’s effectiveness, we assess this approach on attack scenarios, including network and host attacks on the EV charger (Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment—EVSE) in idle and charging states. Furthermore, we assess the prediction results of different deep learning models, such as gated recurrent units (GRUs), long short-term memory (LSTM), recurrent neural networks (RNNs), convolution neural networks (CNNs), multi-layer perceptron (MLP), and dense layer integrated with generative adversarial networks (GANs), using mean absolute error (MAE), root mean square error (RMSE), mean squared error (MSE), and R-squared (R 2 ). Afterward, we compare the error measurements with models, such as hybrid GAN-LSTM, GAN-GRU, GAN-RNN, GAN-CNN, GAN-MLP, and GAN-Dense Layer. The GAN-GRU model exhibits the highest accuracy with the lowest MAE (0.0281). On the contrary, the GAN-CNN model displays the best overall performance concerning error consistency and variance explained. According to the results, integrating GAN into these architectures improves predictive accuracy and the model’s ability to identify potential attacks in advance and decreases error rates.",
      "published": "2025-03-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-92895-9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hayriye Tanyıldız",
        "Canan Batur Şahin",
        "Özlem Batur Dinler",
        "Hazem Migdady",
        "Kashif Saleem",
        "Aseel Smerat",
        "Amir H. Gandomi",
        "Laith Abualigah"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-025-92895-9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 65,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-025-98433-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the CAN bus using deep learning for intrusion detection in vehicles",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol is the essential communication backbone in vehicles within the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), enabling interaction between electronic control units (ECUs). However, CAN messages lack authentication and security, making the system vulnerable to attacks such as DoS, fuzzing, impersonation, and spoofing. This paper evaluates deep learning methods to detect intrusions in the CAN bus network. Using the Car Hacking, Survival Analysis, and OTIDS datasets, we train and test models to identify automotive cyber threats. We explore recurrent neural network (RNN) variants, including LSTM, GRU, and VGG-16, to analyze temporal and spatial features in the data. LSTMs and GRUs handle long-term dependencies in sequential data, making them suitable for analyzing CAN messages. Bi-LSTMs enhance this by processing sequences in both directions, learning from past and future contexts to improve anomaly detection. Our results show that LSTM achieves 99.89% accuracy in binary classification, while VGG-16 reaches 100% accuracy in multiclass classification. These findings demonstrate the potential of deep learning techniques in improving the security and resilience of ITS by effectively detecting and mitigating CAN bus network attacks.",
      "published": "2025-04-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-98433-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ritu Rai",
        "Jyoti Grover",
        "Prinkle Sharma",
        "Ayush Pareek"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-025-98433-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 59,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1038/s41598-026-68795-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MOO-IDS: multi-objective optimization-based lightweight intrusion detection system for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "With the proliferation of intelligent connected vehicles, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, as the backbone of in-vehicle communication, is vulnerable to cyberattacks due to lack of authentication and encryption. Existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) exhibit limitations in addressing data imbalance, complex attack recognition, and resource-constrained deployment. This paper proposes a lightweight intrusion detection system based on multi-objective optimization, termed MOO-IDS. The system integrates a Hybrid Deep Restricted Boltzmann Machine Generator (HyDRBM-Gen) to mitigate attack sample scarcity and class imbalance in vehicular network data. To address targeted ID fabrication and masquerade attacks, two novel features, ID Frequency (IDF) and ID-Data Correlation (IDC), are introduced. An Adaptive-Enhanced Non-Dominated Sorting Dung Beetle Optimizer (AE-NSDBO) optimizes XGBoost hyperparameters to achieve an optimal balance among F1-score, model size, and inference latency, enabling the optimized XGBoost to accomplish intrusion detection. Experimental results on the real-world dataset Real ORNL Automotive Dynamometer (ROAD) demonstrate that MOO-IDS achieves outstanding performance, with a weighted-average F1-score of 0.9907, a model size of only 0.199 MB, and substantially reduced inference latency. The model also performs excellently on the Car Hacking and Survival Analysis datasets. This study provides a high-precision, lightweight, and strongly generalizable multi-class intrusion detection model for resource-constrained vehicular environments.",
      "published": "2026-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-68795-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yali Hao",
        "He Bai",
        "A. Siya",
        "Jiaqi Zhang",
        "Xueliang Fu",
        "Honghui Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Reports",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1038/s41598-026-68795-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4036,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1038/s41598-026-68795-x and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: targeted, car, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/bme2.12034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unimodal‐Bio‐GAN: Keyless biometric salting scheme based on generative adversarial network",
      "description": "Abstract Cancellable biometrics enabled us to develop robust authentication systems by replacing the storage of the original biometric template with another secured version. A technique called biometric salting uses a parameter (key) and an invertible function to transform the human biometrics features into a secured format that can be protected and stored securely in a biometric database system. The salting key plays a main role in the success of this transformation, which makes it robust or vulnerable to many security attacks. One of the main challenges that faces biometrics' researchers currently is how to design and protect such a salting key considering two basic measures: security and recognition accuracy. In this article, we propose unimodal‐Bio‐GAN, a reliable keyless biometric salting technique based on standard generative adversarial network (GAN). In unimodal‐Bio‐GAN, a random permuted version of the human biometric data is implicitly considered as a salting key and required only during the enrolment stage, which increases the system reliability to overcome different security attacks. The experimental results of unimodal‐Bio‐GAN using the CASIA Iris‐V3‐Internal database outperform the previous methods and its security efficiency is analysed using different attack types.",
      "published": "2021-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/bme2.12034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mayada Tarek",
        "Eslam Hamouda",
        "Sara El‐Metwally"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Biometrics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1049/bme2.12034",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/cp.2016.1399",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive cyber-security integrity levels",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity and automation of electronic and electrical systems in modern vehicles has led to the need for cyber security to be built in to the design of such systems from the early stages of development. Although formal international standards for automotive cyber security are still to be developed, the recently published SAE J3061TM recommended practice sets out a framework for organisations to develop their own cyber security engineering process based on some key principles. One of the recommendations of this framework is to carry out a threat analysis and risk assessment early in the product development, in order to identify the relevant threats and classify the risk associated with each threat. The risks are then analysed to determine whether they are at an acceptable level or if risk reduction measures need to be implemented. However the framework does not currently propose how any required risk reduction should be defined or quantified. A number of existing functional safety standards define variants of safety integrity levels, which specify the level of risk reduction required and approaches for achieving it, for example the ASIL in ISO 26262. A commonly accepted way of classifying the required level of security risk reduction is needed to allow subsequent development phases to design, implement, test and validate appropriate security measures which offer the necessary level of protection against malicious adversaries. In this paper we give a short overview of the automotive threat landscape, the typical vehicle attack surface and current standards and best practices. This is followed by a survey of safety integrity levels proposed in current functional safety standards, and the nearest equivalents to security levels found in the available security standards. Based on this we outline some requirements for and propose a set of automotive security integrity levels. The use of these levels is illustrated with a fictitious but realistic case study.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/cp.2016.1399",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Ward",
        "Paul Wooderson"
      ],
      "venue": "IET International Conference on System Safety",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1049/cp.2016.1399",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/cp.2018.0046",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security Standards and Issues in V2X Communications for Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Significant developments have taken place over the past few years in the area of vehicular communication systems in the ITS environment. It is vital that, in these environments, security is considered in design and implementation since compromised vulnerabilities in one vehicle can be propagated to other vehicles, especially given that V2X communication is through an ad-hoc type network. Recently, many standardisation organisations have been working on creating international standards related to vehicular communication security and the so-called Internet of Vehicles (IoV). This paper presents a discussion of current V2X communications cyber security issues and standardisation approaches being considered by standardisation bodies such as the ISO, the ITU, the IEEE, and the ETSI. \\n",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/cp.2018.0046",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "I. Ivanov",
        "Carsten R. Maple",
        "Tim Watson",
        "S. Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Living in the Internet of Things: Cybersecurity of the IoT",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1049/cp.2018.0046",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/el.2017.4360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Channel correlation‐based relay attack avoidance in vehicle keyless‐entry systems",
      "description": "In passive keyless entry and start (PKES) systems, the car unlocks or starts the car when the key is in the proximity of the car. In conventional PKES systems, the car determines the physical proximity of the key on the basis of the received signal strength or the round‐trip time (RTT). However, the conventional schemes are vulnerable to relay attacks because the relay amplifies the signal and minimises the processing time. A solution to avoid the relay attacks in PKES systems is proposed, where the car verifies the proximity of the key on the basis of the correlation of the channel state information as well as the RTT.",
      "published": "2018-01-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/el.2017.4360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyera Jeong",
        "Jaewoo So"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics Letters",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1049/el.2017.4360",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/ell2.13112",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection and defence for CAN bus through frequency anomaly analysis and arbitration mechanism",
      "description": "Abstract As automobile intelligence continues to develop, the electronic control units connected to the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus within vehicles face an increasing number of threats from potential attacks originating from the internet. To address this issue, an intrusion detection and defence method is proposed that is capable of detecting illegal messages through the use of frequency anomaly detection, and subsequently disrupting them through utilization of the CAN bus arbitration mechanism. This proposed method offers a simple implementation compared to traditional approaches, while being able to identify suspicious units and neutralize threats in real‐time. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach.",
      "published": "2024-01-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/ell2.13112",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qiang Dong",
        "Zenglu Song",
        "Haoshu Shao"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics Letters",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1049/ell2.13112",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/els2.12083",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A review of electric vehicle technology: Architectures, battery technology and its management system, relevant standards, application of artificial intelligence, cyber security, and interoperability challenges",
      "description": "Abstract Currently, there is an increased global climate change awareness, and the world is tending towards net zero emissions. The transportation sector is leading in Green House Gas emissions (GHG). Furthermore, the diminishing reserves of fossil fuels, the need for cheaper maintenance vehicles, more efficient drive trains, and better performance vehicles presents a challenge in ICE. Electric Vehicles (EVs) offer the perfect mobility solution which can replace the conventional ICE in the near future. This article comprehensively reviews the components and advances in the various technologies employed in electric vehicles to achieve efficiency in motion and optimise energy management in electric vehicles. This article gives an analysis of the current EV scenario globally. It then details the different configurations of electric vehicle architectures available. The battery is discussed, and the various electrochemical technologies are analysed. Battery Management Systems (BMS) to efficiently manage energy are discussed. The charging methods, voltage levels, and relevant standards are outlined in detail. The traction motors and power conversion technologies are reported with advancements in electric vehicle applications. Furthermore, this article gives a comprehensive overview of various emerging technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI) & Machine Learning (ML), to improve EVs' performance through digitalisation. On the other hand, cybersecurity has become an ever‐challenging issue in EVs due to the increasing use of digital technologies. This article thoroughly overviews cybersecurity challenges in EV applications and explains possible proactive measures. Interoperability arising from various EV manufacturers' many different charging designs is discussed.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/els2.12083",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vincent M. Macharia",
        "Vijay Kumar Garg",
        "Dinesh Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Electrical Systems in Transportation",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1049/els2.12083",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 96,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/et.2017.0205",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected cars - the security challenge",
      "description": "Excitement around connected vehicles conceals the risks they introduce into our transport networks. What can we do to remove the vulnerabilities and build cars that are secure by design.",
      "published": "2017-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/et.2017.0205",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "B. McCluskey"
      ],
      "venue": "Engineering & Technology",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1049/et.2017.0205",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/gtd2.12202",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of electric vehicle charging – An agent‐based approach",
      "description": "Abstract Several European countries have launched programs to increase the market penetration of battery electric vehicles (BEV). Similarly, politicians in Switzerland have targeted a 15% BEV share of new car registrations by 2022. As each electric car increases the power demand, new challenges are posed to the operation of existing distribution grid infrastructure. Here, a new bottom‐up physical approach is presented that couples agent‐based traffic simulations through an unsteady vehicle power consumption model with distribution grid power flow simulations. The impacts on hourly powerline loads from charging a car fleet with an 8.5% BEV share are quantified in the real distribution grid for the canton of Zurich. The grid is composed of 12,000 buses and 9,800 powerlines, providing power to 398,000 individual customers. Results indicate that the risk of overloaded powerlines is highest in low‐level distribution grids. In our most critical future scenario, with simultaneous 8.5% BEV charging at 8 pm with 11 kW, peak line loads reach up to 132% of rated capacity. Hence, in a potential energy transition towards a decarbonised future, each individual distribution grid could face critical loads at specific temporal and spatial bottlenecks. Thus, grids should be assessed individually to limit uncertainties and risks of critical power system situations.",
      "published": "2021-05-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12202",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrick Plagowski",
        "Aleksandr Saprykin",
        "Ndaona Chokani",
        "Reza S. Abhari"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Generation Transmission & Distribution",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1049/gtd2.12202",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/gtd2.12267",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Grid‐supportive electric vehicle charging methodology with energy management for coordinated frequency control",
      "description": "Abstract This paper proposes a vehicle‐to‐grid (V2G) operation methodology of electric vehicles (EVs) for frequency regulation, EV charging, and state‐of‐charge (SOC) management. This V2G operation methodology exhibits multifunctionality in regard to instantaneous power adjustment of EVs for primary frequency control during charging. The proposed method can stabilize grid frequency under the high penetration of renewable energy by simultaneously managing the desired state‐of‐charge (SOC) of the batteries. The results indicate that both charging and charged EVs can assist in frequency regulation so that V2G services can help embracing renewable energy sources and stabilize a power system. The feasibility of this method is verified by a practical power grid model to demonstrate the efficacy of EV charging control for SOC management using DIgSILENT/PowerFactory.",
      "published": "2021-08-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12267",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "regulation",
        "v2g"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jae Woong Shim",
        "Gregor Verbič",
        "Kyeon Hur"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Generation Transmission & Distribution",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1049/gtd2.12267",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/gtd2.12275",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring Cybersecurity Issues in 5G Enabled Electric Vehicle Charging Station with Deep Learning",
      "description": "The surging usage of electric vehicles (EVs) demand the robust deployment of trustworthy electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) with millisecond range latency and massive machine to machine communications where 5G could act. However, 5G suffers from inherent protocols, hardware, and software vulnerabilities that seriously threaten the communicating entities' cyber-physical security. To overcome these limitations in the EVCS system, this paper analyses the impact of False Data Injection (FDI) and Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks on the operation of EVCS. This work is an extension of our previously published conference paper about the EVCS. As new features, this paper simulates the FDI attack and the syn flood DDoS attacks on 5G enabled remote Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system that controls the solar photovoltaics (PV) controller, Battery Energy Storage (BES) controller, and EV controller of the EVCS. The attacks make the EVCS system oscillate or shift the DC operating point. The frequency of oscillation, its damping, and the system's resiliency are found to be related to the attacks' intensity and target controller. Finally, we propose the novel stacked Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) based intrusion detection systems (IDS) solely based on the electrical fingerprint. This model can detect the stealthy cyberattacks that bypass the cyber layer and go unnoticed in the monitoring system with nearly 100% detection accuracy.",
      "published": "2021-04-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12275",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manoj Basnet",
        "M. Hasan Ali"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1049/gtd2.12275",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/gtd2.70001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of transient overvoltages in EV charging stations due to direct lightning strikes",
      "description": "The proliferation in electric vehicle (EV) adoption has necessitated the rapid development of EV charging stations (EVCSs). Given their susceptibility to lightning strikes, it is crucial to guarantee the dependability and security of these stations. This research investigates the impact of lightning on EVCSs, focusing on the critical role of grounding systems. By simulating various lightning strike scenarios, the study examines the influence of factors such as grounding configuration, cable shielding, and lightning current characteristics on the induced overvoltages within EVCS components. The findings contribute to the development of robust lightning protection strategies for EVCSs, enhancing their resilience and ensuring the safe operation of EVs.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.70001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Moradi",
        "Asghar Akbari Foroud"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1049/gtd2.70001",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/ic.2016.0022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Aligning safety and security systems for connected vehicles",
      "description": "Future connected car and autonomous applications need to consider the integrity and assurance of electronic systems - not focus only on one domain such as functional safety or cybersecurity. The automotive industry recognizes this fact, that “security” is now a much wider issue than the physical security of vehicles (prevention of unauthorized use). Many “proof of concept” attacks using vulnerabilities have been demonstrated. The industry is taking a design-led approach e.g. SAE J3061TM to address this issue. But the response to potential threats associated with connected cars needs a pan industry approach. The development, verification and demonstration activities associated with automotive cybersecurity need appropriate techniques and facilities.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/ic.2016.0022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Ward"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1049/ic.2016.0022",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/icp.2023.0416",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Drivers, the missed attack surface of connected vehicles",
      "description": "The purpose of this paper is to analyse the human factors in cyberattacks targeting connected vehicles. To achieve this purpose, we utilised qualitative research methods and analysed multiple attack cases against connected vehicles. These cases demonstrated a number of different attack vectors and vulnerabilities. Our paper demonstrated that the most widely used Risk Assessment standards are flawed in this case; each assumes that certain considerations are either managed by other standards or that they are common knowledge and do not necessitate standardisation. This problem results in unresolved voids in the overall standards structure. The main gap identified was around Human Factors; none of the regulations or standards considered the impact of the owner/user/driver on the connected elements of vehicle safety and cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2023-02-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/icp.2023.0416",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asma Adnane",
        "J. Hardy",
        "Farhan Ahmad",
        "A. Morris",
        "Ashleigh Filtness"
      ],
      "venue": "IET conference proceedings.",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1049/icp.2023.0416",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4053,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1049/icp.2023.0416 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: case, impact, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/icp.2023.1530",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modelling and analysis of relay attack devices for passive-entry-passive-start wireless systems",
      "description": "Passive-entry-passive-start (PEPS) is a wireless communication system that enables a driver to enter and start their vehicle without the need of a physical key. In PEPS system, the vehicle sends low-power LF signal to communicate with the key-fob. If the key is in the vicinity of the automobile, it sends a RF signal which the vehicle senses and unlocks the door. In this work, we show how vulnerable these systems can be to external attacks using relay devices. In a relay attack, the objective is to amplify the vehicle signal to transmit to longer distances such that it can communicate with the key-fob and unlock the door, without the knowledge of the owner. This work includes a model of the relay devices developed using MATLAB, as well as a detailed explanation of an attack scenario. A distance-based test case has also been included to conclude the attack. In the introduction section, a few popular techniques which can be used to mitigate relay attacks have been reviewed.",
      "published": "2023-07-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/icp.2023.1530",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Rath",
        "Altaf Q. H. Badar",
        "V. K. Bharadwaj"
      ],
      "venue": "IET conference proceedings.",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1049/icp.2023.1530",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/icp.2023.2579",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of machine learning and deep learning-based intrusion detection systems in in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "With the growing complexity and connectivity of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs), In-vehicle communication plays an important role in today's driving environment. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most used protocol in an in-vehicle network to exchange data between Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Although in-vehicle communications must be regarded as the last line of security defence for ICV, recent reports have indicated vulnerability to threats due to its broadcasting design. In this context, this paper targets to comprehensively review the advantages and limitations of the existing machine learning and deep learning approaches designed for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). We evaluate their performance and computational resource requirements and propose potential enhancements. Finally, open challenges and future research directions for in-vehicle communication cyber security are highlighted as observations and recommendations.",
      "published": "2023-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/icp.2023.2579",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jingmei Li",
        "Nikolaos Th. Ersotelos",
        "M. Bottarelli",
        "Gregory Epiphaniou"
      ],
      "venue": "IET conference proceedings.",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1049/icp.2023.2579",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/icp.2025.2989",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A lightweight and secure authentication protocol for vehicle to everything communication",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication systems, ensuring robust security has become a critical challenge. Various studies have proposed several protocols; however, many of them may suffer from potential threats, such as impersonation attacks. This paper presents an efficient and lightweight authentication protocol for V2X communication. Our scheme uses zero-knowledge proof to perform mutual authentication without revealing the real identities in V2X communication. The proposed protocol ensures that all vehicles on the network are authenticated without compromising the integrity. Hence, the proposed scheme protects V2X communication against possible attacks. The preliminary result shows that the proposed scheme is efficient in terms of computational complexity.",
      "published": "2025-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/icp.2025.2989",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ujjwal Saini",
        "Pardeep Kumar",
        "Andrew Lambert"
      ],
      "venue": "IET conference proceedings.",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1049/icp.2025.2989",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/icp.2026.0984",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Identifying driver of vehicle for automotive digital forensics",
      "description": "A modern car is equipped with many Electronic Control Units (ECUs) with connections to external networks. As software takes significant portions of vehicles, vulnerabilities in the software and in-vehicle network protocols may increase risk of car accidents. Although many defense mechanisms such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been proposed for the vehicle, these IDSs have limitations in investigating causes of the car accident. Digital forensics for the vehicles have not been thoroughly studied yet. In this paper, we propose algorithms providing comprehensive information derived from limited vehicle data. Also, our proposed algorithms can be used for investigating a car accident, including cyber-attack. We evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms using simulated vehicle data.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/icp.2026.0984",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seoha Lee",
        "Sang Uk Sagong"
      ],
      "venue": "IET conference proceedings.",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1049/icp.2026.0984",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3916,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1049/icp.2026.0984 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: limited, digital, car, significant, information, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/iet-its.2015.0072",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comprehensive survey on security services in vehicular ad‐hoc networks",
      "description": "Vehicular ad‐hoc networks (VANETs) are the most hopeful approach to provide safety information and other infotainment applications to both drivers and passengers. VANETs are formed by intelligent vehicles equipped with On Board Units and wireless communication devices. Hence, VANETs become a key component of the intelligent transport system. Even though VANETs are used in enormous number of applications, there are many security challenges and issues that need to be overcome to make VANETs usable in practice. A great deal of study has been done towards it, but security mechanisms in VANETs are not effective. This study provides a summary about the VANET, characteristics and security challenges. This study also provides a summary of some major security attacks on security services such as availability, confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non‐repudiation and the corresponding countermeasures to make VANET communications more secure.",
      "published": "2016-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-its.2015.0072",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Azees Maria",
        "Pandi Vijayakumar",
        "Lazarus Jegatha Deborah"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1049/iet-its.2015.0072",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 213,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/itr2.12504",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber security analysis of connected vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract The sensor‐enabled in‐vehicle communication and infrastructure‐centric vehicle‐to‐everything (V2X) communications have significantly contributed to the spark in the amount of data exchange in the connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV) environment. The growing vehicular communications pose a potential cyber security risk considering online vehicle hijacking. Therefore, there is a critical need to prioritize the cyber security issues in the CAV research theme. In this context, this paper presents a cyber security analysis of connected vehicle traffic environments (CyACV). Specifically, potential cyber security attacks in CAV are critically investigated and validated via experimental data sets. Trust in V2X communication for connected vehicles is explored in detail focusing on trust computation and trust management approaches and related challenges. A wide range of trust‐based cyber security solutions for CAV have been critically investigated considering their strengths and weaknesses. Open research directions have been highlighted as potential new research themes in CAV cyber security area.",
      "published": "2024-04-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/itr2.12504",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maria Drolence Mwanje",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya",
        "Mohammad Aljaidi",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Sushil Kumar",
        "Devki Nandan Jha",
        "Abdallah Naser",
        "Jaime Lloret"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1049/itr2.12504",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1049/itr2.70172",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LIMA: Local and Lightweight Mutual Authentication for VANETs",
      "description": "ABSTRACT The effectiveness of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) critically depends on vehicular ad‐hoc networks (VANETs) for vehicle‐to‐everything (V2X) communication. ITS relies on wireless technologies, particularly dedicated short‐range communication (DSRC), to facilitate vehicle‐to‐vehicle interactions through basic safety messages (BSMs). DSRC is a proven technology with established deployment models that do not depend on cellular network reliability. Despite its advantages, DSRC is vulnerable to various security threats, including hijacking, impersonation, and side‐channel attacks. Numerous authentication protocols for VANETs have been proposed; however, they have failed to address the challenges. Certification authority (CA)‐based protocols suffer from high latency, while decentralized protocols fall short in preserving vehicle identity and location privacy. Notably, existing solutions overlook the importance of localizing the V2X message sender, which allows adversaries to launch remote attacks from arbitrary locations. To address this gap, we propose LIMA (local and lightweight mutual authentication)—a protocol tailored for VANETs that ensures secure mutual authentication and message integrity by leveraging dual policy attribute‐based encryption (DP‐ABE). The protocol is designed to operate efficiently in real‐world conditions, including scenarios involving blind spots and obstructed vehicles. We validate LIMA through experimental evaluations on real‐world on‐board units (OBUs) and, using PlatoonSAFE OMNeT++ simulations, quantify LIMA's processing overhead and evaluate its effect during emergency events. Moreover, we conduct a formal security analysis using the AVISPA tool. The results demonstrate that LIMA is secure under AVISPA's backend on‐the‐fly model‐checker (OFMC) model and constraint‐logic‐based attack searcher (CLAtSe) model, confirming its resilience against known attacks.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1049/itr2.70172",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Munkenyi Mukhandi",
        "Muhammad Hassan Khan",
        "Fernando Alves"
      ],
      "venue": "IET Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1049/itr2.70172",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/e3sconf/20198701008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementation of OCPP Protocol for Electric Vehicle Applications",
      "description": "The ability of the software and hardware systems to interchange information is a key factor for the success of the electric vehicle industry. Standards have been developed and are in use to ensure base level interoperability of the front-end communication and signaling processes for smart charging between electric vehicles and charge stations. The Open Charge Alliance (OCA), a group of European industries, have developed an open source common back-end protocol, called Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), for charging stations to reduce and secure overall investment costs. OCPP intends to enable grid services based on smart charging. In this paper the authors provide a review of the functionalities OCPP offers and how it can be used in the electrical vehicle-charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/20198701008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ocpp",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thota Venkata Pruthvi",
        "Niladri Dutta",
        "Phaneendra Babu Bobba",
        "Sai Vasudeva Bhagavatula"
      ],
      "venue": "E3S Web of Conferences",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1051/e3sconf/20198701008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/e3sconf/202346900082",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of current attacks on the CAN bus and development of a new solution to detect these types of malicious threats",
      "description": "The majority of modern vehicles have electronic control units (ECUs) in charge of controlling their functions. These ECUs communicate with one another using the CAN (Controller Area Network) communication protocol. This practical bus offers great transfer of data quality by enabling wide propagation that quickly reaches all sections of a vehicle. Unfortunately, this specific protocol places little focus on security, making the CAN bus control system susceptible. This is owing to its ease of physical or remote access and lack of confidentiality. This vulnerability makes it feasible to take control of the vehicle and endanger the safety of the passengers. The main objective of this work is to present the current existing vulnerabilities of the CAN Bus, to discuss a practical demonstration of hacking as well as to propose a technique to fight against these malicious actions, and all this by practical demonstrations on a DACIA Lodgy and Sandero 2014 vehicles.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202346900082",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Karrouchi",
        "Mohammed Rhiat",
        "Ismail Nasri",
        "Ilias Atmane",
        "Kamal Hirech",
        "Abdelhafid Messaoudi",
        "Mustapha Melhaoui",
        "Kamal Kassmi"
      ],
      "venue": "E3S Web of Conferences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1051/e3sconf/202346900082",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/itmconf/20224301025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of communication 5G-V2X: A proposed approach based on securing 5G-V2X based on Blockchain",
      "description": "With the rapid evolution of wireless communication and autonomous vehicles, vehicle to Everything (V2X) communications provides driving safety, traffic efficiency, and real-time traffic information in-vehicle networks. V2X has evolved by integrating 5G cellular access technology and New Radio (NR) into V2X communications (i.e., 5G NR V2X). Since the security issue in 5G-V2X remains a crucial point, we conducted a literature review approach and identified the 5G-V2X communication levels in this paper. The main objective of this study was to develop an approach to secure 5G-V2X. The proposed methodology is based on Blockchain to ensure the 5G-V2X architecture levels.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/itmconf/20224301025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Boughanja Manale",
        "Tomader Mazri"
      ],
      "venue": "ITM Web of Conferences",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1051/itmconf/20224301025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/matecconf/201821003013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unambiguous and Reliable Positioning in the vehicle in terms of Functional Safety and Cyber Security",
      "description": "Functional security and agile software development are two modern areas in product development, which initially have very opposite approaches. For example, formal tests are required by the relevant standards for the former, which must be documented very extensively. The agile software development, on the other hand, tries to come to its conclusion with as few documentation and flexible tests as possible. Also, the proof that testing and development are independent of each other for safety-critical projects is difficult in the context of the use of agile methods. However, taking the constraints of functional safety as given and taking advantage of the enormous flexibility of agile software development, e.g. With the use of Scrum, the Daily Team Meetings create new opportunities in product development. In contrast to previous positioning methods for linearly movable axles, a new developed approach for rear axle steering has not been used as an absolute value encoder, but a novel positioning concept has been researched and developed. Functional Safety first! A new safety concept must therefore be developed. The absolute value encoder, usually realized as an optical or magnetic bar-coded sensor, is used reliably but cost-effectively in a large number of systems. In order to save costs as well as space, the development of the new approach to the sensor will be dispensed with and the positioning will be realized via a new concept. The conventional concepts for position determination of axes is an absolute value encoder. However, this is not highly reliable and has no redundancy. With the new safety concept, the exact position of an axis can be determined and output with high accuracy by means of the various safety devices directly after switching on the system. As a result, the sensor system is hardly susceptible to errors. Here, a detailed error analysis has been carried out. Even after system crashes, there are enough detection points, which are constantly detected during normal operation and thus the plausibility check can be restored. The new explored approach allows the steering to work normally even in safe modes. However, the algorithms for protection have to take effect immediately if, for example, an expected index signal does not occur.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201821003013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ossmane Krini",
        "Edgar Laile"
      ],
      "venue": "MATEC Web of Conferences",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1051/matecconf/201821003013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/matecconf/202235503030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on cyber security risk of telematics box in intelligent connected vehicle",
      "description": "With the rapid development of the automotive industry and the wide application of 5G network technology, there are more and more Telematics Box (T-Box) equipped with intelligent operating systems in vehicles and they are becoming more and more complex. Because it is connected to the on-board CAN bus internally and interconnects with mobile phone /PC through the cloud platform externally, the security of T-Box must be fully guaranteed, to make the automotive more secure. T-Box can realize remote control function, so the T-Box information security problem has been paid more and more attention. In this paper, the T-Box were tested from multiple dimensions by using various methods, and the results were statistically analyzed, and the corresponding protection strategies were proposed for the corresponding security risks.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202235503030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chao Ma",
        "Hao Zhao",
        "Tong Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "MATEC Web of Conferences",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1051/matecconf/202235503030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/matecconf/202439201097",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI to V2X Privacy and Security Issues in Autonomous Vehicles: Survey",
      "description": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming all of the technologies we use every day. More than ever, we are very near to the objective of vehicle autonomy, which has long been desired. Large automakers are also spending billions of dollars on the development of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Among the advantages of this new technology are the possibility for increased passenger safety, less congested roads, reduced traffic, optimized traffic, reduced fuel consumption, less pollution, and improved travel experiences. However, there are also new security and privacy problems associated with this paradigm change. Previously simple mechanical devices, vehicles are today computerized, networked, and intelligent. They gather vast amounts of data, which must be shielded from intrusions. In this paper, we examine privacy issues and security hurdles in AVs. We investigate several attacks using a layer-by-layer methodology. It summarizes the contributions of these research works and categorizes them based on application domains. It also identifies open problems and research challenges that need to be addressed to fully realize the potential of AI in advancing V2X systems. Our intention is to provide insights into the unresolved research issues surrounding AVs and to suggest future lines of inquiry.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202439201097",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Ahmed Mohiuddin",
        "K. Nirosha",
        "Dharavath Anusha",
        "Mohd Nazeer",
        "Ganapathi Raju NV",
        "Sorabh Lakhanpal"
      ],
      "venue": "MATEC Web of Conferences",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1051/matecconf/202439201097",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/sands/2022009",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrated safety and security enhancement of connected automated vehicles using DHR architecture",
      "description": "Safety and security are interrelated and both essential for connected automated vehicles (CAVs). They are usually investigated independently, followed by standards ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434, respectively. However, more functional safety and security features of in-vehicle components make existing safety mechanisms weaken security mechanisms andvice versa. This results in a dilemma that the safety-critical and security-critical in-vehicle components cannot be protected. In this paper, we propose a dynamic heterogeneous redundancy (DHR) architecture to enhance the safety and security of CAVs simultaneously. We first investigate the current status of integrated safety and security analysis and explore the relationship between safety and security. Then, we propose a new taxonomy of in-vehicle components based on safety and security features. Finally, a dynamic heterogeneous redundancy (DHR) architecture is proposed to guarantee integrated functional safety and cyber security of connected vehicles for the first time. A case study on an automated bus shows that DHR architecture can not only detect unknown failures and ensure functional safety but also detect unknown attacks to protect cyber security. Furthermore, we provide an in-depth analysis of quantification for CAVs performance using DHR architecture and identify challenges and future research directions. Overall, integrated safety and security enhancement is an emerging research direction.",
      "published": "2022-11-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/sands/2022009",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yufeng Li",
        "Qi Liu",
        "Xuehong Chen",
        "Chenhong Cao"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Safety",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1051/sands/2022009",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4068,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1051/sands/2022009 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: usually, unknown, case, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/sands/2026012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical-Layer Signal Injection Attacks on EV Charging Ports: Bypassing Authentication via Electrical-Level Exploits",
      "description": "The proliferation of electric vehicles in recent years has significantly expanded the charging infrastructure while introducing new security risks to both vehicles and chargers. In this paper, we investigate the security of major charging protocols such as SAE J1772, CCS, IEC 61851, GB/T 20234, and NACS, uncovering new physical signal spoofing attacks in their authentication mechanisms. By inserting a compact malicious device into the charger connector, attackers can inject fraudulent signals to sabotage the charging process, leading to denial of service, vehicle-induced charger lockout, and damage to the chargers or the vehicle's charge management system. To demonstrate the feasibility of our attacks, we propose PORTulator, a proof-of-concept (PoC) attack hardware, including a charger gun plugin device for injecting physical signals and a wireless controller for remote manipulation. By evaluating PORTulator on multiple real-world chargers, we identify 7 charging standards used by 20 charger piles that are vulnerable to our attacks. The root cause is that chargers use simple physical signals for authentication and control, making them easily spoofed by attackers. To address this issue, we propose enhancing authentication circuits by integrating non-resistive memory components and utilizing dynamic high-frequency Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) signals to counter such physical signal spoofing attacks.",
      "published": "2025-06-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/sands/2026012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hetian Shi",
        "Yi He",
        "Shangru Song",
        "Jian-Wei Zhuge",
        "Jian Mao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1051/sands/2026012",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1051/shsconf/202317501047",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Insurtech: Moroccan Regulation Toward the Example of Insurtech Lead in Arab Countries: United Arab Emirates",
      "description": "Technologies are redefining the ecosystem [1] and the boundaries between industries, and reshaping consumer’s expectations. It is important to share divers’ data in a network to forge a business related to contributor’s data in the same manner to predictive maintenance [2] The partnership with technology suppliers based on IOT and telematics open the gate to a novel ecosystem where one strong platform grows and expands. Digitization and technologies proposed a new approach to common failure for the insurance industry. we present the legal basis as an accelerator to boost the adoption of digital solutions in insurance services including distribution, claim declaration, contract’s renewal.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202317501047",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Halima Elhoufi",
        "Nohaila Elhaddad",
        "Yassine Tabaa"
      ],
      "venue": "SHS Web of Conferences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1051/shsconf/202317501047",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784480915.453",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Comprehensive Threat Modeling for Intelligent Vehicle Cyber Security",
      "description": "In recent years, the development of advanced driver assistant system (ADAS) and vehicular communication has enhanced the level of autonomous vehicles and connected vehicles, which brings a new security challenge to intelligent vehicles. This paper reviews the existing vehicle-related threat modeling and presents the abstract threat model referring to the fundamental factors. Then we perform vulnerability analysis from three respects of vehicular terminal, network communication, and telematics system. Our work can provide comprehensive understanding of intelligent vehicle cyber security threat models and benefit the implementation of security measures in automotive industry.",
      "published": "2018-01-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784480915.453",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Guizhen Yu",
        "Yunpeng Wang",
        "Zhao Zhang",
        "Hongmao Qin"
      ],
      "venue": "COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784480915.453",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784482292.493",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Risk Assessment for Connected Vehicles Based on Back Propagation Neural Network",
      "description": "The wide application of information communication technology makes connected vehicles (CV) more vulnerable to be attacked. The communication systems and key nodes of CVs, e.g., electronic control units, controller area network (CAN), in-vehicle infotainment system, will face various threats such as eavesdropping, tampering, and counterfeiting. Cyber security of vehicles should be paid more attention because it involves drivers’ safety and public traffic security. It is impossible to deal with all kinds of security threats for the effect of performance, compatibility, cost, and efficiency of vehicles. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the security risk of CVs. This paper proposes a security risk assessment method based on the conventional security risk analysis model and utilized back propagation (BP) neural network. The simulation results show that the risk level of CVs can be evaluated quantitatively by trained neural networks, and the method is convenience and applicability for security risk assessment of vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-07-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784482292.493",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yinghui Wang",
        "Yunpeng Wang",
        "Hongmao Qin",
        "Haojie Ji"
      ],
      "venue": "COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784482292.493",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3882,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1061/9780784482292.493 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: propagation, makes, information, safety, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784482933.252",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secured Authentication Method in V2X Communication Scenario",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of Internet of Vehicles (IoV), vehicles are embedded everywhere in the transportation system as ubiquitous things connected based on the V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) communication technology. Risk, cybersecurity, and privacy are major challenges for such a development. Much research has focused on safety, efficiency, and mobility applications in V2X communication. Protection of integrity, authenticity, and tamper-proofing of V2X communication messages is carried out in trust model of credential management system. This system defines legal, policy, and technical requirements for the management of public key certificates for V2X communication applications.",
      "published": "2020-08-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784482933.252",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaoya Xu",
        "Yunpeng Wang",
        "Hongmao Qin",
        "Junjie Zhang",
        "Mengru Yan",
        "Haojie Ji"
      ],
      "venue": "COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784482933.252",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784483565.148",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research and Application of Risk Assessment Method for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Automobile intelligent driving systems and communication services bring the widespread application of information technology and network technology. Meanwhile, there are increasing number of exploitable security vulnerabilities and risks in modern vehicles. These risks may cause serious consequences such as casualties and property losses for drivers. Risk assessment is an important activity in the life cycle of automobile cybersecurity and can provide a guarantee for the formation of correct cybersecurity requirements of products. Considering the current wide recognition standard for threat analysis and risk assessment, this paper proposes a systematic risk assessment method for automotive cybersecurity combined with risk assessment use cases. Finally, a typical use case of security-related component IVI is applied to illustrate the proposed risk assessment method and analysis process of cybersecurity assessment results.",
      "published": "2021-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784483565.148",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Haiyang Yu",
        "Yinghui Wang",
        "Jing Peng"
      ],
      "venue": "COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784483565.148",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784483565.161",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multiple Attacks Intrusion Detection Framework for In-Vehicle Networks Based on Abnormal Data Features",
      "description": "An increasing number of security vulnerabilities have been found in the electronic control units (ECUs) and external communication interfaces of smart cars. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) have become the focus research as an initiative protection measure, yet the key issues are not well resolved, such as detection accuracy and computation overhead. According to vulnerability analysis and the different features of abnormal data under different attacks, an in-vehicle network experimental attack platform and an abnormal behavior characteristic library are built. Then, a low complexity learning algorithm is used to detect simple abnormal features. Next, a more complex detection method is proved to achieve accurate detection of abnormal data for abnormal behavior such as false data injecting and semantic tampering. Our research work makes it easy to understand intrusion detection systems for in-vehicle networks and benefits the implementation of security in the automotive industry.",
      "published": "2021-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784483565.161",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Biao Chen",
        "Zheng Zuo",
        "Chi Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784483565.161",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784484265.183",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Assessment Approach of In-Vehicle Network Information Security",
      "description": "The automotive industry is experiencing a paradigm shift towards automated and connected vehicles. With the increasing usage and complexity of electrical and electronic systems, this study introduces a new security risk assessment. In detail, this study first designs a tailored risk assessment framework, which begins with a threat analysis to identify the assets, and threats to those assets. The following risk assessment process consists of a threat estimation and an impact estimation. We introduce the security level conceptually similar to the Automotive standard safety integrity level (ASIL) in ISO26262. The strong alignment with existing standards and processes should make this framework well-suited for the automotive industry’s needs.",
      "published": "2022-09-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784484265.183",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jian Wanh",
        "Shaowei Zhang",
        "Hengwei Chen",
        "Pengcheng Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784484265.183",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784485484.037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Data Security Risk Analysis Method of Intelligent and Connected Vehicles Based on Data Asset",
      "description": "The diversity and complexity of typical scenarios of intelligent and connected vehicles (ICVs) bring serious risks to the data security of vehicles. To avoid the potential data security risks of ICVs effectively, this paper proposes a data risk analysis method for vehicles based on the characteristics of data assets. Considering the similarity between the internet of things (IoT) system and the internet of vehicles system, this method organizes the data assets of the vehicles combined with the layered architecture of the IoT system. The data security risks of vehicles are analyzed from the aspects of threat analysis, vulnerability analysis, and risk quantification. The risk points of vehicles are analyzed, so as to provide model design and verification methods for data security risk analysis of ICVs.",
      "published": "2024-12-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784485484.037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liyong Wang",
        "Long Jin",
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Yunpeng Chen",
        "Peng He",
        "Jingyan Wang",
        "Junzhe Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784485484.037",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1061/9780784487020.025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing Freight Resilience through Telematics: Insights from the Durkee Fire in Oregon",
      "description": "This study investigates the resilience of freight operations during the Durkee Fire in Oregon, using telematics data from heavy commercial vehicles (HCVs) to develop the Speed Consistency Resilience Index (SCRI). The analysis leverages trip-level data, including vehicle speeds, travel times, and distances, to assess performance across three phases of the fire: before, during, and after the event. The research highlights the vulnerability of freight systems to disruptions such as wildfires, which cause delays, rerouting, and increased operational costs, emphasizing the urgent need for methods to quantify resilience in freight networks. The methodology integrates statistical testing and spatial clustering to assess the fire’s impact. Key findings reveal significant disruptions in speed consistency, particularly along I-84, where closures led to sharp declines in resilience, especially in Baker County. In contrast, US-20 remained more stable, offering a viable alternative route with less disruption. The SCRI metric, which quantifies the consistency of truck speeds during disruptions, provided granular insights into spatial and temporal variations in resilience across the region. It offers a novel framework for understanding and improving the resilience of freight operations. These findings have practical implications for logistics operators and policymakers, helping to enhance contingency planning and inform infrastructure resilience strategies.",
      "published": "2026-06-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784487020.025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "resilience",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rakan Mohammad Radwan Albatayneh",
        "Salvador Hernández"
      ],
      "venue": "ASCE International Conference on Transportation and Development (ICTD)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1061/9780784487020.025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1063/5.0188481",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Developing a comprehensive solution for collecting and managing data from machines by different manufacturers",
      "description": "This research considers a telematics system which includes devices for tracking vehicles.The main purpose of the paper is to overview and select software.Existing software products for telemetry and monitoring are analyzed.Sustainable development is considered as a model of resource utilization, a model of human-nature interaction, a model of civilization development based on innovations and intellectual systems.Effective means of data collection, generalization and systematization in the field of agricultural mechanization, software complexes for data collection and management of machines by different manufacturers are analyzed, as well as an extensive group of software products for the sustainable development of agricultural infrastructure.Particular attention is paid to the need to determine the most appropriate ways to comprehensively solve the problem of collecting and managing data from machines by different manufacturers.The following methods are used for this: Method 1 -Send to Wialon.Some tracking systems have a relay function -sending online data about the desired vehicles to another tracking system using an agreed protocol.In other words, it is the ability to copy location information on both systems; Method 2 -WiaTag.For farmers who are not equipped with MTP Global Positioning System equipment, a solution is offered using the WiaTag mobile application.The Wiatag app is a free global positioning system tracker on a smartphone that does not require any costs to be installed on a car.It is considered appropriate to systematize the problems of sustainable development of the studied market in the form of a block diagram that differentiates and shows important characteristics of the role and position of subjects in achieving the main goalthe reconstruction of the agricultural machinery market and allowing for the means of innovative and technical restructuring of domestic agricultural production.At a certain stage of market development, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that each problem can be transferred from one block to another.The proposed solution to the problem of the lack of high-quality equipment, attractiveness in the domestic market, shown in the first block of the diagram, partially includes a solution to the problem of insufficient preferences for the domestic market on the part of the state.Machine-building enterprises and, as a result, solving the problem of the low level of technological equipment of domestic manufacturers.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0188481",
      "matched_terms": [
        "relay",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zharas Ainakulov",
        "Gulzhan Kurmankulova",
        "Serik Sarsengalievich Ospanov",
        "Zhadra Ainakulova",
        "Heinrich Schüle",
        "Kulmuhanbet Akhmetov"
      ],
      "venue": "AIP conference proceedings",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1063/5.0188481",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1063/5.0189841",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-depth evaluation of security requirements and attacks for secure data communication in ITS",
      "description": "With new technology, the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) has evolved into Data-Driven Intelligent Transport System (DDITS) and further to the Internet of Vehicles (IOV) during the last few decades. Vehicular Ad-hoc networks (VANETs), a hierarchy of Mobile Ad-hoc networks (MANETs), are usually deployed in smart ITS in urban, highway, and rural scenarios. VANET facilitates vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication with massive exchanges of safety and non-safety messages to other vehicles. Moreover, it achieves low latency in an open-access environment without requiring fixed infrastructure or centralized administration, improving ride quality, safety, comfort, and efficiency issues in road traffic. However, open wireless communication channels make these messages vulnerable to attackers to intercept, tamper, replay, and eradicate them. Hence, this paper provides an extensive overview of VANETs, security, and various attacks and countermeasures. It further analyses the critical and challenging security issues, in particular Authentication, data confidentiality, data integrity, availability, and nonrepudiation.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0189841",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Y. Sandeep",
        "P. Venugopal"
      ],
      "venue": "AIP conference proceedings",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1063/5.0189841",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1063/5.0279672",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart grid technologies for optimizing renewable energy utilization in electric vehicle charging infrastructure",
      "description": "This study explores the impact of integrating smart grid technologies on enhancing the efficiency of utilizing renewable energy in electric vehicle (EV) charging networks. This article gives a thorough understanding of how smart grid enhancements play a key function in boosting the reliability and efficacy of EV charging partnerships that largely renewable source. It digs fully into the basic components and how it operates smart grid systems, highlighting their function in real-time regulation and balancing of electricity supply and demand. By scrutinizing case studies and optimal strategies, it demonstrates successful applications of smart grid technologies in EV charging, underscoring advantages such as enhanced energy management, cost reductions, and a decreased environmental footprint. Furthermore, the article addresses technical aspects such as interoperability and cyber security, in addition to policy and regulatory frameworks that support the deployment of smart grids. Lastly, it delineates future prospects and possibilities for advancing smart grid optimization in EV charging infrastructure, highlighting its capacity to instigate transformative changes in sustainable transportation systems.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0279672",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vasupalli Manoj",
        "Venkataramana Guntreddi",
        "R. S. R. Krishnam Naidu",
        "Songa Radha",
        "Srinivasa Rao Sura",
        "Ramana Pilla"
      ],
      "venue": "AIP conference proceedings",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1063/5.0279672",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/01441647.2018.1494640",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Governing autonomous vehicles: emerging responses for safety, liability, privacy, cybersecurity, and industry risks",
      "description": "The benefits of autonomous vehicles (AVs) are widely acknowledged, but there are concerns about the extent of these benefits and AV risks and unintended consequences. In this article, we first examine AVs and different categories of the technological risks associated with them. We then explore strategies that can be adopted to address these risks, and explore emerging responses by governments for addressing AV risks. Our analyses reveal that, thus far, governments have in most instances avoided stringent measures in order to promote AV developments and the majority of responses are non-binding and focus on creating councils or working groups to better explore AV implications. The US has been active in introducing legislations to address issues related to privacy and cybersecurity. The UK and Germany, in particular, have enacted laws to address liability issues; other countries mostly acknowledge these issues, but have yet to implement specific strategies. To address privacy and cybersecurity risks strategies ranging from introduction or amendment of non-AV specific legislation to creating working groups have been adopted. Much less attention has been paid to issues such as environmental and employment risks, although a few governments have begun programmes to retrain workers who might be negatively affected.",
      "published": "2018-07-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2018.1494640",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Araz Taeihagh",
        "Hazel Si Min Lim"
      ],
      "venue": "Transport Reviews",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1080/01441647.2018.1494640",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 616,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/01441647.2020.1862355",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ethical issues in focus by the autonomous vehicles industry",
      "description": "The onset of autonomous driving has provided fertile ground for discussions about ethics in recent years. These discussions are heavily documented in the scientific literature and have mainly revolved around extreme traffic situations depicted as moral dilemmas, i.e. situations in which the autonomous vehicle (AV) is required to make a difficult moral choice. Quite surprisingly, little is known about the ethical issues in focus by the AV industry. General claims have been made about the struggles of companies regarding the ethical issues of AVs but these lack proper substantiation. As private companies are highly influential on the development and acceptance of AV technologies, a meaningful debate about the ethics of AVs should take into account the ethical issues prioritised by industry. In order to assess the awareness and engagement of industry on the ethics of AVs, we inspected the narratives in the official business and technical reports of companies with an AV testing permit in California. The findings of our literature and industry review suggest that: (i) given the plethora of ethical issues addressed in the reports, autonomous driving companies seem to be aware of and engaged in the ethics of autonomous driving technology; (ii) scientific literature and industry reports prioritise safety and cybersecurity; (iii) scientific and industry communities agree that AVs will not eliminate the risk of accidents; (iv) scientific literature on AV technology ethics is dominated by discussions about the trolley problem; (v) moral dilemmas resembling trolley cases are not addressed in industry reports but there are nuanced allusions that unravel underlying concerns about these extreme traffic situations; (vi) autonomous driving companies have different approaches with respect to the authority of remote operators; and (vii) companies seem invested in a lowest liability risk design strategy relying on rules and regulations, expedite investigations, and crash/collision avoidance algorithms.",
      "published": "2021-01-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2020.1862355",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreia Martins Martinho",
        "Nils Herber",
        "Maarten Kroesen",
        "Caspar G Chorus"
      ],
      "venue": "Transport Reviews",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1080/01441647.2020.1862355",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 166,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/01441647.2025.2502879",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric vehicle charging disadvantage: a social justice perspective on charging with implications to accessibility",
      "description": "Electric vehicle (EV) charging access is an important component in the transition to electric mobility, yet access disparities exist across user groups, creating distributive, recognition, and procedural justice gaps. In this paper, we introduce the term charging disadvantage, denoting challenges users face in accessing EV charging. We develop a conceptual framework, the EV charging capabilities (EVCC) framework, grounded on the social justice perspective of the capabilities approach, to illustrate the determinants and impacts of charging access, considering both transport and energy contexts. We conducted a literature review to inform the development of this framework. While previous literature extensively studied the impact of charging access on EV adoption, we further explore the effects on users’ travel behaviour, activity scheduling, and accrual of energy-related assets. By shifting the viewpoint of charging access from spatial infrastructure distribution to the provision of capabilities, we can identify the roles of financial capacity, personal conditions, social roles and relationships, physical environment, and wider structural conditions on charging disadvantage and its consequences. The EVCC framework can be applied as a tool to systematically identify users vulnerable to charging disadvantage and to guide the analysis of EV charging policies and practices. Using the same literature review, we demonstrate one of these applications by identifying highly vulnerable groups and providing recommendations to address their vulnerability. We underscore the need for EV charging infrastructure planning and deployment that is user-centred and captures activity and energy access, rather than solely relying on physical proximity to facilitate a just electric mobility transition.",
      "published": "2025-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2025.2502879",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "vulnerability",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Isrrah Malabanan",
        "Patrícia Sauri Lavieri",
        "Iderlina B. Mateo-Babiano"
      ],
      "venue": "Transport Reviews",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1080/01441647.2025.2502879",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/0735648x.2019.1692425",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive cybersecurity: assessing a new platform for cybercrime and malicious hacking",
      "description": "ABSTRACT The push for technological enhancement and Internet connectivity in all aspects of modern life is radically transforming our use of devices and equipment that was not designed with this functionality. In fact, technological enhancements are transforming the automotive industry by increasing the number of components within the vehicle that are controlled by computers and which provide information to remote systems by various communications methods. These changes create new opportunities for cybercrime, particularly acts of cyber-trespass by computer hackers. This study considers how these technical threats may be limited through the use of criminological theory, specifically a routine activities perspective. The role of various actors in the automotive supply chain, and their potential function to deter and mitigate threats are discussed. The implications of this study for theory and practice are discussed in depth.",
      "published": "2019-10-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648x.2019.1692425",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jay P. Kennedy",
        "T. Holt",
        "B. Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Crime and Justice",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1080/0735648x.2019.1692425",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/08839514.2023.2193461",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Autonomous Driving Model Resistant to Adversarial Attack",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) offer improved efficiency and convenience through innovative embedded devices. However, the development of these technologies has often neglected security measures, leading to vulnerabilities that can be exploited by hackers. Conceding that a CAV system is compromised, it can result in unsafe driving conditions and pose a threat to human safety. Prioritizing both security measures and functional enhancements on development of CAVs is essential to ensure their safety and reliability and enhance consumer trust in the technology. CAVs use artificial intelligence to control their driving behavior, which can be easily influenced by small changes in the model that can significantly impact and potentially mislead the system. To address this issue, this study proposed a defense mechanism that uses an autoencoder and a compressive memory module to store normal image features and prevent unexpected generalization on adversarial inputs. The proposed solution was studied against Hijacking, Vanishing, Fabrication, and Mislabeling attacks using FGSM and AdvGAN against the Nvidia Dave-2 driving model, and was found to be effective, with success rates of 93.8% and 91.2% in a Whitebox setup, and 74.1% and 64.4% in a Blackbox setup for FGSM and AdvGAN, respectively. That improves the results by 24.7% in Whitebox setup 21.5% in Blackbox setup.",
      "published": "2023-03-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/08839514.2023.2193461",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kabid Hassan Shibly",
        "Md Delwar Hossain",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue",
        "Yuzo Taenaka",
        "Youki Kadobayashi"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Artificial Intelligence",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1080/08839514.2023.2193461",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/08874417.2022.2103853",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in the Automotive Industry: A Systematic Literature Review (SLR)",
      "description": "This paper presents a systematic literature review (SLR) on cybersecurity in the automotive industry. Using the R tool Bibliometrix, a total of 537 papers related to cybersecurity and the automotive industry were analyzed. First, our paper contributes to academia by showing that research on this topic is grouped into four clusters that correspond to four lines of research: Automotive Security; Vehicle Engineering; Smart Vehicle; IT Security. Second, our paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the existing gaps. On the subject of standards and framework, there are gaps in terms of what the security requirements must be for the vehicle. This is very important since, given the heterogeneity of technology that vehicles from different manufacturers have, the cybersecurity requirements are different. Additionally, a gap can also be observed in the literature on the supply chain, which has a very small number of papers. In general, they do not cover or elaborate on the supply chain security, when, from a manufacturing point of view, it is very important to manage an effective cybersecurity strategy for the vehicles. Moreover, our paper also contributes to managers and policy-makers’ understanding of cybersecurity. We show that adequate implementation of cybersecurity in the automotive must involve a multidimensional perspective. First, it should be a multistage model, ranging from the first stages of design in interconnection with the suppliers to the final stages of use by the customer. Second, it should be a multi-level model, as a consequence of the interconnection of the vehicle’s control systems. Finally, the model should be multi-feedback, structuring the process design as a feedback system, including incident response, diagnosis services and vehicle updates.",
      "published": "2022-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/08874417.2022.2103853",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ignacio Fernandez De Arroyabe",
        "Tim Watson",
        "Olga Angelopoulou"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Information Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1080/08874417.2022.2103853",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3825,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1080/08874417.2022.2103853 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: incident, suppliers, very, response, vehicle., services, there, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/10447318.2015.1070540",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research Issues in Smart Vehicles and Elderly Drivers: A Literature Review",
      "description": "This article reviewed both studies on general smart car technologies and human–computer interaction (HCI)/human–vehicle interaction studies that were published in journals and conferences so that the current status of research can be identified and future research directions can be suggested. Furthermore, previous studies on elderly drivers were reviewed, as these drivers could be the most vulnerable social group in terms of new technology acceptance. A total of 257 articles for HCI research and 45 articles for elderly drivers were selected and reviewed from 11,267 collected articles (2010–2014). According to the results, most articles were mainly related to safety and adaptive features (e.g., driver’s state recognition, vehicle surrounding monitoring, driver action-suggestion), and infotainment research in terms of HCI (e.g., information technology devices–vehicle interaction, vehicle–vehicle interaction) was relatively insufficient despite its high research demand. According to the results of the literature review and technological trends analysis based on previous technical road maps, from HCI/human factors engineering (HFE) perspectives, research related to “Assistance systems,” “Physiological & mental state recognition,” “Position sensor technology,” “Behavior recognition,” and “Infotainment” was suggested to HCI/HFE researchers for further research. In particular, HCI/HFE researchers need to focus on research on acceptable levels of automation, observing new driving behaviors, investigation of driver characteristics to develop personalized services, and new technology acceptance to develop and improve smart cars in the future.",
      "published": "2015-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/10447318.2015.1070540",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ilsun Rhiu",
        "Sanghyun Kwon",
        "Sangwoo Bahn",
        "Myung Hwan Yun",
        "Wooyeon Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1080/10447318.2015.1070540",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/13639811.2014.996995",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MUSLIM MOTHERS AND INDONESIAN GOSSIP SHOWS IN EVERYDAY LIFE",
      "description": "Television gossip shows, popularly known as infotainment, have become a daily staple for Indonesian viewers for more than a decade. However, due to its nature of publicly airing the supposedly dirty laundry of Indonesian celebrities, infotainment has been under attack since its inception. Religious, professional and social organisations have publicly debated its content to little effect since infotainment remains one of the most watched television programmes. This article seeks to explore and analyse the infotainment landscape in Indonesian television and to examine the experiences of Indonesian Muslim mothers, who are exposed to infotainment, and how they negotiate these programmes in terms of their understanding of the Islamic prohibition of gossip.",
      "published": "2015-03-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2014.996995",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hanny Savitri Hartono"
      ],
      "venue": "Indonesia and the Malay World",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1080/13639811.2014.996995",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/1600910x.2018.1503609",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Who, or what, is insurtech personalizing?: persons, prices and the historical classifications of risk",
      "description": "This paper examines the promises and pitfalls associated with Insurtech – the anticipated innovations in the insurance industry associated with social media marketing, artificial intelligence, big data analytics and more – and focuses in particular on the new methods of pricing and premium setting that are claimed to follow from the availability of self-tracking technologies and new volumes of customer data. Using the examples of telematics data in car insurance, efforts by health insurers to incentivize health behaviours (for example through the use of fitness trackers), and insurance companies’ own marketing materials, we assess the current state of play in the field of ‘personalized’ insurance pricing, pointing to obstacles as well as opportunities associated with its development. We then set these contemporary developments against a longer history of insurance pricing, understood as a history of arranging and classifying objects and persons for the purposes of calculating risk. We show that in its longer history, insurance reflected but also contributed to uncertainties about the distinction between persons and property. Drawing these two strands together, we conclude by assessing the implications of insurtech for future understandings of personhood. While there is scope for new categories of personhood to emerge, we show that there are also important continuities between past and present in terms of the challenge of bringing persons, parts of persons, material objects and pecuniary interests into successful alignment.",
      "published": "2018-05-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910x.2018.1503609",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liz McFall",
        "Liz Moor"
      ],
      "venue": "Distinktion Journal of Social Theory",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1080/1600910x.2018.1503609",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1080/29941849.2026.2678064",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Urban road pricing reframed: a critical review of imperativeness and relevance for the twenty-first century cities in polycrises",
      "description": "This critical review analyses road pricing as a pivotal instrument for governing urban polycrises-the convergence of climatic, social, technological, and fiscal shocks. By evaluating seminal theories from Pigou, Vickrey, and Smeed alongside Singapore's Area Licensing Scheme, this study identifies the limitations of classical models amidst current mobility disruptions. While addressing traditional debates regarding equity, privacy, and political acceptability, the paper proposes that integrating emerging technologies, such as edge computing and advanced telematics, overcomes historical implementation barriers, transitioning conventional tolling into real-time urban governance. Furthermore, twelve innovative framings are introduced to expand the scope of road pricing to include the regulation of electric, connected, and automated vehicles (eCAVs) and automated logistics. Given the erosion of fossil fuel tax revenues and increasing climate-related volatility, the study argues that pricing based on distance and spatial occupancy is the most robust mechanism for ensuring urban resilience. The analysis concludes that road pricing should function as the city's \"operating system\"-a governance framework where algorithmic efficiency is subordinated to a social contract of spatial justice, redistributing revenue to subsidise public transport and mitigate structural inequalities.",
      "published": "2026-06-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/29941849.2026.2678064",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "regulation",
        "resilience",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Humberto Barrera-Jiménez",
        "Mark Stevenson"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainable Transport and Livability",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1080/29941849.2026.2678064",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1742-6596/1607/1/012054",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Road vehicles Cybersecurity system evaluation method",
      "description": "Abstract With the continuous improvement of automobile intelligence and networking, automobile cybersecurity has gradually become the focus of attention from enterprises and research institutions. Whether it is domestic or international, there are many organizations and institutions on the Internet of vehicles cybersecurity is widely concerned, ISO 21434 road vehicle network security project, is an international automotive network security standard, which covers the entire life cycle of automotive products (from design to retirement), is currently in the development. From the perspective of ISO 21434 cybersecurity system requirements, this paper proposes an cybersecurity system evaluation method for automobile companies, in order to evaluate whether or to what extent each automobile company meets the cybersecurity status of ISO 21434 standard.",
      "published": "2020-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1607/1/012054",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hao Shan",
        "Kexun He",
        "Baizheng Wang",
        "Xiyu Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Physics Conference Series",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1088/1742-6596/1607/1/012054",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1742-6596/1729/1/012010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hybrid-Optimizer-Enhanced Neural Network Method for the Security Vulnerability Study of Multiplexer Arbiter PUFs",
      "description": "Abstract With the advent of the Internet of Things, security has become indispensable. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are emerging as a promising alternative to classical cryptographic algorithms as it provides a lightweight and cost-effective solution for implementing a keyless security mechanism. Before adopting a PUF for real-world applications, a thorough examination of all important properties of PUF is necessary, and security and reliability are two of the important properties. The multiplexer based PUF (MPUF) was recently designed to improve upon the reliability while maintaining a similar resistance to machine learning (ML) attacks as compared with XOR PUFs of certain sizes. Recently, feed-forward neural network (NN) methods were found to be an effective tool for studying PUFs’ security against ML attacks, and a study in 2019 found that some MPUFs are insecure against NN attack methods. In this paper, we try to gain further insight into various factors of NNs that affect the predictive power of NN as PUF attack methods. We investigate a NN that employs different optimizers at different stages of the machine learning process, leading to what is called a hybrid-optimizer-enhanced NN. We implemented the new NN for ML attack of MPUFs, and experimental results have shown it converges faster than a traditional NN with a single optimizer on attacking MPUFs, and the new method also requires less training data as compared with a recent NN-based attack study of MPUFs.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1729/1/012010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khalid T. Mursi",
        "Bipana Thapaliya",
        "Yu Zhuang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Physics Conference Series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1088/1742-6596/1729/1/012010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1742-6596/1757/1/012044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on CAN Bus Anomaly Detection Based on LSTM AndResNet",
      "description": "Abstract With the rapid development of intelligent network vehicles, the safety of the vehicle network is taken seriously increasingly, the CAN as the most widely used car on-board network, its security problem has become one of the most important problemsin intelligent made car development, the communication of CAN bus network characteristic and the existing safety problems and analyzes the common means of attack, on the basis of this puts forward the anomaly detection model based on LSTM And ResNet, through the experimental results show that this method CAN effectively detect deception attack.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1757/1/012044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiaqi Song",
        "Fei Li",
        "Ruxiang Li",
        "Yalin Li",
        "Qiyang Zhou",
        "Jiayan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Physics Conference Series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1088/1742-6596/1757/1/012044",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1742-6596/1767/1/012049",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure and Authenticate Communication by using SoftSIM for Intelligent Transportation System in Smart Cities",
      "description": "Abstract Intelligent Transportation System is a field which is daily paving way for new technologies. Communication in vehicular devices has paved way for security breaches. Vehicle-to-everything connects each and every device to our vehicle just like Internet of Things connects everything to the internet. Everything which is connected to the internet, is prone to security attack. It is very difficult to track the source of the information. Authentication is a big issue and has to be solved. This paper has provided a cognitive approach to address this problem effectively in ITS. A softSIM- similar to the hardware SIM has been proposed. An architecture of the softSIM is designed. A novel algorithm for authenticating the on-board softSIM with the operator has been developed. The performance analysis of softSIM is compared with regular device users. The paper also incorporates future scope as well as business case of the study. The soft SIM will be part of on-board unit and shall come programmed from manufacturer side. This has provided cost effective solution and saved the space that was needed for the hardware SIM.",
      "published": "2021-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1767/1/012049",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shalini Yadav",
        "Rahul Rishi"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Physics Conference Series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1088/1742-6596/1767/1/012049",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1742-6596/2517/1/012012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SP-E: Security Evaluation Framework of In-vehicle Infotainment System based on Threat Analyses and Penetration Tests",
      "description": "Abstract With the increasing requirement of people, the functions of in-vehicle infotainment systems are becoming more and more abundant, and their security also affects the safety of vehicles. Therefore, it is more and more important to evaluate the security of the IVI system. This paper proposes a security evaluation framework for in-vehicle infotainment systems based on threat analyses and penetration tests. By constructing the data flow diagram of application scenarios, analyzing threats, combing the attack link diagram, combining white-box audit and black-box test, we use the characteristics of high efficiency of automatic tools and high accuracy of manual methods to set factor sets, and then the whole IVI system is evaluated by Analytic Hierarchy Process and Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2517/1/012012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuang Li",
        "Xin Zhang",
        "Yue Zhou",
        "Meng Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Physics Conference Series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1088/1742-6596/2517/1/012012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1742-6596/930/1/012045",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of GDP Information Technology in Developing of Regional Central Business (Case 50 Airports IT City Development in Indonesia)",
      "description": "Indonesia a great number of populations and demand of air transportation services keep increasing by the year in line with the increasing of population and welfare its people. Need for telematics solutions to support goods transport and distribution in cities is mainly due to the complexity of the processes taking place in urban transport systems and the importance of the optimisation of transport operations via ensuring adequate availability of linear and point infrastructure, while reducing the adverse impacts of the transport system on the environment. Efficient infrastructure supports economic growth, improves quality of life, and it is important for national security. Impact of GDP Information Technology in developing of Regional Central Business especially SME Business, are very large correlations and very significant supported by Passenger Arrival and Departure, Baggage Loaded and Unloaded, Cargo Loaded and Unloaded, Separated regional asset, Grant, Capital Expenditure, Investment of Regional Gov., GDP Agriculture-Forestry-Fishing, GDP Manufacturing, GDP Electricity-Gas, GDP Water supply- Sewerage-Waste Management-Remediation Activities, GDP Financial-Insurance Activities, GDP Business Activities, GDP Public Administration and Defense-Compulsory Social Security, GDP Education and GDP Other Services Activities",
      "published": "2017-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/930/1/012045",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joko Suyono",
        "Agus Sukoco",
        "Muhammad Ikhsan Setiawan",
        "Suhermin Suhermin",
        "Robbi Rahim"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Physics Conference Series",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1088/1742-6596/930/1/012045",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1757-899x/163/1/012012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Change management methodologies trained for automotive infotainment projects",
      "description": "An Automotive Electronic Control Units (ECU) development project embedded within a car Environment is constantly under attack of a continuous flow of modifications of specifications throughout the life cycle. Root causes for those modifications are for instance simply software or hardware implementation errors or requirement changes to satisfy the forthcoming demands of the market to ensure the later commercial success. It is unavoidable that from the very beginning until the end of the project \"requirement changes\" will \"expose\" the agreed objectives defined by contract specifications, which are product features, budget, schedule and quality. The key discussions will focus upon an automotive radio-navigation (infotainment) unit, which challenges aftermarket devises such as smart phones. This competition stresses especially current used automotive development processes, which are fit into a 4 Year car development (introduction) cycle against a one-year update cycle of a smart phone. The research will focus the investigation of possible impacts of changes during all phases of the project: the Concept-Validation, Development and Debugging-Phase. Building a thorough understanding of prospective threats is of paramount importance in order to establish the adequate project management process to handle requirement changes. Personal automotive development experiences and Literature review of change- and configuration management software development methodologies led the authors to new conceptual models, which integrates into the structure of traditional development models used in automotive projects, more concretely of radio-navigation projects.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899x/163/1/012012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "infotainment",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gabriela Ioana Prostean",
        "Stephan Volker",
        "A Hutanu"
      ],
      "venue": "IOP Conference Series Materials Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1088/1757-899x/163/1/012012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1757-899x/878/1/012047",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Logistics 4.0 and supply chain 4.0 in the automotive industry",
      "description": "Abstract The Industry 4.0 technologies give real benefits to the plants where they are implemented such as performance improvement, costs and delays reductions. The automotive plants are among the factories that could implement most of these technologies. Industry 4.0 can affect all of the processes which happen in the automotive industry manufacturing plants – engineering, production, logistics, management, etc. Analysis of all of the processes in one article is too complex task and due to this the paper is focused only on logistics and supply chain. The aim of this article is to investigate the potential possibilities for implementation of Logistics 4.0 and Supply Chain 4.0 in the automotive industry plants, in particular in Bulgaria. Specially designed survey was used as investigation method. It consists of two groups with proposals and assumptions. The survey was conducted by 12 automotive industry logistics experts who are on 6 different logistics positions. The results show that the production visibility (assembly lines connected to internet) and blockchain technologies have the biggest values to the logistics and supply chain. But the cybersecurity and faulty data are the main challenges in front of them.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899x/878/1/012047",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Krasimir Markov",
        "Pavel Vitliemov"
      ],
      "venue": "IOP Conference Series Materials Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1088/1757-899x/878/1/012047",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1088/1757-899x/993/1/012102",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review on various authentication schemes and attacks on connected vehicles",
      "description": "Connected cars are comfortable to drivers. But it also threat to humans. Connected vehicles share data like street safety, traffic analysis, road administration information like café, hospital, etc utilizing intruded on web availability and it is time delicate. Connected vehicles allow drivers and passengers to connect to the outside world while on the road. Security is the primary challenge for automakers and other stakeholders, because connected vehicles rely on wireless and cellular communication interfaces. Information should be protected from intruders. The communications between connected vehicles should be a trusted one. Safety is the primary focus of connected cars and the intruders should be identified and the intruders and falsified nodes can be identified by authentication schemes. In VANET vehicles react as indicated by the data got from the opposite end, so it is very vital that the data spreading in the framework is valid and produced by a genuine client. But there are many pitfalls in various authentication schemes. Privacy of the connected vehicles should be while sharing information and also information shared between connected vehicles should be an authenticated one. So still it a major challenge in connected vehicles due to the special characteristics like mobility, time sensitive, etc. This survey discussed the various authentication schemes and the various attacks related to that. Based on the survey, future directions of the secured trusted communications of connected vehicles have been discussed. The aim of this survey is to identify secured authentication techniques for a trusted communication.",
      "published": "2020-12-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899x/993/1/012102",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. S. Bennet Praba",
        "J.S. Femilda Josephin"
      ],
      "venue": "IOP Conference Series Materials Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1088/1757-899x/993/1/012102",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4044,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1088/1757-899x/993/1/012102 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: vital, primary, sensitive, very, like, there, privacy, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxag087",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integration of context-based feature encoding techniques for attack classification in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Abstract Automotive systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their reliance on in-vehicle networking protocols, particularly the Controller Area Network (CAN), for inter-component communication. Addressing these threats necessitates advanced and adaptable intrusion detection mechanisms. Traditional feature encoding techniques often fail to capture contextual relationships within CAN frame data, leading to reduced detection accuracy. This study introduces a novel feature encoding workflow to semantically encode CAN data bytes using two word embedding techniques such as fastText and Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT). By transforming raw byte data into enriched feature representations, the embeddings effectively capture both byte-level semantics and contextual relationships, enhancing the input space for classifiers like Random Forest, XGBoost, and CatBoost. The models were developed and tested using a standard car hacking dataset. Performance comparisons revealed that embedding-based approaches, including fastText and BERT, achieved superior classification results over traditional methods, with BERT showing slight advantages in recognizing complex attack patterns. For instance, XGBoost exhibited notable improvements with embeddings, increasing precision from 91% to 99%, recall from 74% to 97%, and F1-score from 85% to 98%. These findings confirm the critical role of word embeddings in improving intrusion detection effectiveness and emphasize their value in strengthening the cybersecurity of in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2026-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/bxag087",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J Vanajakshi",
        "A Renuka",
        "Srikanth Shenoy",
        "N. D. Adesh"
      ],
      "venue": "The Computer Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1093/comjnl/bxag087",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1093/isagsq/ksae091",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Radical Right Dystopias in the Global Culture Wars",
      "description": "Abstract Despite the pervasive description of our times as dystopian, the disciplines of political theory and international relations seldom consider the political power of dystopian imaginaries. This article seeks to remedy this neglect by focusing on the radical Right's invocation of dystopias. These dystopian narratives go beyond mere scaremongering and constitute instead “critical dystopias” that follow a distinct grammar rooted in the radical Right's ideological critique of managerialism and liberal globalization. They express the radical Right's fear of liberalism, exploiting the latent dystopian possibilities in the liberal present. Promoted by right-wing influencers and media pundits, critical dystopias translate theoretical and ideological interpretations of social and political life into globally mobile, everyday infotainment readily accessible to broader, global audiences. As such, radical Right dystopias are affective strategies in a global culture war that may help (re)produce and reinforce political subjectivities, identities, and geopolitical imaginaries. They provide a window on the global appeal and interconnectedness of the radical Right and serve as a reminder of the importance of emotions and affect in international politics.",
      "published": "2024-12-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksae091",
      "matched_terms": [
        "geopolitical",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Espionage / sovereignty"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rita Abrahamsen",
        "Michael C. Williams"
      ],
      "venue": "Global Studies Quarterly",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1093/isagsq/ksae091",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1093/iti/liaf007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cascading impacts to critical national infrastructure in connected places triggered by cyber-attacks on smart EV charging infrastructure",
      "description": "Abstract Managing security risks for Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in connected places (earlier known as smart cities) needs to address a consistent ‘system of systems’ approach across local, regional, city and country regimes in addition to traditional cyber security measures that focus on individual systems. This is because, the collective cyber risks of IoT-based smart infrastructures can result in cascading impacts in the inter-connected and inter-related systems posing a risk to the CNI. A systematic literature review was conducted to explore the current state of research that assesses the cascading impacts of potential cyberattacks on smart electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. While the results discussed here cannot be generalized beyond the literature examined, it was found that defining detailed description of threat scenarios with cascading impacts that could manifest, can help establish security mechanisms with stronger accountabilities that anticipate and manage the cascading cyber risks in connected places. After further analysis of security interventions in the UK, it was recommended that the standards, frameworks, guidelines and national strategy need to refer to an overarching policy owned by a UK Government Department for security and resilience of connected places. This research also contributes to the academic literature on crime and place.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/iti/liaf007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meha Shukla",
        "Shane D. Johnson",
        "Peter Jones"
      ],
      "venue": "Intelligent Transportation Infrastructure",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1093/iti/liaf007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1093/oso/9780197763018.003.0008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Conclusions",
      "description": "Abstract The Conclusions chapter links the nineties to the 2020s and answer Why the Nineties Matter. The Bush administration invaded Afghanistan, then Iraq, resulting in wars that lasted until 2021. The Department of Homeland Security changed air travel and prevented another 9/11. NAFTA transformed the economies of its participants. The Soviet Union collapsed, Russia emerged, NATO expanded and united when Russia attacked Ukraine. The Clarence Thomas–Anita Hill episode popularized the term sexual harassment and laid the foundation for the Me Too Movement, and the Rodney King beating showcased police brutality as did the George Floyd episode that provoked the Black Lives Matter marches. Reality television and social media helped Donald Trump become president. Since Ruby Ridge, antigovernment militia groups have surged, and since the O. J. Simpson trial, the news has become Infotainment. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell began the conversation about gender and same sex marriage, now popularly approved. Anything Goes American culture has become mainstream, and the dot.com revolution changed human behavior.",
      "published": "2024-03-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197763018.003.0008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Terry H. Anderson"
      ],
      "venue": "Oxford University Press eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1093/oso/9780197763018.003.0008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1108/lht-01-2021-0013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity attacks on CAN bus based vehicles: a review and open challenges",
      "description": "Purpose Nowadays, connected vehicles are becoming quite complex systems which are made up of different devices. In such a vehicle, there are several electronic control units (ECUs) that represent basic units of computation. These ECUs communicate with each other over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol which ensures a high communication rate. Even though it is an efficient standard which provides communication for in-vehicle networks, it is prone to various cybersecurity attacks. This paper aims to present a systematic literature review (SLR) which focuses on potential attacks on CAN bus networks. Then, it surveys the solutions proposed to overcome these attacks. In addition, it investigates the validation strategies aiming to check their accuracy and correctness. Design/methodology/approach The authors have adopted the SLR methodology to summarize existing research papers that focus on the potential attacks on CAN bus networks. In addition, they compare the selected papers by classifying them according to the adopted validation strategies. They identify also gaps in the existing literature and provide a set of open challenges that can significantly improve the existing works. Findings The study showed that most of the examined papers adopted the simulation as a validation strategy to imitate the system behavior and evaluate a set of performance criteria. Nevertheless, a little consideration has been given to the formal verification of the proposed systems. Originality/value Unlike the existing surveys, this paper presents the first SLR that identifies local and remote security attacks that can compromise in-vehicle and inter-vehicle communications. Moreover, it compares the reviewed papers while focusing on the used validation strategies.",
      "published": "2021-08-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1108/lht-01-2021-0013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Faten Fakhfakh",
        "Mohamed Tounsi",
        "Mohamed Mosbah"
      ],
      "venue": "Library Hi Tech",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1108/lht-01-2021-0013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/3ict56508.2022.9990620",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Data Extraction for Vehicles Forensic Investigation",
      "description": "In a criminal investigation, vehicles are quickly becoming another crucial source of digital evidence. When a car is involved in a criminal offensive such as road traffic accidents, drunk driving even a robbery or a terrorist attack, investigators typically focus on the capture of DNA, fingerprints, and other non-digital identifying materials. (e.g. calls, contacts, messages, pictures, videos and even web history). This paper is to present our findings undertaken on a 2008 Mitsubishi colt with non-factory fitted equipment which in the 2000s many drivers wanted extra comfort while driving to their own music and even connect the mobile device to their vehicles to call others. By using Mobile forensic techniques and On-board Diagnostics (OBD) software to read the vehicles engine status we can show what data is stored within a vehicle and if there is enough to support a case. This Investigation involves a Maxtek Dashboard camera, Ankeway Head unit, the ECU within the vehicle, a Samsung galaxy Android tablet and it’s our goal to show the techniques used to show the different types off data receivable from the vehicle mentioned.",
      "published": "2022-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/3ict56508.2022.9990620",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "ecu",
        "obd"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Corey Stathers",
        "M. Muhammad",
        "Adebamigbe Fasanmade",
        "A. Al-Bayatti",
        "J. Morden",
        "M. S. Sharif"
      ],
      "venue": "2022 International Conference on Innovation and Intelligence for Informatics, Computing, and Technologies (3ICT)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/3ict56508.2022.9990620",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/3ict60104.2023.10391747",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting attacks on in-vehicle networks through a mobile app",
      "description": "The in-vehicle network is composed of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are used to control the electronic behavior of the vehicle. These components receive information from the sensors to take action if necessary. The most commonly used communication protocol in vehicles is the Controller Area Network (CAN), a broadcast system that provides efficient and economical communication. In this context, cybersecurity is essential to ensure driver safety and proper vehicle operation. An attacker could access the internal communication network of the car and read, modify, replicate, or block the data exchanged between the ECUs, leading to various issues such as providing the driver with incorrect information regarding some vehicle consumption data, or tampering with the brakes of the car by blocking the messages before they reach the ECUs. Therefore, it is necessary to detect anomalies and attacks at an early stage to protect the driver’s safety and privacy. Once an attack is identified, a response is required. This article presents a prototype of a mobile application that receives notifications from the Vehicle Security Operations Center (V-SOC) if an attack is detected. An open-source data set has been used to test the attack phase. The results obtained for the attacks analyzed are about 100% for the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score, but since the proposed approach aims to show communication between the V-SOC and a mobile app, we do not consider the metrics. The mobile app receives data on vehicle performance from the back-end server and displays them to the user.",
      "published": "2023-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/3ict60104.2023.10391747",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Paolo Buono",
        "Alessandro Pagano",
        "Danilo Caivano"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Innovation and Intelligence for Informatics, Computing, and Technologies (3ICT)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/3ict60104.2023.10391747",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/5gwf49715.2020.9221363",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight and Space-efficient Vehicle Authentication based on Cuckoo Filter",
      "description": "While the emerging vehicle-to-everything (V2X) connectivity paradigm is radically transforming the automotive sector, unprecedented security challenges arise, calling for innovative security enablers with minimum impact on the ongoing communication. In dense V2X scenarios, the 5G authentication and key agreement (5G-AKA) procedure may suffer from uncontrolled failures which result in unacceptable latency levels due to the excessive signalling overhead. In this paper, we introduce a lightweight vehicle authentication scheme, as an extension of the 5G-AKA, to adequately address a high number of authentication requests. The proposed mechanism leverages the space-efficient features of the cuckoo filter, a probabilistic data structure for approximate set membership tests, to achieve authentication of multiple vehicles at a time. Our performance analysis reveals the impact of various cuckoo filter parameter configurations on the authentication efficiency. In addition, our proposed authentication mechanism is able to outperform the standardized 5G-AKA procedure in terms of latency and protocol overhead even for high vehicle load.",
      "published": "2020-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/5gwf49715.2020.9221363",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Charalampos Kalalas",
        "Jesús Alonso-Zárate"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE 5G World Forum (5GWF)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/5gwf49715.2020.9221363",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aaiee64965.2025.11101603",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic Incentive Strategies for Smart EV Charging Stations: A LLM-Driven User Digital Twin Approach",
      "description": "Electric vehicles and vehicle-to-grid technology are pivotal to modern demand response systems, yet their effectiveness is hindered by uncertainties in user behavior and low participation. To address these challenges, this paper presents a collaborative multi-agent demand response framework enhanced by large language models. By constructing user digital twins that integrate multidimensional user profile features, user decision-making patterns can be accurately predicted. Furthermore, a data and knowledge dual-driven dynamic incentive mechanism is introduced, combined with a network-constrained distributed optimization model, to optimize grid-user interactions while ensuring economic efficiency and security. Simulation results indicate significant improvements in peak load mitigation and charge-discharge strategies. Experimental validation highlights the system’s advantages in load balancing, user satisfaction, and grid stability, providing policymakers with a scalable V2G management tool that fosters sustainable vehicle-grid synergy.",
      "published": "2025-04-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aaiee64965.2025.11101603",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yichen Sun",
        "Cheng-Gang Cui",
        "Chuanlin Zhang",
        "Chun-Yang Gong"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE International Symposium on the Application of Artificial Intelligence in Electrical Engineering (AAIEE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/aaiee64965.2025.11101603",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2017.2752420",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Establishing an Intelligent Transportation System With a Network Security Mechanism in an Internet of Vehicle Environment",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicle (IoV) utilizes networks to conduct message exchange and related services or application. In recent years, smart cities and IoVs have become areas of interest in the new generation Internet of Things development, especially since the development of intelligent transportation system has focused on bettering traffic conditions. This paper proposes establishing an intelligent transportation system with a network security mechanism in an IoV environment, with emphasis on the following aspects: 1) this paper integrates intelligent transportation systems in traffic signal control to aid emergency vehicles in more promptly arriving at its destination; 2) in the case of traffic incidents, this paper’s approach allows regular vehicles to obtain proof of incident from pertaining authorities and learn about nearby vehicles global positioning system information, such as position and speed, and utilize their car camcorder data for proving purposes; and 3) this paper combines roadside units (RSUs) with traffic signal control and transmits important information to the certificate authority (CA) for storage. Given that RSUs are limited in computation ability and storage space, we can assess and filter the information before sending it to the CA, reducing RSUs computational burden and storage space usage. This paper satisfies IoVs network security requirements of authentication, non-repudiation, conditional anonymity, and conditional untraceability, and, as seen from experiment results, the proposed method is superior to that of other studies.",
      "published": "2017-09-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2017.2752420",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hsin-Te Wu",
        "Gwo-Jiun Horng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2017.2752420",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2017.2782159",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cloud-Based Cyber-Physical Intrusion Detection for Vehicles Using Deep Learning",
      "description": "Detection of cyber attacks against vehicles is of growing interest. As vehicles typically afford limited processing resources, proposed solutions are rule-based or lightweight machine learning techniques. We argue that this limitation can be lifted with computational offloading commonly used for resource-constrained mobile devices. The increased processing resources available in this manner allow access to more advanced techniques. Using as case study a small four-wheel robotic land vehicle, we demonstrate the practicality and benefits of offloading the continuous task of intrusion detection that is based on deep learning. This approach achieves high accuracy much more consistently than with standard machine learning techniques and is not limited to a single type of attack or the in-vehicle CAN bus as previous work. As input, it uses data captured in real-time that relate to both cyber and physical processes, which it feeds as time series data to a neural network architecture. We use both a deep multilayer perceptron and recurrent neural network architecture, with the latter benefitting from a long-short term memory hidden layer, which proves very useful for learning the temporal context of different attacks. We employ denial of service, command injection and malware as examples of cyber attacks that are meaningful for a robotic vehicle. The practicality of computation offloading depends on the resources afforded onboard and remotely, and the reliability of the communication means between them. Using detection latency as the criterion, we have developed a mathematical model to determine when computation offloading is beneficial given parameters related to the operation of the network and the processing demands of the deep learning model. The more reliable the network and the greater the processing demands, the greater the reduction in detection latency achieved through offloading.",
      "published": "2017-12-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2017.2782159",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "George Loukas",
        "Tuan Phan Vuong",
        "Ryan Heartfield",
        "Georgia Sakellari",
        "Yongpil Yoon",
        "Diane Gan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2017.2782159",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 278,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2018.2799210",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Distributed Anomaly Detection System for In-Vehicle Network Using HTM",
      "description": "With the development of 5G and Internet of Vehicles technology, the possibility of remote wireless attack on an in-vehicle network has been proven by security researchers. Anomaly detection technology can effectively alleviate the security threat, as the first line of security defense. Based on this, this paper proposes a distributed anomaly detection system using hierarchical temporal memory (HTM) to enhance the security of a vehicular controller area network bus. The HTM model can predict the flow data in real time, which depends on the state of the previous learning. In addition, we improved the abnormal score mechanism to evaluate the prediction. We manually synthesized field modification and replay attack in data field. Compared with recurrent neural networks and hidden Markov model detection models, the results show that the distributed anomaly detection system based on HTM networks achieves better performance in the area under receiver operating characteristic curve score, precision, and recall.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2018.2799210",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chundong Wang",
        "Zhentang Zhao",
        "Liangyi Gong",
        "Likun Zhu",
        "Zheli Liu",
        "Xiaochun Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2018.2799210",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 147,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2018.2841884",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigating the Effects of Attack Detection for In-Vehicle Networks Based on Clock Drift of ECUs",
      "description": "As external interfaces of vehicles multiply, information security of an automobile network system has become increasingly troubling. Mounting attacks have raised the attention of researchers to seek optimal solutions. Therefore, they set forth attack detection to demonstrate the vulnerability of in-vehicle networks, yet most of them focus on packet information directly. This paper comprehensively analyzes the vulnerability of in-vehicle networks and investigates a unique detection method based on clock drift of electronic control units. To investigate the applications of the proposed method further, we take attack time and attack density into consideration and present different patterns of two typical attack scenarios, i.e., injecting attack and suspension attack. In addition, we develop a prototype for data acquisition in a controller area network and undertake substantial vehicle experiments. The results show that the attack detection method has advantages in both recognition accuracy and application range compared with the method based on information entropy theory. This research work is expected to contribute to the further development of attacks detection system applied in vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2018.2841884",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Yunpeng Wang",
        "Hongmao Qin",
        "Xinkai Wu",
        "Guizhen Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2018.2841884",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2018.2848106",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comparative Performance Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Methods for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The fifth-generation (5G) technology makes it widely applicable to connected vehicles. This would entail numerous transmitted data in communication networks and frequent information interactions between vehicles and other terminals, thus leading connected vehicles to be vulnerable to attacks from external communication interfaces. This paper analyzes potential security threats of 5G vehicular network and focuses on intrusion detection methods for in-vehicle networks. We choose four experiment scenarios from potential attacks for in-vehicle networks and collect real car data to compile various attack databases for the first time. In order to find appropriate methods to identify different attacks, four light-weight intrusion detection methods are presented to recognize abnormal behaviors of in-vehicle networks. Furthermore, our study undertakes the detection performance comparison between four detection methods with considering comprehensive evaluation metrics. The evaluation results provide optimal light-weight detection solution for in-vehicle networks. This paper facilitates the understanding of the advantages of the test methods in detection performance for in-vehicle networks and promotes the application of detection technology to deal with the security issues of automotive industry.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2018.2848106",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Yunpeng Wang",
        "Hongmao Qin",
        "Yongjian Wang",
        "Honggang Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2018.2848106",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4105,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2018.2848106 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: frequent, collect, makes, car, access, information, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2018.2865169",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sliding Window Optimized Information Entropy Analysis Method for Intrusion Detection on In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With the considerable growth of cybersecurity risks in modern automobiles, cybersecurity issues in the in-vehicle network environment have attracted significant attention from security researchers in recent years. Enhancing the cybersecurity ability of in-vehicle networks while considering the computing resource and cost constraints become an urgent issue. To address this problem, a novel information entropy-based method is proposed in this paper, which uses a fixed number of messages as sliding windows. By improving the sliding window strategy and optimizing the decision conditions, the detection accuracy is increased and the false positive rate is reduced. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can provide real-time response to attacks with a considerably improved detection precision for intrusion detection in the in-vehicle network environment.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2018.2865169",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wufei Wu",
        "Yizhi Huang",
        "Ryo Kurachi",
        "Gang Zeng",
        "Guoqi Xie",
        "Renfa Li",
        "Keqin Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2018.2865169",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 149,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2018.2878995",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Remote Attestation Security Model Based on Privacy-Preserving Blockchain for V2X",
      "description": "The vehicle to everything (V2X) requires the real-time integration of all kinds of information on roads, pedestrians, the environment, and vehicles themselves. This information also needs to be shared with other vehicles. The effective integration of information and the strong privacy protection are the key restrictions on the development of the V2X. The previous privacy protection model has mainly focused on the centralized network, and there were problems with the centralized gateway and single-point decision, which were not suitable for the decentralized scenario. Therefore, this paper proposes a remote attestation security model based on a privacy-preserving blockchain. The overall model involves two core steps. First, the vehicle provides the network with an evidence of a credible identity and integrity. Secured, the vehicles in the network calculate the nodes to make their respective decisions, and the accounting nodes summarize the sub-conclusions, form the final results, and write them into data blocks. The analysis shows that it possesses the security features of decentralization, traceability, anonymity, irreplaceability, and high efficiency. The model framework, core block chain structure, and protocol process are described in detail. The experimental results based on a realistic infrastructure are presented. These experimental results demonstrate that our scheme can effectively enhance the security of the communications of intelligent vehicles in the V2X.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2018.2878995",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cheng Xu",
        "Hongzhe Liu",
        "Peifeng Li",
        "Pengfei Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2018.2878995",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2019.2892961",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN ID Shuffling Technique (CIST): Moving Target Defense Strategy for Protecting In-Vehicle CAN",
      "description": "New vehicles have become increasingly targeted for cyber-attacks as their rate of digitalization is accelerated. Research on vehicle hacking has highlighted the security vulnerabilities of in-vehicle controller area networks (CANs) as the biggest problem. In particular, a CAN does not offer access control, authentication, or confidentiality, so it fails to prevent reconnaissance operations conducted by an adversary. Because its static configuration (CAN ID, data frame transmission cycle, and data field format) is used in an in-vehicle network environment, the adversary can conduct reconnaissance and easily acquire information to be used for an attack. One of the moving target defense strategies, network address shuffling (NAS), is an extremely practical security solution that can prevent in-vehicle CAN reconnaissance acts. In this paper, we propose a CAN ID shuffling technique using NAS. Our proposed security solution aims to increase the cost burden for the adversary to analyze CAN data frames. To evaluate the performance of the proposed security solution, we conducted an evaluation based on a labcar. Our proposed security solution may be implemented without altering the unique characteristics of the CAN standard. Hence, it can be used as a practical countermeasure to solve the problems affecting in-vehicle CANs.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2892961",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samuel Woo",
        "Daesung Moon",
        "Taek-Young Youn",
        "Yousik Lee",
        "Yongeun Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2019.2892961",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2019.2894183",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Systems for Intra-Vehicle Networks: A Review",
      "description": "A modern vehicle is a complex system of sensors, electronic control units, and actuators connected through different types of intra-vehicle networks to control and monitor the state of the vehicle. In addition, modern vehicles are becoming increasingly connected to the outside world through V2X technologies. However, these provide new attack surfaces that increase the cybersecurity risk to modern vehicles. To this end, there are two distinct and key challenges that need to be addressed to ensure safety and consumer trust. While modern vehicles must be equipped with the best countermeasures against cybersecurity threats, a reliable mechanism shall be also in place to detect the potential intrusions of the system while in operation, which is termed as intrusion detection. This paper provides a structured and comprehensive review of the state of the art of the intra-vehicle intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for passenger vehicles. We first provide an overview of intra-vehicle networks before reviewing contemporary research in intra-vehicle IDSs. The approach employed is to categorize the reviewed works based on their detection technique and to examine the used feature and feature selection methods, evaluation dataset, attack type, performance metrics, and benchmark models. This paper also presents outstanding research challenges and gaps in intra-vehicle IDS research.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2894183",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omar Y. Al-Jarrah",
        "Carsten R. Maple",
        "Mehrdad Dianati",
        "David Oxtoby",
        "Alex Mouzakitis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2019.2894183",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 193,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2019.2937182",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Decentralized Lightweight Authentication and Privacy Protocol for Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Recently many security protocols have been proposed for road safety applications in Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. Most of them, however, do not fully satisfy the requirements of light-weight and fast processing, which are special properties for V2X. Most of the previous authentication protocols assume that a Certificate Authority (CA) is present within the communication range from all the vehicles, which is not practical for moving vehicles. We propose a light-weight security protocol for authentication and privacy protection for V2X. It employs two security hardware devices, Biometric Device (BD) and Tamper Proof Device (TPD), which verifies the driver and securely keeps the keys, respectively. It decentralizes the CA's tasks by locally generating pseudo-identity and private keys to preserve privacy and provide authentication in Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication. In addition, we propose an authentication signature protocol using a notion of hash-chain key generation. We implemented the proposed key generation and authentication protocol using NS-3 simulator. Our extensive simulations demonstrated that the proposed authentication protocol significantly enhances the security level while protecting the conditional privacy of vehicles by utilizing anonymous identities. The proposed protocol has a 20% ~ 85% less communication overhead compared with the previous protocols.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2937182",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shimaa Abdelnaby AbdelHakeem",
        "Mohamed A. Abd El-Gawad",
        "HyungWon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2019.2937182",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2019.2937576",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Intelligent Secured Framework for Cyberattack Detection in Electric Vehicles’ CAN Bus Using Machine Learning",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles’ Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as a legacy protocol for in-vehicle network communication. Simplicity, robustness, and suitability for real-time systems are the salient features of CAN bus. Unfortunately, the CAN bus protocol is vulnerable to various cyberattacks due to the lack of a message authentication mechanism in the protocol itself, paving the way for attackers to penetrate the network. This paper proposes a new effective anomaly detection model based on a modified one-class support vector machine in the CAN traffic. The proposed model makes use of an improved algorithm, known as the modified bat algorithm, to find the most accurate structure in the offline training. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method, CAN traffic is logged from an unmodified licensed electric vehicle in normal operation to generate a dataset for each message ID and a corresponding occurrence frequency without any attacks. In addition, to measure the performance and superiority of the proposed method compared to the other two famous CAN bus anomaly detection algorithms such as Isolation Forest and classical one-class support vector machine, we provided Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) for each method to quantify the correctly classified windows in the test sets containing attacks. Experimental results indicate that the proposed method achieved the highest rate of True Positive Rate (TPR) and lowest False Positive Rate (FPR) for anomaly detection compared to the other two algorithms. Moreover, in order to show that the proposed method can be applied to other datasets, we used two recent popular public datasets in the scope of CAN bus traffic anomaly detection. Benchmarking with more CAN bus traffic datasets proves the independency of the proposed method from the meaning of each message ID and data field that make the model adaptable with different CAN datasets.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2937576",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omid Avatefipour",
        "Ameena Saad Al‐Sumaiti",
        "Ahmed M. El‐Sherbeeny",
        "Emad Mahrous Awwad",
        "Mohammed El‐Meligy",
        "Mohamed A. Mohamed",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2019.2937576",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 169,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2019.2939595",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review on Scheduling, Clustering, and Forecasting Strategies for Controlling Electric Vehicle Charging: Challenges and Recommendations",
      "description": "The usage and adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) have increased rapidly in the 21st century due to the shifting of the global energy demand away from fossil fuels. The market penetration of EVs brings new challenges to the usual operations of the power system. Uncontrolled EV charging impacts the local distribution grid in terms of its voltage profile, power loss, grid unbalance, and reduction of transformer life, as well as harmonic distortion. Multiple research studies have addressed these problems by proposing various EV charging control methods. This manuscript comprehensively reviews EV control charging strategies using real-world data. This review classifies the EV control charging strategies into scheduling, clustering, and forecasting strategies. The models of EV control charging strategies are highlighted to compare and evaluate the techniques used in EV charging, enabling the identification of the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods applied. A summary of the methods and techniques for these EV charging strategies is presented based on machine learning and probabilities approaches. This research paper indicates many factors and challenges in the development of EV charging control in next-generation smart grid applications and provides potential recommendations. A report on the guidelines for future studies on this research topic is provided to enhance the comparability of the various results and findings. Accordingly, all the highlighted insights of this paper serve to further the increasing effort towards the development of advanced EV charging methods and demand-side management (DSM) for future smart grid applications.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2939595",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali Saadon Al-Ogaili",
        "Tengku Juhana Tengku Hashim",
        "N. A. Rahmat",
        "Agileswari K. Ramasamy",
        "Marayati Bte Marsadek",
        "Mohammad Faisal",
        "M. A. Hannan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2019.2939595",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 309,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2019.2943837",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Security Internals of a Skoda Octavia vRS: A Hands on Approach",
      "description": "The convergence of information technology and vehicular technologies are a growing paradigm, allowing information to be sent by and to vehicles. This information can further be processed by the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and the Controller Area Network (CAN) for in-vehicle communications or through a mobile phone or server for out-vehicle communication. Information sent by or to the vehicle can be life-critical (e.g. breaking, acceleration, cruise control, emergency communication, etc $\\ldots $ ). As vehicular technology advances, in-vehicle networks are connected to external networks through 3 and 4G mobile networks, enabling manufacturer and customer monitoring of different aspects of the car. While these services provide valuable information, they also increase the attack surface of the vehicle, and can enable long and short range attacks. In this manuscript, we evaluate the security of the 2017 Skoda Octavia vRS 4x4. Both physical and remote attacks are considered, the key fob rolling code is successfully compromised, privacy attacks are demonstrated through the infotainment system, the Volkswagen Transport Protocol 2.0 is reverse engineered. Additionally, in-car attacks are highlighted and described, providing an overlook of potentially deadly threats by modifying ECU parameters and components enabling digital forensics investigation are identified.",
      "published": "2019-09-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2943837",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "cyber-security",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "key fob",
        "vehicular",
        "volkswagen"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "volkswagen"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Colin Urquhart",
        "X. Bellekens",
        "C. Tachtatzis",
        "Robert C. Atkinson",
        "Hanan Hindy",
        "A. Seeam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2019.2943837",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2019.2946632",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Collaborative Analysis Framework of Safety and Security for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Human error has been statistically proven to be the primary cause of road accidents. This undoubtedly is a contributory cause of the rising popularity of autonomous vehicles as they are presumably able to maneuver appropriately/optimally on the roads while diminishing the likelihood of human error and its repercussion. However, autonomous vehicles are not ready for widespread adoption because their safety and security issues are yet to be thoroughly investigated/addressed. Little literature could be found on collaborative analysis of safety and security of autonomous vehicles. This paper proposes a framework for analyzing both safety and security issues, which includes an integrated safety and security method (S&S) with international vehicle safety and security standards ISO 26262 and SAE J3061. The applicability of the proposed framework is demonstrated using an example of typical autonomous vehicle model. Using this framework, one can clearly understand the vehicle functions, structure, the associated failures and attacks, and also see the vulnerabilities that are not yet addressed by countermeasures, which helps to improve the in-vehicle safety and security from researching and engineering perspectives.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2946632",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Tao Cui",
        "Giedre Sabaliauskaite",
        "Lin Shen Liew",
        "Fengjun Zhou",
        "Biao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2019.2946632",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.2964307",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle Charging Warning and Path Planning Method Based on Spark",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) are increasing popular as clean transportation. However electric vehicle (EV) users often encounter a shortage of electricity in the driving process. Especially when vehicle charging path planning system request reaches peak hour, it will increase the system calculation pressure. To promote penetration and popularity of electric vehicles, it is of critical importance to determine location and size of charging stations more scientifically and improve the computational power of path planning. In this paper, a method is developed for charge warning and path planning of insufficient energy EVs. The method utilizes the appropriate energy consumption factor to construct the electricity early warning model, analyzes the consumption of electricity in the vehicle in real time, and promptly warns the users when the vehicle has insufficient electric energy. Meanwhile, it combines the actual traffic information and map information to construct a network topology based on time weight, queuing mechanism, and charging calculation model to obtain path network model data, charging station queuing times and charging times as parameters. EV path planning problem is solved to minimize the total times of travel using the Dijkstra algorithm with the input path network model data, charging station queuing times and charging times as parameters. At the same time, the Spark computing framework is joined innovatively to improve the computing speed and solve the problem of path planning peak period. The Spark framework is utilized to parallelize the optimized Dijkstra algorithm. The experiment shows that the electric vehicle charging warning and path planning method provides an effective way for drivers of electric vehicles to charge.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2964307",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dong Ding",
        "Junhuai Li",
        "Pengjia Tu",
        "Huaijun Wang",
        "Ting Cao",
        "Facun Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.2964307",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.2973706",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "3GPP NR Sidelink Transmissions Toward 5G V2X",
      "description": "Featuring direct communications between two user equipments (UEs) without signal relay through a base station, 3GPP sidelink transmissions have manifested their crucial roles in the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) Advanced (LTE-A) for public safety and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services. With this successful development in LTE-A, the evolution of sidelink transmissions continues in 3GPP New Radio (NR), which renders sidelink an inevitable component as well as downlink and uplink. Targeting at offering low latency, high reliability and high throughout V2X services for advanced driving use cases, a number of new sidelink functions not provided in the LTE-A are supported in NR, including the feedback channel, grant-free access, enhanced channel sensing procedure, and new control channel design. To fully comprehend these new functions, this paper therefore provides essential knowledge of 3GPP NR sidelink transmissions, including the physical layer structure, resource allocation mechanisms, resource sensing and selection procedures, synchronization, and quality-of-service (QoS) management. Furthermore, this paper also provides performance evaluation to assess the gains brought from the new control channel design. As NR sidelink transmissions have been regarded as a foundation to provide advanced services other than V2X in future releases (e.g., advanced relay), potential enhancements are also discussed to serve the urgent demand in corresponding normative works.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2973706",
      "matched_terms": [
        "relay",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shao‐Yu Lien",
        "Der‐Jiunn Deng",
        "Chun‐Cheng Lin",
        "Hua‐Lung Tsai",
        "Tao Chen",
        "Chao Guo",
        "Shin‐Ming Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.2973706",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 173,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.2975142",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy in Smart Farming: Challenges and Opportunities",
      "description": "Internet of Things (IoT) and smart computing technologies have revolutionized every sphere of 21stcentury humans. IoT technologies and the data driven services they offer were beyond imagination just a decade ago. Now, they surround us and influence a variety of domains such as automobile, smart home, healthcare, etc. In particular, the Agriculture and Farming industries have also embraced this technological intervention. Smart devices are widely used by a range of people from farmers to entrepreneurs. These technologies are used in a variety of ways, from finding real-time status of crops and soil moisture content to deploying drones to assist with tasks such as applying pesticide spray. However, the use of IoT and smart communication technologies introduce a vast exposure to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in smart farming environments. Such cyber attacks have the potential to disrupt the economies of countries that are widely dependent on agriculture. In this paper, we present a holistic study on security and privacy in a smart farming ecosystem. The paper outlines a multi layered architecture relevant to the precision agriculture domain and discusses the security and privacy issues in this dynamic and distributed cyber physical environment. Further more, the paper elaborates on potential cyber attack scenarios and highlights open research challenges and future directions.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2975142",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maanak Gupta",
        "Mahmoud Abdelsalam",
        "Sajad Khorsandroo",
        "Sudip Mittal"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.2975142",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 633,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.2975893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Normal and Malicious Sliding Windows Similarity Analysis Method for Fast and Accurate IDS Against DoS Attacks on In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is a de facto standard of in-vehicle networks. Since CAN employs broadcast communication and a slower network than other general networks (e.g. Ethernet, IEEE802.11), it is inherently vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. As a countermeasure against DoS attacks on CAN, a method for detecting a DoS attack using the entropy in a sliding window has been proposed. This method has a good advantage in terms of effectiveness and the small computational overhead. However, this method may only be effective against DoS attacks under naive conditions such as some higher priority messages. In addition, if an adversary can adjust the entropy of the DoS attack to its normal value, the conventional method cannot detect a DoS attack in which the adversary manipulates the entropy. We found this type of DoS attack, which is called an entropy-manipulated attack. In this paper, we propose a method that can detect an entropy-manipulated attack by using the similarity of two sliding windows. We confirmed that the proposed method detected the DoS attack in 100% of the cases in our experiment, and we showed that the detection time is up to 93% (14 μs) shorter than the conventional method.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2975893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.2975893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.2980523",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Low-Rate Replay-Based Injection Attacks on In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The lack of security in today's in-vehicle network make connected vehicles vulnerable to many types of cyber-attacks. Replay-based injection attacks are one of the easiest type of denial-of-service attacks where the attacker floods the in-vehicle network with malicious traffic with intent to alter the vehicle's normal behavior. The attacker may exploit this vulnerability to launch targeted low-rate injection attacks which are difficult to detect because the network traffic during attacks looks like regular network traffic. In this paper, we propose a sequence mining approach to detect low-rate injection attacks in Control Area Network (CAN). We discuss four different types of replay attacks that can be used by the adversary, and evaluate the effectiveness of proposed method for varying attack characteristics and computational performance for each of the attacks. We observe that the proposed sequence-based anomaly detection achieves over 99% f-score, and outperforms existing dictionary based and multi-variate Markov chain based approach. Given that the proposed technique only uses CAN identifiers, the techniques could be adaptable to any type of vehicle manufacturer.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2980523",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Satya Katragadda",
        "Paul J. Darby",
        "Andrew Roché",
        "Raju N. Gottumukkala"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.2980523",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4085,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2020.2980523 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: targeted, normal, like, where, access, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.2982544",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANet: An Unsupervised Intrusion Detection System for High Dimensional CAN Bus Data",
      "description": "We propose a novel neural network architecture for detecting intrusions on the CAN bus. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is the standard communication method between the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) of automobiles. However, CAN lacks security mechanisms and it has recently been shown that it can be attacked remotely. Hence, it is desirable to monitor CAN traffic to detect intrusions. In order to detect both, known and unknown intrusion scenarios, we consider a novel unsupervised learning approach which we call CANet. To our knowledge, this is the first deep learning based intrusion detection system (IDS) that takes individual CAN messages with different IDs and evaluates them in the moment they are received. This is a significant advancement because messages with different IDs are typically sent at different times and with different frequencies. Our method is evaluated on real and synthetic CAN data. For reproducibility of the method, our synthetic data is publicly available. A comparison with previous machine learning based methods shows that CANet outperforms them by a significant margin.",
      "published": "2019-06-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2982544",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Markus Hanselmann",
        "Thilo Strauss",
        "Katharina Dormann",
        "Holger Ulmer"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.2982544",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 279,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.2985578",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Regulation on Demand Response for Electric Vehicle Charging: A Dynamic Game Method",
      "description": "It has become an urgent problem to be solved that how to make electric vehicle (EV) give full play to shift the power grid peak load through the regulation of demand response (DR). Game theory is often used to provide a new solution for the optimal decision-making among multi-stakeholders. As a dynamic game, differential game can describe the dynamic changes of time-sharing electricity price (TOU price) about power grid and charging power about EV in real time. Considering the problem of “peak on top of peak” caused by a large number of electric vehicles' disordered charging, this paper makes the dispatching strategy of EVs entering the grid based on the TOU price, and establishes a dynamic differential game model for the power grid and EV decision makers. The model is solved by taking the TOU price of power grid and the charging power of EV as the strategy, and smoothing the peak valley difference of power grid and minimizes the charging cost of EV as the goal. In the end, DR for optimizing power grid load and reducing user's low cost is adopted to simulate the proposed model. The simulation results show that the peak-valley difference rate of the optimized power grid is reduced by 6.93%, and the cost of EV users is reduced by 71.52%. The simulation results verify the peak load regulation effect and the economic benefit of the differential game model on the power grid side.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2985578",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuanshuo Zheng",
        "Jingtang Luo",
        "Xiaolong Yang",
        "Yuxuan Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.2985578",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3004661",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical Vulnerability-Information-Sharing Architecture for Automotive Security-Risk Analysis",
      "description": "Emerging trends that are shaping the future of the automotive industry include electrification, autonomous driving, sharing, and connectivity, and these trends keep changing annually. Thus, the automotive industry is shifting from mechanical devices to electronic control devices, and is not moving to Internet of Things devices connected to 5G networks. Owing to the convergence of automobile-information and communication technology (ICT), the safety and convenience features of automobiles have improved significantly. However, cyberattacks that occur in the existing ICT environment and can occur in the upcoming 5G network are being replicated in the automobile environment. In a hyper-connected society where 5G networks are commercially available, automotive security is extremely important, as vehicles become the center of vehicle to everything (V2X) communication connected to everything around them. Designing, developing, and deploying information security techniques for vehicles require a systematic security-risk-assessment and management process throughout the vehicle's lifecycle. To do this, a security risk analysis (SRA) must be performed, which requires an analysis of cyber threats on automotive vehicles. In this study, we introduce a cyber kill chain-based cyberattack analysis method to create a formal vulnerability-analysis system. We can also analyze car-hacking studies that were conducted on real cars to identify the characteristics of the attack stages of existing car-hacking techniques and propose the minimum but essential measures for defense. Finally, we propose an automotive common-vulnerabilities-and-exposure system to manage and share evolving vehicle-related cyberattacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3004661",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "hacking",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yousik Lee",
        "Samuel Woo",
        "Yunkeun Song",
        "Jung‐Ho Lee",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3004661",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3004779",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of 5G Technology Evolution, Standards, and Infrastructure Associated With Vehicle-to-Everything Communications by Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The very last wireless network technology, created to increase the speed and the connections responsiveness, the Fifth-Generation Network (5G) can transmit a great volume of data. It uses wireless broadband connections to support specific end-users and businesses services. It is specifically useful for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), guaranteeing fast connections and security. The 5G network technology can be used to support Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications and applications on autonomous vehicles. It can enable information exchanges between vehicles and other infrastructures and people. It can also provide a more comfortable and safer environment and accurate traffic knowledge. The traffic ?ow can be improved, reducing pollution and accident rates. The cellular network can be associated with V2X as a communicating base to offer enhanced road safety and autonomous driving, and also to offer the IoV connections. This survey presents the 5G technology evolution, standards, and infrastructure associated with V2X ecosystem by IoV. In other words, it presents the IoV supported by 5G V2X communications, considering its architecture, applications and also the V2X features and protocols, as well as the modes, the evaluation and the technological support in such combination. The contribution of this paper is a systematized study about the interaction among these three contents: IoV, 5G, and V2X. Eighty four works were selected to present concepts, standards and to identify the ways to overcome challenges. This survey aims to guide the development of new 5G-V2X services and technologies dedicated to vehicle communications, and also to indicate future directions.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3004779",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carlos Renato Storck",
        "Fátima Duarte-Figueiredo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3004779",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 284,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3022247",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical Layer Authentication Based on Nonlinear Kalman Filter for V2X Communication",
      "description": "Authentication is an important guarantee for vehicle to everything (V2X) commercial deployment. Currently, V2X security often use identity authentication schemes based on public key infrastructure (PKI). These schemes need to transmit certificates and signatures when sending safety-related information such as basic safety messages (BSMs), which need to occupy extra bandwidth and reduce the available channel capacity. So, V2X communication efficiency will be seriously affected in traffic congestion. In this paper, we propose a V2X authentication model based on physical layer characteristics. Then we use the Kalman filter to refine the iterative model and threshold model. The iterative model mainly realizes the priori and posteriori estimation of the current time based on the physical layer characteristics of the previous time, which provides the basis for the entire authentication process. The threshold model analyzes the mathematical characteristics of the priori estimation, and gives the calculation method of the authentication threshold. Since the conventional Kalman filter can only be used for linear discrete system, we use extended Kalman filter and unscented Kalman filter to extend the characteristics used for authentication to non-linearity. At the same time, iterative model and threshold model are improved according to these two algorithms. In terms of security and performance, we compare the proposed schemes with the conventional V2X authentication scheme and physical layer authentication scheme, and the effects of these schemes are analyzed by experiment. We select three characteristics for simulation: received signal strength indication (RSSI), the distance between the two vehicles, and the relative speed between the two vehicles. Then we analyze the process and effect of these two filters, and the factors that affect the threshold. Through experiments, the proposed authentication schemes can effectively take the responsibility of identity authentication in the V2X environment, and have high security level and low overhead, which can reduce the consumption of communication resources by security.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3022247",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jian Wang",
        "Yameng Shao",
        "Yancong Wang",
        "Yuming Ge",
        "Rundong Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3022247",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3024587",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LSWBVM: A Lightweight Security Without Using Batch Verification Method Scheme for a Vehicle Ad Hoc Network",
      "description": "Recently, Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) have been increasingly developed in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs). However, VANETs are vulnerable to security issues because of the open-medium nature of Vehicle-To-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-To-Infrastructure (V2I) communication. Recently, many studies have proposed security schemes to address these issues. However, many of these schemes have massive computational overheads, especially in the process of batch verification method, which verifies multiple messages simultaneously. In this article, a Lightweight Security Without Using Batch Verification Method (LSWBVM) scheme is proposed based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The proposed LSWBVM scheme uses the XOR operation and general hash function during mutual authentication. Meanwhile, to verify a large number of messages, the proposed scheme uses an efficient single verification instead of batch verification in a high traffic density-area. BAN logic proves that the LSWBVM achieves the security goals to mutually authenticate between the nodes. The security analysis indicates that the LSWBVM satisfies the security requirements, such as: identity privacy preserving, tractability and revocability; and secure non-forgery under the random oracle model in an adaptively chosen message attack. The preference evaluation shows that the single verification of proposed LSWBVM is more efficient when compared with batch verification of the related works.",
      "published": "2020",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3024587",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahmood A. Al-Shareeda",
        "Mohammed Anbar",
        "Murtadha A. Alazzawi",
        "S. Manickam",
        "A. S. Al-Hiti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3024587",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3029307",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LSTM-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Can Bus Communications",
      "description": "The modern automobile is a complex piece of technology that uses the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system as a central system for managing the communication between the electronic control units (ECUs). Despite its central importance, the CAN bus system does not support authentication and authorization mechanisms, i.e., CAN messages are broadcast without basic security features. As a result, it is easy for attackers to launch attacks at the CAN bus network system. Attackers can compromise the CAN bus system in several ways including Denial of Service (DoS), Fuzzing and Spoofing attacks. It is imperative to devise methodologies to protect modern cars against the aforementioned attacks. In this paper, we propose a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect and mitigate the CAN bus network attacks. We generate our own dataset by first extracting attack-free data from our experimental car and by injecting attacks into the latter and collecting the dataset. We use the dataset for testing and training our model. With our selected hyper-parameter values, our results demonstrate that our classifier is efficient in detecting the CAN bus network attacks, we achieved an overall detection accuracy of 99.995%. We also compare the proposed LSTM method with the Survival Analysis for automobile IDS dataset which is developed by the Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab, Korea. Our proposed LSTM model achieves a higher detection rate than the Survival Analysis method.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3029307",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Delwar Hossain",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue",
        "Hideya Ochiai",
        "Doudou Fall",
        "Youki Kadobayashi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3029307",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 272,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3035845",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Matrix-Based Dynamic Authentication With Conditional Privacy-Preservation for Vehicular Network Security",
      "description": "In vehicular networks, messages from vehicles are signed before being broadcasted to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the messages. Due to the high mobility of vehicular networks, frequent key updates are often required, which imposes an excessive burden on the key generation process. In this article, we propose a dynamic authentication with conditional privacy-preservation using matrix-based signature generation (DACOP), which is well suited to Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) networks. The proposed authentication method also provides conditional privacy by utilizing a dynamic pseudo-identity and anonymity of the vehicle. In addition, it can significantly reduce the computation overhead for signature generation. We implemented DACOP and analyzed its computation and communication overhead compared with previous methods. Furthermore, our experimental results using real V2X networks demonstrate that DACOP reduces the computation time by 90% while enhancing the security level by 2 times over previous methods.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3035845",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hayotjon Aliev",
        "HyungWon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3035845",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3037705",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attacks on Self-Driving Cars and Their Countermeasures: A Survey",
      "description": "Intelligent Traffic Systems (ITS) are currently evolving in the form of a cooperative ITS or connected vehicles. Both forms use the data communications between Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I/I2V) and other on-road entities, and are accelerating the adoption of self-driving cars. The development of cyber-physical systems containing advanced sensors, sub-systems, and smart driving assistance applications over the past decade is equipping unmanned aerial and road vehicles with autonomous decision-making capabilities. The level of autonomy depends upon the make-up and degree of sensor sophistication and the vehicle's operational applications. As a result, self-driving cars are being compromised perceived as a serious threat. Therefore, analyzing the threats and attacks on self-driving cars and ITSs, and their corresponding countermeasures to reduce those threats and attacks are needed. For this reason, some survey papers compiling potential attacks on VANETs, ITSs and self-driving cars, and their detection mechanisms are available in the current literature. However, up to our knowledge, they have not covered the real attacks already happened in self-driving cars. To bridge this research gap, in this paper, we analyze the attacks that already targeted self-driving cars and extensively present potential cyber-attacks and their impacts on those cars along with their vulnerabilities. For recently reported attacks, we describe the possible mitigation strategies taken by the manufacturers and governments. This survey includes recent works on how a self-driving car can ensure resilient operation even under ongoing cyber-attack. We also provide further research directions to improve the security issues associated with self-driving cars.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3037705",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdullahi Chowdhury",
        "Gour Karmakar",
        "Joarder Kamruzzaman",
        "Alireza Jolfaei",
        "Rajkumar Das"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3037705",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 161,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3984,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2020.3037705 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: depends, targeted, currently, serious, operational, operation, sensor, even."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3041074",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity of Smart Electric Vehicle Charging: A Power Grid Perspective",
      "description": "With the roll-out of electric vehicles (EVs), the automobile industry is transitioning away from conventional gasoline-fueled vehicles. As a result, the EV charging demand is continuously growing and to meet this growing demand, various types of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) are being deployed for commercial and residential use. This nexus of EVs, EVCSs, and power grids creates complex cyber-physical interdependencies that can be maliciously exploited to damage each of these components. This paper describes and analyzes cyber vulnerabilities that arise at this nexus and points to the current and emerging gaps in the security of the EV charging ecosystem. These vulnerabilities must be addressed as the number of EVs continue to grow worldwide and their impact on the power grid becomes more viable. The purpose of this paper is to list and characterize all backdoors that can be exploited to seriously harm either EV and EVCS equipments, or power grid, or both. The presented issues and challenges intend to ignite research efforts on cybersecurity of smart EV charging and enhancing power grid resiliency against such demand-side cyberattacks in general.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3041074",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samrat Acharya",
        "Yury Dvorkin",
        "Hrvoje Pandžić",
        "Ramesh Karri"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3041074",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 264,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2020.3043070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Automotive Service-Oriented Architectures and Implications for Security Countermeasures",
      "description": "New requirements from the customers' and manufacturers' point of view such as adding new software functions during the product life cycle require a transformed architecture design for future vehicles. The paradigm of signal-oriented communication established for many years will increasingly be replaced by service-oriented approaches in order to increase the update and upgrade capability. In this article, we provide an overview of current protocols and communication patterns for automotive architectures based on the service-oriented architecture (SOA) paradigm and compare them with signal-oriented approaches. Resulting challenges and opportunities of SOAs with respect to information security are outlined and discussed. For this purpose, we explain different security countermeasures and present a state of the section of automotive approaches in the fields of firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Identity and Access Management (IAM). Our final discussion is based on an exemplary hybrid architecture (signal- and service-oriented) and examines the adaptation of existing security measures as well as their specific security features.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3043070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcel Rumez",
        "Daniel Grimm",
        "Reiner Kriesten",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2020.3043070",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 99,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3050038",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on the Current Security Landscape of Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "With the proliferation of embedded technologies and wireless capabilities, today's vehicles are no longer isolated mechanical machines. They become part of a hyper-connected system -Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)- that has the potential to support multiple levels of autonomy and intelligence improving considerably the safety, efficiency, and sustainability of transportation networks. However, this raises new security issues that make the whole system prone to cybersecurity attacks that threaten both the safety and privacy of all road-users. This article gives a short background tutorial on the main security issues and the different attacks that hinder Intelligent Transport Systems. To enable secure and safe ITS applications, this article provides a comprehensive analysis of existing solutions and highlights their strengths and limitations. Finally, this survey presents key challenges in the field, and discusses recent trends that must be factored in by researchers, implementers, and car manufactures to improve the security of ITS.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3050038",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ayyoub Lamssaggad",
        "Nabil Benamar",
        "Abdelhakim Senhaji Hafid",
        "Mounira Msahli"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3050038",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 170,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3073057",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "WINDS: A Wavelet-Based Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Network (CAN)",
      "description": "Vehicles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to increase their overall system functionality and connectivity. However, the rising connectivity exposes a defenseless internal Controller Area Network (CAN) to cyberattacks. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a supervisory module, proposed for identifying CAN network malicious messages, without modifying legacy ECUs and causing high traffic overhead. The traditional IDS approaches rely on time and frequency thresholding, leading to high false alarm rates, whereas state-of-the-art solutions may suffer from vehicle dependency. This paper presents a wavelet-based approach to locating the behavior change in the CAN traffic by analyzing the CAN network’s transmission pattern. The proposed Wavelet-based Intrusion Detection System (WINDS) is tested on various attack scenarios, using real vehicle traffic from two independent research centers, while being expanded toward more comprehensive attack scenarios using synthetic attacks. The technique is evaluated and compared against the state-of-the-art solutions and the baseline frequency method. Experimental results show that WINDS offers a vehicle-independent solution applicable for various vehicles through a unique approach while generating low false alarms.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3073057",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehmet Bozdal",
        "Mohammad Samie",
        "Ian K Jennions"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3073057",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 46,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3079190",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Generalized Coordinated Multipoint Framework for 5G and Beyond",
      "description": "The characteristic feature of 5G is the diversity of its services for different user needs. However, the requirements for these services are competing in nature, which impresses the necessity of a coordinated and flexible network architecture. Although coordinated multipoint (CoMP) systems were primarily proposed to improve the cell edge performance in 4G, their collaborative nature can be leveraged to support the diverse requirements and enabling technologies of 5G and beyond networks. To this end, we propose generalization of CoMP to a proactive and efficient resource utilization framework capable of supporting different user requirements such as reliability, latency, throughput, and security while considering network constraints. This article elaborates on the multiple aspects, inputs, and outputs of the generalized CoMP (GCoMP) framework. Apart from user requirements, the GCoMP decision mechanism also considers the CoMP scenario and network architecture to decide upon outputs such as CoMP technique or appropriate coordinating clusters. To enable easier understanding of the concept, popular use cases, such as vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication and eHealth, are studied. Additionally, interesting challenges and open areas in GCoMP are discussed.",
      "published": "2020-08-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3079190",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Sohaib J. Solaija",
        "Hanadi Salman",
        "Abuu B. Kihero",
        "Mehmet Izzet Saglam",
        "Huseyin Arslan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3079190",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3082616",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Noise-Shaped Signaling Method for Vehicle-to-Everything Security",
      "description": "This paper presents a method to improve the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) security. With the recent rapid development of communication technology and traffic applications, V2X is recently commercialized and has been growing as a fundamental system for future applications. Because of the high mobility of the vehicles, V2X requires a low latency and high-reliability. However, previous security methods demand a large computational burden and generate high latency owing to complex operations and long additional data bits for ensuing security. To resolve such constraints, an advanced security method ensuring lower latency and higher reliability is required. We propose a noise-shaped signaling method that provides high-level security with low latency for reliable V2X communication. The proposed method encrypts original data symbols to noise-like symbols by applying a noise envelope that consists of Chaotic Random Magnitude Sequence (CRMS) and Chaotic Random Phase Sequences (CRPS). Our method simplifies the sequence sharing process between a sender and an intended receiver by adapting the characteristics of a chaotic dynamic system. Moreover, the proposed method does not demand additional data bits and generate delay because the method only uses simple multiplication and division procedure for data encryption in the physical layer. We analyze our method in depth using extensive simulations and various viewpoints such as error rate, probability of modulation identification. From the simulations, we demonstrate that a malicious adversary cannot comprehend the transmitted symbols and always has the maximum error rate under various network environments and conditions. We also demonstrate how the adversary cannot infer the modulation scheme from the symbols applying the proposed method. After these analyses, we confirm that the noise-shaped signaling method is high-level of secure method with a low latency for V2X communication.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3082616",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dongryul Park",
        "Jangyong Ahn",
        "Chungjae Choe",
        "Seongho Woo",
        "Seungyoung Ahn",
        "Junsung Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3082616",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3094365",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Blockchain-Based Federated Forest for SDN-Enabled In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "In-vehicle communication systems are usually managed by controller area networks (CAN). By broadcasting packets to their bus, the CAN facilitates the interaction between Electronic Control Units (ECU) that coordinate, monitor and control internal vehicle components. With no authentication mechanism for identifying the legitimacy and source of packets, CAN are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can detect attacks on CAN and machine learning can be used to create the models for the IDSs to detect non-linear attack patterns. However, car manufacturers and owners might want to keep the sensitive information required for training the models confidential. Therefore, we proposed a Blockchain-based Federated Forest Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-enabled IDS (BFF-IDS) to address the problem of data sharing the sensitive CAN data. To ensure scalability, we used InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host the models, and the blockchain is designed to store only a hash of the model and a pointer to its location. The SDN provides the dynamic routing of packets and model exchanges. We used Federated Learning (FL) to create a random forest model. Individuals provide partially trained models, allowing them to keep the underlying data confidential. Using Fourier transform, we decomposed the CAN IDs cycle from CAN bus traffic in the frequency domain for better generalization in multiclass detection of attacks. Multiple statistical and entropy features were extracted to handle the high complexity and non-linearity in CAN bus traffic. The proposed system allows manufacturers and car owners to contribute to the training of the models, as their sensitive data is protected. By storing hashes of the models on a blockchain, the risk of adversaries poisoning the models is reduced and a single point of failure is avoided. We evaluated the proposed system by conducting experiments on a testbed. We found that the proposed system has efficient use of memory and CPU resources and that the detection rate of closely related attacks was high. We recorded the highest model attack detection rate of about 0.981.",
      "published": "2021",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3094365",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "I. Aliyu",
        "Marco Carlo Feliciano",
        "S. van Engelenburg",
        "Dong Ok Kim",
        "C. Lim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3094365",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3100472",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On 5G-V2X Use Cases and Enabling Technologies: A Comprehensive Survey",
      "description": "5G technologies promise faster connections, lower latency, higher reliability, more capacity and wider coverage. We are looking to rely on these technologies to achieve Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, which increase the safety and autonomy of vehicles in addition to road safety, saving energy and costs. The integration of vehicular communication systems and 5G is the subject of many research. Nowadays, researchers address challenges such as automated and intelligent networks, cloud and edge data processing, network management, virtualization, security, privacy and finally interoperability. This paper provides a survey of the latest V2X use cases including requirements, and various 5G enabling technologies under consideration for vehicular communications. Subsequently, we first provide an interesting mapping between the three 5G pillars and V2X use case groups. Then, we present a summary of potential applications of enabling technologies for V2X use case groups. Finally, the open directions of research are discussed, and the challenges that await to be met are pointed out.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3100472",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alain Allouis",
        "Iyad Dayoub",
        "Soumaya Cherkaoui"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3100472",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 214,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3104854",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review of the Security of Backward-Compatible Automotive Inter-ECU Communication",
      "description": "Advanced electronic units inside modern vehicles have enhanced the driving experience, but also introduced a myriad of security problems due to the inherent limitations of the internal communication protocol. In the last two decades, a number of security threats have been identified and accordingly, security measures have been proposed. While a large body of research on the vehicular security domain is focused on exposing vulnerabilities and proposing counter measures, there is an apparent paucity of research aimed at reviewing existing works on automotive security and at extracting insights. This paper provides a systematic review of security threats and countermeasures for the ubiquitous CAN bus communication protocol. It further exposes the limitations of the existing security measures, and discusses a seemingly-overlooked, simple, cost-effective and incrementally deployable solution which can provide a reasonable defense against a major class of packet injection attacks and many denial of service attacks.",
      "published": "2019-10-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3104854",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chandra Sharma",
        "Samuel Moylan",
        "Eugene Y. Vasserman",
        "George T. Amariucai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3104854",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3107308",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Formally Verified Security Scheme for Inter-gNB-DU Handover in 5G Vehicle-to-Everything",
      "description": "Cellular technology has evolved over the decades for mobile network operators to accommodate the ever-growing demands of services for connecting Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X). The 5G infrastructure facilitates V2X communications, where a small-cell base station operating at ultra-high radio frequency with limited coverage becomes pervasive. These small-cell base stations in 5G-V2X must be strategically deployed near the consumers to realize several use cases. More recently, the architectural split solutions in Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN) are introduced, in which the gNB is divided into the distributed unit (gNB-DU) and control unit (gNB-CU). This functional split intends to improve scalability, performance, and network orchestration optimization. In this case, frequent user equipment (UE) handover between gNB-DUs is inevitable. However, the current 5G standard did not consider securing the path between these two entities. Hence, the NG-RAN could likely experience various security threats if the current handover procedure standard is employed without changes. Consequently, this paper introduces potential threats like resource depletion at NG-RAN caused by the useless execution of resource-demanding procedures to complete the transfer of attachment of UE to target gNB-DU. Another is UE being denied from accessing services caused by unsuccessful uplink and downlink synchronization during random access procedure execution, requiring establishing security and mutual authentication between the entities. Motivated by this, we proposed a security protocol composed of two phases, namely initial and handover. While the former phase assists in mutual authentication and key agreement between UE and serving gNB-DU, the latter secures UE’s mobility in inter-gNB-DU handover. This protocol aims to preserve the existing quality of service and support essential security requirements, including confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, secure key exchange, and perfect forward secrecy. The security requirements are formally verified using BAN logic and Scyther, and the proposed protocol demonstrated lower handover latency than EAP-AKA’, AKA, EAP-TLS, and EAP-IKEv2.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3107308",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiyoon Kim",
        "Daniel Gerbi Duguma",
        "Philip Virgil Astillo",
        "Hoonyong Park",
        "Bonam Kim",
        "Ilsun You",
        "Vishal Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3107308",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3110524",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Method Using Bi-Directional GPT for in-Vehicle Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) bus protocol is exposed to threats from various attacks because it is designed without consideration of security. In a normal vehicle operation situation, controllers connected to a CAN bus transmit periodic and nonperiodic signals. Thus, if a CAN identifier (ID) sequence is configured by collecting the identifiers of CAN signals in their order of occurrence, it will have a certain pattern. However, if only a very small number of attack IDs are included in a CAN ID sequence, it will be difficult to detect the corresponding pattern change. Thus, a detection method that is different from the conventional one is required to detect such attacks. Since a CAN ID sequence can be regarded as a sentence consisting of words in the form of CAN IDs, a Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) model can learn the pattern of a normal CAN ID sequence. Therefore, such a model is expected to be able to detect CAN ID sequences that contain a very small number of attack IDs better than the existing long short-term memory (LSTM)-based method. In this paper, we propose an intrusion detection model that combines two GPT networks in a bidirectional manner to allow both past and future CAN IDs (relative to the time of detection) to be used. The proposed model was trained to minimize the negative log-likelihood (NLL) value of the bidirectional GPT network for a normal sequence. When the NLL value for a CAN ID sequence is larger than a prespecified threshold, it is deemed an intrusion. The proposed model outperforms a single unidirectional GPT model with the same degree of complexity as well as other existing LSTM-based models because the bidirectional structure of the proposed model maintains the same estimation performance for most of CAN IDs regardless of their positions in the sequence.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3110524",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Minki Nam",
        "Seung‐Young Park",
        "Duk Soo Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3110524",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 82,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3113649",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain and Autonomous Vehicles: Recent Advances and Future Directions",
      "description": "Blockchain is an underlying technology for securing many real-time applications and their data. The automobile is one such sector in which auto-manufacturers are looking forward to accepting the advantages of distributed ledger technology in autonomous vehicles or systems and improving their products, customer satisfaction, and other valuable experiences. This work aims to find the significance of blockchain technology in Autonomous Vehicles, including Autonomous Electric Vehicles (AEV), Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV), Autonomous Guided Vehicles (AGV), Autonomous Aerial Vehicles (AAeV), and Autonomous Driving. In this work, a comparative analysis of blockchain-integrated autonomous vehicle systems is explored to identify the present scenario and futuristic challenges. In addition to blockchain technology, the uses and importance of sensors, architectures and infrastructure requirements, vehicle types, driving modes, vehicles target and tracking approaches, intelligent contracts, intelligent data handling, and industry-specific use cases are also explored. This study is based on the exploration of recent technologies and practices. As autonomous vehicles are expected to be the future of intelligent transportation, this paper surveys recent advances in autonomous vehicles and systems and how blockchain can help in improving user experiences and improving industry practices. Finally, limitations of work, future research directions, and challenges associated with different autonomous vehicles and systems are presented.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3113649",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Saurabh Jain",
        "Neelu Jyothi Ahuja",
        "P. Srikanth",
        "Kishor Vinayak Bhadane",
        "Bharathram Nagaiah",
        "Adarsh Kumar",
        "Charalambos Konstantinou"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3113649",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 140,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3116678",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Inductive Wireless Power Transfer Charging for Electric Vehicles–A Review",
      "description": "Considering a future scenario in which a driverless Electric Vehicle (EV) needs an automatic charging system without human intervention. In this regard, there is a requirement for a fully automatable, fast, safe, cost-effective, and reliable charging infrastructure that provides a profitable business model and fast adoption in the electrified transportation systems. These qualities can be comprehended through wireless charging systems. Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) is a futuristic technology with the advantage of flexibility, convenience, safety, and the capability of becoming fully automated. In WPT methods resonant inductive wireless charging has to gain more attention compared to other wireless power transfer methods due to high efficiency and easy maintenance. This literature presents a review of the status of Resonant Inductive Wireless Power Transfer Charging technology also highlighting the present status and its future of the wireless EV market. First, the paper delivers a brief history throw lights on wireless charging methods, highlighting the pros and cons. Then, the paper aids a comparative review of different type’s inductive pads, rails, and compensations technologies done so far. The static and dynamic charging techniques and their characteristics are also illustrated. The role and importance of power electronics and converter types used in various applications are discussed. The batteries and their management systems as well as various problems involved in WPT are also addressed. Different trades like cyber security economic effects, health and safety, foreign object detection, and the effect and impact on the distribution grid are explored. Prospects and challenges involved in wireless charging systems are also highlighting in this work. We believe that this work could help further the research and development of WPT systems.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3116678",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aganti Mahesh",
        "C. Bharatiraja",
        "Lucian Mihet‐Popa"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3116678",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 527,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3124565",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Cyber Security Evaluation Framework for In-Vehicle Electrical Control Units",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are equipped with more than 100 Electrical Control Units (ECUs) with over 2500 signals to transmit internally. The application of advanced electronics and communication techniques helps a vehicle transform from an information island into a powerful distribution center. However, a large number of ECUs have introduced a wider range of security threats for vehicles. The attackers can compromise a vehicle remotely through a vulnerable ECU. How to evaluate the cyber security of in-vehicle ECUs has become an important issue. Current Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) only carries out theoretical analysis on the potential threats and risks faced by the vehicle in the conceptual design phase of the lifecycle, but lacks the details of actual security evaluation. In this paper, we proposed a Cyber Security Evaluation Framework (CSEF) to independently evaluate the security of the in-vehicle ECUs, which is composed of the asset identification, the threat analysis, the risk assessment, and the security test. The proposed CSEF is applied to a pre-installed On-Bord Unit (OBU) to provide a use case. The use case show that the proposed CSEF is able to figure out assets, threats, risks behind threats, and vulnerabilities of OBU, playing an important role in guiding others to conduct security evaluation. Moreover, CSEF can be extended to evaluate the cyber security of other critical ECUs, such as the Telematic Box, the infotainment units, and the gateway.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3124565",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haichun Zhang",
        "Yuqian Pan",
        "Zhaojun Lu",
        "Jie Wang",
        "Zhenglin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3124565",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3130495",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Security: A Survey of Security Issues and Vulnerabilities, Malware Attacks and Defenses",
      "description": "Recent years have led the path to the evolution of automotive technology and with these new developments, modern vehicles are getting increasingly astute and offering growing quantities of innovative applications that cover various functionalities. These functionalities are controlled by hundreds of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) which are connected to each other via the Control Area Network (CAN) bus. Although ECUs are designed to offer various amenities that are associated with modern vehicles including comfort, such features expose new attack surfaces that can be harnessed by attackers. This trend is exacerbated by the fact that many of these ECUs rely on wireless communication for interacting with the outside world. Therefore, making them vulnerable to common threats such as malware injection that can compromise the overall security of modern vehicles. In this paper, we provide a detailed description of the architecture associated with intelligent vehicles, and identify various security issues and vulnerabilities that impact such systems. We provide an overview of different malware types and the vectors of attacks they leverage for infecting modern vehicles. This work also presents a detailed survey of available defenses against such attacks including: signature, behavior, heuristic, cloud, and machine learning-based detection measures. Furthermore, this paper intends to assist researchers in becoming familiar with the available defenses and how they can be applied to secure intelligent vehicles against emerging malware threats that can compromise the security of today’s vehicles. It also provides future directions for researchers who are interested in developing new defenses that can safeguard intelligent vehicles systems against malware attacks.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3130495",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdulrahman Abu Elkhail",
        "Rafi Ud Daula Refat",
        "Ricardo Habre",
        "Azeem Hafeez",
        "Anys Bacha",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3130495",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 93,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2021.3136147",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient Intrusion Prevention System for CAN: Hindering Cyber-Attacks With a Low-Cost Platform",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN), which is still today the most used in-vehicle network, does not provide any security or authentication mechanism by design. Since current vehicles, which have numerous connectivity technologies, such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular radio, can be easily accessed from the exterior world, they can be easy targets of cyber-attacks. It is therefore urgently necessary to enhance vehicle security by detecting and stopping cyber-attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel unsupervised intrusion prevention system (IPS) for automotive CANs that detects and hinders attacks without modifying the architecture of the electronic control units (ECUs) or requiring information that is restricted to car manufacturers. We compare two machine learning algorithms’ ability to detect fuzzing and spoofing attacks, and evaluate which of them is most accurate with the fewest number of data bytes. The fewer data bytes required, the sooner detection can start and the sooner attacking frames can be detected. Experiment results show that our proposed detection mechanism achieves accuracy higher than 99%, F1-scores higher than 97%, and detection times shorter than 80μs for the types of attacks considered. Moreover, when compared to four state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems, it is the only solution that is capable of discarding attacking frames before damage occurs while being deployed on inexpensive Raspberry Pi. Such an inexpensive deployment is particularly desirable, as cost is one of the automotive industry’s primary concerns.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3136147",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Paulo Freitas de Araujo-Filho",
        "Antonio Janael Pinheiro",
        "Georges Kaddoum",
        "Divanilson Rodrigo de Sousa Campelo",
        "Fabio L. Soares"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2021.3136147",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3142450",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Survey on Cooperative Intersection Management for Heterogeneous Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Nowadays, with the advancement of technology, world is trending toward high mobility and dynamics. In this context, intersection management (IM) as one of the most crucial elements of the transportation sector demands high attention. Today, road entities including infrastructures, vulnerable road users (VRUs) such as motorcycles, moped, scooters, pedestrians, bicycles, and other types of vehicles such as trucks, buses, cars, emergency vehicles, and railway vehicles like trains or trams are able to communicate cooperatively using vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications and provide traffic safety, efficiency, infotainment and ecological improvements. In this paper, we take into account different types of intersections in terms of signalized, semi-autonomous (hybrid) and autonomous intersections and conduct a comprehensive survey on various intersection management methods for heterogeneous connected vehicles (CVs). We consider heterogeneous classes of vehicles such as road and rail vehicles as well as VRUs including bicycles, scooters and motorcycles. All kinds of intersection goals, modeling, coordination architectures, scheduling policies are thoroughly discussed. Signalized and semi-autonomous intersections are assessed with respect to these parameters. We especially focus on autonomous intersection management (AIM) and categorize this section based on four major goals involving safety, efficiency, infotainment and environment. Each intersection goal provides an in-depth investigation on the corresponding literature from the aforementioned perspectives. Moreover, robustness and resiliency of IM are explored from diverse points of view encompassing sensors, information management and sharing, planning universal scheme, heterogeneous collaboration, vehicle classification, quality measurement, external factors, intersection types, localization faults, communication anomalies and channel optimization, synchronization, vehicle dynamics and model mismatch, model uncertainties, recovery, security and privacy.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3142450",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashkan Gholamhosseinian",
        "Jochen Seitz"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3142450",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 99,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4004,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2022.3142450 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: recovery, points, like, sensors, well, access, privacy, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3145007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hybrid Approach Toward Efficient and Accurate Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With recent advancements in the automotive world and the introduction of autonomous vehicles, automotive security has become a real and important issue. Modern vehicles have tens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) connected to in-vehicle networks. As a de facto standard for in-vehicle network communication, the Controller Area Network (CAN) has become a target of cyber attacks. Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is considered as an effective approach to secure CAN and detect malicious attacks. Currently, there are two primary approaches used for intrusion detection: rule-based and machine learning-based. Rule-based approach is efficient but limited in the detection accuracy while machine learning-based detection has comparably higher detection accuracy but higher computation cost at the same time. In this paper, we propose a novel hybrid IDS that combines the benefits of both rule-based and machine learning-based approaches. More specifically, we use machine learning methods to achieve a high detection rate while keeping the low computational requirement by offsetting the detection with a rule-based component. Our experiments with CAN traces collected from four different vehicle models demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed hybrid IDS.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3145007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Linxi Zhang",
        "Di Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3145007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3151358",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient ECU Analysis Technology Through Structure-Aware CAN Fuzzing",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are equipped with a number of electronic control units (ECUs), which control vehicles efficiently by communicating with each other through the controller area network (CAN). However, the CAN is known to be vulnerable to cyber attacks because it does not have any security mechanisms. To find vulnerable CAN messages that can control safety-critical functions in ECUs, researchers have studied CAN fuzzing methods. In existing CAN fuzzing methods, fuzzing input values are generally generated at random without considering the structure of CAN messages, resulting in non-negligible CAN fuzzing time. In addition, existing fuzzing solutions have limited monitoring capabilities of the fuzzing results. In this paper, we propose a Structure-aware CAN Fuzzing protocol, in which the structure of CAN messages is considered and fuzzing input values are systematically generated to locate vulnerable functions in ECUs. Our proposed Structure-aware CAN Fuzzing system takes less time to run than existing solutions, meaning that problematic CAN messages that may have originated from SW implementation errors or CAN DBC (database CAN) design errors can be found quickly and, subsequently, appropriate action can be taken. Finally, we evaluated the performance of our Structure-aware CAN Fuzzing system on two real vehicles. We proved that our proposed method can find CAN messages that control safety-critical functions in ECUs faster than existing fuzzing solutions.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3151358",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyung-Hoon Kim",
        "Yeonseon Jeong",
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Doon Hoon Lee",
        "Hyo Jin Jo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3151358",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3174356",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TTIDS: Transmission-Resuming Time-Based Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Network (CAN)",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are becoming complex cyber-physical systems equipped with numerous electronic control units (ECUs). Over the controller area network (CAN), these ECUs communicate with each other to share information related to vehicle status as well as commands to efficiently control the vehicle. However, the increasing complexity of modern vehicles has inadvertently expanded potential attack surfaces, making them vulnerable to cyber attacks. In light of this, researchers are currently working to demonstrate remote vehicle maneuvering by compromising ECUs, and as a countermeasure to such malicious manipulation, to study automotive intrusion detection systems (IDSs) as potential remedies. In general, CAN messages are transmitted periodically, and as such, many researchers have relied on frequency-based IDSs in their solutions proposals. However, an attacker can bypass this defense by suspending the communication of the target ECU from the network and injecting malicious messages with the same frequency as the suspended messages. As a result, an attacker is able to masquerade as the original transmission frequency. In this paper, we propose a Transmission-resuming Time-based IDS (TTIDS), which is designed to detect such attacks. TTIDS detects when an ECU periodically transmitting messages is suspended, and then it estimates when the suspended ECU resumes periodic transmission. With this projection, TTIDS detects malicious messages transmitted while the ECU is suspended. We conduct the evaluation of TTIDS on two real vehicles and present the results, which show the TTIDS is able to effectively detect an enhanced attack that bypasses existing frequency-based IDSs with a false positive rate of 0.213% and a false negative rate of 0.027%.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3174356",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seyoung Lee",
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Aram Cho",
        "Dong Hoon Lee",
        "Wonsuk Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3174356",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3204746",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Android Head Units vs. In-Vehicle ECUs: Performance Assessment for Deploying In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems for the CAN Bus",
      "description": "Following the numerous attacks that exploited vulnerabilities of Controller Area Networks (CAN), intrusion detection systems have become a topic of prime importance for in-vehicle buses. Newer in-vehicle communication layers, such as CAN-FD, despite the larger payloads which can easily integrate cryptographic elements, need similar attention. But detecting intrusions may call for demanding algorithms that are not computationally cheap while timely detection is necessary in order to process frames in real-time and take the appropriate actions. In this work we evaluate the performance of several binary classifiers on traditional in-vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and compare them to modern Android devices which have become widespread inside cars with the adoption of Android-capable infotainment systems. Needless to say, these modern devices benefit from higher computational and memory resources while cloud connectivity may alleviate computational costs even further. Contrasting between traditional controllers and Android devices has become necessary and so far there have been little efforts in this direction. To create a realistic testbed, we use collected in-vehicle CAN bus traffic from an SUV as well as more demanding logs from Advanced Driver-assistance Systems (ADAS) implemented on CAN-FD which we augment with adversarial activity.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3204746",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "can-fd",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tudor Andreica",
        "Christian-Daniel Curiac",
        "Camil Jichici",
        "Bogdan Groza"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3204746",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3209818",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overview of Emerging Technologies for Improving the Performance of Heavy-Duty Construction Machines",
      "description": "Construction equipment is one of the most significant resources in every large construction project, accounting for a considerable portion of the project budget. Improving heavy machinery performance can increase efficiency and reduce costs. However, research on boosting machine efficiency is limited. This study adopts mix review methodology (systematic review and bibliometric analysis) and evaluates emerging technologies like Digital twin, Cyber physical systems, Geo-graphic information systems, Global navigation satellite system, Onboard instrumentation system, Radio frequency identification, Internet of things, Telematics, Machine learning, Deep learning, and Computer vision for machine productivity and provides insights into how they can be used to improve the performance of construction equipment. The article defined three major equipment operating areas—monitoring and control, tracking and navigation, and data-driven performance optimization—classified technologies respectively, and explored how they can increase machine productivity. Other circumstantial issues affecting machine operation as well as loopholes in existing innovative tools used in machine processes were also highlighted. This study contributes to the goals of deploying digital tools and outlines future directions for the development of automated machines to optimize project efficiency.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3209818",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asmat Ullah Khan",
        "Lizhen Huang",
        "Erling Onstein",
        "Yongping Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3209818",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3210117",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "HoneyCar: A Framework to Configure Honeypot Vulnerabilities on the Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV), whereby interconnected vehicles that communicate with each other and with road infrastructure on a common network, has promising socio-economic benefits but also poses new cyber-physical threats. To protect these entities and learn about adversaries, data on attackers can be realistically gathered using decoy systems like honeypots. Admittedly, honeypots introduces a trade-off between the level of honeypot-attacker interactions and incurred overheads and costs for implementing and monitoring these systems. Deception through honeypots can be achieved by strategically configuring the honeypots to represent components of the IoV to engage attackers and collect cyber threat intelligence. Here, we present HoneyCar, a novel decision support framework for honeypot deception in IoV. HoneyCar benefits from the repository of known vulnerabilities of the autonomous and connected vehicles found in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) database to compute optimal honeypot configuration strategies. The adversarial interaction is modelled as a repeated imperfect-information zero-sum game where the IoV network administrator strategically chooses a set of vulnerabilities to offer in a honeypot and a strategic attacker chooses a vulnerability to exploit under uncertainty. Our investigation examines two different versions of the game, with and without the re-configuration cost, to empower the network administrator to determine optimal honeypot investment strategies given a budget. We show the feasibility of this approach in a case study that consists of the vulnerabilities in autonomous and connected vehicles gathered from the CVE database and data extracted from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3210117",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sakshyam Panda",
        "Stefan Raß",
        "Sotiris Moschoyiannis",
        "Kaitai Liang",
        "George Loukas",
        "Emmanouil Panaousis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3210117",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4012,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2022.3210117 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: strategic, collect, exposure, costs, like, case, where, without."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3212412",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Statistical Detection of Adversarial Examples in Blockchain-Based Federated Forest In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "Internet-of-Vehicle (IoV) can facilitate the seamless connectivity between connected vehicles (CV), autonomous vehicles (AV), and other IoV entities. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) for IoV networks can rely on machine learning (ML) to protect the in-vehicle network from cyber-attacks. Federated Forests (BFFs) could be used to enable the training of ML models based on a large volume of data while protecting the confidentiality of the data. Storing hashes of the partial models in a blockchain makes tampering with them by adversaries detectable. However, ML models are vulnerable to adversarial examples and unforeseen attack patterns. This paper investigates the impact of various possible adversarial examples on the BFF-IDS. We proposed integrating a statistical detector to detect and extract unknown adversarial samples. By including the unknown detected samples into the dataset, we augment the BFF-IDS with an additional model to detect original known attacks and the new adversarial inputs. The statistical adversarial detector confidently detected adversarial examples at the sample size of 50 and 100 input samples. Furthermore, the augmented BFF-IDS (BFF-IDS(AUG)) successfully mitigates the adversarial examples with more than 96% accuracy. With this approach, the model will continue to be augmented in a sandbox whenever an adversarial sample is detected and subsequently adopt the BFF-IDS(AUG) as the active security model. Consequently, the proposed integration of the statistical adversarial detector and the subsequent augmentation of the BFF-IDS with detected adversarial samples provides a sustainable security framework against adversarial examples and other unknown attacks.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3212412",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ibrahim Aliyu",
        "Sélinde van Engelenburg",
        "Muhammed Bashir Mu’azu",
        "Jinsul Kim",
        "Chang Gyoon Lim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3212412",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4005,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2022.3212412 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: volume, confidentiality, unknown, makes, large, impact, access, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2022.3213843",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity and Forensics in Connected Autonomous Vehicles: A Review of the State-of-the-Art",
      "description": "Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are transformational technologies that have demonstrated significant potential for shaping the future of transportation systems. CAV research has been conducted extensively, both in academic and industrial pursuits. The intention was to put CAVs on the road, but the safety and efficiency of CAVs must be prioritized for this purpose to come to fruition. This technology is built upon sensors, and network communications have the potential to improve automotive infrastructure, reduce traffic and accidents, and facilitate a unified transportation system. Although the auspiciousness of these vehicles is clear, persistent threats exist in terms of cybersecurity attacks, which jeopardize the safety and effectiveness of CAVs. Our study provides a comprehensive dissection of cyberattacks and digital forensics on CAVs. We begin by discussing each element of a standard CAV network and then illustrate the current security. The three main components of CAVs–sensors, communication networks, and actuators-were analyzed in detail. The expansion of cybersecurity and forensic issues is presented with additional investigations into traditional and artificial intelligence-based cyber-defense techniques. Our work concludes by discussing the open challenges and potential research areas for developing robust cybersecurity and forensic solutions exclusively for CAVs.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3213843",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prinkle Sharma",
        "James Gillanders"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2022.3213843",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3233983",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GeFL : Gradient Encryption-Aided Privacy Preserved Federated Learning for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are getting popular because of their usage in a wide range of applications like delivery systems, self-driving taxis, and ambulances. AVs utilize the power of machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) algorithms to improve their self-driving learning experiences. The sudden surge in the number of AVs raises the need for distributed learning ecosystem to optimize their self-driving experiences at a rapid pace. Toward this goal, federated learning (FL) benefits, which can create a distributed learning environment for AVs. But, the traditional FL transfers the raw input data directly to a server, which leads to privacy concerns among the end-users. The concept of blockchain helps us to protect privacy, but it requires additional computational infrastructure. The extra infrastructure increases the operational cost for the company handling and maintaining the AVs. Motivated by this, in this paper, the authors introduced the concept of gradient encryption in FL, which preserves the users’ privacy without the additional computation requirements. The computational power present in the edge devices helps to fine-tune the local model and encrypt the input data to preserve privacy without any drop in performance. For performance evaluation, the authors have built a German traffic sign recognition system using a convolutional neural network (CNN) algorithm-based classification system and GeFL. The simulation process is carried out over a wide range of input parameters to analyze the performance at scale. Simulation results of GeFL outperform the conventional FL-based algorithms in terms of accuracy, i.e., 2% higher. Also, the amount of data transferred among the devices in the network is nearly three times less in GeFL compared to the traditional FL.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3233983",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Raj Parekh",
        "Nisarg Patel",
        "Rajesh Gupta",
        "Nilesh Kumar Jadav",
        "Sudeep Tanwar",
        "Abdullah Alharbi",
        "Amr Kamal Rabea Tolba",
        "Bogdan-Constantin Neagu",
        "Maria Simona Raboacă"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3233983",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3243906",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Integrated Approach of Threat Analysis for Autonomous Vehicles Perception System",
      "description": "Automated vehicles are a revolutionary step in mobility, providing a safe and convenient riding experience while keeping the human-driving task minimal to none. Therefore, these intelligent vehicles are equipped with sophisticated perception sensors (e.g., cameras and radars), high-performance computers, artificial intelligence (AI)-driven algorithms, and connectivity with other internet-of-things (IoT) devices. This makes autonomous vehicles (AVs) a special kind of cyber-physical system (CPS) that is moving at speed in highly interactive and dynamic environments (e.g., public roads). Thus, AV is a potential target for cyber attackers to weaponize, compromising safety and mobility on the road. The first step in addressing this problem is to have a robust threat modeling framework that can address the evolving cyber-physical threats, especially to AV applications. In this regard, two areas are studied in this paper: the common practice of threat modeling in automotive and the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, and sensors and machine learning (ML) algorithms for AV perception systems and potential cyber-physical attacks. A comparative threat analysis for an AV perception system with the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and a system-theoretic process analysis for security (STPA-Sec) approach is also demonstrated in this paper. Based on the analysis, this paper proposes a robust threat analysis and risk assessment framework with mathematical modeling to identify cyber-physical threats to AV perception systems that are critical for the driving behaviors and complex interactions of AVs in their operational design domain.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3243906",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Subhadip Ghosh",
        "Aydin Zaboli",
        "Junho Hong",
        "Jaerock Kwon"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3243906",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 59,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3246497",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Based on the “Asset Container” Method and CWSS",
      "description": "In recent years, legislation and standardization of cyber security management for cyber-physical systems such as automotive systems have been progressing steadily. ISO/SAE 21434, published in 2021, addresses the management and analysis of electrical systems within road vehicles from a cybersecurity perspective. It also recommends some methods for the threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) process. However, there are two problems in the evaluation methods derived from conventional security analysis approaches. One problem is related to the insufficient evaluation of attack feasibilities for cyber-physical systems by the CVSS-based approach. Another problem is the unclear relationship between damage factors in analyzing the impact of damage to each asset. In this paper, we focus on the TARA process, and apply an “asset container” method for threat classification, proposed by the authors at DECSoS 2017, and a CWSS-based risk quantification method. Moreover, we can also add some perspective to improve risk evaluation suitable for automotive systems. Following our past studies on methodologies to evaluate the risk of such special cyber-physical systems, we can quantify risks limited to some cyber-physical systems, such as direct access attacks to in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3246497",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yasuyuki Kawanishi",
        "Hideaki Nishihara",
        "Hirotaka Yoshida",
        "Hideki Yamamoto",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3246497",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3265018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multiple Observation HMM-Based CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "As modern vehicles become more intelligent and connected, the number of ECUs and communication interfaces with external networks (such as 3G/4G and Bluetooth) has increased significantly, which raises potential network security risks. Due to the absence of effective security measures, there is a frequent occurrence of cybersecurity incidents targeting vehicles, particularly the in-vehicle CAN bus network. As the main bus in the vehicle, the CAN bus faces important challenges in its safety due to the lack of security mechanisms. Therefore, we propose a CAN bus intrusion detection system based on multiple observation HMM for in-vehicle networks to enhance the security of the vehicle. Specifically, the proposed algorithm builds a multiple observation HMM-based on the ID and data fields of normal CAN bus traffic. According to the established HMMs, we calculate the existence probability of the frame under the defined time window as the detection threshold. When the existence probability of the frame to be detected exceeds the normal threshold range, it is considered abnormal. Furthermore, we establish four common attack models based on the collected real vehicle data and evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm in these attack scenarios. The experimental results show that the proposed method has better detection performance than other frame-by-frame anomaly detection methods in four attack scenarios.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3265018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chen Dong",
        "Hao Wu",
        "Qingyuan Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3265018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3836,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2023.3265018 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: frequent, normal, vehicle., there, access, safety, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3268519",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "G-IDCS: Graph-Based Intrusion Detection and Classification System for CAN Protocol",
      "description": "The security of in-vehicle networks has become an important issue as automobiles become more connected and automated. In this paper, we propose a graph-based intrusion detection and classification system, named G-IDCS, which aims to enhance the security of the in-vehicle controller area network (CAN) protocol. Existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) using graph theory suffer from limitations, such as requiring a large number of CAN messages for detection and being unable to classify attack types despite analyzing numerous messages. Meanwhile, machine learning or deep learning-based systems have limited sensitivity to environmental changes such as attack type change due to model overfitting, and are unable to provide explanations for classification decisions. Using various graph features, our threshold-based intrusion detection method overcomes these limitations by integrating a threshold-based IDS and a machine learning-based attack type classifier. Our threshold-based intrusion detection method of G-IDCS reduces the number of CAN messages required for detection by more than 1/30 and improves the accuracy of combined attack detection by over 9% compared to an existing intrusion detection method that uses graph theory. Furthermore, unlike existing machine learning and deep learning-based intrusion detection systems, our threshold classifier is robust to changes in attack types and can provide explanations for the features used in attack detection. In addition, our machine learning-based attack type classifier outperforms existing techniques in all performance metrics and can serve as a digital forensic tool for investigating cyber attacks on in-vehicle networks. Using the classifier to identify attack types can facilitate the design of corresponding protection methods, thereby enhancing the security of in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3268519",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sung Bum Park",
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3268519",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3281844",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain Integration for IoT-Enabled V2X Communications: A Comprehensive Survey, Security Issues and Challenges",
      "description": "In V2X (vehicle-to-everything) communication, there is a two-way communication among the vehicle(s) and other Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled smart devices around it that may change how we need to drive. Due to the advancement of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and the rapid development of IoT in transportation, traditional applications are converted to intelligent applications. In V2X communications, the collected information from the IoT smart devices and other sources passes through low-latency, high-bandwidth, high-reliability links. With the future adoption of the 5th generation mobile network (5G) and beyond networks, V2X continues to produce a huge volume of data. However, collecting and storing data securely in blockchain-based storage are extremely needed for immutability and transparency. In this survey article, the convergence of IoT, V2X and blockchain technologies, and various security challenges and their countermeasures are discussed. Next, we discuss various V2X applications and their respective services. Moreover, IoT-V2X architecture and its enabling technologies are discussed in this article. In addition, we also provide a comprehensive analysis of various security mechanisms. Finally, we provide some important challenges and issues of Blockchain for Intelligent Transportation System (BITS).",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3281844",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patruni Muralidhara Rao",
        "Srinivas Jangirala",
        "Saraswathi Pedada",
        "Ashok Kumar Das",
        "Youngho Park"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3281844",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3282110",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Transformer-Based Attention Network for In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Despite the significant advantages of communication systems between electronic control units, the controller area network (CAN) protocol is vulnerable to attacks owing to its weak security structure. The persistent development of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is geared toward preventing vehicles from being targeted by malicious attacks. Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have emerged as a prominent approach in this domain, contributing significantly to the evolution of IDS. Nonetheless, RNN-based methods have certain limitations in step-by-step processing. Their feature extraction at any given point in time only relies on the hidden state of previously observed information, possibly resulting in missing features in the context vector. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-class IDS using a transformer-based attention network (TAN) for an in-vehicle CAN bus. Our model builds on the self-attention mechanism, removing RNNs and classifying attacks into multiple categories. Furthermore, the proposed models can detect replay attacks by aggregating sequential CAN IDs. The experimental results indicate that the TAN is more efficient than the baselines for different input data types and datasets. The highlight is that, although sequential CAN IDs are used, our model can identify intrusion messages without requiring message labeling. Finally, by inheriting the advantages of transformers, TAN employs transfer learning to improve the performance of models trained on small data from other car models.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3282110",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thi Xuan Nguyen",
        "Heungwoo Nam",
        "Daehee Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3282110",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 124,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3307473",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Investigation of Cyber-Attacks and Security Mechanisms for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) can fulfill the emerging demand for smart transportation on a global scale. Such innovations for transportation can bring manyfold benefits from fully autonomous driving services to proactive vehicle monitoring and traffic management. However, given the complexity involved in the deployment of CAVs, zero-tolerance safety, and security measures must be incorporated to avert vehicle immobilization, road accidents, disclosure of sensitive data, or any potential threats. In this article, we present a reference architecture of CAVs to investigate existing and emerging cyber threats and thus, derive a common attack taxonomy for a CAVs ecosystem based on our studies of academic literature and industry white papers. After that, we discuss security mechanisms for the CAVs ecosystem that can be useful for the safe and secure transportation of passengers from one destination to another. Our work can provide insights to security engineers and system architects for investigating security problems using a top-to-bottom approach and subsequently, identifying optimal security solutions for CAVs.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3307473",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandeep Gupta",
        "Carsten R. Maple",
        "Roberto Passerone"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3307473",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 74,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3328182",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Transfer Learning-Based Intrusion Detection System for a Controller Area Network",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a major protocol for in-vehicle network communications. This protocol is simple and efficient for message transmission and the smooth functioning of an in-vehicle system. On the other hand, the weaknesses of this protocol, such as the ID-based arbitration method for message transmission and lack of authentication mechanism, make it vulnerable to various security attacks, including DoS attacks, Fuzzy attacks, impersonation attacks, and replay attacks. Since there is no authentication mechanism for transmitted messages, we need a way to distinguish between normal and attack messages. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an option for this problem because it can raise alarms when there are flaws in the system. IDS is very efficient for intrusion detection where messages with the same IDs are transmitted periodically. The deviation from the normal pattern of message transmission will force the IDS system to trigger alarms. Most studies on the CAN bus IDS system were based on a supervised learning approach. On the other hand, the lack of labeled datasets and a huge amount of training time make it inefficient for new attack patterns. This paper proposes a transfer learning-based IDS system for in-vehicle network intrusion detection. The extraction of quality features using transfer learning (TL) and appropriate fine-tuning methodology is used in the proposed model. This approach can use the available intrusion attack dataset to detect new attacks. The experimental results indicated that the proposed deep hybrid transfer learning (TL) model detects new threats with a high accuracy of approximately 99.9% when compared to state-of-the-art methods, while also lowering training and testing time by more than 30%.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3328182",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narayan Khatri",
        "Sihyung Lee",
        "Seung Yeob Nam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3328182",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3343920",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comprehensive IoT-Driven Fleet Management System for Industrial Vehicles",
      "description": "In the context of fleet management, various challenges, including equipment breakdowns, rising maintenance costs, inefficient resource utilization, and outdated telematics systems, necessitate a transformative approach. Traditional telematics systems encounter limitations such as closed compatibility with specific brands, unique network protocols, and insufficient data analysis and decision-making support. Therefore, these challenges can be addressed by using IoT-driven solutions. This paper introduces an IoT-driven system called the \"intelligent dispatching and health monitoring system\" (IDHMS), which is designed to enhance fleet operations in industries such as mining, construction, and agriculture while addressing issues related to legacy telematics systems. The architecture of IDHMS is a comprehensive IoT-driven framework that integrates embedded hardware, cloud-based software, and flexible network infrastructure. This system facilitates real-time communication, gathering and analysis of data, and decision-making for fleet management in such industries. The IDHMS addresses the limitations of conventional telematics systems by offering standardized protocols, open APIs, robust security measures, comprehensive data analytics capabilities, and a multipurpose ecosystem. Its data-driven insights empower informed decision-making, drive continuous improvement, and enable strategic resource allocation for cost reduction, increased productivity, and competitiveness in dynamic industries. The practical implementation of IDHMS in significant Middle Eastern mines underscores its compatibility with multiple brands, scalability, and potential adoption in various industries.",
      "published": "2023-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3343920",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammadali Farahpoor",
        "Óscar Esparza",
        "Miguel Soriano"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3343920",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3346943",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CF-AIDS: Comprehensive Frequency-Agnostic Intrusion Detection System on In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Many studies have focused on obtaining high accuracy in the design of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for in-vehicle networks, neglecting the significance of different intensive packet injection techniques. Because of their reliance on scenario-specific training datasets, these IDSs are vulnerable to failing to detect real-world attacks. This study implemented deep learning (DL)–based classification for intrusion detection using a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) while considering various intrusion frequencies. Different intrusion frequencies are comprehensively addressed with frequency-agnostic intrusion and resolved by generalizing features for DL input through time series segmentation and frequency domain conversion using Gabor filtering. For training purposes, five types of vehicle data are used, encompassing DoS, fuzzing, and replay attack scenarios. The accuracy range for mechanical version vehicles is typically between 95% and 100%. For electronic vehicles, it is around 90%. Considering the nature of this IDS system, it has been named a Comprehensive Frequency-Agnostic Intrusion Detection System (CF-AIDS). Although this IDS can perform better in all aspects, achieving more efficient results requires a larger amount of situational data.",
      "published": "2023-12-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3346943",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Rezanur Islam",
        "Mahdi Sahlabadi",
        "K.H. Kim",
        "Yoonji Kim",
        "Kangbin Yim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3346943",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3887,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2023.3346943 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: purposes, five, nature, requires, studies, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3347200",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Future: A Comprehensive Review of Security Challenges and Solutions in Advanced Driver Assistance Systems",
      "description": "Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) are advanced technologies that assist drivers with vehicle operation and navigation. Recent improvements and brisk expansion in the ADAS market, as well as an increase in the frequency of incidents such as sensor spoofing, communication interruption etc., in autonomous vehicles (AVs), have raised the need to research ADAS security technology. The security issues raised by incorporating these technologies into automobiles must be addressed to protect the privacy and safety of passengers and other road users. As a result, the purpose of this research is to investigate the security issues that arise from the integration of ADAS technologies. Addressing these challenges holds the potential to establish a foundation for enhanced safety and dependability within transportation networks amidst the ongoing advancements in vehicle technology. This paper starts by describing the vulnerabilities, threats, assaults, and defense mechanisms of the ADAS. It then delves into the attacks and countermeasures in three categories, namely VANET, Hardware, and Adversarial attacks. VANET attacks encompass threats targeting Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, aiming to disrupt communication among vehicles or between vehicles and infrastructure. Hardware attacks focus on vulnerabilities within the physical components of ADAS, including sensors, processors, or communication modules. Adversarial attacks involve deliberate manipulations or perturbations introduced into machine learning models or algorithms utilized within ADAS. These attacks aim to deceive or undermine the functionality of AI-based systems, causing misclassification, compromising system integrity, and posing risks to user safety by exploiting vulnerabilities in the AI decision-making process. Finally, this study highlights potential areas for future research, such as the utilization of artificial intelligence (AI), the necessity of industry-wide standardization, and recommends specific future work tailored to each attack described in the corresponding sections.",
      "published": "2023-12-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3347200",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "driver assistance",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aryan Alpesh Mehta",
        "Ali Asgar Padaria",
        "Dwij Jayesh Bavisi",
        "Vijay Ukani",
        "Priyank Thakkar",
        "Rebakah Geddam",
        "Ketan V. Kotecha",
        "Ajith Abraham"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3347200",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3347619",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle Networks Using Advanced Feature Fusion and Stacking-Enriched Learning",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely heavily on interconnected electronic control units (ECUs) through in-vehicle networks to perform crucial functions such as braking and monitoring engine RPMs. However, the increased number of ECUs and their connectivity to the in-vehicle network poses a security risk due to the lack of encryption and authentication protocols such as the controller area network (CAN). To address this problem, machine learning (ML) based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed. However, existing IDSs suffer from low detection accuracy, limited real-time response, and high resource requirements. This study proposes an accurate and low-complexity IDS for in-vehicle networks based on feature fusion and ensemble learning called the Feature Fusion and Stacking-based IDS (FFS-IDS). FFS-IDS fuses multiple features extracted from raw network traffic and then classifies traffic instances into intrusive and non-intrusive categories using a stacking ensemble learning of basic machine learning classifiers. Specifically, a decision tree is employed as a base classifier, and random forest is used as a meta-learner. This work implements and validates the FFS-IDS using real-time car hacking data sets and achieves better performance than individual decision tree classifiers and popular ensemble learning methods such as Random Forest, LightGBM, AdaBoost, and ExtraTree algorithms. The results demonstrate that FFS-IDS can detect Denial of Service (DoS), Gear spoofing, and RPM spoofing attacks with up to 99% accuracy and Fuzzy attacks with up to 97.5% accuracy using benchmark datasets. Overall, this study shows the effectiveness and practicality of FFS-IDS in detecting intrusions in in-vehicle networks, which is essential for ensuring the cybersecurity and safety of modern vehicles. Future work in this area could involve exploring additional feature extraction techniques and fine-tuning hyperparameters to improve the performance of IDSs further.",
      "published": "2023-12-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3347619",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali A. Altalbe"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3347619",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2023.3348409",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of 6G-Enabled Vehicle-to-Everything Communication in Emerging Federated Learning and Blockchain Technologies",
      "description": "Sixth-generation (6G) communication is emerging as seamless and massive connecting of almost everything. Therefore, vehicles, being extensively linked with human mobility, require a technological pace for compatibility with the 6G era. 6G will also potentially revolutionize the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. However, this modernization will surface several security challenges in the complex heterogeneous architecture of V2X communication in 6G. Similarly, the expansion of V2X also introduces unconventional security risks and vulnerabilities. This paper aims to provide an overview of the security challenges and solutions for V2X communication in the upcoming 6G era to visualize the future of this research domain. This paper discusses the architecture and standards utilized in 6G enabled V2X communications and provisions a comprehensive analysis of V2X security in Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authentication and Access Control (CIA3) domains. Thereby, we analyze the impact of the emerging technological concepts of Blockchain and Federated Learning (FL) in 6G enabled V2X communication. Thereby, we suggest a Blockchain-enabled FL based generic security architecture for V2X communication in 6G networks. At the conclusive end, the review highlights key lessons learned and the future research directions in the domain of security of V2X communications in the 6G including; Privacy in 3D Fog Computing, Privacy in Augmented Reality, C. Secure Software Defined Networking (SDN), Physical Layer Security In THz Spectrum, SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility) and Intrusion Detection using AI.",
      "published": "2023-12-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2023.3348409",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Myoungsu Kim",
        "Insu Oh",
        "Kangbin Yim",
        "Mahdi Sahlabadi",
        "Zarina Shukur"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2023.3348409",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3361829",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: A Survey, Analysis, and Research Challenges",
      "description": "In Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), ensuring road safety has paved the way for innovative advancements such as autonomous driving. These self-driving vehicles, with their variety of sensors, harness the potential to minimize human driving errors and enhance transportation efficiency via sophisticated AI modules. However, the reliability of these sensors remains challenging, especially as they can be vulnerable to anomalies resulting from adverse weather, technical issues, and cyber-attacks. Such inconsistencies can lead to imprecise or erroneous navigation decisions for autonomous vehicles that can result in fatal consequences, e.g., failure in recognizing obstacles. This survey delivers a comprehensive review of the latest research on solutions for detecting anomalies in sensor data. After laying the foundation on the workings of the connected and autonomous vehicles, we categorize anomaly detection methods into three groups: statistical, classical machine learning, and deep learning techniques. We provide a qualitative assessment of these methods to underline existing research limitations. We conclude by spotlighting key research questions to enhance the dependability of autonomous driving in forthcoming studies.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3361829",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "self-driving",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sihem Baccari",
        "Mohamed Hadded",
        "Hakim Ghazzai",
        "Haifa Touati",
        "Mourad Elhadef"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3361829",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 83,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3383431",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "XAI-ADS: An Explainable Artificial Intelligence Framework for Enhancing Anomaly Detection in Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "The advent of autonomous driving systems has given rise to pressing cybersecurity issues regarding the vulnerability of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) to potential attacks. This critical security problem necessitates the application of artificial intelligence (AI) models for anomaly detection in VANETs of autonomous vehicles (AVs). However, the lack of explainability of such AI-based anomaly detection models presents challenges. This motivates an emerging research direction of utilizing explainable AI (XAI) techniques to elucidate the behaviors of anomaly detection models in AV networks. In this work, we propose an end-to-end XAI framework to interpret and visualize the anomaly detection classifications made by AI models securing VANETs. We evaluate the framework on two real-world autonomous driving datasets. The framework furnishes both global and local explanations for the black-box AI models using two XAI methods. Moreover, we introduce two novel feature selection techniques to identify the salient features contributing to anomaly detection, derived from the popular SHAP XAI method and the accuracy of six different black-box AI models.We compare our proposed feature selection approaches with six state-of-the-art feature selection techniques (including two wrapper-based feature selection methods), demonstrating superior performance on various evaluation metrics. To generalize the impact of our feature selection methods, we apply three independent classifiers to evaluate our proposed feature selection approaches. The novel feature selection methods effectively distill themost explanatory features, enhancing model interpretability. Finally, we assess the efficiency (how quickly the XAI models can yield explanatory findings) for each of the six black-box AI models we employed on our two datasets, identifying the most efficient model. By furnishing explanations and visualizations of anomaly detection by AI models, our XAI framework can help in enabling trust and transparency for securing vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3383431",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sazid Nazat",
        "Lingxi Li",
        "Mustafa Abdallah"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3383431",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 82,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3385731",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An In-Depth Exploration of Electric Vehicle Charging Station Infrastructure: A Comprehensive Review of Challenges, Mitigation Approaches, and Optimization Strategies",
      "description": "The increasing popularity and number of electric vehicles (EVs) globally have resulted in a growing demand for efficient, reliable, and effective electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) infrastructure. However, the development and implementation of this infrastructure involves various challenges, including the variety of EVs, charging and battery technologies, high installation costs, limited grid capacity, and uncertainties regarding future demand, and raises issues regarding the quality, security, and stability of the power system. This paper presents a holistic understanding of the challenges, mitigation approaches, and available technologies and protocols related to EVCS network deployment. Moreover, optimization strategies such as location planning, network integration, scheduling charging time, and planning price, which involve maximizing the utilization of charging stations and minimizing associated costs, and their modeling techniques are highlighted. This review aims to provide insights to develop sustainable, efficient EVCS infrastructure while overcoming the challenges and optimizing the benefits.",
      "published": "2024",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3385731",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Yousuf",
        "Zhan-Le Wang",
        "R. Paranjape",
        "Yi-Li Tang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3385731",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 121,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3402946",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding the V2X Pathways: Exploring the Cybersecurity Landscape Through Systematic Review",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication, essential for enhancing road safety, driving efficiency, and traffic management, must be robust against cybersecurity threats for successful deployment and acceptance. This survey comprehensively explores V2X security challenges, focusing on prevalent cybersecurity threats such as jamming, spoofing, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), and eavesdropping attacks. These threats were selected due to their prevalence and ability to compromise the integrity and reliability of V2X systems. Jamming can disrupt communications, spoofing can lead to data and identity manipulation, DDoS attacks can saturate system resources, and eavesdropping can compromise user privacy and information confidentiality. Addressing these major threats ensures that V2X systems are robust and secure for successful deployment and widespread acceptance. An extensive review uncovered a global landscape of V2X cybersecurity research. We highlight contributions from China in scientific publications and the United States in patent innovations, with notable advancements from leading corporations such as Qualcomm, LG, Huawei, Intel, Apple, and Samsung. This work educates and informs on the current state of V2X cybersecurity and identifies emerging trends and future research directions based on a year-by-year analysis of the literature and patents. The findings underscore the evolving cybersecurity landscape in V2X systems and the importance of continued innovation and research in this critical field. The survey navigates the complexities of securing V2X communications, emphasizing the necessity for advanced security protocols and technologies, and highlights innovative approaches within the global scientific and patent research context. By providing a panoramic view of the field, this survey sets the stage for future advancements in V2X cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3402946",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "jamming",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kevin Herman Muraro Gularte",
        "José Alfredo Ruiz Vargas",
        "João Paulo C. L. da Costa",
        "Antonio Silva",
        "Giovanni Almeida Santos",
        "Wang Yu-ming",
        "Christian Alfons Müller",
        "Christoph Lipps",
        "Rafael T. de Sousa",
        "Walter de Britto Vidal Filho",
        "Philipp Slusallek",
        "Hans Dieter Schotten"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3402946",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3426591",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development for High-Assurance Software Update Management System Complying With UN R156",
      "description": "With the advent of autonomous driving and connected vehicles in the automotive industry, various vehicle software components are now connected to wireless networks. This enables vehicles to automatically patch vulnerabilities by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) using Over-The-Air (OTA) technology. However, this increased connectivity also exposes vehicles to a wider range of threats due to the expanded attack surfaces. As a response, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has introduced regulations to ensure vehicle security. Among these, regulation no. 156 outlines requirements for implementing a Software Update Management System (SUMS) related explicitly to OTA. However, the abstract requirements in UN R156 pose challenges for OEMs looking to implement SUMS according to their specific needs. Therefore, we conducted threat modeling to derive more detailed security requirements than those outlined in UN R156. Subsequently, we designed a secure SUMS architecture based on these enhanced security requirements and formally verified whether the architecture satisfies the specified security criteria. Finally, we utilized Atelier B to generate source code for the SUMS.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3426591",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicles",
        "regulation",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaewan Seo",
        "Jiwon Kwak",
        "Seungjoo Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3426591",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3904,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2024.3426591 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: economic, response, access, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3433031",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Charge Scheduling Optimization of Electric Vehicles: A Comprehensive Review of Essentiality, Perspectives, Techniques, and Security",
      "description": "The transportation sector is one among the key sources of greenhouse emissions (GHGs) leading to climate change and global warming. Energy transition through electrified transportation is one of the solutions to tackle the issues. Electric vehicles (EVs) offer significant environmental and economic advantages against the conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. EVs are called mobility loads and their connectivity to the utility grid for charging is unpredictable. The large penetration of such unpredictable loads into the utility grid will lead to undesirable impacts on the utility service. This paper highlights the importance of managing and optimizing the charging schedules. The optimization of EV charging has diverse aspects, and the perspectives of EV charging differ among consumers, aggregators, and utility services. Proper planning and management of EV charging is essential to achieve harmony amongst these stakeholders. A comprehensive review on the objectives of electric vehicle charging optimization from various perspectives is presented and discussed in this paper. EV charging optimization techniques including mathematical programming, meta heuristics algorithms and machine learning techniques are explored. The main objectives, constraints, strength, and limitations of different charging optimization techniques are analyzed in detail. A brief discussion on the communication strategies for data exchange in EV charging framework is presented and the need for a communication security constrained EV charging scheduling is also emphasized.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3433031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shereen Siddhara Abdul Salam",
        "Veena Raj",
        "Mohammad Iskandar Petra",
        "Абул Калам Азад",
        "Sathyajith Mathew",
        "Sheik Mohammed Sulthan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3433031",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3439019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed Consensus-Based Optimal Power Sharing Between Grid and EV Charging Stations Using Derivative-Free Charging Scheduling",
      "description": "The trending penetration of electric vehicles (EVs) and the emergence of new charging stations to the existing power grid pose challenges to power supply security, reliability, and economics. The optimal coordination strategy between the EV and power grid is mandatory for the secure and reliable operation of the EV-connected entire system and to fulfil the EV charging needs at a lower cost. Therefore, the current study looks at improving energy economics through optimal coordination for smart power allocation and EV charging station scheduling. This paper uses a distributed consensus-based optimization algorithm (DCBOA) to identify the best power-sharing arrangement amongst three charging stations for motorbikes, small EVs, and large EVs. Moreover, the EVs are also scheduled optimally at each charging station using a derivative-free optimization algorithm (DFOA). The results show that optimal power sharing has resulted in a considerable decrease in the amount of electricity purchased from the power grid and offers EV charging at a lower cost. Furthermore, the smart scheduling of the EVs reduces the overall load burden on the grid network. The findings emphasize the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed optimal power-sharing approach in raising the energy economics of EV charging stations.",
      "published": "2024",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3439019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zia Ullah",
        "Lai-Qing Yan",
        "Anis ur Rehman",
        "Hasan Saeed Qazi",
        "Xiaodong Wu",
        "Jing-Kuan Li",
        "Hany M. Hasanien"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3439019",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3445498",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Intrusion Detection System for Vehicular Networks Based on an Improved ViT Model",
      "description": "As the connectivity between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and the external environment intensifies, the security and safeguarding of In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) have become pressing issues. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, the most commonly employed vehicular network protocol, is particularly vulnerable due to its inherent lack of security measures, making it susceptible to various attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel intrusion detection model for CAN networks, named IVN-ViT. The proposed IVN-ViT model utilizes an enhanced Vision Transformer architecture (Edge-ViT), incorporating self-supervised learning with Cutout data augmentation, Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) for feature selection, and a fine-tuning strategy that merges Parameter Instance Discrimination (PID) with supervised loss. This not only enhances the model’s convergence speed and predictive accuracy but also meets the lightweight requirements of CAN networks. Experimental results on the “HCRL-car hacking” dataset and the “X-CANIDS” dataset demonstrate that our model achieves over 99% accuracy across all types of attacks. In a simulated vehicular environment, the detection latency for each message averages approximately 1.04ms, fully meeting the first-time requirements of CAN networks. The experiments validate that our proposed method significantly improves model accuracy while ensuring efficient operation within the limited computational resources available in vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3445498",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaoqiang Wang",
        "Baosen Zheng",
        "Zhaoyuan Liu",
        "Ziyao Fan",
        "Yubao Liu",
        "Yinfei Dai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3445498",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3455329",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Event-Triggered Security Control for Connected Vehicle Platoon System Subject to Deception Attacks",
      "description": "An attack-resilient event-triggered secure control approach is presented for the platoon system composed of connected vehicles that are exposed to deception attacks. Firstly, a new discrete linear model is developed for the system of vehicle platooning, including the distance error, the relative velocity, and acceleration as the state vector. Secondly, considering the stochastic occurrence of deception attacks at the sensor and controller ends of vehicles, the probabilistic occurrence of the deception attack is represented by two sets of Bernoulli stochastic variables. In an effort to decrease the communication resources consumption, an event triggering mechanism is used to determine the transmission of vehicle state information between the sensor and controller. Then, the sufficient condition is constructed through utilizing the Lyapunov theory of stability, which can guarantee the stabilization of interconnected vehicles in the platoon, and the parameters related to the controller and event-triggered mechanism are provided based on the solution of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Eventually, the usefulness of the suggested scheme in ensuring control performance while saving computational and communication resources is verified through the comparative experiment and co-simulation of Carsim and Simulink.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3455329",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hancong Dong",
        "Xiulan Song"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3455329",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4077,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2024.3455329 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: stability, sensor, access, information, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3456893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning Frontiers in 3D Object Detection: A Comprehensive Review for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Self-driving cars or autonomous vehicles (AVs) represent a transformative technology with the potential to revolutionize transportation. The rise of self-driving cars has driven remarkable progress in 3D object detection technologies, crucial in safe and efficient autonomous driving. This analysis explores the pivotal function of three-dimensional object detection in improving AV safety and performance, underscoring its importance within the larger framework of self-driving vehicle systems. We offer a thorough examination of techniques, including deep learning frameworks such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), to assess their advantages and drawbacks in 3D object detection. The progression of reference datasets, such as KITTI, Waymo, and NuScenes, was examined, emphasizing their crucial role in propelling detection algorithms forward and enabling comparative studies across diverse methodologies. Key performance evaluation metrics, including Average Precision (AP) and Intersection over Union (IoU), are essential for assessing detection accuracy. Furthermore, we investigated the integration of computer vision and deep learning techniques in object recognition, showing their impact on improving the perceptual capabilities of AVs. This paper also addresses significant challenges in 3D object detection, such as occlusion, scale variation, and the need for real-time processing, while proposing future research directions to overcome these obstacles. This work investigates the most recent 3D object detection methods for self-driving cars, emphasizing the importance of advanced deep learning models and multi-sensor fusion methods. In addition, we identify crucial topics for further investigation, such as enhancing sensor fusion algorithms, increasing computational efficiency, and addressing ethical, security, and privacy concerns. The utilization of these technologies in real-world autonomous driving scenarios is examined by specifying their possible advantages and constraints. It provides valuable insights for researchers and practitioners to guide the development of robust 3D object detection systems crucial for the safe deployment of autonomous driving technologies.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3456893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ambati Pravallika",
        "Mohammad Farukh Hashmi",
        "Aditya Dinesh Gupta"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3456893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 65,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3467002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring Secure V2X Communication Networks for Human-Centric Security and Privacy in Smart Cities",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) and advanced human-centred technologies have seen rapid expansion in smart city applications, including smart enterprises, homes, and vehicular networks. The IoT architecture underpins technological support for both human- and device-centric secure solutions, which are essential to the functioning of smart cities. Within this evolving landscape, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology has emerged as a key innovation, integrating vehicular communication with internet connectivity. This integration facilitates seamless data exchange between vehicles, infrastructure, and other entities, contributing to enhanced road safety, optimized traffic flow, reduced emissions, and the development of more intelligent transportation systems. As V2X technology becomes increasingly widespread, ensuring the security and privacy of the information exchanged within these networks is critical. While much of the existing research has concentrated on general IoT security frameworks and standalone vehicular communication protocols, our study addresses the unique security challenges inherent in V2X environments. This paper identifies and examines various security threats, including data privacy breaches, malicious attacks, and traffic manipulation, and explores strategies to mitigate these risks within V2X communications. In addition, this paper investigates the potential of blockchain technology as an innovative solution for enhancing the security and trustworthiness of information exchanges in V2X networks. The paper also includes a case study that presents a proposed solution demonstrating how blockchain technology could strengthen the security and integrity of data transfers within V2X systems. Through comprehensive analysis, evaluation, and recommendations for future research, this work contributes to the current understanding of secure data exchange in V2X networks.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3467002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vinay Rishiwal",
        "Udit Agarwal",
        "Aziz Alotaibi",
        "Sudeep Tanwar",
        "Preeti Yadav",
        "Mano Yadav"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3467002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3504404",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Cybersecurity in V2X: A Review of Simulation Environments",
      "description": "The deployment and acceptance of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technologies are essential for the advancement of intelligent transportation systems, requiring robust simulation tools for development and validation. This paper offers an overview of leading V2X simulation tools, emphasizing their role in communication and cybersecurity applications. Existing surveys are reviewed, identifying gaps such as the limited coverage of less known tools such as CARLA and CarSim and the absence of detailed market analyses. A thorough assessment of the market significance of V2X simulation tools is provided, highlighting annual trends and profiling leading companies. Publication trends across major scientific databases are also examined, reflecting the growing interest and research diversity in V2X simulations. The review includes an analysis of crucial simulation tools such as SUMO, NS3, OMNeT++, Veins, and CARLA, emphasizing their contributions to V2X communications. Regarding cybersecurity, the study explores simulation parameters for mitigating security threats such as jamming, spoofing, Denial of Service (DoS), and eavesdropping. Furthermore, the increasing integration of different simulation tools is highlighted to address their individual limitations. Finally, emerging research opportunities are identified, advocating for the integration of co-simulation frameworks and AI-driven (Artificial Intelligence) approaches to improve the accuracy and resilience of V2X systems. This survey aims to guide future research efforts in developing secure, efficient, and scalable V2X communication technologies.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3504404",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "jamming",
        "resilience",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kevin Herman Muraro Gularte",
        "João Paulo C. L. da Costa",
        "José Alfredo Ruiz Vargas",
        "Antonio Silva",
        "Giovanni Almeida Santos",
        "Wang Yu-ming",
        "Christian Alfons Müller",
        "Christoph Lipps",
        "Rafael T. de Sousa",
        "Walter de Britto Vidal Filho",
        "Philipp Slusallek",
        "Hans Dieter Schotten"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3504404",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3521661",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federal Deep Learning Approach of Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Communication Network Security",
      "description": "In order to stay current with technology, in-vehicle communication has been enhanced daily. Control area network (CAN) is widely adopted due to the exceptional efficiency and reliability. CAN is susceptible to various network-level attacks due to the shortfall in security protocols. This article presents a new approach in addressing this challenge by introducing a unique intrusion detection system. It utilizes a federal learning framework which employs Convolutional Neural Networks as well as Long-Term Short Memory. The goal of this hybrid methodology is to improve intrusion detection efficacy within the framework of federal learning for IoT while overcoming the drawbacks of current techniques. This approach is commonly employed for spatial extraction of features, permitted the model to detect patterns that may indicate possible attacks. Additionally, it is capable of arresting temporal dependencies over time in the information. This work implements a zero-trust security approach for storing information in local device edges and only sharing the weights that were learned with the centralised federal network. This network collects information from different sources for enhancing the correctness of the universal learning approach. Experimental results show that the proposed technique can effectively detect attacks in real-time on the bus, with a much higher detection ratio. Based on the analysis, it can be discovered that the HCRL SA dataset, when used with the proposed hybrid model, with an impressive accuracy rate, and precision of 99.94% and 99.86% respectively. It is also found that the recall and area of the curve perform better by implementing the proposed technique. It is recorded to be 99.10% and 99.21% respectively.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3521661",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "In-Seop Na",
        "Anandakumar Haldorai",
        "Nithesh Naik"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3521661",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2024.3523358",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Pseudo-Random Identification and Efficient Privacy-Preserving V2X Communication for IoV Networks",
      "description": "The advancement of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) technologies has significantly enhanced road safety and transportation efficiency through smart traffic management and precise control systems. With the advent of 5G and beyond, vehicles within the IoV ecosystem can seamlessly communicate with various smart entities (X) using V2X (Vehicle-to-Entity) communications. However, the openness of IoV networks and the exponential growth of V2X links have expanded potential attack surfaces, increasing the risk of security and privacy breaches. In response to these challenges, this article proposes a privacy-preserving and secure communication framework for IoV networks, addressing critical security challenges in V2X communication. By leveraging lightweight cryptographic mechanisms such as hash functions, quadratic residuosity, and Legendre symbols, the proposed scheme ensures secure authentication, group key sharing, and pseudonym management within IoV networks. The proposed scheme’s security and privacy features, along with its correctness, have been rigorously validated against various security threats where other state-of-the-art schemes fail. Comprehensive performance analysis demonstrates that our scheme completes authentication in a fraction of a millisecond, significantly outperforming existing approaches. The design simplicity and efficiency of the proposed authentication structure make it highly suitable for real-world IoV applications.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3523358",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sujash Naskar",
        "G. Hancke",
        "Tingting Zhang",
        "Mikael Gidlund"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2024.3523358",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3529526",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Temporal Convolutional Network Approach to Secure Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) in Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "Securing data transactions across computer networks presents significant challenges, particularly concerning data privacy and cybersecurity threats. These issues are particularly critical in electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) due to the sensitive data involved, such as data breaches, unauthorized access, and privacy concerns. The primary challenge within EVCS architecture lies in defending against various cyberattacks. Several machine learning models, including convolutional neural networks, recurrent neural networks, and long short-term memory, have been employed to enhance EVCS security. However, these models often struggle to effectively handle the temporal dependencies, complexity, and scalability required for real-time threat detection. In this study, we propose a novel temporal convolutional network (TCN) to enhance EVCS security by rapidly detecting Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) attacks. Our model was trained and tested on the latest CICEVSE2024 dataset, which encompasses attacks targeting EVCS communication protocols, including OCPP and ISO15118, during charging and idle states. The proposed model achieved 100% accuracy in detecting binary labels and 5-class scenarios, and 93% accuracy in identifying 17-class attack types, surpassing existing approaches. Additionally, we conducted a comparative analysis with a hybrid model, demonstrating that the proposed TCN delivers superior performance with lower computational complexity, fewer parameters, a smaller model size, and shorter computation times. These features make the TCN model highly suitable for real-time EVCS applications. This work establishes a new benchmark for EVCS security, showcasing the potential of TCNs to deliver scalable and efficient solutions for safeguarding critical charging infrastructure against cyber threats.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3529526",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ikram Benfarhat",
        "Vik Tor Goh",
        "Siow Chun Lim",
        "Muhammad Sheraz",
        "Teong Chee Chuah"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3529526",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3541035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review on Security Challenges in V2X Communications Technology for VANETs",
      "description": "The Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is emerging as a new networking/communication model that offers remarkable approaches for controlling and managing vehicular traffic. In this scenario, Virtual traffic light (VTL) techniques, advanced navigation support, and fleet management facilities attempt to handle traffic management and control concerns by leveraging vehicular network communication paradigms. The most important communication models in vehicular networks are characterized as vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications technology. In V2X communications, security issues, and related countermeasures are crucial, as they are in other wireless technologies. Our survey provides a systematic overview of various research directions by highlighting and investigating the most critical V2X security issues and related countermeasures. First, we discuss the points mentioned in the previous papers, including the architecture, main characteristics, and communication models of the V2X networks. Furthermore, some of the most significant applications of these mission-critical networks reported in the published papers and the main security challenges and requirements will be highlighted. We also arrange corresponding (existing) resources, to investigate different solutions for securing V2X communications. Finally, a few suggestions for future research related to V2X security challenges are presented. In general, this article reviews and summarizes the studies of the last ten years. This survey will help make it easier for scholars studying V2X communication security and related fields to keep track of the academic frontier, by offering a sufficiently clear landscape and a roadmap.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3541035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eslam Farsimadan",
        "Leila Moradi",
        "Francesco Palmieri"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3541035",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3545245",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Embedded Machine Learning-Based Voltage Fingerprinting for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "This research presents the development and validation of an embedded system for real-time intrusion detection in automotive environments, leveraging voltage-based ECU fingerprinting. The proposed system integrates advanced machine learning algorithms, including SVM, ANN, and DT, optimized for anomaly detection, with linear SVM achieving the highest accuracy. To demonstrate feasibility, the system was implemented on automotive-grade microcontrollers, AURIX Tricore platform TC375. A robust test environment replicating real CAN traffic was employed to validate the approach, based on low-cost embedded devices (Arduino R3/R4 and MCP2515 module). To address synchronization challenges between the CAN transceiver and ADC channels, a circular buffer strategy was introduced, significantly reducing false positives and enhancing system stability. Performance evaluations under nominal and attack scenarios confirm the effectiveness of the solution, offering a practical and reliable method to enhance in-vehicle cybersecurity and mitigate risks for drivers and passengers.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3545245",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pierpaolo Dini",
        "Michele Zappavigna",
        "Ettore Soldaini",
        "Sergio Saponara"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3545245",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3561028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BLE Channel Sounding: Novel Method for Enhanced Ranging Accuracy in Vehicle Access",
      "description": "The recent attempts for vehicle thefts using Relay Station or Man in Middle attacks have triggered the need for precise and secure distance measurement between the owner device and vehicle. Ultra-Wide Band offers high accuracy ranging; it is expensive and hence could not be deployed in vehicle access. Bluetooth® Low Energy Channel Sounding is excellent cost effective and mass scale alternative for enhanced ranging and vehicle access solution. The motivation for this research work lies in minimising power consumption thereby maximising battery life for the handheld owner device such as key fob or smartphone; whilst offering unparalleled security against Man in the Middle or Relay Station Attacks. The proposed work combines the conventional low power Received Signal Strength Indicator based approach with the Bluetooth® Low Energy Channel Sounding framework for accurate distance estimation. The coarse ranging offered by conventional Received Signal Strength Indicator approach is embedded into proximity based secure pairing as well as a pre-check before establishing connection between paired devices. The proposed work performs bidirectional measurement of values of Received Signal Strength Indicator, Phase Based Ranging and Round-Trip Time and cross-correlation of them to enhance accuracy using novel method. The development process utilized ANSYS HFSS 3D High Frequency Simulation for dual antenna design, enabling precise phase difference calibration. The implementation was achieved using a chipset with an ARM Cortex M33 core, hardware accelerators, and a BLE Channel Sounding stack integrated through a Software Development Kit. This work demonstrates a practical, scalable, and secure solution for BLE-based ranging in modern vehicle access systems. Besides security, proposed work provides opportunities for many more use cases such as distance based welcome feature where vehicle will recognise approaching owner and welcome with step by step turning ON of functions such as approach light, ambient light, unlocking the doors etc. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method achieves ranging accuracy comparable to existing LF and RF technologies.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3561028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "relay",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suresh D.",
        "Prashant V. Joshi",
        "Parag Parandkar",
        "Ameya Gambhir",
        "K. M. Sudharshan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3561028",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3561628",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Test of an Embedded Real-Time Compact Voltage Fingerprinting Algorithm for Enhanced Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The article proposes an algorithm for monitoring data traffic in CAN networks on board vehicles. This algorithm detects cyber-attacks through statistical analysis of voltage samples from the protocol’s physical layer. The method aims to be compact and achieve real-time throughput for implementation on an embedded platform. In the article are shown tests of the proposed method on the Automotive MCU AURIX TC375. The Electronic Control Unit (ECU) classification algorithm results from the re-elaboration of the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) method. Using.dbc and recorded.asc traces acquired from a real vehicle (Giulietta Alfa Romeo model), the message traffic is reconstructed and replicated via experimental prototype, providing different voltage levels for each device used to emulate the ECU. The article evaluates the algorithm performance through extensive experiments, assessing its ability to detect traffic anomalies in various attack scenarios.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3561628",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pierpaolo Dini",
        "Ettore Soldaini",
        "Sergio Saponara"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3561628",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3569356",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FEXGBIDS: Federated XGBoost-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "With the rapid development of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) and In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs), the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol faces significant cybersecurity threats due to its open design. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) struggle to balance privacy protection, computational efficiency, and detection accuracy. We propose FEXGBIDS, a privacy-preserving intrusion detection system based on federated XGBoost. By integrating the Federated Learning (FL) framework with cryptographic optimization techniques, FEXGBIDS addresses data silo and security challenges in the vehicular network environment. We use the BatchCrypt algorithm to batch encrypt first- and second-order gradients to reduce the computational and communication overhead of Paillier homomorphic encryption. Additionally, we employ BLS aggregate signatures to achieve efficient and verifiable parameter aggregation, and leverage the DDSketch distributed quantile estimation algorithm to optimize the feature bucketing process. Experiments on the Car Hacking dataset show that FEXGBIDS achieves a detection accuracy of 97.26%, comparable to centralized XGBoost, and improves computational efficiency by 65% over the traditional Paillier method. The system effectively resists spoofing attacks and data leakage, while supporting efficient collaborative training in large-scale Internet of Vehicles (IoV) environments.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3569356",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jie Li",
        "Yuanyuan Song",
        "Ming-Gang Zheng",
        "Shuo Zhang",
        "Liang Han"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3569356",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4849,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/access.2025.3569356 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: fleet_scale, privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: large-scale, car, significant, access, privacy, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3584649",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: A Systematic Review of Automotive Security",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of the automotive industry has driven the emergence of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, raising significant concerns about the cybersecurity vulnerabilities inherent in their complex networks. This systematic review investigates cybersecurity in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, focusing on internal and external networks and addressing four key research questions: (RQ1) What security controls exist in CAV networks? (RQ2) What methodologies are employed in cybersecurity studies? (RQ3) How effective are these methods, and what limitations do they present? (RQ4) What are the key themes, common approaches, and future research directions? Peer-reviewed studies published between 2019 and 2024 were included, using IEEE Xplore, Elsevier, MDPI, ACM Digital Library, and Springer as data sources. Following PRISMA 2020 guidelines, 111 relevant articles were analysed and grouped into seven themes: Authentication, Blockchain, Intrusion Detection Systems, Vehicle-to-Everything communication, Network Operation Centers, Security Operations Centers, and Systematic Reviews. The thematic synthesis highlighted study objectives, methodologies, and implemented security controls. This review identifies significant gaps in the literature, particularly in integrating Security Information and Event Management systems and the real-world validation of proposed security measures. It underscores the need for adaptive cybersecurity frameworks to address evolving threats and highlights the importance of collaboration between academia and industry. Furthermore, future research should prioritize the development of advanced security protocols, address scalability challenges, and explore the impact of emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and 5G. Providing awareness and training is also essential to mitigate human error. These findings are a foundation for designing more resilient and secure Connected and Autonomous Vehicles systems.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3584649",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rafael Abreu",
        "Frederico Branco",
        "Manuel J. C. S. Reis",
        "Carlos Serôdio"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3584649",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3585956",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ASIC Design for Real-Time CAN-Bus Intrusion Detection and Prevention System Using Random Forest",
      "description": "A controller area network (CAN) is the most widely used protocol to communicate between electronic control units (ECUs) inside a vehicle. However, it lacks basic security functions and a structure vulnerable to external attacks. Therefore, it is important to develop an intrusion detection system (IDS) that can effectively identify malicious and legitimate CAN messages, as well as an intrusion prevention system (IPS) that can block such malicious messages in real time. In this study, a random-forest-based intrusion detection system (RF-IDS) was proposed and integrated with a CAN controller to design a system that can perform real-time detection and attack blocking. Existing IDS studies aim for high detection performance. However, the real-time blocking function is limited or the possibility of hardware implementation is yet to be sufficiently verified. To address this issue, we designed an IDS that can immediately determine if an attack is present when receiving a CAN frame and blocking the attack node. Fast and efficient detection is possible complex matrix operations because the random forest model performs detection based on comparison operations. This confirmed that the corresponding structure achieved an average detection time of $1.86~\\mu $ s and detection accuracy of more than 99%, allowing real-time intrusion blocking. Finally, hardware implementation was achieved by completing the design of the ASIC chip through a multiproject wafer process.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3585956",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ju-Young Lee",
        "Sangmin Park",
        "Sua Shin",
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Joosock Lee",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3585956",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3616784",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fed-CALiBER: Federated Lightweight BERT Intrusion Detection on CAN Bus Protocol in Autonomous Vehicle",
      "description": "Recent advancements in autonomous vehicle (AV) technology have highlighted critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities within In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs), particularly the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. While numerous Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) exist, significant gaps remain in addressing resource efficiency and the challenge of Non Independent and Identically Distributed (Non-IID) data in distributed vehicular environments. This study proposes Fed-CALiBER, a novel framework that synergistically combines a compact, pre-trained Lightweight BERT model with a Federated Learning (FL) architecture. By training collaboratively on distinct datasets assigned to Raspberry Pi edge clients, our approach preserves data privacy by keeping raw data localized and is explicitly designed to enhance generalization across Non-IID data distributions. With a reduced communication overhead by transmitting a small parameter footprint (approx. 13 MB) during federated updates, Fed-CALiBER minimizes network overhead during parameter aggregation. Our two-cycle experimental results demonstrate that the federated global model significantly outperforms standalone models in cross-dataset generalization—improving F1-scores on unseen datasets from as low as 71.39% to over 96.59%—and successfully adapts to shifting data distributions. The framework is validated as a practical edge solution, achieving real-time inference (3–4 ms per sample) with low computational overhead on Raspberry Pi clients, representing a lightweight edge client.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3616784",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamman Aryo Bimmo",
        "Budi Rahardjo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3616784",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3621255",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Vehicle-in-the-Loop Simulation-Based Framework for Automotive Cybersecurity Evaluation",
      "description": "As connected and autonomous vehicle technology advances, in-vehicle communication networks have become increasingly exposed to cybersecurity threats due to their connectivity with external environments. In response, international regulations and standards, such as the UNR.155 and ISO/SAE 21434, have been reinforced, underscoring the need for systematic and rigorous security evaluations. However, cybersecurity experiments on public roads pose significant safety challenges, whereas legacy testbeds and software-only simulations often fail to capture the dynamic behavior of actual vehicles. This study proposes a vehicle-in-the-loop simulation (VILS)-based framework to address these limitations, enabling real-time integration between physical vehicles and virtual driving environments. By synchronizing control inputs and state feedback, the framework allows for safe, repeatable testing of diverse cyberattack scenarios under realistic conditions. The experimental results reveal that VILS captures physical responses and network-level anomalies across attack types, supporting comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessments. The framework demonstrates high consistency and analytical precision across repeated trials. These results validate VILS as a practical and robust alternative for improving the accuracy and reliability of real-vehicle cybersecurity evaluations.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3621255",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bogeun Kang",
        "Sanghoon Jeon"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3621255",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3641178",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Factor Authentication for In-Vehicle Secure OTA Protocol",
      "description": "As advancements in vehicle electronics and intelligence accelerate, the number of electronic control units (ECUs) is rapidly increasing, thereby heightening the likelihood of errors and cyberattacks. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are adopting over-the-air (OTA) updates to manage software and firmware remotely to counter these threats, . However, OTA updates pose critical security vulnerabilities, as the communication network is equally accessible to attackers. The single authentication architecture centered on the central gateway (CGW), commonly adopted in prior studies, has structural limitations that significantly reduce its defensive performance against internal network intrusions or CGW compromises. This study proposes a secure OTA protocol to overcome these limitaions by performing ECU-level multi-factor authentication and replacing the CGW-dependent architecture. The proposed approach mitigates the risk of single points of failure in centralized architectures by enabling each ECU to perform mutual authentication directly with the update server. Furthermore, it is designed to be implemented using low-cost security modules on resource-constrained ECUs. The experimental results show that the proposed protocol effectively defends against malicious internal updates while minimizing computational and memory overhead, confirming its applicability to real-world vehicular environments. These findings contribute to enhancing OTA security in the coming era of software-defined vehicles(SDVs).",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3641178",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "H.T. Kim",
        "Sanghoon Jeon"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3641178",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3641508",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Harnessing Fuzzing Capabilities to Improve Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The automotive industry’s rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and advanced networking introduces new avenues for performance enhancement but also creates significant cybersecurity risks. As EVs integrate complex cyber-physical systems, ensuring their safety and reliable operation especially within the context of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) is critical, given the substantial threat posed by cyberattacks to both vehicle infrastructure and power grids. A single compromised Electronic Control Unit (ECU) or infected vehicular network could cascade into a fleet-wide security risk. This paper performs a comprehensive vulnerability analysis to evaluate the cyber risks associated with various modern vehicle modules and assesses their potential risk impact levels, detailing several common attack pathways. We also discuss security testing methods, including penetration testing and dynamic analysis, and highlight the critical role and potential of fuzzing in automotive cybersecurity. Furthermore, we conduct a detailed comparative analysis of existing fuzzers, assessing their current suitability for automotive industrial use. Finally, we propose a novel fuzzing-based security framework that specifically integrates and addresses automotive security concerns by evaluating the security performance against the fundamental pillars of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, ensuring reliability and safety of vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3641508",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "fuzzing",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kunj Dhonde",
        "Ikjot Saini",
        "Mitra Mirhassani"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3641508",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3644944",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Indirect Exposure Training for Robust Time-Series Can Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) lacks built-in authentication, encryption, and integrity protection, which motivates data-driven anomaly detection techniques that learn nominal behavior and flag deviations. In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection framework for CAN traffic under a normal-only training setting, based on a center identifier (ID) prediction objective. Specifically, given a sliding-window context that excludes the center message, the model predicts the center ID, and an event is classified as anomalous when the ground-truth ID is not among the model’s top-k hypotheses. We systematically compare two-dimensional message-window representations and one-dimensional flattened sequences across four input feature configurations: Full, Payload-only, ID-only, and Hybrid. Under an indirect-exposure setting, windows are constructed from the full stream while training uses only samples whose centers are normal, allowing the model to indirectly observe abnormal context without directly learning from attack labels, thereby stabilizing the decision boundary and reducing false positives. Consequently, experiments on three public datasets, Sonata, Soul, and Spark, demonstrate that a one-dimensional Transformer with Hybrid inputs, combined with a top-5 decision rule, achieves the best overall performance.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3644944",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyunjun Jo",
        "Deok‐Hwan Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3644944",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3644958",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CARBUROS: A Formally Verified Authentication Protocol for V2X Communications",
      "description": "The growing adoption of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) demands robust authentication protocols to ensure secure and reliable interaction among road actors. In this context, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) can serve as an important building block; however, integrating MFA into vehicular environments is nontrivial. Traditional MFA verifies digital credentials but typically does not confirm physical presence. In ITS, authentication often requires binding digital identities to a vehicle’s actual position and timing. To address this gap, this work presents CARBUROS, an MFA protocol specifically designed for ITS scenarios. It introduces a dual-channel mechanism that combines a standard digital communication channel with a physical proximity-based channel, ensuring that authentication reflects real-world co-location in space and time. This approach strengthens security by linking digital credentials to physical context. CARBUROS was formally modeled and verified using ProVerif, an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier. The analysis shows that the protocol withstands threats such as unauthorized access, identity spoofing, and functional disruption. The results confirm that CARBUROS preserves authentication and confidentiality under the modeled adversarial conditions while maintaining lightweight communication and computational overhead suitable for deployment in ITS environments.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3644958",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Chiara Bodei",
        "Gabriele Costa",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3644958",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2025.3645058",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Systems for In-Vehicle Networks: Protocols, Applications, and Challenges",
      "description": "In-vehicle networks (IVNs) connect numerous sensors, processors, and Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to enable real-time communication, but their growing complexity has amplified cybersecurity concerns. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, along with its variants CAN-FD, CAN-XL, and complementary protocols such as LIN and FlexRay, remains the backbone of IVNs. However, these protocols (the CAN specifically) were not originally designed to meet the stringent security demands of emerging autonomous and electric vehicles. This survey critically examines existing IVN security literature with a particular focus on intrusion detection systems (IDS) developed for CAN-based architectures. Unlike prior reviews that emphasize algorithmic design or attack taxonomy, this survey provides a comparison of IDS approaches (typically CAN-based due to its dominance in industry and research domain) based on physical-layer features, statistical parameters, information theory, and learning-based methods. We highlight unresolved security limitations of the CAN bus, synthesize mitigation strategies across industrial domains (automotive, aerospace, marine, agricultural, and battery systems), and identify overlooked challenges. Finally, we outline key research frontiers, such as hardware-assisted protection, edge intelligence, blockchainbased authentication, generative AI-driven anomaly detection, and quantum-safe cryptography—toward building resilient next-generation IVNs.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3645058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junaid Ahmad Khan",
        "Muhammad Asif Khan",
        "Nasir Saeed",
        "Pierre-Louis Cayrel",
        "Changhee Hahn"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2025.3645058",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2026.3654521",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight CNN-Based Intrusion Detection for CAN Bus Networks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus plays a key role in keeping vehicles safe by enabling critical systems to communicate with each other. However, because it does not have its own security features, the CAN bus is open to cyber threats. A CAN bus intrusion detection system (IDS) is critical for automotive cybersecurity. This has made it especially important to create IDS that are not just accurate but also efficient enough to run on the limited hardware of Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Unfortunately, many current deep learning solutions for CAN intrusion detection use large and complex models that are too demanding for most automotive systems. Moreover, existing deep learning approaches need excessive computational resources that are unsuitable for resource-constrained ECUs. We propose TinyCNNCANNet, an ultra-lightweight convolutional neural network with just 13K parameters, designed to provide low-latency and resource-efficient CAN intrusion detection under experimental settings. Rather than focusing on on-vehicle deployment, this work evaluates the feasibility of lightweight CNN architectures for future real-time capable CAN intrusion detection. We comprehensively evaluate TinyCNNCANNet on four diverse datasets: CANFD 2021, CICIoV 2024, Multi-Fuzzer-CAN 2025, and SynCAN 2025. These datasets encompass nine attack types. TinyCNNCANNet achieves competitive or superior performance compared to models with 115- $300\\times $ more parameters. All architectures detect volume-based attacks (DoS, flooding, and fuzzing) most effectively. Sophisticated attacks (malfunction and fuzzer variants) challenge all models to a similar degree, regardless of complexity. TinyCNNCANNet shows superior generalization on synthetic out-of-distribution data (SynCAN 2025). It achieves 100% accuracy, while EfficientCANNet (86.82%) and MobileNetCANNet (59.33%) fail, revealing overfitting vulnerabilities in complex models. TinyCNNCANNet delivers 12- $20\\times $ faster inference (0.16-0.51 ms vs. 2.14-4.15 ms) and a 145- $383\\times $ smaller model size (0.04 MB vs. 5.81-15.32 MB). These results demonstrate the potential of TinyCNNCANNet for real-time capable CAN intrusion detection and indicate its suitability for future deployment on embedded automotive platforms.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3654521",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thi-Thu-Huong Le",
        "Andro Aprila Adiputra",
        "Anak Agung Ngurah Dharmawangsa",
        "Hyunjin Jang",
        "Howon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2026.3654521",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2026.3666222",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adaptive Runtime Risk Assessment With Aging-Aware Feasibility for Safety-Critical Systems",
      "description": "In safety-critical systems, such as vehicles, continuous and adaptive risk assessment is essential for maintaining security throughout the system lifecycle. Traditional Threat Analysis and Risk Assessments (TARAs), confined to the design phase of a system, fail to address unforeseen vulnerabilities during operation. This paper introduces a framework for continuous runtime risk assessment, aligned with the automotive standard ISO/SAE 21434 as a concrete application scenario, combining classical TARA during initialization and an adapted version during runtime. The runtime phase updates a preweighted Attack Tree (AT) based on emerging vulnerabilities and applies an aging function to adjust risk feasibility using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The novelty of the framework lies in its runtime adaptation capability to new threats. We evaluate our framework using representative automotive architectures and attack scenarios and further conduct an extensive evaluation by applying it to a generic autonomous vehicular architecture. Results demonstrate that the system delivers timely and adaptive risk assessments, effectively manages evolving cybersecurity threats, and offers a resource-efficient solution suitable for real-world deployment.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3666222",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yaman Qendah",
        "Jannis Hamborg",
        "Christoph Krauß",
        "Stefan Katzenbeisser"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2026.3666222",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2026.3710434",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Accelerating Safety-Critical Automotive Software Development Through Reproducible AI-Assisted Requirements Engineering",
      "description": "Automotive software developed under ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434 depends on requirements that are traceable, reviewable, and grounded in safety and cybersecurity evidence. The practical bottleneck is often not requirement writing alone, but turning fragmented project artifacts into auditable specifications at engineering speed. This paper presents CADRE, an AI-assisted requirements-engineering framework for safety- and cybersecurity-critical automotive systems. CADRE combines deterministic parsers for structured artifacts with retrieval-augmented synthesis for semi-structured and unstructured sources. It constrains this workflow through schema validation, source-grounded traceability, expert review gates, fixed decoding controls, and cryptographic provenance tracking. The evaluation covers four industrial automotive modules from ASIL-B to ASIL-D and CAL-2 to CAL-4. CADRE produced 1,022 synthesized requirements, achieved 98.6% traceability coverage, kept the fabrication rate at 0.2%, and produced byte-identical outputs across independent runs. The results indicate that language-model assistance can add value in regulated automotive requirements workflows when it is embedded in deterministic, provenance-rich, and expert-governed processes.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3710434",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexander Lomovtsev"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2026.3710434",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2026.3731873",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Based Cross-Interface Attack Chain Generation and Optimization for Automotive Cybersecurity Penetration Testing Using a Synthetic Gateway-DUT",
      "description": "Modern software-defined vehicles integrate external wireless access points (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Low Energy [BLE]) with internal safety-critical control networks (Controller Area Network [CAN], virtual CAN [vCAN], and Automotive Ethernet services, including Scalable service-Oriented MiddlewarE over IP [SOME/IP] and Diagnostics over Internet Protocol [DoIP]). We present a controlled, reproducible methodology for optimizing cross-interface test-chain ordering on a synthetic Gateway-DUT. The method models test sequencing as a finite Markov decision process (MDP) and combines multi-armed-bandit cold-start exploration with proximal policy optimization (PPO) sequence optimization to trigger synthetic finding labels rather than claim real vehicle vulnerability discovery or production ECU validation. The scalar reward explicitly comprises finding severity (+ 100.0 CRITICAL, + 72.0 HIGH, + 47.0 MEDIUM, + 15.0 LOW, 0.0 NONE), novelty bonus (+ 10.0), time-step cost (−0.5 per second), and stability penalty (−50.0). Across matched synthetic evaluations, the framework provides reproducible evidence for systematic policy comparison, with all findings interpreted as instrumentation-generated labels within the controlled state space.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3731873",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaejoon Lee",
        "Gwiman Bak",
        "Youngchul Bae"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2026.3731873",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/access.2026.3737128",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Explainable Frame-Level Attack Identification in a Sequence-Based In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "Recently, advances in autonomous driving technologies have increased the possibility of attacks on in-vehicle controller area network (CAN) communication. Accordingly, various deep learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed to detect such attacks. Among them, sequence-based learning methods have been widely used because they can capture temporal correlations that are difficult to analyze from a single frame alone. However, conventional sequence-based IDSs generally label an entire sequence as an attack if at least one attack frame is included in the sequence. As a result, it is difficult to directly identify frame-level information within a sequence classified as an attack, and even normal frames may be incorrectly regarded as attack frames. To address this problem, we propose a sequence-based IDS capable of frame-level attack identification using explainable AI (XAI). The proposed model encodes each CAN frame into a latent representation, constructs a sequence from consecutive representations, and classifies it. For sequences detected as attacks, integrated gradients (IG) method is applied in the latent representation space to compute frame-wise contributions. Then, malicious frames are identified using a threshold calibrated with frame-level ground-truth labels from the validation set. Experimental results show that the proposed model achieves high sequence-level detection performance with an average accuracy of 99.99%. In addition, it records an average accuracy of 99.91%, precision of 99.94%, and recall of 99.83% in frame-level detection. These results demonstrate that the proposed method can identify attack frames based on sequence-level detection results, unlike existing methods.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3737128",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Semin Kim",
        "Jae‐Joong Kim",
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Access",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/access.2026.3737128",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/acdsa67686.2026.11467919",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring Security Gaps in Automotive Infotainment Systems",
      "description": "The text discusses the impact of advanced technology in automobiles, focusing on the vulnerabilities and security measures associated with infotainment systems, car navigation systems, key fobs, and IVI systems. While these technologies enhance the driving experience, they are susceptible to cyber threats such as hacking, GPS spoofing, and key fob attacks. The analysis emphasizes the need for robust security measures, including encryption, regular software updates, and user awareness, to protect against potential risks. In-vehicle infotainment systems serve to bring entertainment and information to vehicle occupants through various interfaces, including audio and video interfaces, touch screen displays, and communication features. The convenience and efficiency of a car's entertainment system, often reliant on WiFi connections, can be compromised by hackers who gain control of the onboard system. With vehicles becoming increasingly connected, robust security measures, including encryption, are vital to safeguard the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information within the automotive industry. The discussion also addresses the challenges and considerations in securing connected vehicles, data protection, communication security, key management, and the regulatory landscape within the automotive industry. This comprehensive analysis addresses the challenges and considerations related to connected vehicles, data protection, communication security, key management, firmware and software security, access control, and the evolving regulatory landscape.",
      "published": "2026-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/acdsa67686.2026.11467919",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "key fob",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Malina Dettore",
        "Ian Corcoran",
        "Joseph Lechner",
        "Charles Dulin",
        "Tauheed Khan Mohd"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Computer, Data Sciences and Applications (ACDSA)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/acdsa67686.2026.11467919",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5096,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/acdsa67686.2026.11467919 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: espionage; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serve, onboard, vital, confidentiality, sensitive, regulatory, user, intelligence."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/acdsa67686.2026.11468170",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Practical Wireless Attack by Metasploit Framework for in-Vehicle CAN Bus",
      "description": "Modern vehicles have become not only simple mechanical devices but increasingly intelligent with complex ones. These vehicles are built on the interconnection of many microcontrollers known as Electronic Control Units (ECUs) over various communication support, primarily the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Also, they are connected to wireless communication for interacting with the exterior world as indicated by on-board navigation, Wi-Fi and mobile communication systems. In addition, they serve as the groundwork for advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), which stand for a safety system that provides information and assistance to the driver to prevent dangerous situations that could lead to an accident. Despite ECUs are developed to provide different advantages to the driver and make the vehicle connected, they made security vulnerabilities more accessible to hackers to break into the vehicle internal network through wireless communication. The purpose of this article is to expose three types of attacks by Wi-Fi on the Electronic Architecture interconnected with CAN bus. These attacks show how a car equipped with ADAS allows hackers to take over its vital components. We carried out several bench tests to gauge its susceptibility to potential threats. This article also aims to help researchers understand the protections available and how they can be used to protect smart vehicles against emerging malware threats that could compromise the security of modern vehicles. Additionally, it provides future guidelines for researchers who want to create new defenses that can protect smart vehicle systems from malware attacks.",
      "published": "2026-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/acdsa67686.2026.11468170",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "malware"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soufian Zerouali",
        "Abdelhafid Messaoudi",
        "Abdelhamid Rabhi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Computer, Data Sciences and Applications (ACDSA)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/acdsa67686.2026.11468170",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/acit52158.2021.9548425",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Access Control for a Connected Vehicle Ecosystem",
      "description": "In recent years, vehicles became a complex network of ECUs and sensors that communicate with each other and their environment. Vehicle data from these connected vehicles is processed and shared with multiple 3rd party applications via cloud vehicle data platforms or aftermarket products for added value. The rise of connected vehicles has also opened attacks on services that tamper with data. Thus, an increased risk of security and privacy in the automotive domain has to be mitigated. In this paper, we present a vehicle data use case to identify the requirements and challenges for security and privacy in the automotive domain. Furthermore, we conduct a literature review of access control models and evaluate them against the identified requirements. Based on our findings, we conclude that the Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) model fulfils most of our vehicle specific requirements.",
      "published": "2021-09-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/acit52158.2021.9548425",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashish Ashutosh",
        "Armin Gerl"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advanced Computer Information Technologies (ACIT)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/acit52158.2021.9548425",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.532,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/acit52158.2021.9548425 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: platforms, case, services, sensors, applications, access, privacy, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/acssc.2016.7869664",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless authentication over noisy channel",
      "description": "We consider the problem of keyless message authentication over noisy channels in the presence of an active adversary. Different from the existing models, in our model, the legitimate users do not have any pre-shared key for authentication. Instead, we use the noisy channel connecting the legitimate users for authentication. The main idea is to utilize the noisy channel connecting the legitimate users to generate an output at the receiver that is difficult for the adversary to replicate through his noisy channel, and then use this output to distinguish legitimate messages from fake messages. By interpreting the message authentication as a hypothesis testing problem, we investigate the authentication exponent: For a given message rate, we investigate the speed at which the optimal successful attack probability can be driven to zero. We fully characterize the authentication exponent for the zero-rate message case and a broad class of non-zero message rate cases.",
      "published": "2016-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/acssc.2016.7869664",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenwen Tu",
        "Lifeng Lai"
      ],
      "venue": "Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers (ACSSC)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/acssc.2016.7869664",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aece62803.2024.10911517",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Internet of Vehicle (IoV) Cyber Attack Detection using Machine Learning Techniques",
      "description": "In the modern century, sophisticated interconnected technologies, also known as the Internet of Things (IoT), evolve quickly and become more adaptable and intelligent, influencing our existence, occupation, transportation, and interaction. The capacities of IoT equipment render the traditional transportation framework a progressively more sophisticated transportation infrastructure, designated as the IoV (Internet of Vehicles). In IoV interactions, the controller area network (CAN) protocol manages vehicle sensors. Due to a lack of communication confidentiality and authentication in the IoV CAN protocol, its communications are exposed to data vulnerability, fuzzy attacks, spoofing, denial of service attacks, and several other significant security issues. They trigger the failure of the electronic control units (ECUs) of these IoVs, which could cause anomalies with breaking, locking, steering, ventilation, and other systems. In the worst cases, this could even be fatal. The proposed research's primary goal is to improve the broad cybersecurity concerns in IoVs using machine learning (ML) methodologies and ensure consumer safety on the street. By incorporating the CICIoV2024 dataset and cutting-edge ML techniques, the proposed solution is able to determine assault over IoVs with the highest possible efficiency, i.e., 100 percent.",
      "published": "2024-11-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aece62803.2024.10911517",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Happy Happy",
        "Asif Iqubal",
        "Subodh Kant Tiwari"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advancement in Electronics & Communication Engineering (AECE)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/aece62803.2024.10911517",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aespc67542.2025.11326784",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing the Efficacy of Fog-Assisted Blockchain for Green Energy Applications: A Case study of EV Charging Network",
      "description": "The integration of green energy sources and electric vehicle is crucial for reducing carbon emissions and to reduce green house gases. However, due to increase adoption of electric vehicle and charging stations, the management of EV charging network poses significant challenges, including energy efficiency, security and scalability. This paper presents an efficient and scalable fog-assisted blockchain-enabled EV charging framework and a case study proposed that reduces transaction latency and increase the transaction throughputs. A fog-assisted blockchain framework is designed and implemented to manage EV charging sessions, optimize energy consumption, and ensure secure transactions. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated using various metrics, including energy efficiency, transaction latency, and security. The results indicate that the fog-assisted blockchain framework can significantly improve the energy efficiency of EV charging networks, reduce transaction latency, and ensure secure transactions. The study demonstrates the potential of fog-assisted blockchain technology in supporting the widespread adoption of green energy sources and electric vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aespc67542.2025.11326784",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Madhusudan Naik",
        "A. Singh",
        "Ditpendu Sihna Roy",
        "Nihar Ranjan Pradhan",
        "R. K. Lenka",
        "R. Barik"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 5th IEEE International Conference on Applied Electromagnetics, Signal Processing, & Communication (AESPC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/aespc67542.2025.11326784",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aiam50918.2020.00061",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Key Security Challenges for Electric Vehicle Charging System",
      "description": "With the proliferating of electric vehicles, charging infrastructure has developed rapidly. Meanwhile, security issues of smart charging station system are becoming increasingly serious. In this paper, we systematically analyze the architecture of the charging station system and the protocols between electric vehicles and charging stations. Furthermore, we present the security issues and challenges of the charging station system including charging protocol, TCU, and the communication between the charging station and the vehicle networking platform. As far as we know, our work is the first practical and systematic work for the security analysis of smart electric vehicle charging stations system.",
      "published": "2020-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aiam50918.2020.00061",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chang Liu",
        "Jin Wang",
        "Jiangpei Xu",
        "Xiao Yu",
        "Li Tian",
        "Jie Wang",
        "Liang Zhou",
        "Deng Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Manufacture (AIAM)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/aiam50918.2020.00061",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aicas59952.2024.10595916",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Is Semantic Communication for Autonomous Driving Secured against Adversarial Attacks?",
      "description": "Artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as a key driver toward the development of the next generation of wireless communication systems (6G), where deep learning (DL) has been widely used for designing the semantic communication modules. However, the utilization of deep neural networks (DNN) may increase the vulnerability of the semantic communication to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we introduce a state-of-the-art wireless semantic communication system for vision-based autonomous driving, integrating a semantic encoder/decoder for image transmission designed based on DNN architecture. We thoroughly evaluate the vulnerability of the model to various adversarial attacks. An adversarial attack consists of slightly modifying the transmitted images by adding small perturbations perhaps imperceptible to humans but harmful to the model. We inject various adversarial attacks including: Auto-PGD attack, FSGM attack, DeepFool attack, Square attack, and adversarial patch attack. Evaluated on semantic communication tasks, the experiments clearly show that semantic communication is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This urgently calls for defense mechanisms to ensure reliability and safety of wireless semantic communication.",
      "published": "2024-04-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aicas59952.2024.10595916",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soheyb Ribouh",
        "Abdenour Hadid"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Artificial Intelligence Circuits and Systems (AICAS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/aicas59952.2024.10595916",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aiccsa56895.2022.10017800",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-BERT do it? Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection System based on BERT Language Model",
      "description": "Due to the rising number of sophisticated customer functionalities, electronic control units (ECUs) are increasingly integrated into modern automotive systems. However, the high connectivity between the in-vehicle and the external networks paves the way for hackers who could exploit in-vehicle network protocols' vulnerabilities. Among these protocols, the Controller Area Network (CAN), known as the most widely used in-vehicle networking technology, lacks encryption and authentication mechanisms, making the communications delivered by distributed ECUs insecure. Inspired by the outstanding performance of bidirectional encoder representations from transformers (BERT) for improving many natural language processing tasks, we propose in this paper ``CAN-BERT\", a deep learning based network intrusion detection system, to detect cyber attacks on CAN bus protocol. We show that the BERT model can learn the sequence of arbitration identifiers (IDs) in the CAN bus for anomaly detection using the ``masked language model\" unsupervised training objective. The experimental results on the ``Car Hacking: Attack \\& Defense Challenge 2020\" dataset show that ``CAN-BERT\" outperforms state-of-the-art approaches. In addition to being able to identify in-vehicle intrusions in real-time within 0.8 ms to 3 ms w.r.t CAN ID sequence length, it can also detect a wide variety of cyberattacks with an F1-score of between 0.81 and 0.99.",
      "published": "2022-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aiccsa56895.2022.10017800",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Natasha Alkhatib",
        "Maria Mushtaq",
        "Hadi Ghauch",
        "Jean‐Luc Danger"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/ACS International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications (AICCSA)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/aiccsa56895.2022.10017800",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 62,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aiea70743.2026.11632471",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An ST-GAT-Based Intrusion Detection Method for in-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With the rapid development of intelligent and connected vehicles, the security of in-vehicle networks has become a critical challenge. Existing intrusion detection methods often fail to effectively detect complex and stealthy attacks, mainly due to their inability to jointly model the spatial correlations and temporal dependencies in CAN bus data. To address this issue, this paper proposes a spatio-temporal graph attention network (ST-GAT) for CAN bus intrusion detection. Within a sliding-window framework, CAN messages are encoded into spatio-temporal representations by integrating message ID, payload, and timestamp information. The proposed ST-GAT jointly captures inter-message relational structures and temporal dynamics, enabling effective modeling of complex CAN traffic patterns. Experimental results on two real-world CAN datasets show that the proposed method outperforms existing approaches in both detection accuracy and generalization capability, particularly for advanced masquerade attacks, demonstrating strong robustness and practical deployment potential.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aiea70743.2026.11632471",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pengze Zhang",
        "Li Cheng",
        "Xuan Li",
        "Haiwen Yuan",
        "Nan Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Electromechanical Automation (AIEA)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/aiea70743.2026.11632471",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4486,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/aiea70743.2026.11632471 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information., strong, intelligence, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aiim67611.2025.11232634",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RUS-IDS: A Robust and Unsupervised Intrusion Detection System for in-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The evolution of intelligent vehicle systems has led to the proliferation of interconnected electronic control units (ECUs) via the Controller Area Network (CAN) - the predominant protocol used in in-vehicle networks (IVNs). Despite its operational efficiency, the lack of inherent security mechanisms in the CAN bus exposes critical vulnerabilities to cyberattacks. This paper proposes a robust unsupervised intrusion detection system (RUS-IDS) that utilizes an unsupervised deep learning model to detect unknown attacks in IVNs. Extensive evaluations on automotive cybersecurity benchmark datasets (Car Hacking Dataset and Survival Analysis Dataset) demonstrate that RUS-IDS achieves superior detection accuracy and$\\mathbf{F 1}$-scores compared to state-of-the-art IDSs in unknown attack scenarios, while also maintaining a lower number of parameters.",
      "published": "2025-09-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aiim67611.2025.11232634",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sun Hong",
        "Cao Rong"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Intelligent Manufacturing (AIIM)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/aiim67611.2025.11232634",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aiita69518.2026.11567097",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection for in-Vehicle CAN Bus Based on Tsallis Entropy",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, as the primary communication protocol in modern vehicles, lacks inherent security mechanisms, making it vulnerable to various cyber-attacks. Traditional entropy-based intrusion detection methods using Shannon entropy exhibit limited sensitivity to small-scale attacks. This paper proposes an intrusion detection system (IDS) for in-vehicle CAN bus based on Tsallis entropy. By introducing the non-extensive parameter $q$, Tsallis entropy enables differentiated weighting for different probability events, thereby enhancing detection sensitivity for various attack types. Experimental results indicate that Tsallis entropy is capable of accurately detecting DoS, fuzzing, replay, drop, and injection attacks, achieving superior accuracy and F1-score compared to the traditional Shannon entropy, particularly for low-intensity attacks.",
      "published": "2026-04-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aiita69518.2026.11567097",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ming Xiao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Industrial Technology Applications (AIITA)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/aiita69518.2026.11567097",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.389,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/aiita69518.2026.11567097 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: primary, limited, making, intelligence, applications, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aina.2015.274",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fuzzing CAN Packets into Automobiles",
      "description": "There have been many warnings that automobiles are vulnerable to the attacks through the network, CAN which connects the ECUs (Electrical Control Units) embedded in the automobiles. Some previous studies showed that the warnings were actual treats. They analyzed the packets flowing on the network and used the packets constructed based on the analysis. We show that it is possible to attack automobiles without any in-depth knowledge about automobiles and specially designed tools to analyze the packets. Experiments are performed in two phases. In the first phase, the victims automobiles are attacked with the packets constructed with the CAN IDs gathered from the sniffed packets flowing in the automobiles. It is not a problem at all to gather CANIDs since CAN is an open simple standard protocol and there are many tools to sniff CAN packets in the Internet. In the second phase, the attack packets are constructed in a completely random manner without any previous information such as CAN IDs. The packets are injected into the network via Bluetooth, a wireless channel. Through the experiments, we show the network vulnerability of automobiles.",
      "published": "2015-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aina.2015.274",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyeryun Lee",
        "Kyunghee Choi",
        "Kihyun Chung",
        "Jaein Kim",
        "Kangbin Yim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/aina.2015.274",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 74,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ainit61980.2024.10581824",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IVIFUZZER: A Fuzzing method for vulnerability exploitation on the operating interface of the In-Vehicle Infotainment system",
      "description": "As an important information system of intelligent and connected vehicles, most In-Vehicle Infotainment systems are set up and manage the vehicles through user interaction. This paper presents a Fuzzing method IVIFUZZER for vulnerability exploitation on the operation interface of the In-Vehicle Infotainment system. With the help of automated robotic arm and improved OCR technology, collecting system leakage information and directional detection of the identified input points, 6 zero day vulnerabilities were found. The experimental results show that the proposed IVIFUZZER method is effective.",
      "published": "2024-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ainit61980.2024.10581824",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "exploitation",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jianhua Wu",
        "Xin Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Seminar on Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Information Technology (AINIT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ainit61980.2024.10581824",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3853,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ainit61980.2024.10581824 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: points, operation, user, intelligence, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ainit65432.2025.11035058",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on the Construction of Vehicle Cybersecurity Management System for the United Nations Regulations",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of information technology in the vehicle industry and the drastic changes in the internal and external environment, the situation of the Intelligent and Connected Vehicles (ICV) cybersecurity is becoming increasingly severe. Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) is the systematic risk-based and engineering approach to protect vehicle cybersecurity. How to establish an effective CSMS has increasingly become a topic of concern to vehicle company managers. The establishment of CSMS plays an important role in improving the security management level of enterprises. In countries such as Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, etc., CSMS is the mandatory cybersecurity requirement for vehicles. This paper summarizes what vehicle CSMS is, analyzes the significance of establishing vehicle CSMS, put forward the framework of CSMS, sorts out the general process of vehicle CSMS, come up with the 4 -level Files Pyramid Model, and provides a method about the construction of CSMS based on ISO / SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2025-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ainit65432.2025.11035058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yangyang Liu",
        "Yaozong Xu",
        "Yangyang Gu",
        "Yanqi Wang",
        "Yingdi Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Seminar on Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Information Technology (AINIT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ainit65432.2025.11035058",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3963,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ainit65432.2025.11035058 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: concern, intelligence, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aiotc66747.2025.11198781",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Controller Area Network Bus Intrusion Detection Classification Model Based on Multimodal Fusion Mechanism",
      "description": "In the field of in-vehicle networking, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as the nerve center for communication among various Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within the vehicle, managing the exchange of information for various functions ranging from engine control to advanced driver assistance systems. However, due to inherent vulnerabilities in the CAN bus design, such as the lack of identity verification, unsupported authorization, non-encrypted transmission, and insufficient integrity protection, it becomes a prime target for various cyberattacks, posing threats to driving safety and leading to data leakage. To address this security challenge, this paper proposes a CAN bus intrusion detection system based on a multimodal fusion mechanism. This model innovatively combines the unique advantages of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and the Mamba model to extract CAN bus data features from both spatial and temporal dimensions. Experimental results show that the intrusion detection system achieves a precision, recall, and $\\mathbf{F 1}$ score of $\\mathbf{1 0 0 \\%}$ on the Carhacking dataset, providing an innovative and effective solution reference for in-vehicle network security protection.",
      "published": "2025-08-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aiotc66747.2025.11198781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuzhu Zhang",
        "Jiang Hao",
        "Chunxu Mu",
        "Yuze Ding"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 4th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things and Cloud Computing Technology (AIoTC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/aiotc66747.2025.11198781",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aiotc71250.2026.11689118",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Rule-Validated and Distribution-Aligned Data Augmentation for Low-Shot CAN Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Connected and intelligent vehicles rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) for in-vehicle communication. Because CAN lacks native authentication and encryption, invehicle networks remain vulnerable to denial-of-service, fuzzy injection, RPM spoofing, and gear spoofing attacks [1]. Existing CAN intrusion detection methods usually require sufficient labelled attack samples, whereas real attack data are scarce in practical deployments [2]. This paper proposes a rule-validated and distribution-aligned data augmentation method for low-shot CAN intrusion detection. The method corrects Car-Hacking Dataset frame labels with the R/T flag, constructs class-wise chronological splits, constrains generated samples by CAN ID, data length code, and payload-byte validity rules, and aligns augmented samples with intra-class CAN ID and payload statistics. Experiments use a sampled Car-Hacking Dataset subset with $\\mathbf{1 0 0, 0 0 0}$ normal frames and $\\mathbf{5 0, 0 0 0}$ frames per attack class. Additional 5-shot and 10-shot experiments are conducted to evaluate more severe low-resource settings. With only 5 real attack frames per class, the low-shot baseline achieves a Macro-F1 of 0.892604, while distribution-aligned and rule-validated augmentation achieve 0.933032 and 0.932340, respectively. With 10 real attack frames per class, rule-validated augmentation achieves the best Macro-F1 of 0.972800. Under the 50 -shot setting, distribution-aligned and rule-validated augmentation improve Macro-F1 from 0.971722 to 0.985195 and 0.984817, respectively. These results suggest that constrained augmentation can improve low-shot CAN intrusion detection, especially when labelled attack data are severely limited.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aiotc71250.2026.11689118",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xi Zhou",
        "Li Shi",
        "Shuping Sun",
        "Longjie Shi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things and Cloud Computing Technology (AIoTC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/aiotc71250.2026.11689118",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aipr50011.2020.9425267",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Black-box Adversarial Attacks in Autonomous Vehicle Technology",
      "description": "Despite the high quality performance of the deep neural network in real-world applications, they are susceptible to minor perturbations of adversarial attacks. This is mostly undetectable to human vision. The impact of such attacks has become extremely detrimental in autonomous vehicles with real-time \"safety\" concerns. The black-box adversarial attacks cause drastic misclassification in critical scene elements such as road signs and traffic lights leading the autonomous vehicle to crash into other vehicles or pedestrians. In this paper, we propose a novel query-based attack method called Modified Simple black-box attack (M-SimBA) to overcome the use of a white-box source in transfer based attack method. Also, the issue of late convergence in a Simple black-box attack (SimBA) is addressed by minimizing the loss of the most confused class which is the incorrect class predicted by the model with the highest probability, instead of trying to maximize the loss of the correct class. We evaluate the performance of the proposed approach to the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) dataset. We show that the proposed model outperforms the existing models like Transfer-based projected gradient descent (T-PGD), SimBA in terms of convergence time, flattening the distribution of confused class probability, and producing adversarial samples with least confidence on the true class.",
      "published": "2020-10-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aipr50011.2020.9425267",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "K. Naveen Kumar",
        "C. Vishnu",
        "Reshmi Mitra",
        "Chalavadi Krishna Mohan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Applied Imagery Pattern Recognition Workshop",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/aipr50011.2020.9425267",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 80,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ancs.2017.25",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Attack-Resilient Source Authentication Protocol in Controller Area Network",
      "description": "While vehicle to everything (V2X) communication enables safety-critical automotive control systems to better support various connected services to improve safety and convenience of drivers, they also allow automotive attack surfaces to increase dynamically in modern vehicles. Many researchers as well as hackers have already demonstrated that they can take remote control of the targeted car by exploiting the vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks such as Controller Area Networks (CANs). For assuring CAN security, we focus on how to authenticate electronic control units (ECUs) in real-time by addressing the security challenges of in-vehicle networks. In this paper, we propose a novel and lightweight authentication protocol with an attack-resilient tree algorithm, which is based on one-way hash chain. The protocol can be easily deployed in CAN by performing a firmware update of ECU. We have shown analytically that the protocol achieves a high level of security. In addition, the performance of the proposed protocol is validated on CANoe simulator for virtual ECUs and Freescale S12XF used in real vehicles. The results show that our protocol is more efficient than other authentication protocol in terms of authentication time, response time, and service delay.",
      "published": "2017-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ancs.2017.25",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ki-Dong Kang",
        "Youngmi Baek",
        "Seonghun Lee",
        "Sang Hyuk Son"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Communications Systems (ANCS)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/ancs.2017.25",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ants.2018.8710105",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Security of Remote Key Less Entry for Vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid growth in the automobile industry and the advancement in the embedded technology, the traditional mechanical key for operating vehicles is gradually replaced by Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) system. Enabling RKE system in vehicles not only improves the security of car access but also facilitates convenience to users. At the same time, RKE system introduces many threats such as eavesdropping, relay, replay attack, On-board Diagnostic (OBD) port scan attack, key fob cloning, jamming and so on. In this paper, we discuss on the keyless car entry system, observe some security weaknesses in a recent RKE system and present a new RKE system. The proposed RKE system uses the notion of unclonable security module to minimize the OBD port scan attack including other known threats. The proposed RKE system achieves authentication of car as well as key fob by preserving privacy of the communicating entities. The security analysis and experimental results show that the proposed RKE system is secure and practical with respect to efficiency and user convenience.",
      "published": "2018-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ants.2018.8710105",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "jamming",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "obd"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jinita Patel",
        "Manik Lal Das",
        "Sukumar Nandi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Advanced Networks and Telecommunications Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ants.2018.8710105",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aparm49247.2020.9209498",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Panel on Safety, Security, and Reliability of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Transportation as a Service (TaaS) is a significant technological innovation that will not only change the quality of our everyday life but also make an imperative impact on the world economy as it can simultaneously solve many problems that we have today, including air pollution, oil/petroleum consumption, heavy traffic jams, parking, etc.",
      "published": "2020-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aparm49247.2020.9209498",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "W. Eric Wong",
        "Yue Chen",
        "Dennis Kengo Oka",
        "Martin Soukup",
        "Germán Ros",
        "Min Xie",
        "Zijiang Yang",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine",
        "Ming Jian Zuo"
      ],
      "venue": "Asia-Pacific International Symposium on Advanced Reliability and Maintenance Modeling (APARM)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/aparm49247.2020.9209498",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/apcc62576.2024.10767951",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Study on the Role of Adaptive Power Control in Jamming Mitigation for Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Remote keyless entry (RKE) systems have become a standard feature in modern vehicles, offering the convenience of wireless control. However, this convenience is accompanied by significant security vulnerabilities, particularly susceptibility to jamming attacks. These attacks disrupt communication between the key fob and the vehicle, potentially leading to unauthorized access and vehicle theft. This study investigates the effectiveness of adaptive power control as a countermeasure to jamming attacks on RKE systems and examines the influence of jammer placement on data transmission success rates. We conducted experiments using a custom-built jammer, transmitter, and receiver to simulate real-world scenarios. Our findings demonstrate that jammer proximity significantly affects transmission success, and while increasing key fob power can initially mitigate jamming, its effectiveness diminishes beyond a certain threshold.",
      "published": "2024-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/apcc62576.2024.10767951",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "jamming",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamza Alkofahi",
        "Amani Altarawneh"
      ],
      "venue": "Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications (APCC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/apcc62576.2024.10767951",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/apci61480.2024.10617212",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cognitive Detection of Anomalies in Autonomous In-Vehicle Network Communication",
      "description": "The research addresses the critical issue of detecting anomalies in autonomous in-vehicle network communication, focusing on the vulnerability of infotainment systems to denial-of-service attacks. The aim is to explore and compare traditional Machine Learning (ML) and advanced Deep Learning (DL) models for the detection of DoS attacks within Controller Area Network (CAN) communications. By evaluating the performance of various ML and DL algorithms, including Decision Tree, Logistic Regression, RandomForest, Feed Forward Neural Networks, and LSTM architectures, the study aims to enhance intrusion detection capabilities in vehicular communication systems. The significance of the research lies in identifying the advantages of DL methods in capturing complex patterns and temporal dependencies within the CAN network, thus contributing to fortifying the security of automotive networks against evolving threats. The results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed models in detecting and mitigating DoS attacks, with DL methods showing promise in automatic learning and adaptability to intricate network structures. This study provides valuable insights for future research endeavors aimed at enhancing the cybersecurity of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-06-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/apci61480.2024.10617212",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suzen Firasta",
        "Yash Rahul Srivastava",
        "Vidya Rao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advancements in Power, Communication and Intelligent Systems (APCI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/apci61480.2024.10617212",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/apnoms.2017.8094172",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Collaborative security attack detection in software-defined vehicular networks",
      "description": "Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are taking more attention from both the academia and the automotive industry due to a rapid development of wireless communication technologies. And with this development, vehicles called connected cars are increasingly being equipped with more sensors, processors, storages, and communication devices as they start to provide both infotainment and safety services through V2X communication. Such increase of vehicles is also related to the rise of security attacks and potential security threats. In a vehicular environment, security is one of the most important issues and it must be addressed before VANETs can be widely deployed. Conventional VANETs have some unique characteristics such as high mobility, dynamic topology, and a short connection time. Since an attacker can launch any unexpected attacks, it is difficult to predict these attacks in advance. To handle this problem, we propose collaborative security attack detection mechanism in a software-defined vehicular networks that uses multi-class support vector machine (SVM) to detect various types of attacks dynamically. We compare our security mechanism to existing distributed approach and present simulation results. The results demonstrate that the proposed security mechanism can effectively identify the types of attacks and achieve a good performance regarding high precision, recall, and accuracy.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/apnoms.2017.8094172",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "infotainment",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Myeongsu Kim",
        "Insun Jang",
        "Sukjin Choo",
        "Jungwoo Koo",
        "Sangheon Pack"
      ],
      "venue": "Asia-Pacific Network Operations and Management Symposium (APNOMS)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/apnoms.2017.8094172",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/appeec.2016.7779489",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle charging management algorithm for a UK low-voltage residential distribution network",
      "description": "The integration of Electric Vehicles (EVs) into low-voltage (LV) residential distribution networks inevitably increases the overall demand, especially peak demand, which may cause thermal or voltage issues. In this paper, a 400V practical residential distribution network is modelled and used to quantify these impacts due to the growing penetration of EVs. Residential load profiles in 1-minute resolution and EV charging profiles with recorded State of Charge (SOC) are randomly and statistically created. Then, a simple charging management algorithm with locally made decision is suggested at EV users' charging points. Results prove that this approach can mitigate the negative impacts of EV charging on network assets. Moreover, it can reduce EV users' electricity cost for charging based on existing UK electricity price scheme `Economy 7,' without compromising EV usage or substantial network infrastructure reinforcement or installation of extensive monitor, control and communication system. The simulation models and analysis are implemented in MATLAB/OpenDSS as an LV distribution network simulation platform.",
      "published": "2016-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/appeec.2016.7779489",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhi Qiao",
        "Jin Seok Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/appeec.2016.7779489",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aqtr55203.2022.9802024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Analysis of Vehicle Instrument Clusters by Automatic Fuzzing and Image Acquisition",
      "description": "Automatic testing and reverse engineering of in-vehicle components have become topics of significant interest as they allow industry professionals to get a better understanding of component behaviour and attack surfaces. In this work we pursue the automatic testing of in-vehicle instrument clusters. These devices may be subject to attacks that may mislead the driver regarding the current state of the car. Understanding the feasibility of such attacks requires the ability to determine the behaviour of the cluster in response to specific instructions received from the CAN bus. For this purpose we use fuzz testing and a camera in order to remove manual intervention and set room for automatic learning of the commands that can be sent to the cluster. This enables the automatic detection of the commands with little or no human intervention. We test our framework on three clusters from real world vehicles and determine in an automatic manner a sufficiently large number of commands and responses that they trigger.",
      "published": "2022-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aqtr55203.2022.9802024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alfred Anistoroaei",
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay",
        "Eugen Horatiu Gurban"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Automation, Quality and Testing, Robotics (AQTR)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/aqtr55203.2022.9802024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/aqtr70159.2026.11577809",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Threat Modelling for OtA Updates in Classic AUTOSAR Systems",
      "description": "With the current automotive growth, the software updates Over The Air (OTA) bring major benefits, introducing at the same time new security threats. In case of Classic AUTOSAR, the security mechanism for OTA is not natively provided by Classic AUTOSAR architecture. Existing work on OTA integration within the AUTOSAR Classic defines functionality implementation, but not the systematic security analysis. This paper focuses on structured security analysis for OTA updates in Classic AUTOSAR systems, identifying the threats, mitigation strategies together with their residual limitations.",
      "published": "2026-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/aqtr70159.2026.11577809",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Radu Mihai-Robert",
        "Dorin Marius Petreuș"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Automation, Quality and Testing, Robotics (AQTR)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/aqtr70159.2026.11577809",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/asap54787.2022.00023",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning-based Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Automotive CAN",
      "description": "Rising complexity of in-vehicle electronics is enabling new capabilities like autonomous driving and active safety. However, rising automation also increases risk of security threats which is compounded by lack of in-built security measures in legacy networks like CAN, allowing attackers to observe, tamper and modify information shared over such broadcast networks. Various intrusion detection approaches have been proposed to detect and tackle such threats, with machine learning models proving highly effective. However, deploying machine learning models will require high processing power through high-end processors or GPUs to perform them close to line rate. In this paper, we propose a hybrid FPGA-based ECU approach that can transparently integrate IDS functionality through a dedicated off-the-shelf hardware accelerator that implements a deep-CNN intrusion detection model. Our results show that the proposed approach provides an average accuracy of over 99% across multiple attack datasets with 0.64% false detection rates while consuming 94% less energy and achieving 51.8% reduction in per-message processing latency when compared to IDS implementations on GPUs.",
      "published": "2022-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/asap54787.2022.00023",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Eashan Wadhwa",
        "Shanker Shreejith"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Application-Specific Systems, Architectures, and Processors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/asap54787.2022.00023",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/asap57973.2023.00033",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-Time Zero-Day Intrusion Detection System for Automotive Controller Area Network on FPGAs",
      "description": "Increasing automation in vehicles enabled by increased connectivity to the outside world has exposed vulnerabilities in previously siloed automotive networks like controller area networks (CAN). Attributes of CAN such as broadcast-based communication among electronic control units (ECUs) that lowered deployment costs are now being exploited to carry out active injection attacks like denial of service (DoS), fuzzing, and spoofing attacks. Research literature has proposed multiple supervised machine learning models deployed as Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to detect such malicious activity; however, these are largely limited to identifying previously known attack vectors. With the ever-increasing complexity of active injection attacks, detecting zero-day (novel) attacks in these networks in real-time (to prevent propagation) becomes a problem of particular interest. This paper presents an unsupervised-learning-based convolutional autoencoder architecture for detecting zero-day attacks, which is trained only on benign (attack-free) CAN messages. We quantise the model using Vitis-AI tools from AMD/Xilinx targeting a resource-constrained Zynq Ultrascale platform as our IDS-ECU system for integration. The proposed model successfully achieves equal or higher classification accuracy (> 99.5%) on unseen DoS, fuzzing, and spoofing attacks from a publicly available attack dataset when compared to the state-of-the-art unsupervised learning-based IDSs. Additionally, by cleverly overlapping IDS operation on a window of CAN messages with the reception, the model is able to meet line-rate detection (0.43 ms per window) of high-speed CAN, which when coupled with the low energy consumption per inference, makes this architecture ideally suited for detecting zero-day attacks on critical CAN networks.",
      "published": "2024-01-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/asap57973.2023.00033",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Shreejith Shanker"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 IEEE 34th International Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures and Processors (ASAP)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/asap57973.2023.00033",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/asap65064.2025.00014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FAV-NSS: An HIL Framework for Accelerating Validation of Automotive Network Security Strategies",
      "description": "Complex electronic control unit (ECU) architectures, software models and in-vehicle networks are consistently improving safety and comfort functions in modern vehicles. However, the extended functionality and increased connectivity introduce new security risks and vulnerabilities that can be exploited on legacy automotive networks such as the controller area network (CAN). With the rising complexity of vehicular systems and attack vectors, the need for a flexible hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) test fixture that can inject attacks and validate the performance of countermeasures in near-real-world conditions in real time is vital. This paper presents an FPGA-based HIL framework tailored towards validating network security approaches (IDS, IPS) and smart integration strategies of such capabilities for an automotive CAN bus. FAV-NSS replicates an actual vehicular system environment with functional ECUs and network infrastructure on an FPGA, allowing functional validation of IDS/IPS algorithms, accelerator designs and integration schemes (software task on ECU, dedicated accelerator). Software APIs on the attached host machine control and configure ECUs, automate test case execution and log signals from the ECUs and the 'virtual' CAN bus during runtime. To show the efficacy of FAV-NSS, we evaluate an IDS accelerator integration problem, both as a traditional coupled accelerator (to the ECU), and secondly close to the CAN controller (mimicking an extended CAN controller). We show that the latter strategy can be fully validated by our framework, which would otherwise require integration of specialised CAN modules into otherwise standard HIL fixtures with ability to instrument internal signals for characterising timing performance. The tests demonstrate a promising latency reduction of $6.3 \\times$ when compared to the traditional coupled accelerator. Our case study demonstrates the potential of FAV-NSS for accelerating the optimisation, integration and verification of smart ECUs and communication controllers in current and future vehicular systems.",
      "published": "2025-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/asap65064.2025.00014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chang-Hong Li",
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Shreejith Shanker"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Application-Specific Systems, Architectures, and Processors",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/asap65064.2025.00014",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/asp-dac52403.2022.9712524",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TENET: Temporal CNN with Attention for Anomaly Detection in Automotive Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "description": "Modern vehicles have multiple electronic control units (ECUs) that are connected together as part of a complex distributed cyber-physical system (CPS). The ever-increasing communication between ECUs and external electronic systems has made these vehicles particularly susceptible to a variety of cyber-attacks. In this work, we present a novel anomaly detection framework called TENET to detect anomalies induced by cyber-attacks on vehicles. TENET uses temporal convolutional neural networks with an integrated attention mechanism to learn the dependency between messages traversing the in-vehicle network. Post deployment in a vehicle, TENET employs a robust quantitative metric and classifier, together with the learned dependencies, to detect anomalous patterns. TENET is able to achieve an improvement of 32.70% in False Negative Rate, 19.14% in the Mathews Correlation Coefficient, and 17.25% in the ROC-AUC metric, with 94.62% fewer model parameters, and 48.14% lower inference time compared to the best performing prior works on automotive anomaly detection.",
      "published": "2021-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/asp-dac52403.2022.9712524",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sooryaa Vignesh Thiruloga",
        "Vipin Kumar Kukkala",
        "Sudeep Pasricha"
      ],
      "venue": "Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/asp-dac52403.2022.9712524",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/asyu58738.2023.10296821",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Functional Safety and Cybersecurity Analysis of Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Technology with the Scope of UL 4600",
      "description": "Vehicle to everything (V2X) is a new generation technology which establishes advanced safety precautions in order to protect lives from harmful situations and also ensures improved traffic efficiency at the same time. Although the technology is promising for our future, V2X applications are still limited where more maturity is needed in order to provide reliability for users in traffic. In addition, V2X concept brings along complexity while envisaging to build massive data communes. This paper represents safety and security analysis of a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) system with V2X perspective. Moreover, possible threat and hazardous scenarios explored to highlight cyber and safety risks where V2X CACC data is under malicious threats from all directions. V2X use cases and scenario definitions are the first step of cyber security analysis. After defining security goals, TARA study is the key actor in cyber security analysis for reducing cyber-attack risk and classifying cyber risk level. Additionally, investigation of different scenarios with functional safety perspective shows impact of safety risk level of CACC. All analysis verdicts are supported by UL 4600 statements",
      "published": "2023-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/asyu58738.2023.10296821",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehmet Duran Menekşe",
        "Baris Tinaz"
      ],
      "venue": "Innovations in Intelligent Systems and Applications Conference (ASYU)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/asyu58738.2023.10296821",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/asyu62119.2024.10756971",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment with Cybersecurity Countermeasures for Over-the-Air Enabled Lane Keeping Assist",
      "description": "With rapidly advancing technology, the automotive industry is undergoing a major development and transformation. Through the development of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), vehicles became smart devices within internet connection. As a consequence of this serious cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risks increased in connection with vehicle complexity. The ISO/SAE 21434:2021 standard covers cybersecurity threats, risks, and the implementation of security measures to be developed against these risks. The main aim of this study is to identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities that may exist during over-the-air (OTA) update process of the lane keeping assist (LKA) control module, to determine the risk levels security goals and security countermeasures. OTA update process is a system update that enables all ADAS functions, particularly LKA, to receive software improvements wirelessly and securely. The LKA control module is an ADAS function that keeps the vehicle in the lane by making corrections to the steering with the help of cameras and sensors. This paper represents potential cybersecurity threats that may arise during OTA updates on the LKA control module and focuses on measures to prevent these threats. Also, in this study contains item boundaries, preliminary architecture for an LKA functionality in the context of OTA-update consideration, threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) and measures based on cybersecurity goals. This TARA study includes 17 asset identification, 35 damage scenarios, determination of impact ratings, 37 threat scenarios, attack path analysis, attack feasibility rating, risk value and cybersecurity assurance level (CAL) in the light of ISO/SAE 21434:2021. The results of this study, 8 cybersecurity goals and 20 countermeasures were determined against possible threats which are mentioned in a limited manner. This paper identifies security vulnerabilities and countermeasures, evaluates the cybersecurity risks, and provides precautions.",
      "published": "2024-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/asyu62119.2024.10756971",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehmet Duran Menekşe",
        "Okan Özçetin",
        "Kaan Doğan",
        "Taha Sevim",
        "Gökhan Mersin",
        "Musab Nail Çekerek"
      ],
      "venue": "Innovations in Intelligent Systems and Applications Conference (ASYU)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/asyu62119.2024.10756971",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/asyu62119.2024.10756981",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Path Analysis and Security Concept Design for OTA Enabled Electric Power Steering System",
      "description": "Electric power steering systems (EPS) are increasingly prevalent in modern vehicles, and over-the-air (OTA) updates offer a convenient method for improving their performance and functionality in the system lifecycle. OTA capability is important to improve control structure with state-of-the-art artificial intelligent (AI) powered novel control algorithms. AI also helps to improve personalized driving characteristics to the best performance. However, OTA capability introduces new security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of potential attack paths within an OTA-enabled EPS system. Critical components and data flows susceptible to manipulation are identified to manipulation and are explored the potential consequences of successful attacks. Based on this analysis, a security concept is proposed to mitigate these identified risks. Proposed security concepts aim to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the EPS system throughout the OTA update process. This research contributes to the development of secure and reliable OTA updates for electric power steering systems, promoting safety and functionality in modern vehicles with applying ISO 21434 [1] requirements and recommendations.",
      "published": "2024-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/asyu62119.2024.10756981",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Engin Subaşı",
        "Muharrem Mercımek"
      ],
      "venue": "Innovations in Intelligent Systems and Applications Conference (ASYU)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/asyu62119.2024.10756981",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/atee66006.2025.11299863",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Refined Attack Categorization and Risk Assessment for Automotive Can Bus: Application on Instrument Panel Cluster",
      "description": "The improvement of technology leads to more complicated systems in the automotive industry, necessitating new security requirements for critical functions of emerging features. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, a significant communication protocol used in vehicles, enables data exchange between various electronic control units (ECUs). Despite its common application, the CAN bus is vulnerable to a wide range of cyberattacks due to its lack of built-in security features. This paper focuses on the security of the CAN bus, particularly the potential attack vectors targeting the instrument panel cluster (IPC) via the CAN bus. Different types of attacks are analyzed, and a CAN bus specific attack framework is proposed, including eavesdropping, spoofing, data insertion, protocol, authentication, denial-of-service attacks (ESDPAD). These attacks are evaluated based on their impact on vehicle safety and functionality using the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) method. Attack vectors identified in the TARA are performed on a test setup to see the impacts on the IPC.",
      "published": "2025-10-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/atee66006.2025.11299863",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kayra Coskun",
        "Mehmet Mustan",
        "Ozan Aydemir",
        "Musa Olcay",
        "Sevgi Nalcakan Satir"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Advanced Topics in Electrical Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/atee66006.2025.11299863",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/auteee60196.2023.10408040",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ConvIDS: A Convolutional LSTM Based Intrusion Detection Model for In-Vehicle CAN Bus",
      "description": "With the popularity of intelligent vehicles, there are numerous concerns regarding the security of the in-vehicle networks (IVNs). Controller Area Network (CAN) is one of the primary networks utilized in vehicles due to its high reliability and low cost. However, the absence of security mechanisms makes it vulnerable to cyber attacks. Once the attacker successfully gains access to the target CAN bus through the physical or wireless interface, various types of injection attacks can be conducted. To detect malicious attack on communication of the CAN bus, an efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) is required. Since the data of the CAN bus is typically in the form of time series, recurrent neural network (RNN) based methods have been proven effective for in-vehicle intrusion detection. In this paper, we proposed a novel approach named ConvIDS. The method is based on CAN image transforming and Convolutional Long Short-Term Memory Network (ConvLSTM). The experiments on real vehicle datasets demonstrate that the proposed model outperforms traditional neural network based methods in aspects of all metrics.",
      "published": "2023-12-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/auteee60196.2023.10408040",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuhan Wu",
        "Siyong Li",
        "Wei Hua Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Automation, Electronics and Electrical Engineering (AUTEEE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/auteee60196.2023.10408040",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3988,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/auteee60196.2023.10408040 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: primary, makes, there, physical, access, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/balkancom71095.2026.11605021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Localization for V2X Communications in Next-Generation Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Future-generation 6G vehicular networks are expected to evolve into intelligent cyber-physical infrastructures which provide intelligent decision-making and ultra-reliable communication mechanisms. In this paper we propose a secure authentication and privacy-preserving localization for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications within the vehicular networks. The methodology presents dedicated HMAC-based lightweight authentication algorithms for both vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) scenarios, ensuring data integrity, message authenticity, and resistance to impersonation and replay attacks. After authentication, vehicle positions are estimated using RSSI-based multilateration by combining signal measurements collected from RSUs and neighboring vehicles. To protect sensitive location information, a differential privacy (DP) mechanism is applied before sharing location data. The methodology is implemented using a REST API simulation environment and evaluated using Postman. Experimental results show that the proposed methods achieve efficient communication performance with low latency overhead. In the V2I scenario, transfer start latency for authentication decreases from 71.38 ms to 65.02 ms, while download time improves from 8.24 ms to 2.37 ms across repeated requests. In the V2V scenario, authentication transfer latency decreases from 67.19 ms to 32.26 ms, and localization transfer latency reduces from 62.03 ms to 18.84 ms, demonstrating improved efficiency during session reuse. These results indicate that the proposed approach provides secure authentication, reliable localization, and low communication overhead for vehicular communications. The proposed solution therefore offers a practical and scalable approach for privacy-aware localization in future 6G vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2026-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/balkancom71095.2026.11605021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Jamil",
        "Adnan Kavak",
        "Sema BAYRAKTAR",
        "Günay Aslan",
        "Cansu Canbolat"
      ],
      "venue": "International Balkan Conference on Communications and Networking (BalkanCom)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/balkancom71095.2026.11605021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/bcca55292.2022.9922372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Requirements for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communications Integrated with Blockchain",
      "description": "With the advancement of fifth-generation cellular systems (5G) and the already provoked research on the sixth-generation cellular systems (6G), stringent functional requirements are growing to facilitate more reliable vehicular communication systems. The progressive needs of V2X communications include obtaining cooperative sensing data in real-time, then analyze and use them in the decision-making process that greatly enhances driving security, traffic quality, infotainment facilities, etc. However, the traditional V2X communications are not capable of providing all these necessities. Moreover, the lack of trust among heterogeneous, massive sets of participants in V2X networks at present may hamper those activities with frequent privacy violations and other irreversible consequences. Hence, the blockchains are applied to assure the accountability and integrity among network participants. On the other hand, the integrated edge layer today consists of Macro BS (MBSs), Small BS (SBSs), Road Side Units (RSUs), and 5G Radio Access Networks (RANs) which are geo-distributed and installed with independent storage facilities. As a result, revolutionary blockchain platforms can be easily accommodated to 5G Mutiaccess Edge Computing (MEC). This allows to apply fast and efficient consensus mechanism for block verification while preventing backhaul congestion by offloading computation at the cloud. Therefore, efficient New Radio (NR) access technology, core network capabilities, and edge-cloud services are needed to reach the full convergence of V2X networks while blockchain can be used to solve major related security vulnerabilities ranging from data privacy leakage, cyber-attacks, and access control to security breaches leading to extremely advanced data theft. Hence, in this research paper, an attempt was made to discuss some existing blockchain integrated architectures in diverse V2X communications by paving the path to develop more robust security mechanisms with 5G enabling technologies,",
      "published": "2022-09-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/bcca55292.2022.9922372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eranda Harshanath Jayatunga",
        "Avishek Nag",
        "Anca Delia Jurcut"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Blockchain Computing and Applications (BCCA)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/bcca55292.2022.9922372",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/bdai70753.2026.11655097",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Dual-Teacher Knowledge Distillation Framework with Differentiable Rule Prior Integration for Automotive Cybersecurity Detection",
      "description": "Knowledge distillation enables the deployment of high-performance attack detection models on resource-constrained in-vehicle ECUs, yet the conventional data-driven single-teacher paradigm suffers from severe knowledge loss of rare attacks and fails to incorporate domain normative priors from ISO 21434/TARA in automotive cybersecurity detection. To address these issues, this paper proposes a novel dual-teacher knowledge distillation framework integrating differentiable rule priors. We first compile symbolic security rules from ISO 21434/TARA into an end-to-end differentiable rule teacher network via fuzzy membership functions and soft decision trees. An adaptive gating mechanism is then designed to realize samplelevel dynamic fusion of knowledge from the rule teacher and the data-driven neural teacher, with a bidirectional co-evolution mechanism for rule base optimization. We further introduce a rule activation alignment loss with a security asymmetric weighting strategy to enhance the rare attack detection capability and interpretability of the lightweight student model. Experimental results on a 103,840 -sample in-vehicle attack detection corpus show that our framework achieves a macro-average F1-score of 92.2%, with an 8.7% improvement over the non-distillation baseline, verifying the effectiveness of our method.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/bdai70753.2026.11655097",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yixuan Liu",
        "童鑫康",
        "Cong Yang",
        "Gu Jinxiang",
        "Kaimin Zhuo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Big Data and Artificial Intelligence (BDAI)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/bdai70753.2026.11655097",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/bigcom65357.2024.00043",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RACCOON: Online Content Recommendation and Edge-Assisted Caching for In-Vehicle Infotainment",
      "description": "As the In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system continuously gains widespread attention, enhancing content delivery in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is crucial to achieve advanced IVI that caters to various needs of both drivers and passengers. With the assistance of edge computing, caching contents at the edge can effectively reduce transmission latency and thus improve the user Quality of Experience (QoE). However, the interplay between caching and personalized recommendation has been overlooked, which could impede the QoE maximization under limited resources of the edge network and vehicles. To address this, we design the first online content recommendation and edge-assisted caching framework for IVI systems, named RACCOON, proactively striking a balance between personalized recommendation and latency reduction. Technically, we first propose a hierarchical edge caching architecture and rigorously formulate the constrained QoE maximization problem. Within the mathematical model, we develop a new QoE function, the first in literature to jointly capture two aspects: content-wise effectiveness in recommendation and network-wise efficiency. We then exploit distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), largely reducing the state and decision spaces. In particular, we nicely integrate Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) with heterogeneous nodes into MARL, to capture the dynamic topological relationship between different agents, outperforming conventional MARL strategies with naive agent coordination. A rule-based module is then designed to balance agents' choices that could previously incur network congestion. Extensive simulations under realistic data traces demonstrate that RACCOON outperforms reasonable heuristics and state-of-the-art MARL algorithms, achieving up to 167% QoE improvement.",
      "published": "2024-08-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/bigcom65357.2024.00043",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yufei You",
        "Xiaoxi Zhang",
        "TianXiang Zhu",
        "Bin Rao",
        "Yihong Li",
        "Jingpu Duan",
        "Lei Xue",
        "Ennan Zhai",
        "Xu Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Big Data Computing and Communications (BigCom)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/bigcom65357.2024.00043",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/bigdata47090.2019.9006041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Examination of Double Arbiter PUFs on Security against Machine Learning Attacks",
      "description": "Security is important for the functioning of Internet-of-Things (IoTs). Many IoT devices are closely physically approachable by the crowd, making cryptographic key-based security protocols vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) are emerging as a promising keyless solution by utilizing inherent variations of integrated circuits (ICs) to produce different responses from different devices. While physically unclonable, some PUFs were reported to be mathematically clonable by machine learning (ML) methods. XOR PUFs are a group of PUFs mathematically clonable when a large number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) are available to attackers. Double Arbiter PUFs (DAPUFs) were developed for increased security against machine learning attacks over XOR PUFs, and studies showed that DAPUFs are highly secure against attacks using Support Vector Machine (SVM). In this paper, we investigate how secure DAPUFs are against neural network-based attack methods and compare the DAPUFs' performance with that of XOR PUFs. The results confirm with existing studies on DAPUFs' higher security when compared with XOR PUFs, but also discovered that DAPUFs are not secure against neural network-based attacks if attackers can obtain a large number of CRPs, revealing a security vulnerability of those DAPUFs we examined in this study.",
      "published": "2019-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/bigdata47090.2019.9006041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meznah A. Alamro",
        "Yu Zhuang",
        "Ahmad O. Aseeri",
        "Mohammed Saeed Alkatheiri"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/bigdata47090.2019.9006041",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/bigdata55660.2022.10020644",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: Open Issues and Recommendations",
      "description": "The paper analyses cyber security challenges of smart cities with a particular focus on the intelligent integrated and interconnected electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. The analysis indicates that not all innovative elements and smart city solutions have adequate cybersecurity protection. Digital technologies vary considerably in terms of the level of potential risks, with certain novel technologies — such as V2G, smart charging, and smart energy management — posing higher risks than others. It is intended to lay a foundation for securing EV charging infrastructure by analysing problem context and data to be protected, including attack surfaces and cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in the EV ecosystem, analysing standardisation for the EV connection to the charging infrastructure, and providing a set of recommendations and best practices to securing EV charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2022-12-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/bigdata55660.2022.10020644",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "v2g"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Inna Skarga-Bandurova",
        "Igor Kotsiuba",
        "Tetiana Biloborodova"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/bigdata55660.2022.10020644",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/bigdatasecurity-hpsc-ids.2019.00012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Vulnerabilities in Consumer IoT Applications",
      "description": "Extensive penetration testing to IoT applications was conducted in this work to discover the vulnerabilities. In addition to the study the most vulnerable security flaws defined by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), this work also tested a set of man-in-the-middle attacks exploiting found vulnerabilities. It is discovered that a wide range of IoT apps in smart homes, security system, health-care and connected cars are susceptible to a set of attacks, and some of those apps have over 1 million downloads. Countermeasures were proposed as recommendations to secure the apps for IoT devices.",
      "published": "2019-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/bigdatasecurity-hpsc-ids.2019.00012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected cars",
        "penetration",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arjun Shakdher",
        "Suyash Agrawal",
        "Baijian Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Big Data Security on Cloud, IEEE International Conference on High Performance and Smart Computing, and IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Data and Security (BigDataSecurity/HPSC/IDS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/bigdatasecurity-hpsc-ids.2019.00012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/bigdatasecurity-hpsc-ids58521.2023.00031",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ImageFed: Practical Privacy Preserving Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle CAN Bus Protocol",
      "description": "In-vehicle networks handle the communication among Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and sensors with a serial protocol called Controller Area Network (CAN), which takes advantage of a broadcast mechanism for transferring data. However, the lack of authentication and encryption in CAN bus might lead to the vehicle being compromised by an untrusted agent. Meanwhile, AI-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) introduced in the literature require a centralized cloud server to undertake the resource-consuming task of processing network data, which also occupies the bandwidth while transferring data from vehicles to the remote server. Moreover, many car manufacturers avoid sharing information with the remote server to prevent further exposure of vehicles’ private data. We utilize Federated Learning (FL) as a suitable solution to previous challenges, where data is trained locally on the vehicle side, and partially trained models are sent to the server. Nevertheless, private training in-side the vehicle requires low memory utilization while achieving low latency and high performance compared to Centralized Learning (CL) approaches. In this study, we propose a practical privacy-preserving IDS (ImageFed) approach by employing federated Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). To evaluate the robustness of ImageFed in real-world applications, we investigate two scenarios that may cause performance degradation in FL, such as non-independent and identically distributed (non-iid) clients and scarcity of training data during the process. The resulting analysis proves the robustness of ImageFed while delivering an average 99.54% f1-score, 99.87% accuracy, and low detection latency.",
      "published": "2023-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/bigdatasecurity-hpsc-ids58521.2023.00031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamideh Taslimasa",
        "Sajjad Dadkhah",
        "Euclides Carlos Pinto Neto",
        "Pulei Xiong",
        "Shahrear Iqbal",
        "Suprio Ray",
        "Ali Akbar Ghorbani"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Big Data Security on Cloud, IEEE International Conference on High Performance and Smart Computing, and IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Data and Security (BigDataSecurity/HPSC/IDS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/bigdatasecurity-hpsc-ids58521.2023.00031",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/blockchain53845.2021.00053",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BATS: A Blockchain-based Authentication and Trust Management System in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "As the backbone of the connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) enable a variety of applications for sharing traffic information and road safety messages. However, the possibility of malicious activity in such an untrusted environment necessitates evaluating the credibility of sent messages by vehicles. In this article, we put forward a blockchain-based authentication and trust management system for vehicular networks. This architecture incorporates multiple local blockchains for enabling distributed V2X communication and a global trust score blockchain for evaluating the credibility of sent messages from vehicles as illustrated in the teaser figure. To empower our proposed architecture, we propose a novel Dual Consensus Method (DCM) consisted of local consensus for event blockchains and global consensus for the trust score blockchain. DCM enables real-time and concurrent operation of different blockchains in our architecture. We employ Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) consensus method for the global consensus. For the local consensus, we propose a new consensus method named Restricted Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (RPBFT). Through our design, a vehicle's information for decision-making about an event is not limited to the neighboring vehicles and RSUs. It has access to both recent data regarding an event and vehicles' trust scores in a fully decentralized and private fashion. Performance evaluation of our proposed method reveals its capability to calculate and store trust sores via secure, decentralized, and real-time operation.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/blockchain53845.2021.00053",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehrdad Salimitari",
        "Mohsen Joneidi",
        "Yaser P. Fallah"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/blockchain53845.2021.00053",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cac59555.2023.10450898",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Algorithm of CAN Bus Data Flow Based on Inception-ResNet Model",
      "description": "With the rapid development of the industrial internet, the volume of data in industrial networks is increasing, and network attacks are becoming more concealed and complex. Traditional machine learning methods are no longer suitable for the new scenarios of industrial intrusion detection. Therefore, this study addresses the difficulties in feature selection and overfitting when applying traditional machine learning methods to handle industrial bus data. It proposes a Deep Convolutional Neural Network Intrusion Detection (DCNN-IDS) model and verifies it using the natural gas dataset from Mississippi State University. The DCNN-IDS model utilizes the Inception-ResNet model as its underlying structure, optimizes the model size, redesigns the network architecture, and introduces an image generator module to generate two-dimensional CAN data images with sequentially ordered bit identifiers. Experimental results demonstrate that the DCNN-IDS model defeats other machine learning algorithms and exhibits excellent performance in detecting intrusion attacks in industrial networks.",
      "published": "2023-11-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cac59555.2023.10450898",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuanhao Sun",
        "Han Liu",
        "Runyuan Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "China Automation Congress (CAC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/cac59555.2023.10450898",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/camad.2019.8858455",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IoT for 5G/B5G Applications in Smart Homes, Smart Cities, Wearables and Connected Cars",
      "description": "Internet of things (IoT) is referred to as smart devices connected to the internet. A smart device is an electronic device, which may connect to other devices or are part of a network such as Wi-Fi. The increase of IoT devices has helped with advancing technology in many areas of society. Application of IoT in 5G/B5G devices has provided many benefits such as providing new ideas that can become projects for tech companies, generating big data (large volume of data which can be used to reveal trends, patterns and associations) and providing various ways of communicating. This has also had an impact on how companies improve their business with the use of advanced technology. However, the rapid growth of IoT has introduced a new platform for cybercriminals to attack. There has been published security measures on IoT to help deal with such risks and vulnerabilities. This survey paper will explore IoT in relation to smart homes, smart cities, wearables and connected cars. The benefits, risks and vulnerabilities will be discussed that comes along with using such devices connected to the internet.",
      "published": "2019-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/camad.2019.8858455",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hasna Uddin",
        "Marcia Gibson",
        "Ghazanfar Ali Safdar",
        "Tahera Kalsoom",
        "Naeem Ramzan",
        "Masood Ur Rehman",
        "Muhammad Ali Imran"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/camad.2019.8858455",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/camad67323.2025.11229895",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reevaluating Optional Fields in OCPP 2.0.1: Preliminary Case Study by Spoofing State of Charge",
      "description": "The rapid growth of electric vehicle (EV) adoption has intensified the need for secure, reliable, and interoperable charging infrastructures. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 2.0.1 introduces advanced features to support secure and intelligent EV charging. However, critical fields like the state of charge (SOC) still remain highly unexplored and optional in practice. The selective adoption of the SOC within the OCPP protocol introduces risks related to the fair scheduling, grid stability, and billing accuracy. In this paper, we introduce a case study on SOC spoofing to demonstrate the implications of treating this field as optional within the OCPP protocol. The priority hack and the overstay hack are studied as two different types of attacks, where the adversaries manipulate the SOC values in order to gain unfair charging priority or extend the station occupancy, respectively. An autoencoder-based anomaly detection mechanism is designed to identify the spoofing attacks, achieving an F1 score of 87%. Our testing and validation demonstrate that even when only the initial and final SOC values are transmitted, the spoofing can still be detected. Our analysis concludes to the proposal of making the SOC reporting mandatory, at least at session start and end, in order to significantly strengthen the reliability and security of the OCPP 2.0.1-enabled infrastructures.",
      "published": "2025-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/camad67323.2025.11229895",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aisha B Rahman",
        "Md Sadman Siraj",
        "Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou",
        "Georgios Fragkos",
        "Ryan Sullivant",
        "Yung Ryn Choe",
        "Junghwan Rhee",
        "Kyu Hyoung Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/camad67323.2025.11229895",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccai65422.2025.11189640",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Network Security of Intelligent Connected Vehicles Based on Telematics Technology",
      "description": "With the rapid development of Telematics technology, intelligent connected vehicles show a broad prospect in terms of traffic efficiency enhancement, energy management optimization and user experience improvement. However, due to the high inter connectivity of intelligent connected vehicles, their network security issues are getting more and more attention. This paper focuses on the network security challenges of intelligent networked vehicles, analyzes the network security status quo of intelligent networked vehicles and the main threats they face from the system architecture, threat model and key technologies, discusses the core technology of network security and the anomaly detection method based on artificial intelligence, and finally puts forward a comprehensive protection system and the future research direction of network security of intelligent networked vehicles in combination with a typical case to provide a reference for the security development of intelligent networked vehicles. automobile security development to provide reference. The purpose of this paper is to improve the network security protection level of intelligent networked vehicles and promote their application and development in the field of intelligent transport.",
      "published": "2025-05-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccai65422.2025.11189640",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liu Ling",
        "Zhao Feng",
        "Han Hui Min"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Communication and Artificial Intelligence (CCAI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccai65422.2025.11189640",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.398,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ccai65422.2025.11189640 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: user, case, intelligence, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccdc52312.2021.9601420",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An intrusion detection method for the in-vehicle network",
      "description": "In view of the defects of the vehicle controller area network (CAN) bus protocol and the large number of attack interfaces exposed by the vehicle, the vehicle network is vulnerable to network attacks, which leads to vehicle information security and driving safety issues. And current intrusion detection algorithms are difficult to achieve realtime online intrusion detection in the in-vehicle network. This paper proposes an in-vehicle CAN network intrusion detection method based on message ID and message cycle. First, this method performs whitelist detection of message ID, and then performs dual-threshold intrusion detection based on message cycle. The experimental results show that the detection accuracy of this method against in-vehicle CAN network message injection attacks is 94.13%, the precision rate is 92.46%, and the false alarm rate is 4.01 %.",
      "published": "2021-05-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccdc52312.2021.9601420",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anyu Cheng",
        "Yibo Peng",
        "Hao Yan",
        "Xiaona Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccdc52312.2021.9601420",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccdc58219.2023.10326685",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Parametric observation rule-based intrusion detection strategy for in-vehicle network",
      "description": "Due to the increasingly frequent interaction between in-vehicle network information and the outside world, a large number of network intrusions have already occurred in vehicles leading to loss of control of the vehicle and jeopardizing public safety. To protect the controllability of the vehicle and avoid the intrusion of the in-vehicle network, this paper proposes an intrusion detection method based on parameter observation rules and constructs an intrusion detection model based on parameter observation rules, and the observation rules are designed from message-level rules and signal-level rules. This paper builds a HIL (Hardware-in-the-Loop) testbed, and its experimental results show that the method effectively resists the message replay attack, message injection attack, and signal tampering attack of the in-vehicle CAN network, and the identification rate of attack detection reaches 97.53%.",
      "published": "2023-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccdc58219.2023.10326685",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junan Ke",
        "Weiping Deng",
        "Shanshan Wang",
        "Jie Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccdc58219.2023.10326685",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccece49351.2022.9918406",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of the Open Charge Point Protocol Between the Electric Vehicle and the Fast Charging Station on the Cybersecurity of the Smart Grid",
      "description": "Cyber-physical security is becoming an important issue within the smart grid. The growth in sales of the electric vehicles (EVs) dictates the need for high-power fast charging stations (HP-FCS). The operation and control of such HP-FCS requires the integration of information and communication technologies (ICT), which makes such critical infrastructure prone to cyber-attacks and hence compromising the charging of the EVs in particular when operating in vehicle-to-grid mode. In Canada, the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) is considered one of the most popular protocols used in HP-FCS. This charging protocol does not include built-in security measures against cyberattacks and hence it may represent an access point to the unauthorized users. In this paper, potential threats against HP-FCS that uses the OCPP are demonstrated through the cyberattacks applied to microgrid equipped with distributed renewable energy resources. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates how to implement a cyber-attack on such a microgrid when operating in an islanded mode while investigating the impact of such cyberphysical attacks on its components.",
      "published": "2022-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccece49351.2022.9918406",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ocpp",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kandarp Gandhi",
        "Walid G. Morsi"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference proceedings - Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccece49351.2022.9918406",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccece59415.2024.10667169",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A New Approach to Detect and Thwart Replay Attacks on Car Remote Keyless Entry Systems from Stratosphere",
      "description": "Replay attacks orchestrated from a high-altitude platform station (HAPS) in the stratosphere for car theft represent an emerging threat. Indeed, most previous research into replay attacks on cars has focused on limited factors such as the proximity of the attacker and physical properties like frequency. However, exploring the attacker’s position in a wider area has not been studied until now. Our study first presents an attack model where the attacker is in the stratosphere and a signaling model. We then illustrate that, if a HAPS performs this attack, it has a wide coverage area and can affect many vehicles. Angle of arrival (AoA) information can be robustly used to detect the source and determine if there is an attack. This poster explores in detail the process flow of the attack and suggests countermeasures.",
      "published": "2024-08-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccece59415.2024.10667169",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gédéon Ghislain Nkwewo Ngoufo",
        "Güneş Karabulut Kurt"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference proceedings - Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccece59415.2024.10667169",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccisp55629.2022.9974501",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Identification Technology of RKE System Using Multi-dimension RF Fingerprints",
      "description": "Recently, remote keyless entry system (RKE system) has been gradually replacing traditional way to unlock car doors for convenience. However, it has been shown that RKE system is vulnerable to cyber attacks including relay attack, amplification attack and cryptographic attack. In order to solve this dilemma, RF fingerprints method was applied to identify car key fobs in this paper. Power spectrum of preamble signal envelope was proposed to extract features while carrier frequency offset and least mean square-based adaptive filter were also used as auxiliary ones. Multi-dimension RF fingerprints were presented in this paper based on three features mentioned above to increase identification accuracy. Support vector machine(SVM) was chosen with 10-fold cross-validation to train classifier model. Corresponding to current research on keyless entry car theft, the classification results in this paper show that signals from various key fobs can be classified with 99.3% accuracy when using Rf fingerprints extracted from multiple features, with false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0.7% and false rejection rate (FRR) of 0.7% under Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classifier.",
      "published": "2022-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccisp55629.2022.9974501",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Weizun Wang",
        "Jie Huang",
        "Aiqun Hu",
        "Mengjia Ding",
        "Jiabao Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communication, Image and Signal Processing (CCISP)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccisp55629.2022.9974501",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc.2018.8319180",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Spoofing attack using bus-off attacks against a specific ECU of the CAN bus",
      "description": "This paper reports spoofing attacks that exploit a vulnerability of the controller area network (CAN) protocol, which is often used in in-vehicle networks. However, authorized electronic control units (ECU) should be able to detect anomalous CAN message traffic. We focused on ECU states used for error handing. Bus-off attacks against the ECU have been proposed to induce transmission errors, and then transit the state of the target ECU to the bus-off state, in which the ECU cannot access the CAN bus. The attack combining the bus-off attack with the spoofing attack could not be detected by the authorized ECUs, and would consequently be a potential threat for the vehicle. In this paper, we propose a spoofing attack method that uses a bus-off attack and is not detected by the authorized ECUs. Based on the proposal, we implemented an attacker prototype using a field-programmable gate array. In a laboratory setting, we verified the attack in a simulated environment consisting of the attack hardware and ECU, and evaluated the effect of spoofing and the behavior of an actual car. The results showed that the transmission of regular messages was completely prevented, and the percentage of spoofing messages could be made 100%; that is, no error was detected in the ECUs of the car. We have verified the feasibility of the proposed method and the potential threat for actual cars. In the future, we will conduct studies to prevent vehicles from such attacks.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc.2018.8319180",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kazuki Iehira",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue",
        "Kenji Ishida"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc.2018.8319180",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc.2019.8651708",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Designing Attacks Against Automotive Control Area Network Bus and Electronic Control Units",
      "description": "Security is a critical issue for new car generation targeting intelligent transportation systems (ITS), involving autonomous and connected vehicles. In this work we designed a low cost CAN probe and defined analysis tools in order to build attack scenarios. We reuse some threats identified by a previous work. Future researches will address new security protocols.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc.2019.8651708",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pascal Urien"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc.2019.8651708",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc46108.2020.9045510",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ECU Counterfeit Mitigation Using Holistic Approach in Modern Automotive Echo System",
      "description": "Integrated Circuits (ICs) are the brains in a wide range of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in automotive systems. Counterfeit ECUs exploited by an unauthorized third-party can affect the car's overall performance despite the fact that we have proper hardware security modules in place. Automotive ECUs have traditionally been secured by isolating them within the hardware architecture stack. Consequently, the vehicle's attack surface is limited and it is hard for an attacker to synchronize an attack against the vehicle system. Unfortunately, fraudulent replica of ECU units may be overlooked and they can make their way into the car's CAN bus drivetrain network causing serious threats to the general public safety. A novel solution for the ECU counterfeit problem is proposed, which stems from the use of ECU fingerprint using Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) and the implementation of the Defense in Depth (DiD) model. Implementation effort using hardware Proof of Concept Circuit is under its way and it is in its final stage.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc46108.2020.9045510",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. El-Said"
      ],
      "venue": "Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc46108.2020.9045510",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc49032.2021.9369569",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Adversarial Attack Defending System for Securing In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "In a modern vehicle, there are over seventy Electronics Control Units (ECUs). For an in-vehicle network, ECUs communicate with each other by following a standard communication protocol, such as Controller Area Network (CAN). However, an attacker can easily access the in-vehicle network to compromise ECUs through a WLAN or Bluetooth. Though there are various deep learning (DL) methods suggested for securing in-vehicle networks, recent studies on adversarial examples have shown that attackers can easily fool DL models. In this research, we further explore adversarial examples in an in-vehicle network. We first discover and implement two adversarial attack models that are harmful to a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)-based detection model used in the in-vehicle network. As shown in our experiments, adversaries can attack the LSTM-based detection model with a success rate of over 98%. Then, we propose an Adversarial Attack Defending System (AADS) for securing an in-vehicle network. Specifically, we focus on brake-related ECUs in an in-vehicle network. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that the proposed AADS achieves over 99 % accuracy for detecting adversarial attacks.",
      "published": "2020-08-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc49032.2021.9369569",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Li",
        "Jing Lin",
        "Kaiqi Xiong"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc49032.2021.9369569",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc49033.2022.9700548",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BenchAV: A Security Benchmarking Framework for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are capable of making driving decisions autonomously using multiple sensors and a complex autonomous driving (AD) software. However, AVs introduce numerous unique security challenges that have the potential to create safety consequences on the road. Security mechanisms require a benchmark suite and an evaluation framework to generate comparable results. Unfortunately, AVs lack a proper benchmarking framework to evaluate the attack and defense mechanisms and quantify the safety measures. This paper introduces BenchAV – a security benchmark suite and evaluation framework for AVs to address current limitations and pressing challenges of AD security. The benchmark suite contains 12 security and performance metrics, and an evaluation framework that automates the metric collection process using Carla simulator and Robot Operating System (ROS).",
      "published": "2022-01-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc49033.2022.9700548",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Aminul Hoque",
        "Mahmud Hossain",
        "Ragib Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc49033.2022.9700548",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc49033.2022.9700580",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Interaction Provenance-based Trust Management Scheme For Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicles (CVs) have facilitated the development of intelligent transportation system that supports critical safety information sharing with minimum latency. However, CVs are vulnerable to different external and internal attacks. Though cryptographic techniques can mitigate external attacks, preventing internal attacks imposes challenges due to authorized but malicious entities. Thwarting internal attacks require identifying the trustworthiness of the participating vehicles. This paper proposes a trust management framework for CVs using interaction provenance that ensures privacy, considers both in-vehicle and vehicular network security incidents, and supports flexible security policies. For this purpose, we present an interaction provenance recording and trust management protocol. Different events are extracted from interaction provenance, and trustworthiness is calculated using fuzzy policies based on the events.",
      "published": "2022-01-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc49033.2022.9700580",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Aminul Hoque",
        "Ragib Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc49033.2022.9700580",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4089,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ccnc49033.2022.9700580 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: though, trust, privacy, information, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc51664.2024.10454752",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study of AI-Based In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "We analyzed ML-based In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems (IV-IDS). Our review of recent automotive forensics studies highlights constraints relevant to in-vehicle networks and the associated security/safety requirements, revealing gaps in the existing literature. This paper contributes to the existing research corpus by addressing AI's limitations in IV-IDS. It defines pertinent baseline metrics for in-vehicle networked systems, enabling an assessment of the viability of AI-based intrusion detection systems.",
      "published": "2024-01-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc51664.2024.10454752",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elies Gherbi",
        "Hamza Khemissa",
        "Mohammed Lamine Bouchouia",
        "Maxime Ayrault"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc51664.2024.10454752",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccnc65079.2026.11366516",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dual-Layer Intrusion Detection for EVSE Networks: A TinyML-Driven Security Framework",
      "description": "As Electric Vehicle (EV) charging stations become more prevalent to fuel the growing EV infrastructure, the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) has become essential for connecting these chargers with their central management systems. Despite its popularity, OCPP version 1.6 lacks critical security features, making the charging infrastructure vulnerable to a range of cyberattacks, including Denial of Charging, Charging Profile Manipulation, Unauthorized Access, and Heartbeat Flooding. To tackle these issues, our work introduces a lightweight, Dual-Layer Intrusion Detection System (IDS) designed specifically for OCPP 1.6-enabled EV chargers. Our approach is built and validated using the Federated OCPP 1.6 Intrusion Detection Dataset. It relies on a neural network architecture that looks at both Application-level and Network-level data to detect suspicious behavior. For performance evaluation, we compared our neural network with a Random Forest (RF) baseline. Ultimately, the fully quantized INT8 Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) model was deployed to an ESP32 microcontroller, confirming that it can deliver robust performance on resource-constrained hardware. Testing showed that our dual-layer IDS provides high detection accuracy, achieving 96-98% post-deployment accuracy across protocol layers with low latency of 0.19 ms, and consuming only 14.77 μJ per inference. By comparing pre-deployment (on PC) and post-deployment (on-device) results, we tracked how the TinyML model’s performance shifts from development to real-world edge deployment.",
      "published": "2026-01-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccnc65079.2026.11366516",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "evse",
        "intrusion",
        "ocpp",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gowtham Raj Rachakonda",
        "Madhuri Siddula",
        "Om Prakash Yadav",
        "Olusola Tolulope Odeyomi",
        "Xiaohong Yuan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccnc65079.2026.11366516",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccsb71176.2026.11716378",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Measuring Incomplete Hardening Across Production-Class Automotive Firmware Stacks",
      "description": "Vehicle firmware often contains security components whose effective deployment cannot be inferred from their presence alone. This paper examines four anonymized production-class firmware corpora: an Adaptive AUTOSAR-class ADAS platform, a domain-controller–IVI pair, a distributed multi-ECU ADAS network, and a split Android/cluster architecture. We operationalize Automotive Firmware Hardening Completeness (AFHC) as an evidence model for comparing five control areas: authentication, credential protection, policy enforcement, network exposure, and release-build control. The analysis correlates configurations, headers, ELF binaries, certificates, startup paths, and service bindings. It identifies deterministic diagnostic material, extractable private keys, a configured reverse diagnostic path, broad interface bindings without authentication markers in the inspected files, permissive mandatory access control, empty root password-hash fields, and engineering artifacts in release images. These observations establish static evidence of incomplete hardening, not runtime exploitability. The main result is a traceable cross-stack account of where deployed security mechanisms and firmware evidence disagree, together with release checks aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE R155/R156.",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccsb71176.2026.11716378",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecu",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuebin Shao",
        "Zheng Wang",
        "Yuqiao Ning",
        "Shiyu Mu",
        "Shihao Xue",
        "Quanrui Huo"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Science and Blockchain (CCSB)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccsb71176.2026.11716378",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccst.2016.7815711",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion prevention system of automotive network CAN bus",
      "description": "Automotive networks based on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus (ISO 11898) family of protocols have been shown to be vulnerable to exploits by hackers who are outside the vehicle. These networks can be compromised in a manner which could jeopardize vehicle occupants. One well-publicized exploit led to a costly automotive recall that affected more than a million vehicles. Other exploits can allow criminals to steal cars without physically breaking into them. While no fatalities have yet occurred, hackers could trigger an event that led to accident involving serious injury or even death. The CAN bus connects electronic control units (ECUs), some of which are required for safety and emissions systems such as the anti-lock braking and fuel injection systems. In addition to controlling required functions, other ECUs provide consumer-oriented features such as infotainment and lighting. Whether factory installed or aftermarket add-ons, each ECU introduces attack vectors into the overall automotive network. This research focuses on securing these vehicle networks, specifically the CAN bus. This paper will analyze the current vulnerabilities and describe our design for a real-time intrusion prevention system (IPS) that neutralizes attacks by actively monitoring the CAN bus and eliminating malicious messages.",
      "published": "2016-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccst.2016.7815711",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sam Abbott-McCune",
        "Lisa A. Shay"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccst.2016.7815711",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ccst.2016.7815712",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Techniques in hacking and simulating a modem automotive controller area network",
      "description": "This research will demonstrate hacking techniques on the modern automotive network and describe the design and implementation of a benchtop simulator. In currently-produced vehicles, the primary network is based on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus described in the ISO 11898 family of protocols. The CAN bus performs well in the electronically noisy environment found in the modern automobile. While the CAN bus is ideal for the exchange of information in this environment, when the protocol was designed security was not a priority due to the presumed isolation of the network. That assumption has been invalidated by recent, well-publicized attacks where hackers were able to remotely control an automobile, leading to a product recall that affected more than a million vehicles. The automobile has a multitude of electronic control units (ECUs) which are interconnected with the CAN bus to control the various systems which include the infotainment, light, and engine systems. The CAN bus allows the ECUs to share information along a common bus which has led to improvements in fuel and emission efficiency, but has also introduced vulnerabilities by giving access on the same network to cyber-physical systems (CPS). These CPS systems include the anti-lock braking systems (ABS) and on late model vehicles the ability to turn the steering wheel and control the accelerator. Testing functionality on an operational vehicle can be dangerous and place others in harm's way, but simulating the vehicle network and functionality of the ECUs on a bench-top system provides a safe way to test for vulnerabilities and to test possible security solutions to prevent CPS access over the CAN bus network. This paper will describe current research on the automotive network, provide techniques in capturing network traffic for playback, and demonstrate the design and implementation of a benchtop system for continued research on the CAN bus.",
      "published": "2016-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ccst.2016.7815712",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sam Abbott-McCune",
        "Lisa A. Shay"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/ccst.2016.7815712",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cdc49753.2023.10383926",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Attack Detection Framework for Connected Vehicles in V2X Networks Based on An Iterative UFIR Filter",
      "description": "Connected vehicles have great advantages in driving safety and energy efficiency under the support of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, while they are also vulnerable to malicious cyber-attacks. To enhance the cyber security of connected vehicles, a cyber-attack detection framework is proposed based on multi-source information fusion specifically for the vehicle localization system. In this framework, an iterative unbiased finite impulse response (UFIR) filter is utilized to estimate the vehicle position with low computational load, based on the vehicle dynamics model and information from the inertial measurement system (IMU), GPS, and V2X networks. In addition, a discriminator module is developed to analyze the residuals between estimations and position information from different sources for cyber-attack detection. Finally, multiple simulation cases are implemented to validate the effectiveness of the proposed framework.",
      "published": "2023-12-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cdc49753.2023.10383926",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kai Jiang",
        "Zhiyang Ju",
        "Lingying Huang",
        "Rong Su"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/cdc49753.2023.10383926",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3971,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/cdc49753.2023.10383926 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: response, information, safety, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cdma54072.2022.00025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Intrusion Detection System for CAN Protocol Using Neighborhood Similarity",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the most commonly used communication protocol for in-vehicle networks due to its simplicity, efficiency and robustness. However, the CAN protocol is vulnerable to malicious attacks because it lacks basic security features such as message ID authentication, access control and message verification. Specifically, CAN pro-tocol fails to provide protection against message injection at-tacks. This paper presents a novel lightweight Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that translates CAN traffic into a mathematical abstraction i.e. temporal graph and then applies neighborhood-based graph similarity technique to detect CAN bus intrusions. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated on a dataset from a real vehicle. The dataset consists of three types of message injection attack including spoofing, fuzzy and DoS attack is used for performance evaluation. Experimental results indicate that the proposed IDS can successfully detect these attacks with high detection accuracy. Specifically, the proposed IDS achieves detection accuracy of 96.01% as compared to best case scenario detection accuracy of 90.16% for existing state-of-the-art.",
      "published": "2022-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cdma54072.2022.00025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rafi Ud Daula Refat",
        "Abdulrahman Abu Elkhail",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Data Science and Machine Learning Applications (CDMA)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/cdma54072.2022.00025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cewit.2017.8263141",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity challenges of systems-of-systems for fully-autonomous road vehicles",
      "description": "We are seeing rapid development of in-vehicle, vehicleto- vehicle, intelligent roadway, infrastructure and ride-hailing systems. However, progress in some areas is much faster than in others. For example, in-vehicle self-driving systems are evolving rapidly, but development of intelligent road systems is relatively sluggish. These systems are beginning to interconnect and interoperate to become complex systems-of-systems for which attack surfaces and vulnerabilities are expanding exponentially. Many of these systems are standalone and proprietary and do not interoperate. However, systems must be seamlessly integrated if we are to arrive at safe and secure fully-autonomous road vehicles. If we do not create broad standards early on, we can expect vulnerabilities to grow so much that they could overwhelm potential benefits from improved safety and fuel economies. Warnings about cybersecurity consequences of such complexities appear from time to time in academic publications and the popular press, but few companies and government agencies do not seem to heed these admonitions and suggestions. Meanwhile, the self-driving juggernaut ploughs ahead. Here, we identify likely cybersecurity consequences that will arise because current efforts reflect uncoordinated design and development, particularly of supporting infrastructure systems. We describe how such risks might be mitigated proactively by introducing cybersecurity requirements early in the design, development and deployment processes. We also discuss how we might establish universal automotive and transportation security and safety standards that are enforceable and can be enforced globally across in-vehicle and ex-vehicle systems. While we see impressive near-term advances, particularly with in-vehicle systems and vehicle-to-vehicle systems, such innovations will eventually hit a roadblock if infrastructure systems, both physical and cyber, do not receive the attention required to achieve acceptable levels of cybersecurity and safety.",
      "published": "2017-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cewit.2017.8263141",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "C. Warren Axelrod"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference & Expo on Emerging Technologies for a Smarter World (CEWIT)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/cewit.2017.8263141",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cic50333.2020.00010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Industry Plenary Panel: Autonomous Driving: Practical Challenges & Opportunities",
      "description": "One of the prominent industry trends at this point is development of self-driving technology and vehicles. Autonomous vehicles are increasingly touching our lives and society. With the current pandemic, their value in driverless transportation, contactless delivery and better safety increased manyfold. There are several key technology trends that are acting as critical drivers of enabling and realizing self-driving cars: AI/ML, Distributed and Federated Machine Learning, Perception, Adversarial Machine Learning, Edge and Cloud computing, Hardware technology for sensors, RADARs and LIDARs, Cybersecurity, Safety, AI Ethics and regulatory requirements.",
      "published": "2020-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cic50333.2020.00010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Collaboration and Internet Computing (CIC)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/cic50333.2020.00010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ciees66347.2025.11300034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning-Based Architectures for UAV Network Attack Detection",
      "description": "This research aims to develop and compare deep learning approaches to detect cyberattacks on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) networks, including Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). We applied Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) on the ECU-IoFT dataset to investigate feature distributions and relationships, prepared it for training, applied the SMOTE technique to balance the data, and compared the DL architectures' results. The dataset contains 54,492 samples representing various attacks on UAV Wi-Fi communications, which were carefully preprocessed. The models achieved high performance, with the ANN achieving an average accuracy of 96%, the RNN achieving 96%, and the CNN achieving a lower average accuracy of 81%. We also applied additional evaluation metrics, including precision, recall, F1-score, and confusion matrices, which confirmed the models' effectiveness in accurately detecting UAV network attacks. This reflects the ability of the DL models to recognize patterns associated with UAV security threats, enhancing the efficiency of UAV networks in the face of cyberattacks.",
      "published": "2025-11-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ciees66347.2025.11300034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. Al-Marri",
        "Plamen Zlatkov Zahariev",
        "Mahar Khashim",
        "Ahmed F. N. Obeidat",
        "Yahya M. Tashtoush"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 6th International Conference on Communications, Information, Electronic and Energy Systems (CIEES)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ciees66347.2025.11300034",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ciees66347.2025.11300081",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Immutable Audit of EV Charging Sessions Using Blockchain and IPFS",
      "description": "As electric vehicles (EVs) become more prevalent, ensuring secure and transparent tracking of their charging activities has emerged as a critical challenge. Traditional centralized methods are vulnerable to data integrity issues and lack resilience, raising concerns about trustworthiness. This work presents a blockchain-enhanced architecture for auditing EV charging sessions. It offloads Charging Data Records (CDRs) to the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), while preserving their integrity through cryptographic anchors recorded on an Ethereum-compatible smart contract. This approach strikes a balance between decentralization and system performance. A prototype was developed featuring OCPP-based session simulation and automated verification via smart contracts. Experimental evaluation across thousands of test cases confirmed the system's ability to detect data tampering with minimal processing overhead, especially when integrated with Layer-2 scaling technologies. These results demonstrate the framework's potential to improve transparency and trust in EV charging networks.",
      "published": "2025-11-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ciees66347.2025.11300081",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "resilience",
        "secure",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nexhibe Sejfuli-Ramadani",
        "Jelena Gjorgjev",
        "Valentina Angelkoska",
        "Erenis Ramadani",
        "Florim Idrizi",
        "Aleksandar Risteski"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications, Information, Electronic and Energy Systems (CIEES)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ciees66347.2025.11300081",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ciisca59740.2023.00061",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing the Connected Vehicle Security Using the SecureAuto Tool",
      "description": "Connected vehicles have thousands of components, including software-based applications, making their safety and security-critical. However, the automotive industry faces challenges such as a lack of control over post-market devices, chip shortages leading to fake components, and limited trained resources. Current Threat Modelling and Risk Analysis approaches are insufficient, particularly STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Integrity, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege) due to the complex networked interfaces of connected vehicles. Compliance with industry standards, such as ISO/SAE 21434, is also challenging. A more comprehensive approach, such as using STRIDE, Lateral Movement, and the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process, is necessary to identify critical assets, threats, and associated risks. Simulating potential attack scenarios can help develop effective security strategies. Using tools and solutions can also help smaller automotive manufacturers meet security requirements and reduce costs. Adopting a comprehensive approach to Threat Modelling and Risk Analysis can improve safety and security for connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2023-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ciisca59740.2023.00061",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sai Sharanya Anand",
        "Sandeep Vijayaraghavan",
        "Shinu Abhi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computational Intelligence for Information, Security and Communication Applications (CIISCA)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/ciisca59740.2023.00061",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4024,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ciisca59740.2023.00061 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: assets, limited, making, service, intelligence, applications, information, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ciit68512.2026.11731553",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Accelerating Over-the-Air Updates in Autonomous Robotic Vehicle: A Bandwidth-Efficient and Secure Framework for Software-Defined Mobility",
      "description": "This paper presents a quantitative evaluation of a bandwidth-efficient and secure Over-the-Air (OTA) update framework for autonomous robotic vehicles. Addressing the critical need for reliable software maintenance in Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs), we propose a formal latency decomposition model to identify transmission bottlenecks across heterogeneous networks (Wi-Fi, LTE, and 5G). Furthermore, we introduce an adaptive update strategy that optimizes bandwidth usage by dynamically switching between delta-differencing and full-image downloads based on a modification efficiency threshold. Experimental results demonstrate that this approach reduces data payloads by nearly 90% for incremental patches, while 5G connectivity reduces protocol handshake latency by an order of magnitude compared to legacy LTE. The study concludes with a scalability analysis and security assessment, validating the framework’s robustness for fleet-wide deployment in next-generation mobility systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ciit68512.2026.11731553",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Petar Dimitrievski",
        "Andrea Kulakov",
        "Vlatko Spasev",
        "Nevena Ackovska"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Informatics and Information Technologies (CIIT)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ciit68512.2026.11731553",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cine56307.2022.10037554",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recommender Credibility-Based Trust Model for Secure V2X Communication",
      "description": "An Intelligent Transportations System (ITS) can realise a sustainable transportation system by alleviating traffic congestion and offering a safe travel experience. V2X communication is the backbone of an ITS because it enables the exchange of information between vehicles and ITS entities. Despite the vast potential applications of V2X communication, its open wireless nature makes it susceptible to attacks. An attack by a malicious user in a delay-sensitive V2X network can have fatal consequences. Although cryptographic solutions offer robust security against external attacks, they fail in the case of inside attackers. Consequently, it is necessary to supplement cryptographic solutions with trust-based models to secure the highly vulnerable V2X networks. This paper suggests a recommender credibility-based trust model for better trust calculation for detecting and consequently avoiding communication with malicious nodes. The proposed model keeps track of previous node misbehaviours and filters bogus recommendations received from malicious nodes for enhancing the security of V2X communication. The performance of the proposed model is compared with the existing model in terms of PDR and FNR.",
      "published": "2022-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cine56307.2022.10037554",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Faisal Rasheed Lone",
        "H. Verma",
        "K. Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "2022 5th International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Networks (CINE)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/cine56307.2022.10037554",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cinti53070.2021.9668440",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Classification of Cyber-Attacks on 5G-V2X",
      "description": "In the Advent of Vehicular Communion as an essential part of autonomous driving, and the demanding requirements and services for autonomous driving, a new technology is needed to fulfill those needs. The new features of 5G and NR-5G enables it as the platform of choice for sensors and vehicles. It fulfills the requirements of vehicular networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 14 and above addresses the requirements of V2X services with standardized services for the current LTE and upcoming 5G-NR technologies. On the other hand, due to its novelty, serious security and privacy concerns were raised. Wireless interfaces on vehicles create the possibility for attackers to remotely access vehicles. In this paper, we present an organized view of the existing 5G- V2X communication technologies, including V2X history, architecture, communication and use cases, We explore the different attacks and vulnerabilities on 5G-V2X, and present a comprehensive classification based on the combination of various criteria found in the literature. Lastly we discuss the possible direction of future research related to security issues in V2X communication.",
      "published": "2021-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cinti53070.2021.9668440",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mera Nizam-Edden Saulaiman",
        "Miklós Kozlovszky",
        "Á. Csilling"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Informatics (CINTI)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/cinti53070.2021.9668440",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cis52066.2020.00084",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Convolutional Encoder Network for Intrusion Detection in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Integrated with various electronic control units (ECUs), vehicles are becoming more intelligent with the assistance of essential connections. However, the interaction with the outside world raises great concerns on cyber-attacks. As a main standard for in-vehicle network, Controller Area Network (CAN) does not have any built-in security mechanisms to guarantee a secure communication. This increases risks of denial of service, remote control attacks by an attacker, posing serious threats to underlying vehicles, property and human lives. As a result, it is urgent to develop an effective in-vehicle network intrusion detection system (IDS) for better security. In this paper, we propose a Feature-based Sliding Window (FSW) to extract the feature of CAN Data Field and CAN IDs. Then we construct a convolutional encoder network (CEN) to detect network intrusion of CAN networks. The proposed FSW-CEN method is evaluated on real-world datasets. The experimental results show that compared to traditional data processing methods and convolutional neural networks, our method is able to detect attacks with a higher accuracy in terms of detection accuracy and false negative rate.",
      "published": "2020-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cis52066.2020.00084",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xing Zhang",
        "Xiaotong Cui",
        "Kefei Cheng",
        "Liang Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/cis52066.2020.00084",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cisai54367.2021.00050",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-FT: A Fuzz Testing Method for Automotive Controller Area Network Bus",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the de-facto standard for connecting the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in automobiles. However, there are serious cyber-security risks due to the lack of security mechanisms. In order to mine the vulnerabilities in CAN bus, this paper proposes CAN-FT, a fuzz testing method for automotive CAN bus, which uses a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) based fuzzy message generation algorithm and the Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) based anomaly detection mechanism to capture the abnormal states of CAN bus. Experimental results on a real-world vehicle show that CAN-FT can find vulnerabilities more efficiently and comprehensively.",
      "published": "2021-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cisai54367.2021.00050",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cyber-security",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haichun Zhang",
        "Kelin Huang",
        "Jie Wang",
        "Zhenglin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Information Science and Artificial Intelligence (CISAI)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/cisai54367.2021.00050",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cisat62382.2024.10695200",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An annotation and indexing model based on automotive cybersecurity test cases",
      "description": "This paper proposes an annotation and indexing model based on automotive cybersecurity test cases, which includes: firstly, annotating the test cases and establishing a label list; then, counting the frequency of occurrence and weight of high-frequency words in the label list, and constructing a retrieval model; finally, inputting the contents of the test cases entered by the user into the retrieval model, get the preliminary retrieval results, and determine the final retrieval results according to the operation of the test cases. The model proposed in this paper can effectively improve the retrieval speed of cybersecurity test cases for intelligent connected vehicles. In addition, this paper develops a whole-vehicle software test bed system to realize the digital management of automotive cybersecurity test cases.",
      "published": "2024-07-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cisat62382.2024.10695200",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ming-Ming Yu",
        "Zhen Guo",
        "Yu-Qiao Ning",
        "Qian-Chuang Zhi",
        "Tian-Ling Liu",
        "Dong-Qing Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 7th International Conference on Computer Information Science and Application Technology (CISAT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/cisat62382.2024.10695200",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cisce52179.2021.9445964",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Classification Method of Vehicle Cyber Security Based on Hybrid Analysis",
      "description": "With the rapid development of the network technology of intelligent connected vehicles, the cyber security risk classification of vehicles will provide a good reference for the cyber security management of intelligent connected vehicles. This paper introduces the method of cyber security risk classification of automotive parts in the process of risk assessment. By using the hybrid analysis method of qualitative and quantitative, the cyber security related items of automotive are identified and the key feature information is extracted. At the same time, the risk level is calculated by using the quantitative evaluation method based on attack potential. In addition, the effectiveness of this method is verified by taking the vehicle information terminal T-Box as an example.",
      "published": "2021-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cisce52179.2021.9445964",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hao Zhao",
        "Wei Ping Hu",
        "Tianyu Liu",
        "Pingyi Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications, Information System and Computer Engineering (CISCE)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/cisce52179.2021.9445964",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cisce55963.2022.9851006",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Interpretable and Lightweight Intrusion Detection for In-vehicle Network",
      "description": "Along with the improvement of informatization and intelligence in modern vehicles, the attacks aimed at in-vehicle network has been becoming an emerging threat. Current methods such as neural network-based methods have shown a state-of-the-art performance on intrusion detection based on in-vehicle network monitoring. However, the limitations in interpretability and resource consumption remain the non-negligible obstales for practical applications and deployments. In this paper, we propose and build an interpretable and lightweight framework based on shapelets model for in-vehicle network intrusion detection. We conduct massive experiments on a real-world dataset, namely Car-Hacking 2019 to evaluate our detection framework. Experiments demonstrate that our proposed method can reach or surpass state-of-the-art methods in four different adversarial scaneraios with extremely low time consumption, while providing interpretable results with visual explanations for further investigations.",
      "published": "2022-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cisce55963.2022.9851006",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gang Yang",
        "Chaojing Tang",
        "Zhiyuan Jiang",
        "Xingtong Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications, Information System and Computer Engineering (CISCE)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/cisce55963.2022.9851006",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4058,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/cisce55963.2022.9851006 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: remain, intelligence, applications, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cisce65916.2025.11065179",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "C3Net: Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Network using CNN-ConvLSTM with CBAM",
      "description": "With the popularity of intelligent vehicles, there are numerous concerns regarding the security of the in-vehicle networks. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a serial communication network with simple structure while connecting Electronic Control Units (ECUs) with high reliability. However, CAN is vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to the lack of security mechanisms, so an efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) is required. In this paper, we proposed a novel intrusion detection model named C3Net. Our model consists of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), Long Short-Term Memory (ConvLSTM) network and Convolutional Block Attention Module (CBAM). A method converting CAN messages to images is designed to enhance data robustness while encoding potential pattern information into spatial features. CAN image sequences are then fed as input of the model and Fully Connected (FC) subnetwork is used to make classification in the end. Experiments on varying key hyperparameter values were conducted using real-vehicle datasets. Our proposed C3Net achieved excellent results with the highest F1 value of 0.9677 and an average AUC value close to 1.",
      "published": "2025-05-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cisce65916.2025.11065179",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siyong Li",
        "Bang Du",
        "Wei Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications, Information System and Computer Engineering (CISCE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/cisce65916.2025.11065179",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3847,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/cisce65916.2025.11065179 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: there, information, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ciss.2019.8692790",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing PKES against Relay Attacks using Coordinate Tracing and Multi-Factor Authentication",
      "description": "In most produced modern vehicles, Passive Keyless Entry and Start System (PKES), a newer form of an entry access system, is becoming more and more popular. The PKES system allows the consumer to enter within a certain range and have the vehicle's doors unlock automatically without pressing any buttons on the key. This technology increases the overall convenience to the consumer; however, it is vulnerable to attacks known as relay and amplified relay attacks. A relay attack consists of placing a device near the vehicle and a device near the key to relay the signal between the key and the vehicle. On the other hand, an amplified relay attack uses only a singular amplifier to increase the range of the vehicle sensors to reach the key. By exploiting these two different vulnerabilities within the PKES system, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to the vehicle, leading to damage or even stolen property. To minimize both vulnerabilities, we propose a coordinate tracing system with an additional Bluetooth communication channel. The coordinate tracing system, or PKES Forcefield, traces the authorized key's longitude and latitude in real time using two proposed algorithms, known as the Key Bearing algorithm and the Longitude and Latitude Key (LLK) algorithm. To further add security, a Bluetooth communication channel will be implemented. With an additional channel established, a second frequency can be traced within a secondary PKES Forcefield. The LLK Algorithm computes both locations of frequencies and analyzes the results to form a pattern. Furthermore, the PKES Forcefield movement-tracing allows a vehicle to understand when an attacker attempts to transmit an unauthenticated signal and blocks any signal from being amplified over a fixed range.",
      "published": "2019-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ciss.2019.8692790",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Syed S. Rizvi",
        "Jarrett Imler",
        "Luke Ritchey",
        "Michael Tokar"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Information Sciences and Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ciss.2019.8692790",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ciss50987.2021.9400233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Unsupervised Learning Approach for In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "In-vehicle networks remain largely unprotected from a myriad of vulnerabilities to failures caused by adversarial activities. Remote attacks on the SAE J1939 protocol based on controller access network (CAN) bus for heavy-duty ground vehicles can lead to detectable changes in the physical characteristics of the vehicle. In this paper, I develop an unsupervised learning approach to monitor the normal behavior within the CAN bus data and detect malicious traffic. The J1939 data packets have some text-based features that I convert to numerical values. In addition, I propose an algorithm based on hierarchical agglomerative clustering that considers multiple approaches for linkages and pairwise distances between observations. I present prediction performance results to show the effectiveness of this ensemble algorithm. In addition to in-vehicle network security, this algorithm is also transferrable to other cybersecurity datasets, including botnet attacks in traditional enterprise IP networks.",
      "published": "2021-03-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ciss50987.2021.9400233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nandi Leslie"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Information Sciences and Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/ciss50987.2021.9400233",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/citisia50690.2020.9371804",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analyzing Vehicle-to-Everything Communication for Intelligent Transportation System: Journey from IEEE 802.11p to 5G and Finally Towards 6G",
      "description": "The rapid development of the Intelligent Transportation System increases the potential of Vehicular communication in a smart transportation network. Although there are several technological attempts to support vehicular communication, they have limitations from various perspectives including mobility, security, resource allocation, and device-to-device communication. In order to address those limitations, this study evaluates the most appropriate communication technology to transmit data in the future Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communication system. First, we conduct a performance evaluation of the current main vehicular communication system requirements. Then, we analyze the applications of communication technologies such as wi-fi, LTE, 5G, and 6G to fulfill the requirements of future V2X communication. Later, we explore the advanced features of 6G in the context of the Intelligent Transportation System. Then, we suggest that 6G technology as the corresponding communication technology to future V2X communication systems based on the analysis. Finally, we propose an architecture for the 6G V2X network and discuss security challenges and suggested solutions for the architecture.",
      "published": "2020-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/citisia50690.2020.9371804",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Geetha. K. Munasinghe",
        "Mohsin Murtaza"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Innovative Technologies in Intelligent Systems and Industrial Applications (CITISIA)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/citisia50690.2020.9371804",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cits55221.2022.9832912",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of Blockchain-based Secure Electric Vehicle Charging System Using ECC",
      "description": "Greener and more energy-efficient transportation options have pushed electric vehicles to the forefront of the global transportation market. Since then, academia and the transportation industry have tried to develop sustainable protocols that ensure dependable, scalable, and secure communication. With this vision, various security researchers have suggested authentication techniques to protect the messages exchanged between entities of the charging system. In its continuation, Kim et al. have proposed a charging system for electric vehicles based on the blockchain. With a close analysis of this protocol, our team has found that their scheme suffers from message substitution attacks, session key disclosure attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, etc. This article proposes a secure and robust blockchain-based electric vehicle charging system using the ECC cryptosystem and lightweight one-way hash functions. Furthermore, the security of the proposed protocol is being analyzed, and the results confirm that the suggested protocol can withstand significant attacks.",
      "published": "2022-07-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cits55221.2022.9832912",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanjeev Kumar Dwivedi",
        "Ruhul Amin",
        "Satyanarayana Vollala"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer, Information and Telecommunication Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/cits55221.2022.9832912",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cloudcom62794.2024.00014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security in EV Charging Systems: A Hybrid Detection and Mitigation Approach",
      "description": "The rapid proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates advanced charging infrastructure, which is increasingly reliant on cloud-based technologies and the Internet of Things (IoT). However, these systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks that could have severe repercussions, including power grid failures. This paper addresses the security vulnerabilities inherent in the EV charging system. We propose a novel hybrid security solution tailored for cloud-based EV charging systems that integrates time-series-based regression models with classification algorithms to detect and mitigate both power consumption anomalies and network intrusions effectively. Our approach includes a comprehensive analysis to identify vulnerabilities and threats for cloud-based EV systems, a dual-model system for anomaly and intrusion detection, and a feedback-based threshold adjustment mechanism to assist overflow and anomaly identification. We provide a detailed analysis of data communication threats from a cloud perspective, design a robust security model, and evaluate various models to select the most effective ones for real-time security management. The finally decided models present excellent accuracy and practical value. Our findings contribute to enhancing the resilience of EV charging systems against cyber-physical threats, ensuring more reliable and secure operations.",
      "published": "2024-12-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cloudcom62794.2024.00014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hui-Yao Dong",
        "Igor V. Kotenko"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/cloudcom62794.2024.00014",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cmi48017.2019.8962145",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Prioritization methodology of computing assets for connected vehicles in security assessment purpose",
      "description": "The paper is devoted to a preparation for security assessment of connected vehicles, prioritization points of attacks on structural elements in particular. Described approach is based on quality assessment of developed components and their accordance with model of attacker. Important feature of methodology concludes in evaluation of each informational flow criticality interacting with component. The conclusion indicates the advantages of the developed approach and describes its disadvantages, if approach is implemented on elements, built by the AUTOSAR architecture basis.",
      "published": "2019-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cmi48017.2019.8962145",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autosar",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrey E. Barinov",
        "Nikolay Davydkin",
        "Daria E. Sharova",
        "Сергей Вадимович Скурлаев"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/cmi48017.2019.8962145",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cns.2018.8433168",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "T-PAAD: Trajectory Privacy Attack on Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Despite extensive research efforts over the last decade, security and privacy concerns on self-driving cars and other autonomous vehicles are still prevalent. This paper presents a new possible attack, Trajectory Privacy Attack on Autonomous Driving (T-PAAD), which aims to deanonymize trajectories by exploiting the relation between autonomous vehicles path planning algorithms and trajectories.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cns.2018.8433168",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelnasser Banihani",
        "Abdulrahman Alzahrani",
        "Raed S. Alharthi",
        "Huirong Fu",
        "George Corser"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/cns.2018.8433168",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cns48642.2020.9162271",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Platoon Handover Authentication in 5G-V2X : IEEE CNS 20 Poster",
      "description": "In 5G-Vehicle to Everything (5G-V2X) network, the signaling storm may incur as platoon moves through in such ultra-dense network (UDN) of base stations since masses of vehicles in the platoon execute the handover authentication simultaneously. In this poster, we propose an efficient platoon authentication handover scheme by integrating Software Defined Network (SDN) and Aggregated Message Authentication Codes (AMACs) techniques in 5G-V2X network to reduce handover signaling overhead and communication delay during authentication.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cns48642.2020.9162271",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guanjie Li",
        "Chengzhe Lai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/cns48642.2020.9162271",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cns48642.2020.9162275",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Generation of realistic signal strength measurements for a 5G Rogue Base Station attack scenario",
      "description": "The detection and prevention of cyber-attacks is one of the main challenges in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) autonomous platooning scenarios. A key tool in this activity is the measurement report that is generated by User Equipment (UE), containing received signal strength and location information. Such data is effective in techniques to detect Rogue Base Stations (RBS) or Subscription Permanent Identifier SUPI/5G-GUTI catchers. An undetected RBS could result in unwanted consequences such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and subscriber privacy attacks on the network and UE. Motivated by this, this paper presents the novel simulation of a 5G cellular system to generate a realistic dataset of signal strength measurements that can later be used in the development of techniques to identify and prevent RBS interventions. The results show that the tool can create a large dataset of realistic measurement reports which can be used to develop and validate RBS detection techniques.",
      "published": "2020-04-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cns48642.2020.9162275",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Saedi",
        "Adrian Moore",
        "P. Perry",
        "Mohammad Shojafar",
        "H. Ullah",
        "Jonathan Synnott",
        "Ruth Brown",
        "I. Herwono"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/cns48642.2020.9162275",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cobcom62281.2024.10631203",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing Automotive Connectivity: New Technologies and Security Considerations",
      "description": "The automotive industry is changing from mechanical engineering towards the software-defined vehicle. A modern vehicle contains more software than a common aircraft to implement Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, ADAS. These systems provide road users with advanced safety features such as adaptive cruise control, brake, lane and steer assistant and pave the way toward autonomous vehicles. To realize these functionalities, several connectivity services must be included within a modern vehicle – from backend connectivity, navigation, emergency calls (eCall), traffic assistance, Over-theAir (OTA) updates, all the way to streaming services and Wi-Fi hotspots for passengers. A permanent internet connection must be guaranteed and other communication strategies such as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle-to-Cloud (V2C), Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technologies need to be considered. RF technologies within the ISM and other RF bands are used, and a variety of antennas need to be integrated to provide best possible signal coverage in any driving situation. This paper features a brief description of new automotive technologies, connectivity considerations by antenna simulations and the resultant cyber security concerns that arise from the large number of connections.",
      "published": "2024-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cobcom62281.2024.10631203",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "driver assistance",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Klaus Kainrath",
        "Philipp Ortner",
        "Giancarlo Benincasa",
        "Erich Leitgeb"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Broadband Communications for Next Generation Networks and Multimedia Applications (CoBCom)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/cobcom62281.2024.10631203",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/codit55151.2022.9804071",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A review of factors impacting Cybersecurity in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs)",
      "description": "Cybersecurity, a critical aspect for any organization, is now being introduced into connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV). Due to enhancements in automation and interconnectivity, cybersecurity threats have increased tremendously. The threats to CAVs, due to their unique mobility, connectivity and operational requirements, are different from those related to organizational cybersecurity. Hence, new types of threats relevant to CAVs must be identified and assessed, and robust defence mechanisms must be designed to reduce the risks arising from previously unknown threats. Furthermore, it is essential to select technologies that fit into the CAV structure and address the immediate challenges of identified potential technologies. The objective of this study is to determine and assess the most important influencing factors and sub-factors that determine the impact of cybersecurity on CAVs. Our research shows that the detection and assessment of new types of attack, robust defensive techniques and technology assessment are significant factors that will impact cybersecurity in CAVs by improving cyber-resiliency, the reliability of defensive techniques and technology selection. The scope of the research is qualitative and targeted for academic purposes. Eventually, publication may serve as a basis for cybersecurity implementation by automotive organizations.",
      "published": "2022-05-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/codit55151.2022.9804071",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohinder Pandey",
        "Seetharaman"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Control, Decision and Information Technologies (CoDIT)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/codit55151.2022.9804071",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/codit62066.2024.10708325",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "How Does Distributed Denial of Service Affect the Connected Cars Environment?",
      "description": "Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are among the most insidious cyberattacks targeting any networking system. In the Internet domain, these attacks have demonstrated the capability of bringing down most systems for extended periods. In recent years, researchers have been exploring and simulating DDoS attacks against connected car systems. However, these simulated attacks have primarily employed messages from the Internet domain rather than leveraging the messages exchanged between connected vehicles. This paper presents a novel study that investigates the impact of DDoS attacks employing Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs), which serve as fundamental safety messages for establishing awareness in the connected car environment. The results obtained reveal that our attack exerts a significant, silent, and stealthy impact on connected cars. While the system remains operational, the quality of the services it provides (e.g., data collection and vehicle cooperation) is severely compromised. This highlights the vulnerability of connected cars to these attacks and underscores the need for robust mitigation strategies.",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/codit62066.2024.10708325",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ayoub Wehby",
        "Sherali Zeadally",
        "Rida Khatoun",
        "Mohammed Lamine Bouchouia",
        "Ahmad Fadlallah"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Control, Decision and Information Technologies (CoDIT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/codit62066.2024.10708325",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cogmob55547.2022.10118297",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Use Cases of Attack Graph in Threat Analysis And Risk Assessment for The Automotive Domain",
      "description": "Attack graph is a commonly used methodology in IT security to represent all paths in the system that can lead to a successful attack. It is used to visually represent and automatically analyze security vulnerabilities in the system, as well as to analyze potential defense strategies. Nevertheless, attack graphs are not widely used in the automotive domain. Cognitive mobility systems rely on autonomous decision making by its participants. In order to enable trust in vehicles to make correct decisions, we must ensure that they are immune to failure and malicious manipulation. This trust requires a high level of safety and security. For a smart car, with multiple external connections, the complexity of the attack surface increases dramatically. Ensuring the security of the vehicle depends on a large number of interrelated factors. Thus we need methods, tools and know-how for evaluating the security postures of vehicles. The new ISO/SAE 21434 standard specifies the technical requirements for cyber-security management of road vehicles. It defines the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) for the analysis and assessment of cyber-security risks to a given automotive system. We propose a generic model to automate the attack path generation and analysis in the TARA. We also discuss several use cases for this model, including the enumeration of possible attack paths, the automatic evaluation of the feasibility and risk of each path, and the construction of a defence graph to ensure the security of the system.",
      "published": "2022-10-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cogmob55547.2022.10118297",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mera Nizam-Edden Saulaiman",
        "Miklós Kozlovszky",
        "Anna Bánáti",
        "Á. Csilling"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Cognitive Mobility (CogMob)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/cogmob55547.2022.10118297",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/coins54846.2022.9854983",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on Employing UPTANE for Secure Software Update OTA in Drone Environments",
      "description": "Software updates over the air (OTA) enable devices and systems to maintain up-to-date software without physical intervention. However, software updates OTA could be the target of attackers as its ecosystems include multiple attack surfaces. In this paper, we show the case study of the adaptation of UPTANE for drone environments. While UPTANE is designed to support the automotive environments, we perceive that it can be used flexibly in drone environments. We show how our customization supports unique characteristics of drone environments, not only for a single drone but also for a drone swarm. We illustrate that the proposed design is resilient against known attack scenarios and provides efficiency in drone environments.",
      "published": "2022-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/coins54846.2022.9854983",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shamma Al Blooshi",
        "Kyusuk Han"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Omni-layer Intelligent Systems (COINS)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/coins54846.2022.9854983",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/compsac.2019.00120",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CSKES: A Context-Based Secure Keyless Entry System",
      "description": "Remote keyless entry has been widely used on access control systems. These systems, in particular, Passive Keyless Entry and Start systems (PKES), allow drivers automatically unlock their vehicles by standing within one meter of the vehicle while carrying a key fob. Traditional key fobs adopt the RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) wireless communication technology. Yet, due to the restricted processing capacity of the key fobs and the vulnerabilities of RFID technology, these systems are subject to relay attack. In this paper, we propose a Context-based Secure Keyless Entry System (CSKES) that adopts BLE (Blue-tooth Low Energy) as a wireless communication technology and utilizes multiple context-based physical security features, namely, RSSI (Receiving Signal Strength Indicator), RTT (Round-Trip Time), GPS (Global Positioning System) coordinates, and Wi-Fi access point lists, to precisely identify the close proximity of a vehicle to its corresponding key fob. This multi-feature proximity identification system is highly efficient to mitigate classic relay attacks. We first introduce the implementation of the proposed system. Then we evaluate the system performance using three classification models with a dataset collected from normal and abnormal use cases. The results show that the proposed Context-based Secure Keyless Entry System demonstrates great efficiency in identifying physical proximity and preventing classic relay attack.",
      "published": "2019-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/compsac.2019.00120",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Juan Wang",
        "Karim Lounis",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/compsac.2019.00120",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/compsac48688.2020.00-44",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Divider: Delay-Time Based Sender Identification in Automotive Networks",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is one of the in-vehicle network protocols that is used to communicate among Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and has been de-facto standard. CAN is simple and has several vulnerabilities such as unable to distinguish spoofing messages because it does not support any authentication or sender identification properties. In previous work, some voltage-based methods to identify the sender node have been proposed. The methods can identify ECUs with high accuracy. However, the accuracy of source identification depends on a feature that is extracted from a continuous function of voltage use sampling. In general, as the sampling rate increases, the accuracy of identification is improved. Though the amount of data used for the identification increases too. Hence, it is desired to create an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that identifies ECUs using few sampling features as there is a limited computing resource in vehicles. In this paper, we propose a delay-time based sender identification method of ECUs. We confirm that the proposed method achieved a true positive rate of 96.7% in CAN bus prototype against spoofing attack from a compromised ECU, detecting spoofing attack from an unmonitored ECU with a true positive rate of 98.0% in real-vehicle.",
      "published": "2020-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/compsac48688.2020.00-44",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Tomoya Kitagawa",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/compsac48688.2020.00-44",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/compsac48688.2020.00011",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Long Short-Term Memory-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Controller Area Network Bus",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system works inside connected cars as a central system for communication between electronic control units (ECUs). Despite its central importance, the CAN does not support an authentication mechanism, i.e., CAN messages are broadcast without basic security features. As a result, it is easy for attackers to launch attacks at the CAN bus network system. Attackers can compromise the CAN bus system in several ways: denial of service, fuzzing, spoofing, etc. It is imperative to devise methodologies to protect modern cars against the aforementioned attacks. In this paper, we propose a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect and mitigate the CAN bus network attacks. We first inject attacks at the CAN bus system in a car that we have at our disposal to generate the attack dataset, which we use to test and train our model. Our results demonstrate that our classifier is efficient in detecting the CAN attacks. We achieved a detection accuracy of 99.9949%.",
      "published": "2020-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/compsac48688.2020.00011",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected cars",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Delwar Hossain",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue",
        "Hideya Ochiai",
        "Doudou Fall",
        "Youki Kadobayashi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/compsac48688.2020.00011",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/compsac65507.2025.00017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Attack-Fault Trees in the ODE Metamodel to Support Safety and Security Co-Analysis in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "Integrating safety and security in automotive cyber-physical systems (CPS) domains (e.g. autonomous vehicles), is challenging for two main reasons. First, it is still difficult to represent the potential consequences of system failures or malicious attacks. Secondly, these systems must ensure safety and security despite unknowns and uncertainties. A Digital Dependability Identity (DDI) can facilitate this by encapsulating all dependability characteristics (e.g., design, requirements, safety, and security analysis models) of CPS’s components. The Open Dependability Exchange (ODE) metamodel is an implementation of the DDI concept, but has limitations in the interplay between safety and security. ODE is aligned with with ISO 26262 but lacks certain security concepts to be aligned with ISO 21434. Also, ODE supports modeling fault trees, but modeling attack trees and attack-fault trees still not. This paper proposes an extension to the ODE metamodel, aiming to increase coverage of ISO 21434 concepts and allowing the modeling of attack-fault trees. We built these metamodel extensions based on an analysis of the ODE metamodel, industry standards, Microsoft STRIDE model, and HEAVENS security analysis methodologies. We evaluated the proposed extensions in an illustrative example of an autonomous vehicle.",
      "published": "2025-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/compsac65507.2025.00017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Victor Luiz Grechi",
        "André Luiz de Oliveira",
        "Barbara Gallina",
        "Leonardo Montecchi",
        "Rosana Teresinha Vaccare Braga"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/compsac65507.2025.00017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comsnets56262.2023.10041363",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smartverse: Blockchain based Crowdsourced V2X Message Verification and Dissemination System",
      "description": "Intelligent transportation systems with Vehicle to Everything (V2X) connectivity can help smart cities solve problems like pedestrian jaywalking, vehicle collision, and traffic congestion. V2X offers seamless connectivity between road in-frastructures and driver assistance systems with crowd-sourced data to guide design and feature sets. V2X applications raise security and privacy risks despite their benefits. Risks include data loss, device failure, and environmental damage. The current PKI-based V2X ecosystem requires many pseudonym keys to work successfully. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) often encoun-ters bottlenecks due to the enormous volume of authorisation, registration, and confirmation requests. When we transit to a means of fully autonomous transport, an enormous amount of data related to vehicle movement will flood the V2X network. A considerable infrastructure setup is needed to validate these mes-sages. Blockchain technology offers distributed ledger technology and a decentralised data processing mechanism. So blockchain can solve the issue of validating the messages in the V2X network. This paper proposes Smartverse, a blockchain technology-based authentication method to validate messages in the V2X ecosystem. We used the Ethereum blockchain platform, Interplanatary File System (IPFS) and developed algorithms to validate the crowd-sourced data in the V2X network. When a user submits data, say vehicle collision, other users in the V2X network validate the data by a voting mechanism. Once the messages are marked valid, other V2X users will receive this message. This paper explains the blockchain-based V2X network architecture and message validation algorithm.",
      "published": "2023-01-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comsnets56262.2023.10041363",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "driver assistance",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M R Jivthesh",
        "Rohit Mathew Samuel",
        "M R Gaushik",
        "N B Sai Shibu",
        "Sethuraman N Rao",
        "A. Nidhin Mahesh"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communication Systems & Networks (COMSNETS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/comsnets56262.2023.10041363",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comsnets56262.2023.10041381",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hand it Over Carefully: Security Breach during Handover in 5G-V2X",
      "description": "Vehicular communication draws much interest among researchers due to its prospective applications in traffic safety, ubiquitous connectivity, and infotainment. Vehicular networks are integrated with Fifth-Generation (5G) technology to create a 5G vehicle-to-everything (5G-V2X) communication network to inherit the advanced properties of 5G. 5G-V2X provides comfort, reliability, and security to vehicular users' data. However, one of the serious challenges in the 5G-V2X is Handover (HO) procedure when the vehicle moves from one base station to another. At the time of handover, there are some attacks possible such as impersonation attack, Denial of Service (DoS) attack, Man in the Middle attack, etc. In our work, we examine the possible impersonation attack during HO which leads to DoS. We demonstrate the attack by rogue Femto Access Point (FAP) during HO. A vehicle that becomes an attacker by impersonating one of the legitimate FAPs during HO causes DoS attacks by blocking the communication of nearby vehicles. This may be critical to life. Hence, we proposed an attack detection model for the given scenario which is based on HO Failure Ratio (HFR) and Radio Link Failure (RLF). We proposed the attack model and demonstrated the impact of the attack in 5G-V2X by packet loss rate, throughput, block rate, and HFR. Our attack detection method helps to detect the attack efficiently and is also faster than an existing approach.",
      "published": "2023-01-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comsnets56262.2023.10041381",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "infotainment",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Dey",
        "Moumita Patra"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/comsnets56262.2023.10041381",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2521642",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Networks Outlook: Achievements and Challenges",
      "description": "This paper presents a comprehensive survey of five most widely used in-vehicle networks from three perspectives: system cost, data transmission capacity, and fault-tolerance capability. The paper reviews the pros and cons of each network, and identifies possible approaches to improve the quality of service (QoS). In addition, two classifications of automotive gateways have been presented along with a brief discussion about constructing a comprehensive in-vehicle communication system with different networks and automotive gateways. Furthermore, security threats to in-vehicle networks are briefly discussed, along with the corresponding protective methods. The survey concludes with highlighting the trends in future development of in-vehicle network technology and a proposal of a topology of the next generation in-vehicle network.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2016.2521642",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Weiying Zeng",
        "Mohammed A. S. Khalid",
        "Sazzadur Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2016.2521642",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 168,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2873088",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey on Misbehavior Detection in Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Cooperative intelligent transportation systems (cITS) are a promising technology to enhance driving safety and efficiency. Vehicles communicate wirelessly with other vehicles and infrastructure, thereby creating a highly dynamic and heterogeneously managed ad-hoc network. It is these network properties that make it a challenging task to protect integrity of the data and guarantee its correctness. A major component is the problem that traditional security mechanisms like public key infrastructure (PKI)-based asymmetric cryptography only exclude outsider attackers that do not possess key material. However, because attackers can be insiders within the network (i.e., possess valid key material), this approach cannot detect all possible attacks. In this survey, we present misbehavior detection mechanisms that can detect such insider attacks based on attacker behavior and information analysis. In contrast to well-known intrusion detection for classical IT systems, these misbehavior detection mechanisms analyze information semantics to detect attacks, which aligns better with highly application-tailored communication protocols foreseen for cITS. In our survey, we provide an extensive introduction to the cITS ecosystem and discuss shortcomings of PKI-based security. We derive and discuss a classification for misbehavior detection mechanisms, provide an in-depth overview of seminal papers on the topic, and highlight open issues and possible future research trends.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2018.2873088",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rens Wouter van der Heijden",
        "Stefan Dietzel",
        "Tim Leinmuller",
        "Frank Kargl"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2018.2873088",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 292,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2951818",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Security Aspects for 3GPP 5G Networks",
      "description": "With the continuous development of mobile communication technologies, Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has proposed related standards with the fifth generation mobile communication technology (5G), which marks the official start of the evolution from the current Long Term Evolution (LTE) system to the next generation mobile communication system (5GS). This paper makes a large number of contributions to the security aspects of 3GPP 5G networks. Firstly, we present an overview of the network architecture and security functionality of the 3GPP 5G networks. Subsequently, we focus on the new features and techniques including the support of massive Internet of Things (IoT) devices, Device to Device (D2D) communication, Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communication, and network slice, which incur the huge challenges for the security aspects in 3GPP 5G networks. Finally, we discuss in detail the security features, security requirements or security vulnerabilities, existing security solutions and some open research issues about the new features and techniques in 3GPP 5G network.",
      "published": "2019-11-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2019.2951818",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Ping Cao",
        "Maode Ma",
        "Hui Li",
        "Ruhui Ma",
        "Yunqing Sun",
        "Pu Yu",
        "Lihui Xiong"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2019.2951818",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 280,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2020.2975048",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Connected & Autonomous Vehicles: Challenges Posed by Adversarial Machine Learning and the Way Forward",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) will form the backbone of future next-generation intelligent transportation systems (ITS) providing travel comfort, road safety, along with a number of value-added services. Such a transformation-which will be fuelled by concomitant advances in technologies for machine learning (ML) and wireless communications-will enable a future vehicular ecosystem that is better featured and more efficient. However, there are lurking security problems related to the use of ML in such a critical setting where an incorrect ML decision may not only be a nuisance but can lead to loss of precious lives. In this paper, we present an in-depth overview of the various challenges associated with the application of ML in vehicular networks. In addition, we formulate the ML pipeline of CAVs and present various potential security issues associated with the adoption of ML methods. In particular, we focus on the perspective of adversarial ML attacks on CAVs and outline a solution to defend against adversarial attacks in multiple settings.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2020.2975048",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adnan Qayyum",
        "Muhammad Usama",
        "Junaid Qadir",
        "Ala Al-Fuqaha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2020.2975048",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 258,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2020.3012961",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Challenges in Connected Vehicular Cloud Computing",
      "description": "Vehicular cloud computing (VCC) is an improvement from conventional cloud computing to new revolutionized computing services including intelligent transportation, autonomous driving and vehicle control, Internet browsing, online documentation, and infotainment. It enables vehicles to autonomously share heterogeneous computational resources while solving unanticipated critical problems dynamically. However, in a world of black hats, technology often has a dark side as well. Therefore, the VCC is limited by considerable security and privacy challenges. The special characteristics of VCC, including the multitenancy nature of clouds, intermittent wireless communications, high mobility of vehicles, and rapid resource elasticity with decentralized operations, have promoted security solutions used in vehicular ad hoc networks and conventional cloud computing to be revised. This paper first presents a state-of-the-art study of VCC that focuses on VCC architecture, its features analysis, and extensive VCC applications. Second, the proposed threats identification taxonomy and an exhaustive survey on security and privacy issues in VCC are presented under a layered approach: physical resource layer, vehicle-to-anything (V2X) network layer, and vehicular cloud layer, as well as at a complete system level. Finally, we highlight and discuss challenges and open research issues that can be considered as future research directions.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2020.3012961",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arooj Masood",
        "Demeke Shumeye Lakew",
        "Sungrae Cho"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2020.3012961",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 105,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2020.3029723",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges and Solutions for Cellular Based V2X Communications",
      "description": "A wide variety of works have been conducted in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications to enable a variety of applications for road safety, traffic efficiency and passenger infotainment. Although dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) based V2X is already in the deployment phase, cellular based V2X is gaining more interest in academia and industry most recently. This article surveys the existing work and challenges on LTE and 5G to support efficient V2X communications. First, we present the motivations for cellular based V2X communications. Second, we summarize the LTE V2X architecture and operating scenarios being considered. Third, we discuss the challenges in existing LTE for supporting V2X communications such as physical layer structure, synchronization, multimedia broadcast multicast services (MBMS), resource allocation, security and survey the recent solutions to these challenges. We further discuss the challenges and possible solutions for 5G based vehicular communications. Finally, we discuss the open research issues and possible research directions in cellular based vehicular communications.",
      "published": "2020-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2020.3029723",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sohan Gyawali",
        "Shengjie Xu",
        "Yi Qian",
        "Rose Qingyang Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2020.3029723",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 472,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2022.3184448",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle Charging: A Survey on the Security Issues and Challenges of the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP)",
      "description": "The increased use of smart Electric Vehicles (EVs) and Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEV) opened a new area of research and development. The number of EV charging sites has considerably increased in residential as well as in public areas. Within these EV charging sites, various entities need to communicate in a secure and efficient way. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) offers a way to coordinate this communication and is already being used in many implementations. However, only the latest OCPP 2.0 version of the protocol includes certain security features. In this article, we present the entities that take part in an OCPP-based smart charging scenario, we identify security issues and threats and present solutions that have been proposed by scholars. We identify open security issues for OCPP and propose future research directions for the security enhancement of the protocol.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2022.3184448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zacharenia Garofalaki",
        "Dimitrios Kosmanos",
        "Sotiris Moschoyiannis",
        "Dimitrios Kallergis",
        "Christos Douligeris"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2022.3184448",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 188,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2023.3236448",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Machine Learning-Based Misbehavior Detection Systems for 5G and Beyond Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Advances in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology and onboard sensors have significantly accelerated deploying Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs). Integrating V2X with 5G has enabled Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communications (URLLC) to CAVs. However, while communication performance has been enhanced, security and privacy issues have increased. Attacks have become more aggressive, and attackers have become more strategic. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) proposed by standardization bodies cannot solely defend against these attacks. Thus, in complementary of that, sophisticated systems should be designed to detect such attacks and attackers. Machine Learning (ML) has recently emerged as a key enabler to secure future roads. Various V2X Misbehavior Detection Systems (MDSs) have adopted this paradigm. However, analyzing these systems is a research gap, and developing effective ML-based MDSs is still an open issue. To this end, this paper comprehensively surveys and classifies ML-based MDSs as well as discusses and analyses them from security and ML perspectives. It also provides some learned lessons and recommendations for guiding the development, validation, and deployment of ML-based MDSs. Finally, this paper highlighted open research and standardization issues with some future directions.",
      "published": "2022-01-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2023.3236448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelwahab Boualouache",
        "Thomas Engel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2023.3236448",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 179,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2023.3264928",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Controller Area Network Reverse Engineering",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is a masterless serial bus designed and widely used for the exchange of mission and time-critical information within commercial vehicles. Invehicle communication is based on messages sent and received by Electronic Control Units (ECUs) connected to this serial bus network. Although unencrypted, CAN messages are not easy to interpret. In fact, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) attempt to achieve security through obscurity by encoding the data in their proprietary format, which is kept secret from the general public. As a result, the only way to obtain clear data is to reverse engineer CAN messages. Driven by the need for in-vehicle message interpretation, which is highly valuable in the automotive industry, researchers and companies have been working to make this process automated, fast, and standardized. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review of the state of the art and summarize the major advances in CAN bus reverse engineering. We are the first to provide a taxonomy of CAN tokenization and translation techniques. Based on the reviewed literature, we highlight an important issue: the lack of a public and standardized dataset for the quantitative evaluation of translation algorithms. In response, we define a complete set of requirements for standardizing the data collection process. We also investigate the risks associated with the automation of CAN reverse engineering, in particular with respect to the security network and the safety and privacy of drivers and passengers. Finally, we discuss future research directions in CAN reverse engineering.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2023.3264928",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alessio Buscemi",
        "Ion Turcanu",
        "German Castignani",
        "Andriy Panchenko",
        "Thomas Engel",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2023.3264928",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2023.3309864",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection in the Automotive Domain: A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "The automotive domain has realized amazing advancements in communication, connectivity, and automation— and at a breakneck pace. Such advancements come with ample benefits, such as the reduction of traffic accidents and the refinement of transit efficiency. However, these new developments were not necessarily made with security in mind. Researchers have unearthed a number of security vulnerabilities in paradigms such as in-vehicle networks (IVNs), the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), and intelligent transportation systems (ITSs). As automotive technologies continue to evolve, it would be realistic to expect new vulnerabilities to arise—both vulnerabilities that are identified and vulnerabilities that are not. If—or more pragmatically, when—these vulnerabilities are exploited, intrusion detection will be paramount. Therefore, we find it prudent to review intrusion detection in the automotive domain. We explore a myriad of threats and intrusion detection techniques—from the boundaries of the vehicles own network to the wider Internet of Vehicles (IoV). Intrusion detection, while not a panacea, can be a costeffective solution to many automotive security issues. Generally, such intrusion detection systems (IDSs) do not disrupt existing hardware, infrastructure, or communications; rather, they merely tap into the network and monitor for suspicious traffic. Given the very reasonable price tag, the implementation of intrusion detection systems would be an auspicious step by the automotive industry to assure the security—and safety—of the modern automobile. This paper volunteers a comprehensive review of intrusion detection technologies in the automotive domain.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2023.3309864",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Lampe",
        "Weizhi Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2023.3309864",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 120,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2024.3486367",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey and Comparative Analysis of Security Properties of CAN Authentication Protocols",
      "description": "Modern cars’ complexity and increased reliance on electronic components have made them a prime target for attackers. In particular, the in-vehicle communication system is one of the major attack surfaces, with the Controller Area Network (CAN) being the most used protocol. CAN connects electronic components with each other, allowing them to communicate and carry out control functions, as well as managing the vehicle state. However, these components, called Electronic Control Units (ECUs), can also be exploited for malicious purposes. Indeed, since the CAN bus was not designed with security features, attackers can exploit its vulnerabilities to compromise ECUs and corrupt the communication, allowing for remote vehicle control, disabling breaks, and engine shutdowns, causing significant safety threats. In response to the absence of standardized authentication protocols within the automotive domain, researchers propose diverse solutions, each with unique strengths and vulnerabilities. However, the continuous influx of new protocols and potential oversights in meeting security requirements and essential operational features further complicate the implementability of these protocols. This paper comprehensively reviews and compares the 15 most prominent authentication protocols for the CAN bus. Our analysis emphasizes their strengths and weaknesses, evaluating their alignment with critical security requirements for automotive authentication. Additionally, we evaluate protocols based on essential operational criteria that contribute to ease of implementation in predefined infrastructures, enhancing overall reliability and reducing the probability of successful attacks. Our study reveals a prevalent focus on defending against external attackers in existing protocols, exposing vulnerabilities to internal threats. Notably, authentication protocols employing hash chains, Mixed Message Authentication Codes, and asymmetric encryption techniques emerge as the most effective approaches. Through our comparative study, we classify the considered protocols based on their security attributes and suitability for implementation, providing valuable insights for future developments in the field.",
      "published": "2024-01-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2024.3486367",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alessandro Lotto",
        "Francesco Marchiori",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2024.3486367",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/comst.2026.3674515",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection and Prevention for Intra- and Inter-Vehicle Networks: A Comprehensive Survey",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2026.3674515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aya El-Fatyany",
        "Jabar Mahmood",
        "Michael Abebe Berwo",
        "Xiaohang Wang",
        "Li Lu",
        "Qiang Xue",
        "Kui Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/comst.2026.3674515",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/conecct52877.2021.9622628",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart vehicle monitoring for detecting anomalies on CAN bus",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are embedded with advanced electric devices known as Electronic Control Unit (ECU). CAN protocol is used in transmitting/receiving messages between the ECUs. CAN bus is a well-known and broadly used protocol in the automotive industry and is evaluated as one of the best standards for vehicular networks. Unfortunately, the CAN bus protocol is vulnerable to frequent attacks due to the lack of a message authentication capability in the protocol. Unprotected CAN communications make the vehicles accessible to a variety of harmful wired/wireless attacks. This makes easier for hackers to break the network and carry out malicious activities. In the proposed system, CAN bus protocol is implemented to monitor the parameters like Vehicle Speed, Seatbelt status, Temperature, humidity, Altitude of the vehicle remotely. This system will be able to overcome the security drawbacks in CAN bus protocol which detects and ignores any irregular or unusual traffic activities such as fuzzy, Denial of Service (DoS), and impersonation attacks using the anomaly detection method.",
      "published": "2021-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/conecct52877.2021.9622628",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohan J",
        "Ch. Ravi Kishore"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/conecct52877.2021.9622628",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/crc50527.2021.9392627",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection on the In-Vehicle Network Using Machine Learning",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is a protocol for the in-vehicle network that connects microcontrollers called Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and other components in a vehicle so that they may communicate among themselves and control the operations of the vehicle. The CAN protocol was initially not designed with security in mind, but as modern vehicles are increasingly becoming connected to the outside world through wired and wireless interfaces, the CAN bus has become susceptible to intrusions and attacks such as message injection, replay attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and eavesdropping. This paper presents an intrusion detection method based on the Isolation Forest (iForest) algorithm that detects message insertion attacks using message timing information. The resulting intrusion detection system benefits from the linear time complexity and low memory requirement of the iForest algorithm, as well as the ability to train the classifier with only a small sample of normal CAN traffic. The usage of only timing information for intrusion detection makes it a vehicle-agnostic method that does not rely on the message content, which is often proprietary and confidential information. The intrusion detection system was trained with normal CAN traffic trace and tested with two spoof attack CAN datasets. The high values obtained for the Area Under Curve (AUC) measure in the two cases, 0.966 and 0.974, indicated the effectiveness of this approach for intrusion detection.",
      "published": "2021-01-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/crc50527.2021.9392627",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaila Sharmin",
        "Hafizah Mansor"
      ],
      "venue": "Cyber Resilience Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/crc50527.2021.9392627",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cros69211.2026.11565614",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OTA Updates for Intelligent Vehicles: Challenges for a Safe and Secure Strategy",
      "description": "The increasing complexity of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICVs) and the growth of embedded software have made Over-the-Air (OTA) updates essential for maintaining security, performance, and regulatory compliance. However, OTA mechanisms introduce challenges related to distribution reliability, cybersecurity protection, and the assurance of safe vehicle operation during and after the update process. This work analyzes the resilience of recent automotive OTA software update strategies with respect to core information security pillars: privacy, confidentiality, non-repudiation, integrity, availability (of both the vehicle and the update process), authentication, and safety (of both the vehicle and the update process). A Rapid Review methodology was applied to 16 studies published between 2020 and 2025, which were systematically evaluated against these criteria. The results show that while integrity and authentication are widely addressed, two critical gaps remain: maintaining vehicle availability during updates and ensuring update-level safety. Only a limited number of approaches provide comprehensive mechanisms for detecting, sanitizing, and revoking defective update artifacts, and even fewer allow continued vehicle operation during installation. Nonetheless, relevant contributions were identified, including the use of multicore virtualization, digital twins, cloud-based infrastructures, and blockchain-based mechanisms to improve authenticity, efficiency, and pre-deployment validation. Overall, the findings indicate that although significant progress has been made, further research is required to better balance security, availability, and safety, enabling truly resilient OTA update architectures for modern automotive systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cros69211.2026.11565614",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Henrique Cordeiro Pereira",
        "Petrônio G. Lopes"
      ],
      "venue": "Brazilian Conference on Robotics (CROS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/cros69211.2026.11565614",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4405,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/cros69211.2026.11565614 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: confidentiality, regulatory, remain, operation, limited, studies, even, digital."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csci54926.2021.00199",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A safe dynamic access control providing mandatory automotive cybersecurity",
      "description": "The recent computerization of automotive vehicles offers new ways for attackers to penetrate critical systems. To ensure their safety, cybersecurity is therefore required. Cyberse-curity can be enforced with different mechanisms, such as access control, thanks to reference monitors. However, systematic access control may harm safety properties in certain scenarios. Therefore, the integration of access control mechanisms in automotive systems remains an open problem. Our paper provides a general approach adding dynamic mandatory access control to enforce security properties while guaranteeing their innocuousness with respect to the vehicle’s safety. To achieve this, we start by formally modeling the system. Then, a mandatory access control policy is proposed with respect to the different vehicle’s states. Using a dedicated model checking tool, the safety of the access control mechanism is verified with respect to a formal attack model. Using the attack paths produced by the verification tool, the access control policy can be iteratively refined, thus improving the availability and resilience of the system.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csci54926.2021.00199",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vincent Hugot",
        "A. Jousse",
        "C. Toinard",
        "Benjamin Venelle"
      ],
      "venue": "2021 International Conference on Computational Science and Computational Intelligence (CSCI)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/csci54926.2021.00199",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cscloud66326.2025.00013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Obstacle Resilience in Autonomous Vehicles Under Security Threats",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicle (AV) security is critical, as even minor software attacks can disrupt key vehicle functions. Resilience, the ability to maintain safe operation despite system compromise is essential. While most existing approaches are tested only in theory or simulation, this paper presents a lightweight, real-time resilience framework implemented on the physical QCar 2 and virtual platform from Quanser, using the NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin as the main Electronic Control Unit (ECU) for perception and decision-making. We conduct a CVSS-inspired threat analysis, focusing on a configuration tampering attack targeting the main ECU. Through extensive analysis and experiments measuring detection delay and success rate, we demonstrate that this attack disrupts object detection and braking functions. In addition, our resilience framework effectively restores vehicle operation, improving the Mission Success Rate from 0% to over 90% with minimal overhead. This work advances practical autonomous vehicle resilience and lays a solid foundation for future developments in over-the-air resilient updates and fleet diagnostics.",
      "published": "2025-11-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cscloud66326.2025.00013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chieh-Hsin Tsai",
        "Hariri Salim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/cscloud66326.2025.00013",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cscn.2017.8088619",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overview of 5G security in 3GPP",
      "description": "The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is currently specifying the next (fifth) generation “5G” of the mobile network including a new radio interface. This work is performed in most of the 3GPP working groups on all layers and just passed the study phase with the beginning of documenting normative specifications. The new 5G system is designed to be the enabler platform for different services of new stakeholders like Mission Critical Communications (MCC), Internet of Things (IoT) Automotive and Railways as well as Energy Providers and Broadcast agencies etc. This paper is describing the basic new concepts in the 5G core network architecture and its security implications including an overview of the two services Vehicle to Everything (V2X) and Internet of Things (IoT) that are considered as important vertical services for the new 5G system.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cscn.2017.8088619",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaowei Zhang",
        "Andreas Kunz",
        "Stefan Schröder"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/cscn.2017.8088619",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 73,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cscn.2019.8931311",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey of Security Aspect of V2X Standards and Related Issues",
      "description": "In the past years, two communication technologies have emerged for Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, namely IEEE 802.11p-based and cellular-based solutions. However, V2X-related standards continue to evolve. For example, IETF has been working on V2X topics from an IP network and transport perspective. After completing the LTE-based V2X standard specifications, 3GPP continues with a 5G-based V2X solution. While IEEE 802.11p-based and cellular-based solutions appear to be two competing solutions, there have been proposals for a hybrid approach in which both technologies co-exist and are used at the same time in a different manner. However, this implies that there are two different security solutions with different architectures: this requires careful consideration to ensure co-existence and operation. This paper presents a survey of the recent developments in the area of V2X standardization with a focus on security aspects.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cscn.2019.8931311",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takahito Yoshizawa",
        "Bart Preneel A"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/cscn.2019.8931311",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cscn53733.2021.9686156",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2X Misbehavior and Collective Perception Service: Considerations for Standardization",
      "description": "Connected and Automated Vehicles use sensors and wireless communication to improve road safety and efficiency. However, attackers may target Vehicle-to-Everything communication. Indeed, an attacker may send authenticated but wrong data to send false location information, alert incorrect events or report a bogus object endangering the safety of other CAVs. Currently, Standardization Development Organizations are working on developing security standards against such attacks. Unfortunately, current standardization efforts do not include misbehavior specifications for advanced V2X services such as Collective Perception yet. This work assesses the security of Collective Perception Messages and proposes inputs for consideration in existing standards.",
      "published": "2021-12-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cscn53733.2021.9686156",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Raashid Ansari",
        "Jean-Philippe Monteuuis",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "Cong Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/cscn53733.2021.9686156",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cscn60443.2023.10453140",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A 5G-based Authentication Framework for V2X Communication",
      "description": "The integration of Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) promises to revolutionize smart mobility. However, this technological advancement also exposes V2X networks to cybersecurity threats. To address these challenges, this work explores the critical security requirements for V2X communications, including User Equipment (UE) authorization, data integrity protection, and privacy support.",
      "published": "2023-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cscn60443.2023.10453140",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Diana Magalhães",
        "Vinícius Ferreira",
        "Nelson Rodrigues",
        "Joao Miguel Fernandes"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/cscn60443.2023.10453140",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cscs52396.2021.00050",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Physical Systems - A New Approach For Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Nowadays, intelligent vehicles are becoming more and more important in the transportation field. What makes such a vehicle vulnerable is the number of interconnected components that individually have a strong security but can cause weakness points when they are connected. The challenge is to design and build a powerful system that uses both cyber-physical components. The proposed model is a system with integrated modules for fingerprint and face recognition to certify that a driver has the right to access the vehicle. The aim is to develop a security system for intelligent vehicles that can be also a secure keyless entry system using the power of biometrics. When a driver approaches the car, a sensor will activate the recognition modules. Only after the total completion of the recognition process the driver is authenticated and has the right to use the vehicle. We simulated real-time face detection and eye tracking using Matlab 2020a. Face detection is performed using Viola-Jones algorithms and the tracking is made with bbox-es. Besides normal conditions, other tests were made to challenge the algorithm, for example: angle rotations, the use of glasses, face mask, glasses and face mask together.",
      "published": "2021-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cscs52396.2021.00050",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Béatrix-May Balaban",
        "Ioan Ştefan Sacală",
        "Alina Petrescu-Niţă",
        "Florin Pop"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Control Systems and Computer Science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/cscs52396.2021.00050",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cscs66924.2025.00065",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Practical Evaluation Of ota-community-edition Cybersecurity Posture",
      "description": "This study conducts a practical experiment to extend previous pentesting work done on the open-source implementation of the Uptane standard. The objective was to observe whether the security posture improved compared to the initial (now obsolete) reference implementation and to explore other potential cases that were maybe overlooked during previous penetration tests.The test results are relevant since the implementation tested throughout the study, ota-community-edition, is the only open-source alternative that researchers can use to test the Over-The-Air Update processes in the context of automotive vehicles.The current study is the first approach to employ Assumed-Breach scenarios in practical tests against the given infrastructure and shows the importance of software security assurance practices in the field of Automotive Vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cscs66924.2025.00065",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rareş-Mihail Visalom",
        "Amelia-Ştefania Andronescu",
        "Alin-Gabriel Antoci",
        "Jan-Alexandru Văduva",
        "Razvan Victor Rughinis",
        "Dinu Țurcanu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Control Systems and Computer Science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/cscs66924.2025.00065",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cse.2018.00035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Test and Evaluation System for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "In the field of automotive cybersecurity testing, there is no systematic and comprehensive test methodology, test content, test standard, test tool and so on. It cannot support the research and development test of intelligent vehicle efficiently and completely. In the process of development, the lack of cybersecurity test segment results in the failure of automotive cybersecurity performance. To solve this problem, an evaluation method of cybersecurity testing is proposed. First of all, it carries out threat analysis for automotive cyber security, and determines the 108 basic cybersecurity testing items. Considering the three factors of scene factor, threat factor and impact factor, the classification of vulnerabilities is divided. The evaluation index system based on product test, automotive intelligent level and enterprise emergency response is designed, and the comprehensive evaluation method of vehicle cybersecurity is designed, and the calculation examples of vulnerability level division and vehicle cybersecurity evaluation are given.",
      "published": "2018-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cse.2018.00035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yanan Zhang",
        "Peiji Shi",
        "Changqing Dong",
        "Yangyang Liu",
        "Xuebin Shao",
        "Chao Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering (CSE)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/cse.2018.00035",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cse/euc.2019.00094",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANDY CREAM - Hacking Infotainment Android Systems to Command Instrument Cluster via Can Data Frame",
      "description": "Modern vehicles functionalities are regulated by Electronic Control Units (ECU), from a few tens to a hundred, commonly interconnected through the Controller Area Network (CAN) communication protocol. CAN is not secure-by-design: authentication, integrity and confidentiality are not considered in the design and implementation of the protocol. This represents one of the main vulnerability of modern vehicle: getting the access (physical or remote) to CAN communication allows a possible malicious entity to inject unauthorised messages on the CAN bus. These messages may lead to unexpected and possible very dangerous behaviour of the target vehicle. In this paper, we present CANDY CREAM, an attack made of two parts: CANDY aiming at exploiting a vulnerability exposed by an infotainment system based on Android operating system connected to the vehicle's CAN bus network, and CREAM, a post-exploitation script that injects customized CAN frame to alter the behaviour of the vehicle.",
      "published": "2019-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cse/euc.2019.00094",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "exploitation",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "I. Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "2019 IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering (CSE) and IEEE International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/cse/euc.2019.00094",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csitss67709.2025.11294405",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Wireless Electric Vehicle-Charging Station Communication Using Hybrid Encryption and Attack-Resilient Protocols",
      "description": "The growing adoption of wireless Electric Vehicle charging necessitates lightweight yet robust communication protocols that can withstand modern cyber threats. Existing standards offer limited encryption and remain vulnerable to replay attacks, man-in-the-middle intrusions, and certificate spoofing largely due to the inherent weaknesses of centralized Public Key Infrastructure. The proposed work illustrates a secure, hybrid cryptographic framework for real-time EV-Charging Station communication using a client-server architecture. The solution integrates Advanced Encryption Standard, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, and context-aware token verification mechanisms. By embedding GPS data, timestamps, and Charging Station fingerprints into each request and replacing third-party public key infrastructure with pinned local certificates, the system ensures session isolation and secure data interchange. A Python-based implementation using sockets, PyCryptodome, and custom web dashboards demonstrates strong resilience against various attacks, while also supporting transparent billing and user-driven charging preferences.",
      "published": "2025-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csitss67709.2025.11294405",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Disha Bharadwaj",
        "T. Sanjana",
        "Dhvani Amit Banker",
        "Nandani Prasad",
        "Roopa Ravish"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computation System and Information Technology for Sustainable Solutions (CSITSS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/csitss67709.2025.11294405",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csitss67709.2025.11295031",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Federated Learning Architectures and Challenges for Intrusion Detection in Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) leading the charge in transforming the future of automotive technology, integrating advanced communication technologies and artificial intelligence to enhance safety and efficiency. However, as next-generation vehicular networks become more connected, privacy-focused Federated Deep Learning (FDL) intrusion detection systems are facing growing challenges present notable cybersecurity challenges. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the use of Federated Deep Learning (FDL) to strengthen Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in vehicular networks. It examines the security weaknesses in critical in-vehicle communication protocols, including the CAN bus and Automotive Ethernet, and discusses threats such as spoofing and jamming that can compromise network integrity and data confidentiality. The study highlights Federated Learning (FL) as a method that preserves privacy, enabling multiple nodes to jointly train machine learning models while keeping their local sensitive data confidential. This survey consolidates recent advancements in applying Federated Learning (FL) to Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), emphasizing its strengths in ensuring scalability and preserving privacy within the highly dynamic vehicular ecosystem. It also explores how integrating deep learning models within FL architectures can significantly enhance the ability of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to recognize and counter advanced cyber threats targeting vehicle networks. By comparing existing methodologies and identifying limitations, this paper highlights the main challenges and explores potential future research paths for developing secure and privacy-preserving intrusion detection systems for next-generation vehicular communication networks using Federated Deep Learning.",
      "published": "2025-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csitss67709.2025.11295031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "jamming",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Selvarani S",
        "M. R"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 9th International Conference on Computational System and Information Technology for Sustainable Solutions (CSITSS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/csitss67709.2025.11295031",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csnet47905.2019.9108923",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cloud-based Sybil Attack Detection Scheme for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Automated and connected vehicle technologies are among the most heavily researched automotive technologies. As a part of an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), connected vehicles provide useful information to drivers and the infrastructure to help make safer and more informed decisions. However, vehicle connectivity has made the ITS more vulnerable to security attacks that can endanger vehicle's security as well as driver's safety. Sybil attack is a very common attack, considered dangerous in a distributed network with no centralized authority. When launched against connected vehicles, it consists of controlling a set of vehicles with forged or fake identities to try to alter the measurements and data collected by the ITS, leading to sub-optimal decisions. In this paper, we provide a cloud-based detection scheme for connected vehicles against such an attack. Contrary to the previous distributed solutions in the literature, this paper presents a cloud-based solution that integrates a cloud-based authorization unit to authenticate legitimate nodes using symmetric cryptography and real-time location tracking. As a centralized authentication system, cloud computing is more reliable and secure in managing the vehicle as a device than any other infrastructure in the vehicular network and can provide real-time visibility. A trust evaluation approach is also integrated into the scheme to drive the decisions of the vehicles concerning potential collaborations. The performed experiment and security analysis show the efficacy of our proposed cloud-based solution in terms of detection rate, complexity and system requirements.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csnet47905.2019.9108923",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anika Anwar",
        "Talal Halabi",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine"
      ],
      "venue": "Cyber Security in Networking Conference (CSNet)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/csnet47905.2019.9108923",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4575,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/csnet47905.2019.9108923 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: location, very, trust, well, privacy, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csnet52717.2021.9614644",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection systems in in-vehicle networks based on bag-of-words",
      "description": "This paper investigates the application of the Bag-of-Words approach for the implementation of Intrusion Detection Systems on CAN-bus traffic in in-vehicle networks. A sliding window approach is used for dimensionality reduction where a set of CAN-bus messages (the window) is transformed to Bag-of-Words statistics. In an initial step, the Bag-of-Words approach is used to create a dictionary on the basis of legitimate CAN-bus traffic without attacks. Then, the Bag-of-Words approach is applied to detect four different types of intrusion attacks. The study presented in this paper investigates the application of Bag-of-Words to different combinations of the data present in the traffic including the arbitration field (CAN-ID) and the payload data. The results of this study confirms the results of the literature, which show that the CAN-ID information provides the optimal detection accuracy. In fact, for some attacks a perfect detection accuracy is obtained (100%). Taking in consideration that the CAN-ID information can be spoofed, the study investigates the use of the payload data as well. The use of payload data decreases the detection accuracy in comparison to the case of using the CAN-ID only, but it still provides an excellent performance (more than 98%) in intrusion detection. Overall, the results of the study show that the Bag-of-Words approach can be applied with success to the detection of various attacks in in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2021-10-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csnet52717.2021.9614644",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianmarco Baldini"
      ],
      "venue": "Cyber Security in Networking Conference (CSNet)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/csnet52717.2021.9614644",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csnet67572.2025.11288195",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OTArmor: Securing Automotive Over-the-Air Updates Against Malware Using Generative Modeling",
      "description": "The rapid rise of connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) demands a new level of cybersecurity vigilance, particularly when it comes to over-the-air (OTA) updates. While OTA updates are essential for keeping vehicles secure and up-to-date, they also expand the attack surface, creating new opportunities for malicious actors to exploit. Infotainment systems, often overlooked in favor of safety-critical electronic control units (ECUs), represent a particularly vulnerable entry point. Traditional signature-based malware detection methods fall short in this domain, especially against zero-day threats, underscoring the urgent need for more adaptive and resilient defenses. To close this gap, we introduce OTArmor, a generative AI (GenAI)–driven defense mechanism for in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems. At its core is a variational autoencoder (VAE) that learns the distribution of benign OTA updates and flags deviations as potential malware, providing a decisive advantage over conventional supervised models that depend on labeled attack data and struggle to adapt to novel or evolving threats. Unlike existing solutions focused on ECUs and trained on broad, generalized datasets, OTArmor is specifically tailored to the IVI environment and trained exclusively on real OTA update data. Before installation, OTArmor screens update artifacts by analyzing file size, entropy, byte occurrence, and n-gram features. We benchmarked its performance against Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Isolation Forest, testing across contamination rates of 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100%. The results demonstrate that our OTArmor approach consistently identifies malicious files with ROC–AUC values of nearly 0.992 and F1-score of up to 0.985, substantially outperforming PCA and Isolation Forest. To our knowledge, this is the first study to leverage real OTA update data to replicate a production-grade IVI environment for malware detection. By combining generative modeling with domain-specific training, OTArmor provides a practical and forward-looking defense against emerging threats in IVI systems.",
      "published": "2025-10-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csnet67572.2025.11288195",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Darwin Liao",
        "Marwa A. Elsayed"
      ],
      "venue": "Cyber Security in Networking Conference (CSNet)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/csnet67572.2025.11288195",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr54599.2022.9850292",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ML-based Anomaly Detection for Intra-Vehicular CAN-bus Networks",
      "description": "With advancements in the automotive industry and self-driving cars, automotive cybersecurity has become a pivotal and prioritized issue for all automakers. The CAN-bus is widely used to exchange data between vehicular networks and components, such as safety-critical systems and infotainment. Despite its importance, CAN bus systems lack security safeguards, exposing them to various security threats. This work proposes a novel two-stage Anomaly Detection System that detects malicious attacks with high detection accuracy incurring low latency. The novelty of this work is to use machine learning techniques like Decision Tree, Random Forest, and XGBoost to get predictable results while balancing with rule-based systems and keeping computational effort low. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed model can detect different attacks with high accuracy (above 90%) on the CAN-intrusion-dataset with very low execution time and high F1-score. Thus, proving the effectiveness and efficiency of our hybrid model.",
      "published": "2022-07-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr54599.2022.9850292",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaurya Purohit",
        "Manimaran Govindarasu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr54599.2022.9850292",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr54599.2022.9850299",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Powertrace-based Fuzzing of CAN Connected Hardware",
      "description": "Modern cyber-physical systems require a thorough security evaluation before they are exposed to the public. Fuzzing is a conventional security analysis technique typically employed to discover vulnerabilities in software programs. Applying fuzzing to vehicle cyber-physical systems is difficult, as typical instrumentation techniques are infeasible in an embedded environment.We propose using powertrace monitoring as an additional feedback channel for fuzzing embedded systems. We construct a hardware-in-the-loop system for fuzzing Electronic Control Units connected to a CAN bus and monitoring their powertrace outputs to detect which messages yield a response from the target system. We demonstrate that this black-box approach can be used to detect responses to messages as small as five memory accesses with high probability (p < 0.01), proving its value for detecting hidden backdoors and undocumented functionality. These results apply even to cases where messages are handled outside of a triggered interrupt.",
      "published": "2022-07-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr54599.2022.9850299",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Murray Dunne",
        "Sebastian Fischmeister"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr54599.2022.9850299",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr57506.2023.10224967",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SPAT: A Testbed for Automotive Cybersecurity Training",
      "description": "With the increasing of cyber threats in cyber-physical systems, and especially in the automotive sector, companies need to train cybersecurity experts with vertical competencies in the field as described in the regulations R155 and R156 defined by UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe). Testbeds capable of simulating the control network, the sensors and the actuators of a vehicle represent a great tool for this purpose. This paper presents the first prototype of SPAT (Sababa Portable Automotive Testbed), a testbed for automotive cybersecurity training. SPAT includes, in a portable suitcase, all the control and network devices based on the CANBus technology of a real vehicle. We present the features of the functioning prototype, and we also discuss the next steps towards a testbed that will include the most recent communication technologies employed in the automotive sector.",
      "published": "2023-07-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr57506.2023.10224967",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roberto Caviglia",
        "Giovanni Battista Gaggero",
        "Nicola Vincis",
        "Omar Morando",
        "Alessio Aceti",
        "Mario Marchese"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science Symposium in Russia",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr57506.2023.10224967",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679384",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An SDR-Based Framework for Cybersecurity Assessment of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Systems",
      "description": "In the realm of Vehicle-to-Everything systems and vehicular ad-hoc networks, unique characteristics such as high data speeds and bandwidth requirements distinguish them from conventional wireless technologies. Effective transmission and reception of critical Cooperative Awareness Messages and safety data necessitate advanced hardware and software capable of handling substantial message volumes efficiently. This makes it difficult to assess the vulnerabilities of the system, in particular for non-proprietary parties. For this purpose, with a particular focus on wireless communication channels, a framework based on Software Defined Radio technology is presented to assess vulnerabilities and evaluate the profound security of Vehicle-to-Everything network communications between On Board Unit and Road Side Unit for implications of unauthorized interception and manipulation of vital vehicle data by individuals situated near highways. The paper raises pertinent questions about the security level of Vehicle-to-Everything communications and focuses on the importance of robust cybersecurity measures in safeguarding Vehicle-to-Everything systems against potential threats and ensuring the integrity and safety of vehicular communication channels.",
      "published": "2024-09-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679384",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Saad Sohail",
        "Giancarlo Portamauro",
        "Fabio Patrone",
        "Mario Marchese"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679384",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CyberVehiCare: A Testbed for Cybersecurity of Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Automotive Systems",
      "description": "The increasing integration of connectivity features in modern vehicles has expanded the attack surface for cyber threats, underscoring the need for robust cybersecurity research tools. This paper introduces CyberVehiCare, an innovative and realistic testbed designed to support the analysis and validation of cybersecurity mechanisms for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) automotive systems. By combining real components from a commercial vehicle with emulated V2X modules, CyberVehiCare enables comprehensive testing of in-vehicle and external communication vulnerabilities. The platform supports experimentation with cyberattacks, vulnerability assessments, and the development of security countermeasures, contributing to safer and more resilient automotive networks. The testbed’s design, implementation, and validation are discussed, highlighting its potential to advance research.",
      "published": "2025-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md. Arafatur Rahman",
        "Sze Wei Tan",
        "Mohammed Saad Sohail",
        "Giovanni Battista Gaggero",
        "Fabio Patrone",
        "Mario Marchese",
        "Prashant Pillai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130089",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VPTaaS: An AI-Driven Cybersecurity Framework for Connected Vehicles—Concept, Validation, and Feasibility Study",
      "description": "The rapid integration of connected technologies in modern vehicles has significantly enhanced functionality, efficiency, and user experience, but it has simultaneously introduced complex cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Traditional IT-centric security solutions fall short in addressing the dynamic and critical nature of threats to automotive systems. This paper presents Vehicle Penetration Test as a Service (VPTaaS), a conceptual framework designed to proactively identify, assess, and mitigate cybersecurity risks in connected vehicles. VPTaaS integrates AI-driven threat prediction, multimodal vulnerability analysis, real-time cyber-health monitoring, and manufacturer-agnostic penetration testing into a unified service offering. To validate the market demand and assess the feasibility of this approach, a structured survey involving 83 stakeholders - including vehicle owners, insurance representatives, service providers, and industry professionals - was conducted. Results indicate strong stakeholder awareness of vehicular cybersecurity threats ($79 \\%$ $86 \\%$) and a high preference ($86 \\%-88 \\%$) for proactive cybersecurity assessments. The technical framework is aligned with industry standards such as ISO 21434 and UNECE WP. 29 R155 & R156, emphasizing regulatory compliance and realworld applicability. The findings confirm the market readiness and technical viability of VPTaaS, highlighting its potential to enhance vehicle cybersecurity resilience, protect personal data, and support regulatory compliance. Future work will focus on prototype development, real-world pilot studies, and expansion to autonomous and V2X communication systems.",
      "published": "2025-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130089",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "penetration",
        "personal data",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sze Wei Tan",
        "Md. Arafatur Rahman",
        "Nadia Refat",
        "Prashant Pillai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130089",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4667,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130089 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: providers, personal, regulatory, strong, nature, studies, user, service."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Wicked Problem, Parsimonious Solution: Securing Electric Vehicle Charging Station Software",
      "description": "Electric vehicle charging infrastructure presents a suite of novel cyber-physical threats. Among this infrastructure, charging stations are the most vulnerable elements. The software in the charging station supply equipment is particularly vulnerable. Currently, the software is an attack surface that is largely unprotected and poorly characterized. To represent the vulnerabilities in this attack surface, we advocate for applying modern software quality assurance to characterize vulnerabilities in electric vehicle charging station software. Specifically, we advocate for the application of hierarchical software quality assurance (HSQA) to specialized electric vehicle charging station software. HSQA provides a comprehensive view of the code quality and security -- from the level of individual vulnerabilities (e.g., CVEs) to high level characteristics (e.g., CIA Triad). HSQA incorporates quality and security considerations throughout the software development lifecycle. Thus, our position is that HSQA is an excellent approach for assessing electrical vehicle charging station software.",
      "published": "2026-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emma Sheppard",
        "Zachary Wadhams",
        "Dalton Arford",
        "Clemente Izurieta",
        "Ann Marie Reinhold"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR), Chania, Crete, Greece, 2025, pp. 679-686",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130101",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130158",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-MAID: An Intrusion Detection Protocol for CAN Bus",
      "description": "Contemporary research has identified a variety of vulnerabilities and exploits targeting automobiles that exploit the controller area network (CAN) bus. Furthermore, physical unclonable functions (PUF) can be used to fingerprint devices and generate unique secret keys. The use of common hardware such as SRAM can enable PUFs to be developed even on lowend devices. We propose a Controller Area Network Message Authenticating Intrusion Detection system (CAN-MAID) as a security protocol capable of being retrofitted onto preexisting vehicles. CAN-MAID can be used to detect illegitimate messages sent on the CAN bus and be supplemented with other modern countermeasures to improve security according to the computational capabilities of in-car computers.",
      "published": "2025-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130158",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "exploits",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "L.W. Kevin Marquis",
        "John A. Chandy"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/csr64739.2025.11130158",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvci59596.2023.10397258",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Resilient Control Strategy in Connected Vehicles under Actuator Attacks",
      "description": "With the promotion of advanced communication technology, autonomous vehicle platoons (AVPs) develop rapidly due to their advantages in enhancing traffic efficiency, road safety and reducing fuel consumption. However, as cyber physical systems, AVPs are very vulnerable to malicious attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel resilient control scheme to detect and tolerate a malicious directional actuator attack in a distributed manner which destroys the feedback control system by reversing the direction of actuator. The scheme consists of a distributed trigger mechanism with a logic-based switching criterion to detect the directional actuator attacks, and a resilient and distributed triple-step control scheme to defend against the attacks. The proposed control scheme is applied on bidirectional (BD) topology. Both global asymptotic stability and string stability of the platoon system are strictly proved via Lyapunov’s stability theory. Finally, simulation results are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.",
      "published": "2023-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvci59596.2023.10397258",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kai Li",
        "Yulei Wang",
        "Hong Chen",
        "Jinwu Gao"
      ],
      "venue": "CAA International Conference on Vehicular Control and Intelligence (CVCI)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvci59596.2023.10397258",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvci59596.2023.10397303",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks against Traffic Sign Detection for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Deep neural networks play a crucial role in 2D object detection based on visual data, but they are also vulnerable to adversarial samples. Attackers manipulate low-resolution images to execute data poisoning attacks. This paper introduces a method to generate realistic high-resolution adversarial samples aimed at compromising traffic sign detection models. Specifically, we propose a high-resolution adversarial sample framework built upon generative adversarial networks. Subsequently, an adversarial traffic sign detection model is developed to investigate the impact of data poisoning. To enhance the model’s robustness, we conduct adversarial training. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our data poisoning approach in misleading the detection model. Furthermore, the detection model exhibits improved robustness against such attacks following adversarial training.",
      "published": "2023-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvci59596.2023.10397303",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feiyang Xu",
        "Ying Li",
        "Chao Yang",
        "Weida Wang",
        "Bin Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "CAA International Conference on Vehicular Control and Intelligence (CVCI)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvci59596.2023.10397303",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvci63518.2024.10830154",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection for Intelligent Vehicle CAN Bus Based on Tsetlin Machine",
      "description": "With the development in Intelligent Connected Vehicle(ICV) technology, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus responsible for vehicle safety and real-time communication has become a primary target for cyberattacks, which poses a threat to automotive operational safety. We propose the first time a low-power, lightweight, and highly interpretable intrusion detection system (IDS) for CAN bus based on Tsetlin Machine (TM). Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves an overall detection accuracy of 99.79 % on the Car-Hacking dataset. During the detection process, our method outperforms traditional LSTM and DCNN approaches by more than 3 times in inference speed, while consuming only 1 W of power on the Raspberry Pi 4B.",
      "published": "2024-10-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvci63518.2024.10830154",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "intrusion",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xing-Xing Wang",
        "Yi Shen",
        "Wen-Jie Wei",
        "Zhenkun Hu",
        "Lu Lou"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 8th CAA International Conference on Vehicular Control and Intelligence (CVCI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvci63518.2024.10830154",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4598,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/cvci63518.2024.10830154 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: primary, operational, intelligence, safety, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvci66304.2025.11348404",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Robust Intrusion Detection System for Unknown Attack Detection in In-Vehicle CAN Networks using Temporal Features",
      "description": "Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) are becoming widespread and secure in-vehicle networking is critical. The Controller Area Network (CAN), as the de facto in-vehicle communication protocol, is increasingly exposed to cyberattacks and unauthorized access, which present substantial security risks. Existing in-vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) often struggle to identify Zero-Day attacks, highlighting the need for robust and adaptive security solutions. This work proposes an advanced IDS for the in-vehicle CAN network. The system comprises three components: a data preprocessing module that enhances data quality through one-hot encoding; a data analysis module based on a Temporal Convolutional Network Autoencoder (TCN-AE) for robust temporal feature extraction; and an attack detection module that leverages Evidential Neural Networks (ENN) to facilitate effective uncertainty quantification and detection of unknown attacks. The experiment, based on the Car-Hacking dataset, demonstrates that our IDS achieves an average accuracy of 0.9988 and an F1 score of 0.9948 for known attacks, and 0.9532 accuracy and 0.8327 F1-score for unknown attacks.",
      "published": "2025-10-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvci66304.2025.11348404",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yufeng Du",
        "Teng Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "CAA International Conference on Vehicular Control and Intelligence (CVCI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvci66304.2025.11348404",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvpr42600.2020.01426",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PhysGAN: Generating Physical-World-Resilient Adversarial Examples for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Although Deep neural networks (DNNs) are being pervasively used in vision-based autonomous driving systems, they are found vulnerable to adversarial attacks where small-magnitude perturbations into the inputs during test time cause dramatic changes to the outputs. While most of the recent attack methods target at digital-world adversarial scenarios, it is unclear how they perform in the physical world, and more importantly, the generated perturbations under such methods would cover a whole driving scene including those fixed background imagery such as the sky, making them inapplicable to physical world implementation. We present PhysGAN, which generates physical-world-resilient adversarial examples for misleading autonomous driving systems in a continuous manner. We show the effectiveness and robustness of PhysGAN via extensive digital- and real-world evaluations. We compare PhysGAN with a set of state-of-the-art baseline methods, which further demonstrate the robustness and efficacy of our approach. We also show that PhysGAN outperforms state-of-the-art baseline methods. To the best of our knowledge, PhysGAN is probably the first technique of generating realistic and physical-world-resilient adversarial examples for attacking common autonomous driving scenarios.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr42600.2020.01426",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zelun Kong",
        "Junfeng Guo",
        "Ang Li",
        "Cong Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvpr42600.2020.01426",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 151,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvpr52688.2022.01473",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On Adversarial Robustness of Trajectory Prediction for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Trajectory prediction is a critical component for autonomous vehicles (AVs) to perform safe planning and navigation. However, few studies have analyzed the adversarial robustness of trajectory prediction or investigated whether the worst-case prediction can still lead to safe planning. To bridge this gap, we study the adversarial robustness of trajectory prediction models by proposing a new adversarial attack that perturbs normal vehicle trajectories to maximize the prediction error. Our experiments on three models and three datasets show that the adversarial prediction increases the prediction error by more than 150%. Our case studies show that if an adversary drives a vehicle close to the target AV following the adversarial trajectory, the AV may make an inaccurate prediction and even make unsafe driving decisions. We also explore possible mitigation techniques via data augmentation and trajectory smoothing.",
      "published": "2022-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr52688.2022.01473",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qingzhao Zhang",
        "Shengtuo Hu",
        "Jiachen Sun",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Z. Morley Mao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvpr52688.2022.01473",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 155,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvpr52733.2024.01410",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Backdoor Attack by Naturalistic Data Poisoning on Trajectory Prediction in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "In autonomous driving, behavior prediction is funda-mental for safe motion planning, hence the security and ro-bustness of prediction models against adversarial attacks are of paramount importance. We propose a novel adver-sarial backdoor attack against trajectory prediction models as a means of studying their potential vulnerabilities. Our attack affects the victim at training time via naturalistic, hence stealthy, poisoned samples crafted using a novel two-step approach. First, the triggers are crafted by perturbing the trajectory of attacking vehicle and then disguised by transforming the scene using a bi-level optimization technique. The proposed attack does not depend on a particu-lar model architecture and operates in a black-box manner, thus can be effective without any knowledge of the victim model. We conduct extensive empirical studies using state-of-the-art prediction models on two benchmark datasets using metrics customized for trajectory prediction. We show that the proposed attack is highly effective, as it can sig-nificantly hinder the performance of prediction models, un-noticeable by the victims, and efficient as it forces the vic-tim to generate malicious behavior even under constrained conditions. Via ablative studies, we analyze the impact of different attack design choices followed by an evaluation of existing defence mechanisms against the proposed attack.",
      "published": "2024-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr52733.2024.01410",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mozhgan Pourkeshavarz",
        "Mohammad Sabokrou",
        "Amir Rasouli"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvpr52733.2024.01410",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvpr52733.2024.02308",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical 3D Adversarial Attacks against Monocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Deep learning-based monocular depth estimation (MDE), extensively applied in autonomous driving, is known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Previous physical attacks against MDE models rely on 2D adversarial patches, so they only affect a small, localized region in the MDE map but fail under various viewpoints. To address these limitations, we propose 3D Depth Fool (3D2Fool), the first 3D texture-based adversarial attack against MDE models. 3D2Fool is specifically optimized to generate 3D adversarial textures agnostic to model types of vehicles and to have improved robustness in bad weather conditions, such as rain and fog. Experimental results validate the superior performance of our 3D2Fool across various scenarios, including vehicles, MDE models, weather conditions, and viewpoints. Real-world experiments with printed 3D textures on physical vehicle models further demonstrate that our 3D2Fool can cause an MDE error of over 10 meters. The code is available at https://github.com/GandolfczjhI3D2Fool.",
      "published": "2024-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr52733.2024.02308",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junhao Zheng",
        "Chenhao Lin",
        "Jiahao Sun",
        "Zhengyu Zhao",
        "Qian Li",
        "Chao Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvpr52733.2024.02308",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvprw.2019.00177",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Attack Generator: A Systematic Approach Towards Constructing Adversarial Attacks",
      "description": "Most state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) classification systems are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. As a consequence, adversarial robustness poses a significant challenge for the deployment of ML-based systems in safety-and security-critical environments like autonomous driving, disease detection or unmanned aerial vehicles. In the past years we have seen an impressive amount of publications presenting more and more new adversarial attacks. However, the attack research seems to be rather unstructured and new attacks often appear to be random selections from the unlimited set of possible adversarial attacks. With this publication, we present a structured analysis of the adversarial attack creation process. By detecting different building blocks of adversarial attacks, we outline the road to new sets of adversarial attacks. We call this the \"attack generator\". In the pursuit of this objective, we summarize and extend existing adversarial perturbation taxonomies. The resulting taxonomy is then linked to the application context of computer vision systems for autonomous vehicles, i.e. semantic segmentation and object detection. Finally, in order to prove the usefulness of the attack generator, we investigate existing semantic segmentation attacks with respect to the detected defining components of adversarial attacks.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvprw.2019.00177",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Felix Assion",
        "Peter Schlicht",
        "Florens Greßner",
        "Wiebke Gunther",
        "Fabian Hüger",
        "Nico M. Schmidt",
        "Umair Rasheed"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvprw.2019.00177",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cvprw67362.2025.00343",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EL-Attack: Explicit and Latent Space Hybrid Optimization based General and Effective Attack for Autonomous Driving Trajectory Prediction",
      "description": "Accurate prediction of nearby road actors' future trajectories is crucial for autonomous vehicles. With the development of foundational models, autonomous driving trajectory prediction has seen significant improvements. However, these neural network-based methods are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, challenging the reliability and safety of predictions. Previous attack methods focused on constraint spaces and objective functions, generating adversarial trajectories via perturbations in the explicit space followed by further optimization. However, these methods overlook the threat model's potential. To fully leverage the model's optimization, we propose a novel adversarial attack method, EL-Attack, which emphasizes multi-space collaborative optimization in both explicit and latent spaces. The framework first uses a spatio-temporal attention module to extract semantic representations of the trajectory's spatiotemporal context, then builds a threat model based on an adversarial autoencoder. In the explicit space, we introduce an interactive risk field based on the autonomous vehicle's drivable area to guide the target vehicle's trajectory. In the latent space, we apply semantic-level perturbations on latent vectors and regularize them, enhancing attack targeting and stealthiness. We conducted experiments and evaluations on the Argoverse dataset and a virtual-real testing platform. In terms of effectiveness, compared to the best performing baseline, our method improves the attack success rate by 4.0 % and 15.2 % on the VectorNet and TNT models respectively. we also tested in scenarios such as straight roads, curves, and intersections for real-world validation and transferability.",
      "published": "2025-06-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cvprw67362.2025.00343",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuesong Bai",
        "Changhang Tian",
        "Wei Xia",
        "Zhenshu Ma",
        "Haiyang Yu",
        "Yilong Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/cvprw67362.2025.00343",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cyber-rci68134.2025.11384960",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Camouflage Robustness in Autonomous Vehicle Sign Detection",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles rely on robust traffic sign detection, yet small, localized adversarial perturbations can significantly reduce detection confidence or suppress signs entirely. This paper studies adversarial camouflage attacks on speed-limit signs using a standard two-stage YOLOv8 training procedure involving pretraining on cropped Kaggle signs followed by fine-tuning on CARLA driver-view images. Robustness is evaluated using standard ROI-constrained FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) and PGD (Projected Gradient Descent) attacks, consistent with established practice in localized adversarial attack research, where perturbations are restricted to a small region of the image such as the target object or sign. Defenses include JPEG re-encoding, bilateral filtering, and adversarial training (AT) with compression-aware fine-tuning. Results show that AT improves robustness against PGD, while JPEG re-encoding mitigates confidence loss under attack by suppressing high-frequency noise, effectively complementing adversarial training. Combining AT with moderate JPEG preprocessing provides a practical defense with minimal accuracy loss. These findings highlight lightweight, deployable strategies for enhancing adversarial robustness in safety-critical autonomous driving systems.",
      "published": "2025-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cyber-rci68134.2025.11384960",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Grace Sumanjali Pagolu",
        "Muhammad Asad",
        "Ganesh Sistu",
        "Michael G. Madden",
        "Ihsan Ullah"
      ],
      "venue": "Cyber Research Conference - Ireland (Cyber-RCI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/cyber-rci68134.2025.11384960",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cybercom63683.2024.10803155",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Standards to Implementation: Functional Safety and Cybersecurity in Modern Autonomous and Electric Vehicles",
      "description": "Rapid progress in autonomous and electric vehicles (EVs) demands strict measures to ensure functional safety and cybersecurity. This review paper thoroughly analyzes the key standards that govern these critical areas, particularly ISO 26262 for functional safety and ISO/SAE 21434 for cybersecurity. It delves into practical implementations, highlights the challenges faced, and examines the best practices for merging these stan¬dards into a unified framework that addresses the interconnected safety and security aspects. Additionally, the paper discusses emerging trends, such as advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), blockchain technology, and human-machine interface design, and their potential to substantially improve vehicle safety and security. Collaboration within the automotive industry is also emphasized, particularly in devel¬oping unified standards and overcoming integration challenges. This comprehensive review offers valuable insights into future developments and regulatory changes expected to influence the industry, providing essential perspectives for researchers, prac¬titioners, and policymakers involved in the evolving domain of autonomous and electric vehicle technology.",
      "published": "2024-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cybercom63683.2024.10803155",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simran Khokha"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cybernation and Computation (CYBERCOM)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/cybercom63683.2024.10803155",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/cybersa.2019.8899615",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Modeling of Connected Vehicles: A privacy analysis and extension of vehicleLang",
      "description": "Modern vehicles contain more than a hundred Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate over different in-vehicle networks. These ECUs are often connected to the Internet, which makes them vulnerable to various cyber attacks. Besides, large amounts of data are generated and communicated through vehicular networks, and some of them are sensitive for the vehicle drivers. Previously, a threat modeling language named vehicleLang was proposed for security analysis of vehicles, however, privacy issues of the vehicular data have not been thoroughly addressed. To fill the gap, this paper proposes a privacy-focused enhancement of vehicleLang, and the suggested privacy extension is evaluated by threat modeling with test cases running through the Meta Attack Language (MAL) compiler.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/cybersa.2019.8899615",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenjun Xiong",
        "Robert Lagerström"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/cybersa.2019.8899615",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4007,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/cybersa.2019.8899615 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: sensitive, makes, large, privacy, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dasc-picom-cbdcom-cyberscitech52372.2021.00022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantitative Security Assurance Case for In-vehicle Embedded Systems",
      "description": "Technological advances are transforming the automotive industry by increasing the number of computer-controlled auto components that provide information to remote systems through various means of communication. The changes have created new opportunities for cyber-attacks. To enable the engineering of in-vehicle embedded systems within road vehicles to keep up with changing technology and attack methods, in this year, ISO and SAE will jointly release the international standard ISO/SAE 21434. However, to date there are few studies about how to apply the standard to academia and industry. To fill this gap, the paper proposes an approach to develop assurance cases for cybersecurity argument of road vehicle in compliance with ISO/SAE 21434. We analyze the standard, and then propose a model-based approach to automotive cybersecurity assurance. After that, case studies are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. Finally, the paper is concluded by discussing the limitations and future directions of the study.",
      "published": "2021-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dasc-picom-cbdcom-cyberscitech52372.2021.00022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhengshu Zhou",
        "Y. Matsubara",
        "Hiroaki Takada"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress (DASC/PiCom/CBDCom/CyberSciTech)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/dasc-picom-cbdcom-cyberscitech52372.2021.00022",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dasc/picom/cbdcom/cy59711.2023.10361381",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "User-Centric Security and Privacy Threats in Connected Vehicles: A Threat Modeling Analysis Using STRIDE and LINDDUN",
      "description": "The increasing equipment of cars with smart systems and their networking with other devices is leading to a growing network of connected vehicles. Connected cars are Internet of Things (IoT) devices that communicate bidirectionally with other systems, enabling internet access and data exchange. Artificial Intelligence (AI) offers benefits such as autonomous driving, driver assistance programs, and monitoring. The increasing connectivity of cars also brings new risks to users' privacy. Our study focuses on privacy threats in connected cars from a user perspective. Our study provides a comprehensive threat model analysis based on a combination of STRIDE and LINDDUN. We analyze the various threats and vulnerabilities that arise from connecting cars to the internet and other devices, including Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Vloud (V2C), and Vehicle-to-Device (V2D). We conduct our study based on a theoretical model of a modern-day connected vehicle of another study. Our study shows that several types of threats can negatively impact the privacy of connected car users. This encapsulates the potential risks, such as the inadvertent disclosure of personal data due to the vehicle's interconnectedness with other devices, including smartphones, and the subsequent susceptibility to unauthorized access, while also highlighting the need for robust security measures indicated by our comprehensive threat modeling, to safeguard against a wide array of identified cybersecurity threats.",
      "published": "2023-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dasc/picom/cbdcom/cy59711.2023.10361381",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "personal data",
        "privacy",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Beáta Stingelová",
        "Clemens Thaddäus Thrakl",
        "Laura Wrońska",
        "Sandra Jedrej-Szymankiewicz",
        "Sajjad Khan",
        "Davor Svetinović"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress (DASC/PiCom/CBDCom/CyberSciTech)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/dasc/picom/cbdcom/cy59711.2023.10361381",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5359,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/dasc/picom/cbdcom/cy59711.2023.10361381 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: personal, unauthorized, user, intelligence, car, risks, impact, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dasc/picom/datacom/cyberscitec.2018.00062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Contract Based Energy Blockchain for Secure Electric Vehicles Charging in Smart Community",
      "description": "The smart community (SC), as an important part of the Internet of energy (IoE), can facilitate integration of distributed renewable energy sources (RES) and electric vehicles (EVs) in the smart grid. However, due to the potential security and privacy issues caused by untrusted and opaque energy markets, it becomes a great challenge to optimally schedule the charging behaviors of EVs with distinct energy consumption preferences in SC. In this paper, we propose a contract based energy blockchain for secure EV charging in SC. Firstly, a permissioned energy blockchain system is introduced to implement secure charging services for EVs with the execution of smart contracts. Secondly, a reputation based delegated Byzantine fault tolerance (DBFT) consensus algorithm is proposed to eficiently achieve the consensus in the permissioned blockchain. Furthermore, based on the contract theory, the optimal contracts are analyzed and designed to satisfy EVs' individual needs from energy sources while maximizing the operator's utility. Finally, numerical results validate the effectiveness and ef?ciency of the proposed scheme through comparison with other conventional schemes.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dasc/picom/datacom/cyberscitec.2018.00062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuntao Wang",
        "Zhou Su",
        "Qichao Xu",
        "Ning Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress (DASC/PiCom/CBDCom/CyberSciTech)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/dasc/picom/datacom/cyberscitec.2018.00062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dasc68382.2025.00008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Digital Signature Security Enhancement for Remote Keyless Entry System",
      "description": "Remote Keyless Entry System (RKEs) is an important area in security research because of their prevalence in industrial settings such as home/gate and car entry systems. The traditional challenge-response protocol for RKEs uses a Digital Signature Transponder (DST40) engine that suffers from a short key and challenge space, making it subject to cryptographic attacks. Previously proposed improvements suffer from either security flaws, backward compatibility issues, or lack of computational efficiency. In this work, we propose an efficient security enhancement scheme ${\\text{DSTX}}_{Keys{}}^{{\\text{CBC - MAC }}}$. It employs cryptographic constructions that rely only on the existing DST40 engine, enabling compatibility with existing devices. We increase effective key security from 40 bits to 79 bits and enhance overall security. We implement our protocol on bare-metal embedded devices for practical experiment result.",
      "published": "2025-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dasc68382.2025.00008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jinyao Xu",
        "Yintong Luo",
        "Ian G. Harris"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress (DASC/PiCom/CBDCom/CyberSciTech)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/dasc68382.2025.00008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dasc68382.2025.00022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Modular, Resource-Efficient IDS Framework for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are not well-suited for modern automotive environments due to their high hardware demands, isolated operation, and limited adaptability to constrained embedded platforms. Most current vehicles rely on single-engine IDS solutions, as the simultaneous deployment of multiple IDS tools is typically infeasible due to CPU, memory, and power limitations. This restriction leads to fragmented threat visibility and suboptimal detection performance.This paper presents a generalizable, containerized IDS architecture that enables efficient integration of multiple detection engines—such as Suricata, Snort, and Zeek—within a lightweight, resource-optimized framework. Rather than advocating specific tools, our goal is to demonstrate a reusable and modular methodology for building scalable IDS systems in automotive networks.The proposed architecture introduces three key components: (1) container-based deployment for efficient resource sharing, (2) cross-platform event correlation to reduce false positives, and (3) a modular rule system supporting dynamic updates across heterogeneous IDS platforms. Evaluation in a simulated Controller Area Network (CAN) environment demonstrates up to 65% reduction in hardware usage, a 40% decrease in false positives, and detection accuracy above 95%.",
      "published": "2025-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dasc68382.2025.00022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "I. Khaliq",
        "Yuzo Taenaka",
        "Y. Kadobayashi"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Dependable Autonomic and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/dasc68382.2025.00022",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dessert61349.2023.10416431",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Effective Safety and Cybersecurity Co-engineering in Critical Domains",
      "description": "The primary objective of functional safety and cybersecurity co-engineering is to streamline assessment processes and enhance efficiency by implementing integrated approaches, therefore reducing overall effort and bringing several consequential advantages. Although this concept is not new, and there have already been successful attempts at its utilization in different critical domains such as nuclear, railway, and automotive, no mature approach could be easily adopted and applied during the assessment. Another challenge is that the understanding of co-engineering is essentially different, depending on domain specifics and priorities. Moreover, issues are still related to measuring efficiency achieved by co-engineering utilization. This paper addresses the current state of safety and cybersecurity co-engineering in critical domains. With a focus on nuclear, automotive, and railway domains, it proposes directions toward developing effective co-engineering frameworks for them.",
      "published": "2023-10-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dessert61349.2023.10416431",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ievgen Babeshko",
        "Oleg A. Illiashenko",
        "Félicita Di Giandomenico"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems, Services and Technologies (DESSERT)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/dessert61349.2023.10416431",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ds-rt71368.2026.11726838",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performance Assessment of Security Credential Management Systems in Real-Time V2X Networks",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication relies on PKI-backed pseudonym certificates for authentication and privacy. However, certificate revocation remains challenging because vehicular networks require timely validation despite intermittent infrastructure connectivity. This paper compares two revocation approaches within a Security Credential Management System (SCMS): Bloom-filter-based local verification and simplified OCSP-based online validation. Using analytical calculations and OMNeT++/SUMO simulations, it was evaluated latency, communication overhead, false-positive behavior, caching efficiency, and resilience to packet loss. Bloom filters provide local verification in 14–17 μs without online queries, at the cost of tunable false positives. Under modeled assumptions, OCSP returns deterministic status but requires about 182 ms and reaches delays of tens of seconds under severe packet loss. Although caching reduces OCSP traffic, online validation remains dependent on connectivity. The results indicate that Bloom-filter-based revocation is better suited to time-sensitive local verification, whereas OCSP is more appropriate as a complementary mechanism in hybrid deployments with reliable connectivity.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ds-rt71368.2026.11726838",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Mashhadawi",
        "Xhevat Januzi",
        "Gentrit Ibishi",
        "Edison Pignaton de Freitas",
        "Wagner Ourique de Morais",
        "Alexandre dos Santos Roque"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Distributed Simulation and Real Time Applications (DS-RT)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ds-rt71368.2026.11726838",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsa56465.2022.00122",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Entry Security System based on Gait Context",
      "description": "In recent years, the keyless entry system has been popularized in various vehicles, which greatly facilitates the daily travel life of car owners. If the keyless entry system is attacked by criminals, it will pose a serious threat to the safety of the entire car, which requires great attention. This paper studies the security protection of the keyless entry system in old-gen cars. Aiming at the problems that most of the existing protection schemes are difficult to apply on old models, a keyless entry security protection system based on gait semantics is designed. Based on the original keyless entry protocol, the security protection system uses a smartphone to analyze the owner's gait activity analysis to resist attacks. Aiming at the collected gait data of the acceleration sensor and gyroscope sensor in smartphone, this paper introduces a semantic segmentation model to process the gait data in the keyless entry scene, and divides the gait data sequence into gait activity sequences by designing the model. To determine the legitimacy of the unlock request, it has been proved by tests that the recognition accuracy of the gait semantic recognition model reaches 93.8%. Excellent, in the normal state (walking, stationary) unlocking experiment, the accuracy of legality determination reached 98.3% (177/180), which can better complete the protection function.",
      "published": "2022-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsa56465.2022.00122",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guoda Wang",
        "Miao Zhang",
        "Yaozong Hu",
        "Zhaofeng Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems and Their Applications (DSA)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsa56465.2022.00122",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsaa.2016.20",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection in Automobile Control Network Data with Long Short-Term Memory Networks",
      "description": "Modern automobiles have been proven vulnerable to hacking by security researchers. By exploiting vulnerabilities in the car's external interfaces, such as wifi, bluetooth, and physical connections, they can access a car's controller area network (CAN) bus. On the CAN bus, commands can be sent to control the car, for example cutting the brakes or stopping the engine. While securing the car's interfaces to the outside world is an important part of mitigating this threat, the last line of defence is detecting malicious behaviour on the CAN bus. We propose an anomaly detector based on a Long Short-Term Memory neural network to detect CAN bus attacks. The detector works by learning to predict the next data word originating from each sender on the bus. Highly surprising bits in the actual next word are flagged as anomalies. We evaluate the detector by synthesizing anomalies with modified CAN bus data. The synthesized anomalies are designed to mimic attacks reported in the literature. We show that the detector can detect anomalies we synthesized with low false alarm rates. Additionally, the granularity of the bit predictions can provide forensic investigators clues as to the nature of flagged anomalies.",
      "published": "2016-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsaa.2016.20",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adrian Taylor",
        "Sylvain P. Leblanc",
        "Nathalie Japkowicz"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Data Science and Advanced Analytics (DSAA)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsaa.2016.20",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 424,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsc55868.2022.00021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research and Application of Intelligent Vehicle Cybersecurity Threat Model",
      "description": "Threat analysis and risk assessment are important activities in the cybersecurity life cycle of intelligent vehicles, which provide guarantee for the formation of correct cybersecurity requirements for automotive. Based on some research on threat analysis and risk assessment technologies used in traditional information systems as well as some practical experience in the automotive field, this paper proposes a structured and systematic threat model for intelligent vehicles, based on which the threat analysis and risk assessment process is realized, with the aim of improving some existing methods. Taking a typical vehicle-level security-related business OTA as the example, the model and the analysis process proposed in this paper are practically applied, in which the methods of data-flow-diagram and attack-tree are combinedly used to analyze possible threats to assets of an intelligent vehicle. The workload of threat modeling and risk analysis is evaluated, and the practical significance of improving the analysis efficiency via a software tool is analyzed. The result shows that this model is more comprehensive to achieve a complete analysis, and it is also convenient to be implemented as a software tool.",
      "published": "2022-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsc55868.2022.00021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhang Haitao",
        "Luo Lei",
        "Li Ruikun",
        "Yi Jiajia",
        "Li Yun",
        "Lirong Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Data Science in Cyberspace",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsc55868.2022.00021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-industry.2019.00009",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Attacks Against Safety-Critical ADAS Based on In-Vehicle Network Message Patterns",
      "description": "Vehicles on the road today are Internet-enabled devices, providing navigation, safety, and entertainment to passengers. It is possible for an attacker to compromise these devices to gain remote access to the in-vehicle network, allowing control of the vehicle. To detect the presence of masqueraded messages, we propose a Message Time-series Intrusion Detection System (MTS IDS), which is based on the principle that ADAS messages exhibit regular (benign) patterns.We demonstrate the feasibility of detecting masquerade injection attacks that attempt to negatively influence Advanced Driver-assistance Systems such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Lane Centering Systems (LCS). Our results show a MTS IDS detects masquerade messages against ACC and LCS ADAS systems with F1-scores of 0.9889 and 0.98705, respectively. While no computing system can be completely secure, these results can help increase resilience of ADAS and autonomous vehicles against masquerading attacks, and therefore improve road and passenger safety.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-industry.2019.00009",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christopher N. Gutierrez",
        "Marcio Juliato",
        "Shabbir Ahmed",
        "Manoj R. Sastry"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-industry.2019.00009",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-s.2019.00010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy and Security of Connected Vehicles in Intelligent Transportation System",
      "description": "The paper considers data security and privacy issues in intelligent transportation systems which involve data streams coming out from individual vehicles to road side units. In this environment, there are issues in regards to the scalability of key management and computation limitations at the edge of the network. To address these issues, we suggest the formation of groups in the vehicular layer, where a group leader is assigned to communicate with group members and the road side unit. We propose a lightweight permutation mechanism for preserving the confidentiality and privacy of sensory data.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-s.2019.00010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alireza Jolfaei",
        "Krishna Kant"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume (DSN-S)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-s.2019.00010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 46,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4111,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/dsn-s.2019.00010 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: volume, confidentiality, where, there, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-s52858.2021.00017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigation of Automotive Control Modules Hardware Replacement-based Attacks Through Hardware Signature",
      "description": "Authentication of hardware modules connected through Controller Area Networks (CAN) in modern vehicles is becoming an increasing security issue. Untrusted modules introduced on the market may alter the secure boot infrastructure of a complex vehicle, thus completely compromising its security. This paper introduces the problem and highlights a preliminary idea for reaching better protection and preventing or limiting this category of attacks.",
      "published": "2021-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-s52858.2021.00017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Franco Oberti",
        "Ernesto Sánchez",
        "Alessandro Savino",
        "Filippo Parisi",
        "Stefano Di Carlo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume (DSN-S)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-s52858.2021.00017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-s60304.2024.00012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AuSSE: A Novel Framework for Security and Safety Evaluation for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AV) are becoming increasingly efficient and equipped with advanced technologies and connectivity. These include over-the-air software updates, connecting telematics data, and software-defined vehicles. However, these advancements also introduce new potential attack surfaces and increase AV security and safety risks. A critical challenge arises: How can we assess cyber attack impact on the operational safety of AV? To address this challenge, this paper proposes a novel framework named AuSSE (Autonomous Vehicle Security and Safety Evaluation).We developed a novel graphical security model called VHARM to identify attack paths and assess security risks. Additionally, we created CARLASec, an extension to the existing CARLA simulator. CARLASec enables the handling of in-vehicle networks, protocols, cyber attack injection mechanisms, and safety scores. As a result, it is suitable for a wider range of research on AV attack and defence. Additionally, recognising that AV security and safety cannot be separated, we introduce methods for comprehensive security and safety evaluations.",
      "published": "2024-06-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-s60304.2024.00012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nhung H. Nguyen",
        "Jin-Hee Cho",
        "Terrence J. Moore",
        "Seunghyun Yoon",
        "Hyuk Lim",
        "Frederica F. Nelson",
        "Guangdong Bai",
        "Dong Seong Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume (DSN-S)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-s60304.2024.00012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-s60304.2024.00024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Novel CAN Bus Fuzzing Framework for Finding Vulnerabilities in Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Modern vehicles, increasingly becoming interconnected digital ecosystems, rely on sophisticated networks for operations and safety. This study introduces a novel fuzzing framework aimed at identifying vulnerabilities within automotive systems, specifically focusing on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By employing “Automated Reverse Engineering-Guided Fuzzing,” our framework evaluates the security resilience of these networks against sophisticated attacks. Modified data packets are disseminated within the CAN framework, and ECU reactions are monitored, uncovering potential vulnerabilities. This comprehensive approach not only identifies weaknesses but also enhances the understanding of operational characteristics, setting a new benchmark for automotive cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2024-06-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-s60304.2024.00024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manu Jo Varghese",
        "Adnan Anwar",
        "Frank Jiang",
        "Robin Doss"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume (DSN-S)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-s60304.2024.00024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-s65789.2025.00018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Leaving No Blind Spots: Toward Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity and autonomy of modern vehicles have drastically expanded their attack surface, introducing interdependent cybersecurity risks. However, existing security mechanisms often focus on isolated threats, failing to address their interplay within complex vehicle ecosystems. As vehicles become increasingly dependent on AI-driven control, electric powertrains, and networked architectures, ensuring resilience across multiple attack vectors requires a holistic security approach. This work proposes a unified three-layer security framework that integrates (i) physical-layer protection through battery authentication and side-channel resilience, (ii) AI-layer robustness against adversarial attacks on perception and intrusion detection, and (iii) communication-layer security for in-vehicle network protection. By leveraging cross-domain security principles, including cyber-physical security analysis, adversarial ML defenses, and in-vehicle network protection, this framework provides a cohesive and scalable methodology for securing next-generation automotive systems.",
      "published": "2025-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-s65789.2025.00018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Francesco Marchiori",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 55th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume (DSN-S)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-s65789.2025.00018",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-w.2016.26",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Designing Security for In-vehicle Networks: A Body Control Module (BCM) Centered Viewpoint",
      "description": "The overabundance of attacks reported on in-vehicle networks triggered reactions from both the academic research communities and industry professionals. However, designing security for in-vehicle networks is a challenging task and it is yet unclear to what extent current proposals are suitable for real world vehicles. In this work, we advocate the use of a top-down approach in which we analyze the functionalities along with reported attacks. Due to the abundance of in-vehicle services and the associated large number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), we center our analysis on a key subsystem from the car: the Body Control Module (BCM). The rationale behind choosing this particular module comes from at least three key factors: i) a large number of components that aredirectly linked to the BCM were target of previously reported attacks (e.g., keys and electronic immobilizes, tire sensors, diagnostic ports, etc.), ii) by design, body components are generally exposed to the outside and it is reasonable to assumethat adversaries will frequently have access to peripherals controlled by the BCM, iii) the BCM controls subsystems thatare both attractive from an economic perspective (e.g., accessto the car), or from a safety perspective (e.g., seat-belts, lights, etc.). Our discussion is entailed by a concrete analysis of therisks of reported attacks and preferable security designs.",
      "published": "2016-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-w.2016.26",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Eugen Horatiu Gurban",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks workshops",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-w.2016.26",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-w.2018.00069",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of Automotive CAN Cyber-Attacks by Identifying Packet Timing Anomalies in Time Windows",
      "description": "Cyber-attacks on the automotive controller area network (CAN) have recently been shown to be achievable and potentially disruptive or deadly. Detecting an attack quickly will require the development of intrusion detection systems that can cope with the rapid broadcast of CAN data, the comparatively limited computational power of automotive components, and the proprietary nature of CAN data specifications. This paper presents an analysis of CAN broadcasts and consequent testing of statistical methods to detect timing changes in the CAN traffic indicative of some predicted attacks. The detection is implemented in time-defined windows. The generation of simulated attack data, and the determination of positive detections, are also considered.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-w.2018.00069",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrew Tomlinson",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Harsha Kalutarage"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks workshops",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-w.2018.00069",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-w.2018.00070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fuzz Testing for Automotive Cyber-Security",
      "description": "There is increasing computational complexity within the connected car, and with the advent of autonomous vehicles, how do manufacturers test for cyber-security assurance? The fuzz test is a successful black box testing method that hackers have used to find security weaknesses in various domains. Therefore, should the fuzz test, mentioned (without any details) in SAE J3061, be applied more widely into the vehicle systems development process to help reduce vulnerabilities? To investigate this question a custom fuzzer was developed to allow for experimentation against a target vehicle's CAN bus (used as the data interconnect for the vehicle's ECUs). The results demonstrate that the fuzz test has a part to play as one of the many security tests that a vehicle's systems need to undergo before being made ready for series production. However, previous problems raised when cyber testing a vehicle were confirmed. Thus, in adding the fuzz test to the automotive engineering tool box some issues are raised that need addressing in future research.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-w.2018.00070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "connected car",
        "cyber-security",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel S. Fowler",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Paul Wooderson"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks workshops",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-w.2018.00070",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-w58399.2023.00031",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PSP Framework: A novel risk assessment method in compliance with ISO/SAE-21434",
      "description": "As more cars connect to the internet and other devices, the automotive market has become a lucrative target for cyberattacks. This has made the industry more vulnerable to security threats. As a result, car manufacturers and governments are working together to reduce risks and prevent cyberattacks in the automotive sector. However, existing attack feasibility models derived from the information technology field may not always provide accurate assessments of the potential risks faced by Vehicle Electronic Control Units in different operating conditions and domains. To address this issue, This paper introduces the PUNCH Softronix and Politecnico di Torino (PSP) framework. This framework is designed to provide accurate assessments compatible with the attack feasibility models defined by the automotive product security standards. The PSP framework utilizes social sentiment analysis to evaluate the real threat risk levels.",
      "published": "2023-05-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-w58399.2023.00031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Franco Oberti",
        "Ernesto Sánchez",
        "Alessandro Savino",
        "Filippo Parisi",
        "Stefano Di Carlo"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks workshops",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-w58399.2023.00031",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-w58399.2023.00035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Automotive Cybersecurity Maturity Level Assessment Programme",
      "description": "Cybersecurity will be key for the new and future vehicles that depend on the exchange of data with the infrastructure. These vehicles will bring countless new features and are potentially capable of autonomous driving. This paper analyses the automotive threats, standards and regulations. An explanation about the automotive future vision and cybersecurity dependency is given. The main presentation is a high-level model of a five-grade rating system responsible for evaluating the cybersecurity quality of the future vehicles, in order to establish a trustable and reliable environment. Based on the standards used for secure software development and security assessment we defined a procedure for the evaluation of security of the technological components of a car.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-w58399.2023.00035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrick Grümer",
        "Pedro Brandao"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 53rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-W)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-w58399.2023.00035",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn-w65791.2025.00056",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Model-based Approach for Cybersecurity Assessment of Off-Road and Defense Vehicles",
      "description": "The large amount of Electric/Electronic (E/E) systems in modern vehicles make them vulnerable to cyberattacks. New regulations and standards, such as UNECE R155 and ISO/SAE 21434, aim to tackle this issue by providing tools and workflows that vehicle designers can use to minimize cybersecurity threats. Plenty of research is being carried out in the automotive cybersecurity field, which is rich in assessment methodologies that comply with latest regulations. However, most efforts focus on Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs), often overlooking other families of vehicles such as Off-Road Vehicles (ORVs) and Defense Vehicles (DVs). These categories face not only many of the same cyber vulnerabilities as CAVs, but also unique cybersecurity challenges due to their special E/E systems. In this work we present a novel cybersecurity assessment methodology based on ADVISE Meta, an ontology-based modeling framework. ADVISE Meta models can be converted into lower-level stochastic models, which can be simulated to compute the probability that the adversaries reach their cybersecurity goals. Our methodology integrates well-established cybersecurity sources such as CAPEC, TAL, and UNECE R155, making it a suitable approach for industrial applications. Moreover, it is well integrated in the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) framework defined in ISO/SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2025-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn-w65791.2025.00056",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "tara",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Umberto Bellini",
        "Marzieh Kordi",
        "Bruno Crispo A",
        "Paolo Lollini",
        "Andrea Bondavalli",
        "Davide Compar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks workshops",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn-w65791.2025.00056",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn58367.2023.00018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Breaking Geographic Routing Among Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Geographic routing for connected vehicles enables vehicles and roadside infrastructure to exchange information about traffic conditions and road hazards based on their geographic positions. Its security is thus critical to traffic efficiency and road safety. In this paper, we conduct a security analysis of one standardized geographic routing protocol - GeoNetworking-and unfortunately find that its packet forwarding algorithms are vulnerable to two simple attacks. The first inter-area interception attack disturbs the victim vehicle's routing decision making and intercepts packets transmitted from one area to another. The second intra-area blockage attack intervenes packet forwarding within an area by impersonating a packet forwarder in a contention based flooding process; The attacker injects fake packets to its nearby peers and prevents vehicles within an area from receiving the broadcast packets. We use an open-source simulator to evaluate the effectiveness of proof-of-concept attacks and assess their attack damages under the settings released in public field tests. The first attack achieves an inter-area interception rate up to 99.9% (>35% in all test cases); The second attack reaches an intra-area packet blockage rate between 35% and 39%, which implies that about one-third vehicles within an area fail to receive broadcast packets. These attacks cause unnecessary traffic jams and collisions which could be avoided if GeoNetworking is properly secured. We further propose standard-compatible solutions to mitigating both attacks and conduct a preliminary evaluation to validate their effectiveness.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn58367.2023.00018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zizheng Liu",
        "Shaan Shekhar",
        "Chunyi Peng"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn58367.2023.00018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dsn64029.2025.00050",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MichiCAN: Spoofing and Denial-of-Service Protection using Integrated CAN Controllers",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) has been the de facto in-vehicle network protocol since the 1980s, despite lacking essential security principles like authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. CAN is especially vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, threatening the availability of safety-critical functions. Existing countermeasures have seen limited adoption due to challenges in real-time detection, prevention, and high overhead on Electronic Control Units (ECUs). To address these issues, we propose MichiCAN, a distributed, backward-compatible, real-time defense against DoS and spoofing attacks. MichiCAN leverages integrated/on-chip CAN controllers in modern MCUs, enabling bit-level access to CAN messages. This allows MichiCAN to detect DoS attacks during the arbitration phase and neutralize them by bussing off the attacker ECU swiftly. Experiments on a CAN bus prototype and a real vehicle demonstrate MichiCAN’s effectiveness in enhancing automotive network security.",
      "published": "2025-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dsn64029.2025.00050",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Bulut Gözübüyük",
        "Eric Andrechek",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Kang G. Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/dsn64029.2025.00050",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/dtis48698.2020.9081056",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection System for Altered Signal Values within the Intra-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "A modern vehicle is a complex system of sensors, actuators, and electronic control units (ECUs) connected through different automotive networks. In the past, vehicle networks used to be isolated from the outside world which made them immune to attacks. However, recent technologies have made vehicles vulnerable to cyberattacks. This paper proposes a supervised prediction model that allows the ECUs to detect anomalies in the content of the received messages. The implementation introduces a novel approach to rely on the signal value instead of the bitstream values for feature selection. The advantage of this approach will be highlighted. Additionally, a discussion of anomaly detection in the AUTOSAR standard is presented showing how the implemented model can be integrated into a network of ECUs running AUTOSAR communication stacks. A thorough evaluation of the proposed model is presented on a generated dataset where different types of data anomalies are added.",
      "published": "2020-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/dtis48698.2020.9081056",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecus",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamed Abd Elhamid Abbas",
        "Mona Safar",
        "Ashraf Salem"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems in Nanoscale Era (DTIS)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/dtis48698.2020.9081056",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ecai.2018.8679052",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges in Automotive Security",
      "description": "The modern cars are becoming more and more complex, allowing us to connect our phone to graphical interfaces of the car or have the vehicle system directly connected to external networks. These transformations include major advantages in efficiency, comfort and safety mechanisms, but the systems developed in a car are becoming targets for cyber security attacks. The software level in the automotive industry is increasing so the systems are becoming vulnerable to threats from the IT world. In this paper we present the entry points, the weaknesses in vehicle systems and emerging threats.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ecai.2018.8679052",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Irina-Georgiana Oancea",
        "Emil Simion"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronics, Computers and Artificial Intelligence (ECAI)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ecai.2018.8679052",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ecai52376.2021.9515057",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ultra-Wideband Technology in Telematics Security - A short Survey",
      "description": "By securing smart vehicles they should become less hackable, especially for driverless cars. The most exposed points of attack refer to wireless connectivity, such as connecting mobile devices, multi-payment services, remote access to the vehicle’s key, parking itself, etc. The risk of hacking refers to the security features of the car, or even the theft of the car or personal data. This research roughly defines security policies for automotive purposes and develops a vehicle security model based on security distributed outside and inside the vehicle, access rights, and presenting a security model. Moreover, the paper presents a case study for Ultra-Wide Band technology used in telematic security and analyzes two types of security applications. The first is a security balloon (short-distance UWB network with authentication of each new connection request), based on the interconnection of several UWB devices at the same time, which is described together with the specific architecture of the car system. The second UWB application is based on intrusion detection radar techniques (which allows the antennas to be hidden in the car, detecting intrusion positions along with the wireless identification process). Finally, we highlighted the advantages of these methods when used in security systems.",
      "published": "2021-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ecai52376.2021.9515057",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "hacking",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marius Rogobete",
        "Marius Iulian Mihăilescu",
        "Eugen Marin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronics, Computers and Artificial Intelligence (ECAI)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/ecai52376.2021.9515057",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4615,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ecai52376.2021.9515057 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: purposes, personal, points, even, case, services, intelligence, car."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ecai69016.2026.11613826",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security in Automotive Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Mitigating DDoS Attacks Through Integrated SIEM, NDR, and SOAR Solutions",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity of automotive systems through Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication and Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) has created new vulnerabilities to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, threatening the availability of safety-critical vehicle communications and infrastructure services. This research addresses the challenge of protecting MANET-based automotive infrastructure by developing an integrated security architecture combining Network Detection and Response (NDR), Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), and Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) capabilities. Risk analysis was conducted using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, mapping security controls across its six core functions. A laboratory proof of concept validated the architecture using CYBERQUEST (SIEM) and NETALERT (NDR) platforms to detect and automatically mitigate a simulated volumetric DDoS attack against a static network node. The integrated detection chain successfully identified abnormal connection volumes, correlated alerts across multiple sources, and executed automated blacklisting responses without human intervention. The results demonstrate that commercially available security platforms can be effectively adapted for MANET environments when properly integrated, providing rapid automated response capabilities aligned with European regulatory requirements including the NIS2 Directive and UNECE Regulation No. 155.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ecai69016.2026.11613826",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "C. Ene",
        "Marius Minea"
      ],
      "venue": "European Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ecai69016.2026.11613826",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ecce-europe62795.2025.11238613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Heterogeneous Cloud-Based EV Charging Management System with Rust and Multi-Device Integration",
      "description": "The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has created a need for scalable, secure, and efficient charging management systems. Traditional implementations rely on cloud-based architecture using Python or C++, but they often suffer from performance bottlenecks and security vulnerabilities. This paper introduces a novel Rust-powered cloud-native EV charging management system that integrates multiple energy sources, including EV chargers, solar panels, and batteries, into a heterogeneous smart home environment. The system leverages Rust for its high performance and memory safety and is deployed on the AWS cloud for scalability and remote management. The platform enables secure communication, real-time energy monitoring, and AI-driven energy optimization. The initial prototype of the system has been successfully implemented as a Rust-based web application and is currently being migrated to AWS (Amazon web services) for full deployment. However, significant work remains in optimizing energy management algorithms and improving cross-device interoperability.",
      "published": "2025-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ecce-europe62795.2025.11238613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Zia",
        "Ming-Lei You",
        "Mark Sumner",
        "Christian Klumpner",
        "Mohamed Hajj"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 Energy Conversion Congress & Expo Europe (ECCE Europe)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ecce-europe62795.2025.11238613",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ecnct66493.2025.11172408",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Cybersecurity of Ethernet for ICV",
      "description": "This paper mainly focuses on the information security threats faced by automotive ethernet, and constructs a framework based on threat analysis and risk assessment, aiming at identifying, assessing and mitigating the impact of these threats on automotive network security. The framework based on threat analysis and risk assessment can effectively improve the information security level of automotive ethernet, which has important theoretical and practical significance for automotive network security management. Through the experiment of attack recognition rate, the research technique achieves 90%, 85% and 95% high recognition rate under replay attack, fuzzy attack and DoS(Denial of service) attack respectively. It can be seen from the data conclusion that the framework based on threat analysis and risk assessment has high effectiveness and practicability in ethernet information security protection.",
      "published": "2025-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ecnct66493.2025.11172408",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xu Liu",
        "Jing Liu",
        "Haijun Wang",
        "Xingpei Bian",
        "Meng Han",
        "Wenxia Ji",
        "Yu‐Wei Su",
        "Wenbo Jia"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronics and Communication, Network and Computer Technology (ECNCT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ecnct66493.2025.11172408",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ecti-con60892.2024.10594943",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impacts of Electric Vehicle Charging on Residential Feeders",
      "description": "The global shift towards electric vehicles (EVs) is marked as a significant transformation towards transportation industry, driven by the urgent necessity to curb carbon emissions and address climate change concerns. Electric vehicles are widely regarded as environmentally friendly due to their zero-emission operation. However, the integration of electric vehicles into the power grid presents intricate challenges that require thorough examination. When multiple electric vehicles are charging simultaneously, the local power system has an abrupt surge in electricity demand. This surge results in voltage problems, overloads, and increased power losses. The vulnerability of the home grid segment is particularly pronounced during peak charging hours. The primary objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the impact of EV charging on the electricity grid. This paper involves simulating the operation of a MATLAB-based 13-node system and analyzing the effects of EV charging on voltage, and system performance. The study seeks to offer information on the impacts of EV adoption on local electrical infrastructure. With the growing number of electric vehicles on the roads, it becomes increasingly imperative to devise solutions that ensure the reliability of the local power system. This research aims to contribute to the development of strategies for the secure and efficient connection of EVs to the grid, promoting a more sustainable and dependable energy future.",
      "published": "2024-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ecti-con60892.2024.10594943",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samran Saleem",
        "Pisitpol Chirapongsananurak"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Telecommunications and Information Technology (ECTI-CON)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ecti-con60892.2024.10594943",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/educon46332.2021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "2021 IEEE Global Engineering Education Conference (EDUCON)",
      "description": "The automotive industry is a dynamic industry that is constantly evolving and changing with the advancements of technology.As cars become more technology dependent, the threat landscape and likelihood of a cyber-attack becomes greater and inherently larger as issues arise.With the introduction to automation and increased use of embedded systems and infotainment systems, modern cars have become a pillar piece of the Internet of Things network.This research details an in-depth study into the vulnerabilities and risks surrounding the current and future state of the automotive industry, highlights the most safety-critical components of the modern car, providing a holistic threat landscape to improve security awareness and posture regarding automotive security.It also demonstrates the utilisation of this analysis with the integration of an education package built on top of a hardware module based on a Raspberry Pi, that emulates its own CAN Bus network that individuals can interact with as if it was a vehicle to provide education on CAN hacking.This device has the potential to be attached to education ranges and labs which can help educate individuals on different security skills to help improve security awareness and knowledge.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/educon46332.2021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "hacking",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/educon46332.2021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/educon46332.2021.9454086",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Education in Cyber Physical Systems Security: The Case of Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The automotive industry is a dynamic industry that is constantly evolving and changing with the advancements of technology. As cars become more technology dependent, the threat landscape and likelihood of a cyber-attack becomes greater and inherently larger as issues arise. With the introduction to automation and increased use of embedded systems and infotainment systems, modern cars have become a pillar piece of the Internet of Things network. This research details an in-depth study into the vulnerabilities and risks surrounding the current and future state of the automotive industry, highlights the most safety-critical components of the modern car, providing a holistic threat landscape to improve security awareness and posture regarding automotive security. It also demonstrates the utilisation of this analysis with the integration of an education package built on top of a hardware module based on a Raspberry Pi, that emulates its own CAN Bus network that individuals can interact with as if it was a vehicle to provide education on CAN hacking. This device has the potential to be attached to education ranges and labs which can help educate individuals on different security skills to help improve security awareness and knowledge.",
      "published": "2021-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/educon46332.2021.9454086",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "hacking",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sophia McCall",
        "Çağatay Yücel",
        "Vasilios Katos"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Global Engineering Education Conference (EDUCON)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/educon46332.2021.9454086",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eeais66172.2025.11171168",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Security for Software Updates of Intelligent Connected Vehicles Based on Post-Quantum Cryptography",
      "description": "This paper addresses the security challenges of intelligent connected vehicle software updates in the quantum computing era by proposing a hybrid cryptography scheme (PQ/T) that combines post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with classical cryptography. Our solution extends X.509 digital certificates to incorporate PQC algorithms while maintaining compatibility with existing PKI infrastructure. The proposed dual-signature approach enables seamless migration to quantum-resistant security without disrupting current over-the-air (OTA) update systems. Experimental results demonstrate that PQ/T effectively safeguards software update packages against quantum threats while preserving the performance of conventional TLS protocols. This work provides a practical transition pathway for automotive cybersecurity in the post-quantum era.",
      "published": "2025-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eeais66172.2025.11171168",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wanli Zhao",
        "Zhang Wang",
        "Lian Zhao",
        "Zhengyang Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Automation and Information Science (EEAIS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/eeais66172.2025.11171168",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eecct71142.2026.11746521",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An LLM-Assisted Fuzzing Framework for Vehicle ECU Vulnerability Discovery",
      "description": "The electronic and electrical architecture of intelligent connected vehicles is evolving from distributed ECUs toward domain-based control and centralized computing models, resulting in an expansion of the connectivity scope, interaction paths, and attack surface of in-vehicle software. For closed-source ECU firmware, traditional rule-based testing and byte-level fuzz testing are often constrained by protocol limitations that are difficult to explicitly express, leading to issues such as long state transition paths and insufficient utilization of runtime feedback. This paper employs a literature review and framework analysis to map out three technical strands: in-vehicle cybersecurity testing, AI-assisted fuzz testing, and large language model (LLM) software testing. It further discusses feasible mechanisms for the collaboration between LLMs and fuzz testing across three key stages: protocol modeling, test input generation, and feedback optimization. The analysis suggests that LLMs can be used to convert heterogeneous information — such as protocol documentation and DBC files—into structured constraints usable by testers; however, their outputs still require rule validation, execution feedback, and manual review. Computing resources, adaptation to proprietary protocols, discrepancies between simulation and actual vehicles, and vulnerability reproducibility are the priority issues that need to be addressed when engineering such methods. Based on this, this paper proposes research directions such as lightweight inference, multi-source evidence fusion, cross-vehicle model transfer, and automated verification, providing a reference for security testing research targeting ECU firmware.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eecct71142.2026.11746521",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Quan-Rui Huo",
        "Yu-Qiao Ning",
        "Shi-Yu Mu",
        "Dong-Qing Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 International Conference on Electronic Engineering, Communications and Computer Technology (EECCT)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/eecct71142.2026.11746521",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eecct71142.2026.11746527",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LLM-Guided Semantic Fuzzing for Automotive Can Bus Vulnerability Discovery",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, as the core communication backbone of intelligent connected vehicles, lacks encryption and authentication mechanisms, exposing vehicles to serious security threats. Traditional CAN bus fuzzing techniques suffer from frame acceptance rates below 1% because randomly generated test cases violate protocol constraints such as Data Length Code (DLC), Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), signal ranges, and inter-signal dependencies. This paper proposes CAN-SemFuzz, a hybrid fuzzing framework that integrates Large Language Model (LLM)-guided semantic mutation with coverage-based feedback. The approach leverages GPT-4o-mini to understand CAN protocol semantics from DBC files and generate protocol-compliant yet semantically anomalous test cases, while coverage feedback guides mutation strategy optimization. Experimental evaluation on the HCRL Car-Hacking dataset demonstrates that the proposed framework achieves 76.5% detection rate for fuzzy attacks (compared to 28.7% for mutation-based fuzzing), 99.8% detection rate for DoS attacks, and 47.5% frame acceptance rate versus 0.8% for random fuzzing. Time-to-first-vulnerability improves by $\\mathbf{3. 2} \\times$ over mutation-based fuzzing (9.1 min vs. 29.1 min). The total LLM API cost is approximately $0.30 per complete fuzzing campaign, making the approach practical for routine security testing.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eecct71142.2026.11746527",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qi Yu",
        "Zhen Guo",
        "Tian-Ling Liu",
        "Shi-Wen Shen",
        "Shi-Xuan Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 International Conference on Electronic Engineering, Communications and Computer Technology (EECCT)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/eecct71142.2026.11746527",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4218,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/eecct71142.2026.11746527 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: routine, campaign, serious, large, making, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eeeic/icpseurope64998.2025.11169283",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Strategies for Marine Electronic Control Units",
      "description": "The rise of digital technologies has led to cyberphysical systems that seamlessly integrate engineering systems with their digital counterparts. The Internet of Things (IoT) serves as a key infrastructure for these technologies, significantly impacting the maritime sector through the demand for increased connectivity. This introduces challenges in implementing advanced networking, communication protocols, and centralized cloud connectivity. However, increased connectivity heightens cybersecurity risks, necessitating secure transmission systems. In the maritime sector the internal primary communication protocol between Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is the Controller Area Network (CAN) while external cloud connectivity is typically established by other protocols such as GSM/machinetype communication (MTC). This paper examines cybersecurity threats in maritime applications, analyzing their vulnerabilities to highlight the need for robust cybersecurity frameworks, intrusion detection systems, and data encryption. Rule-based cybersecurity algorithms are developed and validated on a smallscale test system with CAN network nodes connected to the cloud. This strategy contributes to secure the maritime sector, reducing operational risks in highly connected future systems.",
      "published": "2025-07-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eeeic/icpseurope64998.2025.11169283",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ettore Soldaini",
        "Sachin Kumar Bhoi",
        "Sajib Chakraborty",
        "Omar Hegazy"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering and IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Europe (EEEIC / I&CPS Europe)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/eeeic/icpseurope64998.2025.11169283",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eei63073.2024.10696654",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure and Efficient Vehicle OTA Software Update System: Design and Validation",
      "description": "With the widespread popularity of intelligent connected vehicles, the demand for software updates of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) is becoming increasingly frequent. However, as the functionality of software update packages becomes more enriched, the time required for Over-The-Air (OTA) update also lengthens accordingly, and the security of update packages particularly important in this process. Aiming at the problems existing in the current OTA update of vehicle, this paper proposes an OTA system solution based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) hybrid encryption and decryption technology and Ethernet transmission. Through validation, this OTA system not only significantly reduces the time for OTA updates but also ensures the security of update packages, thereby meeting the growing update demands and security standards.",
      "published": "2024-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eei63073.2024.10696654",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jingxuan Wang",
        "Rui Chen",
        "Haiou Wen",
        "Yaxiang Chen",
        "Qianping Hou",
        "Wendong Duan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronic Engineering and Informatics (EEI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/eei63073.2024.10696654",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eespe68405.2026.11648914",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Methodology for Automatic Test Case Generation in Intelligent Connected Vehicle Cybersecurity Testing Based on Large Language Models",
      "description": "With the increasing complexity of the \"cloud–pipe–end\" architecture in intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs), the coexistence of multiple communication protocols such as automotive Ethernet, CAN bus, and V2X communication, coupled with the successive release of regulations and standards including UN R155, ISO/SAE 21434, and GB44495, the traditional manual approach to writing cybersecurity test cases faces severe challenges in terms of efficiency, coverage, and compliance. Large language models (LLMs), with their powerful semantic understanding and content generation capabilities, offer a new technical pathway for the automated generation of test cases. However, general-purpose LLMs lack domain-specific knowledge of automotive cybersecurity, and their direct application encounters challenges such as knowledge deficiency, insufficient scenario adaptation, and untrustworthy generated content. This paper proposes a methodological framework for automatic test case generation in ICV cybersecurity testing, named AutoCarSec. Centered on domain knowledge injection, the framework adopts a three-layer progressive architecture consisting of a knowledge enhancement layer, a scenario modeling and generation layer, and a multi-agent collaborative execution layer, systematically addressing the three core issues of knowledge acquisition, scenario modeling, and quality assurance for LLMs in the automotive cybersecurity testing domain. This paper elaborates on the detailed design of four key stages: structured construction of automotive cybersecurity domain knowledge, automatic test scenario modeling based on attack trees and TARA, LLM-driven hierarchical test case generation, and multi-agent collaborative verification with iterative optimization. It provides a logically sound and highly operable methodological reference for the intelligent transformation of cybersecurity testing for intelligent connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eespe68405.2026.11648914",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "tara",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qianchuang Zhi",
        "Zhen Guo",
        "Qi Yu",
        "Mingming Yu",
        "Longhai Yu",
        "Shixuan Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Energy Systems and Power Engineering (EESPE)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/eespe68405.2026.11648914",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3947,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/eespe68405.2026.11648914 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: pathway, direct, large, case, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eit.2017.8053416",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection in connected cars",
      "description": "Automobiles are becoming increasingly connected and therefore are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Intrusion detection systems are a well established technique in cyber security and are now being deployed to detect attacks on cars by filtering the data streams which are exchanged by the car and the outside world as well within the automotive bus systems. The paper gives a brief overview of intrusion detection systems and discusses some of the major cyber security threats arising in the world of connected cars. We also show how intrusion detection systems can be implemented by artificial neural networks.",
      "published": "2017-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eit.2017.8053416",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roland E. Haas",
        "Dietmar P. F. Möller",
        "Prateek Bansal",
        "Rahul Kumar Ghosh",
        "Srikrishna S Bhat"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electro Information Technology",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/eit.2017.8053416",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eit.2017.8053441",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive connectivity, cyber attack scenarios and automotive cyber security",
      "description": "The Automotive industry is changing rapidly, as classical automotive engineering and information and communication technologies (ICT) converge. Digitization, new mobility concepts, e-mobility, and autonomous driving require a permanent connection with the Internet and transform the car into a very complex cyber-physical system. However, with this connectivity the car becomes vulnerable to cyber attacks. It is very important to understand the threat scenarios underlying the mega trends that are changing the industry. The paper gives a brief overview of the main drivers of this change and discusses some of the major cyber security threats arising in the world of connected cars focussing on three important areas where cyber attacks can happen - e-mobility, car sharing and automated valet parking. Fortunately, there are various cyber security measures that can help to protect the connected car. We briefly discuss some of the main approaches.",
      "published": "2017-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eit.2017.8053441",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roland E. Haas",
        "Dietmar P. F. Möller"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electro Information Technology",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/eit.2017.8053441",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eit.2018.8500295",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Protecting ECUs and Vehicles Internal Networks",
      "description": "The Automotive Industry is on the verge of digital transformation. The race building fully connected and autonomous cars has begun and it will redefine the way we have been using transportation systems. The goal of connected cars is to provide personalized and safe driving, but connectivity is opening the doors for cyber-attacks. Control Area Network (CAN)-bus is a serial car bus network that connects Electronic Control Units (ECUs), sensors and actuators in a system or subsystem for control applications. Thousands of signals are recorded on the CAN-Bus which can give almost real-time information about the car, driver and the surroundings. This paper proposes a conceptual approach for intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) for connected cars and an overview of machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection as part of intrusion detection.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eit.2018.8500295",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Priyanka Sharma",
        "Dietmar P. F. Möller"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electro Information Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/eit.2018.8500295",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eit51626.2021.9491889",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Network Security",
      "description": "Today automobiles are no longer mere isolated mechanical devices, but are increasingly connected to the outside environment, e.g. V2I(Vehicle-to-Infrastructure), V2V(Vehicle-to-Vehicle), V2C(Vehicle-to-Cloud) and V2X(Vehicle-to-Everything)[1]. The high degree of connectivity makes vehicles exposed to a range of security and privacy threats. The increasingly interconnected demand of a vehicle's control modules means there is no safety without security.In this paper we describe the vulnerability of CAN and Ethernet automotive buses. We present the multiple domain CAN buses connected to a high speed Gigabit automotive Ethernet. We describe backend computers and central computing gateways provide layered security. We explain that Hardware Security Modules and Message Authentication Code (MAC) in CAN frame will increase security. We suggest ways to protect automotive Ethernet bus.",
      "published": "2021-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eit51626.2021.9491889",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dingwang Wang",
        "Subramaniam Ganesan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electro Information Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/eit51626.2021.9491889",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eit53891.2022.9813965",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security Threats for 5G Networks",
      "description": "The fifth-generation mobile network (5G) services have the potential to provide high-speed connectivity to a large user base with excellent benchmarks on low latencies, large capacity, and faster upload/download data rates. The potential for millimeter-wave technologies to sustain enough power for mobile/Wi-Fi connectivity for indoor/outdoor applications provides an additional layer of expansion of 5G services to enhance good user experiences. The probability of threat landscape increases with a significant increase in network connectivity, users, non-existent or non-compliant Internet of Things (IoT) standards, and service types. Network mobility and applications that are planning on deploying 5G services such as Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Everything (V2X), Vehicle or Building to Infrastructure (V2I/B2I) Augmented and Virtual Reality (AR/VR), digital twins-based and streaming video services increase vulnerabilities and risk landscape compromising Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) properties. This paper provides a high-level categorization of cyber attacks related to 5G environment into Physical, Remote, and Local. The various benchmarks (latency, bandwidth) for 5G network evaluation across multiple 5G related technologies such as Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC), Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communications (URLLC) are outlined.",
      "published": "2022-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eit53891.2022.9813965",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaya Preethi Mohan",
        "Niroop Sugunaraj",
        "Prakash Ranganathan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electro Information Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/eit53891.2022.9813965",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eitce70137.2026.11634545",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TinyCAN-LLM: A Lightweight Language Model Framework for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection in Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) relies on secure invehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication to support connected vehicular services. However, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus remains vulnerable to cyberattacks that can compromise the reliability of vehicular operations. Although conventional machine learning models have been widely used for CAN bus intrusion detection, most existing approaches process CAN records as independent numerical samples, limiting their ability to explicitly model contextual dependencies among consecutive messages and to support interpretable security alerts. To address this gap, this paper proposes TinyCAN-LLM, a lightweight language-model-assisted intrusion detection framework for CAN bus security in IoV-enabled vehicular environments. The key idea is to represent CAN identifiers and data bytes as compact structured token sequences, allowing a tiny language model to learn contextual byte-level and message-level patterns through sliding windows of consecutive CAN messages. The proposed framework fine-tunes a Qwen2.5-0.5B-based tiny language model using 4-bit quantization and LoRA adaptation, with only 0.173% of the parameters being trainable. Experiments are conducted on the CICIoV2024 dataset, covering one benign class and five attack-specific classes. The results show that TinyCAN-LLM achieves 99.80% accuracy, 99.80% macro F1-score, and a macro false positive rate of 0.04%. These findings demonstrate that CAN traffic can be effectively modeled as structured token sequences, providing a lightweight and context-aware foundation for intrusion detection in IoV environments.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eitce70137.2026.11634545",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelaziz Amara Korba",
        "Raja Waseem Anwar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronic Information Technology and Computer Engineering (EITCE)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/eitce70137.2026.11634545",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/emr.2026.3717861",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "This Technology Manager's Notebook article presents empirical findings and strategic insights on cybersecurity risks in autonomous and connected vehicles, derived from a large-scale vulnerability assessment conducted by the Weichen Security Laboratory across more than 1,000 vehicle models and components between 2022 and 2023. We identify and categorize eight primary vulnerability types—system, data, cloud, communication, hardware, business logic, application, and mobile application—with year-over-year increases in high-risk vulnerabilities. The paper further analyzes real world attack patterns such as signal injection, exploitation, and privilege escalation via in-vehicle systems. We outline six actionable, lifecycle-oriented cybersecurity recommendations for engineering managers and other decision makers. Our contribution bridges technical vulnerability data with managerial response frameworks, advocating for an integrated “cloud-pipe-end” security architecture aligned with the automotive V-model development lifecycle. The practical insights provide opportunities for engineering managers and organizations to implement or consider these initiatives. It also sets some foundational ideas and perspectives that researchers can use to further investigate this important topic.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/emr.2026.3717861",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "exploitation",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuan Wang",
        "Huanyu Zhao",
        "Joseph Sarkis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Engineering Management Review",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/emr.2026.3717861",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4583,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.86,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/emr.2026.3717861 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: fleet_scale; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: escalation, strategic, organizations, large-scale, primary, patterns, response, risks."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/encycris52570.2021.00012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Asset-driven Security Assurance Cases with Built-in Quality Assurance",
      "description": "Security Assurance Cases (SAC) are structured arguments and evidence bodies used to reason about security of a certain system. SACs are gaining focus in the automotive domain as the needs for security assurance are growing. In this study, we present an approach for creating SAC. The approach is inspired by the upcoming security standards ISO/SAE-21434 as well as the internal needs of automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). We created the approach by extracting relevant requirements from ISO/SAE-21434 and illustrated it using an example case of the head lamp items provided in the standard. We found that the approach is applicable and helps to satisfy the requirements for security assurance in the standard as well as the internal compliance needs in an automotive OEM.",
      "published": "2021-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/encycris52570.2021.00012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mazen Mohamad",
        "Örjan Askerdal",
        "Rodi Jolak",
        "Jan-Philipp Steghöfer",
        "Riccardo Scandariato"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Engineering and Cybersecurity of Critical Systems (EnCyCriS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/encycris52570.2021.00012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/epec47565.2019.9074822",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of Electric Vehicles Botnets on the Power Grid",
      "description": "The increased penetration of Electric Vehicles (EVs) in the transportation sector has increased the requirement of Fast Charging Direct Current (FCDC) stations to meet customer's speedy charging requirements. However, both charging stations and EVs connection to the communication infrastructure as well as the power grid makes it vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this paper, the vulnerability of the EV charging process is initially studied. We then show how a botnet of compromised EVs and FCDC stations can be utilized to launch cyber attacks on the power grid resulting in an increase in the load at a specific time. The effect of such attacks on the distribution network in terms of line congestion and voltage limit violations is investigated. Moreover, the effect of the botnet of the transmission network is also studied.",
      "published": "2021-03-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/epec47565.2019.9074822",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omniyah Gul M Khan",
        "Ehab El-Saadany",
        "Amr Youssef",
        "Mostafa Shaaban"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/epec47565.2019.9074822",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/esai62891.2024.10913954",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "State of the Art on CAN Protocol Vulnerabilities and Intrusion Detection Systems in Automotive Networks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is a primary communication protocol in modern vehicles that enables communication among electronic control units (ECU). Nevertheless, this protocol contains numerous weaknesses that make automotive networks susceptible to various cyber dangers, including message spoofing, eavesdropping, and denial-of-service (DoS) assaults. This article provides a detailed analysis of modern Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) created to protect CAN networks. We evaluated and contrasted the most recent IDS approaches, discussing their advantages and disadvantages. The paper points out the current research limitations and suggests potential future research directions to improve IDS performance in automotive networks. The practical implications of these discoveries suggest that employing IDS methodologies in real-world settings could greatly enhance the security of modern vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-12-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/esai62891.2024.10913954",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Saad Darouiche",
        "El Bachir Tazi",
        "Hassan Satori"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Embedded Systems and Artificial Intelligence (ESAI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/esai62891.2024.10913954",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4408,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/esai62891.2024.10913954 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: primary, points, intelligence, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/esci53509.2022.9758266",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding E-Healthcare Documents Utilizing an Infrastructure for Advanced Keyless Signature Infrastructure Blockchain Within the Cloud",
      "description": "The decentralized nature of vulnerable health records can bring about cases where timely records are unavailable, worsening overall health results. Moreover, as patient participation in healthcare increases, there's a growing demand for individuals to control and access the data. Blockchain is a protected, decentralized online server which may be employed to handle electronic health records (EHRs) efficiently, therefore with the possibility to boost health outcomes by producing a stream for interoperability. Thus, it's of key-value to secure electronic overall health captures. Centralized storage space of comprehensive health information appeals to constant viewing, and cyber-attacks of affected person captures are complex. Thus, it's essential to develop a method while using the cloud, which enables you to guarantee authentication and offers the integrity of overall health captures. The keyless signature infrastructure utilized within the suggested method of ensuring electronic signatures' secrecy also guarantees elements of authentication. Besides, information integrity is handled through the proposed blockchain technologies. The functionality of the suggested framework is examined by evaluating the variables such as typical period, sizing, and then the price of information storage space and retrieval on the blockchain know-how with traditional details storage space methods. The result reveals that the resulting period of the suggested process, together with blockchain engineering, is practically 55% smaller than traditional strategies. Also, they voice the price of storage space is approximately 25% less when it comes to the method with Blockchain in deep comparability with all the pre-existing strategies.",
      "published": "2022-03-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/esci53509.2022.9758266",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Udhayakumar Hariharan",
        "V. Dhanakoti",
        "K. Rajkumar",
        "Jeyavel Janardhanan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Emerging Smart Computing and Informatics (ESCI)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/esci53509.2022.9758266",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/etfa52439.2022.9921551",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On In-Vehicle Network Security Testing Methodologies in Construction Machinery",
      "description": "In construction machinery, connectivity delivers higher advantages in terms of higher productivity, lower costs, and most importantly safer work environment. As the machinery grows more dependent on internet-connected technologies, data security and product cybersecurity become more critical than ever. These machines have more cyber risks compared to other automotive segments since there are more complexities in software, larger after-market options, use more standardized SAE J1939 protocol, and connectivity through long-distance wireless communication channels (LTE interfaces for fleet management systems). Construction machinery also operates throughout the day, which means connected and monitored endlessly. Till today, construction machinery manufacturers are investigating the product cybersecurity challenges in threat monitoring, security testing, and establishing security governance and policies. There are limited security testing methodologies on SAE J1939 CAN protocols. There are several testing frameworks proposed for fuzz testing CAN networks according to [1]. This paper proposes security testing methods (Fuzzing, Pen testing) for in-vehicle communication protocols in construction machinery.",
      "published": "2022-09-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/etfa52439.2022.9921551",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sheela Hariharan",
        "Alessandro V. Papadopoulos",
        "Thomas Nolte"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/etfa52439.2022.9921551",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/etfa65518.2025.11205792",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-Divisional Cybersecurity Risk Management in Automotive: Requirements and Current Practices",
      "description": "Collaboration across multiple divisions in the automotive industry, including vehicle engineering, production, and backend services, complicates cybersecurity risk management. While standards such as ISO/SAE 21434, the ISO/IEC 27000 family, and the IEC 62443 series each offer domain-specific guidance, a focused review shows they do not offer a fully integrated, cross-divisional framework. Rather, they present scattered guidance on topics like communication channels, external dependencies, and aligned risk criteria, leaving it to organizations to unify these elements.To explore how this gap manifests in practice, semi-structured interviews were conducted with six automotive manufacturers, capturing real-world challenges and strategies for cross-divisional cybersecurity risk management. The findings reveal disparate risk assessment methods, inconsistent terminology, and fragmented communication channels among these divisions, which hinder a holistic security posture. Conversely, the results highlight the benefits of coordinated strategies, such as enhanced risk transparency, more efficient resource allocation, and stronger regulatory compliance.Based on both the standards analysis and interview outcomes, this paper advocates a cohesive framework that harmonizes processes, tools, and language across automotive divisions, ultimately guiding manufacturers toward an overarching, more robust cybersecurity posture.",
      "published": "2025-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/etfa65518.2025.11205792",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrick Wagner"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/etfa65518.2025.11205792",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/etncc59188.2023.10284964",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Jamming attacks and Anti-Jamming Strategies on Car Remote Keyless Entry System",
      "description": "This research investigated the jamming attacks on car Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems based on the computed signal to noise ratio (SNR) and then proposed, an anti-jamming strategy from the analysis of the results. The increasing misuse of small portable radio frequency electronic devices to transmit unlawful intentional signals is responsible for interfering with the operation of a radio frequency-based car remote central locking system known as RKE system. It contains a short-range radio transmitter (key fob) and a receiver unit inside the vehicle, with most RKEs operating at frequency of 315 MHz for North American cars and at 433.92 MHz for European. The effect of this jamming signal on the RKE will depend on some factors including but not limited to transmitter power, the relative transmitters distances from the car. In the simplest form of RKE jamming, the radio frequency signal from the jammer corrupts the content of the radio frequency signal from the car key fob transmitter within the RKE proximity so that the intended receiver wrongly decodes the message to close the car door. In this investigation, two signals, one from a gate motor remote (jammer) located at a fixed distance from the car and the second from a car key fob located at distance not exceeding the car locking distance were transmitted to a car equipped with an RKE system concurrently. The SNR at the RKE receiver was computed using the appropriate propagation model. This process was repeated for different locations or distances of the car key fob. A matrix of SNR values for different pairs of, car key fob/jammer. The transmission parameters like transmission frequency, transmission power as well as transmitted signal bandwidth of the transmitters that were not available were determined through measurements using a spectrum analyser. Based on the SNR data obtained, the area of the likelihood of jamming was determined and the necessary conclusions and proposals are given.",
      "published": "2023-08-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/etncc59188.2023.10284964",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "jamming",
        "key fob",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Clement Temaneh‐Nyah",
        "Eino JN Shivute"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Emerging Trends in Networks and Computer Communications (ETNCC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/etncc59188.2023.10284964",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ets.2016.7519280",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securely connected vehicles - what it takes to make self-driving cars a reality",
      "description": "Summary form only given. The car is evolving. It is transforming from a mode of transport to a self-driving robot and information hub. Cars are enabling consumers to seamlessly integrate their mobile and wearable devices and soon it will also drive autonomously. Wireless technologies play a key role in creating the autonomous driving experience. The rise of secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications, affordable compact radar solutions and Ethernet for high-bandwidth data transfer are making it ever closer to becoming a reality. Self-driving cars will integrate a variety of interfaces for collecting and analyzing data from other vehicles and their surroundings. While being essential to making this possible, this connectivity also exposes cars to vulnerabilities such as hackers and viruses. Powerful, reliable wireless technologies combined with highest level of privacy and system security will be critical. Lars Reger outlines what it takes to realize the secure connected car of the future.",
      "published": "2016-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ets.2016.7519280",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected car",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lars Reger"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Test Symposium (ETS)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/ets.2016.7519280",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ets.2016.7519280 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: creating, transport, making, car, privacy, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eucnc.2018.8442825",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MEC-Assisted End-to-End Latency Evaluations for C-V2X Communications",
      "description": "The efficient design of fifth generation (5G) mobile networks is driven by the need to support the dynamic proliferation of several vertical market segments. Considering the automotive sector, different Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C- V2X) use cases have been identified by the industrial and research world, referring to infotainment, automated driving and road safety. A common characteristic of these use cases is the need to exploit collective awareness of the road environment towards satisfying performance requirements. One of these requirements is the End-to-End (E2E) latency when, for instance, Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs) inform vehicles about their status (e.g., location) and activity, assisted by the cellular network. In this paper, focusing on a freeway-based VRU scenario, we argue that, in contrast to conventional, remote cloud-based cellular architecture, the deployment of Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) infrastructure can substantially prune the E2E communication latency. Our argument is supported by an extensive simulation-based performance comparison between the conventional and the MEC-assisted network architecture.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eucnc.2018.8442825",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "infotainment",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mustafa Emara",
        "Miltiades C. Filippou",
        "Dario Sabella"
      ],
      "venue": "European Conference on Networks and Communications",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/eucnc.2018.8442825",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 95,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurosp.2017.52",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Content delivery over TLS: a cryptographic analysis of keyless SSL",
      "description": "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is designed to allow two parties, a client and a server, to communicate securely over an insecure network. However, when TLS connections are proxied through an intermediate middlebox, like a Content Delivery Network (CDN), the standard endto- end security guarantees of the protocol no longer apply. In this paper, we investigate the security guarantees provided by Keyless SSL, a CDN architecture currently deployed by CloudFlare that composes two TLS 1.2 handshakes to obtain a proxied TLS connection. We demonstrate new attacks that show that Keyless SSL does not meet its intended security goals. These attacks have been reported to CloudFlare and we are in the process of discussing fixes. We argue that proxied TLS handshakes require a new, stronger, 3-party security definition. We present 3(S)ACCEsecurity, a generalization of the 2-party ACCE security definition that has been used in several previous proofs for TLS. We modify Keyless SSL and prove that our modifications guarantee 3(S)ACCE-security, assuming ACCE-security for the individual TLS 1.2 connections. We also propose a new design for Keyless TLS 1.3 and prove that it achieves 3(S)ACCEsecurity, assuming that the TLS 1.3 handshake implements an authenticated 2-party key exchange. Notably, we show that secure proxying in Keyless TLS 1.3 is computationally lighter and requires simpler assumptions on the certificate infrastructure than our proposed fix for Keyless SSL. Our results indicate that proxied TLS architectures, as currently used by a number of CDNs, may be vulnerable to subtle attacks and deserve close attention.",
      "published": "2017-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurosp.2017.52",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karthikeyan Bhargavan",
        "Ioana Boureanu",
        "Pierre-Alain Fouque",
        "Cristina Onete",
        "Benjamin Richard"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurosp.2017.52",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00036",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Vehicular DAA Scheme for Unlinkable ECDSA Pseudonyms in V2X",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is a broadcast messaging system intended to improve the efficiency and safety of connected and autonomous vehicles. In this paper we present a new V2X architecture and key management solution that reconciles the strong privacy guarantees of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) with the efficiency, low-latency and accountability that is required for V2X. In contrast with the leading V2X standards, and uniquely in the literature, we prevent long-term vehicle pseudonym tracking despite dishonest and colluding certificate authorities and whilst retaining centralised authority over revocation. Our Vehicular DAA (VDAA) scheme includes a novel construction that optimally limits Sybil attacks by restricting each vehicle to one anonymous pseudonym-request per epoch. We present a new security model for VDAA and show that we can reduce the unforgeability and unlinkability of our Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) broadcast messages to the security of the underlying DAA scheme.",
      "published": "2020-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00036",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christopher Hicks",
        "Flavio D. Garcia"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00036",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00020",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using Cyber Digital Twins for Automated Automotive Cybersecurity Testing",
      "description": "Cybersecurity testing of automotive systems has become a practical necessity, with the wide adoption of advanced driving assistance functions and vehicular communications. These functionalities require the integration of information and communication technologies that not only allow for a plethora of on-the-fly configuration abilities, but also provide a huge surface for attacks. Theses circumstances have also been recognized by standardization and regulation bodies, making the need for not only proper cybersecurity engineering but also proving the effectiveness of security measures by verification and validation through testing also a formal necessity. In order to keep pace with the rapidly growing demand of neutral-party security testing of vehicular systems, novel approaches are needed. This paper therefore presents a methodology to create and execute cybersecurity test cases on the fly in a black box setting by using pattern matching-based binary analysis and translation mechanisms to formal attack descriptions as well as model-checking techniques. The approach is intended to generate meaningful attack vectors on a system with next-to-zero a priori knowledge.",
      "published": "2021-07-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00020",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefan Marksteiner",
        "Slava Bronfman",
        "M. Wolf",
        "E. Lazebnik"
      ],
      "venue": "2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00020",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Model-Driven Methodology for Automotive Cybersecurity Test Case Generation",
      "description": "Through international regulations (most prominently the latest UNECE regulation) and standards, the already widely perceived higher need for cybersecurity in automotive systems has been recognized and will mandate higher efforts for cybersecurity engineering. The UNECE also demands the effectiveness of these engineering to be verified and validated through testing. This requires both a significantly higher rate and more comprehensiveness of cybersecurity testing that is not effectively to cope with using current, predominantly manual, automotive cybersecurity testing techniques. To allow for comprehensive and efficient testing at all stages of the automotive life cycle, including supply chain parts not at hand, and to facilitate efficient third party testing, as well as to test under real-world conditions, also methodologies for testing the cybersecurity of vehicular systems as a black box are necessary. This paper therefore presents a model and attack tree-based approach to (semi-)automate automotive cybersecurity testing, as well as considerations for automatically black box-deriving models for the use in attack modeling.",
      "published": "2021-07-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "regulation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefan Marksteiner",
        "P. Priller"
      ],
      "venue": "2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00021",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy and modern cars through a dual lens",
      "description": "Modern cars technologies are evolving quickly. They collect a variety of personal data and treat it on behalf of the car manufacturer to improve the drivers’ experience. The precise terms of such a treatment are stated within the privacy policies accepted by the user when buying a car or through the infotainment system when it is first started. This paper uses a double lens to assess people’s privacy while they drive a car. The first approach is objective and studies the readability of privacy policies that comes with cars. We analyse the privacy policies of twelve car brands and apply well-known readability indices to evaluate the extent to which privacy policies are comprehensible by all drivers. The second approach targets drivers’ opinions to extrapolate their privacy concerns and trust perceptions. We design a questionnaire to collect the opinions of 88 participants and draw essential statistics about them. Our combined findings indicate that privacy is insufficiently understood at present as an issue deriving from driving a car, hence future technologies should be tailored to make people more aware of the issue and to enable them to express their preferences.",
      "published": "2021-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "personal data",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giampaolo Bella A",
        "Pietro Biondi",
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Giuseppe Tudisco"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw54576.2021.00022",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw55150.2022.00041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comparative Analysis of UNECE WP.29 R155 and ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "In the last years, the increasing number of cyber-attacks on vehicles has shown the importance to implement security solutions within the automotive domain. To reduce the risk that a vehicle or its components get attacked and compromised, two cybersecurity references have been released: UNECE WP.29 R155 and ISO/SAE 21434. In March 2021, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) published the WP.29 R155 regulation, mandatory in some countries from July 2022 to homologate vehicles' cybersecurity. Officially released in August 2021, ISO/SAE 21434 is a cybersecurity standard which aims to be widely accepted and applied in the engineering of electrical and electronic (E/E) systems for road vehicles. In this work, we describe and analyze the two norms, comparing them to show their points of contact and differences. From our analysis, the two documents, spanned both along the entire life-cycle of a vehicle, can be considered overlapped in some processes, but also complementary to increase the cybersecurity of the vehicle. Finally, we provide a use case of application of the regulation and the standard on an E/E system, reporting the possible limits and implementations.",
      "published": "2022-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw55150.2022.00041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw55150.2022.00041",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw61312.2024.00048",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Work-in-Progress: Towards a New Configurable and Practical Remote Automotive Security Testing Platform",
      "description": "In the automotive security sector, the absence of a testing platform that is configurable, practical, and user-friendly presents considerable challenges. These difficulties are compounded by the intricate design of vehicle systems, the rapid evolution of attack vectors, and the absence of standardized testing methodologies. We propose a next-generation testing platform that addresses several challenges in vehicle cybersecurity testing and research domains. In this paper, we detail how the Vehicle Security Engineering Cloud (VSEC) Test platform enables easier access to test beds for efficient vehicle cybersecurity testing and advanced (e.g., penetration, fuzz) testing and how we extend such test beds to benefit automotive security research. We highlight methodology on how to use this platform for a variety of users and use cases with real implemented examples.",
      "published": "2024-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw61312.2024.00048",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sekar Kulandaivel",
        "Wenjuan Lu",
        "Brandon Barry",
        "Jorge Guajardo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw61312.2024.00048",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CheckOCPP: Automatic OCPP Packet Dissection and Compliance Check",
      "description": "As the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) grows, ensuring compliance and security in EV charging infrastructure is critical. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) is the de facto standard for communication between EV charging stations and central management systems. However, verifying real-world implementations for protocol adherence and security remains challenging. We introduce CheckOCPP, an OCPP dissector integrated with Wireshark, designed to detect OCPP versions (1.6, 2.0, and 2.0.1), validate message structures against predefined compliant schemas, and flag non-compliant or malformed packets in real-time. CheckOCPP is built using Lua and leverages the Mobility House Python OCPP open-source library. As a dissector, CheckOCPP can be used for compliance verification and security analysis. Our evaluation demonstrates its effectiveness in dissecting and validating OCPP 1.6, 2.0, and 2.0.1 traffic, including detecting non-compliant behaviors against simulated malformed packets and EmonEVSE, an actual charging station.",
      "published": "2025-06-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Boussaha",
        "Victor Fresno Gómez",
        "Thomas Barber",
        "Daniele Antonioli"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00044",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00045",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Avatar: Adversarial Vehicle Trajectory Attack Targeting Autonomous Driving Planner",
      "description": "With the increasing adoption of autonomous vehicles, ensuring the planner safety is critical, as it directly impacts trajectory and safety. This study introduces AVATAR, a novel black-box attack framework exploiting planner vulnerabilities by subtly adjusting trajectories. The attack requires no prior knowledge of the planner internals. AVATAR uses reinforcement learning to optimize attack strategies and polynomial trajectory generation to maintain realism. Experiments across multiple traffic scenarios show significant degradation in safety and efficiency for both rulebased and learning-based planners. The impact is especially significant in high-traffic and collision-avoidance scenarios. Cross-environment and cross-planner evaluations confirm AVATAR's robustness, sometimes outperforming scenariospecific attack methods. This study shows that autonomous driving planners are susceptible to adversarial trajectory attacks, potentially resulting in unsafe or inefficient behaviors.",
      "published": "2025-06-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00045",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiadong Liu",
        "Tatsuya Mori"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00045",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw72509.2026.00045",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security risk assessment in distributed systems made practical: Application to a real-world mobility system",
      "description": "Tracking and managing all threats affecting a complex distributed system is an enormous challenge in practice. We focus on advanced mobility systems, for which a sophisticated TARA (threat analysis and risk assessment) method has been standardized in ISO/SAE 21434. We propose practical extensions that introduce a hierarchical structure to complex TARAs, based on the architecture of the system under evaluation. This facilitates a modular computation of risks for the entire system as well as relevant subsystems (e.g. components or features), thus supporting distributed development of complex systems while fully satisfying the TARA requirements of ISO/SAE 21434. We also report on our implementation of the method and on our application to a complex real-world mobility system.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw72509.2026.00045",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maike Massierer",
        "Carsten Nobbe"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw72509.2026.00045",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/eurospw72509.2026.00046",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Revisiting Bluetooth Vulnerabilities in Automotive Infotainment Systems: A Remote Code Execution Case Study",
      "description": "Modern vehicles integrate multiple wireless interfaces, such as Bluetooth, which significantly expand their attack surface. In this work, we analyze a proprietary Bluetooth stack embedded in a widely deployed automotive infotainment system. We show that this implementation contains a vulnerability similar to CVE-CVE-2018-20378, despite vendor claims that the studied version is unaffected.We demonstrate the exploitability of this vulnerability by developing specially crafted exploitation primitives, achieving remote code execution without user interaction, despite the presence of mitigations such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP).Our results highlight a gap between publicly documented vulnerabilities and their practical exploitability in real-world embedded systems.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw72509.2026.00046",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "exploitation",
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2018-20378"
      ],
      "authors": [
        "Philippe Trébuchet",
        "Guillaume Bouffard"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/eurospw72509.2026.00046",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ficloud70576.2026.00019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigating Sybil Attacks in V2X Communication Through Cryptographic Trust Anchors",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication enables vehicles to exchange safety-critical messages, but its reliance on temporary pseudonymous identities makes it vulnerable to Sybil attacks, where a single attacker fabricates multiple identities to inject false information into the network. This paper presents a lightweight cryptographic mechanism that combines SHA-256 Proof-of-Work token mining with a time-windowed ratecontrol layer to limit the number of new identities a vehicle can activate within a given interval. The mechanism was implemented in Java and evaluated through a parametric simulation across three independent variables: PoW difficulty, rate limit, and attack intensity. Results show that a difficulty of 4 and a rate limit of 5 tokens per 10-second window provide an effective balance between Sybil resistance and legitimate vehicle access in an 8-vehicle scenario, with an average mining time of 0.227 seconds. The evaluation identifies the rate-control layer as the primary security mechanism, while PoW difficulty increases the computational cost per identity without independently capping accepted tokens. The proposed approach is infrastructure-free and suitable for regulated V2X deployments where attackers represent a minority of the network.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ficloud70576.2026.00019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maher Fayyad",
        "Abdullah Awad",
        "E. P. de Freitas",
        "W. O. de Morais",
        "Alexandre dos Santos Roque"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Future Internet of Things and Cloud",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ficloud70576.2026.00019",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/fmec54266.2021.9732568",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bird's-eye view on the Automotive Cybersecurity Landscape & Challenges in adopting AI/ML",
      "description": "The integration of intelligent functionalities in con-nected and autonomous automotive system has great potential to deliver personalised user experience and improve traffic manage-ment. It can benefit the society by improving highway capacity and safety of road users. The adoption of data-driven Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning models in the automotive sector is opening venues to new services and business models such as autonomous fleet management, self-driving trucks, robo-taxi etc. However, where the sharing of mix-critical data brings opportunities, it simultaneously presents serious cybersecurity and functional safety risks. In recent years, the cyber attacks have impacted every segment of automotive system including electronic control unit, infotainment, communications, firmware, mobile apps etc. This adoption of AI and ML as enabling technology for next-generation autonomous transportation systems is going to significantly widen the automotive attack surface. This trend has increasing tendency of exposing both vehicle and road -side infrastructure to a wide range of sophisticated cyber attacks. This paper aims to review and build a body of knowledge on the topic of automotive cybersecurity, by bridging a domain-specific knowledge gap among automotive system designers, engineers and system security architects. For this purpose, it discuss the autonomous driving system data processing pipeline and threat analysis and risk assessment process of automotive cybersecurity standard ISO/SAE 21434 to harness and harden automotive cybersecurity. It highlights automotive system architectural and ecosystem challenges in adopting AI and ML driven decision making.",
      "published": "2021-12-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/fmec54266.2021.9732568",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electronic control unit",
        "infotainment",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fahad Manzoor Siddiqui",
        "Rafiullah Khan",
        "Sakir Sezer"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Fog and Mobile Edge Computing (FMEC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/fmec54266.2021.9732568",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/fnwf55208.2022.00101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Personalized Federated Learning for Automotive Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "In connected cars, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus communication is the central connectivity and communication system for electronic control units (ECUs). Although the CAN bus is the central communication system for most cars, it lacks basic security features, i.e., authentication and encryption. Consequently, an attacker may compromise the CAN bus system effortlessly with even free attacking tools. In case of an attacker succeeds in compromising the ECUs, they can take control and stop the engine, disable the brakes, turn the lights on/off, etc., which makes the questions concerning the transformation of modern cars and safe driving. In this study, we propose a Personalized Federated learning-based Intrusion Detection System that ensures effective, secure training procedures without sharing any sort of data. In our research, we contemplate Supervised and Unsupervised Federated Learning to observe the behavior of CAN bus intrusion data. Our experiment result demonstrates that the Federated Learning-based supervised classifier effectively detects the CAN bus attacks, with accuracy of 99.98%.",
      "published": "2022-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/fnwf55208.2022.00101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected cars",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kabid Hassan Shibly",
        "Md Delwar Hossain",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue",
        "Yuzo Taenaka",
        "Youki Kadobayashi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Future Networks World Forum (FNWF)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/fnwf55208.2022.00101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/fpl57034.2022.00070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Multi-Attack CAN Intrusion Detection System on Hybrid FPGAs",
      "description": "Rising connectivity in vehicles is enabling new capabilities like connected autonomous driving and advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) for improving the safety and reliability of next-generation vehicles. This increased access to in-vehicle functions compromises critical capabilities that use legacy invehicle networks like Controller Area Network (CAN), which has no inherent security or authentication mechanism. Intrusion detection and mitigation approaches, particularly using machine learning models, have shown promising results in detecting multiple attack vectors in CAN through their ability to generalise to new vectors. However, most deployments require dedicated computing units like GPUs to perform line-rate detection, consuming much higher power. In this paper, we present a lightweight multi-attack quantised machine learning model that is deployed using Xilinx's Deep Learning Processing Unit IP on a Zynq Ultrascale+ (XCZU3EG) FPGA, which is trained and validated using the public CAN Intrusion Detection dataset. The quantised model detects denial of service and fuzzing attacks with an accuracy of above 99 % and a false positive rate of 0.07%, which are comparable to the state-of-the-art techniques in the literature. The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) execution consumes just 2.0 W with software tasks running on the ECU and achieves a 25 % reduction in per-message processing latency over the state-of-the-art implementations. This deployment allows the ECU function to coexist with the IDS with minimal changes to the tasks, making it ideal for real-time IDS in in-vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2022-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/fpl57034.2022.00070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "controller area network",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Shanker Shreejith"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/fpl57034.2022.00070",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/fpl60245.2023.00040",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring Highly Quantised Neural Networks for Intrusion Detection in Automotive CAN",
      "description": "Vehicles today comprise intelligent systems like connected autonomous driving and advanced driving assistance systems (ADAS) to enhance the driving experience, which is enabled through increased connectivity to infrastructure and fusion of information from different sensing modes. However, the rising connectivity coupled with the legacy network architecture within vehicles can be exploited for launching active and passive attacks on critical vehicle systems and directly affecting the safety of passengers. Machine learning-based intrusion detection models have been shown to successfully detect multiple targeted attack vectors in recent literature, whose deployments are enabled through quantised neural networks targeting low-power platforms. Multiple models are often required to simultaneously detect multiple attack vectors, increasing the area, (resource) cost, and energy consumption. In this paper, we present a case for utilising custom-quantised MLP's (CQMLP) as a multi-class classification model, capable of detecting multiple attacks from the benign flow of controller area network (CAN) messages. The specific quantisation and neural architecture are determined through a joint design space exploration, resulting in our choice of the 2-bit precision and the n-layer MLP. Our 2-bit version is trained using Brevitas and optimised as a dataflow hardware model through the FINN toolflow from AMD/Xilinx, targeting an XCZU7EV device. We show that the 2-bit CQMLP model, when integrated as the IDS, can detect malicious attack messages (DoS, fuzzing, and spoofing attack) with a very high accuracy of 99.9%, on par with the state-of-the-art methods in the literature. Furthermore, the dataflow model can perform line rate detection at a latency of 0.11 ms from message reception while consuming 0.23 mJ/inference, making it ideally suited for integration with an ECU in critical CAN networks.",
      "published": "2024-01-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/fpl60245.2023.00040",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Shreejith Shanker"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 33rd International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/fpl60245.2023.00040",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/fuzz-ieee.2017.8015464",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Car hacking identification through fuzzy logic algorithms",
      "description": "Modern vehicles have lots of connectivity, this is the reason why protect in-vehicle network from cyber-attacks becomes an important issue. The Controller Area Network is a de facto standard for the in-vehicle network. However, lack of security features of CAN protocol makes vehicles vulnerable to attacks. The message injection attack is a representative attack type which injects fabricated messages to deceive original Electronic Control Units or to cause malfunctions. In this paper we propose a method able to detect four different type of attacks targeting the CAN protocol adopting fuzzy algorithms. We obtain encouraging results with a precision ranging from 0.85 to 1 using the fuzzy NN algorithm in the identification of attacks targeting CAN protocol.",
      "published": "2017-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/fuzz-ieee.2017.8015464",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fabio Martinelli",
        "Francesco Mercaldo",
        "Vittoria Nardone",
        "Antonella Santone"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems (FUZZ-IEEE)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/fuzz-ieee.2017.8015464",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 104,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/gcce59613.2023.10315400",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing OTA Update Security in Zonal Architecture for Automobiles",
      "description": "Since the automobile industry enhances driving safety features and caters to increasing demands for driver entertainment, in order to reduce the time and cost of automobile software/firmware updates, the Over-The-Air (OTA) updates play a vital role. Any malicious updates or update failures, however, can pose significant personal safety risks. Hence, OTA updates in vehicular systems have emerged as a critical area of research. While some studies have explored secure transmission protocols between OTA Cloud and vehicles [1] , [2] , the secure flow of update packages towards the target components remains unaddressed. This paper aims to mitigate these security threats in vehicular update processes. We first examine the structure of the In Vehicle Network (IVN) in future automobiles, then establish an update threat model using STRIDE. Drawing upon international standards for vehicular software updates such as UNECE R156 and ISO 24089, we design security mechanisms for in-vehicle components, ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the update process. Moreover, we use the Two Phase Commit mechanism to ensure update atomicity within zonal architecture.",
      "published": "2023-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/gcce59613.2023.10315400",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "in vehicle network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuan-Hsiu Chou",
        "Wen-Wei Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Global Conference on Consumer Electronics (GCCE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/gcce59613.2023.10315400",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/gcwkshps52748.2021.9682145",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Signature-Over-The-Air with Transfer Learning IDS for Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICV)",
      "description": "Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICV) are considered the promising technology that will replace traditional vehicles soon, especially with the improvement in automation and network technologies. This gives rise to the possibility of new cyberattacks, including intra- and inter-vehicle communication attacks. This paper proposed an infrastructure-independent, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to secure the Intra-Vehicles and external networks. The anomaly-based IDS in the model is assisted by a blacklist attacks signatures that are placed in the connected vehicles, where the signatures of the new attacks can be generated in a cloud-based security management system and updated to the network of connected vehicles using the over-the-air-update concept, so each network-connected vehicle will work as a packet inspector that helps to find the attacks log and add it to a cloud signature database. In the detection engine, Self-taught Transfer Learning (STL) is used to transfer the knowledge of a pre-trained Deep Belief Network (DBN) model from the source domain and construct a feed-forward Deep Neural Network (DNN). The comparison with baseline machine learning (ML)/deep learning (DL) algorithms shows that the proposed model achieves better performance in terms of Accuracy, Precision, Detection Rate (DR), F1-score, and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC).",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/gcwkshps52748.2021.9682145",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yazan Otoum",
        "Amiya R. Nayak"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/gcwkshps52748.2021.9682145",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4029,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/gcwkshps52748.2021.9682145 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: where, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/gcwkshps56602.2022.10008525",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Garlic Routing for Securing Data Exchange in V2X Communication",
      "description": "The rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed the conventional vehicular network into smart vehicular communication, such as vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-pedestrians, and vehicle-to-infrastructure that are categorized under the umbrella of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) ecosystem. It offers colossal applications for road safety, such as hazard warning, intersection assistance, and vehicle prioritization by sharing vehicular data between different entities of the V2X systems. However, V2X communication is imperiled by various security vulnerabilities, such as man-in-the-middle, data injection, and session hijacking attacks that jeopardize the data exchange of V2X communication. To respond to the aforementioned security issues, we proposed an artificial intelligence (AI) and garlic routing (Gr)-based secure and intelligent architecture that improves the security enhancements of the V2X systems. First, AI-based classifiers are employed to efficiently classify the attack and non-attack data of the V2X communication. Further, the Gr network is adopted to process the non-attack data and offers ElGamal + advanced encryption standard (AES)-based encryption to secure the vehicular data. To further improvise the Gr network, each gateway of Gr is associated with the blockchain technology for secure storage. The performance of the proposed architecture is evaluated by considering different performance metrics, such as accuracy, scalability, and probability of data compromisation rate. The results show that the random forest (RF) outperforms in classifying data by achieving 98.2% accuracy. Further, with blockchain technology, the probability of data compromisation rate decreases, i.e., 14.3% and increases the scalability, i.e., 52.63% of the proposed architecture.",
      "published": "2022-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/gcwkshps56602.2022.10008525",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. Jadav",
        "Rajesh Gupta",
        "Sudeep Tanwar",
        "Pronaya Bhattacharya"
      ],
      "venue": "2022 IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/gcwkshps56602.2022.10008525",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013481",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart Electric Vehicle Charging with Ideal and Practical Communications in Smart Grids",
      "description": "The growing number of electric vehicles (EV) in the automotive market is leading to ever sharper spikes in consumer power demand. Smart EV charging techniques seek to adjust EV charging load to compensate for supply-demand mismatch. However, all schemes are vulnerable to communications inefficiencies. This paper models implications of communications-driven latency in smart EV charging relevant to secondary voltage control in the distribution network. EV charging load and driving pattern data are gathered from verified statistical studies. A smart charging scheme is proposed enabling high EV penetration with no peak load increase and minimal infrastructure additions. Further, it is applicable to all flexible loads and permits power allocation via a number of possible algorithms. A communications structure for this scheme is then developed, and system performance under ideal and practical communications constraints are studied.",
      "published": "2019-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013481",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "John W. Heron",
        "Hongjian Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013481",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013892",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Tree-Based Intelligent Intrusion Detection System in Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The use of autonomous vehicles (AVs) is a promising technology in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) to improve safety and driving efficiency. Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology enables communication among vehicles and other infrastructures. However, AVs and Internet of Vehicles (IoV) are vulnerable to different types of cyber-attacks such as denial of service, spoofing, and sniffing attacks. In this paper, an intelligent intrusion detection system (IDS) is proposed based on tree-structure machine learning models. The results from the implementation of the proposed intrusion detection system on standard data sets indicate that the system has the ability to identify various cyber-attacks in the AV networks. Furthermore, the proposed ensemble learning and feature selection approaches enable the proposed system to achieve high detection rate and low computational cost simultaneously.",
      "published": "2019-10-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013892",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "spoofing",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Yang",
        "Abdallah Moubayed",
        "Ismail Hamieh",
        "Abdallah A. Shami"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013892",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 245,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013930",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Experimental Study Towards Attacker Identification in Automotive Networks",
      "description": "The auxiliary functions of modern vehicles have increased the number of attack surfaces. As the most important information exchange channel for vehicles, Controller Area Network (CAN) attracts more and more attention. Due to no encryption and authentication, CAN bus is vulnerable to attack. Thus, the attacker can manipulate the message with serious consequences. Several methods have been proposed to improve the security of vehicles. However, most of them have their own deficiencies. In this paper, we propose an LOF-based attack detection scheme which utilizes the voltage physical characteristics of the CAN frame to judge whether a message is transmitted by a legitimate Electronic Control Unit (ECU). As validated by extensive experiments on two vehicles, our scheme can identify the attacker with an average detection rate of 98.9\\%, and the false detection rate is less than 0.5\\%. In addition, our scheme can accurately identify attacks from external devices.",
      "published": "2019-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013930",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jing Ning",
        "Jiajia Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom38437.2019.9013930",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom42002.2020.9322395",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Effective In-Vehicle CAN Bus Intrusion Detection System Using CNN Deep Learning Approach",
      "description": "The modern car is increasingly connected. That connection is magnified by the presence of a large number of electronic control units (ECUs). The communication between the ECUs of a modern car is assured by the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system. Despite its importance, the CAN bus system is bereft of security mechanisms making it vulnerable to numerous security attacks. When an attacker succeeds in compromising the ECUs, they can take control and stop the engine, disable the brakes, turn the lights on/off, etc. An intrusion detection system (IDS) can be deployed as an appropriate security measure to detect the malicious network traffic in the CAN bus system. In this paper, we propose a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based network attacks IDS for protecting the CAN bus system. For efficiency reasons, we generated our own datasets from three car models. Our experiment results demonstrate that our classifier is efficient for detecting the CAN bus system attacks, and it performs with a high accuracy of 99.99% and a detection rate of 0.99.",
      "published": "2020-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom42002.2020.9322395",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Delwar Hossain",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue",
        "Hideya Ochiai",
        "Doudou Fall",
        "Youki Kadobayashi"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom42002.2020.9322395",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 64,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom46510.2021.9685130",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VehicleCIDS: An Efficient Vehicle Intrusion Detection System Based on Clock Behavior",
      "description": "Nowadays, more and more external interfaces are added into intelligent and connected vehicles. The in-vehicle network, especially the controller area network (CAN), is no longer a closed environment, which provides more approaches for attackers to invade. To resist attacks, numerous researchers have proposed intrusion detection systems (IDSs). However, attackers can intrude CAN bus in a more advanced way, such as masquerade attack, which leads to failures of most IDS. To counter masquerade attacks, we propose an efficient vehicle IDS based on clock behavior, called VehicleCIDS. First, the system uses recursive least squares (RLS) algorithm to estimate the clock behavior of each electronic control unit (ECU). Then, a statistical method called empirical rule is used to detect attack messages. Finally, it utilizes dynamic time warping (DTW) to identify attackers. The experimental results on real vehicles show that the recognition rate of VehicleCIDS can achieve 98.52% in intrusion detection and 87.71% in attacker identification.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom46510.2021.9685130",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yilin Zhao",
        "Yi-Jie Xun",
        "Jia-Jia Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Global Communications Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom46510.2021.9685130",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3827,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/globecom46510.2021.9685130 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000766",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Intrusion Detection System for Next Generation In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "As emerging technologies such as mobile communication, vehicle to everything, and artificial intelligence are widely used in intelligent connected vehicles, drivers can gain a convenient and colorful driving experience. While these tech-nologies enrich the driving experience, they also bring a series of vulnerable interfaces to the vehicle. These interfaces can be used by hackers to attack other nodes of in-vehicle network that lack authentication and encryption. For this, researchers design scheme to encrypt and authenticate messages to protect in-vehicle networks, but this scheme would occupy the bandwidth resources of in-vehicle network. Therefore, researchers propose parameter monitoring-based intrusion detection system (IDS), information theory-based IDS, and fingerprint-based IDS, which do not occupy bandwidth. However, most IDSs either cannot locate the source of the attack, cannot detect aperiodic frames, or need to know the non-public mapping between electronic control units (ECUs) and identifiers (IDs) of in-vehicle network. To solve these weaknesses, we propose a novel IDS that establishes voltage fingerprints for each ID. This system can detect period and aperiodic malicious frames and locate the source of attack without knowing the mapping between ECUs and IDs. The experimental results on actual vehicles demonstrate that our scheme is robust against real scenarios.",
      "published": "2022-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000766",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhouyan Deng",
        "Yijie Xun",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Shouqing Li",
        "Yilin Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000766",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3882,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000766 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: next, vehicle., intelligence, without, information, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000969",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reducing Security Overhead in the Context of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C- ITS) are very important in our daily lives. They ensure road safety through the exchange of data between vehicles and road side units (RSU). Due to the sensitivity of the exchanged data between different entities, C- ITS systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks, they require high protection. In order to guarantee the integrity and the authentication of the exchanged messages, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), has specified specific procedures to manage certificates and signatures of all sent messages. Each vehicle periodically sends signed CAMs. Then, the integration of the signature and certificate in each transmitted CAM has a considerable impact on the communication channel load and bandwidth. In this study, we propose a new lightweight authentication mechanism which uses the cluster concept to decrease the network overhead. The objective is to reduce the number of signatures and certificates on all exchanged messages. The key idea is that neighbouring vehicles form a cluster to establish a trust relationship with each other, thus removing the need to send signed messages each time. Our method allows for the exchange of lightweight data without certificates or signatures (unsigned CAMs) and therefore verification and signature processes are no longer necessary all the time, which saves processing time and allows for smoother and faster communications.",
      "published": "2022-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000969",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ramzi Boutahala",
        "Marwane Ayaida",
        "Hacène Fouchal"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000969",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001217",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A PUF-based Lightweight and Secure Mutual Authentication Mechanism for Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Keyless entry systems in cars give users the flexibility of unlocking the car door without using physical keys. Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) system is one of the common types of keyless entry systems. RKE systems that use a fixed code to unlock the car are susceptible to replay attacks. RKE systems that use rolling codes instead of fixed codes are still vulnerable to RollJam attacks. To protect RKE systems from such attacks, we propose a lightweight and secure mutual authentication mechanism based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We provide formal security analysis to show that the proposed mechanism is resilient against several common attacks. We also provide a comparison with other existing schemes which shows that the proposed mechanism is very efficient in terms of computation cost.",
      "published": "2022-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001217",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rohini Poolat Parameswarath",
        "Biplab Sikdar"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001217",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001280",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LCCDE: A Decision-Based Ensemble Framework for Intrusion Detection in The Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles, including autonomous vehicles and connected vehicles, have adopted an increasing variety of functionalities through connections and communications with other vehicles, smart devices, and infrastructures. However, the growing connectivity of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) also increases the vulnerabilities to network attacks. To protect IoV systems against cyber threats, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that can identify malicious cyber-attacks have been developed using Machine Learning (ML) approaches. To accurately detect various types of attacks in IoV networks, we propose a novel ensemble IDS framework named Leader Class and Confidence Decision Ensemble (LCCDE). It is constructed by determining the best-performing ML model among three advanced ML algorithms (XGBoost, LightGBM, and CatBoost) for every class or type of attack. The class leader models with their prediction confidence values are then utilized to make accurate decisions regarding the detection of various types of cyber-attacks. Experiments on two public IoV security datasets (Car-Hacking and CICIDS2017 datasets) demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed LCCDE for intrusion detection on both intra-vehicle and external networks.",
      "published": "2022-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001280",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Yang",
        "Abdallah A. Shami",
        "Gary Stevens",
        "Stephen de Rusett"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001280",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 87,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3947,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001280 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: confidence, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001536",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IDS for CAN: A Practical Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus Security",
      "description": "Modern automobiles depend heavily on electronics, controlled by the vehicle's internal network. The controller area network (CAN bus) is the predominant protocol, known for its reliability but also its grievous lack of security. Unfortunately, security is expensive and automotive manufacturers seem disinclined to invest in CAN bus protection. Thus, consumers are left with few options to improve security. In this work, we develop IDS for CAN – an Android application that functions as an intrusion detection system (IDS) for the CAN bus system. In particular, it communicates with a standard ELM 327-type device, plugged into the diagnostic port that is mandatory in the United States and Europe. The application will detect suspicious traffic on the CAN bus and generate an alert to notify the user. In our evaluation, we investigate the performance with both datasets and real vehicles. The results indicate the practicability and the effectiveness of our proposed system. Our application will allow consumers to take charge of automotive security.",
      "published": "2022-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001536",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Lampe",
        "Weizhi Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001536",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001736",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Post-Quantum PHY-Layer Authentication for Secure Initial Access in V2X Communications",
      "description": "One of the greatest challenges in vehicle-to-everything(V2X) communications lies in protecting vehicle authentication during initial access against advanced quantum cyber-physical attack (CPA), as well as maintaining ultra-reliable low-latency communications with each other and the infrastructure. In this paper, we propose a vehicle initial access authentication system which exploits post-quantum encryption and signal processing technique to defend against both active and passive quantum CPA. The system encodes/decodes the physical layer bits of messages using quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check code to avoid quantum passive cyber attacks while eliminating the influence of high-power active cyber attacks on bits by employing the independent component analysis based signal separation technique. We define the system failure probability to measure the reliability, by considering both the cyber and physical plane influence, such as asynchronous access delay caused by mobility and communications, wireless channel fading and the uncertain bit generation induced by traffic hazards. Simulations show the effectiveness of our proposed system against attacks and indicate how the adverse cyber-physical effects, either being intentional or unintentional, can be avoided subtly to reduce system failures.",
      "published": "2022-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001736",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dongyang Xu",
        "James A. Ritcey"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001736",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom52923.2024.10901814",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV): A Deep Learning Approach for Anomaly and Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "The rapid advancement in the Internet of Vehicles environments brings forth a significant increase in cybersecurity threats, with vehicles becoming prime targets for cyber-attacks. This paper presents a comprehensive study on the security vulnerabilities of electronic control units (ECUs), sensors, and communication links within the IoV framework. Utilizing the newly released CICIoV2024 dataset, we propose a deep neural network (DNN) model tailored for detecting a wide range of cyber-attacks, including DoS and spoofing attacks. Our model demonstrates remarkable performance in classifying benign and malicious activities, showing high accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score across various attack scenarios. By applying rigorous preprocessing techniques and innovative model architecture, our research contributes significantly to the field of automotive cybersecurity, offering a robust solution for safeguarding the IoV ecosystem against emerging cyber threats.",
      "published": "2024-12-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom52923.2024.10901814",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wafaa Ferhi",
        "Mourad Hadjila",
        "Djillali Moussaoui",
        "Sidi‐Mohammed Senouci"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom52923.2024.10901814",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom54140.2023.10437245",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VDKMS: Vehicular Decentralized Key Management System for Cellular Vehicular-to-Everything Networks, A Blockchain-Based Approach",
      "description": "The rapid development of intelligent transportation systems and connected vehicles has highlighted the need for secure and efficient key management systems (KMS). In this paper, we introduce VDKMS (Vehicular Decentralized Key Management System), a novel Decentralized Key Management System designed specifically as an infrastructure for Cellular Vehicular-to-Everything (V2X) networks, utilizing a blockchain-based approach. The proposed VDKMS addresses the challenges of secure communication, privacy preservation, and efficient key management in V2X scenarios. It integrates blockchain technology, Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) principles, and Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) to enable secure and trustworthy V2X applications among vehicles, infrastructures, and networks. We first provide a comprehensive overview of the system architecture, components, protocols, and workflows, covering aspects such as provisioning, registration, verification, and authorization. We then present a detailed performance evaluation, discussing the security properties and compatibility of the proposed solution, as well as a security analysis. Finally, we present potential applications in the vehicular ecosystem that can leverage the advantages of our approach.",
      "published": "2023-10-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom54140.2023.10437245",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wei Yao",
        "Yuhong Liu",
        "Fadi P. Deek",
        "Guiling Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom54140.2023.10437245",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4064,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/globecom54140.2023.10437245 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: well, applications, privacy, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom54140.2023.10437682",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G V2X Misbehavior Detection as Edge Core Network Function Based on AI/ML",
      "description": "As 5G Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technology takes the lead in V2X communication, it opens the possibility for telecommunication service providers to offer Vehicle-to-Network (V2N) services using their existing 5G network infrastructure. To enhance the security of 5G V2N services, in this paper we propose a novel collaborative V2X misbehavior detection system. This system would safeguard the V2X application servers (V2X ASs), deployed in the 5G edge network, from any malicious V2X position manipulation attacks. Our proposal includes two enhanced machine learning models. The first model utilizes historical data to conduct On-Road Plausibility Checks (ORPC), while the second model builds upon the first by enabling collaboration among edge detection nodes through the sharing of attack ratios for each vehicle. Our proposed models were tested using extensive 5G core-network emulations, yielding excellent results. The first model achieved a notable accuracy improvement from 73% to 91%, while the second model further enhanced the accuracy to an impressive 95%.",
      "published": "2023-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom54140.2023.10437682",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hadi Yakan",
        "Ilhem Fajjari",
        "Nadjib Aitsaadi",
        "Cédric Adjih"
      ],
      "venue": "Global Communications Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom54140.2023.10437682",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/globecom59602.2025.11431956",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Ranging for Proximity-Based Authentication Using Physical Unclonable Functions in OFDM",
      "description": "This paper presents a secure ranging system for proximity-based authentication using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). It specifically targets applications such as keyless entry systems that require accurate and tamper-resistant distance measurement. The proposed system utilizes PUF-based noiselike signatures embedded in the OFDM modulation process to mitigate distance manipulation attacks from adversaries. We implemented the design on a USRP X310 platform, leveraging both software and hardware-based processing to achieve real-time performance. Experimental evaluations conducted in wireless channels demonstrate that our PUF-based secure ranging system achieves decimeter-level accuracy and successfully resists distance reduction attacks. This approach offers high security and precision, making it a promising solution for secure and robust proximity-based authentication.",
      "published": "2025-12-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/globecom59602.2025.11431956",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Demba Komma",
        "Jiyoon Han",
        "Mingyan Liu",
        "Hun-Seok Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Global Communications Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/globecom59602.2025.11431956",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/glocom.2018.8647323",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An MEC-Based DoS Attack Detection Mechanism for C-V2X Networks",
      "description": "Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) as a wireless communication technology has been widely investigated to guarantee road safety and support autonomous driving. Nevertheless, due to high-mobility of nodes and time-varying topology of networks, C-V2X networks always face many security threats. We identify a new Denial of Service (DoS) attack in which a small number of nodes maliciously reserve the communication resources in a C-V2X network by requesting high priority V2X services frequently. A malicious vehicle detection scheme is then developed to defend against this attack. Different from the detection methods based on traffic analysis, the Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) server only needs to focus on detecting nodes with high malicious probability in our scheme. Thus, we propose a model to estimate the probability that a node is malicious based on its communication resources consumption state. Simulation results demonstrate not only the feasibility of our attack but also desirable performance of the proposed malicious node detection mechanism.",
      "published": "2018-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2018.8647323",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yang Li",
        "Rong-Hui Hou",
        "K. Lui",
        "Hui Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Global Communications Conference",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/glocom.2018.8647323",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/glocom.2018.8647571",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Experimental Study Towards the In-Vehicle Network of Intelligent and Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "As the mainstream of future automotive industry, Intelligent and Connected Vehicles (ICVs) have versatile connections between themselves and external devices, although able to provide more conveniences and better driving experiences for the users, also bring forward lots of intrusion portals for the malicious attackers. It is noticed that the final step of almost all attacks in available works, must be at the in-vehicle network, i.e., the CAN bus. Actually, the characteristics of CAN data, specifically, the broadcast transmission on the CAN bus, as well as the unencrypted authentication strategy make the CAN bus vulnerable to various attacks. Different from previous works about CAN bus, we present in this paper a comprehensive study on the in-vehicle network of a modern ICV (a Luxgen SUV), from the perspective of the vehicle auxiliary system. We first clarify the complicated communication process among the smart key, Body Control Module (BCM), and Key Control Unit (KCU), identify the loophole among the Luxgen auxiliary system, and then introduce a practical method to utilize this vulnerability. Finally, extensive experiments have been conducted on the Luxgen SUV where a wireless diagnostic equipment was utilized to achieve successful remote invasion in road tests.",
      "published": "2018-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2018.8647571",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yijie Xun",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Jing Ning",
        "Haibin Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/glocom.2018.8647571",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/glocom.2018.8647864",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Group Authentication with Dynamic Vehicle-Clustering for 5G-Based V2X Communications",
      "description": "For 5G based Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, it is envisioned that the network latency will be dramatically decreased to the extent of 1msec. However, achieving such low latency with high mobility in vehicular networks is a challenge. In this paper, we propose a lightweight group authentication scheme for 5G- based V2X communications using three different vehicles' roles in each cluster: an ordinary vehicle, Cluster Head (CH), and gateway vehicle. To increase cluster connectivity time, our clustering algorithm is developed based on three metrics: cluster's relative velocity, relative position, and received signal strength. The proposed authentication scheme aims to mutually authenticate the vehicle and CH as well as create a shared group key to be used inside the cluster. The security analysis and performance evaluation show that our proposed scheme thwarts inside and outside authentication attacks, and achieves up to 50% less computation overhead than those achieved in the existing schemes.",
      "published": "2018-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2018.8647864",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanaa Taha",
        "Xuemin Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/glocom.2018.8647864",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/glocom.2018.8648020",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Handover Authentication Scheme for 5G-Based V2X Communications",
      "description": "With the development of 5G-based Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communications, many emerging applications have been prospered. However, either of them requires V2X communications to provide secure, reliable, and efficient handover authentication with low computation overheads. It becomes extremely challenging when vehicles move with frequent handovers. In this paper, a lightweight handover authentication scheme is proposed for 5G-based V2X communications. Specifically, each vehicle can initially acquire a temporary encrypted identity from a network function virtualization (NFV)-manager in its home public land mobile network (PLMN). This encrypted identity is used to authenticate the vehicle to the new PLMN when a handover occurs. By comparing with two previous schemes, simulation results show that the proposed scheme achieves over 50% less computation overhead than those achieved in both of them, while does not affected the overall network handover latency much. Additionally, the proposed scheme can thwart both inside and outside network attacks well.",
      "published": "2018-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2018.8648020",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanaa Taha",
        "Mohammed Alhassany",
        "Xuemin Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "Globecom",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/glocom.2018.8648020",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/glocomw.2015.7413993",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Car Hacking Experiment: When Connectivity Meets Vulnerability",
      "description": "Interconnected vehicles are a growing commodity providing remote access to onboard systems for monitoring and controlling the state of the vehicle. Such features are built to facilitate and strengthen the owner's knowledge about its car but at the same time they impact its safety and security. Vehicles are not ready to be fully connected as various attacks are currently possible against their control systems. In this paper, we analyse possible attack scenarios on a recently released all-electric car and investigate their impact on real life driving scenarios. We leverage our findings to change the behaviour of safety critical components of the vehicle in order to achieve autonomous driving using an Open Vehicle Monitoring System. Furthermore, to demonstrate the potential of our setup, we developed a novel mobile application able to control such vehicle systems remotely through the Internet. We challenge the current state-of-the-art technology in today's vehicles and provide a vulnerability analysis on modern embedded systems.",
      "published": "2015-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/glocomw.2015.7413993",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sasan Jafarnejad",
        "Lara Codecà",
        "Walter Bronzi",
        "Raphaël Frank",
        "Thomas Engel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/glocomw.2015.7413993",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3927,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/glocomw.2015.7413993 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: onboard, currently, vehicle., car, impact, access, safety, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/hase.2019.00044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability Analysis of an Automotive Infotainment System's WIFI Capability",
      "description": "Automobiles of the current era are heavily computerized which makes them highly susceptible to attacks that were unheard of with traditional automobiles. In the past with traditional automobiles, one would require physical access to the automobile to compromise it. Today however, computerization has allowed remote accessibility of automobiles. Remote compromise is feasible by utilizing a vast range of attack vectors such as mechanics tools, automotive infotainment system, Bluetooth and cellular radios etc. In addition, wireless communication channels have made it possible to have long distance vehicle control, location tracking, in-cabin audio ex filtration etc. One of the electronic components in a modern automobile is its automotive infotainment system. This paper focuses on identifying the vulnerabilities of the automotive infotainment system with respect to its WIFI capabilities by conducting structured vulnerability tests on the WIFI capabilities of an automotive infotainment system. To do this, we analysed the WIFI attack surface and constructed test environments and used appropriate tools such as (Nmap (open port scan), Nessus (vulnerability scan), Metasploit) to generate a penetration testing plan to search for vulnerabilities. The vulnerability findings are well documented in this paper.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/hase.2019.00044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "infotainment",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Edwin Franco Myloth Josephlal",
        "Sridhar Adepu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/hase.2019.00044",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/hora61326.2024.10550523",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Key Fob Replay Attacks on Personal Vehicles: Vulnerabilities and Mitigation Strategies",
      "description": "This paper explores the intricacies of modern key fobs, focusing on their underlying technology, security features, and communication interfaces. It also examines the diverse communication links utilized by these key fobs. Additionally, it addresses the critical implementation of rolling codes in contemporary cars, ensuring synchronized signal reception, and further examines the KEELOQ code hopping technology, vital for secure remote keyless entry systems, replacing less secure fixed code devices, as well as the Ultimate version of the same code hopping technology for further securing of the rolling code mechanism. Later, the paper delves into exploiting vulnerabilities within modern key fob systems and finally ways of mitigation.",
      "published": "2024-05-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/hora61326.2024.10550523",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ana Kapulica",
        "Vedran Dakić",
        "Zlatan Morić",
        "Robert Petrunić"
      ],
      "venue": "International Congress on Human-Computer Interaction, Optimization and Robotic Applications (ICHORA)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/hora61326.2024.10550523",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/hpcc/smartcity/dss.2019.00193",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust and Self-Evolving IDS for In-Vehicle Network by Enabling Spatiotemporal Information",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN bus) is the most popular vehicle bus standard for communication between Electronics Control Units (ECUs) and related electronic devices. Modern vehicles are generally equipped with many (dozens of, or even hundreds of) electronic and intelligent devices so that drivers can gain a more comfortable driving experience. Protecting this increasingly complex vehicle ecosystem can be an arduous task, especially as the proliferation of data across different connected devices makes them more vulnerable than ever before. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been found extremely helpful in monitoring CAN traffic and detecting potential intrusions. The paper proposes a novel and robust intrusion detection mechanism for in-vehicle CAN network by using spatiotemporal information enabled time series prediction. The proposed IDS analyzes the CAN traffic generated by the in-vehicle network in real time and identifies the abnormal state of the vehicle practically. Our model utilizes substantially both the time and space information of the instructions information sent by the ECUs in detecting the intrusions and thus outperforms the classical Long Short Term Memory model. The intrusion detection mechanism provides strong robustness in the sense that it can perform fast online learning of packet features (while the vehicle is running) to implement new protocols for intrusion detection (enabling to capture the fresh state of the vehicle) if the underlying communication protocol of the vehicle has changed. In particular, the IDS can evolve by itself as exotic environment factors (such as road conditions, atmospheric conditions, etc.) change and manage its model by itself in a self-organized way. Experiment results demonstrate the performance of the model and the effectiveness against both known and unknown attacks.",
      "published": "2019-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/hpcc/smartcity/dss.2019.00193",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junchao Xiao",
        "Hao Wu",
        "Xiangxue Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications; IEEE International Conference on Smart City; IEEE International Conference on Data Science and Systems (HPCC/SmartCity/DSS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/hpcc/smartcity/dss.2019.00193",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/hpcc67675.2025.00175",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Beyond the Key: Towards Practical Radio Biometrics in Cars",
      "description": "The evolving landscape of vehicle theft in the United Kingdom highlights the limitations of current automotive security technologies and the rise of increasingly sophisticated attack vectors. Using national datasets from the Office for National Statistics and the Home Office, this research identifies significant trends in offender behaviour, vehicle targeting, and victim impact. The study evaluates existing vehicle access systems - including Remote Keyless Entry (RKE), Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES), and other digital platforms - highlighting persistent vulnerabilities such as relay attacks, key cloning, and internet-enabled exploits. Emphasis is placed on Channel State Information (CSI)-based radio biometrics, a passive and non-intrusive authentication method that shows strong resilience to spoofing. Comparative analysis positions CSI as a promising candidate for next-generation vehicle access control systems, offering potential benefits in both prevention and post-incident forensic analysis.",
      "published": "2025-08-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/hpcc67675.2025.00175",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lukasz Migacz",
        "Xiaohua Feng",
        "Marc Conrad"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications; IEEE International Conference on Smart City; IEEE International Conference on Data Science and Systems (HPCC/SmartCity/DSS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/hpcc67675.2025.00175",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/hpsr52026.2021.9481853",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges in the Automotive Software Supply Chain, Connected CAR : Benefits from an Intent Policy framework",
      "description": "Car Manufacturer has to address today growing threats, cars have been incrementally becoming more complex with more code and on the other hand they have to maintain its components during extended life spans of several years compared with other industries. This, together with the increasing connectivity thanks to the connected car and 5G, is becoming a major concern for the industry.FISHY offers a prime opportunity to address some of these challenges since it will offer a homogenous way to tackle some of the threats.The focus of this document is to describe how the supply chain for its IOT components, that are part of the ECU, can be secured to maintain security over time, all using surveillance techniques such as continuous vulnerability management or firmware and software updates using out-of-band channels.Finally, we will discuss the importance of security maintain-ability as a key enabler for long-term crypto-based protection.",
      "published": "2021-06-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/hpsr52026.2021.9481853",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "ecu",
        "security",
        "supply chain",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jose Soriano",
        "Guillermo Jiménez",
        "Ernesto Correa",
        "Noel Ruiz"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on High Performance Switching and Routing",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/hpsr52026.2021.9481853",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/hst47167.2019.9032989",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attacks on Machine Learning: Adversarial Examples in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV a.k.a. driverless cars) offset human response for transportation infrastructure, enhancing traffic efficiency, travel leisure, and road safety. Behind the wheels of these mobile robots lies machine learning (ML) to automate mundane driving tasks and make decisions from situational awareness. Attacking ML, the brain of driverless cars, can cause catastrophes. This paper proposes a novel approach to attack CAV by fooling its ML model. Using adversarial examples in CAVs, the work demonstrates how adversarial machine learning can generate attacks hardly detectable by current ML classifiers for CAV misbehavior detection. First, adversarial datasets are generated by a traditional attack engine, which CAV misbehavior detection ML models can easily detect. Building attack ML model takes two phases: training and testing. Using supervised learning, Phase I trains the model on the time-series data, converted from the adversarial datasets. Phase II tests the model, which leads, for the next round of model improvement. The initial round deploys K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and Random Forest (RF) algorithms, respectively. The next round, guided by deep learning (DL) models, uses Logistic Regression (LG) of neural network and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) of recurrent neural network. The results, in precision-recall (PR) and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, validate the effectiveness of the proposed adversarial ML models. This work reveals the vulnerability in ML. At the same time, it shows the promise to protect critical infrastructure by studying the opponent strategies. Future work includes retraining the adversarial ML models with real-world datasets from pilot CAV sites.",
      "published": "2019-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/hst47167.2019.9032989",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prinkle Sharma",
        "David E. Austin",
        "Hong Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/hst47167.2019.9032989",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/i-smac58438.2023.10290472",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attribute-based Access Control for Secure Firmware Over-The-Air Updates in Vehicles",
      "description": "The vulnerability of modern connected vehicles stems from the fact that firmware updates are frequently downloaded wirelessly. By taking advantage of flaws in the update procedure, malicious actors can compromise vehicle systems and put the lives of drivers and passengers at risk. To secure communications between vehicles, this research details a method for employing Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). Secure and adaptable data sharing in decentralized settings is made possible by CP-ABE, a cryptographic technique. The goals of this study is to improve the state of the art for vehicular communication systems with regards to key revocation, attribute revocation, and efficient encryption and decryption performance. The proposed method can be broken down into three stages: publishing updates, choosing updates, and retrieving updates. The paper describes CP-ABE and discusses how it can be used for in-car communication. Current CP-ABE-based access control and location privacy schemes for vehicular communication are also discussed. The proposed methodology employs optimized algorithms and techniques to solve the problems of key revocation, attribute revocation, and efficient encryption and decryption performance. Furthermore, for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed method the AVISPA simulation tool is used that verify the correctness of the proposed scheme, proving its resilience to attacks.",
      "published": "2023-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/i-smac58438.2023.10290472",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Parth Shendkar",
        "Yash Undre",
        "A. Mahadik",
        "Manas Borse",
        "Rachana Yogesh Patil"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 7th International Conference on I-SMAC (IoT in Social, Mobile, Analytics and Cloud) (I-SMAC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/i-smac58438.2023.10290472",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.469,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/i-smac58438.2023.10290472 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: fact, location, access, privacy, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/i2cacis61270.2024.10649859",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driving Safely in the Digital Age: Securing Connected Cars Against Cyber Threats",
      "description": "The advent of connected vehicles, characterized by features such as internet connectivity, data sharing, and autonomous driving, represents a transformative shift in the automotive industry. This progression not only enhances user experiences but also signifies a pivotal advancement in vehicular technology. However, the escalating connectivity in these vehicles introduces substantial cybersecurity challenges, encompassing threats of unauthorized access, data breaches, and the potential for remote hijacking. These vulnerabilities underscore the imperative need for robust security measures to shield smart cars from cyber threats. This paper addresses these concerns through a comprehensive analysis of cybersecurity in connected vehicles, with a particular focus on identifying and mitigating risks. We advocate for a holistic approach that integrates efforts from industry, government, and academia to fortify vehicle security. Our methodology involves implementing UNEX hardware solutions in selected use cases, showcasing their effectiveness in securing communication between On-Board Units (OBU) and Roadside Units (RSU), while also enhancing intrusion detection systems. The experimental analysis specifically targets various cybersecurity aspects, employing real-world scenarios to validate the efficacy of the proposed solutions. The analysis revealed a vulnerability in OBU-RSU communication, as injected packets bypassed detection despite longer round-trip times (1.5 to 2.7 seconds). The paper establishes the high efficiency and accuracy of these solutions in safeguarding connected vehicles against cyber threats, offering a promising outlook for automotive cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2024-06-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/i2cacis61270.2024.10649859",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Saranya Jayakumar",
        "Ali Safaa Sadiq",
        "Safa Hamdare",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Automatic Control and Intelligent Systems (I2CACIS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/i2cacis61270.2024.10649859",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5203,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/i2cacis61270.2024.10649859 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: government, unauthorized, user, digital, access, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/i2ct54291.2022.9824254",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Android-Based Multifactor Authentication for Securing Passive Keyless Access System",
      "description": "Passive Keyless Entry System is a security system that allows a user to lock or unlock the vehicle without having to press any buttons on the keyfob. This PKE system is derived from existing remote keyless entry systems that utilise a remote key to lock or unlock the vehicle. Intrusion analysis and securing of this system are in line with defence monitoring in modern days. In this vein, securing the system against relay and replay attacks is addressed by this paper. Also, the keyfob used by the current system is computationally constrained to use stronger keys to effectively secure the system. To address this issue, an Android-based multi-factor authentication system is proposed that considers user activity, GPS based distancing and timestamp methods to validate the user over a secure Bluetooth channel before unlocking. Through a series of experiments, it is shown that the proposed system with the above-mentioned combination of factors is proven to be effective against relay and replay attacks.",
      "published": "2022-04-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/i2ct54291.2022.9824254",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intrusion",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aditya D Naik",
        "Ritvik Vibhu",
        "Udbhav P Saboji",
        "Vanisha R. M",
        "S Nagasundari",
        "Prasad B. Honnavalli"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference for Convergence in Technology (I2CT)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/i2ct54291.2022.9824254",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/i2ct61223.2024.10543867",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safety Warning for Electric Vehicle Charging Utilizing A-LSTM Algorithm",
      "description": "As the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) continues to surge, ensuring the security of EV charging infrastructure becomes increasingly crucial. This research paper delves into the utilization of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) algorithms for the analysis and enhancement of electric vehicle safety. LSTM, a form of recurrent neural network (RNN), proves especially adept at handling time series data—a critical factor in anticipating and averting security issues during the charging process. The article assesses the current state of electric vehicle safety, introduces the LSTM methodology, and presents findings from a study evaluating the efficacy of this approach in predicting and preventing accidents. The results underscore the algorithm’s capacity to robustly and reliably identify anomalies, thereby contributing to the overall safety and dependability of electric vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/i2ct61223.2024.10543867",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Y. Anil Kumar",
        "P. Arun",
        "T. Sri Rama Koushik",
        "N. Sai",
        "R. Ganesh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference for Convergence in Technology (I2CT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/i2ct61223.2024.10543867",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iacs.2017.7921990",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A protocol for a secure remote keyless entry system applicable in vehicles using symmetric-key cryptography",
      "description": "In our modern society, comfort became a standard. This comfort, especially in cars can only be achieved by equipping the car with more electronic devices. Some of the electronic devices must cooperate with each other and thus they require a communication channel, which can be wired or wireless. In these days, it would be hard to sell a new car operating with traditional keys. Almost all modern cars can be locked or unlocked with a Remote Keyless System. A Remote Keyless System consists of a key fob that communicates wirelessly with the car transceiver that is responsible for locking and unlocking the car. However there are several threats for wireless communication channels. This paper describes the possible attacks against a Remote Keyless System and introduces a secure protocol as well as a lightweight Symmetric Encryption Algorithm for a Remote Keyless Entry System applicable in vehicles.",
      "published": "2016-12-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iacs.2017.7921990",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tobias Glocker",
        "Timo J. Mantere",
        "Mohammed Salem Elmusrati"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information and Communication Systems (ICICS)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/iacs.2017.7921990",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iaecst64597.2024.11117791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fuzz Testing of Vehicle CAN Bus Based on Sequence Generative Adversarial Network",
      "description": "With the rapid development of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, computer vision, and image processing, modern cars have evolved from traditional transportation into new intelligent terminals, but the demand for safety and reliability remains unchanged. As the basic network for internal communication in vehicles, the CAN bus is the key targets of malicious attacks. Once invaded, it will cause serious security issues. Fuzz testing is an essential method for assessing the security level of CAN bus, which identifies CAN bus weaknesses and vulnerabilities at an early stage. However, in practical scenarios, it will face problems such as data explosion and protocol reverse difficulty. This paper proposes a fuzz testing approach based on sequence generative adversarial network (SeqGAN), which employs the dynamic game between the generator and the discriminator to extract the global features of the protocol for bypassing reverse parsing. In this way, the proposal can generate high-quality test data without communication matrix, which improve test efficiency significantly. Experimental results show that our approach is superior to the current mainstream solutions in terms of testing input pass and vulnerability mining.",
      "published": "2024-12-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iaecst64597.2024.11117791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guoli Cheng",
        "Jingwei Shang",
        "Lei Yun",
        "Yanjiao Ma",
        "Linfeng Du"
      ],
      "venue": "International Academic Exchange Conference on Science and Technology Innovation (IAECST)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iaecst64597.2024.11117791",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ias62731.2025.11061427",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing the Impact of Electric Vehicle Charging on Residential Distribution Grids",
      "description": "To achieve net-zero carbon emissions, electrification in the transportation sector plays an important role. Significant increase of electric vehicles (EV) has been observed nationally and globally. While the transition to EVs presents substantial environmental benefits, it would lead to several challenges to the power grid due to EV charging activities. Growing EVs greatly increase peak loads on distribution grids, particularly during evening charging periods. This surge can result in operational challenges, including greater voltage drops, increased power losses, and potential overloading violations, compromising grid reliability and efficiency. This study focuses on determining ampacity violations, and analyzing line loading levels in a 240-bus distribution system with 1120 customers, located in the Midwest U.S. By simulating a range of charging scenarios and evaluating EV chargers with varying power capacities under different distribution system voltage levels, this research aims to identify lines at risk of ampacity violations for various EV charging penetration rates up to 100%. The findings will provide valuable insights for utilities and grid operators, informing strategies for voltage level adjustments and necessary infrastructure reinforcements to effectively accommodate the growing energy demands associated with widespread EV adoption.",
      "published": "2025-06-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ias62731.2025.11061427",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elias Raffoul",
        "Xingpeng Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting (IAS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ias62731.2025.11061427",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ias62731.2025.11061545",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Reinforcement Learning based Smart Inverters in Microgrids with Electric Vehicle Charging Systems Considering False Data Injection Attacks Detection",
      "description": "The integration of electric vehicle (EV) charging systems into microgrids introduces complexities in energy management and vulnerability to cyber-attacks, such as false data injection attacks (FDIAs). Smart inverters play a critical role in regulating power flow and voltage stability but are susceptible to FDIAs that compromise grid reliability. This paper proposes a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based framework to enhance smart inverter operations in microgrids with EV charging while detecting FDIAs. The DRL agent optimizes real-time power dispatch and voltage regulation, simultaneously learning to identify anomalous data patterns indicative of attacks. By integrating detection mechanisms within the control strategy, the framework ensures resilient operation against malicious data manipulation. Results demonstrate the approach's effectiveness in maintaining operational efficiency and accurately detecting FDIAs. The proposed solution offers a robust, adaptive strategy for securing microgrids with high EV penetration against evolving cyber threats, ensuring both stability and security in decentralized energy systems.",
      "published": "2025-06-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ias62731.2025.11061545",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chou-Mo Yang",
        "Pei-Min Huang",
        "Chun‐Lien Su",
        "Mahmoud Elsisi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting (IAS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ias62731.2025.11061545",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iatmsi60426.2024.10503203",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Scalable Hybrid Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Engine for an Automotive Subsystem",
      "description": "Modern-day automobiles rely heavily on software capabilities to enhance user experience and comfort. With each passing day, the hardware and software complexity of these systems are rapidly growing. The advancement of driverless technologies and their dependency on software poses a major threat ie., the vulnerability of these systems to external bad agents, who look forward to compromising the system and extracting user-sensitive information or even taking control of these systems. Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) systems play an important role in detecting these security loopholes and aid in finding solutions to such vulnerabilities. In this research, we present a novel engine for TARA, which is a lightweight tool, deployable across the automotive supply chain, conforms to AUTOSAR standards, is easy to use, and caters to the needs of modern-day needs of security in the automotive domain. Our experiments with this methodology proved that it could detect security issues of Ethernet, making it relevant to the era of Automotive Ethernet.",
      "published": "2024-03-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iatmsi60426.2024.10503203",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S Shrinidhi Rao",
        "Subir Kumar Roy"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches in Technology and Management for Social Innovation (IATMSI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iatmsi60426.2024.10503203",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iavvc57316.2023.10328098",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Data-Driven Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Deep Learning (DL) is a growing technological frontier supporting many autonomous driving applications. Past decade with the growth in deep learning concepts and models, we also witnessed a growth in cyber-security concerns related to these models. Adversarial attacks are well-known attacks on these models where slight noise/ perturbations are introduced with the input image, forcing the DL models to misclassify with high confidence. These are significant threats and concerns when using DL models for real-world autonomous vehicle applications. However, various defensive mechanisms have been suggested to improve the resiliency of these models. In this study, we worked on the LISA dataset and tested with four transfer learning models, EfficientNet, SqueezeNet, ResNet-18 and Inception-V3, with accuracies of 95%, 95%, 94% and 97%, respectively. Based on the severity of adversarial attacks, we selected three attacks, Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Basic Iterative Method (BIM) and Project Gradient Descent (PGD) attacks ranging from less intensive to highly intensive adversarial attacks. When subjected to FGSM, BIM, and PGD attacks, we discovered that the model performance for EfficientNet decreased to 92%, 38%, and 50%, that for SqueezeNet decreased to 87%, 53%, and 59%, that for ResNet-18 decreased to 95%, 53%, and 49%, and that for Inception-V3decreased to 93%, 45%, and 56%. respectively. The combination of Total Variance Minimization and Spatial Smoothing was determined to be the most effective defensive method combination to increase performance during adversarial attacks. Despite only slight improvements in the performance of FGSM attacks, all models significantly outperformed during BIM and PGD attacks, with performance accuracy of 83% and higher.",
      "published": "2023-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iavvc57316.2023.10328098",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omar A. Azim",
        "Lex Baker",
        "Reek Majumder",
        "Abyad Enan",
        "Sakib Mahmud Khan",
        "Mashrur A. Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Automated Vehicle Validation Conference (IAVVC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iavvc57316.2023.10328098",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iavvc61942.2025.11219527",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Model-Driven Approach to UN R155 Security Compliance Arguments",
      "description": "With UN R155, a regulatory framework for automotive cybersecurity has been established. This regulation and supporting standards, including ISO/SAE 21434, represent a harmonized effort to define universally applicable security requirements to ensure cybersecurity in vehicles. Adopting and leveraging security artifacts from engineering phases to argue compliance is a necessary next step toward deploying security-compliant connected vehicles. UN R155 approval as part of roadworthiness assessments requires a demonstration of evidence that security requirements are met. The primary challenge for vehicle manufacturers is to determine whether their security concept aligns with UN R155 and provides sufficient protection against cyberattacks. Bridging the gap between engineering artifacts and compliance arguments, this work examines how security modeling can provide a structured set of evidence considering mandatory UN R155 threats. We build on an existing security modeling approach and show how the resulting model is applied to derive evidence for compliance arguments and support the justification of roadworthiness regarding the cybersecurity of connected vehicles. Overall, this approach enables an automated collection of security evidence and provides a model-driven argumentation framework, aiding manufacturers and regulators in demonstrating compliance with UN R155 vehicle type requirements.",
      "published": "2025-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iavvc61942.2025.11219527",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mona Hellstern",
        "Florian Sommer",
        "Reiner Kriesten"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Automated Vehicle Validation Conference (IAVVC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iavvc61942.2025.11219527",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3969,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iavvc61942.2025.11219527 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collection, primary, next, regulatory, requires, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ic2sdt62152.2024.10695991",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simuhack : A Realistic Attack Simulation Framework for Enhancing Cybersecurity in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "As autonomous driving technology advances, modern vehicles are evolving into sophisticated digital systems. This evolution introduces new challenges for ensuring safety and security in vehicle design, particularly concerning smart sensors, Electronic Control Units (ECUs), and in-vehicle communications. Addressing these challenges requires robust security measures to mitigate potential attacks. However, real-world testing of these systems is both complex and costly. To overcome this hurdle, proposed the Simuhack framework within the CARLA software, which simulates attack datasets for comprehensive security analysis in vehicle design. Simuhack facilitates the creation of realistic attack scenarios, including GPS spoofing, V2X attacks, ECU attacks, and Replay and Bogus Information attacks commonly encountered in modern vehicles. We demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of our framework by evaluating five cyber attack scenarios using the LGSVL simulation software. Our findings underscore the critical importance of proactive security measures in safeguarding autonomous driving systems against potential cyber threats.",
      "published": "2024-08-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ic2sdt62152.2024.10695991",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "D. Kiruthika",
        "K. A. Kameshwari",
        "G. Ananthi"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 First International Conference on Pioneering Developments in Computer Science & Digital Technologies (IC2SDT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ic2sdt62152.2024.10695991",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ic3ecsbhi63591.2025.10991327",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Wireless Power Transfer Technologies for Electric Vehicle Charging Application: A Review",
      "description": "With the fusion of fossil fuels coming to an end, we are transitioning towards sustainable powers like Electric Vehicles (EVs) which have no emissions. EVs can take a long time to charge and plug-in chargers are slow and hit-or-miss. A plausible solution to this problem is Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) as it can charge devices without any physical connection and thus easier, convenient and safer. Wireless power transfer has existed, in theatrically demonstrated form (thanks to Nikola Tesla) since at least the 1890s and is currently used for EV charging while static or even dynamic. This is all good and well, but dynamic charging adds cost. Additionally, coil misalignment and efficiency loss are challenges to be faced by WPT but security measures have been developed throughout the years that make it more effective. This solution also offers safe and low-cost handling, but operates optimally over short distances. With continued advancements, it could fundamentally change how our EVs are charged for a cleaner and greener future. With ongoing technological progress, it has the potential to overcome its current limitations and become the leading charging solution for EVs, ultimately contributing to a cleaner and greener future. As advancements continue, it could fundamentally transform the way we charge our EVs.",
      "published": "2025-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ic3ecsbhi63591.2025.10991327",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tejas Bharat Khatal",
        "Yogesh Minanath Wani",
        "Vaishnavi Kacheshwar Deokar",
        "Kunal Vijay Borse",
        "Fareed Ahmad"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cognitive Computing in Engineering, Communications, Sciences and Biomedical Health Informatics (IC3ECSBHI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ic3ecsbhi63591.2025.10991327",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icact67549.2025.11351420",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Powered Vehicle-to-Everything Communication for Next-Generation Intelligent Transportation Networks",
      "description": "This study indicates that the blockchain-powered vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication system outperforms standard and mixed V2X systems. In this era of smart transportation networks, automobiles, roadside units (RSUs), and other infrastructure must communicate securely and efficiently. Blockchain technology is beneficial for data accuracy, security, and growth. This article offers a decentralized, multi-layered solution to secure communication using cryptography tools, including public-private key pairs, digital signatures, and reputation-based trust management. The system's consensus technique adds only proven, immutable data to the blockchain. This fosters trust and transparency. Blockchain-powered V2X always outperforms conventional techniques in scale, latency, traffic, security, stability, fault tolerance, and interoperability. With more connected autos, it performs well. Communication is quicker for time-sensitive work and more secure and private. The autonomous system reduces energy utilization and faults. Blockchain-powered V2X can verify data, expand it, and integrate with other technologies. This makes it ideal for smart transportation networks.",
      "published": "2025-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icact67549.2025.11351420",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bhulakshmi Makkena",
        "Noori Memon",
        "Sai Charan Madugula",
        "Zein Bassam Bani Younes",
        "Preeti Sharma Nair"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Advanced Computing Technologies (ICACT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icact67549.2025.11351420",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icaica63239.2024.10823030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on OTA Upgrade of Vehicle Ethernet Signal Module Based on Python",
      "description": "To address the challenge of prolonged vehicle OTA technology upgrade processes, this study presents a Python-based in-car Ethernet signal module designed specifically for data transmission and processing in automotive OTA upgrade applications. The module supports the Ethernet communication protocol, enabling efficient, high-speed, and reliable data transmission. Additionally, it ensures enhanced stability and robust security, meeting the stringent requirements of automotive environments. By integrating this module, the efficiency of OTA updates can be significantly improved, reducing downtime and enhancing user experience. The proposed solution demonstrates its potential as a vital component in modern automotive technology systems, paving the way for smarter and more connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-11-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icaica63239.2024.10823030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhu Yongjian",
        "Muzhapa Mutalifu",
        "Wang Manna",
        "Kexun He"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Computer Applications (ICAICA)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icaica63239.2024.10823030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icaiic51459.2021.9415261",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on Attack Pattern Generation and Hybrid MR-IDS for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The CAN (Controller Area Network) bus, which transmits and receives ECU control information in vehicle, has a critical risk of external intrusion because there is no standardized security system. Recently, the need for IDS (Intrusion Detection System) to detect external intrusion of CAN bus is increasing, and high accuracy and real-time processing for intrusion detection are required. In this paper, we propose Hybrid MR (Machine learning and Ruleset) -IDS based on machine learning and ruleset to improve IDS performance. For high accuracy and detection rate, feature engineering was conducted based on the characteristics of the CAN bus, and the generated features were used in detection step. The proposed Hybrid MR-IDS can cope to various attack patterns that have not been learned in previous, as well as the learned attack patterns by using both advantages of rule set and machine learning. In addition, by collecting CAN data from an actual vehicle in driving and stop state, five attack scenarios including physical effects during all driving cycle are generated. Finally, the Hybrid MR-IDS proposed in this paper shows an average of 99% performance based on F1-score.",
      "published": "2021-04-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icaiic51459.2021.9415261",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "D. Kang",
        "Sang-Hun Yoon",
        "D. Shin",
        "Young Yoon",
        "H. Kim",
        "Soohyun Jang"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Signal Processing and Signal Processing Education Workshop",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icaiic51459.2021.9415261",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icaiic68212.2026.11454400",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Tamperproof Quantum-Inspired Hierarchical Federated Learning for Side-Channel Security in 6G Resource-Constrained V2X Communications",
      "description": "This paper proposes a tamperproof Quantum-Inspired Federated Learning (QiFL) framework for side-channel attack mitigation in resource-constrained V2X networks. Phase 1 demonstrates that a tensor-network-based QiFL model achieves comparable guessing entropy to a conventional CNN while reducing parameters by approximately 95.8% and accelerating hierarchical federated training by $3.6 \\times$. Phase 2 integrates cryptographic authentication, anomaly-aware Byzantine-robust aggregation, and quantum-inspired security layers into a hierarchical FL architecture. A qubit (tensor-rank) ablation study shows that a 1-qubit QiFL configuration preserves security-level performance with minimal parameters and runtime, validating its suitability for vehicular edge-cloud deployment.",
      "published": "2026-02-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icaiic68212.2026.11454400",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Ajakwe",
        "Dong-Seong Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Signal Processing and Signal Processing Education Workshop",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icaiic68212.2026.11454400",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icara51699.2021.9376542",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Approach of Scenario-Based Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Over-the-Air updates for an Autonomous Vehicle",
      "description": "To provide overall safety to the automotive domain both vehicle safety and security need to be considered. Cybersecurity is a key to define the quality of the autonomous vehicle by introducing safe and secure development and risk assessment. The implementation of the Over-The-Air (OTA) updates in the automotive industry brought many facilities to the drier and the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The amount of cost-saving from OTA for OEMs is assumed over several billion. So, research is essential for safe and secure OTA updates in the autonomous vehicle. However, Highly Automated Driving Functions (HADFs) have already raised the necessity of secure development because a threat can lead to harm in certain scenarios including the functional insufficiencies as mentioned in Safety Of The Intended Functionality (SOTIF) of the system. Scenario-based Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) is extensively used in automated vehicle systems and can support for further development of scenario-based threat analysis for OTA updates. Additionally, the scenario-based analysis represents the alliance of safety and security during product development. Therefore, this paper illustrates the scenario-based analysis and assessment of threats including the OTA feature. Furthermore, demonstrates the processes step-by-step to perform Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) against potential vulnerabilities to obtain a set of cybersecurity goals for a HADF.",
      "published": "2021-02-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icara51699.2021.9376542",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marzana Khatun",
        "Michael Glaß",
        "Rolf Jung"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Automation, Robotics and Applications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icara51699.2021.9376542",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icassp48485.2024.10447854",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Localization of Key Fob Using Channel Impulse Response of Ultra Wide Band Sensors for Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Using neural networks for localization of key fob within and surrounding a car as a security feature for keyless entry is fast emerging. In this paper we study: 1) the performance of pre-computed features of neural networks based UWB (ultra wide band) localization classification forming the baseline of our experiments. 2) Investigate the inherent robustness of various neural networks; therefore, we include the study of robustness of the adversarial examples without any adversarial training in this work. 3) Propose a multi-head self-supervised neural network architecture which outperforms the baseline neural networks without any adversarial training. The model’s performance improved by 67% at certain ranges of adversarial magnitude for fast gradient sign method and 37% each for basic iterative method and projected gradient descent method.",
      "published": "2024-03-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icassp48485.2024.10447854",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abhiram Kolli",
        "Filippo Casamassima",
        "Horst Possegger",
        "Horst Bischof"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icassp48485.2024.10447854",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icbaie49996.2020.00048",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on cyber security Technology and Test Method of OTA for Intelligent Connected Vehicle",
      "description": "As the development of automotive intelligent and networking, OTA technology has become an important means of remote upgrade of connected cars. However, cyber security problems have not been solved in the OTA upgrade process of the connected cars. The lack of data protection strategy and testing methods seriously hinder the application of OTA upgrade. This paper takes the typical connected car OTA upgrade system architecture as a case and analyzes the architecture and upgrade process of the connected vehicle OTA upgrade system. And this paper researches the cyber security threat model of the OTA upgrade systems. This paper proposes an all-around protection strategy for OTA upgrade system cyber security of connected vehicle. This paper proposes a comprehensive and implementable test evaluation method basing on the professional darkroom. The results provide reference for OTA-based intelligent connected vehicle.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icbaie49996.2020.00048",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kexun He",
        "Wang Changyuan",
        "Yanyan Han",
        "Fang Xiyu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Internet of Things Engineering (ICBAIE)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icbaie49996.2020.00048",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icbctis55569.2022.00042",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Electric Vehicle Charging Transaction Model Based on Blockchain",
      "description": "In recent years, electric vehicles have achieved rapid development, but the problems of transaction trust and data security have also followed. Therefore, this paper proposes a blockchain-based electric vehicle charging transaction model, and designs the network and transaction process of alliance blockchain supporting multi charging operators. The Hyperledger Fabric blockchain network solves the interconnection problem of different operators' devices, ensures the security and transparency of the transaction. Besides, this paper designs a Service Billing Model based on the user's reputation, and implements it with smart contract. From the results, the model well simulates the impact of user reputation on the service fee. It ensures the profitability and sustainable operation of the platform, and encourages users to improve their reputation, which is helpful for the efficient and stable operation of the transaction platform.",
      "published": "2022-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icbctis55569.2022.00042",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaoyong Guo",
        "Kailin Wang",
        "Yongliang Li",
        "Zhenhua Yan",
        "Xuwei Xia"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Blockchain Technology and Information Security (ICBCTIS)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icbctis55569.2022.00042",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icbds67396.2025.11376648",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Based Security Mechanism for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication plays a pivotal role in enabling intelligent transportation systems and autonomous driving. However, it is vulnerable to various security threats such as message tampering, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks. This paper proposes a blockchainbased security framework for V2X communication that leverages decentralized trust, immutability, and smart contracts to enhance data integrity, authentication, and trust management. A detailed literature review with 15 recent studies is conducted, followed by a proposed architecture and implementation methodology. The results demonstrate that blockchain integration significantly improves security, though certain challenges remain in terms of scalability and latency. The paper concludes with future directions for optimizing blockchain applications in vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2025-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icbds67396.2025.11376648",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vaishali G Waghmode",
        "Madhuri J Siddharapu",
        "Amruta V Patil",
        "Madhav J. Salunkhe"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Distributed Systems Security (ICBDS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icbds67396.2025.11376648",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc-robins64345.2025.11086226",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Digital Twins in Autonomous Vehicles: Cyber Threats, Mitigation Strategies, and Innovative Security Solutions",
      "description": "Digital Twin (DT) technology in the Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) has revolutionized vehicle design, predictive maintenance, and real-time decision-making. For instance, by virtualizing physical assets, Digital Twins allow for optimization based on data, and learning in a simulation context. However, integration poses risks such as cyber-attacks in various forms: a data breach, sensor spoofing, adversarial attack, ransomware, and even model poisoning. These vulnerabilities would lead to the unauthorized access of systems, operational failure, and decision-making compromise, with a threat to the safety and reliability of the AV ecosystems. This review work provides a comprehensive analysis of the challenges in DT-enabled AVs from the cybersecurity standpoint, focusing on key attack surfaces such as cloud-based DT platforms, AI-driven analytics, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. In fact, it further advances cutting-edge mitigation strategies such as blockchain-based authentication, federated learning for secure model training, AI-driven intrusion detection, and quantumresistant cryptographic techniques.",
      "published": "2025-06-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc-robins64345.2025.11086226",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "L. Kumar",
        "Amit Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Cloud Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc-robins64345.2025.11086226",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc.2016.7511098",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A simple intrusion detection method for controller area network",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is established as the main communication channel inside vehicles. CAN relies on frame broadcast to share data between different microcontrollers managing critical or comfort functions such as cruise control or air conditioning. CAN is distinguished by its simplicity, its real-time application compatibility and its low deployment cost. However, CAN major drawback is its lack of security support. That is, CAN fails to provide protections against attacks such as intrusion, denial of service or impersonation. We propose in this work a simple intrusion detection method for CAN. Our main idea is to make each microcontroller monitor the CAN bus to detect malicious frames.",
      "published": "2016-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc.2016.7511098",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aymen Boudguiga",
        "Witold Klaudel",
        "Antoine Boulanger",
        "Pascal Chiron"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc.2016.7511098",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc.2019.8761788",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy-Preserving Electric Vehicle Charging for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Ecosystems",
      "description": "The proliferation of renewable energy systems and high-capacity batteries has enabled customers to trade their excess energy on the market in a peer-to-peer manner through the smart grid. At the same time, electric vehicles (EVs) are enjoying widespread acceptance, leading to a higher demand for charging stations. In this paper, we propose a system where energy traders and EV owners collectively work to satisfy the energy demands of EVs. Specifically, energy traders make bids to EV owners who, in turn, reserve their preferred charging station for a specific period of time. To protect the privacy of EV owners, we also introduce an anonymous payment system that cannot link individual owners to specific charging locations. Finally, to guarantee the security and transparency of the entire system, we store all transactions on a consortium blockchain that is managed by the energy traders and the financial institutions that support the anonymous payment system. Our experimental results indicate that the overhead of the cryptographic operations involved in the major transactions is low, in terms of both computational and communication cost.",
      "published": "2019-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc.2019.8761788",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eman Mohammed Radi",
        "Noureddine Lasla",
        "Spiridon Bakiras",
        "Mohamed M. E. A. Mahmoud"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc.2019.8761788",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc40277.2020.9148649",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "STRIDE: Scalable and Secure Over-The-Air Software Update Scheme for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Current trends forecast that Over-The-Air (OTA) software updates will be highly significant for future autonomous vehicles. The OTA update will enable fast distribution of software updates and fixing bugs in the embedded software installed on its electronic control units. However, in terms of security, OTA updates are highly critical due to complexity, numerous attack surfaces, and unsafe and old techniques. In addition, OTA updates must be scalable to large number of vehicles without incurring additional network bandwidth. In this work, we propose STRIDE, a scheme for OTA software updates over cloud that is secure against malicious attacks while being scalable to concurrent software updates in a large number of vehicles. STRIDE enables fast and secure distribution of update packages from software providers to vehicles. STRIDE ensures end-to-end security using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. We evaluate the performance of our proposal through extensive experiments. Experimental results show that STRIDE significantly reduces the overheads, without compromising the network load and software update retrieval time than the best performed scheme in the state-of-the-art.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc40277.2020.9148649",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amrita Ghosal",
        "Subir Halder",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc40277.2020.9148649",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc42927.2021.9500246",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Targeted Discreditation Attack against Trust Management in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication systems in the U.S. rely on IEEE 1609.2 security protocols for message authentication using digital signatures. A key requirement for trust management in such systems is the ability to detect misbehaving vehicles, e.g., when vehicles are repeatedly forging signatures. However, this creates a new attack surface where receivers cannot determine whether the causes of signature verification failures are indeed malicious attacks. In this paper, we present our novel, open-source, USRP-based testbed and utilize it to demonstrate how a stealthy reactive jammer can exploit this vulnerability. Our novel, targeted attack is highly efficient (even given the short validity period for vehicle pseudonyms) and difficult to detect. Our experimental results show that our attack can successfully discredit a victim in prominent misbehavior detection schemes with just two minutes of jamming. Finally, we discuss the capabilities and extensibility of our testbed as well as the challenges of potential attack mitigation techniques.",
      "published": "2021-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc42927.2021.9500246",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Geoff Twardokus",
        "Jaime Ponicki",
        "Samantha Baker",
        "Peter Carenzo",
        "Hanif Rahbari",
        "Sumita Mishra"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc42927.2021.9500246",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3911,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icc42927.2021.9500246 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: targeted, ability, trust, even, digital, well, where, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc45041.2023.10279368",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated Learning for Zero-Day Attack Detection in 5G and Beyond V2X Networks",
      "description": "Deploying Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) on top of 5G and Beyond networks (5GB) makes them vulnerable to increasing vectors of security and privacy attacks. In this context, a wide range of advanced machine/deep learning-based solutions have been designed to accurately detect security attacks. Specifically, supervised learning techniques have been widely applied to train attack detection models. However, the main limitation of such solutions is their inability to detect attacks different from those seen during the training phase, or new attacks, also called zero-day attacks. Moreover, training the detection model requires significant data collection and labeling, which increases the communication overhead, and raises privacy concerns. To address the aforementioned limits, we propose in this paper a novel detection mechanism that leverages the ability of the deep auto-encoder method to detect attacks relying only on the benign network traffic pattern. Using federated learning, the proposed intrusion detection system can be trained with large and diverse benign network traffic, while preserving the CAVs' privacy, and minimizing the communication overhead. The in-depth experiment on a recent network traffic dataset shows that the proposed system achieved a high detection rate while minimizing the false positive rate, and the detection delay.",
      "published": "2023-05-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc45041.2023.10279368",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelaziz Amara Korba",
        "Abdelwahab Boualouache",
        "Bouziane Brik",
        "Rabah Rahal",
        "Y. Ghamri-Doudane",
        "Sidi Mohammed Senouci"
      ],
      "venue": "ICC 2023 - IEEE International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc45041.2023.10279368",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 46,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838655",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated-LSTM based Network Intrusion Detection Method for Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has enabled intelligent services for connected vehicles such as advanced driver assistance and autonomous vehicles. However, due to the multiple external communication interfaces, intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) are vulnerable to malicious network intrusion attacks. The malicious attackers can not only remotely intrude into the in-vehicle networks (IVNs) and control the compromised vehicles, but also invade the neighboring vehicles through IoV. To protect the compromised vehicles from being manipulated, a novel federated long short-term memory (LSTM) neural network-based IVN intrusion detection method is proposed in this paper. Specifically, based on the periodicity of the ID sequence of IVN messages, an LSTM neural network model is built for the incoming message ID prediction, and an ID prediction-based network intrusion detection method is developed subsequently. Moreover, an FL framework working in client-server mode is built for secure and efficient LSTM neural network model training in IoV systems. In the framework, ICVs work as the clients for local model training, and base stations (BSs) equipped with mobile edge computing (MEC) servers are the parameter servers for global model parameter aggregation. Simulations have been conducted based on the practical dataset. The numerical results indicate that the detection accuracy of the federated-LSTM based method on spoofing, replay, drop, and DoS attacks is beyond 90%.",
      "published": "2022-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838655",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tianqi Yu",
        "Guodong Hua",
        "Huaisheng Wang",
        "Jianfeng Yang",
        "Jianling Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838655",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3908,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838655 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: servers, services, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838780",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Transfer Learning and Optimized CNN Based Intrusion Detection System for Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles, including autonomous vehicles and connected vehicles, are increasingly connected to the external world, which enables various functionalities and services. However, the improving connectivity also increases the attack surfaces of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), causing its vulnerabilities to cyber-threats. Due to the lack of authentication and encryption procedures in vehicular networks, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are essential approaches to protect modern vehicle systems from network attacks. In this paper, a transfer learning and ensemble learning-based IDS is proposed for IoV systems using convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and hyper-parameter optimization techniques. In the experiments, the proposed IDS has demonstrated over 99.25% detection rates and F1-scores on two well-known public benchmark IoV security datasets: the Car-Hacking dataset and the CICIDS2017 dataset. This shows the effectiveness of the proposed IDS for cyber-attack detection in both intra-vehicle and external vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2022-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838780",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Yang",
        "Abdallah A. Shami"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838780",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 179,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3874,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icc45855.2022.9838780 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc51166.2024.10623113",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Intrusion Detection System in CAN Bus through Multi-Scale Feature Fusion",
      "description": "Over the past few decades, as vehicles have become increasingly intelligent, the applications of in-vehicle electronic systems have expanded significantly. However, with the growing complexity of vehicle networks, there is an ever-increasing concern for their network security. In particular, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus has become a critical medium for communication between various Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within a vehicle. Since the design of the CAN bus lacks sufficient security measures, it is vulnerable to various network intrusions. To address this security challenge, researchers have been searching for ways to enhance the network security of the CAN bus to ensure that vehicle systems are not compromised by unauthorized access or network attacks. This paper introduces a robust intrusion detection system (IDS) for the CAN bus in vehicles, employing a novel Multi-Scale Feature Fusion technique. Leveraging the distinct capabilities of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), and Transformer neural network architectures, the proposed methodology adeptly captures and prioritizes both shallow and deep features of CAN bus data. Besides, it enhances detection accuracy and robustness against various cyber-attacks. Evaluation on the Carhacking dataset demonstrates superior performance, achieving a precision, recall, and F1-score of 100%. Verified by an ablation study, this approach promises a substantial advancement in safeguarding in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2024-06-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc51166.2024.10623113",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jianhua Zhou",
        "Sifan Li",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Hassan Jalil Hadi",
        "Hai Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc51166.2024.10623113",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc52391.2025.11160828",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GFuzz4CAN: A Generative Model-based Fuzzing Method for In-vehicle Controller Area Network",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) bus has been the fundamental communication method to interconnect the critical powertrain and body domains in vehicles for decades. Typical in-vehicle CAN buses employ rule-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to prevent non-compliant CAN messages for security enhancement. However, as the progress of connected autonomous vehicular techniques, more undiscovered vulnerabilities behind CAN IDS are gradually exposed, causing severe threats to vehicle safety, even threatening human life. To address it, fuzzing has become an efficient security testing method to automatically explore unknown vulnerabilities underlying the in-vehicle CAN bus. Existing fuzzing methods either conduct time-consuming random testing that is easily detected by IDS, causing inefficient vulnerability exploration, or rely on precious expert experience for higher efficiency. Instead, this paper turns to seek the power of deep generative models that automatically learn the data communication protocol for compliant fuzzing sample generation. Such a method both releases the experts' knowledge of reverse engineering, and can generate compliant samples to bypass typical rule-based IDS. To further improve the efficiency of exploring exceptions based on the generated samples, we optimize the reward function of SeqGAN with Extreme Value Theory (EVT), to fit the distribution of exception samples. With the trained model, we design a fuzzing system GFuzz4CAN, and conduct extensive experiments for evaluation. Experimental results on open-source datasets and a CAN bus device demonstrate that GFuzz4CAN can achieve$2 \\sim 11 \\mathrm{x}$higher efficiency compared to byte-level random fuzzing, and is feasible to identify 2 vulnerabilities on the device.",
      "published": "2025-06-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc52391.2025.11160828",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuhan Wu",
        "Lu Li",
        "Yuli Wu",
        "Shuguo Zhuo",
        "Zhan Qin",
        "Kui Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc52391.2025.11160828",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587579",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analyzing the Impact of Adversarial Attacks on C-V2X-Enabled Road Safety: An Age of Information Perspective",
      "description": "The Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X), introduced and developed by the 3GPP, is a promising technology for the Autonomous Driving System (ADS). C-V2X aims to fulfill the Service-Level Requirements (SLRs) of ADS to ensure road safety following the development of the latest version, i.e., the NR-V2X. However, vulnerabilities threatening road safety in NR-V2X persist that have yet to be investigated. Existing research primarily evaluates road safety based on successful packet receptions. In this work, we propose a novel resource starvation attack that exploits vulnerabilities in the resource allocation of NR-V2X to diminish the required SLRs, making the road condition unsafe for autonomous driving. Furthermore, we establish the Age of Information (AoI) as the predominant metric for estimating the impact of adversarial attacks on NR-V2X by constructing a Discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) based analytical model and validating it through extensive simulations. Finally, our analysis underscores how the proposed attack on NR-V2X can lead to unsafe driving conditions by reducing the SLR of time-sensitive applications in ADS up to 15% from the target. Additionally, we observe that even benign vehicles act selfishly when resources are scarce, leading to further safety compromises.",
      "published": "2026-03-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587579",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahmudul Hassan Ashik",
        "Moinul Hossain"
      ],
      "venue": "ICC 2026 - IEEE International Conference on Communications, Glasgow, United Kingdom, 2026, pp. 1-6",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587579",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587647",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Beyond Arbitrary Thresholds: Conformal Prediction for Trustworthy CAN Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) traffic increasingly employ data-driven models to detect abnormal communication patterns. These systems learn normal behavior and trigger alarms when reconstruction errors exceed a predefined threshold, which is typically chosen heuristically without statistical justification. This paper reinterprets this threshold-based approach through the lens of conformal prediction, establishing a rigorous theoretical foundation for anomaly detection in CAN traffic. We demonstrate that selecting a percentile of benign reconstruction errors is equivalent to conformal calibration under exchangeability assumptions. Violations of this assumption caused by attacks or abnormal behavior are detected when nonconformity scores exceed the calibrated quantile, reframing anomaly detection as a test for distributional shift. We evaluate multiple nonconformity measures (MSE, MAE, and MaxAE) and propose an online calibration mechanism with an adaptive threshold for handling drift. This post-hoc update adapts the decision cutoff at inference time without retraining the base detector, improving F1-scores from 0.70 to 0.91 on DoS/Fuzzing attacks while reducing false alarms from benign drift. Experimental validation on the HCRL Car-Hacking dataset confirms that our conformal framework delivers statistically principled and reliable CAN bus intrusion detection.",
      "published": "2026-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anthony Nasry Massaad",
        "Aleksandar Avdalović",
        "Peyton Andras",
        "Joseph Khoury",
        "Elias Bou‐Harb"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587647",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587977",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Low-Overhead Phase-Based Ranging for Sub-GHz Wireless Systems Using Fractional-N PLL",
      "description": "Remote keyless entry (RKE) systems are widely adopted in modern vehicles for their convenience, but they remain vulnerable to relay attacks that exploit wireless channels. Wireless ranging between the key fob and the vehicle has been recognized as an effective countermeasure. We have previously proposed a bidirectional sub-GHz ranging technique based on phase detection. However, implementing such phase-based ranging on existing transceiver System-on-Chips (SoCs) typically requires redesigning the transmitter and receiver architectures, which leads to increased development time and the loss of established design advantages. This paper proposes a novel phase-based ranging method that requires no modification to the RF/analog architecture of the existing transceiver. The key idea is to estimate and compensate for the initial phase variation of the internal local oscillator (LO) caused by switching between transmission and reception frequencies. The proposed method introduces a duplicated integrator within the delta-sigma modulator of a fractional-N phase-locked loop (PLL). The duplicated integrator continues operating independently of frequency changes, enabling accurate estimation of the initial LO phase variation by comparing its integral value with that of the original integrator. The proposed approach preserves the proven transceiver design, leveraging its established advantages while significantly reducing development time while maintaining low power consumption and compact SoC implementation. Simulation results demonstrate that accurate phase-based ranging can be achieved without architectural redesign, making the proposed method well-suited for secure and efficient wireless ranging in RKE and similar IoT applications.",
      "published": "2026-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587977",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "exploit",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Masaki Nishikawa",
        "Shoji Otaka",
        "Ichiro Seto",
        "Tomoaki Otsuki"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Communications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icc59461.2026.11587977",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icca59364.2023.10401797",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced Multi-Level Secure Over-the-Air Update System using Adaptive AUTOSAR",
      "description": "Vehicles are majorly controlled by software run on ECUs rather than traditional mechanical components. This software is becoming very complex, adding and offering many new features. The main challenge for manufacturers is to ensure that new updates that fix bugs and add new features are done safely and quickly in the vehicle. Over-the-air (OTA) updates are the more modern solution after going to repair garage and using a wired diagnostics tester. It takes advantage of using it in modern vehicles, especially after the release of the Adaptive AUTOSAR platform which is characterized by dynamic and scalability. Applying these great features creates some challenges and risks that must be considered such as security. In this paper, we propose a solution of a multi-level security system for over-the-air updates over the Adaptive AUTOSAR platform connected with the cloud. This system interacts with the user through the mobile phone to accept or decline the updates.",
      "published": "2023-11-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icca59364.2023.10401797",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autosar",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mona Helmy",
        "Mohamed Mahmoud"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer and Applications (ICCA)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icca59364.2023.10401797",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icca66035.2025.11430854",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring the DoIP Protocol in Automotive Systems Architecture and Deployment Challenges",
      "description": "The increasing digitalization of the automotive sector and the transition toward electric vehicles (EVs) have introduced unprecedented requirements for scalable, high-bandwidth, and secure diagnostic communication. Diagnostics over Internet Protocol (DoIP), standardized in ISO 13400, emerges as a central enabler by leveraging Ethernet and IP-based networking to extend diagnostic workflows beyond traditional workshop tools. In contrast to legacy field buses such as CAN, LIN, or FlexRay, DoIP offers native compatibility with modern IT infrastructures, supporting Over-the-Air (OTA) software updates, cloud integration, and advanced fleet monitoring. These features are particularly relevant in EVs, where reliable diagnostics are critical for optimizing battery management systems (BMS), ensuring powertrain safety, and enabling predictive maintenance strategies. Furthermore, DoIP facilitates real-time data processing when combined with fog computing, enabling low-latency interventions for safety-critical functions and integration with Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services. The contribution of this paper is the proposal of a distributed computing-based diagnostic architecture, which integrates DoIP with fog and cloud resources to enhance scalability, security, and resilience. Despite these opportunities, challenges remain regarding cybersecurity vulnerabilities, deployment cost, and incomplete global standardization. This paper highlights both opportunities and obstacles, positioning DoIP as a cornerstone for future software-defined and connected mobility.",
      "published": "2025-12-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icca66035.2025.11430854",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "flexray",
        "resilience",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Imen Bouzarkouna",
        "Marwen Aouini"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer and Applications (ICCA)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icca66035.2025.11430854",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icca66035.2025.11430990",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Your EV Is Talking Behind Your Back: How Token-Based Security Can Protect Driver Privacy",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) generate unprecedented volumes of user data, including driving patterns, location histories, and charging behaviors, raising significant privacy concerns. This study introduces a novel token-based security framework for EV charging infrastructure that leverages hardware-backed tokenization to protect personally identifiable information (PII) while maintaining grid efficiency. The framework employs AES-256 encryption with hardware security modules (HSMs) to generate single-use tokens and implements controlled state-of-charge (SoC) reporting with ±2% random offset to prevent pattern inference while enabling grid optimization. Compatible with Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 2.0 and Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI) 2.2 standards, this solution ensures inter-operability across heterogeneous charging networks and complies with global privacy regulations, including GDPR, CCPA, PIPL, and DPDP.",
      "published": "2025-12-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icca66035.2025.11430990",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "gdpr",
        "ocpp",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prem Akula",
        "Karthik Pappu",
        "Akshay Mittal"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conferences on Computing Advancements",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icca66035.2025.11430990",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccar.2019.8813479",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Intelligent Diagnosis Strategy and Treatment Method of ev Charging Fault",
      "description": "With electric cars, large-scale development, in order to reduce the potential safety hazard in the process of electric vehicle charging, in this paper, by analyzing the power battery, charging pile, power supply equipment integration between safety mechanism, puts forward the integration of fault logic judgment business process, established a multistage equipment integration on-line fault diagnosis of the fault tree, making the integration of fault judging module and fault processing module, information mining and integrated warning index pretreatment technology is studied, which can effectively improve the electric car charging security, promote the healthy development of electric vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccar.2019.8813479",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hui Gao",
        "Xianhai Meng",
        "Kejun Qian",
        "Weiguo Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Control, Automation and Robotics (ICCAR)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccar.2019.8813479",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc202255925.2022.9922866",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overview of Attack Graph Generation For Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Modern vehicles of today integrate new services and advanced functionalities to bring comfort and safety features to the driver and passengers. As these vehicles are connected to external networks, they are similar to an Internet of Things device (IoT). The legacy definition of automotive security focuses on the safety of the vehicle, preventing physical attacks on the vehicle, but like an IOT device, the connected vehicle now has a wide attack surface that enables new, even remote attacks with serious consequences on the safety and security of the driver. Attack graphs are an efficient tool to automatically analyze security vulnerabilities in a system, it’s widely used in the IT domain but not so popular in the Automotive domain because of the high complexity of the automotive network.Currently defining assets and threat scenarios is done manually by experts in the automotive domain, which is a tedious and error-prone process. Increasing the automation of this process is necessary for efficient vehicle security assessment. In this paper, we will discuss The idea of an automated attack graph generation tool for Threat analysis in the automotive domain. We evaluate open-source attack analysis methodologies and frameworks from the IT domain that already provide automation to this critical task, define a general model, and map the concepts to the automotive domain.",
      "published": "2022-07-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc202255925.2022.9922866",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mera Nizam-Edden Saulaiman",
        "Miklos Kozlovszky",
        "Á. Csilling",
        "Anna Bánáti",
        "Abdallah Benhamida"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Computational Cybernetics (ICCC)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc202255925.2022.9922866",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc55456.2022.9880704",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Framework for In-vehicle Network Combining Time Features and Data Features",
      "description": "In recent years, the security of in-vehicle networks has received a lot of concern. The lack of in-vehicle network security mechanisms makes the in-vehicle network extremely vulnerable to attackers. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) have proved to be an efficient way to protect in-vehicle networks. Researchers have proposed many in-vehicle network intrusion detection methods, such as deep learning-based, statistical-based, and fingerprint-based detection methods. However, their methods either require a large amount of computation and are difficult to deploy, or have poor detection ability and high detection latency. In this paper, we first proposed an improved time-interval-based detection method and then designed an intrusion detection framework based on time features and data features according to the feature analysis. We experimented proposed method to compare with the conventional time-interval-based method on the same dataset. The proposed method achieved 99.57%, 97.57%, 97.98%, and 0.977 in accuracy, precision, recall, and f1-score, respectively. Compared with the conventional method, the proposed method improved 1.6%, 12.8%, 3.5%, and 8.1% in the four metrics, respectively.",
      "published": "2022-08-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc55456.2022.9880704",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guoxiang Qin",
        "Ying Zhou",
        "Yan Jiajun",
        "Jieqi Chen",
        "Bin Rao",
        "Pengju Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc55456.2022.9880704",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc55456.2022.9880746",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hybrid Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle CAN Bus",
      "description": "Intrusion detection on the Controller Area Network (CAN) is aimed for detecting attacks from external interfaces of smart cars. Conventional detection methods judge the frames with fixed time thresholds determined by the range of a single interval. Due to the differences between statistical properties of training datasets and real vehicle data, the result may not attain a good balance in terms of precision and recall. To address the problem, we propose the adjacent interval-based detection (AID) method. The key insight of this method is determining the legitimate range based on two adjacent intervals that meet specific fluctuation amplitude. Furthermore, to improve the low recall under some specific forms of attack, a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS) consists of the AID method, information entropy detection, and relative distance detection is proposed. Experiments on real vehicle datasets demonstrate that our system outperforms the conventional method.",
      "published": "2022-08-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc55456.2022.9880746",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuhan Wu",
        "Zikai Wang",
        "Yuhua Xu",
        "Wei Hua Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc55456.2022.9880746",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4018,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iccc55456.2022.9880746 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc57788.2023.10233123",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GB-IDS: An Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus Based on Graph Analysis",
      "description": "In smart connected vehicles, the controller area network (CAN) bus provides a platform for communication and interaction among various heterogeneous electronic control units (ECUs), enabling intelligent travel services for users. However, existing researches show that the CAN bus is vulnerable to various injection attacks (e.g., denial of service (DoS) attack, fuzzing attack, impersonation attack), which not only threaten the operation of vehicles but also jeopardize user safety. Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are limited in their practicality, as they either require parsing the CAN communication protocol of the vehicle or rely on massive amounts of training data. In this paper, we propose GB-IDS, a graph-based CAN bus detection system. GB-IDS leverages a novel graph structure that characterizes the CAN ID time series, which overcomes the protocol parsing defect and achieves more accurate characterization than previous works. Meanwhile, the variational autoencoder (VAE) is exploited to train classifiers without negative samples. Our experimental results on the public dataset, called OTIDS, demonstrate that GB-IDS can achieve high detection success rates, especially in the absence of negative samples.",
      "published": "2023-08-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc57788.2023.10233123",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yan Meng",
        "Jiachun Li",
        "Fazhong Liu",
        "Shaofeng Li",
        "Haotian Hu",
        "Haojin Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc57788.2023.10233123",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3906,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iccc57788.2023.10233123 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: threaten, operation, limited, user, services, service, without, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc62479.2024.10681772",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A&D Graph-Based Graph Neural Network Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Controller Area Network",
      "description": "The rapid advancement of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has significantly enhanced the diversity and intelligence of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within the Controller Area Network (CAN) of vehicles. Implementing an effective Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is paramount for ensuring the security of the in-vehicle CAN. Traditional approaches in intrusion detection often rely on single-sample analysis, demanding extensive labeled data. To circumvent this limitation, a graph-based IDS that eliminates the necessity for single-sample labeling becomes imperative. Nonetheless, existing graph-based IDS models encounter the challenge of achieving high accuracy, especially for impersonation attacks. In this paper, we propose Arbitration&Data graph-based Graph Neural Networks (A&D-GNN) IDS to improve detection accuracy for in-vehicle CAN effectively. The proposed A&D-GNN IDS can significantly improve detection accuracy for impersonation attacks, which includes the Arbitration&Data (A&D) graph construction algorithm, representation learning, and intrusion detection. Based on the CAN message characteristics, the A&D directed attribute graph can extract comprehensive information, including information about both the arbitration field and the data field in the CAN message frame, notably, the data field is associated with the arbitration field. Therefore, the following Graph Neural Networks (GNN) with powerful representation capabilities can learn more precise graph-level representations. Lastly, a multi-classification layer is applied to perform intrusion detection. Experimental results on the public benchmark OTIDS dataset show that our proposed model is superior to other models with higher accuracy and an impressive accuracy of 99.92% for impersonation attacks.",
      "published": "2024-08-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc62479.2024.10681772",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yaru He",
        "Jia-Qi Gao",
        "Mingrui Fan",
        "Dao-Qi Han",
        "Yueming Lu",
        "Yao-Jun Qiao"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc62479.2024.10681772",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc65605.2025.11022804",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cryptographic Solutions for Secure Communications and Compliance with International Automotive Standards: Implementation on Mechatronic Platforms",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of modern vehicles, driven by the integration of advanced software systems and connectivity features, has introduced significant cybersecurity challenges to the automotive industry. This transformation, while enhancing user experience and vehicle functionality, has exposed critical vulnerabilities that could jeopardize vehicle integrity, user safety, and data confidentiality. As vehicles increasingly rely on interconnected systems, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures has become a paramount concern for manufacturers, regulators, and researchers. The primary focus of the study is on the application of cryptographic algorithms to establish secure communication channels between various vehicle components and systems. Cryptographic techniques, which form the cornerstone of secure data exchange, are explored in depth to address threats such as unauthorized access, data manipulation, and eavesdropping. A practical simulation was conducted to demonstrate the efficacy of secure data exchange mechanisms. This simulation utilized two hardware platforms: the Renesas Synergy SK-S7G2 and the Raspberry Pi. By implementing modern cryptographic protocols, the study showcases how encrypted communication can mitigate cybersecurity risks in real-world automotive scenarios. Furthermore, the research highlights the significance of adhering to industry standards such as ISO/SAE 21434, which provides a comprehensive framework for addressing cybersecurity in automotive systems. By aligning with these standards, manufacturers can systematically identify and mitigate risks, thereby enhancing the overall security posture of their vehicles. This compliance not only ensures regulatory adherence but also fosters consumer trust in the safety and reliability of digital vehicles. The study also provides tailored strategies for automotive cybersecurity, emphasizing proactive risk management, regular software updates, and robust encryption protocols. This work contributes valuable insights and practical solutions for addressing the cybersecurity challenges posed by the digitalization and interconnectivity of modern vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc65605.2025.11022804",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Florin-Alexandru Dita",
        "Ionut-Nicusor Iftimiciuc",
        "Ionut-Cristian Reşceanu",
        "Florina-Luminiţa Petcu",
        "Nicu George Bîzdoacă"
      ],
      "venue": "International Carpathian Control Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc65605.2025.11022804",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4655,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iccc65605.2025.11022804 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: espionage; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: encrypted, valuable, concern, primary, regulatory, platforms, unauthorized, trust."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc70295.2026.11680462",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dual-Alignment Based Cross-Domain Open-Set Recognition for Unknown Attack Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With the advancement of connected vehicles, the Controller Area Network (CAN) faces severe security threats due to its lack of encryption and authentication mechanisms. While deep learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) show promise, their practical deployment is hindered by domain shift across different vehicle models and the inability to identify unknown attacks in open-set scenarios. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a Domain-Adaptive Open-Set Rejection-based Unified cross-domain intrusion detection network (DORU-Net) for in-vehicle network security based on dual alignment and open-set recognition. First, raw CAN messages are converted to grayscale images for convolutional neural network-based high-dimensional spatiotemporal feature extraction. To overcome domain heterogeneity, a Domain-Adversarial Neural Network (DANN) architecture integrated with a Gradient Reversal Layer (GRL) and Correlation Alignment (CORAL) loss is constructed. This dual-alignment strategy constrains the source and target domains in both the adversarial feature space and the secondorder statistical distribution to boost alignment robustness. In inference, a cascaded open-set mechanism utilizing Extreme Value Theory and OpenMax is designed to uniformly identify single or mixed unknown attacks in the target domain as “unknown classes” via distribution boundaries. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that DORU-Net can identify unknown attacks across heterogeneous vehicles, retaining 99.4% accuracy even when source-domain training data is reduced to 30%.",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc70295.2026.11680462",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wentao Li",
        "Xiaoqi Feng",
        "Jianfeng Yang",
        "Jianling Hu",
        "Tianqi Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc70295.2026.11680462",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3966,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iccc70295.2026.11680462 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: space, loss, unknown, even, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccc71363.2026.11593218",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges of Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment in Modern Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles have evolved into highly connected, software-defined cyber-physical systems whose expanding attack surfaces and regulatory obligations have made cybersecurity risk assessment a foundational engineering activity. Central to this landscape is Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA), defined within ISO/SAE 21434 and required as auditable evidence under UN ECE R155 and R156. Yet despite its formal importance, the practical execution of TARA across the automotive industry remains inconsistent, highly subjective, and difficult to reproduce. This paper investigates the root causes of these issues through a synthesis of four key academic contributions. The findings reveal pervasive divergences in asset definition, threat modeling depth, feasibility and impact scoring, and semantic interpretation, compounded by supply-chain fragmentation and the accelerating complexity of software-defined vehicles. To address these systemic weaknesses, the paper proposes a suite of complementary conceptual enhancements. Together, these constructs advance TARA from a largely manual, analyst-driven activity to a more scientific, auditable, and lifecycle-aware discipline aligned with both engineering needs and regulatory expectations. The proposed enhancements aim to support a more adaptive and scalable application of TARA, enabling compliance with ISO/SAE 21434 while addressing the realities of long-lived, software-defined vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccc71363.2026.11593218",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Florin-Alexandru Dita",
        "Ionut-Cristian Reşceanu",
        "Ionut-Nicusor Iftimiciuc",
        "Florina-Luminiţa Petcu",
        "Ştefan-Irinel Cismaru",
        "Anca-Cecilia Stoenac",
        "Catalin-Marius Mita",
        "Daniela Coman",
        "Nicu George Bîzdoacă"
      ],
      "venue": "International Carpathian Control Conference",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccc71363.2026.11593218",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3976,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iccc71363.2026.11593218 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: asset, activity, regulatory, impact, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccca66364.2025.11325608",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Application AI-Powered Cybersecurity for Electric Motor vehicles: Real-Time Intrusion Prevention Using Deep Learning Models in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The fast development of Electric Motor Vehicles (EMVs) is making unprecedented hardware smart integrated electronic systems, networked systems and digital connectivity. EMVs equipped with advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), over-the-air firmware updates, and Internet of Things (IoT) interfaces are now exposed to cyber threats in vehicle networks like the CAN bus 1. Conventional rule-based security systems are ineffective in dealing with intelligent dynamic threats such as those that threaten the security of the driver or the integrity of the data. This paper studies the use of AI-assisted security techniques - namely real-time intrusion prevention systems (IPS) based on deep learning models - to strengthen EMVs' defensive mechanisms against newer cyber-attacks. We Introduce a RNN-based and CNN-based and networks like CNN-LSTM to detect and stop the misuse of the CAN bus in real time network for detection and prevention of rogue behavior on CAN bus. Our methodology encompasses gathering and cleaning vehicle CAN Datasets, discovering temporal and spatial pattern of cyber anomalies, and model building for distinguishing between normal and cyber-invasive traffic. The system performance is tested on both real and artificial data to verify the suitability of our models against various evolving threats, including spoofing, DoS, and message injection. The use of deep learning-based IPS has several advantages over conventional approaches. These advantages are adaptive learning with new threat patterns, low false positive rate and real-time decision making with low latency. Moreover, the use of light-weight AI models running on embedded systems in the vehicle avoids both excessive impact on the performance and power consumption—key elements for EMV systems. The work not only adds a scalable mechanism to meet the increasing cybersecurity demand in modern electric vehicles, but also leads to potential integrations with vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications and autonomous driving systems in the future. The research establishes a foundation to build trust in ITS (intelligent transportation system) by securing the cybersecurity risks of in-vehicle networks using AI. The findings demonstrate that the proposed hybrid CNN-LSTM architecture significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in terms of both classification accuracy, the speed of detection and generalizability to unseen types of attack vectors, and hence confirm the efficacy of the proposed real-time deep learning IPS architecture for EMVs.",
      "published": "2025-11-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccca66364.2025.11325608",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ramanan Sathiaseelan",
        "Manikandan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing, Communication and Automation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccca66364.2025.11325608",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccci65070.2025.11158677",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GNN-Based in-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "With the increasing degree of automation and connectivity in modern cars, the security of the vehicle's internal network has become an important issue. This study aims to analyze and detect security threat behaviors in the Controller Area Network (CAN) within the vehicle's intra-vehicle networks (IVNs). To overcome this problem, this study proposes a CAN Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on the Graph Neural Network (GNN) model. The GNN is trained and classified based on the timestamp changes of the CAN frame arbitration ID as edge attributes in the graph, which is called gIDS-CAN (GNN based Intrusion Detection System in Controller Area Network). This method is designed to implement a gIDS-CAN that can monitor the packet analysis of the vehicle CAN protocol, detect any malicious or abnormal messages, and effectively identify CAN attacks through a comprehensive analysis of edge features and topological information. The gIDSCAN provides a novel solution for the security of the vehicle's internal network.",
      "published": "2025-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccci65070.2025.11158677",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wen-Chi Lu",
        "Bo-Chao Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Communication and the Internet (ICCCI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccci65070.2025.11158677",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icccn.2017.8038391",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Internet of Vehicles and Autonomous Connected Car - Privacy and Security Issues",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icccn.2017.8038391",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J. Joy",
        "M. Gerla"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/icccn.2017.8038391",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icccnt49239.2020.9225442",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection System on Controller Area Network with Machine Learning Models",
      "description": "Parallel with the developing world, transportation technologies have started to expand and change significantly year by year. This change brings with it some inevitable problems. Increasing human population and growing transportation-needs result many accidents in urban and rural areas, and this recursively results extra traffic problems and fuel consumption. It is obvious that the issues brought by this spiral loop needed to be solved with the use of some new technological achievements. In this context, self-driving cars or automated vehicles concepts are seen as a good solution. However, this also brings some additional problems with it. Currently many cars are provided with some digital security systems, which are examined in two phases, internal and external. These systems are constructed in the car by using some type of embedded system (such as the Controller Area Network (CAN)) which are needed to be protected form outsider cyberattacks. These attack can be detected by several ways such as rule based system, anomaly based systems, list based systems, etc. The current literature showed that researchers focused on the use of some artificial intelligence techniques for the detection of this type of attack. In this study, an intrusion detection system based on machine learning is proposed for the CAN security, which is the in-vehicle communication structure. As a result of the study, it has been observed that the decision tree-based ensemble learning models results the best performance in the tested models. Additionally, all models have a very good accuracy levels.",
      "published": "2020-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icccnt49239.2020.9225442",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soner Can Kalkan",
        "Özgür Koray Şahingöz"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing, Communication and Networking Technologies (ICCCNT)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icccnt49239.2020.9225442",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icccs69761.2026.11613267",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient Post-Quantum Cross-Domain Authentication Scheme for 6G V2X Using Accelerated FrodoKEM",
      "description": "Secure and efficient cross-domain authentication is critical for the emerging 6G Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) networks. However, quantum computers will soon be able to break standard security systems like ECC and RSA. While lattice-based cryptography offers a promising defense, standard unstructured lattice schemes suffer from high computational latency, making them impractical for real-time vehicular environments. To alleviate this challenge, this paper proposes a novel cross-domain authentication scheme that bridges the gap between post-quantum security and strict latency requirements. We utilize AVX2 instruction set acceleration on RSUs to parallelize FrodoKEM's matrix operations, significantly reducing computational overhead without compromising security. We provide a formal security proof using BAN logic and a comprehensive performance evaluation. The results demonstrate that our scheme achieves quantum-resistant security with a total authentication latency of approximately 7.56 ms. It can satisfy the stringent requirements of 6G V2X networks with Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC).",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icccs69761.2026.11613267",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jingfeng Wang",
        "Yingying Yao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer and Communication Systems (ICCCS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icccs69761.2026.11613267",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icce-asia67487.2025.11263681",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of an Automotive OTA System with Zonal Gateways and PQC-Hybrid TLS",
      "description": "This paper proposes an over-the-air (OTA) software update architecture for vehicles adopting zonal electrical/electronic (E/E) architectures. Overall proposed OTA between the server and the ECUs comprises four stages: ready, distribution, user consent, activation and supports functional safety with dual bank (A/B)switching and anti-roll back policy. Clear roles are assigned to an OEM server with a Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP), a Vehicle Mobile Gateway (VMG) / Vehicle Central Computer (VCC) ingress, zonal gateways, and ECUs. To ensure long-term cybersecurity, we adopt post-quantum cryptography (PQC): a hybrid-PQC TLS 1.3 air interface using a PQC key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), PQC-aware key lifecycle for long-lived artifacts such as firmware metadata and device credentials. Cryptographic workloads are concentrated at the VMG/VCC and zonal gate-ways and ECUs retain final signature verification to preserve end-to-end authenticity. The proposed architecture serves as a reference framework, showing how the VMG/VCC, zonal gateways, and ECUs coordinate OTA updates under PQC-aware security processes to prepare for the post-quantum era.",
      "published": "2025-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icce-asia67487.2025.11263681",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiseong Chung",
        "Sungkwon Park",
        "Song‐Nam Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics-Asia (ICCE-Asia)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icce-asia67487.2025.11263681",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icce-taiwan71481.2026.11652765",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hardware-Oriented Intrusion Detection Architecture for CAN Bus Networks Using DBSCAN Models",
      "description": "CAN networks are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as injection, replay, and spoofing. Spoofing attacks are difficult to detect because forged messages can match normal CAN ID, payload, and timing. This work proposes a hardware-oriented IDS using voltage fingerprints and DBSCAN-based inference implemented on a Cyclone V FPGA. The system achieves a latency of$75.06 \\mu \\mathrm{s}$and a throughput of 13.4 k samples$/ \\mathrm{s}$, meeting real-time requirements for spoofing detection.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icce-taiwan71481.2026.11652765",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kai-Ching Huang",
        "Chang-Ming Wu",
        "Jiun‐Wei Horng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Taiwan (ICCE-Taiwan)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icce-taiwan71481.2026.11652765",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icce.2019.8662084",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection of Cyber Physical Network Data Using 2D Images",
      "description": "Vehicles are increasingly cyber-physical systems which depend on upwards of 100 or more networked control units. Consequently vehicles, especially those produced after about 2010, face challenges to ensure autonomy, security, and safety. The vehicles’ electronic control units (ECUs) control most of the safety-critical systems. Protecting these networks is especially challenging because there is no publicly available translation of in-vehicle network data to vehicle functions. Thus, an intrusion detection system (IDS) based on mapping the controller area network (CAN) data to 2D images has been developed. While somewhat similar to other recent works that map network features to images, this novel approach utilizes the underlying physical model to automatically group features in a method that makes convolutional neural network (CNN) analysis more feasible. It addresses the most challenging attack in which a compromised ECU sends out incorrect values but sends them within the correct time window. This novel method is shown to detect these kinds of rogue ECU cyber-attacks with greater than a 90% accuracy using very limited training data.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icce.2019.8662084",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. R. Moore",
        "Jason M. Vann"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icce.2019.8662084",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icce46568.2020.9043039",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Timestamp-based Defense Mechanism Against Replay Attack in Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Proper security protocols should be considered as a critical requirement in today’s digital world to prevent adversaries from being able to gain access to valuables. Although numerous preventative mechanisms have been implemented, attackers adapt and develop new attack techniques to infiltrate existing technologies. The results of infiltration experiments revealed vulnerabilities in the radio frequency (RF) communication of cars and garages in remote keyless entry (RKE) systems as well. In this work, we present a timestamp-based solution to enhance the security of existing rolling-code based RKE system and demonstrate it through a prototype implementation.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icce46568.2020.9043039",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyle Greene",
        "Deven Rodgers",
        "Henry Dykhuizen",
        "Kyle McNeil",
        "Quamar Niyaz",
        "Khair A. Al Shamaileh"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icce46568.2020.9043039",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icce53296.2022.9730305",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Zero-Knowledge Proof for Enabling Privacy Preserving Electronic Toll Collection with Vehicle-to-Everything Communications",
      "description": "ETC systems today use technology that can be exploited to track toll users. This work develops a GPS-free toll collection that uses a zero-knowledge proof to verify V2X On-board units (OBU) in a way that prioritizes security and privacy while accommodating resource limitations of the embedded technology. Our privacy preserving ETC protocol consists of three parts: a mutual authentication handshake, a zero-knowledge proof challenge, and a verification for toll-payment processing. Bench analysis evaluates embedded systems' limitations of algorithmic operations, and field tests of challenges are conducted in a real-life scenario to show proof-of-concept among V2X interference.",
      "published": "2022-01-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icce53296.2022.9730305",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jordan McEntyre",
        "Billy Kihei"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icce53296.2022.9730305",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icce59016.2024.10444185",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting and Mitigating Colluding Attacks in Connected Vehicles using Reinforcement Learning",
      "description": "As the vehicles are interconnected and share infrastructure information among each other, the adoption of connected vehicles (CVs) continues to surge. However, CV’s introduce vulnerabilities related to the integrity of the shared data, which may be compromised by either malicious attacks or sensor failures. Detecting these vulnerabilities in CVs has become paramount to provide safety to the passengers and pedestrians in the network. Trust and reputation-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms are one way for the detection and handle these vulnerabilities. These algorithms fail to work when the number of vehicles collude together to disrupt the CV network. In response to this, we propose a trust and reputation based RL along with multi level dempster shafer technique to deal with colluding attacks in CVs. This integration involves fusing reputation-based trust management on a vehicle level with a RL agent running on road side unit. We conduct performance analysis on different RL algorithms namely deep Q-networks, actor-critic and proximal policy optimization.",
      "published": "2024-01-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icce59016.2024.10444185",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pranay Chowdary Jasti",
        "Henry Griffith",
        "Heena Rathore"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icce59016.2024.10444185",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4067,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icce59016.2024.10444185 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: response, sensor, trust, information, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccea50009.2020.00063",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Physical Attack Threats Analysis for UAVs from CPS Perspective",
      "description": "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been widely adopted in military and civilian areas. However, security problems of UAVs are also gradually exposed and attracted great attention. As an integration of computation, control and communication components, UAVs could be considered as a typical Cyber Physical System (CPS). Therefore, the security threats coming from cyber-attack will affect the safety performance of UAVs, that is, cyber security threats could spread to physical domain. Aiming at the type of “cyber-physical attack”, this paper analyzes its main threats to UAVs from a CPS perspective. Based on analyzing CPS architecture of UAVs, the cyber-physical threats are clarified from attacks on sensors, computation/control, communication components respectively. As the preliminary work for analyzing cross-domain security risk propagation mechanism of UAVs, the spread process of the threats from cyber domain to physical domain was analyzed, which is also of reference significance for analyzing other CPS.",
      "published": "2020-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccea50009.2020.00063",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "threats",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guo Rong-xiao",
        "Tian Ji-wei",
        "Wang Bu-hong",
        "Shang Fu-te"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Engineering and Application (ICCEA)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccea50009.2020.00063",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccea69962.2026.11743654",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CVE Compliance Auditor: A Standard-Based Root Cause Analysis System for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "In recent years, the rapid growth of connected and intelligent vehicles has led to increasing cybersecurity threats, with numerous vulnerabilities recorded in public databases such as CVE. While existing vulnerability analysis tools can identify technical causes, they rarely link findings to mandatory national standards, making compliance audits time-consuming and error-prone. To bridge this gap, we propose CVE Compliance Auditor, a novel system that integrates multilingual vector retrieval, chain-of-thought reasoning, and a retrieval-augmented loop to automatically map CVE descriptions to relevant clauses in automotive cybersecurity standards (e.g., GB/T 40855-2021, GB/T 40856-2021, GB/T 40861-2021). Given an English vulnerability description, the system retrieves candidate Chinese standard provisions, performs step-by-step compliance analysis, and generates interpretable root cause summaries along with actionable remediation suggestions. We implemented the system using Python, FAISS, and large language models, and evaluated it on 320 automotive-related CVEs spanning 2018 to 2024. Experimental results show that our approach achieves 92.1% ± 2.0% Precision@5, 88.9% ± 2.3% Recall@5, and 95.2% ± 1.8% HitRate@5, outperforming keyword-based matching, standalone LLM analysis, and a structured Ontology+SPARQL baseline. The hallucination rate of our method is 2.1%, demonstrating effective mitigation of LLM-generated inaccuracies through clause verification. Moreover, expert evaluation confirms enhanced interpretability and practical value for compliance-driven security auditing in regulated automotive environments. Preliminary experiments on 40 UNECE-aligned CVEs show promising adaptability to international regulations such as UNECE R155 and R156. This work demonstrates a scalable methodology for bridging vulnerability intelligence with regulatory compliance, paving the way for automated audit solutions in safety-critical industries.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccea69962.2026.11743654",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lin Huo"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Engineering and Application (ICCEA)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccea69962.2026.11743654",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccecome.2018.8658720",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on CAN Bus Protocol: Attacks, Challenges, and Potential Solutions",
      "description": "The vehicles are equipped with electronic control units that control their functions. These units communicate with each other via in-vehicle communication protocols like CAN bus. Although CAN is the most common in-vehicle communication protocol, its lack of encryption and authentication can cause serious security shortcomings. In the literature, many attacks are reported related to CAN bus and the number increases with rising connectivity in the cars. In this paper, we present CAN protocol and analyze its security vulnerabilities. Then we survey the implemented attacks and proposed solutions in the literature.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccecome.2018.8658720",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehmet Bozdal",
        "Mohammad Samie",
        "Ian K Jennions"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing, Electronics & Communications Engineering (iCCECE)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccecome.2018.8658720",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 134,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icces.2017.8275376",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Replay attack on lightweight CAN authentication protocol",
      "description": "Day after day, users' expectations of tomorrow vehicles' features are increasing. Although the industry's prime goal is users' satisfaction, many unsolved problems are still present. Amongst the major challenges are the huge interconnections and dependability within the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) used inside vehicles. Five years ago, the number of ECUs within a vehicle was about 70 ECUs. This number has doubled nowadays, and it is expected to double again in the near future. This adds challenges to both of network management and network security. The purpose of this paper is to enhance the CAN immunity against attacks. In this paper, we focus on the lightweight CAN authentication protocol, investigate the protocol immunity against Denial of service attack, and propose a solution for this attack. As a result, we achieve security protocol that is suitable for all security aspects.",
      "published": "2017-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icces.2017.8275376",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pakinam Noureldeen",
        "Marianne Amir Azer",
        "Ahmed Refaat",
        "Mahmoud Alam"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Engineering & Systems (ICCES)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/icces.2017.8275376",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icces48960.2019.9068143",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware-Assisted Virtualization for Heterogeneous Automotive Applications",
      "description": "Today's car manufacturers are racing in deploying new innovative functionalities in modern cars like human-machine interface (HMI) technologies, cloud-based services, vehicle ad-hoc networks (V ANET) and autonomous driving. Such new technologies increase the complexity of vehicle's E/E architecture and adds new requirements on automotive software systems. This can specially be seen in cockpit domain units like Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), Infotainment Head Units (IHU) and Telematics (TEM). The software applications of such units now exhibit large variations in requirements in terms of safety, security and connectivity as they are involved in both in-Vehicle network communication and cellular vehicle communication (V2X). In addition to that, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are heading towards consolidating multiple units into single high computing platform. Although this simplifies the networking model of the vehicle, it adds more challenges on the architecture of automotive software systems. This paper focuses on utilizing hardware-assisted virtualization techniques to allow consolidating these heterogeneous applications on the same hardware. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated to proof meeting the requirements of such applications.",
      "published": "2019-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icces48960.2019.9068143",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamed Mounir",
        "Mohamed AbdelSalam",
        "Mona Safar",
        "Ashraf Salem"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Engineering & Systems (ICCES)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icces48960.2019.9068143",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccies63851.2025.11032978",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicles Secure Data Sharing using Secure and Differential Privacy computation on multi-party",
      "description": "To ensure effective and secure transportation systems, networked automobiles need to share enormous amounts of data that safeguard users' privacy. Data leakage issues, large computing expense, and lack of differential privacy guarantees are some of the challenges with existing methods. The Privacy-Preserving Vehicular Data Exchange Framework (PPVDEF) to address the above issues. It integrates differential privacy (DP) with secure multi-party computation (SMPC) to render data exchange among infrastructure, cloud, and automobiles safe and speedy. While PPVDEF supports collective intelligence through privacy-conscious data analytics and aggregation, it ensures sensitive vehicle data remains confidential. The proposed methodology enhances security through unwanted access blocking and ensures privacy by adding controlled noise to keep personal data private. The study indicates that PPVDEF makes vehicle data analytics significantly more accurate, efficient, and scalable without compromising data privacy. The approach encourages smarter and safer transportation networks by providing a platform where connected cars can trust each other and their privacy can be ensured. The proposed Method achieves the data privacy by 97.6%, accuracy by 98.5% and scalability by 96.3%.",
      "published": "2025-04-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccies63851.2025.11032978",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "personal data",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kamal Kumar",
        "Rallabandi Venkata Santoshi Saraswati Swetha Nagini",
        "A Shivaprasad",
        "R. Maheswari",
        "Haider Mohmmed Alabdeli",
        "Dilli Ganesh V"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computational Innovations and Engineering Sustainability (ICCIES)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccies63851.2025.11032978",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4121,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iccies63851.2025.11032978 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: personal, sensitive, makes, trust, large, intelligence, where, without."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccims61672.2024.10690430",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of Privacy Risks of Vehicle Telematics",
      "description": "The integration of vehicle telematics systems into modern automobiles has transformed transportation, providing several advantages such as increased safety, effectiveness, and ease. However, the growth of connected automobiles raises serious concerns about privacy dangers for both drivers and passengers. The purpose of this study is to assess the privacy hazards connected to vehicle telematics using simulation-based methodologies based on the Veins, SUMO and OMNET++ frameworks to investigate privacy breaches and evaluate analyzing the privacy risks with ISO 21434 and TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment) methodology enable them to identify potential vulnerabilities and implement robust measures to protect user data from unauthorized access, breaches and misuse. Simulations are used to investigate potential attack vectors such as unauthorized data access, man in the middle attack and identity theft in order to assess the scope of privacy and trust issues. This study aims to delve into the complex dynamics of vehicle telematics, using simulation-based approaches to investigate privacy breaches and pave the path for informed decision-making in the field of connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-07-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccims61672.2024.10690430",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "iso 21434",
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hasan Saadi Jaber Aljzaere",
        "Raj Kumar Kaladi",
        "Wolfram Hardt"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing, Internet of Things and Microwave Systems (ICCIMS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccims61672.2024.10690430",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5296,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iccims61672.2024.10690430 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serious, unauthorized, trust, user, risks, access, privacy, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccit-144147971.2020.9213789",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis of a Long Range Autonomous Unmanned Aerial System",
      "description": "Technology of the 21st century has led to the development and deployment of many unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) within today's airspace. UAVs typically perform tasks such as surveillance, pipeline, and crop monitoring, professional imaging, surveying, search and rescue, and military operations. Many of these UAVs execute their duties entirely autonomously without the intervention of humans. Due to the nature of the responsibilities of UAVs, their security is of utmost importance. Security threats to UAVs are often targeted at the unmanned aerial system (UAS) which includes everything employed to allow the UAV to function; this can include the software running on the drone, the control system piloting the drone and the connection between the two. This paper provides an overview of autonomous UAS architecture and analyzes security threats to the system. The goal of this paper is to support UAV manufacturers and developers to have an understanding of the components required in an autonomous UAS and allow them to identify, prevent and address security concerns within their systems.",
      "published": "2020-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccit-144147971.2020.9213789",
      "matched_terms": [
        "threat",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jason Whelan",
        "Abdulaziz Almehmadi",
        "Jason Braverman",
        "Khalil El‐Khatib"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing and Information Technology (ICCIT)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccit-144147971.2020.9213789",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccmc51019.2021.9418436",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and validation of CAN protocol with enhanced Security in electric vehicle",
      "description": "Controller Area Network(CAN) which is specially designed for Automotive connectivity has a major drawback in the security of data transmission, where the data can be easily hacked. By hacking the data can be read, altered or even false data can be injected which will lead to a huge risk for the vehicle itself and the driver/passengers in the vehicle. To prevent this combining two algorithms in cryptography (AES and RSA) encryption to the messages in the CAN bus is provided. The data sent from the ECU will be encrypted using the AES algorithm, the key used by the AES will also be encrypted using the RSA algorithm. Decryption will be done by a reverse process where first the key of AES will be decrypted and then the data will be decrypted. By providing encryption and decryption the data can be transferred securely. This project also provides authentication which is achieved by sending acknowledgment signals. By providing encryption and authentication the Replay attack and Injection of forged frames can be avoided. Here the time taken for encryption, authentication, and decryption for different samples of the text of different sizes are also calculated. Results shows that proposed algorithm is more suitable for e-vehicle with better CAN protocol security.",
      "published": "2021-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccmc51019.2021.9418436",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "D. R.",
        "P. K"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference Computing Methodologies and Communication",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccmc51019.2021.9418436",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccp68926.2025.11427137",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Transferability of software update requirements from the automotive industry to fire alarm systems",
      "description": "The increasing digitalization and networking of safety-critical infrastructures requires robust software management and secure update mechanisms. This case study investigates the transferability of established software update and cybersecurity standards from the automotive industrynamely ISO 24089, ISO/SAE 21434, and ISO/IEC 27001-to the domain of fire alarm systems. While vehicles and fire alarm systems differ fundamentally in terms of mobility and user interaction, they share comparable risk profiles and regulatory demands, particularly regarding system integrity, lifecycle management, and cybersecurity. The study employs a structured risk analysis across four dimensions-technical, operational, legal, and user-related-to assess the applicability of automotive standards to stationary fire alarm systems. Findings reveal significant overlaps in key risk areas such as failed updates, compatibility issues, cyberattacks, and liability. Consequently, the layered approach of ISO 24089, which distinguishes between organizational and technical update processes, offers a suitable framework for fire alarm technology. Similarly, the lifecycle-oriented risk management approach of ISO/SAE 21434 can be adapted to enhance cybersecurity resilience in building-integrated systems. Despite these promising parallels, domain-specific constraints-such as stricter certification requirements and differing network infrastructures-must be taken into account. The qualitative methodology used provides a valuable conceptual basis for standard transferability but lacks empirical validation. Future research should therefore include practical trials and extend the approach to related domains such as industrial automation (e.g., ISO/IEC 62443). Overall, the study demonstrates that cross-domain knowledge transfer can strengthen the security, maintainability, and regulatory robustness of networked fire alarm systems, thereby contributing to the broader discourse on resilient digital infrastructures.",
      "published": "2025-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccp68926.2025.11427137",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "resilience",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ulrich Rabe",
        "Jörg F. Wollert"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Computer Communication and Processing (ICCP)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccp68926.2025.11427137",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccpct61902.2024.10673280",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid Scheme of Post-Quantum Cryptography and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography for Certificates ─ A Case Study of Security Credential Management System in Vehicle-to-Everything Communications",
      "description": "Due to the current standard of Security Credential Management System (SCMS) for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications using asymmetric cryptography, specifically Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), which may be vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. Therefore, the V2X SCMS is threatened by quantum computing attacks. However, although the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has already selected Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms as the standard, the current PQC algorithms may have issues such as longer public key lengths, longer signature lengths, or lower signature generation and verification efficiency, which may not fully meet the requirements of V2X communication applications. In view of the challenges in V2X communication, such as packet length, signature generation and verification efficiency, security level, and vehicle privacy, this study proposes a hybrid certificate scheme of PQC and ECC. By leveraging the strengths of both PQC and ECC, this scheme aims to overcome the challenges in V2X communication. PQC is used to establish a security level resistant to quantum computing attacks, while ECC is utilized to establish anonymous certificates and reduce packet length to meet the requirements of V2X communication. In the practical experiments, the study implemented the SCMS end entity based on the Chunghwa Telecom SCMS and the Clientron On-Board Unit (OBU) to conduct field tests in Danhai New Town in New Taipei City. The performance of various existing hybrid certificate schemes combining PQC (e.g., Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) and ECC is compared, and a practical solution is provided for V2X industries.",
      "published": "2024-08-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccpct61902.2024.10673280",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel C. H. Chen",
        "Bon‐Yeh Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Circuit, Power and Computing Technologies",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccpct61902.2024.10673280",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccps.2018.00012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cloaking the Clock: Emulating Clock Skew in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Automobiles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECU) that communicate via in-vehicle network protocol standards such as Controller Area Network (CAN). These protocols are designed under the assumption that separating in-vehicle communications from external networks is sufficient for protection against cyber attacks. This assumption, however, has been shown to be invalid by recent attacks in which adversaries were able to infiltrate the in-vehicle network. Motivated by these attacks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed for in-vehicle networks that attempt to detect attacks by making use of device fingerprinting using properties such as clock skew of an ECU. In this paper, we propose the cloaking attack, an intelligent masquerade attack in which an adversary modifies the timing of transmitted messages in order to match the clock skew of a targeted ECU. The attack leverages the fact that, while the clock skew is a physical property of each ECU that cannot be changed by the adversary, the estimation of the clock skew by other ECUs is based on network traffic, which, being a cyber component only, can be modified by an adversary. We implement the proposed cloaking attack and test it on two IDSs, namely, the current state-of-the-art IDS and a new IDS that we develop based on the widely-used Network Time Protocol (NTP). We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real connected vehicle, and show that it can always deceive both IDSs. We also introduce a new metric called the Maximum Slackness Index to quantify the effectiveness of the cloaking attack even when the adversary is unable to precisely match the clock skew of the targeted ECU.",
      "published": "2017-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccps.2018.00012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sang Uk Sagong",
        "Xuhang Ying",
        "Andrew Clark",
        "Linda G. Bushnell",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccps.2018.00012",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 95,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccr67387.2025.11291881",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Zero-Day Threat Detection in Autonomous Vehicles Using Few-Shot LSTM Autoencoders on CAN Bus Data",
      "description": "This research presents a computationally efficient, few-shot learning framework built on LSTM autoencoders for zero-day threat detection in autonomous vehicle (AV) CAN bus networks. The model integrates sequence reconstruction, meta-learning adaptation, and dynamic threshold calibration to detect previously unseen anomalies in real-time. Experimental validation across diverse AV scenarios—urban traffic, high-speed CAN injection, ECU impersonation, and V2X interference—yielded up to 98.3% detection accuracy, 0.89 F1-score, and 87.4% zero-day generalization. The system reduced false positives by 76% compared to rule-based IDS and delivered inference latency under 13.9 ms on 32-bit embedded ECUs. Using only 3-5 labeled instances per novel attack, the architecture achieved rapid adaptation through episodic fine-tuning and latent-space anomaly scoring. It is lightweight, retraining-free, hardware-compatible, and compliant with ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155 cybersecurity mandates—making it a scalable, real-time IDS solution for next-generation connected and autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-07-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccr67387.2025.11291881",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "threat",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Belal Abdalhamza Azeez",
        "Ahmed Dheyaa Radhi",
        "Hassan Mahmood",
        "Mohammed Amin Almaiah",
        "Mohammed Abdul Jaleel Maktoof",
        "Hayder Abd Alrazaq",
        "Muhammad N Majed",
        "Wasan Adnan Hashim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cyber Resilience (ICCR)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccr67387.2025.11291881",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccr67387.2025.11292284",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An ensemble approach to enhance accuracy and robustness of persistent malware detection in-vehicle infotainment system",
      "description": "The growing integration of information technology into vehicles makes the importance of automotive cybersecurity protection systems necessary. There are many kinds of attacks that threaten the safety of vehicles and the privacy of their owners. One such possible malicious action is remote code execution, which allows an attacker, for example, to exploit the software of an automobile to control an automobile’s function s such as brakes and steering. These consequences include risk to safety, infringement of privacy, economic losses, damage to the automobile, and spoiling reputation for the automobile industry. The continual malware-detecting model based on voting ensemble classifiers has better accuracy than other machine learning models specifically on infotainment system. It deals with real-time threats on the Internet of Things devices. The proposed model provides a comprehensive view of how an attacker might target a system, mapping out potential entry points, data flows, and trust boundaries in automated vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-07-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccr67387.2025.11292284",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "V. Joseph Raymond",
        "Sivaneasan Bala Krishnan",
        "V. Senthil Murugan",
        "Prąsun Chakrabarti"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cyber Resilience (ICCR)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccr67387.2025.11292284",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccsie65832.2025.00049",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A New Paradigm for Privacy (N2P) : Achieving Keyless Anonymity Through Mathematical Interpolation Schemes",
      "description": "Ensuring anonymity in communication networks has become a critical issue due to growing threats of surveillance and traffic correlation attacks. Traditional systems like Tor and Mixnets, while effective, still suffer from latency and vulnerability limitations. This paper proposes a novel framework called New Paradigm for Privacy (N2P), which integrates keyless anonymity through the use of disjoint routing schemes combined with mathematical interpolation techniques: Lagrange, Newton, and Hermite. The approach splits communication packets into sub-identities, routed independently over multiple paths, and reassembled using interpolation at the receiver end. Experimental simulations conducted using Python and NetworkX demonstrate that: Lagrange interpolation offers perfect reconstruction accuracy (100%) but with higher latency; Newton interpolation allows faster execution and dynamic adaptability with a good average accuracy of (94.42%); Hermite interpolation provides better stability in case of sub-identity losses but at the cost of increased complexity and lower accuracy (92.15%). N2P shows enhanced resistance to traffic correlation attacks (60% lower than Tor) and enables keyless identity reconstruction while maintaining scalability across large networks. Its multipath routing strategy, combined with interpolation resilience, makes N2P a promising approach for secure, anonymous communications in dynamic network environments.",
      "published": "2025-07-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccsie65832.2025.00049",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "privacy",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Mohamed Youssouf",
        "Abdramane Issa Oumar",
        "Daouda Ahmat"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cyber Security and Information Engineering (ICCSIE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccsie65832.2025.00049",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icct62929.2024.10875011",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Formal Verification-Based Risk Assessment Framework for the Authentication of Self-driving Vehicles",
      "description": "With self-driving vehicles becoming more and more part of the modern transportation, secure communication among vehicle to vehicle, infrastructure and cloud services are very important. Autonomous vehicles (AVs) face various security threats because they rely on wireless communications to interact with infrastructure (V2I) and other vehicles (V2V). The security and the integrity of such communication are essential, especially in large-scale network-topologies, as well as in real-time and scalable authentication processes. We proposed a framework that uses formal verification techniques to systematically identify, assess, and mitigate potential risks associated with authentication protocols in autonomous vehicles. By Incorporating probabilistic model checking, the framework facilitates a more rigorous approach to security and increases the resilience of authentication mechanisms in diverse environments and operating conditions. Our risk assessment methodology considers authentication failures caused by network delays, adversarial attacks (such as man-in-the-middle and replay attacks), and data breaches. The proposed framework is compared with existing authentication and risk assessment models and demonstrates superior accuracy, scalability, and formal security guarantees. This paper highlights the need for formal methods to provide highly secure authentication solutions for AVs and positions this framework as a major step forward in AV security in general.",
      "published": "2024-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icct62929.2024.10875011",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Salman Saeed",
        "Sergey Valentinovich Bezzateev"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information, Control, and Communication Technologies (ICCT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icct62929.2024.10875011",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icct67417.2025.11374268",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "STIDS: State Transition-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Networks Using Isolation Forest",
      "description": "Intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) benefit from the intelligent services empowered by the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) but face significant threats from network intrusions in the meantime. To address these threats, it is crucial to develop the intrusion detection system (IDS) for in-vehicle networks. In this paper, a state transition-based intrusion detection system (STIDS) has been proposed with the facilitation of the isolation forest. Specifically, providing the temporal periodicity of the transitions between controller area network (CAN) messages, state transition matrices are built first based on the historical data. Subsequently, the isolation forest is applied to the proposed STIDS for intrusion detection based on the anomaly scores. Simulations have been conducted based on two practical datasets, where five typical types of attacks are involved, including Denial of Service (DoS), fuzzy, spoofing, malfunction, and tampering. Simulation results indicate that the proposed STIDS can reach the detection accuracy of beyond 98%, while reducing the time cost to millisecond level.",
      "published": "2025-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icct67417.2025.11374268",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaoqi Feng",
        "Haoren Ke",
        "Jianfeng Yang",
        "Tianqi Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icct67417.2025.11374268",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3992,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icct67417.2025.11374268 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: five, services, service, where, significant, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icctech57499.2023.00012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Systems Context-Aware Adaptive Reinforcement Learning Approach for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles are replacing humans in the driver's seat. It requires intelligent systems. Therefore, it is crucial to have cognitive and context-aware Adaptive Reinforcement Learning for highly sensitive, safety, and security-driven autonomous systems architecture design. The system must know any context as part of the machine learning outcome. Therefore, it is important to bring the dynamic, safety-driven algorithms and their hardware components together to co-work based on context-aware adaptive concepts. The context part of the Reinforcement Learning system is used as input parameters to the Context Aware Machine Learning decision support mechanism that inference controls the operations in an autonomous system. Therefore, it is essential to have the system adaptive in nature and dynamic at runtime to update the learning-based output, and it can be further inference based on context. This paper explores the context specification allowing it to change dynamically as the hardware applies the algorithm. A context that changes dynamically thus provides a modified set of input parameters to the operations control mechanism so that the forward-looking behavior of the autonomous system can be driven adaptively. Our research results prove that the hardware dependency to adopt such a cognitive and context-aware adaptive machine learning algorithm for context-aware autonomous driving systems is important.",
      "published": "2023-02-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icctech57499.2023.00012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "C.R. Sakthivel",
        "V. Chandrasekar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Technologies (ICCTech)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icctech57499.2023.00012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icctit68197.2025.11406333",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Path Optimization in Connected Vehicular Networks: A PPO-based Learning Approach",
      "description": "V2X connectivity patterns establish the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) paradigm. Nevertheless, the notable benefits of V2X connectivity inadvertently introduce security vulnerability challenges. This paper applies the Markov Decision Process (MDP). It describes the attacker’s selection problem, specifically how they exploit vulnerabilities to achieve topological attack objectives. Specifically, we define a topological network by analyzing the IoV’s cloud-channel-edge terminal architecture. Subsequently, attacks targeting the IoV are integrated with attack scenarios to construct a vulnerability network. The attack process is then established as a dual-network model. This model is based on the one-to-many relationship between topological nodes and vulnerability nodes. We utilize an approximate policy optimization (PPO) algorithm to solve the MDP problem. Its primary objective is to identify the optimal attack path within the IoV. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed PPO algorithm can identify potential attack paths. Furthermore, it can determine the optimal attack path. This contributes to a comprehensive, global analysis of vulnerability exploitation within IoV systems.",
      "published": "2025-12-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icctit68197.2025.11406333",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hongyang Nie",
        "Sen Li",
        "Cong Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 5th International Conference on Communication Technology and Information Technology (ICCTIT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icctit68197.2025.11406333",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccubea.2018.8697376",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Low-Level Memory Attacks on Automotive Embedded Systems",
      "description": "Most of the modern car's functionality is controlled by software, embedded into electronic control units (ECUs). Modern cars are using more than 70 ECUs. So the embedded system is becoming a vital part of the next generation cars. Automotive Embedded Systems are also being network enabled, allowing for remote updates and data sharing. Due to this exposure software corruption has become a major concern. This paper has reviewed the detailed working of low-level memory in the automotive embedded system, possible threats, potential vulnerabilities which can be exploited. Low-level memory plays an important role in ECUs. It stores all the necessary configuration and the functionality of the individual ECU. There are many ways to read/access the contents of these sectors. Possible attacks on low-level memory segments of an ECU are broadly classified as physical, logical and side-channel attacks. This paper has also reviewed the general attacking strategies on memories available in widely known hardware resources. Based on this study, buffer overflow attack and memory access using debuggers are implemented and discussed here.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccubea.2018.8697376",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gaurav Kalamkar",
        "Ajey Gotkhindikar",
        "Ashok Rajaram Suryawanshi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing Communication Control and automation",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccubea.2018.8697376",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccubea.2018.8697772",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Security in Automotive Networks",
      "description": "As a new generation vehicle are in market now days, new networking architecture is defined for those vehicles. In-vehicle communication and different interfaces which are used to connect in-vehicle network to outside are vulnerable. Communication like Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle to Anything (V2X) is not secure as there are so many vulnerabilities present in designed communication protocol. The vehicles which are on road consist of several Electronic controller units (ECU). These ECUs takes input from different sensors or another ECU and take appropriate action. When vehicle is on road, these ECUs are communicating continuously. According to the current figure there are near about 70 to 100 ECUs present and communication of these ECU is taken place via different communication channel called bus. To reduce the complex wiring of buses, researchers developed different protocol for different type of communication bus protocol such as LIN, CAN, FlexRay, and MOST which is widely used by different automotive manufacturers. On the basis of speed used for communication the bus is chosen like, to play video there must be very high speed bus as streaming must be taken place with maximum speed without any delay. There are several safety critical ECUs also such as break system, Engine Control, Speed Control etc. Apart from these, as day by day the luxurious features are introduced by the automotive manufacturer by adding more ECU and security for that gaining more importance. So the risk of cyber-attack is quite high which can be life threat to driver and passenger. In addition to that, interfaces such as wireless communication, remote diagnostics, and firmware update over the air are new platforms where attacker have various option for intrusion. For example attacker can take control on vehicle steering using wireless communication interface and puts lives of passengers in danger. To reduce the complex wiring for communication and increase the efficiency of communication automotive manufacturers developed different protocols but the security for that. In this paper, we will provide an insight into the different protocols for Inter-vehicle and In-vehicle communication network systems, overview and the emerging In-Vehicle networking standards and their security issues.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccubea.2018.8697772",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shriram Jadhav",
        "Deepak D. Kshirsagar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing Communication Control and automation",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccubea.2018.8697772",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccubea69821.2026.11702144",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Fragment-Level Integrity Verification for CAN-Based OTA Using Micro-Hash Chains",
      "description": "The Over-The-Air (OTA) firmware updates are crucial for today's vehicles for remote management and deployment of software components. However, commonly employed intravehicle communication interfaces such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) do not have built-in security features, including authentication and encryption, and thus, are susceptible to attacks from adversaries. In the case of the CAN-based OTA systems, firmware is fragmented because of the limitations of payload size. Fragmentation creates the attack vector for adversaries who could inject their own malicious fragments while maintaining the correct structure of the message, including offsets and checksums. Conventional integrity checks like the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) cannot recognize such attacks. This paper proposes a lightweight fragment-level verification scheme relying on the micro-hash chain with the use of BLAKE2s-256 hashing and Ed25519 digital signatures. Such an approach allows progressive verification of integrity of firmware fragments as well as end-to-end authenticity. Evaluation of the proposed scheme with the use of hardware components - ESP32 nodes with the MCP2515 CAN controller - shows that the method is capable of recognizing attacks at the injection point with no overhead in computation.",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccubea69821.2026.11702144",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pratheeksha Karanth",
        "Sanidhya Sharma",
        "Veral Gupta"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing Communication Control and automation",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccubea69821.2026.11702144",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccv51070.2023.00754",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Semi-supervised Semantics-guided Adversarial Training for Robust Trajectory Prediction",
      "description": "Predicting the trajectories of surrounding objects is a critical task for self-driving vehicles and many other autonomous systems. Recent works demonstrate that adversarial attacks on trajectory prediction, where small crafted perturbations are introduced to history trajectories, may significantly mislead the prediction of future trajectories and induce unsafe planning. However, few works have addressed enhancing the robustness of this important safety-critical task. In this paper, we present a novel adversarial training method for trajectory prediction. Compared with typical adversarial training on image tasks, our work is challenged by more random input with rich context and a lack of class labels. To address these challenges, we propose a method based on a semi-supervised adversarial autoencoder, which models disentangled semantic features with domain knowledge and provides additional latent labels for the adversarial training. Extensive experiments with different types of attacks demonstrate that our Semi-supervised Semantics-guided Adversarial Training (SSAT1) method can effectively mitigate the impact of adversarial attacks by up to 73% and outperform other popular defense methods. In addition, experiments show that our method can significantly improve the system's robust generalization to unseen patterns of attacks. We believe that such semantics-guided architecture and advancement on robust generalization is an important step for developing robust prediction models and enabling safe decision making.",
      "published": "2023-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccv51070.2023.00754",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ruochen Jiao",
        "Xiangguo Liu",
        "Takami Sato",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Qi Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccv51070.2023.00754",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccve.2015.1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A two-year survey on security challenges in automotive threat landscape",
      "description": "The threat landscape is changing and the connected-car now becomes a new cyber attack target. When mobile connects both car and the vehicle cloud via mobile apps, connected-car solutions are bringing new threats into the vehicle. As early as late 2013, we began to find security vulnerabilities for car makers, TSP (Telematics Service Providers), car sharing companies, OBD dongle manufacturers and auto app developers in their products and services. With our helps, those vendors have fixed security vulnerabilities. In our knowledge, it is first comprehensive connected-car security survey covering both premarket and aftermarket. More than 80 testing checkpoints have been applied on the security penetration testing. In this paper, we will show our research findings.",
      "published": "2015-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccve.2015.1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "obd",
        "penetration",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wei Qi Yan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Connected Vehicles and Expo",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccve.2015.1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccve.2016.5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing connected car adoption: Security framework",
      "description": "A comprehensive security solution is no longer an option, and needs to be designed bottom-up into the car software. The architecture needs to be scalable and tiered, leveraging the proven technologies, processes and policies from the mature industries. The objective is to detect, defend and recover from any attack before harm comes to passengers, data and instrumentation. No matter how hardened security is there is always a need to patch any security vulnerabilities. This paper presents high level framework for security and over the air (OTA) framework.",
      "published": "2016-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccve.2016.5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M.U. Khurram",
        "Hemanth Kumar",
        "Adi Chandak",
        "Varun Sarwade",
        "Nitu Arora",
        "Tony Quach"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Connected Vehicles and Expo",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccve.2016.5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccw.2016.7503773",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Preventing relay attacks and providing perfect forward secrecy using PHYSEC on 8-bit μC",
      "description": "Physical Layer Security (PHYSEC) has the potential to offer substantial advantages for key management for small resource-constrained devices. In this paper, we investigate two PHYSEC primitives: channel reciprocity based key generation (CRKG) and channel reciprocity based relay detection (CRRD). The security and entry performance of such systems in real-world scenarios are still open research questions. Until now, there are no embedded implementations of CRKG and CRRD systems providing resource requirements such as code size, number of clock cycles, and power consumption. Moreover, there are only few experimental verification of practical use cases that provide information about applicability and that cope with current security issues. We fill this gap with measurements carried out with our embedded prototype. By way of example, we address security critical remote keyless entry (RKE) use cases. To achieve this we created the first implementation of both PHYSEC primitives on an 8-bit SoC and provide practice-oriented performance results. Further, we provide a fair comparison to elliptic curve cryptography based key establishment schemes.",
      "published": "2016-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccw.2016.7503773",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Zenger",
        "Mario Pietersz",
        "Christof Paar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Communications workshops",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccw.2016.7503773",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccwamtip51612.2020.9317386",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Communication Protocol by Using Vehicular AD-HOC Network",
      "description": "Incidents among road vehicles happen raised measures of wounds, passing rates, and vital cash related losses. Vehicle to everything updates road prosperity, traffic stream, Traffic adequacy, roadway security, and communication unflinching quality or decreases traffic blocking which impacts transportation. Vehicular Ad-hoc networks is a huge thought from the investigation organize and the vehicle business to improve the organizations of cooperate intelligent transportation system. The potential results of vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-structure, vehicle to cloud, vehicle to house, vehicle to network, vehicle to pedestrian correspondence showing, and PC entertainment will be shown. A quick generation of vehicular Ad-hoc masterminds is continuously required. In any case, this is nothing yet hard to achieve in light of the way that road traffic and framework correspondence test frameworks are amazing and normally creamer structures are required. One such a mutt approach, Vehicles in Network Simulation (Veins), melds the by and large used Simulation of Urban Mobility and the renowned discrete event multiplication state of Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++ (OMNET++).",
      "published": "2020-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccwamtip51612.2020.9317386",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Ahtsam Naeem",
        "Xiaolin Jia",
        "Muhammad Asim Saleem",
        "Wasif Akbar",
        "Afzaal Hussain",
        "Shahbaz Nazir",
        "Khwaja Mutahir Ahmad"
      ],
      "venue": "International Computer Conference on Wavelet Active Media Technology and Information Processing (ICCWAMTIP)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccwamtip51612.2020.9317386",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccwamtip53232.2021.9674146",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient Access Control Framework For Service-Oriented Architecture of Vehicle",
      "description": "The static interaction method in automobile is difficult to solve the communication requirements of emerging technologies such as Advanced Driving Assistance System (ADAS) and Over-The-Air Technology (OTA). With the development of intelligence, automobiles will occupy an important position in the Internet of Things in the future. Therefore, they need to have the characteristics of openness, connectivity and self-evolution. Further, the design of Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is gradually introduced to provide more flexible communication and service call for the Internet of Vehicles. In traditional in-vehicle communication such as the CAN bus, a variety of security and safety mechanisms are adopted to protect the information and functional safety of vehicle. In automotive SOA, potential security threats also need be taken seriously. Aiming at the hidden dangers of unauthorized access in the automobile, we propose an efficient distributed access control architecture. And based on the message dissemination middleware-SOME/IP protocol of automotive SOA, a secure access control protocol-Security Expended SOME/IP (SE-SOME/IP) is designed, which can simultaneously have multiple security mechanisms and provide access control Function. The use of Attribute-Based Access Control and the introduction of Access Vector Cache can greatly shorten the request time of service.",
      "published": "2021-12-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccwamtip53232.2021.9674146",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Ruikun",
        "Zhang Haitao",
        "Yun Li",
        "Lirong Chen",
        "Qi Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Computer Conference on Wavelet Active Media Technology and Information Processing (ICCWAMTIP)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccwamtip53232.2021.9674146",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccwamtip68645.2025.11352685",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Progressive Automotive Attack Path Analysis: A Four-Stage Framework with Hybrid Validation",
      "description": "Rapid intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) development dramatically expands attack surfaces, rendering manual Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) inadequate. Rule-based systems lack flexibility, while general-purpose Large Language Models (LLMs) suffer from unreliability. To address this, we propose a four-stage framework combining LoRA-Gen for generation, CVE validation, KG verification, and LoRA-Score feasibility assessment in compliance with ISO/SAE 21434. Evaluated on 66 real-world scenarios, the framework achieves 96.4% F1-score under strict criteria and 99.9% under moderate criteria, aligning with expert ground truth. It completes analysis in ~38s per scenario, demonstrating high efficiency.",
      "published": "2025-12-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccwamtip68645.2025.11352685",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dan Yu",
        "Qianyu Zhang",
        "Jianchao Luo",
        "Xuedong Song",
        "Xiangyang Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Computer Conference on Wavelet Active Media Technology and Information Processing (ICCWAMTIP)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccwamtip68645.2025.11352685",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccworkshops63917.2026.11586233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A baseline threat and mitigation model for automotive cybersecurity and privacy",
      "description": "This paper investigates the existence and systematic identification of baseline assets, threats, and mitigation measures for automotive cyber-physical systems (CPSs). It introduces the SCAR automotive model, a comprehensive registry integrating 18 high-level asset categories and 124 fine-grained assets across security and privacy domains. Threats are analysed using STRIDE and LINDDUN, while mitigations are grounded in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 and GDPR, ensuring regulatory alignment. The SCAR automotive model provides a well-grounded, scalable, and operationally actionable framework for the engineering of cybersecurity and privacy. It serves as a baseline control framework, bridging threat modelling with compliance. The model is constructed via the SCAR modelling methodology, a domain-agnostic, human–AI (HAI) approach with multi-level refinement, easily adaptable to other automotive sub-domains or other CPS areas such as healthcare and energy.",
      "published": "2026-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccworkshops63917.2026.11586233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "gdpr",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giampaolo Bella",
        "Davide Bonaventura",
        "Gianpietro Castiglione",
        "Sergio Esposito",
        "Mirko Giuseppe Mangano",
        "Mario Raciti",
        "S. Riccobene",
        "Daniele Francesco Santamaria"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC Workshops)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccworkshops63917.2026.11586233",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iccworkshops63917.2026.11586353",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic Security Resource Allocation in V2X Edge Computing via Attention-BiGAN and DRL",
      "description": "To address the security defense challenges arising from constrained computational resources and highly dynamic network threats in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) edge computing nodes, this paper proposes a closed-loop dynamic resource scheduling and intrusion detection framework based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). First, a Bidirectional Generative Adversarial Network (BiGAN) integrated with a channel attention mechanism serves as the core detection engine to capture concealed attack features within high-noise communication environments through feature recalibration. A risk-adaptive dual-stream scheduling mechanism is designed, wherein a Deep Q-Network (DQN) agent is employed to dynamically regulate the allocation ratio of security detection resources based on real-time perceived threat levels and communication queue backlog states. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves an F1-score of 0.9389 on the NSL-KDD dataset while attaining a Pareto optimal balance between detection accuracy and communication latency. Compared with static high-resource strategies, the proposed approach significantly reduces queuing latency, thereby guaranteeing the real-time performance and security of critical V2X services.",
      "published": "2026-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iccworkshops63917.2026.11586353",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiao-Sheng Ni",
        "Xiong-Bin Yu",
        "Chang-Jie Hu",
        "Song-Yi Wang",
        "Xing Luo",
        "Xiong Li",
        "Jingpu Duan"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC Workshops)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iccworkshops63917.2026.11586353",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icdcsw.2017.23",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Detection and Isolation of Black Hole Attacks in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected Vehicles (CVs) can be exposed to black hole attacks that deceive legitimate nodes by falsifying an attractive route to a destination node. This occurs when an attacker sends a packet to the source node confirming the existence of a fresh route. In this paper, we propose a Black Hole Detection Protocol (BlackDP) that works on a highway divided into clusters and monitored by Road Side Units (RSUs) to detect both single and cooperative black hole attacks. Every RSU is tasked with performing both detection and isolation of black hole attacks for their respective highway section after authentication violations and suspicious route establishment activities that have been reported by a legitimate node. The design goal of BlackDP is to decouple the detection process from mobile nodes and construct a trusted semi-centric detection process that can collect needed information for lightweight detection and reliable isolation of malicious nodes. We validate BlackDP in a simulated highway environment to demonstrate its effectiveness.",
      "published": "2017-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icdcsw.2017.23",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sami Saad Albouq",
        "Erik M. Fredericks"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/icdcsw.2017.23",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3985,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icdcsw.2017.23 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: sends, collect, activities, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icdm58522.2023.00089",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ATTA: Adversarial Task-transferable Attacks on Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "Deep learning (DL) based perception models have enabled the possibility of current autonomous driving systems (ADS). However, various studies have pointed out that the DL models inside the ADS perception modules are vulnerable to adversarial attacks which can easily manipulate these DL models’ predictions. In this paper, we propose a more practical adversarial attack against the ADS perception module. Particularly, instead of targeting one of the DL models inside the ADS perception module, we propose to use one universal patch to mislead multiple DL models inside the ADS perception module simultaneously which leads to a higher chance of system-wide malfunction. We achieve such a goal by attacking the attention of DL models as a higher level of feature representation rather than traditional gradient-based attacks. We successfully generate a universal patch containing malicious perturbations that can attract multiple victim DL models’ attention to further induce their prediction errors. We verify our attack with extensive experiments on a typical ADS perception module structure with five famous datasets and also physical world scenes1.1We release our code at https://github.com/qingjiesjtu/ATTA",
      "published": "2023-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icdm58522.2023.00089",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qingjie Zhang",
        "Maosen Zhang",
        "Han Qiu",
        "Tianwei Zhang",
        "Mounira Msahli",
        "Gérard Memmi"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icdm58522.2023.00089",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icdsbs69077.2026.11634893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Shield for AI Driven Cyber Threat Intelligence",
      "description": "Automobiles have developed into technologically advanced cyber-physical systems, thanks to the use of multiple Electronic Control Unit systems (ECUs) consisting of in-vehicle networking and cloud-based connectivity. These new technologies are intended to automate as well as improve safety and the user experience, but by doing so they have introduced a much larger cyber-attack surface for vehicles. Some examples of these new threats are: CAN Bus Injection, remote exploits against Infotainment Systems, GPS Spoofing, firmware alteration, abuse of over-the-air software updates, all of which directly affect your safety and privacy. Present regulations and industry standards (ISO/SAE 21434) regarding vehicle cyber-attack or generation security do not account for manual procedures associated with an increase in vulnerabilities at an exponential rate. There are no common security tools that can automatically correlate new vulnerabilities to specific vehicle systems or components and determine risk based on context. This paper describes a new framework named Automotive Shield that will provide an AI based approach to assessing vehicle cybersecurity risks in real-time by correlating new vulnerabilities to known vehicle systems or components utilizing a large language model (LLM). Automotive Shield will enable automated reporting of vulnerabilities, real-time scoring of risk associated with each vulnerability, as well as the ability to conduct vehicle cybersecurity assessments at scale for new connected & autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icdsbs69077.2026.11634893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaushik Saravanan",
        "K. P. Theertha",
        "Kanniga Devi R"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Data Science and Business Systems (ICDSBS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icdsbs69077.2026.11634893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icdscnc70670.2026.11746485",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle-to-Everything Interaction and Control System for New Energy Vehicles Based on IoT Architecture",
      "description": "Addressing the issues of cloud platform signaling congestion, cross-domain authentication redundancy, and bandwidth squeezing in concurrent scenarios such as large-scale electric vehicle charging scheduling, this paper proposes a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interaction and control system based on an IoT architecture. An edge-cloud collaborative topology is constructed, with edge nodes preprocessing nearby to suppress invalid traffic; an intent-driven two-layer time-slot scheduling design is implemented, with reserved time slots and dynamic token buckets ensuring deterministic transmission of high-priority messages; distributed identity and verifiable credentials are introduced to achieve lightweight cross-domain authentication, eliminating single-point bottlenecks; and an adaptive control strategy integrating battery status and grid load is proposed to balance interaction overhead and control timeliness online. In concurrent experiments, the charging latency was 47.5 ms, the alarm success rate was >99.9%, the authentication latency was 29.7 ms, and the adaptive overhead was reduced by 67%. The conclusion shows that the integration of edge collaboration, intent scheduling, and distributed trust effectively solves the deterministic and secure reliability challenges of high-concurrency V2X interactions.",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icdscnc70670.2026.11746485",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jing Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Distributed Systems, Computer Networks and Cybersecurity (ICDSCNC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icdscnc70670.2026.11746485",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icdsis65355.2025.11070840",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving Power Quality and Stability of EV Charging Systems with Grid and PV Solar Integration via Adaptive Bayesian Neural Networks",
      "description": "Energy security, resource depletion, and environmental concerns require transportation electrification. EV usage has surged due to fossil fuel depletion, automobile pollution, and energy security concerns. EV loads are different from system loads, making power grid integration problematic. Thorough data preparation ensured data integrity, resolved missing data, and improved data quality. The ICA was utilised to pick important predictors and enrich the dataset through feature engineering to understand energy usage patterns. It compared RF and classic BNNs to a new Self-Adaptive BNN architecture for robust regression analysis. The proposed Self-Adaptive BNN outperformed regression workloads with a 1.9% MAPE, 2.3 kWh RMSE, and 0.82 R2 score. These measurements reveal improved EV charging station energy consumption prediction accuracy and lower error rates. The Self-Adaptive BNN model has potential in renewable energy and EV infrastructure due to its validation over several EV charging stations. The model can solve EV-grid integration issues and promote cost-effective, efficient, and sustainable energy solutions, the findings show.",
      "published": "2025-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icdsis65355.2025.11070840",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. L. Dwarakanad",
        "H. C",
        "M. P",
        "S. G",
        "T. A"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 3rd International Conference on Data Science and Information System (ICDSIS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icdsis65355.2025.11070840",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iceaai68945.2026.11442485",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Intrusion Detection for Vehicle CAN Bus Based on AAFormer-GAN",
      "description": "With the rapid development of the intelligent connected vehicle industry, the number of on-board ECUs has surged. As the core standard for on-board communication, the CAN protocol faces prominent security risks. Bus intrusion can easily lead to vehicle loss of control and other accidents, making the research and development of on-board network intrusion detection technology of great significance. This paper expounds on the structure of the CAN protocol, the classification of intrusion detection systems, and the core characteristics of CNN. Addressing the bottlenecks of data imbalance in datasets and unknown attack detection, we design a data generation network based on the associative attention mechanism, AAFormer-GAN. This network, with AAFormer as its backbone, employs a mean squared error loss function to alleviate the vanishing gradient problem in traditional GANs, generating time-series attack samples that closely resemble the real distribution. Experimental verification shows that its generation quality surpasses mainstream models such as WGAN-GP. The unknown attack detection model constructed based on this provides an innovative solution for onboard CAN bus intrusion detection, enhancing the ability to identify small samples and unknown attacks.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iceaai68945.2026.11442485",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicle",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chun-Hui Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 2nd International Conference on Electrical Automation and Artificial Intelligence (ICEAAI)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iceaai68945.2026.11442485",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4433,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iceaai68945.2026.11442485 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: onboard, loss, unknown, ability, making, intelligence, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icecaa55415.2022.9936152",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey on CAN-Bus Packet Filtering Firewall",
      "description": "The world is moving towards autonomous vehicles and the vehicle is exposed to various types of communication, like Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X). This communication facilitates telematics, diagnostics and over the air software update features. The vehicle is also connected via various interfaces like Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), Bluetooth (BT), Universal Serial Bus (USB), and On-board Diagnostics (OBD) to the external world for various purposes. This opens possibility for several cyber-attacks through external ports, network interfaces if there are no adequate cyber security mechanisms implemented, and cybersecurity risks are not treated. Controller Area Network (CAN-bus) is a central nervous system of the modern vehicle and most of the in-vehicle communication takes place on it. Unfortunately, the CAN-bus is inherently insecure and lacks basic security features like authentication and encryption. The insecure nature of CAN-bus in a vehicle lead to several security exploits and malicious activities which put driver and passengers at risk. Therefore, security measures need to be implemented in the automotive network. This paper addresses CAN vulnerabilities, critical attacks, and security measures to protect CAN bus such as cryptographic measures, firewall and methods to detect and prevent such attacks. Certain approaches have been identified and discussed in this paper. Moreover, this paper attempts to bring together essential background knowledge required to work on security for CAN network in automotive embedded systems.",
      "published": "2022-10-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icecaa55415.2022.9936152",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd",
        "telematics",
        "v2g",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-grid",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Y P Sahana",
        "Ajey Gotkhindikar",
        "Shailendra Kumar Tiwari"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Edge Computing and Applications (ICECAA)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icecaa55415.2022.9936152",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icecce61019.2023.10442984",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CADS: Cyber-Attack Detection System Using Decision Tree for Automotive Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are equipped with a large number of electronic control units (ECUs) to provide more convenient and safe services for drivers. These ECUs are required to share the various control data for driving using the CAN (Controller Area Network) protocol that is one of the communication protocols for in-vehicle networks. Recently, as vehicles become capable of real-time, two-way communication with various elements on the road, modern vehicles faces a wide range of security issues. The in-vehicle networks are already suffered from the cyber-attacks exploiting newly exposed security vulnerabilities. However, it cannot guarantee the safety and security of the vehicles from as the CAN is designed without considering security. Therefore, this paper proposes a machine learning-based cyber-attack detection system (CADS) in CAN to ensure driving safety. This CADS learns the data pattern of the CAN frames generated while the driving and is able to distinguish between regular messages and cyberattack messages. The performance of the fully trained detection model of the CADS is evaluated using a vast number of testing dataset. The results show that our CADS in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score has 100% of the detection rate for regular messages, replay attacks, brute-force attacks except for modification messages.",
      "published": "2023-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icecce61019.2023.10442984",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seohee Park",
        "Youngmi Baek"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electrical, Communication, and Computer Engineering (ICECCE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icecce61019.2023.10442984",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iceccme64568.2025.11277513",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DIMA: A Post-Quantum and Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Identity Management Architecture for Secure V2X Authentication",
      "description": "The security and privacy of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication are critical for the reliability of future intelligent transportation systems (ITS). Existing V2X public key infrastructure (VPKI) models face centralization risks, inefficient revocation, limited privacy, and vulnerability to quantum attacks. While blockchain-based frameworks improve decentralization, they often depend on classical cryptography and offer limited defense against Sybil attacks and identity linkage. This paper presents DIMA, a post-quantum decentralized identity management architecture for V2X authentication and privacy preservation. DIMA integrates a dual-layer permissioned blockchain with CRYSTALS-Dilithium for quantum-resistant digital signatures, zk-STARKs for anonymous pseudonym issuance, and privacy tokens with a reputation-based refresh mechanism for Sybil resistance. A hash-based accumulator supports scalable revocation, while self-sovereign identity (SSI) and zero-knowledge attribute proofs enable privacy-preserving access control. Security is analyzed under a quantum-capable adversarial model, and performance is evaluated using analytical benchmarks. Results demonstrate that DIMA achieves strong unlinkability, scalable Sybil deterrence, and real-time authentication, addressing key limitations of prior approaches and providing a quantum-resilient foundation for next-generation V2X ecosystems.",
      "published": "2025-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iceccme64568.2025.11277513",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sara Benouar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electrical, Computer, Communications and Mechatronics Engineering (ICECCME)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iceccme64568.2025.11277513",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iceccme64568.2025.11277558",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Challenges in IoT-enabled Green Mobility Systems",
      "description": "The rise of green mobility solutions, such as electric vehicles (EVs), smart charging stations, and connected public transit systems, has been accompanied by increased reliance on Internet of Things (IoT) technologies. While these advancements support sustainable urban development, they also introduce cybersecurity risks. This paper explores key security challenges in IoT-enabled green mobility—such as attack vectors, vulnerabilities in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, and risks to EV charging infrastructure. We review existing frameworks and propose a multi-layered model integrating blockchain-based authentication, AI-driven intrusion detection, and lightweight cryptographic protocols for resource-constrained IoT devices. The framework ensures confidentiality, integrity, and availability while maintaining scalability and energy efficiency. Case studies and simulations demonstrate the feasibility of securing sustainable transportation systems.",
      "published": "2025-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iceccme64568.2025.11277558",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J. C. S. Manuel Reis",
        "Alexandre Sousa",
        "André Barbosa",
        "Arsénio Reis"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 5th International Conference on Electrical, Computer, Communications and Mechatronics Engineering (ICECCME)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iceccme64568.2025.11277558",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icecet63943.2025.11472111",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VeTARA: A Vessel Environment Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Framework",
      "description": "The integration of IT and OT in modern vessel systems underscores the critical importance of maritime cybersecurity. Although IACS establishes No. 171 as a maritime cybersecurity risk assessment framework and cyber resilience guideline for UR E26, it does not adequately address the complex and interconnected nature of modern vessels. Recent cyber incidents, such as the attempted attack on Ballast Water Treatment Systems (BWTS) by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlight the increasing threats targeting vessel control systems [1]. This study proposes VeTARA, a cybersecurity risk assessment framework that integrates ISO/SAE 21434’s TARA methodology with NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 and NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 2. VeTARA provides a structured approach to evaluating and mitigating cybersecurity risks in maritime systems by incorporating the Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover functions of NIST CSF 2.0 and aligning them with the four resilience goals of NIST SP 800-160 (Anticipate, Withstand, Recover, and Adapt). By addressing the limitations of existing maritime cybersecurity guidelines, VeTARA improves the evaluation and management of cyber threats in vessel operations, fostering safer and more resilient maritime environments against emerging adversarial tactics.",
      "published": "2025-07-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icecet63943.2025.11472111",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "H. Lim",
        "Yonghun No",
        "Yong-Gun Jo"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 5th International Conference on Electrical, Computer and Energy Technologies (ICECET)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icecet63943.2025.11472111",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icecs202256217.2022.9971118",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unified Lightweight Authenticated Encryption for Resource-Constrained Electronic Control Unit",
      "description": "Electronic control units (ECU) have been widely used in modern resource-constrained automotive systems, com-municating through the controller area network (CAN) bus. However, they are still facing man-in-the-middle attacks in CAN bus due to the absence of a more effective authenti-cation/encryption mechanism. In this paper, to defend against the attacks more effectively, we propose a unified lightweight authenticated encryption that integrates recent prevalent cryp-tography standardization Isap and Ascon.First, we reuse the common permutation block of ISAP and Asconto support authenticated encryption and encryption/decryption. Second, we provide a flexible and independent switch between authenticated encryption and encryption/decryption to support specific application requirements. Third, we adopt standard CAESAR hardware API as the interface standard to support compatibility between different interfaces or platforms. Experimental results show that our proposed unified lightweight authenticated encryption can reduce 26.09% area consumption on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA board compared with the state-of-the-arts. In addition, the encryption overhead of the proposed design for transferring one CAN data frame is$\\mathbf{10.75} \\mu s$using Asconand$\\mathbf{72.25} \\mu s$using ISAP at the frequency of 4 MHz on embedded devices.",
      "published": "2022-10-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icecs202256217.2022.9971118",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chunxu Guo",
        "Yi Wang",
        "Fupeng Chen",
        "Yajun Ha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits and Systems (ICECS)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icecs202256217.2022.9971118",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icect66235.2025.11381699",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicular Network DDoS Defender: Detecting And Preventing DDos Attacks in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Digital links to vehicle networks have revolutionized how transportation works, making the infrastructure and ride better and safer for passengers. However, these improvements have also increased the danger zone by making connected cars more vulnerable to sophisticated cyberattacks like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) assaults. This paper presents a vehicular network DDoS defender framework. The key purpose of the proposed framework is to efficiently detect DDoS attacks in a vehicular network and timely protect the ecosystems that can target automobiles. We applied different machine learning techniques using the most up-to-date information and benchmarks for the Internet of Vehicles. We trained and tested five commonly used machine learning (ML) algorithms over CICIoV2024 dataset among which the support vector machine (SVM) classifier outperformed all other ML algorithms with $\\mathbf{9 8. 2 \\%}$ accuracy, $\\mathbf{9 7 \\%} \\mathbf{F 1}$-score, $\\mathbf{9 8 \\%}$ AUC ROC and $\\mathbf{1. 8 m s}$ inference latency. This experimental results indicates that the proposed framework can accurately locate and react to vehicular network attacks that happen in real life.",
      "published": "2025-11-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icect66235.2025.11381699",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Azhar Ali Khan",
        "Faisal Hussain",
        "Abdul Majid Soomro"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Engineering & Computing Technologies (ICECT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icect66235.2025.11381699",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iceet56468.2022.10007335",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-based Approach to thwart Replay Attacks targeting Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) is a revolutionary technology that allows drivers to gain access to their vehicles using a wireless key fob operating on short-range radio waves. This technology offers numerous advantages for drivers, but it is still vulnerable to serious security threats which target the interactions between the fob and car, which may eventually result in car theft. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based approach to thwart replay attacks targeting cars equipped with RKE systems. We consider the key fob and the car as two separate users of a private blockchain in which a miner authenticates the key fob with the corresponding car to grant or deny access using a smart contract. We validate our findings by a performance evaluation of the time taken by the miner to validate the access to the vehicle.",
      "published": "2022-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iceet56468.2022.10007335",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Issa Abdoul Razac Djinko",
        "Thabet Kacem",
        "Anteneh Girma"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Engineering and Emerging Technologies (ICEET)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iceet56468.2022.10007335",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icei65890.2026.11448037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Authentication Mechanisms for Securing Charging Infrastructure for Electric Vehicle",
      "description": "The increasing adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) as part of sustainable urban transport has heightened the need for robust and secure charging infrastructures. This paper explores the cybersecurity challenges in EV charging systems, focusing on static and dynamic charging methods. It highlights vulnerabilities in interfaces such as EV operator-Internet and EVSE-Maintenance, which are susceptible to cyberattacks like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), ransomware, and Trojan attacks. Current authentication protocols, including identitybased encryption, elliptic curve cryptography, hash functions, and physical unclonable functions (PUFs), are reviewed, revealing limitations in computational complexity, communication overhead, and security features. The paper emphasizes the importance of security frameworks like ISO 15118, IEC 61850, and OCPP, alongside emerging standards such as NIST Cybersecurity Framework and ISO/IEC 27001:2022, to address these vulnerabilities. Authentication mechanisms such as RFID cards, mobile apps, Plug-and-Charge (ISO 15118), and biometric authentication are compared, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. A novel threeserver authentication protocol using modified elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is proposed to enhance security and mitigate malicious authentication failures. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for scalable, efficient, and secure authentication solutions tailored to the unique requirements of EV charging infrastructures, ensuring user trust and supporting the sustainable development of urban transport systems.",
      "published": "2026-01-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icei65890.2026.11448037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit V Nagarale",
        "D. Sakhare"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 International Conference on Emerging Trends and Innovations in ICT (ICEI)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icei65890.2026.11448037",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iceic57457.2023.10049883",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware Design of Intrusion Detection System for Automotive CAN Bus Using Random Forest",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) bus is a reliable protocol that connects electronic control units in a vehicle to send and receive control data for driving a vehicle. However, CAN-bus is quite weak against external attacks since it was not designed considering cybersecurity. In this paper, we propose an intrusion detection system (IDS). It monitors data frames on CAN bus, and detects spoofing attack using random forest, one of the machine learning techniques. When combined with node exclusion system (NES) in the previous works, IDS can effectively detect the hacked node and NES can exclude it from the CAN bus. The proposed IDS and NES have been designed and verified with Modelsim simulator.",
      "published": "2023-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iceic57457.2023.10049883",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dae-Heon Lee",
        "C. Han",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronics, Information and Communications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iceic57457.2023.10049883",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iceict51264.2020.9334354",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security for Autonomous Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Autonomous driving is developing rapidly with the progress of AI. But due to the evolution of automotive E/E architecture and interaction of vehicle-to-everything, security threats are also increasing rapidly. In this paper, we try to identify the technical challenges and the core issues of securing Autonomous Vehicles and the networks, make an analysis of the mainstream standards and industry best practices, and furthermore highlight some research areas.",
      "published": "2020-11-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iceict51264.2020.9334354",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ai-Fen Sui",
        "Gordon Muehl"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electronic Information and Communication Technology (ICEICT)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iceict51264.2020.9334354",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iceidt66693.2025.11473612",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development and Implementation of an IoT-Based Secure Key Fob System for Enhanced Vehicle Access Control",
      "description": "This research aims to enhance vehicle security in Malaysia by integrating Remote Key authentication BLE technology. The traditional remote key system lacks proper ownership verification, making vehicles vulnerable to unauthorized access. To address this, the proposed solution introduces an additional security layer without altering the original remote key functionality. A BLE authentication module is installed in the vehicle, ensuring that only the verified owner can start the engine. If the remote key is lost or stolen, the vehicle owner can use a mobile application for identity verification and remote access management. The app also enables real-time vehicle tracking and secure digital key sharing. This research aims to create a secure, user-friendly, and cost-effective solution to prevent unauthorized vehicle access while improving the convenience of car key management. This research aligns with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, by promoting innovative automotive security solutions that enhance safety and technological resilience in Malaysia.",
      "published": "2025-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iceidt66693.2025.11473612",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "key fob",
        "resilience",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hong Rui Yi",
        "Muhammad Ehsan Rana",
        "Kamalanathan Shanmugam",
        "Muhammad Hussain Rana",
        "Raziff Hamsan",
        "Nurul Asyira Roslin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Emerging Innovation and Digital Technology (ICEIDT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iceidt66693.2025.11473612",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icemce60359.2023.10490855",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Designing a Standardized Process for Automotive Cyber Security Incident Management",
      "description": "With the development of automotive networking and intelligence, the cyber security issues faced by intelligent connected vehicles have become increasingly prominent. Automotive cyber security has become a significant concern in the industry. Incident management, as an essential part of the vehicle's entire lifecycle, encompasses incident detection, analysis, and response. It plays a critical role in ensuring cyber security for both automobile manufacturers and component suppliers. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a standardized management process. This paper presents a general process for managing automotive cyber security incidents, based on ISO/SAE 21434 “Road vehicles-Cybersecurity engineering” and R155 “Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to cyber security and cyber security management system”. The proposed process serves as a guide for relevant enterprises to adapt it to their specific business scope, characteristics, practical experience, and potential types of cyber security incidents they may encounter. Furthermore, it encourages continuous improvement and refinement based on their own development, aiming to address cyber security incidents in a standardized and efficient manner while minimizing their negative impact.",
      "published": "2023-10-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icemce60359.2023.10490855",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meng Han",
        "Jing Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electrical, Mechanical and Computer Engineering (ICEMCE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icemce60359.2023.10490855",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5326,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icemce60359.2023.10490855 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: incident, concern, intelligence, significant, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icemd64575.2024.10963615",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancements in Electric Vehicle Charging Optimization: A Survey of Reinforcement Learning Approaches",
      "description": "In response to global warming and energy shortages, there has been a significant shift towards integrating renewable energy sources, energy storage systems, and electric vehicles. Deploying electric vehicles within smart grids offers a promising solution to reduce carbon emissions. However, managing the charging and discharging processes of them as distributed power supplies present significant challenges. Additionally, the intermittent nature of renewable energy, uncertainties in electric vehicle-related parameters, fluctuating energy prices, and varying loads make maintaining stable power system operations more complex. Effective management systems for electric vehicle battery charging are crucial to coordinating these processes and ensuring a secure, efficient, and reliable power system. Reinforcement learning, enhanced by deep learning, has gained substantial interest for its model-free approach and real-time optimization, effectively managing electric vehicle charging by maximizing cumulative rewards. This review synthesizes existing literature on reinforcement learning-based frameworks, objectives, and architectures for electric vehicle charging coordination strategies in power systems, classifying methods into centralized and decentralized categories. Additionally, the article offers suggestions for future research directions to further enhance reinforcement learning-based electric vehicle charging optimization.",
      "published": "2024-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icemd64575.2024.10963615",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehrshad Shokati",
        "Parisa Mohammadi",
        "Atoosa Amirinian"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icemd64575.2024.10963615",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icenco49778.2020.9357372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Group Authentication Protocol for Secure 5G Enabled Vehicular Communications",
      "description": "The fifth generation (5G) networks exhibit extremely low latency, extremely high bandwidth, and high density connections that are salient features for the support of vehicle to everything (V2X) services. Although a lot of research efforts have been directed towards addressing 5G technical issues for the support of V2X communications, these researches only concentrate on synchronization, physical layer structure or resource allocation. Very little research has been carried out on how to uphold message security as well as user privacy in V2X networks and as such, these networks still face a number challenges relating to privacy and secure payload exchanges. For instance, to facilitate cooperative driving, road conditions as well as vehicle status is shared among all neighbor autonomous vehicles. This is accomplished via periodical generation of notification messages. As such, message authentication is essential to prevent attacks and boost reliability in an autonomous platoon. Unfortunately, existing authentication protocols incur high computational and communication costs during the authentication process. Moreover, although novel access validation and key agreement schemes have been suggested, secure and efficient mobility management still faces many challenges owing to the high number of recurrent handovers and massive vehicular communications. To address these challenges, this paper sought to develop an efficient and secure protocol that was shown to have average communication and computational costs and also robust against impersonation, MitM, replay and eavesdropping attacks.",
      "published": "2020-12-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icenco49778.2020.9357372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vincent Omollo Nyangaresi",
        "Anthony Joachim Rodrigues",
        "Silvance Onyango Abeka"
      ],
      "venue": "International Computer Engineering Conference",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icenco49778.2020.9357372",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icess.2019.8782514",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simple Physical Adversarial Examples against End-to-End Autonomous Driving Models",
      "description": "Recent advances in machine learning, especially techniques such as deep neural networks, are promoting a range of high-stakes applications, including autonomous driving, which often relies on deep learning for perception. While deep learning for perception has been shown to be vulnerable to a host of subtle adversarial manipulations of images, end-to-end demonstrations of successful attacks, which manipulate the physical environment and result in physical consequences, are scarce. Moreover, attacks typically involve carefully constructed adversarial examples at the level of pixels. We demonstrate the first end-to-end attacks on autonomous driving in simulation, using simple physically realizable attacks: the painting of black lines on the road. These attacks target deep neural network models for end-to-end autonomous driving control. A systematic investigation shows that such attacks are surprisingly easy to engineer, and we describe scenarios (e.g., right turns) in which they are highly effective, and others that are less vulnerable (e.g., driving straight). Further, we use network deconvolution to demonstrate that the attacks succeed by inducing activation patterns similar to entirely different scenarios used in training.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icess.2019.8782514",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adith Boloor",
        "Xin He",
        "Christopher D. Gill",
        "Yevgeniy Vorobeychik",
        "Xuan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Embedded Software and Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icess.2019.8782514",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icetci64844.2025.11083999",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on CAN Bus and TPMS Fuzzy Testing Technology in Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Fuzzy testing technology is an efficient technique for discovering unknown network security vulnerabilities in information technology equipment. Based on a practical scenario of black box attacks on intelligent connected vehicles, this paper takes CAN bus and tire pressure monitoring system as physical interfaces and sensor attack entrances, respectively, to study the role of TPMS fuzzy testing technology in intelligent connected vehicle network security testing. Among them, CAN bus fuzz testing can discover CAN bus data frames that cause abnormal phenomena in vehicles, and tire pressure monitoring system fuzz testing can discover abnormal data messages that tamper with tire pressure and temperature data.",
      "published": "2025-05-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icetci64844.2025.11083999",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "tpms"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jianan Zhang",
        "Li Yin",
        "Yunhui Jia",
        "Bo Li",
        "Yingqi Shi",
        "Wenbin Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Electronic Technology, Communication and Information (ICETCI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icetci64844.2025.11083999",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3982,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icetci64844.2025.11083999 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: unknown, sensor, physical, information, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icetecc65365.2025.11070228",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Ensemble Deep Learning Framework for Autonomous Vehicle Attack Detection",
      "description": "Recent advancements in autonomous vehicles have enhanced their functionality and connectivity by integrating programmable components and wireless communications devices such as Electronic Control Units (ECUs). However, these devices are vulnerable to cyber-attacks hence, timely detection necessary for the safety of passengers and vehicles. Several traditional rule-based systems and classical machine learning based methods for cyber attack detection have been proposed that suffer from several inherent challenges such as incapability of handling more complex or diverse threats due to the need for predefined parameters for each possible scenario and manual feature extraction process respectively. These challenges highlight the need for more advanced, and flexible methods to develop reliable security systems. To overcome challenges in the existing systems, this paper introduces a completely automated robust intrusion detection system to detect cyber-attacks in autonomous vehicles. The presented framework is trained and validated on a publicly available database and attained the highest accuracy of 94.52%, surpassing several existing architectures in performance. Additionally, the results of the proposed framework are visually interpreted using Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) techniques like LIME and SHAP to showcase the framework’s transparency and trustworthiness.",
      "published": "2025-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icetecc65365.2025.11070228",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hassan A. Jari",
        "Hassan Ahmed",
        "Hareem Kibriya",
        "Wazir Zada Khan",
        "Ali Tahir"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Emerging Technologies in Electronics, Computing and Communication (ICETECC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icetecc65365.2025.11070228",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icfeict59519.2023.00032",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An OTA-oriented Protocol for Security Protection",
      "description": "With the continuous upgrading of automotive technology, the application of intelligent connected vehicles has become increasingly widespread, and Over-the-Air (OTA) technology has become an indispensable part of the vehicle industry. OTA technology has brought many benefits to vehicles, but at the same time, it has brought tremendous challenges to the security of vehicles. Based on the security requirements of the in-vehicle CAN bus and the technical characteristics of OTA updates for vehicles, this article proposes an OTA-oriented protocol for security protection to ensure the security of data transmission among ECUs during the OTA process. We built an experimental platform using the STM32F407 development board from Punctual Atom company to develop and test the proposed OTA-oriented protocol for security protection. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed OTA-oriented protocol for security protection possesses high security, real-time performance, and scalability, which can provide strong support for the development of automotive OTA technology.",
      "published": "2023-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icfeict59519.2023.00032",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "WenXuan Wang",
        "Guihe Qin",
        "Yanhua Liang",
        "Lifeng Yang",
        "Yingbei Wang",
        "Feng Yao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Frontiers of Electronics, Information and Computation Technologies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icfeict59519.2023.00032",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icfpt56656.2022.9974508",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight FPGA-based IDS-ECU Architecture for Automotive CAN",
      "description": "Recent years have seen an exponential rise in complex software-driven functionality in vehicles, leading to a rising number of electronic control units (ECUs), network capabilities, and interfaces. These expanded capabilities also bring-in new planes of vulnerabilities making intrusion detection and management a critical capability; however, this can often result in more ECUs and network elements due to the high computational overheads. In this paper, we present a consolidated ECU architecture incorporating an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Automotive Controller Area Network (CAN) along with traditional ECU functionality on an off-the-shelf hybrid FPGA device, with near-zero overhead for the ECU functionality. We propose two quantised multi-layer perceptrons (QMLP's) as isolated IDSs for detecting a range of attack vectors including Denial-of-Service, Fuzzing and Spoofing, which are accelerated using off-the-shelf deep-learning processing unit (DPU) IP block from Xilinx, operating fully transparently to the software on the ECU. The proposed models achieve the state-of-the-art classification accuracy for all the attacks, while we observed a 15x reduction in power consumption when compared against the GPU-based implementation of the same models quantised using Nvidia libraries. We also achieved a 2.3x speed up in per-message processing latency (at 0.24 ms from the arrival of a CAN message) to meet the strict end-to-end latency on critical CAN nodes and a 2.6x reduction in power consumption for inference when compared to the state-of-the-art IDS models on embedded IDS and loosely coupled IDS accelerators (GPUs) discussed in the literature.",
      "published": "2022-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icfpt56656.2022.9974508",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Shanker Shreejith"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology (FPT)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icfpt56656.2022.9974508",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icgea64602.2025.11009875",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safety and Security Sensors for Smart EV Charging Station",
      "description": "City transport systems often struggle to cope with high volumes of traffic and become congested, despite the use of various traffic management strategies. The concentration of traffic around city centres results in pollution and poor urban air quality, although the increasing popularity of electric vehicles is helping ameliorate these effects. One reason for the growing momentum behind electric vehicles is the emergence of mobility operators such as car-sharing companies, who target users wishing to rent out vehicles on a short-term basis. There is currently rapid growth in one-way car-sharing, in which the vehicle can be dropped off at a different location from the pickup point. Crucially, one-way car-sharing gives the opportunity for travellers to utilize car-sharing in conjunction with other modes, such as public transport modes, for their journey, provided the requisite intermodal connections are present. This paper looks at how one-way electric vehicle car-sharing systems have the potential to become important components of future city transport systems. The future role of shared autonomous vehicles is also considered.",
      "published": "2025-03-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icgea64602.2025.11009875",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Leva",
        "E. Ogliari",
        "Nicoletta Matera",
        "R. Miceli",
        "F. Viola",
        "M. Curatolo"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 9th International Conference on Green Energy and Applications (ICGEA)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icgea64602.2025.11009875",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ichora69329.2026.11537168",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Potential-Based Cybersecurity Risk Assessment of AV Sensing Systems",
      "description": "Cameras, LiDAR, and RADAR are just a few of the sensing tools used by autonomous cars to observe and comprehend their surroundings. Strong surveillance is provided by these sensors, but they also give enemies a wide attack surface to exploit. This paper investigates significant cyber-physical threats to the sensing layers of autonomous vehicles, such as adversarial situations and camera blindness, LiDAR spoofing and saturation, RADAR spoofing, jamming, and interference. Using an attack potential-based feasibility assessment in compliance with ISO/SAE 21434, each attack is evaluated based on elapsed time, necessary expertise, component knowledge, window of opportunity, and equipment. To calculate overall risk, feasibility ratings are paired with safety impact levels obtained from ISO 26262. The results demonstrate that although some attacks are highly effective, their technical complexity limits their use, whereas simpler attacks could provide more operational risks. In order to help prioritize cybersecurity solutions for autonomous vehicle sensing systems, this study provides an organized, riskoriented perspective.",
      "published": "2026-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ichora69329.2026.11537168",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ferhat AĞAÇ",
        "Arif Başgümüş",
        "Mustafa Namdar",
        "Gunes Yilmaz"
      ],
      "venue": "International Congress on Human-Computer Interaction, Optimization and Robotic Applications (ICHORA)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ichora69329.2026.11537168",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ichveps53178.2021.9600963",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of AC Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment based on Safety Standard",
      "description": "Electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) is a battery charging system for electric vehicles (EVs). EVSE must be designed to refer to the applicable standards to ensure security and interoperability with various types of EV. This paper explains the design of EVSE for mode 3 AC charging station (CS) based on International standard IEC 61851-1. The design follows the safety requirements on IEC 61851-1, such as overvoltage, overcurrent, and residual current devices to protect persons against electric shocks. Moreover, the charge controller manages the functionality of the devices and their communication so that energy transfers safely. The EVSE is equipped with a human-machine interface (HMI) using Raspberry Pi as the central processor to communicate between CS and EV users. The open charge point protocol (OCPP) is installed for communication between CS and the back-end system; thus, CS can be monitored and managed from the central system. The design is implemented for a 22 kW 3-phase AC EVSE and its testing result demonstrated a successful charging process to the commercial EV, Mitsubishi i-MiEV.",
      "published": "2021-10-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ichveps53178.2021.9600963",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "evse",
        "ocpp",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khotimatul Fauziah",
        "Yuli Astriani",
        "Dionysius Aldion Renata",
        "Afrias Sarotama",
        "Agus Suhendra",
        "Eka Rakhman Priandana",
        "Riza Riza"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on High Voltage Engineering and Power Systems (ICHVEPS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/ichveps53178.2021.9600963",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icih67754.2025.11608399",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ethical Hacking of Autonomous Vehicle Security: Exploring Vulnerabilities and Software-Based Defense Strategies",
      "description": "The cybersecurity scheme arises with autonomous vehicles AVs that rely on connected components–the sensor, control system and V2X communications–that may come under attack by GPS spoofing, CAN bus injection, and sensor tampering. Such traditional defenses do not provide adaptability and scalable testing environments. The paper presents SecureSimAV a software approach for ethical hacking based on the Carla simulator to test, detect, and mitigate AV cyberattacks in a controlled environment. SecureSimAV consists of i attack injection modules, ii machine learning-based intrusion detection agents, and iii a threat log and response system. This includes a survey of AV vulnerabilities through perception, control, and communication layers, along with some functional pseudocode that reveals how these integrated systems operate. The SecureSimAV platform offers low cost, reproducibility, scalability, and a secure environment for researchers and developers to probe the security of an AV without risking assets in the real world. It fosters an environment that supports the building of secure and resilient autonomous vehicle ecosystems through responsible and proactive cybersecurity testing.",
      "published": "2025-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icih67754.2025.11608399",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Skandesh Goutham Ranganathan J",
        "P. S.",
        "J. Umamageswaran"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE International Conference on Innovate for Humanitarian: Tech Solutions for Global Challenge (ICIH)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icih67754.2025.11608399",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icimia69818.2026.11744982",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementation of Dynamic Pricing Model for OCPP Compliant EV Charging Station",
      "description": "The proposed system integrates OCPP-based Communication Framework which utilizes the ESP32-based IoT-enabled hardware combining both RFID-based authentication and MQTT-based communication to a cloud-based Charging Station Management System (CSMS). This allows real-time monitoring and control of EV charging operations. The project also utilizes a dynamic pricing strategy which help in balancing demand across the grid, by varying the tariffs paid for electricity depending on the time-of-use and the level of congestion at the station. Another major contribution of this system is a proposed State of Charge (SoC) based heuristic scheduling algorithm which prioritizes vehicles with critically low SoC levels, thereby enhancing fairness and reliability of service. As part of the evaluation of system performance, synthetic datasets were created to simulate realistic EV arrivals that clustered together; this resulted in the experimental results demonstrating a 50% reduction in waiting time for critical vehicle(s) from 62.7 minutes to 31.2 minutes under medium load conditions, as well as increasing the throughput of EVs charged at the stations from 41 to 43 EVs over the 300-minute observation window. Additionally, the amount of station utilization remained high at approximately 95%. The integration of the developed hardware and the software framework demonstrate a scalable, efficient solution for providing next-generation EV charging infrastructures an intelligent grid integration and sustainable energy management.",
      "published": "2026-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icimia69818.2026.11744982",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. Gowtham",
        "R. Resmi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Innovative Mechanisms for Industry Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icimia69818.2026.11744982",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icimtech202671078.2026.11699007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Deep Learning Based Intrusion Detection for Vehicular CAN Bus Systems Using the CICIoV2024 Dataset",
      "description": "The rapid integration of Internet of Things (IoT) technology within the automotive sector has led to the emergence of the internet of vehicles (IoV) offering significant benefits in terms of vehicle monitoring, control, and maintenance through collaboration. However, dependence on electronic control units and network connectivity leaves vehicles vulnerable to severe cyber threats such as spoofing attack and denial of service (DoS) attacks. This study addresses the limitations of existing deep learning architectures for intrusion detection particularly those lacking activation functions that achieve suboptimal recall and precision scores. Using the realistic CICIoV2024 dataset which was collected from actual hardware under various attack simulation, this research proposes an enhanced deep neural network architecture. The proposed method incorporates the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function into a 5 layer fully connected neural network introducing nonlinearity to improve pattern recognition. This study evaluates the performance of the model across 3 classification scenarios like binary classification (benign versus attack), multi-category (benign, DoS, and Spoofing category), and specific-cate4gory classification (where the class consists of 6 classes including speed and steering wheel attack).",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icimtech202671078.2026.11699007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yulianto Yulianto"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Management and Technology (ICIMTech)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icimtech202671078.2026.11699007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iciot.2018.00029",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Data Communication in Autonomous V2X Systems",
      "description": "In Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication systems, vehicles as well as infrastructure devices can interact and exchange data with each other. This capability is used to implement intelligent transportation systems applications. Data confidentiality and integrity need to be preserved in unverified and untrusted environments. In this paper, we propose a solution that provides (a) role-based and attribute-based access control to encrypted data and (b) encrypted search over encrypted data. Vehicle Records contain sensitive information about the owners and vehicles in encrypted form with attached access control policies and policy enforcement engine. Our solution supports decentralized and distributed data exchange, which is essential in V2X systems, where a Central Authority is not required to enforce access control policies. Furthermore, we facilitate querying encrypted Vehicle Records through Structured Query Language (SQL) queries. Vehicle Records are stored in a database in untrusted V2X cloud environment that is prone to provide the attackers with a large attack surface. Big datasets, stored in cloud, can be used for data analysis, such as traffic pattern analysis. Our solution protects sensitive vehicle and owner information from curious or malicious information cloud administrators. Support of indexing improves performance of queries that are forwarded to relevant encrypted Vehicle Records, which are stored in the cloud. We measure the performance overhead of our security solution based on self-protecting Vehicle Records with encrypted search capabilities in V2X communication systems and analyze the effect of security over safety.",
      "published": "2018-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iciot.2018.00029",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Denis A. Ulybyshev",
        "Aala Oqab Alsalem",
        "Bharat Bhargava",
        "Savvas Savvides",
        "Ganapathy Mani",
        "Lotfi Ben Othmane"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Congress on Internet of Things (ICIOT)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/iciot.2018.00029",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icipca61593.2024.10709180",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Internet of Vehicles Communication Scheme Combining SM9 Algorithm and V2X PKI",
      "description": "As the number and frequency of interactions between vehicles and the external environment increase, the security threats faced by vehicles have become more numerous and destructive in the context of the Internet of vehicles (IoV). Ensuring the security of entities and the confidentiality of interaction information has become increasingly important. The traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system uses digital certificates issued by Certificate Authorities for secure authentication, which has drawbacks such as high costs and certificate management difficulties. The SM9 algorithm has emerged as an effective solution to address these challenges. This study proposes an communication scheme that combines PKI with the SM9 algorithm, optimizing the weaknesses in the traditional PKI system, such as inadequate encryption strength and high pseudonymous certificate storage consumption. This contribution plays a significant role in upgrading the traditional PKI system and expanding the application scope of the SM9 algorithm.",
      "published": "2024-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icipca61593.2024.10709180",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qianchuang Zhi",
        "Zhen Guo",
        "Yuqiao Ning",
        "Zhang Wang",
        "Mingming Yu",
        "Longhai Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Image Processing and Computer Applications (ICIPCA)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icipca61593.2024.10709180",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icisce50968.2020.00068",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An In-Vehicle Network Security Protocol Based on Dynamic Encryption",
      "description": "Vehicles are developing toward intelligence and networking, automotive electronic systems are facing more and more attack threats. In view of the multi-functional mixedcriticality characteristics of automotive electronic system, a security protocol for vehicle CAN network based on dynamic encryption is proposed to save system computing resources and reduce the impact on real-time performance. The encryption algorithm level table is designed according to the functional safety level, and the correspondence relationship between the functional criticality, security level and encryption algorithm. Then, we modify the message format and construct a security protocol based on dynamic encryption. In addition, the timing logic of the received messages is judged with the synchronous counter, an anti-replay attack method is represented. Finally, a simple in-vehicle network system is modeled with CANoe, the dynamic encryption mechanism is realized and its effectiveness is verified.",
      "published": "2020-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icisce50968.2020.00068",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yu-hong Luo",
        "Y. Wei",
        "De-Feng Ding",
        "Jia-Ying Xie"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Science and Control Engineering",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icisce50968.2020.00068",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icise-ie53922.2021.00029",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on management methods of automotive cybersecurity tools",
      "description": "With the in-depth integration of informatization and automobiles, automobiles are transforming from traditional means of transportation to a new type of intelligent travel carrier[1]. While it has brought great changes to the automobile industry, it has also increased cyber security threats. Automotive cyberecurity tools are an inevitable element introduced in the process of automotive cyberecurity transformation, and become one of the important factors affecting automotive cyberecurity. Therefore, the management of automotive cyberecurity tools as a necessary link in automotive cyberecurity assurance has been paid more and more attention by various enterprises.",
      "published": "2021-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icise-ie53922.2021.00029",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jing Liu",
        "Ying-Yi Yao",
        "Haijun Wang",
        "Wen-Bo Jia",
        "Yanxin Wu",
        "Xu Liu",
        "Qiao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "2021 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Education (ICISE-IE)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icise-ie53922.2021.00029",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iciss66954.2025.11389474",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Systematic Literature Review on the Security Evaluation of Autonomous Vehicle Networks Using Common Criteria",
      "description": "This paper presents a systematic literature review (SLR) analyzing the implementation of Common Criteria and ISO/SAE 21434 standards in securing communication within autonomous vehicle networks (AVNs). The study aims to identify vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies, and technical gaps related to securing both in-vehicle and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. Our analysis shows that many AVNs suffer from weaknesses stemming from the lack of strong authentication, incomplete data encryption, and poor network segmentation, which collectively undermine the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of messages exchanged in these networks. Furthermore, real-world implementation falls short in fully aligning with FPT_TDC. 1 controls and meeting the exhaustive requirements outlined by ISO/SAE 21434, due to scalability, interoperability, real-time processing, and cost constraints. This study emphasizes the necessity of a holistic approach that integrates high-level standard compliance with rigorous technical controls, thereby strengthening the robustness and resiliency of autonomous vehicle communication against evolving cyber attacks.",
      "published": "2025-09-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iciss66954.2025.11389474",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "I Wayan Widi Pradnyana",
        "Muhammad Ghozi Aqsha Munadi",
        "Ashja Radithya Lesmana",
        "Muhammad Nur Alif Ramadhan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on ICT for Smart Society (ICISS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iciss66954.2025.11389474",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iciss67859.2026.11453904",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Smart, Secure, and Cybersecurity-Enabled V2X Communication Model for Software-Defined Vehicles Using IoT and Cloud Technologies",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication plays a crucial role in enabling intelligent transportation systems and Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs). However, existing V2X architectures face challenges related to latency, scalability, communication efficiency, and cybersecurity threats. This paper proposes a smart, secure, and cybersecurity-enabled V2X communication model that integrates Internet of Things (IoT) devices with cloudbased services to enhance V2X and V2I communication performance. The proposed framework improves communication speed and accuracy while incorporating cybersecurity mechanisms such as authentication, encryption, and intrusion detection to mitigate malicious attacks. Simulation results demonstrate improved latency, throughput, packet delivery ratio, and enhanced security resilience compared to conventional V2X communication models. The proposed architecture aims to contribute towards safer and more reliable next-generation software-defined vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2026-03-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iciss67859.2026.11453904",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Saubhagya Ranjan Das",
        "G. Suseela"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Sustainable Systems (ICISS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iciss67859.2026.11453904",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icit.2019.8755211",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementation of Node Authentication Algorithm of In-Vehicle Network in Connected Car",
      "description": "Responding to the latest developments in information communication technology, the connected car that support autonomous driving or services is actively underway. A connected car is a vehicle connected to an external network through wireless communication. It improves user convenience and stability of vehicle through various external connections. However, there is a problem of security against intrusion from the outside. This security issues are resolved by encrypting the entire data within the controller area network (CAN) network system, but that can be time-consuming and cause the authentication process to be carried out in the event of a certification procedure. To solve this problem, this paper proposes an intrusion detection algorithm for the in-vehicle network of the connected car. The proposed algorithm can detect encryption and authentication techniques by detecting and identifying external intruders when identifying external intruder's password and authentication techniques. Additionally, we develop an intrusion detection algorithm to minimize the burden of the vehicle's electronic control unit (ECU) a system using node authentication algorithm.",
      "published": "2019-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icit.2019.8755211",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected car",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kimin Jeong",
        "Eunhye Shin",
        "Hyunhee Kim",
        "Kyung-Chang Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icit.2019.8755211",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icit58233.2024.10540960",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An FPGA-Based Intrusion Detection System Using Binarised Neural Network for CAN Bus Systems",
      "description": "As vehicles are made more intelligent with numerous installed sensors, the in-vehicle networks become more prone to critical security issues. The absence of any authentication process for Controller Area Network (CAN), which is the most widely used communication protocol among the Electronic Control Units (ECUs), makes the network vulnerable to attacks. By connecting some malicious nodes to the vehicle CAN bus, the intruders can capture and manipulate the vehicle data. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) utilising machine learning models have shown outstanding performance in detecting incoming attacks, and even better, they do not reduce the communication speed when compared to adding the authentication mechanism into the CAN protocol. This paper presents an FPGA-based IDS using Binarised Neural Network (BNN) for CAN bus systems. The developed 1-bit BNN model makes the implementation fit in a low-cost FPGA device. Moreover, to maximise efficiency, the model is structured in a novel two-stage cascaded architecture called Coarse-to-Fine (C2F) model. Using this architecture, a Coarse model is first processed to detect whether any attack has taken place. Then, only when any attack occurrence is identified, a Fine model is executed for attack-type detection. Results show that our approach achieves more than 99% in every evaluation metric for attack detection and classification. Furthermore, compared to the state-of-the-art FPGA-based IDS, the proposed IDS reduces power consumption by 40% with a comparable speed.",
      "published": "2024-03-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icit58233.2024.10540960",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Auangkun Rangsikunpum",
        "Sam Amiri",
        "Luciano Copello Ost"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icit58233.2024.10540960",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3851,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icit58233.2024.10540960 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: makes, even, sensors, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icit58465.2023.10143128",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Kalman Filter-Based Adversarial Patch Attack Defense for Autonomous Driving Multi-Target Tracking",
      "description": "The visual perception module in autonomous vehicles is based on deep learning technology to realize environmental perception, including object detection, semantic segmentation, depth estimation, etc. While deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance on various computer vision tasks, researchers have found that deep learning models drop significantly in accuracy when they add carefully crafted small perturbations to their inputs. Such an attack is called adversarial attack. The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial attacks brings potential security risks to autonomous driving perception systems. As the first step in autonomous driving, any erroneous output from the perception module can lead to serious consequences. In the existing literature, there are few studies on the impact of the adversarial attack on the perception module on the subsequent modules and the corresponding coping strategies of the subsequent modules. In this paper we addresses this gap by investigating the impact of adversarial attacks on the object detection algorithm on the multi-object tracking module and we proposes a solution that uses the Kalman filter with packet loss compensation to mitigate the reduction of multi-object tracking accuracy under adversarial attack.",
      "published": "2023-04-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icit58465.2023.10143128",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ru Yi",
        "Jicheng Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icit58465.2023.10143128",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icit63637.2025.10965319",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Low-Cost Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus Networks Using RISC-V with Binarised Neural Networks",
      "description": "The increasing number of sensors used in smart vehicles has significantly raised concerns about in-vehicle network security. Machine learning (ML) based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) designed for the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol demonstrates excellent performance in detecting attacks without introducing additional overhead. Deploying such IDSs on FPGA using RISC-V, rather than directly deploying the model on FPGA, sacrifices detection speed but in general reduces energy consumption and on-chip resource usage. The RISC-V platform deployed on FPGA can handle tasks beyond attack detection, offering greater flexibility, particularly for low-cost FPGA devices. This work leverages the lightweight Zero-Riscy core to deploy a Binary Neural Network (BNN)-based IDS on FPGA. Three custom instructions are proposed for convolution, pooling, and fully connected layers, integrating XNOR, POPCOUNT, and threshold operations. This reduces the number of instructions required per task, thereby decreasing the frequency of interactions between Zero-Riscy and the instruction memory. The results show that the Zero-Riscy-based IDS, while sacrificing some detection speed, still meets real-time detection requirements. Compared to the state-of-the-art FPGA-based IDS implementations, it achieves energy consumption at 13% and resource utilisation at 20% of their levels.",
      "published": "2025-03-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icit63637.2025.10965319",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qian-Kun Liu",
        "Sam Amiri",
        "Luciano Ost"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Industrial Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icit63637.2025.10965319",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icite59717.2023.10733882",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Data Security Risk Assessment Method of Intelligent and Connected Vehicles Based on Data Security Classification and Grading",
      "description": "The rapid development of intelligent and connected vehicle (ICV) has brought increasing communication data and valuable data assets. However, the diversity and complexity of ICV data make it hard to carry out data security risk assessment. Aiming at the problem, this paper proposes an effective analytical method for the data security risk assessment method of ICVs. Considering the typical scenario for the generated data of ICVs, a data security classification and grading framework is constructed from the aspects of in-vehicle data, personal data, and external environment data. The data security risk assessment model is built for ICVs and includes functional modules such as asset identification, threat identification, impact assessment, vulnerability identification, and risk assessment. This work provides methods and security management and control strategy support for ICV data security risk assessment.",
      "published": "2023-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icite59717.2023.10733882",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "personal data",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liyong Wang",
        "Long Jin",
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Jingyan Wang",
        "Yupeng Chen",
        "Junzhe Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Engineering (ICITE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icite59717.2023.10733882",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4127,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icite59717.2023.10733882 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: asset, personal, valuable, impact, privacy, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icites53477.2021.9637070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Cybersecurity Testing for In-vehicle Network",
      "description": "The development of technologies such as Information Communication Technology (ICT), Internet of Vehicles (IoVs), and industrial intelligence has made automotive cybersecurity issues more prominent. Cybersecurity issues have gradually attracted widespread attention in the field of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICV). Cybersecurity testing is an effective means to ensure the cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Fuzzing and penetration testing are both important methods of security testing. In SAE J3061 and the impending ISO/SAE 21434, it is clearly mentioned that fuzzing and penetration testing technologies should be applied in the development of automotive cybersecurity activities, but no specific testing details are involved. The WP.29 regulations also require security tests to verify the effectiveness of security measures when conducting type approval with regard to cybersecurity. There is neither a standardized method for how to conduct automotive cybersecurity testing, nor specific testing tools. In this paper, a brief overview of the applied security testing methods in the automotive domain is provided first. Then, we present a cybersecurity testing method, which extends the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) from the perspective of testing processes. Besides, we also design and develop a security testing tool for the in-vehicle network to assist security analysis. Finally, taking Controller Area Network with Flexible Data Rate (CAN FD) as an example, the proposed method is applied to the designed testbed.",
      "published": "2021-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icites53477.2021.9637070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "penetration",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Xuan Zhang",
        "Shuo Hou"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Technology and Embedded Systems (ICITES)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icites53477.2021.9637070",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3862,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icites53477.2021.9637070 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: activities, intelligence, there, information, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icitsif69060.2026.11608775",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication using Named Data Networking (NDN): A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "Security in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is an important problem, and traditional IP-based architectures aim at channel protection and device authentication, yet they cannot ensure data security after it has been sent. This basically leaves associated persistent threats such as spoofing, false data injection, and sybil attacks, which have a direct impact on road safety and the trustworthiness of cooperative intelligent transport systems. Furthermore, IP’s centrality on trust, end-to-end sessions, and host-based addressing is actually contrary to the highly dynamic, decentralized, and delay-sensitive vehicular environments. This paper provides an extensive literature survey that identifies these architectural and protocol-level shortcomings of IP in V2X communication. It also delves into Named Data Networking (NDN) as a viable alternative that moves security to the data plane using inherent content signatures, facilitates in-network caching for fault tolerance, and provides trust without ongoing connections.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icitsif69060.2026.11608775",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sreenivasa Chakravarthi Sangapu",
        "Praveen Perumal",
        "Sankara Narrayana S P"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Technologies for a Sustainable and Inclusive Future (ICITSIF)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icitsif69060.2026.11608775",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icjece.2026.3692881",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Pseudonym Scheme Based on Hybrid Certificates for Security Credential Management System in Vehicular Communications",
      "description": "In recent years, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) have developed a series of security communication standards for vehicular communications. These standards include mechanisms such as the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Butterfly Key Expansion (BKE) to protect vehicle privacy. However, these standards are mainly based on the Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), which may be vulnerable to attacks from quantum computing in the future. In response to this potential risk, this study proposes a hybrid certificate that combines the ECC with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This approach enables infrastructure systems to be built on cryptographic foundations that are more resilient to quantum-based attacks. Furthermore, this study presents a generalized pseudonym scheme that is compatible with various cryptographic algorithms for generating pseudonym certificates. This design aims to eliminate the possibility of inferring any correlation between the public key in a pseudonym certificate and that in an enrollment certificate. This study also conducts a comprehensive performance evaluation of the RSA, ECC, and PQC algorithms, particularly those standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The comparison considers factors such as message length and computation time. Based on the findings, this study recommends suitable pseudonym schemes that adopt hybrid certificates for secure and efficient use in vehicular communications.",
      "published": "2026-06-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icjece.2026.3692881",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel C. H. Chen",
        "F. J. Hwang",
        "Yu-Chih Wei",
        "Chin-Chen Chang",
        "Bon-Yeh Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (2026)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icjece.2026.3692881",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ickecs61492.2024.10616551",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "POPCORN ATTACK: Intrusion into CAN remotely through android application of infotainment system",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are no longer pure mechanical systems. In the pursuit of enhanced functionality, comfort, and safety of the vehicle, advanced embedded electronic devices have been integrated into vehicular systems. These electronic components are interconnected through the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus and communicate with each other using the CAN bus protocol, opening a wider road to new vulnerabilities. In this study, one such method will be explored that facilitates entry into the CAN and injection of erroneous values that affect crucial components such as the tachometer, speedometer and other devices. The approach to achieve this goal is a twofold process; the first part focuses on gaining remote access to the infotainment system of the target vehicle. The second part involves the manipulation of messages within the CAN through the infotainment system. Various apparatus have been employed for this comprehensive testbench, including myTVS apz92 infotainment system and an instrument cluster, among others. These elements serve as crucial components for evaluating and testing the feasibility of the approach.",
      "published": "2024-04-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ickecs61492.2024.10616551",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abhinav R Bharadwaj",
        "M K Akhilesh",
        "H A Abhiram",
        "Roopa Ravish"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Communication Systems (ICKECS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ickecs61492.2024.10616551",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icmi65310.2025.11141172",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security of Autonomous Vehicles: Detecting Adversarial Attacks Targeting Traffic Signs",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are revolutionizing the transportation sector; however, a huge setback to them becoming more prevalent in the market is the security vulnerabilities they are exposed to. The dependency of autonomous vehicles on machine learning and sensor-based systems makes them susceptible to many safety risks. These safety risks range from minor misinterpretations, such as failing to detect a trivial object, to critical failures like collisions or erratic driving. These vulnerabilities can undermine public trust and delay the widespread adoption of AV technology. This research explores a comprehensive approach to improve the robustness of AVs against adversarial attacks targeting traffic signs. This study investigates developing classification models to detect the proposed attack scenario. By addressing the root causes of erroneous actions of AVs, this research contributes to advancing secure and robust autonomous vehicle technologies essential for the safety of the public.",
      "published": "2025-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icmi65310.2025.11141172",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Farah El Sehrawy",
        "Zyad Mahrous",
        "Muhammad Hataba"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Computing and Machine Intelligence (ICMI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icmi65310.2025.11141172",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icmisi65108.2025.11115802",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trust Algorithms in Vehicle-to-Everything Communications",
      "description": "The increasing prevalence of intelligent transportation systems necessitates secure and reliable communication among vehicles. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication serves as a cornerstone for enabling real-time information sharing, reducing traffic congestion, enhancing road safety, and preventing accidents. Establishing trust between vehicles is critical to ensure secure data exchange and to mitigate risks posed by malicious activities. This paper surveys various trust algorithms employed in vehicular networks, evaluating their effectiveness, computational and communication complexities, and suitability for real-world applications. The study provides insights into optimizing these algorithms for enhanced performance and security in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication systems.",
      "published": "2025-05-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icmisi65108.2025.11115802",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohanad Zawrah",
        "Tamer Abdelkader",
        "Mohamed Watheq El-Kharashi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Machine Intelligence and Smart Innovation (ICMISI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icmisi65108.2025.11115802",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icmla55696.2022.00048",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANBERT: A Language-based Intrusion Detection Model for In-vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Controller Area networks (CAN) provide a standard means of communicating across vehicular electronic units without a centralized computing unit or complex dedicated wiring. Despite the benefits offered by in-vehicle networks, CAN networks have been susceptible to network attacks such as replay, fuzzing, and denial of service attacks. In addition, the proliferation of internet-connected vehicles motivates the need to build a robust and secure vehicular network system. Deep learning-based language models such as Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) models have proven to produce remarkable results for natural language tasks. BERT models provide a deep understanding of the underlying semantics in textual data. In this paper, we propose CANBERT, a language-based intrusion detection model for CAN bus. We leverage the power of transformer models to provide the detection of malicious attacks on the CAN network. We provide a thorough analysis of our approach using a CAN dataset produced in a realistic driving scenario which consists of a combination of normal data and malicious data from various types of attack scenarios such as Denial of Service (DoS), fuzzy, and impersonation attacks. Our approach is able to detect all of the attacks with high precision and accuracy. In addition, we compare our method with other baseline models and state-of-the-art deep learning intrusion detection approach for in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2022-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icmla55696.2022.00048",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ebelechukwu Nwafor",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icmla55696.2022.00048",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3858,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icmla55696.2022.00048 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: normal, service, without, applications, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icmlant59547.2023.10372987",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation and Analysis of Standard Security Technology in V2X Communication -- Exploring ECQV Implicit Certificate Cracking",
      "description": "In IEEE 1609.2 and IEEE 1609.2.1 standards for Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) secure communication, various security algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) have been adopted and designed. To enhance the efficiency of the Security Credential Management System (SCMS), this study evaluates the computational time for key generation, key expansion, signature generation, and signature verification under different security strengths. This study discusses relevant techniques based on Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificates, analyzes the length of uncompressed elliptic curve points, compressed elliptic curve points, explicit certificates, and implicit certificates. Furthermore, this study proposes mathematical models to demonstrate the probability of ECQV cracking and provides suggestions for mitigating ECQV cracking risks.",
      "published": "2023-09-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icmlant59547.2023.10372987",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel C. H. Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icmlant59547.2023.10372987",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icmsao.2017.7934878",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANTrack: Enhancing automotive CAN bus security using intuitive encryption algorithms",
      "description": "In this paper, the proposed CANTrack solution is described and its implementation is thoroughly explained. CANTrack is a sophisticated Computer Aided Design (CAD) tool that supports the entire development process for automotive networked systems. CANTrack differentiates itself from other competitive tools; by not only supporting planning, development, testing and finally starting-up; but also incorporating the unique features of CAN bus security enhancement and tool customization upon customer needs. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus security feature is implemented using an intuitive algorithm that encrypts the 8-byte payload data using a symmetric key that is being dynamically changed using synchronized key generators across all nodes. This algorithm makes the encrypted message unique at any instance of time to avoid replay attacks. The algorithm is tested thoroughly on an experimental setup using Vector Canoe; with the results of two use cases presented.",
      "published": "2017-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icmsao.2017.7934878",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wael Farag"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Modeling, Simulation, and Applied Optimization",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/icmsao.2017.7934878",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icmsci62561.2025.10894521",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IoT-Enabled EV Charging System with Real-Time Heat Sensing and Dynamic Cooling",
      "description": "The need for dependable and effective EV charging systems has increased due to the quick rise in EV sales. In order to solve the issue of overheating during the charging process, this study suggests an Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled EV charging system that is combined with dynamic cooling mechanisms and real-time heat sensors. EV batteries and charging stations that overheat can shorten battery life, increase safety risks, and decrease system efficiency. The suggested method continually checks the charging unit's and the EV battery's temperatures by utilizing Internet of Things sensors. The system activates dynamic cooling devices, including fans or liquid cooling, to maintain ideal temperatures when temperatures rise over safe levels. Through a cloud-based interface and real-time data transfer, the IoT platform enables customers and service providers to remotely monitor charging performance and guarantee system security. In order to maximize charging speed and avoid overloading, the system may also dynamically adjust charging rates based on battery and ambient variables.",
      "published": "2025-01-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icmsci62561.2025.10894521",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J. K.",
        "V. P",
        "V. G",
        "Yuvasaravanan S",
        "S. B"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems for Collaborative Intelligence (ICMSCI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icmsci62561.2025.10894521",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icnc68183.2026.11416919",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluating Vulnerabilities of Connected Vehicles Under Cyber Attacks by Attack-Defense Tree",
      "description": "Connected vehicles represent a key enabler of intelligent transportation systems, where vehicles are equipped with advanced communication, sensing, and computing technologies to interact not only with one another but also with surrounding infrastructures and the environment. Through continuous data exchange, such vehicles are capable of enhancing road safety, improving traffic efficiency, and ensuring more reliable mobility services. Further, when these capabilities are integrated with advanced automation technologies, the concept essentially evolves into connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). While connected vehicles primarily focus on seamless information sharing, autonomous vehicles are mainly dependent on advanced perception, decision-making, and control mechanisms to operate with minimal or without human intervention. However, as a result of connectivity, an adversary with malicious intentions might be able to compromise successfully by breaching the system components of CAVs. In this paper, we present an attack-tree based methodology for evaluating cyber security vulnerabilities in CAVs. In particular, we utilize the attack-defense tree formulation to systematically assess attack-leaf vulnerabilities, and before analyzing the vulnerability indices, we also define a measure of vulnerabilities, which is based on existing cyber security threats and corresponding defensive countermeasures.",
      "published": "2026-02-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icnc68183.2026.11416919",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Baqer Mollah",
        "Honggang Wang",
        "Hua Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "2012 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icnc68183.2026.11416919",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoac44903.2018.8939095",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Effective Cryptography Mechanism for Enhancing Security in Smart Key System",
      "description": "Our modern technologies are going towards wireless network and communications. Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) system or Smart Key System is an electronic lock used to unlock the vehicle or doors with the help of the wireless key which transmits the fixed code to the receiver. As they are convenient for the modern world, one of the major drawbacks in wireless communications is Security. The RKE wireless system is more vulnerable to attack. The Replay attack is the more commonly occurring attack in RKE system. One of the solution to prevent a replay attack in RKE is Rolling Code. The system is more secure from the attack by the use of an encryption algorithm. We proposed an effective cryptography mechanism to prevent the attack in the smart key system. Our proposed RKE-Crypto model, prevent the replay attack and also reduce the communication attack in RKE system.",
      "published": "2018-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoac44903.2018.8939095",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Madhumitha Sri Selvakumar",
        "Rohini Purushothkumar",
        "Arunkumar Ramakrishnan",
        "Gunasekaran Raja"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advanced Computing",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoac44903.2018.8939095",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoco59262.2023.10397929",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey on Security Attacks in Connected and Autonomous Vehicular Systems",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles, also known as CAVs, are a general trend in the evolution of the automotive industry that can be utilized to make transportation safer, improve the number of mobility options available, user costs will go down and new jobs will be created. However, as our society grows more automated and networked, criminal actors will have additional opportunities to conduct a variety of attacks, putting CAV security in danger. By providing a brief review of the state of cyber-security in the CAVs environment, this study aims to draw attention to the issues and concerns associated with security. The first thing it does is categorize the multiple cyber-security threats and weaknesses in the context of CAVs into three groups: attacks on the vehicle's network, attacks on the Internet at large, and other attacks. This is done in accordance with the various communication networks and targets under attack. Next, it considers the possibility of cyber attacks to be an additional form of threat posed by the environment of CAVs. After that, it details the most up-to-date defense tactics for securing CAVs and analyzes how effective they are. In addition, it draws some conclusions about the various cyber-security and safety requirements of CAVs that are now available, which is beneficial for the use of CAVs in the real world. At the end, we discussed some implications on Adversary Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles. In conclusion, a number of difficulties and unsolved issues for future research are analyzed and explored.",
      "published": "2023-10-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoco59262.2023.10397929",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S M Mostaq Hossain",
        "Shampa Banik",
        "Trapa Banik",
        "Ashfak Md Shibli"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Computing (ICOCO)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoco59262.2023.10397929",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoici62503.2024.10696771",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication in AI-Empowered Electric Vehicles",
      "description": "Data in AI-Empowered Electric Vehicles is protected by using blockchain technology for immutable and verifiable transactions, in addition to high-strength encryption methods and digital signatures. This research paper compares and evaluates the security mechanisms for V2X communication in AI-enabled EVs. The purpose of the study is to ensure the reliability of security measures by evaluating performance metrics including false positive rate, false negative rate, detection accuracy, processing time, communication latency, computational resources, key generation time, and throughput. A comprehensive experimental approach is implemented using a diverse dataset gathered from actual V2X communication condition. The evaluation reveals that the security mechanisms perform inconsistently. Message integrity verification obtains the highest detection accuracy with a low false positive rate of 2% and a 0% false negative rate. Traffic encryption has a low processing time, requiring only 10 milliseconds for encryption and decryption, and adds only 5 bytes of communication latency to V2X messages. The detection accuracy of intrusion detection systems is adequate at 95%, but they require more computational resources, consuming 80% of the CPU and 150 MB of memory. In particular attack scenarios, certificate-based authentication and secure key exchange show promise. Certificate-based authentication mitigates MitM attacks with a false positive rate of 3% and a false negative rate of 1%. Secure key exchange thwarts replication attacks with a false positive rate of 0 and a false negative rate of 2. Nevertheless, their efficacy varies based on the attack scenario, highlighting the need for adaptive security mechanisms. The evaluated security mechanisms exhibit varying rates of throughput. Message integrity verification and traffic encryption accomplish high throughput, enabling 1 Mbps and 800 Kbps, respectively, of secure data transfer rates. Overall, the results contribute to the comprehension of V2X communication security challenges in AI-enabled EVs. Message integrity verification and traffic encryption have emerged as effective mechanisms that provide robust security with high performance. The study provides insight for designing secure and dependable V2X communication systems. Future research should concentrate on enhancing V2X communication's security mechanisms and exploring novel approaches to resolve emerging threats.",
      "published": "2024-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoici62503.2024.10696771",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Edward Naveen. V",
        "S. Dhivya",
        "M. Joe Marshell",
        "K. Arul Jeyaraj",
        "V. Ebenezer",
        "A Jenefa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Cyber Physical Systems and Internet of Things (ICoICI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoici62503.2024.10696771",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoici69824.2026.11723357",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AutoGuard-CAN: A Four-Layer Cascaded AI-Powered Intrusion Detection System for Secure In-Vehicle CAN Bus Communication",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, designed in 1986 without any authentication or encryption, remains the dominant in-vehicle communication protocol despite serving as a critical attack surface in today’s connected vehicles. AutoGuard-CAN addresses this gap through a novel four-layer cascaded intrusion detection framework — combining a deterministic Rule Engine (<1 ms), an online Adaptive Random Forest Classifier (<5 ms), an unsupervised Autoencoder for zero-day anomaly detection (<10 ms), and a hybrid LSTM-LightGBM meta-classifier (<15 ms) — achieving full end-to-end inference in under 100 milliseconds. On the HCRL CAN Intrusion Dataset (12,000 balanced instances: Attack-Free, DoS, Fuzzy, and Impersonation classes), the system delivers 94% accuracy, 94% precision, 94% recall, and 94% F1-score, with per-class accuracies of 91%, 92%, 93%, and 100% respectively. This represents a 1.08× gain over standalone LightGBM (93%), a 1.16× gain over standalone RNN (81%), and surpasses all published baselines: LSTM+CNN (0.85), RF/XGBoost (0.92), and KNN/SVM (0.85). Unlike prior works, AutoGuard-CAN uniquely combines five capabilities in one system: cascaded multi-model fusion, zero-day detection via reconstruction-error thresholding at the 95th percentile, per-prediction SHAP explainability, cross-dataset validation on X-CANIDS, and a FedAvg-based Federated Learning framework for privacy-preserving fleet deployment — none of which any single prior system achieves simultaneously. The false positive rate stays below 1% with throughput exceeding 1,000 messages per second, making it the first CAN IDS that is simultaneously accurate, real-time, explainable, and generalisable.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoici69824.2026.11723357",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "G. S",
        "F. J",
        "Kiruba Wesley"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 4th International Conference on Intelligent Cyber Physical Systems and Internet of Things (ICoICI)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoici69824.2026.11723357",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4531,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icoici69824.2026.11723357 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: five, making, without, physical, privacy, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoin.2016.7427089",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection system based on the analysis of time intervals of CAN messages for in-vehicle network",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in the vehicles is a de facto standard for serial communication to provide an efficient, reliable and economical link between Electronic Control Units (ECU). However, CAN bus does not have enough security features to protect itself from inside or outside attacks. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one of the best ways to enhance the vehicle security level. Unlike the traditional IDS for network security, IDS for vehicle requires light-weight detection algorithm because of the limitations of the computing power of electronic devices reside in cars. In this paper, we propose a light-weight intrusion detection algorithm for in-vehicle network based on the analysis of time intervals of CAN messages. We captured CAN messages from the cars made by a famous manufacturer and performed three kinds of message injection attacks. As a result, we find the time interval is a meaningful feature to detect attacks in the CAN traffic. Also, our intrusion detection system detects all of message injection attacks without making false positive errors.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoin.2016.7427089",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyun Min Song",
        "Ha Rang Kim",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Networking",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoin.2016.7427089",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 474,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoin56518.2023.10048986",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A V2X Access Authorization Mechanism based on Decentralized ID (DID) and Verifiable Credentials (VC)",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose DID/VC-based V2X Access Authorization Mechanism that improves the CA-centered structure problem of the V2X security authentication system developed to ensure the anonymity of V2X users and create a safe operating basis for ITS. The CA-centered PKI structure represents a structure in which there is a CA that can lead or control the identity of the identity subject. In this structure, the identity subject’s personal information and certificate can be stolen by a Misbehavior CA, and there is a risk of external attack such as MITM attack. Building trust in V2X networks is a major problem because it is difficult to evaluate reliability between vehicles and infrastructure in an untrustworthy environment. In this paper, we propose a DID/VC-based V2X Access Authorization Mechanism that selects a trusted authority to improve reliability, guarantees data sovereignty and privacy protection of identity subjects, and generates safe digital credentials.",
      "published": "2023-01-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoin56518.2023.10048986",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Espionage / sovereignty"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiho Lim",
        "Hansu Oh",
        "K. Sim",
        "Sunyoung Kim",
        "Ki-Hyung Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Networking",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoin56518.2023.10048986",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3844,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/icoin56518.2023.10048986 and T-017: structured overlap in impacts: espionage, privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: espionage, personal, trust, digital, there, access, privacy, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoin63865.2025.10993082",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection In-Vehicle Networks using Bio-Inspired Approaches",
      "description": "Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are significant for providing services, applications, and communication to vehicles, connecting them to the outside world and supporting Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Inside the car, the invehicle network (IVN), also known as CAN (Controller Area Network), handles communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and sensors, ensuring the vehicle’s functionality and safety. However, external connections make this internal network vulnerable to unauthorized and malicious access. This work presents a comparative study of two bio-inspired metaheuristics (Bat and Ant Colony Optimization) for use in Intrusion Detection System (IDS) models. It focuses on machine learning-based classifiers to detect and classify anomalous and malicious traffic on the CAN bus.",
      "published": "2025-01-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoin63865.2025.10993082",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thales Guimaraes Marques",
        "Ana M. B. C. Quevedo",
        "Antonio H. G. Leoncio",
        "Carlos H. O. O. Quevedo",
        "Joaquim Celestino"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Networking",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoin63865.2025.10993082",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icoris63540.2024.10903698",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimizing Automotive Cybersecurity with Cost-Sensitive Decision Forest Algorithm in IoV",
      "description": "In the quickly changing world of connected cars, having strong cybersecurity is essential. To protect vehicular networks from cyber threats, this study provides an Embedded Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that has been optimized using the Cost-Sensitive Decision Forest (CSForest) optimization algorithm. To improve data usefulness and model performance, a thorough preprocessing and feature engineering process was carried out using a real vehicular GPS tracking process from ToN-IoT dataset. After evaluating several machine learning algorithms, CSForest received the best results, scoring 100% accuracy along with flawless precision, recall, and F-measure scores. Our results highlight how well the CSForest-based IDS can detect and stop possible cyberattacks in connected cars, which will improve automotive cybersecurity and create a safer driving environment for vehicular communication systems. The study also emphasizes how crucial it is to keep updating IDS models to handle the ever-changing nature of cyberattacks and maintain the dependability and resilience of vehicular communication systems in the future. The discovery has practical consequences as it can improve connected and autonomous car cybersecurity infrastructure substantially, lowering vulnerabilities and guaranteeing a safer transportation ecosystem.",
      "published": "2024-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icoris63540.2024.10903698",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "resilience",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Salwa Umar Qureshi",
        "Alireza Souri",
        "N. Inanç"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 6th International Conference on Cybernetics and Intelligent System (ICORIS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icoris63540.2024.10903698",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icosec70158.2026.11736166",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PPO-FLCNet: Proximal Policy Optimized Federated Learning Based Convolutional Network for Security Enabled Attack Detection in 6G-V2X Network",
      "description": "The rapid advancement of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology has emerged as a transformative innovation, which seamlessly improves communication between vehicles with a broader range of network connectivity. However, this technology ensures information exchange between vehicles, infrastructures and other entities by contributing to optimized traffic flow, enhanced road safety and the development of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS). The existing frameworks developed for V2X communication systems face several challenges regarding high latency, security and privacy of data transmission, computational overhead and severe network congestion. Therefore, this research proposed a Proximal Policy Optimized Federated Learning based Convolutional Network (PPO-FLCNet) approach to perform attack detection in the 6G-V2X Network. Typically, the use of the Federated Learning (FL) mechanism ensures data privacy and security of the network. Moreover, the incorporation of the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm improves the performance of the PPO-FLCNet model and makes training faster with less computational cost. Notably, the numerical results indicate that the proposed PPO-FLCNet model gains accuracy of 96.71%, inference delay of 8.521ms, sensitivity of 96.092% and specificity of 96.50% based on VeReMi_dataset at 90% training, respectively.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icosec70158.2026.11736166",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dhanashree Jadhav",
        "Pallavi Sapkale"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 7th International Conference on Smart Electronics and Communication (ICOSEC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icosec70158.2026.11736166",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icpects62210.2024.10780153",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Assessment on Cyber Security Challenges and Issues Associated with Cyber-Physical Power System and Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "As EVs become more widespread, the automotive industry is rapidly moving away from traditional gasoline-powered cars. This shift has led to a significant increase in the demand for EV charging infrastructure. The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) with power grids introduces intricate cyber-physical interdependencies that may be vulnerable to exploitation by malicious entities, thereby posing potential risks to some part or whole of the power systems. This paper explores the security vulnerabilities related to cyber threats arising from this integrated system and highlights both existing and evolving gaps in the security framework. Mitigating these issues is essential as the worldwide fleet of electric vehicles expands, increasing their influence on the power grid and hence affects the physical power system. The paper seeks to identify the cyber security challenges and issues in physical power system associated with compromised EVCS/EVs. This paper also encourages further research into the cyber-Security of smart EV charging systems and to strengthen the resilience of power system against such cyber threats.",
      "published": "2024-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icpects62210.2024.10780153",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploitation",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bala Vanitha A",
        "Chandrasekaran Nayanatara",
        "D. Saravanan",
        "Aishwarya S K",
        "Sharmila P",
        "P. Shanmugapriya"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Power, Energy, Control and Transmission Systems (ICPECTS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icpects62210.2024.10780153",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icpee65973.2025.11411030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LSTM based DDos Attacks Prevention and Detection for EV Charging Batteries",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle charging infrastructure is crucial to the sustainable energy transition but it is also susceptible to cyberattacks. Protection against possible cyberattacks, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) assaults, has become crucial with the growth of electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) networks. The extensive Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) dataset, which includes high-performance computing (HPC) statistics, system performance indicators, and network traffic data, is used to analyze the proposed approach, and to create a strong anomaly detection framework by utilising deep learning techniques, to analyse host-based data, such as kernel eventlogs and HPC data. LSTM based model is used for sequence-based learning, analysing high-granularity event sequences to identify anomalous patterns, and putting in place a preprocessing pipeline that guarantees dependable data input for the model are some of the main contributions.",
      "published": "2025-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icpee65973.2025.11411030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaik John Saida",
        "Brij Kishor Tiwari",
        "Shaik Rafi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Power Electronics and Energy (ICPEE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icpee65973.2025.11411030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icpege67691.2026.11451275",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Intelligent Connected Vehicle Safety Technology Based on Fuzzy Testing",
      "description": "With the increasing complexity of automotive electronic systems, in vehicle devices use wireless communication technology to provide various functional services, making cars the main target of hacker attacks. Fuzzy testing, as an effective method for automotive software security testing, can generate a large amount of random data, simulate the behavior of attackers, trigger hidden vulnerabilities or defects in software systems, monitor their abnormal reactions, discover potential errors and security vulnerabilities, and enhance the security of automotive software. This article focuses on the research status and application challenges of fuzzy testing technology in the safety analysis of intelligent connected vehicles. Three methods of fuzzy testing technology are analyzed, and the framework, data types, and workflow of fuzzy testing technology for intelligent connected vehicles are proposed, contributing to the safe development of the intelligent connected vehicle industry.",
      "published": "2026-01-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icpege67691.2026.11451275",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiuchen Zhan",
        "Mei Liu",
        "Xiaodong Zang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Power, Electronics and Green Energy (ICPEGE)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icpege67691.2026.11451275",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icpege67691.2026.11451392",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on User Experience Optimization and Security Risk Control of OTA Updates for Automobiles",
      "description": "This article conducts a highly systematic, logical and layered analysis of the issues related to user experience improvement and security risk control in the automotive over- the-air (OTA) update technology: It first clarifies industry trends, technical features, and existing problems, and then uses methods such as literature analysis, case studies, and expert interviews to rigorously argue feasible strategies for enhancing user experience and ensuring system security. It naturally and appropriately takes the OTA practices of important domestic and foreign automakers such as Tesla and NIO as comparative objects. Thus, it naturally and powerfully concludes that improving the software update process, enhancing the friendliness of the human-machine interaction interface, and building a complete security protection system all have direct and significant implications for improving the overall performance of the automotive OTA system. Therefore, this article further proposes a system optimization model that combines users, technology, and security, providing a clear framework for the design and development of automotive OTA systems that is both theoretically supported and practically instructive. Even more commendably, the results obtained have extremely strong academic and practical significance for the advanced development of intelligent connected vehicle technology and the transformation and upgrading of related industries.",
      "published": "2026-01-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icpege67691.2026.11451392",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yang Nirunze",
        "Wang Yuzhe"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Power, Electronics and Green Energy (ICPEGE)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icpege67691.2026.11451392",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icpei61831.2024.10748816",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection in CAN Bus using the Entropy of Data and One-class Classification",
      "description": "This paper presents an intrusion detection method in a controller area network (CAN) bus using an anomaly detection approach to detect anomaly messages communicated in the CAN bus. The proposed method commences with the calculation of the entropy of CAN ID messages transmitted within a specified time frame. It then employs a One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM), which has been trained on a dataset representing normal behavior, to classify the messages as either normal or anomaly. The testing results indicate that this method achieves an accuracy of 98.5% in classification.",
      "published": "2024-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icpei61831.2024.10748816",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Charnon Chupong",
        "N. Junhuathon",
        "K. Kitwattana",
        "Theerapol Muankhaw",
        "Nattapol Ha-upala",
        "M. Nawong"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 International Conference on Power, Energy and Innovations (ICPEI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icpei61831.2024.10748816",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icphys.2018.8387687",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected cars — Threats, vulnerabilities and their impact",
      "description": "The growing demand for interoperability between system components within a connected car has led to new security challenges in automotive development. The existing components, based on established technology, are often being combined to form such a connected car. For such established technologies, individual, often sector specific threat and vulnerability catalogs exist. The aim of this paper is to identify blocks of established technologies in a connected car and to consolidate the corresponding threat and vulnerability catalogs relevant for the individual constituent components. These findings are used to estimate the impact on specific system components and subsystems to identify the most crucial components and threats.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icphys.2018.8387687",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefanie Strobl",
        "David Hofbauer",
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Silia Maksuti",
        "Markus Tauber",
        "Jerker Delsing"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/icphys.2018.8387687",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icphys.2018.8390816",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Visual analysis of CAN bus traffic injection using radial bar charts",
      "description": "The CAN bus protocol is used in modern vehicles to control dozens of devices. It is simple enough, but this protocol lacks security mechanisms, and that is one of the main reasons that the entire vehicle is vulnerable for different cyber-physical attacks. Therefore, the detection and counteraction against such attacks on the CAN bus protocol is an important task. In the paper, we present an approach for visual analysis of the CAN bus protocol traffic dumps, which is based on visualization of traffic timeline segments by using radial bar charts. Experiments for visualization of traffic dumps are presented. The advantages of the proposed approach are simplicity and clarity in determining attacks. The proposed model allows displaying a large amount of detailed information for a long-time period at one time and on one screen.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icphys.2018.8390816",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maxim Kolomeets",
        "Andrey Alexeevich Chechulin",
        "Igor Vitalievich Kotenko"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/icphys.2018.8390816",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icpics58376.2023.10235357",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Intelligent Connected Vehicles Information Security Attack Matrix Model",
      "description": "This paper proposes an intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) information security three-dimensional attack matrix model, which includes the following components: firstly, an algorithm for evaluating the security level of the electronic control unit (ECU) information is proposed to determine the X-axis content of the three-dimensional attack matrix model based on the security relevance level of the information; secondly, using the clustering method based on the Connected Vehicle Product Security Vulnerability Library (CAVD), the ICV attack nodes are identified to determine the Y-axis content of the model; and finally, based on the empirical database, common attack techniques for vehicles are identified to determine the Z-axis content of the model. The proposed model enables the visual display and analysis of ICV information security attack behaviors.",
      "published": "2023-07-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icpics58376.2023.10235357",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ming-Ming Yu",
        "Zhen Guo",
        "Shi-Wen Shen",
        "Yu-Qiao Ning",
        "Tian-Ling Liu",
        "Dong-Qing Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 IEEE 5th International Conference on Power, Intelligent Computing and Systems (ICPICS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icpics58376.2023.10235357",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icps65515.2025.11087840",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GAP-CAN: Gradient-Based Adversarial Attack on Transformers for CAN Bus Anomaly Detection",
      "description": "Today, automotive technology is highly dependent on both internal and external communications, making it vulnerable to new attack vectors. To enhance communication security, researchers have proposed anomaly detection methods using advanced sequence modeling with transformers. Although these architectures achieve impressive accuracy in the upper 90 % range, their performance beyond limited testing scenarios is unclear. To overcome this obstacle, we propose to study the limits of the model using adversarial samples. The most effective method of generating adversarial samples uses gradient descent. Since transformers use discrete tokenized inputs, gradient descent cannot be applied directly. In order to overcome this challenge, we present the Gradient-based Adversarial Perturbation on CAN (GAP-CAN) framework, which leverages space relaxation techniques to apply gradient-based optimization. The GAPCAN framework is comprised of the following components: 1) gradient-based search for adversarial samples and 2) adversarial example generation for existing datasets. The benefit of this approach is the ability to generate multi-token adversarial perturbations in a tractable amount of time. We tested the GAPCAN framework on two common publicly available datasets. Our experimental results show that the GAP-CAN framework successfully finds an adversarial sample within the first 100 queries 63% of the time for a higher entropy dataset and 5% of the time for a lower entropy dataset.",
      "published": "2025-05-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icps65515.2025.11087840",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devin Drake",
        "Victor Cobilean",
        "Harindra S. Mavikumbure",
        "Morgan Stuart",
        "Swagat Das",
        "Milos Manic"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icps65515.2025.11087840",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icra48891.2023.10161384",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2XP-ASG: Generating Adversarial Scenes for Vehicle-to-Everything Perception",
      "description": "Recent advancements in Vehicle-to-Everything communication technology have enabled autonomous vehicles to share sensory information to obtain better perception performance. With the rapid growth of autonomous vehicles and intelligent infrastructure, the V2X perception systems will soon be deployed at scale, which raises a safety-critical question: how can we evaluate and improve its performance under challenging traffic scenarios before the real-world deployment? Collecting diverse large-scale real-world test scenes seems to be the most straightforward solution, but it is expensive and time-consuming, and the collections can only cover limited scenarios. To this end, we propose the first open adversarial scene generator V2XP-ASG that can produce realistic, challenging scenes for modern LiDAR-based multi-agent perception systems. V2XP-ASG learns to construct an adversarial collaboration graph and simultaneously perturb multiple agents' poses in an adversarial and plausible manner. The experiments demonstrate that V2XP-ASG can effectively identify challenging scenes for a large range of V2X perception systems. Meanwhile, by training on the limited number of generated challenging scenes, the accuracy of V2X perception systems can be further improved by 12.3% on challenging and 4% on normal scenes. Our code will be released at https://github.com/XHwind/V2XP-ASG.",
      "published": "2023-05-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icra48891.2023.10161384",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hao Xiang",
        "Runsheng Xu",
        "Xin Xia",
        "Zhaoliang Zheng",
        "Bolei Zhou",
        "Jiaqi Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation/Proceedings",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icra48891.2023.10161384",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icrtccm.2017.32",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on Vehicle to Vehicle Collision Prevention Using Fog, Cloud, Big Data and Elliptic Curve Security Based on Threshold Energy Efficient Protocol in Wireless Sensor Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icrtccm.2017.32",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. Sathishkumar",
        "K. Rajakumar"
      ],
      "venue": "2017 Second International Conference on Recent Trends and Challenges in Computational Models (ICRTCCM)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/icrtccm.2017.32",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsc59802.2024.00019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Context-Aware Framework for Analysing Automotive Vehicle Security",
      "description": "Recent advancements in technology have transformed conventional mechanical vehicles into sophisticated computer systems on wheels. This transition has elevated their intelligence and facilitated seamless connectivity. However, such development has also escalated the possibility of compromising the vehicle’s cyber security expanding the overall cyber threat landscape. This necessitates an increased demand for security measures that manifest flexibility and adaptability instead of static threshold-based measures. Context-awareness techniques can provide a promising direction for such security solutions. Integration of context-awareness in security analysis helps in analysing the behaviour of the environment where IoT devices are deployed, enabling adaptive decision-making that aligns with the current situation. While the incorporation of context-awareness into adaptive systems has been explored extensively, its application to support the cyber security of vehicular ecosystem is relatively new. In this paper, we proposed a context-aware conceptual framework for automotive vehicle security that allows us to analyse real-time situations thereby identifying security threats. The usability of the framework is demonstrated considering an Electric Vehicle(EV) Charging case study.",
      "published": "2024-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsc59802.2024.00019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Teena Kumari",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Arkady Zaslavsky",
        "Hesamaldin Jadidbonab",
        "Valeh Moghaddam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Semantic Computing (ICSC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsc59802.2024.00019",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsc63108.2024.10895308",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MitM Cyber Risk Analysis in OCPP Enabled EV Charging Stations",
      "description": "The increasing adoption of Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS) necessitates robust security measures, par-ticularly in the communication protocols used between Charging Point (CP) and EVCS Server (CS). This paper focuses on the vulnerabilities associated with the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), a widely used protocol for EVCS communication. Specifically, we analyze the risks of Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)attack, which exploit weaknesses in OCPP's client and server communication. We implemented a MitM attack on OCPP 1.6, discovering that although it uses TLS 1.2 for encryption, this version is not secure. In the intercepted packets, the information about the cipher suites used by TLS 1.2, session id, server address, application protocols is in plaintext, making the system vulnerable. Our findings underscore the need for enhanced security measures. First and foremost, preventing MitM attacks is crucial. Additionally, if communication is intercepted, using the latest version of TLS and encrypting cipher suite information can further strengthen security. Our analysis is supported by experimental results demonstrating the feasibility of such attacks and their potential consequences.",
      "published": "2024-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsc63108.2024.10895308",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploit",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Safa Hamdare",
        "David Joseph Brown",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Manish Jugran"
      ],
      "venue": "Intelligent Cybersecurity Conference (ICSC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsc63108.2024.10895308",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icscss69635.2026.11645901",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-based Fraud Detection in Electric Vehicle Charging Networks",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) are becoming increasingly popular, leading to rapid development of EV charging infrastructure. Along with this growth, issues such as unauthorized charging, energy misuse, and abnormal charging sessions are also increasing. Existing monitoring systems generally depend on fixed threshold values and manual observation, which are not always capable of identifying complicated fraud patterns. In this paper, a machine learning-based approach is proposed for detecting unusual charging behavior in EV charging networks. Since labeled fraud data is difficult to obtain, unsupervised learning techniques are used for anomaly detection. The charging data is first cleaned properly and important parameters are selected for analysis. Then, Isolation Forest and K-Means clustering are used to find charging sessions that behave differently from normal patterns. Different visualizations are also used to study charging behavior and anomaly distribution. The obtained results indicate that the proposed system is capable of detecting abnormal charging sessions with good efficiency. This work shows that machine learning can play an important role in improving the security and reliability of modern EV charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icscss69635.2026.11645901",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ishita Dixit",
        "Vaishnavi Singh",
        "Nikita Keshri",
        "V. P. Meena",
        "Tridibesh Nag",
        "T. Vijayakumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Sustainable Computing and Smart Systems (ICSCSS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icscss69635.2026.11645901",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsip70099.2026.11744253",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Channel-Attention-Enhanced Cascaded Method for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Modern vehicles use the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to carry vehicle-state and control-function messages, but the CAN protocol does not authenticate message sources. Once an attacker gains access to the bus, it can disrupt message timing through injection or suspension, or manipulate payload-derived signal values through masquerading. Thus, timely CAN bus intrusion detection is a necessary and practical countermeasure without modifying the in-vehicle communication protocol. Existing multimodal methods improve attack coverage chiefly by combining timing analysis and signal analysis. However, two issues are still not fully addressed. First, the signal analysis branch usually uses the latent features encoded by long short-term memory (LSTM) networks directly, but does not explicitly distinguish the importance of different latent channels. Second, parallel fusion requires the deep signal model to be executed for every message, even when some timing anomalies can already be identified by a lightweight detector. This causes unnecessary CA-CANet inference, increases computational overhead, and may reduce practical throughput in real-time CAN bus monitoring. To address these issues, this paper proposes a channel-attention-enhanced cascaded intrusion detection method. The core idea is to combine latent-channel recalibration with TIL-first early exit. The method inserts a channel gating module after the LSTM encoder of each CAN identifier to recalibrate latent features channel by channel. It then adopts a Time Interval Likelihood (TIL)-first cascaded decision strategy, which directly outputs an anomaly decision when an obvious timing anomaly is detected, thereby skipping the subsequent signal reconstruction model and reducing inference cost. Experimental results show that, with CA-CANet as the signal branch, the final multimodal detector achieves average true positive rate, true negative rate, and F1 score of 0.968, 0.996, and 0.977 on X-CANIDS, and 0.930, 0.992, and 0.941 on SynCAN. The TIL-first cascade is prediction-equivalent to parallel max fusion under fixed binary thresholds, so it does not introduce an additional detection boundary. Its benefit is computational: it skips CA-CANet for 30.38% and 8.49% of messages and increases estimated server-side throughput over our parallel max-fusion implementation by 1.44 times and 1.09 times on X-CANIDS and SynCAN, respectively. These results indicate that channel-wise recalibration improves the signal branch, whereas timing-first early exit reduces unnecessary deep-model inference.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsip70099.2026.11744253",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaolong Yao",
        "Wanli Wu",
        "Wence Lian",
        "Yi Xie",
        "Xuehu Yan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Signal and Image Processing",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsip70099.2026.11744253",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsmartgrid66138.2025.11071728",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dosage: Real-Time Detection of Signaling Dos-Attacks in Smart Grid Environment",
      "description": "The transformation of traditional electrical grids into smart grids has significantly streamlined electricity distribution and monitoring. However, like any modern cyber-physical system, smart grids are susceptible to various cyberattacks. Among these, one of the most common and disruptive are signaling Denial-of-Service (DoS)-attacks, where attackers flood the cellular traffic within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) with redundant requests. In this paper, we propose DoSAGE, a method for detecting signaling DoS-attacks within the AMI that enables both keyless and periodic threat detection in real-time. To detect potential vulnerabilities our scheme leverages information embedded within smart meter datagrams. For identifying DoS attacks, we design a cellular automata (CA)-based key less authenticated encryption scheme together with a three-way handshaking protocol, which allows a lightweight implementation with minimal additional overhead. Our method exhibits improved throughput and faster computation compared to the existing standard authenticated encryption schemes, demonstrating its effectiveness in enhancing the security of the smart grid environment.",
      "published": "2025-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsmartgrid66138.2025.11071728",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tapadyoti Banerjee",
        "Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsmartgrid66138.2025.11071728",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsp51882.2021.9408966",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Comprehensive Evaluation of Electric Vehicle Charging Failures",
      "description": "With the large-scale development of electric vehicles, in order to reduce the potential safety hazards in the charging process of electric vehicles, this paper analyzes the charging safety characteristics of electric batteries, charge and discharge equipment, and power supply equipment of electric vehicles, studies the fault correlation between multi-level equipment, and establishes an integrated fault priority comprehensive evaluation model based on comprehensive fuzzy analytic hierarchy process. The data on the interconnected data platform can be used to obtain a quantitative evaluation result of the actual demonstration effect, and the actual effect of the integrated security early warning system. It can effectively improve the charging safety of electric vehicles and promote the healthy development of electric vehicles.",
      "published": "2021-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsp51882.2021.9408966",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Si-Ya Wei",
        "Zhu Qing",
        "Xueming Li",
        "Xianhai Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Signal Processing (ICSP)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsp51882.2021.9408966",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsp54964.2022.9778620",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection System Based on Bi-LSTM",
      "description": "In order to improve the accuracy of in-vehicle network anomaly detection by using the time correlation between CAN messages, this paper proposes an intrusion detection system based on Bi-directional Long Short-Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) network, and designed a sliding window strategy, Time series linear regression was performed on the real vehicle-mounted message data set to determine the sliding window of the optimal time length. The two-dimensional input data sample set is constructed according to the determined sliding window, and the two-dimensional data feature training classifier is learned by BILSTM network, and the trained network model is used to realize intrusion detection. In this experiment, four data sets were used to verify the detection performance. Compared with the existing research methods, the detection accuracy of the four data sets increased by 5.3%, 3.8%, 2% and 3.3% on average.",
      "published": "2022-04-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsp54964.2022.9778620",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Defeng Ding",
        "Lu Zhu",
        "Jiaying Xie",
        "Jiaying Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Signal Processing (ICSP)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsp54964.2022.9778620",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsrs48664.2019.8987605",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Detecting Attacks over CAN-BUS",
      "description": "The increasing number of connected cars introduced new cyber-attacks strategies that give life to potentially devastating scenarios on everyday life. In fat, the connected cars show many vulnerabilities and are not conform to the policies defined in the AIC Model (availability, integrity and confidentiality). On the other hand, the advantages related to cars connected are very useful for implementing new innovative scenarios providing, for example, context and situation awareness in some operative scenarios. The main problem relies in the introduction of effective techniques that works in well-known framework (PC, Smartphone, ...) in a real challenging environment as the automotive. In this scenario, the main parameter to consider is that of the quick ability to identify and react a possible attack. So in this paper, an embedded Intrusion Detection System for Automotive is introduced. It works adopting a Bayesian Network approach for the quick identification of malicious messages on the controller Area Network (CAN-Bus). The first experimental results, obtained in a real scenario, seems to be real interesting.",
      "published": "2019-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsrs48664.2019.8987605",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mario Casillo",
        "Simone Coppola",
        "Massimo De Santo",
        "Francesco Pascale",
        "Emanuele Santonicola"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on System Reliability and Safety (ICSRS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsrs48664.2019.8987605",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsrs53853.2021.9660658",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safety and Security Concept for Software Updates on Mixed-criticality Systems",
      "description": "The raising connectivity of critical embedded systems makes them vulnerable to cyber-security attacks that compromise not only privacy but also safety. This results in intricate dependencies between functional safety and security, and higher demands to address both disciplines simultaneously. However, there are still many gaps on the common application of functional safety and cyber-security standards. Over-The-Air (OTA) software updates are a clear example of this challenge. While the installation of regular software upgrades is a crucial cyber-security practice to keep the system up-to-date with the latest security patches, they might involve high re-certification efforts and costs from a safety standpoint. In this paper, a safety and security concept for software updates on mixed-criticality systems is presented. Particularly, a combined safety and security risk assessment on an automotive use case is performed and risk mitigation measures proposed.",
      "published": "2021-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsrs53853.2021.9660658",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Imanol Mugarza",
        "Irune Yarza",
        "Irune Agirre",
        "Fabrizio Lussiana",
        "Stefania Botta"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on System Reliability and Safety (ICSRS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsrs53853.2021.9660658",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icsrs63046.2024.10927504",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Holistic Approach to Investigate Failure Effects for Analysing Functional Safety and Cybersecurity in Semiconductors",
      "description": "Ensuring functional safety and cybersecurity in automotive applications is a pressing concern in nowadays. The complexity of systems with safety-critical functionalities poses a challenge for effective verification approaches to reduce the gaps between safety and cybersecurity. Semiconductors are pivotal to automated driving systems due to their role in implementing complex functionalities. Therefore, it is essential to consider both Functional Safety (FuSa) and Cybersecurity aspects when developing semiconductor devices. This paper presents a holistic approach to incorporating failure effects and modes that considers both FuSa and Cybersecurity. Additionally, it investigates the potential relationship between failures effects and/or attack effects in semiconductors and emphasizes the interplay between FuSa and cybersecurity in an analysis. By illustrating proposed co-analysis concept between these areas, this study aims to provide insights into ensuring comprehensive FuSa and Cybersecurity measures in semiconductor development for automotive applications.",
      "published": "2024-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icsrs63046.2024.10927504",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marzana Khatun",
        "Antonino Armato",
        "Sebastian Fischer"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on System Reliability and Safety (ICSRS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icsrs63046.2024.10927504",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icssa48308.2019.00008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing PKES: Integrating Artificial Intelligence Into PKES Forcefield For Anomaly Detection",
      "description": "Passive Keyless Entry and Start System (PKES) is a convenient feature found in newer cars that allows the user to enter their car without having to press a button on a key fob. Users can simply walk up to their vehicle and once they are in close enough proximity, it unlocks and the user is granted access. However, the convenience of PKES comes at a price; vulnerability to relay attacks and amplified relay attacks. Our proposed method, PKES Forcefield, would protect the user from these attacks without sacrificing any convenience. PKES Forcefield utilizes coordinate tracing and multifactor authentication to secure the user. To add more security to PKES Forcefield, we propose AI integration to construct a profile for each user of the vehicle. This profile will store data on the habits of the user (location, walking speed, time, etc.). Once each user has a profile built from their input data, our system will be able to detect any behaviors that differ from the user's profile (anomalies) and then proper security measures will be taken depending on if the anomaly is considered to be a Low Risk Anomaly or a High Risk Anomaly.",
      "published": "2019-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icssa48308.2019.00008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Syed S. Rizvi",
        "Jarrett Imler",
        "Luke Ritchey",
        "Michael Tokar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Software Security and Assurance (ICSSA)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icssa48308.2019.00008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icst.2017.62",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Testbed for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Modern automotive platforms are cyber-physical in nature and increasingly connected. Cybersecurity testing of such platforms is expensive and carries safety concerns, making it challenging to perform tests for vulnerabilities and refine test methodologies. We propose a testbed, built over a Controller Area Network (CAN) simulator, and validate it against a real-world demonstration of a weakness in a test vehicle using aftermarket On Board Diagnostic (OBD) scanners (dongles).",
      "published": "2017-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icst.2017.62",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "obd",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel S. Fowler",
        "Madeline Cheah",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/icst.2017.62",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icst69053.2026.00019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Natural Adversaries: Fuzzing Autonomous Vehicles with Realistic Roadside Object Placements",
      "description": "The emergence of Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) has spurred research into testing the resilience of their perception systems, i.e., ensuring that they are not susceptible to critical misjudgements. It is important that these systems are tested not only with respect to other vehicles on the road, but also with respect to objects placed on the roadside. Trash bins, billboards, and greenery are examples of such objects, typically positioned according to guidelines developed for the human visual system, which may not align perfectly with the needs of AVs. Existing tests, however, usually focus on adversarial objects with conspicuous shapes or patches, which are ultimately unrealistic due to their unnatural appearance and reliance on white-box knowledge. In this work, we introduce a black-box attack on AV perception systems that creates realistic adversarial scenarios (i.e., satisfying road design guidelines) by manipulating the positions of common roadside objects and without resorting to \"unnatural\" adversarial patches. In particular, we propose TrashFuzz, a fuzzing algorithm that finds scenarios in which the placement of these objects leads to substantial AV misperceptions -- such as mistaking a traffic light's colour -- with the overall goal of causing traffic-law violations. To ensure realism, these scenarios must satisfy several rules encoding regulatory guidelines governing the placement of objects on public streets. We implemented and evaluated these attacks on the Apollo autonomous driving system, finding that TrashFuzz induced violations of 15 out of 24 traffic laws.",
      "published": "2026-05-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icst69053.2026.00019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yang Sun",
        "Haoyu Wang",
        "Christopher Michael POSKITT",
        "Jun Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icst69053.2026.00019",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icstw.2019.00033",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Developing a QRNG ECU for Automotive Security: Experience of Testing in the Real-World",
      "description": "Over the last decade, automotive components and systems have become increasingly connected and digital in nature. This trend has significantly increased the risk of malicious interference with car components, vehicles and infrastructure, and cybersecurity defences have generally proven to be lacking. The success of, and trust in, connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) relies upon these security gaps being closed as soon as possible. To this end, Crypta Labs introduced a novel electronic control unit (ECU) prototype for enabling secure digital communication in the transport domain. Due to its novelty, it is a challenge to evaluate its functionality, robust and reliable for automotive platforms. In this paper, we introduce the novel ECU, apply a testing methodology specially adapted to this product to achieve the evaluation goal, and conclude with a discussion.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icstw.2019.00033",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Siamak Tavakoli",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Oliver Maynard"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icstw.2019.00033",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icstw50294.2020.00019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Model-Based Security Testing Approach for Automotive Over-The-Air Updates",
      "description": "Modern connected cars are exposed to various cybersecurity threats due to the sophisticated computing and connectivity technologies they host for providing enhanced user experience for their occupants by offering numerous innovative applications. While prior studies exist that explore cybersecurity challenges, tools and techniques for automotive systems, over-the-air (OTA) software updates for automobiles can be exploited by the attackers to compromise vehicle security and safety has not been covered extensively. This paper presents our Model-Based Security Testing (MBST) approach, designed for cybersecurity evaluation of the OTA update system for automobiles, which has an integrated testbed and a software tool that is capable of automatically generating and executing test cases by using attack trees as an input. Integrating threat modelling in the testing provides several benefits, including clear and systematic identification of different threats. Automation of the test-case generation and execution has the obvious benefits of saving time and manual effort, as manual test-case generation is both a time-consuming and error-prone process (especially, when the testing involves several test-cases). A simple simulated attack is used to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of our testing approach. To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research that uses a testing approach similar to our approach for automotive OTA security evaluation.",
      "published": "2020-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icstw50294.2020.00019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahid Mahmood",
        "Alexy Fouillade",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icstw50294.2020.00019",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icstw50294.2020.00033",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Generating Tests for the Discovery of Security Flaws in Product Variants",
      "description": "Industrial products, like vehicles and trains, integrate embedded systems implementing diverse and complicated functionalities. Such functionalities are programmable by software and contain a multitude of parameters necessary for their configuration, which have been increasing due to the market diversification and customer demand. In addition, industrial products are often built by aggregating different software parts (components), constituting thus product variants. Product variants with such variability need to be tested adequately, in particular if one is concerned with security vulnerabilities. While efficient automated testing approaches already exist, such as fuzzing, no tool is able to use results from previous testing campaigns to increase the efficiency of security testing the next product variant that shares certain functionalities. This paper presents an approach that can ignore already covered functionalities by previous tests and give more importance to blocks of code that have yet to be checked. The benefit is to avoid repeating unnecessary work, hence increasing the speed and the coverage in the new variant. The approach was implemented in a tool based on the AFL fuzzer and was validated with a set of programs of different versions. The experimental results show that the tool can perform better than AFL in our testing scenario.",
      "published": "2020-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icstw50294.2020.00033",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Francisco João Guimarães de Almeida Araújo",
        "Ibéria Medeiros",
        "Nuno Neves"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/icstw50294.2020.00033",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ict70370.2026.11594725",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PROMETHEUS: A Physics-Aware Bayesian Architecture for Dynamic Risk Assessment in Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "description": "Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 5G Telecommunication network infrastructure and Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs), face a critical “safety-security paradox,” where valid cybersecurity countermeasures, operating in isolation, can inadvertently trigger catastrophic physical failures. Current state-of-the-art Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) methodologies, such as ISO/SAE 21434, rely on static, design-time matrices that become obsolete the moment a system encounters unforeseen operational contexts. To bridge the gap, this paper introduces PROMETHEUS, a novel physics-aware Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) framework developed within the GuardAI EU-funded project. PROMETHEUS unifies cybersecurity (probability of compromise) and physical safety (severity of consequence) into a single, real-time mathematical model. The proposed architecture utilises a Recursive Bayesian Estimator to continuously track the conditional probability of cyber compromise, initialised by a contextual prior based on Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Environmental Scores. Crucially, this cyber threat metric is gated by a modular physical engine $(\\Phi_{\\text{Physical}})$ that is explicitly tailored to three GuardAI Use Cases (UCs): UC1 for UAVs integrating EASA SORA 2.5 kinematic constraints, UC2 for 5G enforcing 3GPP Service Level Agreements (SLA) and UC3 for CAVs utilising Mahalanobis distance for ISO 26262/SOTIF sensor dissonance evaluation. By passing the global risk score through a hysteresis-controlled actuation layer, PROMETHEUS establishes a new state-of-the-art for fail-operational CPS, mathematically guaranteeing that active cyber defences never violate physical safety bounds.",
      "published": "2026-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ict70370.2026.11594725",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "George Lazaridis",
        "Amalia Damianou",
        "Avraam Bardos",
        "Antonios Lalas",
        "Periklis Chatzimisios",
        "Konstantinos Votis",
        "D. Tzovaras"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Telecommunications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ict70370.2026.11594725",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ictai.2019.00127",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driver Identification Based on Vehicle Telematics Data using LSTM-Recurrent Neural Network",
      "description": "Despite advancements in vehicle security systems, over the last decade, auto-theft rates have increased, and cyber-security attacks on internet-connected and autonomous vehicles are becoming a new threat. In this paper, a deep learning model is proposed, which can identify drivers from their driving behaviors based on vehicle telematics data. The proposed Long-Short-Term-Memory (LSTM) model predicts the identity of the driver based on the individual's unique driving patterns learned from the vehicle telematics data. Given the telematics is time-series data, the problem is formulated as a time series prediction task to exploit the embedded sequential information. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated on three naturalistic driving datasets, which gives high accuracy prediction results. The robustness of the model on noisy and anomalous data that is usually caused by sensor defects or environmental factors is also investigated. Results show that the proposed model prediction accuracy remains satisfactory and outperforms the other approaches despite the extent of anomalies and noise-induced in the data.",
      "published": "2019-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ictai.2019.00127",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "exploit",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abenezer Girma",
        "Xuyang Yan",
        "Abdollah Homaifar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ictai.2019.00127",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 55,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ictc52510.2021.9621200",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Countering Attacks in IN-Vehicle Network: An Evaluation of Machine Learning Algorithms",
      "description": "Cyber-security for IN-Vehicle network protocols is a high-priority research area in the automotive space. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in IN-Vehicle networks are connected via the CAN protocol to facilitate reliable information dissemination. Nevertheless, devices connected to this protocol, and the protocol itself are susceptible to attack as it lacks data authentication mechanism for detecting legitimate and illegitimate traffic. A variety of Machine Learning (ML) approaches for mitigating this problem have emerged. The work presented an investigation into the classification power of various ML models using a public CAN bus dataset. In addition, a comparative analysis of the most used and standardized ML techniques. Based on the analysis of the results of the various investigations, the “Fine Tree”, “Fine Gaussian SVM”, and “Fine KNN” are the most suitable for resolving security issues in CAN Bus using the accuracy and minimum classification error of the various ML models as evaluation criteria.",
      "published": "2021-10-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ictc52510.2021.9621200",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Goodness Oluchi Anyanwu",
        "Cosmas Ifeanyi Nwakanma",
        "Jae Min Lee",
        "Dong‐Seong Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/ictc52510.2021.9621200",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ictc66702.2025.11388292",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Object-Aware Steering Attacks for Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "Recent advances in deep learning have promoted autonomous driving, but adversarial attack methods on autonomous driving systems revealed safety vulnerabilities. However, existing studies have focused solely on manipulating vehicle control (e.g., steering) without explicit attack targets, limiting the effectiveness of attacks in real-world driving environments. To address this limitation, we propose a novel adversarial attack method against autonomous driving that can induce collisions with specific target objects. The proposed method generates adversarial perturbations that reflect the relative position of the target object during autonomous vehicle motion. The generated adversarial perturbations are injected into the autonomous vehicle on a frame-by-frame basis, enabling the vehicle to collide with the target object. Experimental results on the Udacity’s self-driving car simulator show that the proposed method induces collisions with high success rates. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed method can precisely guide an autonomous vehicle toward target objects to induce collisions.",
      "published": "2025-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ictc66702.2025.11388292",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Min Jeon",
        "Hyun Jun Yook",
        "Baekgeun Jeong",
        "So Hyun Kang",
        "Youn Kyu Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ictc66702.2025.11388292",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ictcs.2019.8923077",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity: Foundations for Next-Generation Vehicles",
      "description": "The automotive industry is experiencing a serious transformation due to a digitalisation process and the transition to the new paradigm of Mobility-as-a-Service. The next-generation vehicles are going to be very complex cyber-physical systems, whose design must be reinvented to fulfil the increasing demand of smart services, both for safety and entertainment purposes, causing the manufacturers' model to converge towards that of IT companies. Connected cars and autonomous driving are the preeminent factors that drive along this route, and they cause the necessity of a new design to address the emerging cybersecurity issues: the “old” automotive architecture relied on a single closed network, with no external communications; modern vehicles are going to be always connected indeed, which means the attack surface will be much more extended. The result is the need for a paradigm shift towards a secure-by-design approach. In this paper, we propose a systematisation of knowledge about the core cybersecurity aspects to consider when designing a modern car. The major focus is pointed on the in-vehicle network, including its requirements, the current most used protocols and their vulnerabilities. Moreover, starting from the attackers' goals and strategies, we outline the proposed solutions and the main projects towards secure architectures. In this way, we aim to provide the foundations for more targeted analyses about the security impact of autonomous driving and connected cars.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ictcs.2019.8923077",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michele Scalas",
        "Giorgio Giacinto"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on New Trends in Computing Sciences (ICTCS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ictcs.2019.8923077",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icton59386.2023.10207369",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Digital Twin for Enhanced Cybersecurity in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose an architecture and implementation methodology based on the NFV-MANO approach used in the telco industry to achieve automated deployment and configuration of digital twin instances for modern connected vehicles. The digital twin instance serves as a cyber range to safely experiment with potential attacks and countermeasures tailored for in-vehicle scenarios within a controlled virtualized environment.",
      "published": "2023-07-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icton59386.2023.10207369",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chiara Grasselli",
        "Andrea Melis",
        "Roberto Girau",
        "Franco Callegati"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Transparent Optical Networks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icton59386.2023.10207369",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icton59386.2023.10207422",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Radio Jamming in Vehicle-to-Everything Communication Systems: Threats and Countermeasures",
      "description": "More than 1.35 million lives are lost due to traffic accidents, with 94% of these accidents caused by human error. In order to significantly improve the traffic safety and efficiency, automated driving systems, including Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and autonomous driving, exchanges sensor and perception data between the automated vehicle and its surrounding objects via Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communication. Although V2X technologies, such as dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) and cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X), are essential for the safety in certain driving use cases, they may completely fail in the presence of radio interference. Therefore, the development of robust V2X systems to deal with radio jamming in automated driving applications is crucial. In this paper, we present scenarios of the radio jamming attacks considering traditional driving use cases of V2X systems and we propose countermeasures against these attacks. Using a simulation environment, we validate the proposed countermeasures mitigating the effects of radio jamming.",
      "published": "2023-07-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icton59386.2023.10207422",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "driver assistance",
        "jamming",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antonio Silva",
        "João Paulo C. L. da Costa",
        "Giovanni Almeida Santos",
        "Zohair Miri",
        "Muhammad I. B. M. Fauzi",
        "Alexey V. Vinel",
        "Edison Pignaton de Freitas",
        "Kira Kastell"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Transparent Optical Networks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icton59386.2023.10207422",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icufn57995.2023.10200297",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attack of ML-based Intrusion Detection System on In-vehicle System using GAN",
      "description": "In recent years, research has focused on developing intrusion detection systems (IDS) within vehicle networks to prevent automotive hacking from external cyberattacks. While machine learning (ML) techniques have shown promise in detecting known attacks, their vulnerability to adversarial examples remains a significant challenge. In this study, we introduce a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)-based method for creating adversarial attacks capable of bypassing ML-based IDS in in-vehicle networks. Our approach involves preprocessing an automotive hacking dataset, training a GAN-based model, and evaluating the generated attacks using accuracy metrics. The results demonstrate that adversarial attacks effectively reduce the detection accuracy of various IDSs to less than 50%, emphasizing the importance of addressing adversarial cases when designing and evaluating ML-based IDSs for in-vehicle networks. Additionally, t-SNE visualization reveals the successful generation of new adversarial attacks, highlighting the need for ongoing research to strengthen the security of in-vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2023-07-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icufn57995.2023.10200297",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "EunSeong Seo",
        "JeongEun Kim",
        "Wook Lee",
        "Junhee Seok"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/icufn57995.2023.10200297",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icufn65838.2025.11170005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration on V2X Certificate using KpqC Algorithms*",
      "description": "Connected vehicles utilizing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication enhance road safety and transportation efficiency, supporting cooperative autonomous driving through real-time interactions. However, increased connectivity raises cyber-attack risks, endangering driver and pedestrian safety. This highlights the urgent need to integrate Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into vehicular communications [6]. In this paper, we implement the Korean PQC digital signature algorithm HAETAE for V2X environments and compare its performance with the NIST PQC signature scheme, ML-DSA which is derived from CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM, and traditional signatures, RSA, and ECC under TLS 1.3 environments. Results indicate that PQC algorithms introduce substantial overhead, whereas traditional algorithms produce smaller certificates. Specifically, HAETAE provides more efficient certificates than ML-DSA [3], minimizing latency impacts in TLS operations. These findings inform the critical balance between enhanced security and certificate size, guiding future post-quantum TLS designs.",
      "published": "2025-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icufn65838.2025.11170005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yujin Seo",
        "Young-Sik Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icufn65838.2025.11170005",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icufn69619.2026.11628732",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Speed-Aware Jammer-Resilient Receiver for Multi-User MIMO V2X Systems",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication plays a crucial role in enabling connected and autonomous driving by supporting the reliable exchange of safety-critical information among vehicles and infrastructure. However, due to the open nature of wireless channels, V2X systems are vulnerable to various physical-layer attacks, among which jamming is one of the most intuitive and severe threats. In this paper, we propose a vehicle speed-aware jammer-resilient reception framework for multi-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) V2X systems. The proposed method exploits the fundamental difference in Doppler characteristics between stationary jammers and moving vehicles. By transforming the received signal into the Doppler domain, the receiver identifies low-Doppler components associated with static interference and suppresses them through Doppler-domain filtering. Notably, the proposed approach does not require prior knowledge of the jammer channel or its spatial direction, making it suitable for practical V2X environments. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed framework effectively mitigates strong jamming signals and significantly improves the achievable sum-rate compared with conventional receivers.",
      "published": "2026-11-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icufn69619.2026.11628732",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "exploits",
        "jamming",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hanyoung Park",
        "Yongjae Jang",
        "Ji-Woong Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icufn69619.2026.11628732",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icufn69619.2026.11628801",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ISO/SAE 21434-Compliant Asset Modelling for TARA of Electric Vehicle BMS",
      "description": "The performance of Electric Vehicles (EVs) is heavily dependent on the effectiveness of their battery management systems (BMS). A BMS exchanges data such as voltage, temperature, and control signals with other electronic control units (ECUs), diagnostic tools, and sometimes backend services. Due to this connectivity, BMS units are increasingly exposed to cybersecurity threats, making BMS security a critical concern. Cyberattacks typically begin with assets, as attackers often exploit vulnerable assets to launch attacks. Consequently, identifying these assets, understanding their vulnerabilities, and evaluating the impact of attacks are essential goals for implementing a robust cybersecurity framework. This study focuses on identifying assets within intelligent BMS utilizing the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and the threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) methodology. Through this approach, the research seeks to establish a comprehensive understanding of the main asset list and definitions, which helps identify potential vulnerabilities in BMS systems and provides guidelines to improve their resilience to cyberattacks.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icufn69619.2026.11628801",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Esmot Ara Tuli",
        "Mubashrah Saddiqa",
        "Mehmet Emre Aslakci",
        "Abdullah Hocaoğlu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/icufn69619.2026.11628801",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icumt.2017.8255200",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-factor authentication: A survey and challenges in V2X applications",
      "description": "Today, the digitalization strides tremendously on all the sides of the modern society. One of the enablers to keep this process secure is the authentication. It touches many different areas of the connected world including payments, communications, and access right management. This manuscript attempts to shed the light on the authentication systems' evolution towards Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) from Singlefactor Authentication (SFA) and through Two-factor Authentication (2FA). Particularly, MFA is expected to be utilized for the user and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interaction which is selected as descriptive scenario. The manuscript is focused on already available and potentially integrated sensors (factor providers) to authenticate the occupant from inside the vehicle. The survey on existing vehicular systems suitable for MFA is given. Finally, the MFA system based on reversed Lagrange polynomial, utilized in Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS), was proposed to enable flexible in-car authentication. The solution was further extended covering the cases of authenticating the user even if some of the factors are mismatched or absent. The framework allows to qualify the missing factor and authenticate the user without providing the sensitive biometric data to the verification entity. The proposed is finally compared to conventional SSS.",
      "published": "2017-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icumt.2017.8255200",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aleksandr Ometov",
        "Sergey Valentinovich Bezzateev"
      ],
      "venue": "International Congress on Ultra Modern Telecommunications and Control Systems and Workshops (ICUMT)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/icumt.2017.8255200",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icvadv63329.2025.10961129",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced Security Framework for Gray-Hole Attack Prevention in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "The gray-hole attacks are certainly destructive to the integrity and reliability of vehicular ad-hoc networks where a malicious node will drop packets selectively while keeping the instance innocuous. Commercial and Safety Applications Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks and IoT of Vehicles, ITS, and V2X VANETs nowadays are advancing fast in tune with the commercial and safety applications. Nonetheless, despite offering plenty of possible advantages, VANETs cowl an openly-distributed-dynamic nature that raises their exposure to different classes of attacks and threats, one of those being the gray-hole attack (GHA)_. The first version is known as Smart GHA that did not disclose its wrongdoing during routing discoveries, whereas in the second variant-a sequence-based GHA-it behaves wrongly at the route discovery stage but selectively drops packets-after the route was established-in this two-pronged form. The present work specifies the novel strategy in the field of security which is termed Detection and Prevention of GHA (DPGHA). In it, both forms of GHA have been detected and prevented in AODV-based VANETs. The dynamic threshold values defined in DPGHA are based on the anomalies in the packets that are received, forwarded, and generated with their sequence numbers. Dynamic threshold values and dynamic monitoring could increase computational complexity even more and increase the processing requirements imposed on a node with limited resources. The algorithm endorses cooperative detection of malicious behavior and vehicles' resilience. Simulation and evaluation of the ARBD algorithm indicate enhanced accuracy and efficiency in the identification of gray-hole attackers, thus securing and boosting VANET performance.",
      "published": "2025-03-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icvadv63329.2025.10961129",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Vimalnath",
        "R. Midhun",
        "A. S. Kavinesh",
        "P. Karvendan",
        "K. Kishore"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 International Conference on Visual Analytics and Data Visualization (ICVADV)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icvadv63329.2025.10961129",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icves.2016.7548161",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementation of the CAN-FD protocol in the fuzzing tool beSTORM",
      "description": "With the growth of ECUs that are mounted in automobiles, the transmission capacity of Controller Area Network (CAN), which is currently used by most on-vehicle networks, is becoming insufficient, and therefore CAN With Flexible Data Rate (CAN-FD), presented by Bosch GmbH, is viewed as a nextgeneration standard. Recently, the number of attacks on ECUs connected to CAN has been increasing, and from the viewpoint of CAN security there has been much discussion of safety. However, with regard to CAN-FD, which is an expansion of CAN, although a discussion of safety is needed, that has hardly happened. This paper reports on an implementation that uses the generic fuzzing tool beSTORM to investigate the vulnerability of the CAN-FD protocol. We also aim at practical application by measuring the transmission time for beSTORM test data and by estimating the time required for CAN-FD fuzzing tests.",
      "published": "2016-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icves.2016.7548161",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ryosuke Nishimura",
        "Ryo Kurachi",
        "Kazumasa Ito",
        "Takashi Miyasaka",
        "Masaki Yamamoto",
        "Miwako Mishima"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Vehicular Electronics and Safety (ICVES)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/icves.2016.7548161",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icves.2019.8906465",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey of network intrusion detection systems for controller area network",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are complex safety critical cyber physical systems, that are connected to the outside world, with all security implications that brings. To enhance vehicle security several network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) have been proposed for the CAN bus, the predominant type of in-vehicle network. The in-vehicle CAN bus, however, is a challenging place to do intrusion detection as messages provide very little information; interpreting them requires specific knowledge about the implementation that is not readily available. In this paper we collect how existing solutions address this challenge by providing an organized inventory of frame based CAN NIDS proposed in literature, categorizing them based on what information they extract from the network and how they build their model.",
      "published": "2019-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icves.2019.8906465",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guillaume Dupont",
        "Jerry den Hartog",
        "Sandro Etalle",
        "Alexios Lekidis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Vehicular Electronics and Safety (ICVES)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/icves.2019.8906465",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icves65691.2025.11376182",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Approach to Formal Verification of Autonomous Vehicle Systems using Threat Analysis",
      "description": "The rapid advancement and deployment of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) present transformative opportunities to enhance safety, efficiency, and convenience within the transportation industry. However, these innovations introduce significant cybersecurity risks due to the complex electronics and continuous connectivity that CAVs depend on. Traditional testing methods, while critical, often fall short in detecting vulnerabilities across the vast range of scenarios these vehicles may encounter. Formal verification, a mathematical approach to system validation, offers a more rigorous and comprehensive solution by ensuring that systems operate as expected to search through all possible execution paths. However, defining appropriate system properties for verification remains a challenge, as a system designer may write properties that fail to address real-world threats effectively. This research addresses this gap by integrating threat analysis into the process of defining security properties, ensuring that the verification process is aligned with actual cybersecurity risks. We leverage Natural Language Processing (NLP) to extract key security details from threat analysis result texts, automating the generation of system properties. This approach simplifies the verification process, with its usability demonstrated through a high-level 5G-V2X design use case scenario.",
      "published": "2025-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icves65691.2025.11376182",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sheraz Mazhar",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Robin Doss",
        "Adnan Anwar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Vehicular Electronics and Safety (ICVES)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icves65691.2025.11376182",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icvisp54630.2021.00011",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ascertaining Factors Affecting Autonomous Driving in New Zealand - A Framework for HMI Design",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles [AVs] will emerge as a powerful catalyst, thus forming a potentially disruptive technology opening doors to technological, socio-cultural and legal challenges. Present-day research is mainly focused on technological orientation, lacking the predominant social and behavioural linkages. NZ being a testbed of innovative technologies, is facing significant challenges in growing population and traffic congestions. Auckland ranks 47th globally in terms of traffic congestion costing $\\$1.3$b a year to the economy. Therefore, harnessing AV technology will be a significant step to remain competitive. The people’s readiness for acceptance influences AVs successful implementation. In this background, it is quintessential to ascertain and evaluate critical factors affecting the successful deployment of AVs in NZ. This exploratory research study is a part of a larger project of realizing a trust dynamics and governance framework for humanizing driverless technology. It is being carried out in collaboration with BMW NZ Group using Autonomous Level 2 Vehicle in Auckland on high, medium and low-density roads with level 3 functions mostly. Drawing on systematic qualitative evidence, this study attempted to find out key determinants/variables affecting user acceptance, including anthropomorphism, training, feedback, safety, security, privacy, customization and adaptive automation for AVs deployment in NZ and their role in garnering users’ trust besides suggesting an HMI Autonomous Driving Events Relationship Framework for AVs.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icvisp54630.2021.00011",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "bmw",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "bmw"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Attiq Ur Rehman",
        "Ali GhaffarianHoseini",
        "Nicola Naismith",
        "John Tookey",
        "Amirhosein Ghaffarianhoseini",
        "Shafiq Urrehman"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vision, Image and Signal Processing (ICVISP)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/icvisp54630.2021.00011",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icvtts62812.2024.10763924",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Decoupling sepolicy Development from AOSP: A Faster Workflow for Android Automotive",
      "description": "The automotive industry’s embrace of Android for in-vehicle infotainment and navigation systems necessitates robust security measures. SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux), a mandatory access control (MAC) system integrated within the Android kernel, plays a critical role in achieving this objective. By enforcing granular security policies, SELinux restricts access to system resources and data for processes and applications, mitigating potential vulnerabilities and minimizing the impact of malicious software. However, developing and debugging se-policies within the traditional Android Open-Source Project (AOSP) environment presents a significant bottleneck for developers. The current process entails a tedious iterative process involving log collection, analysis of Access Violation Control (AVC) denials, policy modifications, rebuilding the system, flashing the updated image onto the target device, and finally, retesting functionality. This loop for each iteration significantly hinders development efficiency. This research delves into exploring alternative approaches to optimize se-policy development in the context of automotive Android. The focus lies on potentially decoupling the se-policy creation and testing. This decoupling has the potential to streamline the development workflow, leading to faster development cycles and improved developer productivity.",
      "published": "2024-09-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icvtts62812.2024.10763924",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Imran Khan",
        "Balasubramanian Achuthan",
        "Gopinath Srinivasan",
        "Arun Vasudevan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicular Technology and Transportation Systems (ICVTTS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/icvtts62812.2024.10763924",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icvtts67119.2025.11296485",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "General Data Protection Regulation Compliance in Connected Vehicles for Over The Air Updates, App Stores, and Data Logging and Analytics",
      "description": "Connected vehicles have evolved into formidable data generators, collecting information ranging from driver behavior and location to vehicle performance. Considering the evolution of Software Defined Vehicles (SDV), this paper provides an in-depth analysis of General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) compliance in automotive systems, focusing on three critical domains. For each domain, I identify relevant GDPR requirements such as lawful bases for processing, data minimization, and user rights, summarize current research and challenges, examine real-world industry practices, and propose technical and organizational solutions to ensure compliance. OTA software update processes must balance safety and cybersecurity with privacy, in-vehicle app ecosystems introduce complex multi-controller scenarios requiring robust consent and access controls, and continuous vehicle data logging or Vehicle Telemetry calls for privacy-by-design measures. I cite examples from leading manufacturers and recent regulatory guidance, and I outline best practices from consent management and pseudonymization to data protection by design.",
      "published": "2025-09-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icvtts67119.2025.11296485",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "gdpr",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prashanth Ram Kurumbudel"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 International Conference on Vehicular Technology and Transportation Systems (ICVTTS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icvtts67119.2025.11296485",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.6195,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "accepted",
          "explanation": "Strong automatic match between doi:10.1109/icvtts67119.2025.11296485 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: requiring, location, regulatory, user, access, privacy, information, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/icvtts67119.2025.11296537",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comparative Study of PKI and Blockchain-Based Security Architectures in V2X Communication Systems",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication underpins cooperative intelligent transport systems by enabling vehicles and infrastructure to exchange time-critical data. However, increasing interconnectivity raises security concerns around authentication, integrity, privacy, revocation, and auditability. This paper examines two dominant paradigms—Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and blockchain-based approaches and compares their suitability for V2X deployments. We synthesize standards and recent studies to provide a side-by-side architectural analysis and quantitative, order of magnitude metrics for authentication latency, revocation timeliness, bandwidth and storage overhead, and scalability. The findings indicate that PKI delivers real-time message authentication at millisecond level latency with mature standardization and deployment readiness, whereas permissioned blockchain improves transparency and enables near-real-time for consensus driven misbehavior handling and revocation.",
      "published": "2025-09-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/icvtts67119.2025.11296537",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahul H. Abubakkar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicular Technology and Transportation Systems (ICVTTS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/icvtts67119.2025.11296537",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iditr62018.2024.10554294",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Communication Security Strategy for Intelligent Connected Vehicles Based on HSM",
      "description": "The development of intelligent connected vehicles cannot be separated from secure network communication. So far, a large number of security communication technologies have emerged, such as secure transport layer protocol, national secret TLS, etc. However, the number of vehicle attack events has not decreased but has become more frequent. One of the reasons is that the current mainstream in vehicle network CAN protocol lacks necessary security protection measures, and related communication security technologies still lack practical application in vehicle production. This article discusses the security strategy of intelligent connected vehicle communication based on HSM, including the establishment of an encryption channel using TLS with a national security dual certificate mechanism, secure key storage, signature, and signature verification and authentication mechanisms. Vehicle networking communication mainly includes external communication, security gateway, and in vehicle ECU communication. Both Android apps with Key Master functionality and Windows apps with TPM functionality can securely communicate with vehicles. With the help of certificates, certificate chains, ECDHE, and OpenSSL Engine mechanisms, secure communication between cloud, external devices, and vehicles can be achieved. This solution has been deployed and implemented in a certain automotive company.",
      "published": "2024-05-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iditr62018.2024.10554294",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "in vehicle network",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haijun Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 3rd International Conference on Innovations and Development of Information Technologies and Robotics (IDITR)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iditr62018.2024.10554294",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iecon.2016.7792955",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical unclonable keys for smart lock systems using Bluetooth Low Energy",
      "description": "Nowadays, several smart lock systems use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to stablish a wireless communication between the physical key (key fob, card, smartphone, etc.) and the lock. Security is based on creating and storing secret digital keys to establish a cryptographically secure communication. The problem is that several attacks can break such security, particularly the copy of the physical key. In order to increase the difficulty of the attacks, the physical keys described in this paper do not store the secret cryptographic keys but reconstruct them when they are needed and remove them when they are not used. Only the trusted physical keys are able to reconstruct the secrets with the public data stored in them. This is possible by using the start-up values of the SRAM in the BLE chip of the physical key, which acts as a physical unclonable function (PUF), so that if the physical key is copied, the lock cannot be opened. The idea has been proven with the development of a smart lock system with key fobs based on the CC2541 BLE system on chip from Texas Instruments. Experimental results are included to illustrate the performance.",
      "published": "2016-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iecon.2016.7792955",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miguel Ángel Prada-Delgado",
        "A. Vazquez-Reyes",
        "Iluminada Baturone"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society (IECON)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/iecon.2016.7792955",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iecon55916.2024.10906000",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Physical Security Trends of EV Charging Systems: A Survey",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS) are rapidly being built all around the world to support the growing number of Electric vehicles (EVs) on the road. EVCSs hook into critical infrastructure and offer a vital service, so it is very important they remain secure and available, yet they remain vulnerable to a number of attacks. Thus, it is becoming more and more important to examine the security of EVCSs. In this paper, we will explore the current cyber-physical threat landscape faced by EVCSs. First, we examine the protocols used for communication during the EV charging process and their strengths and weaknesses. Next, we discuss the overall cyber-physical security threats of the entire system, as well as Artificial Intelligence-based (AI) solutions to combat these threats. Finally, we present the future research directions.",
      "published": "2024-11-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iecon55916.2024.10906000",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devin Drake",
        "Harindra S. Mavikumbure",
        "Victor Cobilean",
        "Milos Manic"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iecon55916.2024.10906000",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ieee.iciot.2017.12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adaptable Safety and Security in V2X Systems",
      "description": "With the advances in the areas of mobile computing and wireless communications, V2X systems have become a promising technology enabling deployment of applications providing road safety, traffic efficiency and infotainment. Due to their increasing popularity, V2X networks have become a major target for attackers, making them vulnerable to security threats and network conditions, and thus affecting the safety of passengers, vehicles and roads. Existing research in V2X does not effectively address the safety, security and performance limitation threats to connected vehicles, as a result of considering these aspects separately instead of jointly. In this work, we focus on the analysis of the tradeoffs between safety, security and performance of V2X systems and propose a dynamic adaptability approach considering all three aspects jointly based on application needs and context to achieve maximum safety on the roads using an Internet of vehicles. Experiments with a simple V2V highway scenario demonstrate that an adaptive safety/security approach is essential and V2X systems have great potential for providing low reaction times.",
      "published": "2017-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ieee.iciot.2017.12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miguel Villarreal-Vasquez",
        "Bharat Bhargava",
        "Pelin Angın"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Congress on Internet of Things (ICIOT)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/ieee.iciot.2017.12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ieee.iciot.2017.13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trust-IoV: A Trustworthy Forensic Investigation Framework for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV)",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a complex and dynamic mobile network system that enables information sharing between vehicles, their surrounding sensors, and clouds. While IoV opens new opportunities in various applications and services to provide safety on the road, it introduces new challenges in the field of digital forensics investigations. The existing tools and procedures of digital forensics cannot meet the highly distributed, decentralized, dynamic, and mobile infrastructures of the IoV. Forensic investigators will face challenges while identifying necessary pieces of evidence from the IoV environment, and collecting and analyzing the evidence. In this article, we propose TrustIoV - a digital forensic framework for the IoV systems that provides mechanisms to collect and store trustworthy evidence from the distributed infrastructure. Trust-IoV maintains a secure provenance of the evidence to ensure the integrity of the stored evidence and allows investigators to verify the integrity of the evidence during an investigation. Our experimental results on a simulated environment suggest that Trust-IoV can operate with minimal overhead while ensuring the trustworthiness of evidence in a strong adversarial scenario.",
      "published": "2017-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ieee.iciot.2017.13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "secure",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahmud Hossain",
        "Ragib Hasan",
        "Shams Zawoad"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Congress on Internet of Things (ICIOT)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/ieee.iciot.2017.13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 64,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iemtronics52119.2021.9422616",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilience of Autonomous Vehicle Object Category Detection to Universal Adversarial Perturbations",
      "description": "Due to the vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples, numerous works on adversarial attacks and defenses have been burgeoning over the past several years. However, there seem to be some conventional views regarding adversarial attacks and object detection approaches that most researchers take for granted. In this work, we bring a fresh perspective on those procedures by evaluating the impact of universal perturbations on object detection at a class-level. We apply it to a carefully curated data set related to autonomous driving. We use Faster-RCNN object detector on images of five different categories: person, car, truck, stop sign and traffic light from the COCO data set, while carefully perturbing the images using Universal Dense Object Suppression algorithm. Our results indicate that person, car, traffic light, truck and stop sign are resilient in that order (most to least) to universal perturbations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such a ranking has been established which is significant for the security of the data sets pertaining to autonomous vehicles and object detection in general.",
      "published": "2021-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iemtronics52119.2021.9422616",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Nayeem Teli",
        "Seung‐Won Oh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International IOT, Electronics and Mechatronics Conference (IEMTRONICS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/iemtronics52119.2021.9422616",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ifeec.2015.7361482",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and implementation of electric vehicle charging load integrated test system",
      "description": "With the growth of EV number, large scale penetration of EV load may bring problems to the LV distribution network, such as voltage sags, transformer overload, circuit overload and etc. It has become a hotspot in related fields to study the impact that EV implementation will bring to the LV distribution network. In this paper, a set of EV charging load integration test system was designed and developed to deal with the shortcomings of the existing study means. The system can simulate charging load of various types of vehicles, and versatile set of convenience, security and scalability in one. With this system we carried out some studies of EV charging load characteristic modeling, including the establishment of the models of battery of EV and the charging static load of EV, which will be helpful to the researchers of EV in some degree.",
      "published": "2015-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ifeec.2015.7361482",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chunlin Guo",
        "Wen Chen",
        "Zhongjun Chi",
        "Zongfeng Li",
        "Xiaojuan Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Future Energy Electronics Conference (IFEEC)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/ifeec.2015.7361482",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ignite69592.2026.11705961",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Intelligent EV Charging Infrastructure Integrating Charging Station Mapping, Real- Time Communication, and Secure Digital Payments",
      "description": "The rapid growth of electric-vehicle (EV) adoption and the expansion of charging infrastructure demand secure, intelligent, and user-centric charging solutions for smart cities. Existing EV charging ecosystems face critical challenges related to cybersecurity vulnerabilities, inefficient energy utilization, and unreliable payment mechanisms. This research proposes a smart EV charging mapping framework integrated with network communication and an automated payment system to enhance charging efficiency, security, and user convenience. The proposed system incorporates a Charging-Station-Management-System (CSMS) that coordinates Electric-Vehicle-Supply-Equipment (EVSE) units for optimized charging operations based on dayahead electricity pricing, thereby minimizing operational energy costs. Secure communication between EVs and charging stations is established using the Open-Charge-Point-Protocol (OCPP) version2.0.1, enabling functionalities such as user authentication, transaction management, energy monitoring, and charger status supervision. To further improve usability, the framework integrates a wireless EV charging mechanism using electromagnetic induction, allowing vehicles to charge automatically upon parking without physical connectors. A realtime automated payment module ensures seamless user authentication, secure billing, and transparent financial transactions. By addressing cybersecurity risks, operational inefficiencies, and payment security concerns, the proposed framework contributes to the development of secure, effective, and scalable EV-charging setup suitable for future smart city deployments.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ignite69592.2026.11705961",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "ocpp",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tanishka Dalvi",
        "Sakshi Ladhe",
        "Saniya N. Shaikh",
        "Divya Zambre",
        "S. Argade"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 1st International Conference on Innovation & Growth in Next-Gen Intelligent Technology & Engineering (IGNITE)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ignite69592.2026.11705961",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iiki65561.2024.00033",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Binary Logistic Regression based Intrusion Detection System for CAN bus Security",
      "description": "The complex distributed systems installed in vehicles represent the cutting edge of the automotive industry. Electronic control units communicate with each other by sending and receiving messages over a well-known protocol called the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system. Car Broadcast is a new, but insecure, way to communicate between external electronic devices. However, today’s vehicles are on the brink of security because the CAN network lacks a secure authentication and authorization mechanism. The rise in cyber attacks such as spoofing, spoofing and most commonly denial of service attacks is the result of uncertain measures in the CAN bus network. Although many intrusion detection systems have been developed to provide more secure communication in the vehicle, CAN is still far from being the most secure communication protocol. Since cyber attacks can come from a little-known or completely unknown source, it is essential to take a probabilistic approach based on previous observations from previous attacks. Therefore, we propose a new intrusion detection system that uses binary logistic regression (BLR) to detect and mitigate attacks on a CAN bus network. Binary logistic regression is a very popular predictive model that is widely used in various fields. In binary logistic regression, data is first analyzed, then the probability of individual events is estimated by observing previous data, and then a binary classification model is created. An evaluation of the well-known Nsl-kdd and Kdd-99 datasets shows that our proposed method has a dominant overall performance. The final detection rate is 099.031% using Nsl-kdd with a positive rate as low as 00.073% and the rate of detection is 099.043% using kdd-99 with a positive false rate as low as 00.046% ̇ Specifically, to detect denial of service (DoS) attacks, the proposed system achieved a detection rate of 099.061% and 099.098% in Nsl-kdd and kdd-99 dataset respectively. Comparative evaluation confirmed that BLR is more reliable as a memory unit for intrusion detection system.",
      "published": "2024-12-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iiki65561.2024.00033",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asma Alfardus",
        "Danda B. Rawat"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Identification, Information, and Knowledge in the Internet of Things",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iiki65561.2024.00033",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iirw49815.2020.9312862",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Addressing Weak Links in Automotive Reliability Semiconductor Contamination Control, Inspection and Test",
      "description": "As we move into a more electrified and automated reality, the sustainability of functional safe and secure electronic systems is a major concern of automobile manufacturers. The complexity of high performance systems is not possible without the application of the latest semiconductor technology nodes. However, the effort to compensate for reliability and robustness gaps in those technologies via resilient design strategies, that are also compliant to cyber security IP and that address defect related attack vectors, creates challenges with respect to performance, size, power, security and cost (PSPSC).Technology generation dependent resilient design measures always relate to the physics-of-failure (PoF), making it evident that defectivity management in the leading edge domain is no longer simply a manufacturing concern, but rather an interdisciplinary task for design and process engineering teams, including process logistics. A process monitoring approach that effectively helps to reduce a) the number of critical defects and b) the number of defect types automatically reduces the resilient design effort for detection and compensation (circuit adaption).In this paper we will illustrate anonymized case studies and exemplary fab benchmarks to bridge the link between design and process engineering in order to infer best practices for automotive related semiconductor manufacturing. Following a systems engineering approach, the effort/cost for effective defectivity management including contamination control is weighted against effort/cost for resilient design and test strategies. It is therefore possible to create a framework that systematically identifies the optimization potential in the below defect detection threshold domain.",
      "published": "2020-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iirw49815.2020.9312862",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Aal",
        "Jennifer Braggin",
        "Antoine Amade",
        "Mark Puttock"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Integrated Reliability Workshop final report",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iirw49815.2020.9312862",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iisa.2019.8900712",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cognitive Infotainment Systems for Intelligent Vehicles",
      "description": "Lately, the automotive world is witnessing a trend related to the deployment and extensive use of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) inside vehicles. Such systems generate large volumes of real-time data that need to be managed, communicated, interpreted, aggregated, and analyzed in order to support real-time decision-making capabilities. Furthermore, automotive industries have introduced In-Vehicle-Infotainment (IVI) systems in supporting drivers/passengers with a varying set of functions. The main purpose of this study is to present an IVI cognitive functionality that automatically and dynamically proposes the optimum music genre to the drivers /users when they want to travel with their vehicles. The proposed system utilizes (i) driver/user's profile data and his/her current situation, (ii) driver/user's personal preferences, (iii) external environment information obtained from sensor measurements, and (iv) previous knowledge, turned into experience, in an automated manner. Knowledge is obtained through the exploitation of a machine learning technique based on the Bayesian networking principles. Indicative simulation results showcase the behavior of the aforementioned IVI cognitive functionality in proactively identifying the optimal music genre and accordingly notifying the driver/user.",
      "published": "2019-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iisa.2019.8900712",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "exploitation",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ilias E. Panagiotopoulos",
        "George J. Dimitrakopoulos"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information, Intelligence, Systems & Applications (IISA)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/iisa.2019.8900712",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/imcom48794.2020.9001682",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum-resistant Lattice-based Authentication for V2X Communication in C-ITS",
      "description": "Although there has been a lot of research on a vehicle to everything (V2X) for a cooperative-intelligent transport system (C-ITS), there has been little research on quantum-resistant V2X schemes. Since the speed of improvement in quantum computing is groundbreaking, we need to develop a quantum-resistant scheme in advance. In this paper, we propose a quantum-resistant lattice-based scheme for C-ITS, making safe even in the quantum era. Our proposed scheme uses a simplified NTRU Prime and BLISS that are considered to support both security and practicality. In addition, the scheme is a pseudonym-based authentication scheme as other V2X authentication schemes because pseudonym-based authentication provides both security and anonymity. Lastly, our proposed scheme is robust against several known attacks such as impersonation, replay, and quantum attacks.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/imcom48794.2020.9001682",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sewan Ha",
        "Hakjun Lee",
        "Dongho Won",
        "Youngsook Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication (IMCOM)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/imcom48794.2020.9001682",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/indin.2015.7281913",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing smart maintenance services: Hardware-security and TLS for MQTT",
      "description": "Increasing the efficiency of production and manufacturing processes is a key goal of initiatives like Industry 4.0. Within the context of the European research project ARROWHEAD, we enable and secure smart maintenance services. An overall goal is to proactively predict and optimize the Maintenance, Repair and Operations (MRO) processes carried out by a device maintainer, for industrial devices deployed at the customer. Therefore it is necessary to centrally acquire maintenance relevant equipment status data from remotely located devices over the Internet. Consequently, security and privacy issues arise from connecting devices to the Internet, and sending data from customer sites to the maintainer's back-end. In this paper we consider an exemplary automotive use case with an AVL Particle Counter (APC) as device. The APC transmits its status information by means of a fingerprint via the publish-subscribe protocol Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) to an MQTT Information Broker in the remotely located AVL back-end. In a threat analysis we focus on the MQTT routing information asset and identify two elementary security goals in regard to client authentication. Consequently we propose a system architecture incorporating a hardware security controller that processes the Transport Layer Security (TLS) client authentication step. We validate the feasibility of the concept by means of a prototype implementation. Experimental results indicate that no significant performance impact is imposed by the hardware security element. The security evaluation confirms the advanced security of our system, which we believe lays the foundation for security and privacy in future smart service infrastructures.",
      "published": "2015-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/indin.2015.7281913",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Lesjak",
        "Daniel M. Hein",
        "Michael Hofmann",
        "Martin Maritsch",
        "Andreas Aldrian",
        "Peter Priller",
        "Thomas Ebner",
        "Thomas Ruprechter",
        "Gunther Pregartner"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/indin.2015.7281913",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/indin51400.2023.10217971",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Hardware-Functional to Software-Defined Vehicles and their Security Issues",
      "description": "Over the next few years, the automotive industry is set to experience a revolutionary transformation driven by several interconnected trends such as autonomous driving, connected vehicles, and electrification. Our research focuses on Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs), their definition, and an analysis of their possible cybersecurity issue. SDV is a new concept that is changing the definition of vehicles from purely hardware-based to software-oriented. The research analyzes the SDV security following the ISO/SAE 21434 guidelines, performing a complete vulnerability assessment to determine the main possible threats and their impact on different aspects like safety and operations. The findings suggest that SDVs may be the future of the automotive industry and will offer greater convenience and sustainability, throughout the vehicle life cycle but only if appropriate solutions to mitigate potential security threats like denial-of-service or jamming attacks, will be implemented.",
      "published": "2023-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/indin51400.2023.10217971",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "jamming"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chiara Bodei",
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/indin51400.2023.10217971",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3934,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/indin51400.2023.10217971 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: following, next, like, impact, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ines67149.2025.11078029",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring the Intersection Between STIX Framework and TARA for Sharing Cyber Threat Intelligence for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-06-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ines67149.2025.11078029",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "tara",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Saulaiman",
        "M. Kozlovszky",
        "Á. Csilling"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Engineering Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ines67149.2025.11078029",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/infocomwkshps47286.2019.9093753",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Global Roaming Trust-based Model for V2X Communications",
      "description": "Smart cities need to connect physical devices as a network to improve the efficiency of city operations and services. Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is one of the key components in smart cities, due to its capability of supporting communications between vehicles to improve the driving experience. Whilst Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications are essential, cyber-security poses a significant challenge in V2X communications. A V2X communication link is vulnerable to various cyber-attacks including internal and external attacks. Internal attacks cannot be detected by conventional security schemes because the compromised nodes have valid credentials. Thus, a new trust model is urgently needed to mitigate cyber-security risks. In this paper, a global roaming trust-based security model is proposed for V2X communications. Each vehicle has a global knowledge about malicious nodes in the network. In addition, various experiments are conducted with different percentage of malicious nodes to measure the performance of the proposed model. Simulation results show that the proposed model improves False Negative Rate (FNR) by 33.5% in comparison with the existing method.",
      "published": "2019-04-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/infocomwkshps47286.2019.9093753",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cyber-security",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljawharah Alnasser",
        "Hongjian Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/infocomwkshps47286.2019.9093753",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/infocomwkshps54753.2022.9797928",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-empowered Secure Data Communication in V2X Environment with 6G Network",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) environment is driven by the evolution of Internet-of-Vehicles, satisfying the applications of Intelligent Transportation Systems. The rapid growth in vehicles demanded intelligent services such as traffic congestion, road safety, collision avoidance, and efficient traffic monitoring for autonomous V2X environments. On-board units and Roadside units communicate using Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol to broadcast vehicle and traffic information. But, CAN does not employ any security feature for encrypting the broadcasted messages. Hence, there is a demand to use Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques and Blockchain (BC) technology to handle security issues in CAN. Given this background, we proposed an AI-empowered, BC-based secure data communication underlying a 6G network. We have used CAN Intrusion Detection dataset for training and testing purposes. Our proposed architecture uses Gaussian Naive Bayes classifier to classify the dataset into attacked and attack-free classes and outperforms with 93% accuracy. We have achieved low data storage cost, low latency, and high scalability by employing Inter Planetary File System and a 6G network, respectively.",
      "published": "2022-05-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/infocomwkshps54753.2022.9797928",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anuja R. Nair",
        "N. Jadav",
        "Rajesh Gupta",
        "Sudeep Tanwar"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Computer Communications Workshops",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/infocomwkshps54753.2022.9797928",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/infoteh60418.2024.10495939",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Identification and Classification in V2X Scenarios",
      "description": "The latest technological advancements in the area of vehicular wireless communications have enabled smooth, timely and location independent communication and exchange of information between vehicles and other vehicular communication elements, such as position and speed of the vehicle, traffic information, alarms, etc. This advanced concept is known as vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, and it encompasses techniques for safe and efficient operation of cooperative intelligent transportation system (ITS) applications. The V2X communication highly relies on wireless environment characteristics, which are vulnerable to unlawful interception, eavesdropping, hacking and a range of other cyber security issues. This research is related to the analysis of the security and privacy concerns of the V2X scenarios.",
      "published": "2024-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/infoteh60418.2024.10495939",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "hacking",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Valentina V. Timcenko",
        "Slavica V. Boštjančič Rakas",
        "Sandra Lagén",
        "Biljana Bojović",
        "Katerina Koutlia",
        "Carles Antón‐Haro"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium INFOTEH-JAHORINA (INFOTEH)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/infoteh60418.2024.10495939",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/inista68122.2025.11249556",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Ultra-Low Latency: Binarized Neural Network Architectures for in-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "The Control Area Network (CAN) protocol is essential for in-vehicle communication, facilitating high-speed data exchange among Electronic Control Units (ECUs). However, its inherent design lacks robust security features, rendering vehicles susceptible to cyberattacks. While recent research has investigated machine learning and deep learning techniques to enhance network security, their practical applicability remains uncertain. This paper presents a lightweight intrusion detection technique based on Binarized Neural Networks (BNNs), which utilizes payload data, message IDs, and CAN message frequencies for effective intrusion detection. Additionally, we develop hybrid binary encoding techniques to integrate non-binary features, such as message IDs and frequencies. The proposed method, namely the BNN framework specifically optimized for in-vehicle intrusion detection combined with hybrid binary quantization techniques for non-payload attributes, demonstrates efficacy in both anomaly detection and multi-class network traffic classification. The system is well-suited for deployment on micro-controllers and Gateway ECUs, aligning with the real-time requirements of CAN bus safety applications.",
      "published": "2025-10-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/inista68122.2025.11249556",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hui-Yao Dong",
        "Igor V. Kotenko"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on INnovations in Intelligent SysTems and Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/inista68122.2025.11249556",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/inocon50539.2020.9298286",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBER SECURITY IN VEHICLE COMMUNICATION",
      "description": "In the Automotive Industry, cyber security implementation is low. A car has multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and every ECU communicates a huge number of messages to another ECU through Control Area Network (CAN). If the hacker invades the system, then it is like an open source of resources and any amount of valuable information can be manipulated. This can lead to a great damage. This is a motivation to verify various existing cyber security features, understand the system and then implement the cyber security features. In this paper, key slot verification design, maximum authoritative counter verification design and user mode implementation have been discussed. The Automotive Open Source Architecture (AUTOSAR) platform is used for development in the automotive industry.",
      "published": "2020-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/inocon50539.2020.9298286",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manjula R Parmar",
        "M. Kumari",
        "R. N"
      ],
      "venue": "2020 IEEE International Conference for Innovation in Technology (INOCON)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/inocon50539.2020.9298286",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/instcon69741.2026.11691660",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Temporal Integrity Monitoring Of SAEJ1772 Control Pilot Signals for Secure Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "Electric vehicle (EV) charging systems depend on the control pilot (CP) signal for communication between the EV and electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE). However, existing implementations lack mechanisms to verify the temporal integrity of CP signal transitions, making them vulnerable to timing-based anomalies and signal manipulation attacks. This work presents a simplified CP signal emulation framework for experimental validation of a temporal integrity monitoring approach and for security analysis. A discrete hardware setup using STM32-based EV and EVSE controllers is developed to generate and observe CP states under controlled conditions. The proposed framework observes voltage transitions within the control pilot (CP) and assesses their temporal alignment to identify abnormal behaviour. Experimental findings indicate that the system successfully detects anomalous transitions and timing discrepancies in CP signaling. The proposed method offers a lightweight and practical way to improve the security of communication systems used in electric vehicle charging.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/instcon69741.2026.11691660",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "evse",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kavyasree Majeti",
        "Bhaskar Karra",
        "Dadigi Yuvaraj",
        "Ramesh Vaddi",
        "Siva Sankar Yellampalli"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Instrumentation (INSTCon)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/instcon69741.2026.11691660",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iolts60994.2024.10616052",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Navigating the road to automotive cybersecurity compliance",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are now part of a complex digital ecosystem, leveraging Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cloud computing for enhanced safety, efficiency, and user experience. However, this digital integration has introduced significant cy-bersecurity challenges, including data protection, unauthorized access prevention, and user privacy. As vehicles become more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, the industry must implement robust cybersecurity measures. Regulations like the UN’s UNR155 and UNR156 establish stringent cybersecurity requirements, demanding comprehensive manage-ment systems, regular updates, and continuous testing to counter evolving threats. These regulations under score the importance of cybersecurity in automotive safety. Future automotive cybersecurity will depend on developing advanced protections and collaboration among manufacturers,policymakers, and cybersecurity experts to ensure innovation and security in an interconnected digital world.",
      "published": "2024-06-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iolts60994.2024.10616052",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Franco Oberti",
        "Fabrizio Abrate",
        "Alessandro Savino",
        "Filippo Parisi",
        "Stefano Di Carlo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iolts60994.2024.10616052",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5363,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iolts60994.2024.10616052 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: unauthorized, like, user, digital, intelligence, significant, access, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iolts60994.2024.10616053",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Can social media shape the security of next-generation connected vehicles?",
      "description": "abstract-The increasing adoption of connectivity and electronic components in vehicles makes these systems valuable targets for attackers. While automotive vendors prioritize safety, there remains a critical need for comprehensive assessment and analysis of cyber risks. In this context, this paper proposes a Social Media Automotive Threat Intelligence (SOCMATI) framework, specifically designed for the emerging field of automotive cybersecurity. The framework leverages advanced intelligence techniques and machine learning models to extract valuable insights from social media. Four use cases illustrate The framework’s potential by demonstrating how it can significantly enhance threat assessment procedures within the automotive industry.",
      "published": "2024-07-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iolts60994.2024.10616053",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nicola Scarano",
        "Luca Mannella",
        "Alessandro Savino",
        "Stefano Di Carlo",
        "Politecnico Di Torino"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iolts60994.2024.10616053",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11116851",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Semantic Coherence: Understanding Cybersecurity and Digital Sovereignty in the Automotive Landscape",
      "description": "The relationship between cybersecurity and digital sovereignty is increasingly viewed as complementary. Cybersecurity focuses on the technical and operational protection of digital infrastructures, while digital sovereignty encompasses the political and strategic dimensions related to technological autonomy and the ability to regulate and make decisions. This intersection is particularly noticeable in technology and regulation-heavy sectors, such as the automotive industry, where vehicles are transforming into connected and intelligent platforms capable of generating, processing, and transmitting large amounts of data. In this context, protecting user privacy emerges as a critical challenge, closely linked to cybersecurity needs and the control over the cross-border flow of information. These dynamics show how difficult it is to coordinate cybersecurity, data management, and compliance across different countries, especially when foreign suppliers and supply chains are involved. Consequently, there is an urgent need for a coherent, shared, and relevant technical-conceptual framework that integrates operational requirements, fundamental rights, and strategic objectives. This paper proposes a semantic approach to analyze, systematize, and map emerging key concepts from normative sources, policy documents, and standards, using both expert-based approach and Artificial Intelligence models, to facilitate the extraction and organization of domain-specific terminology enhancing the population or enrichment of semantic resources. Results show the importance of controlled vocabularies, such as thesauri, which serve as fundamental tools for facilitating classification, interoperability, and for supporting normative production. In the case of the automotive sector, it becomes an operational support to address challenges related to cybersecurity, privacy protection, and regulatory autonomy.",
      "published": "2025-07-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11116851",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Espionage / sovereignty"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elisa Sorrentino",
        "Anna Federica Spagnuolo",
        "Alessio Portaro",
        "Maria Taverniti",
        "Elena Cardillo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11116851",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5525,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11116851 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain; impacts: espionage, privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: foreign, political, espionage, serve, suppliers, strategic, information., regulatory."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11116886",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANDoSA: A Hardware Performance Counter-Based Intrusion Detection System for DoS Attacks on Automotive CAN Bus",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, essential for automotive embedded systems, lacks inherent security features, making it vulnerable to cyber threats, especially with the rise of autonomous vehicles. Traditional security measures offer limited protection, such as payload encryption and message authentication. This paper presents a novel Intrusion Detection System (IDS) designed for the CAN environment, utilizing Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) to detect anomalies indicative of cyber attacks. A RISC-V-based CAN receiver is simulated using the gem5 simulator, processing CAN frame payloads with AES-128 encryption as FreeRTOS tasks, which trigger distinct HPC responses. Key HPC features are optimized through data extraction and correlation analysis to enhance classification efficiency. Results indicate that this approach could significantly improve CAN security and address emerging challenges in automotive cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2025-07-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11116886",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Franco Oberti",
        "Stefano Di Carlo",
        "Alessandro Savino"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11116886",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11117010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On Post-Quantum Attribute-Based Encryption for Automotive Over-the-Air Software Updates",
      "description": "Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) has been proposed to ensure the confidentiality of over-the-air (OTA) software updates in the automotive sector. Existing schemes predominantly rely on pairing-based cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. This paper explores an ABE scheme based on Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE), a quantum-resistant cryptographic primitive. We implement a prototype on an embedded platform to assess the scheme's performance in terms of processing time and memory usage on the vehicle side. Results indicate that the RLWE-based ABE scheme can be efficiently integrated into OTA update frameworks with minimal performance overhead.",
      "published": "2025-07-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11117010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianluca Dini",
        "Salvatore Lombardi",
        "Tommaso Antonini"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iolts65288.2025.11117010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iot.2015.7356546",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Conversations with connected vehicles",
      "description": "We present a system that allows drivers and fleet managers to interact with their connected vehicles both by means of direct control and indirect goal-setting. The ability to move data from vehicles to a remote server is established by the flexible and secure open vehicle telematics platform “CloudThink.” Based on this platform, we present several prototypes of how people can be enabled to conveniently interact with connected vehicles: First, we demonstrate a system that allows users to select and interact with vehicles using object recognition methods and automatically generated user interfaces on smartphones or personal wearable devices. Second, we show how functional semantic metadata can be used to smooth the boundaries for interacting with vehicles in the physical and virtual worlds. Finally, we present a method for monitoring interactions between vehicles and remote services which increases safety and security by enhancing driver oversight and control over the data that leaves and enters their vehicle.",
      "published": "2015-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iot.2015.7356546",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simon Mayer",
        "Joshua Eric Siegel"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on the Internet of Things (IoT)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/iot.2015.7356546",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4758,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iot.2015.7356546 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: backend_cloud, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: oversight, indirect, personal, direct, ability, vehicle., user, services."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iotaima66468.2025.11212712",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "StageDistill-CAN: Lightweight Multi-Stage Distillation for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "With the growing complexity of intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs), in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) systems have become increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated cyberattacks. Traditional cryptographic and perimeter-based defenses are insufficient under real-time and internal threat conditions, highlighting the urgent need for efficient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). In this paper, we propose StageDistill-CAN, a novel lightweight intrusion detection framework for CAN bus systems that integrates multistage temporal-semantic modeling with a two-stage knowledge distillation strategy. To ensure the teacher model provides precise and informative representations of CAN bus traffic for knowledge distillation, we design StageNet-CAN, integrating Bi-GRU for temporal dependencies and Multi-Head Self-Attention for latent semantic patterns. To meet the computational constraints of invehicle environments, we further propose a novel two-stage knowledge distillation strategy framework that transfers rich knowledge from a complex teacher model to lightweight student models. Through the process involving attention alignment and temperature-scaled soft label transfer, our approach preserves high detection performance while significantly reducing computational overhead. Finally, we design differentiated lightweight student models, to accommodate varied computational environments while preserving detection performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that StageDistill-CAN achieves superior detection accuracy with low model complexity, making it well-suited for real-world vehicular IDS applications.",
      "published": "2025-08-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iotaima66468.2025.11212712",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "threat",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Linfeng Du",
        "Jielin Cheng",
        "Lei Yun",
        "Yang Yang",
        "Tinghua Zhang",
        "Rui Gao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence and Mechanical Automation (IoTAIMA)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iotaima66468.2025.11212712",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4889,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iotaima66468.2025.11212712 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: extensive, making, intelligence, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iotais53735.2021.9628576",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threats and Attacks to Modern Vehicles",
      "description": "As modern vehicles are complex IoT devices with intelligence capable to connect to an external infrastructure and use Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication, there is a need to secure the communication to avoid being a target for cyber-attacks. Also, the organs of the car (sensors, communication, and control) each could have a vulnerability, that leads to accidents or potential deaths. Manufactures of cars have a huge responsibility to secure the safety of their costumers and should not skip the important security research, instead making sure to implement important security measures, which makes your car less likely to be attacked. This paper covers the relevant attacks and threats to modern vehicles and presents a security analysis with potential countermeasures. We discuss the future of modern and autonomous vehicles and conclude that more countermeasures must be taken to create a future and safe concept.",
      "published": "2021-11-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iotais53735.2021.9628576",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simon Grønfelt Philipsen",
        "Birger Andersen",
        "Bhupjit Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things and Intelligence Systems (IoTaIS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/iotais53735.2021.9628576",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iotm.0001.1900071",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "NR Sidelink Design Overview for Advanced V2X Service",
      "description": "3GPP standardization is currently studying the support of advanced vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services in Release 16. The NR sidelink (SL) being designed in 3GPP Release 16 to support advanced V2X services directly between vehicles and other road users is expected to finish early in 2020. Advanced V2X services primarily focus on platooning, cooperative driving, extended sensor, and remote driving use cases. A new QoS parameter of minimum communication range (MCR) introduced for 5G V2X means fulfillment of ultra-low latency and very high reliability requirements within a given MCR. Design for ultra-low latency and very high reliability enhancement is required to meet an end-to-end latency of 3 ms and high reliability up-to 99.999 percent. NR SL design studies V2X message delivery for periodic/aperiodic traffic type and different cast types such as unicast, groupcast, and broadcast traffic requiring substantial changes in network architecture, physical, and protocol layers. This article provides insights on the current 3GPP Release 16 NR SL design for NR V2X, the network architecture, security, and protocol enhancement. The PC5-QoS model for NR SL includes the newly introduced range parameter and connection establishment for both groupcast and unicast V2X communication using NR-PC5 RRC. In addition, the design of the NR SL physical layer addresses the necessary improvements needed in the SL physical layer structures, and procedures for reliable packet transmissions considering minimum communication range.",
      "published": "2020-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iotm.0001.1900071",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karthikeyan Ganesan",
        "Joachim Löhr",
        "Prateek Basu Mallick",
        "Andreas Kunz",
        "Ravi Kuchibhotla"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Magazine",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iotm.0001.1900071",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iotm.001.2200140",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G Vehicle-to-Everything at the Cross-Borders: Security Challenges and Opportunities",
      "description": "5G Vehicle-to-Everything (5G-V2X) communications will play a vital role in the development of the automotive industry. Indeed and thanks to the Network Slicing (NS) concept of 5G and beyond networks (B5G), unprecedented new vehicular use-cases can be supported on top of the same physical network. NS promises to enable the sharing of common network infrastructure and resources while ensuring strict traffic isolation and providing necessary network resources to each NS. However, enabling NS in vehicular networks brings new security challenges and requirements that automotive or 5G standards have not yet addressed. Attackers can exploit the weakest link in the slicing chain, connected and automated vehicles, to violate the slice isolation and degrade its performance. Furthermore, these attacks can be more powerful, especially if they are produced in cross-border areas of two countries, which require an optimal network transition from one operator to another. Therefore, this article aims to provide an overview of newly enabled 5G-V2X slicing use cases and their security issues while focusing on cross-border slicing attacks. It also presents the open security issues of 5G-V2X slicing and identifies some opportunities.",
      "published": "2023-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iotm.001.2200140",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelwahab Boualouache",
        "Bouziane Brik",
        "Q. Tang",
        "A. A. Korba",
        "Sylvain Cherrier",
        "S. Senouci",
        "Enric Pardo",
        "Y. Ghamri-Doudane",
        "Rami Langar",
        "Thomas Engel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Magazine",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iotm.001.2200140",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iotm.001.2200233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On-Demand Security Framework for 5GB Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Building accurate Machine Learning (ML) attack detection models for 5G and Beyond (5GB) vehicular networks requires collaboration between Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) nodes. However, while operating collaboratively, ensuring the ML model's security and data privacy is challenging. To this end, this article proposes a secure and privacy-preservation on-demand framework for building attack-detection ML models for 5GB vehicular networks. The proposed framework emerged from combining 5GB technologies, namely, Federated Learning (FL), blockchain, and smart contracts to ensure fair and trusted interactions between FL servers (edge nodes) with FL workers (vehicles). Moreover, it also provides an efficient consensus algorithm with an intelligent incentive mechanism to select the best FL workers that deliver highly accurate local ML models. Our experiments demonstrate that the framework achieves higher accuracy on a well-known vehicular dataset with a lower blockchain consensus time than related solutions. Specifically, our framework enhances the accuracy by 14 percent and decreases the consensus time, at least by 50 percent, compared to related works. Finally, this article discusses the framework's key challenges and potential solutions.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iotm.001.2200233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelwahab Boualouache",
        "Bouziane Brik",
        "S. Senouci",
        "T. Engel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Magazine",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iotm.001.2200233",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iprecon55716.2022.10059518",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Communication between Arduinos using Controller Area Network(CAN) Bus",
      "description": "Present-day vehicles have numerous Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and they communicate with each other over a network known as the Controller Area Network(CAN) bus. In this way, the CAN bus is a fundamental component of intra-vehicle communication. The CAN bus was designed without focusing on communication security and in this way it is vulnerable to many cyber attacks. As the vehicles are always connected to the Internet, the CAN bus is remotely accessible and could be hacked. To secure the communication between ECUs and defend against these cyber attacks, we apply a Hash Message Authentication Code(HMAC) to automotive data and demonstrate the CAN bus communication between two ECUs using Arduino UNO and MCP2515 CAN bus module.",
      "published": "2022-12-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iprecon55716.2022.10059518",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Swathy Lakshmi",
        "Renjith H Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Power and Renewable Energy Conference (IPRECON)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iprecon55716.2022.10059518",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ipsn48710.2020.00-32",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Brake Data-Based Location Tracking in Usage-Based Automotive Insurance Programs",
      "description": "Many usage-based automotive insurance programs do not directly use any GPS-based location tracking devices. Instead, CAN-bus data, such as brake signal data, can be collected by these programs to evaluate drivers’ driving habits and vehicle usage policies. In this paper, we demonstrate that by using a temporal sequence of applied brake signals collected from a vehicle, attackers can still possibly infer the vehicle’s route over the period, even though brake signal data does not reveal any specific location information. Our route inference is basically composed of three steps: At first, we categorize brake signal subsequences into four different driving maneuvers (i.e., stopping from a certain speed, reducing speed to adjust with the traffic flow, and taking left and right turns). Second, we estimate the number of intersections traversed by the vehicle using the applied brake signals and their corresponding maneuvers. Particularly, we also estimate the overall speed profile based on the magnitude and interval of different brake signals. From the estimated speed profile, we infer the distances, traveling time, and traffic signs corresponding to the candidate edges. Finally, we design a graph-based route-selection algorithm to find a list of (paths) routes from the regional map using the predicted driving maneuvers and the speed profile. We use a score function based on three factors (i.e., distance, traveling time, and traffic signs) to identify a candidate edge. We evaluate our approach using over 450km of transportation data, which has been collected from 24 individuals. The experimental results demonstrate that, by resorting to our solution, 89% of the original drivers’ trajectory can be successfully recovered from their brake data regardless of driver and vehicle models.",
      "published": "2020-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ipsn48710.2020.00-32",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ankur Sarker",
        "Chenxi Qiu",
        "Haiying Shen",
        "Hua Uehara",
        "Kevin Zheng"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/ipsn48710.2020.00-32",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iraset64571.2025.11008233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Threats Analysis on Connected Vehicles, CAN System, and the Role of AI",
      "description": "The cybersecurity market for connected vehicles is estimated at $2.9 billion in 2022, with a projection of $10.3 billion by 2032. This cost increase highlights the urgency and criticality of the situation in the face of cyber-attacks. The purpose of this paper is to understand the current issues and to study the proposed solutions in the security of connected vehicles. We will start by understanding the challenges of cyber security through real cases, to then study the vulnerabilities of communication protocols exploited by cyber attackers, notably the CAN standardized protocol and finally to study the innovation proposed at this level and identify the role of AI. This study aimed to demonstrate how urban mobility is at risk against the expertise of cyber attackers in violating the communication systems of connected vehicles, even if they are standardized and old. We concluded by demonstrating how, using AI and prevention systems against cyber-attacks, we can secure them.",
      "published": "2025-05-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iraset64571.2025.11008233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Imane Chakir",
        "Ayoub Raziq",
        "Hasna Nhaila",
        "Mohamed El Khaïli",
        "Abdellah Zamma"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Innovative Research in Applied Science, Engineering and Technology (IRASET)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iraset64571.2025.11008233",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/irc.2019.00122",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review of SLAM Techniques and Security in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) is a widely researched topic in the field of robotics, augmented/virtual reality and more dominantly in self-driving cars. SLAM is a technique of building a map of the environment and estimating the state of the robot in the map in which it is moving, simultaneously. SLAM has been there for more than 30 years and has contributed significantly in the industry targeting from small scale driven applications to large scale, which resulted in the advent of this decade's self driving cars. This paper attempts to give an understanding and progress of SLAM in autonomous driving industry as well as briefly describes the SLAM techniques that have contributed significantly to the industry, which were especially evaluated on KITTI dataset. We have also attempted to compare various techniques that were presented and made a rough estimate on why the state of the art approach can be revised and refurnished to suit the complex understanding of the environment for effective localization. In the end we have briefly described the security threats related to autonomous driving industry and why this is alarming.",
      "published": "2019-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/irc.2019.00122",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashutosh Singandhupe",
        "Hung Manh La"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Robotic Computing (IRC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/irc.2019.00122",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 146,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iros58592.2024.10802234",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attack on Trajectory Prediction for Autonomous Vehicles with Generative Adversarial Networks",
      "description": "Accurate trajectory prediction is crucial for autonomous vehicles to realize safe driving. Current trajectory prediction approaches generally rely on deep neural networks, which are susceptible to adversarial attacks. To evaluate the adversarial robustness and security of deep-learning-based trajectory prediction models, this paper proposes an adversarial attack method on trajectory prediction using generative adversarial networks (GANs). First, a novel LSTM-based attack trajectory model named Adv-GAN is proposed considering both the temporal and spatial driving features. The networks in Adv-GAN are trained through game learning between the generator and the discriminator to obtain the adversarial trajectories with real driving feature distribution. Furthermore, the generated trajectory is optimized with the vehicle kinematics model for driving feasibility on roads. The derived adversarial attack can lead to considerable deviations in trajectory prediction which affects driving safety for autonomous vehicles. We evaluate the proposed Adv-GAN on three public datasets, and experimental results show the effectiveness with better attack performance compared to a state-of-the-art adversarial attack model.",
      "published": "2024-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iros58592.2024.10802234",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiping Fan",
        "Zhenpo Wang",
        "Guoqiang Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iros58592.2024.10802234",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/irps48227.2022.9764484",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recent Advances and Trends on Automotive Safety : (invited)",
      "description": "This paper provides a summary of most recent advances and trends in automotive safety, especially related to Automated Driving Systems (ADS). It covers both functional safety, safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF) and their relationships with other areas of dependability such as cybersecurity. It also covers the several standardization activities currently ongoing in safety and Artificial Intelligence. The paper mostly focuses on HW but it also describes the major challenges related to HW-SW interface.",
      "published": "2022-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/irps48227.2022.9764484",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Riccardo Mariani",
        "Karl Greb"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Reliability Physics Symposium proceedings",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/irps48227.2022.9764484",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/is.2018.8710526",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Digital Twin-based Privacy Enhancement Mechanism for the Automotive Industry",
      "description": "This paper discusses a Digital Twin demonstrator for privacy enhancement in the automotive industry. Here, the Digital Twin demonstrator is presented as a method for the design and implementation of privacy enhancement mechanisms, and is used to detect privacy concerns and minimize breaches and associated risks to which smart car drivers can be exposed through connected infotainment applications and services. The Digital Twin-based privacy enhancement demonstrator is designed to simulate variety of conditions that can occur in the smart car ecosystem. We firstly identify the core stakeholders (actors) in the smart car ecosystem, their roles and exposure to privacy vulnerabilities and associated risks. Secondly, we identify assets that consume and generate sensitive privacy data in smart cars, their functionalities, and relevant privacy concerns and risks. Thirdly, we design an infrastructure for collecting (i) real-time sensor data from smart cars and their assets, and (ii) environmental data, road and traffic data, generated through operational driving lifecycle. In order to ensure compliance of the collected data with privacy policies and regulations, e.g. with GDPR requirements for enforcement of the data subject's rights, we design methods for the Digital Twin-based privacy enhancement demonstrator that are based on behavioural analytics informed by GDPR. We also perform data anonymization to minimize privacy risks and enable actions such as sending an automatic informed consent to the stakeholders.",
      "published": "2018-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/is.2018.8710526",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "gdpr",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Violeta Damjanović"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/is.2018.8710526",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 134,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isaect68904.2025.11318801",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Automotive Cybersecurity: Intrusion Detection Systems for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Cybersecurity has become a critical concern as modern vehicles become increasingly complex and interconnected. Integrating telematics and V2X communications with smart sensors increases the cyber-attack surface, making intrusion detection systems (IDS) necessary for maintaining vehicle safety and ensuring data integrity. Using an IDS framework tailored to automotive cybersecurity, this paper presents a comprehensive approach to addressing automotive cybersecurity. A proposed system identifies multiple attack types, including DoS, Fuzzy, Impersonation, and Free State attacks, by combining decision trees (C4.5) and k-nearest Neighbours (k-NN) algorithms. Based on the CARLA and KIA SOUL datasets, the system demonstrates high accuracy and robust detection performance. The model is found to be efficient in real-time environments, highlighting its potential for use in next-generation intelligent transport systems.",
      "published": "2025-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isaect68904.2025.11318801",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "kia",
        "telematics",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Renu Bahuguna",
        "Jm Giri",
        "Aryender Singh",
        "Meenakshi Maindola",
        "Ruqaiya Khanam",
        "Shafiq Sharhrah"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Advanced Electrical and Communication Technologies (ISAECT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/isaect68904.2025.11318801",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3945,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/isaect68904.2025.11318801 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: concern, transport, making, sensors, safety, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isc2.2016.7580758",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless car sharing system: A security and privacy analysis",
      "description": "This paper proposes a novel physical keyless car sharing system where users can use and share their cars without the need of physical keys. It also provides a comprehensive security and privacy analysis of such a system. It first presents a high-level model for a keyless car sharing system, describing its main entities and specifying the necessary functional requirements to allow users to share their cars (with other users) without exchanging physical keys. Based on this model and functional requirements, the paper presents a comprehensive threat analysis of the system. It focuses on the threats affecting the system's security and the users' privacy. This analysis results in a specification of an extensive set of security and privacy requirements for the system. This work can be used as a guide for a future keyless car sharing system design and as a mean to assess the security and privacy risks imposed on users by such systems.",
      "published": "2016-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isc2.2016.7580758",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iraklis Symeonidis",
        "Mustafa Mustafa",
        "Bart Preneel A"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Smart Cities Conference (ISC2)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/isc2.2016.7580758",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isc257844.2023.10293400",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SecFob: A Remote Keyless Entry Security Solution",
      "description": "All major vendors currently offer Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems for passenger vehicles, which have become a standard feature of modern cars. These systems enable wireless communication between drivers and vehicles, facilitating convenient functions such as remote start and passive keyless entry. Unfortunately, the existing security measures implemented in these systems are often inadequate, leaving them vulnerable to intrusions and a wide array of attacks. To address these vulnerabilities, we present SecFob, a solution that combines quantum random number generation (QRNG), machine learning, and encryption techniques. SecFob is designed to defend against common attack techniques by leveraging the perfect entropy offered by QRNG and by incorporating machine learning techniques, specifically utilizing the Siamese Neural Network. These solutions are cost-effective, portable, and with the use of ML technique, are able to detect amplified signals.",
      "published": "2023-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isc257844.2023.10293400",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Braxton Bolt",
        "Hoda Maleki",
        "Gagan Agrawal",
        "Jeffrey D. Morris",
        "Khan Farabi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Smart Cities Conference (ISC2)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/isc257844.2023.10293400",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isc266238.2025.11293305",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight CNN for CAN-Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Automotive electronic control units (ECUs) typically offer less than 32 kB of on-chip flash memory, presenting a significant challenge for deploying deep-learning models for Controller Area Network (CAN bus) intrusion detection systems (IDS). While existing deep learning methods demonstrate high efficiency in threat detection, their complex architectures often render them too resource-intensive for the stringent constraints of automotive ECUs. This paper addresses this critical gap by proposing an efficient methodology for developing an ultra-lightweight CNN-based IDS. Our approach centers on the systematic application and validation of an information-dense RGB tensor encoding for 16-frame CAN windows (adapted from prior work [1]), which effectively captures crucial temporal, identifier, and data-length characteristics. This encoding is coupled with CANET-33K, a novel and compact 32.9k-parameter CNN architecture specifically tailored for these RGB representations, and a one-shot hybrid compression strategy that combines structured pruning with 8-bit post-training quantization (PTQ). The resulting INT8 model achieves a 99.73% overall accuracy and a 0.40% false-negative rate across four common attack types (DoS, Fuzzy, Gear, RPM). Notably, the compressed model is over 420 times smaller than a 7 MB Inception-ResNet baseline and 16 times smaller than recent specialized RGB-CNNs, while maintaining comparable or superior detection performance. These results demonstrate a viable path towards deploying high-performance IDS on resource-constrained automotive hardware.",
      "published": "2025-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isc266238.2025.11293305",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xueyan Liu",
        "Hao Liu",
        "Claire Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE International Smart Cities Conference (ISC2)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/isc266238.2025.11293305",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isc266238.2025.11293316",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrated Simulation Framework for Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on complex perception and communication systems, making them vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can compromise safety. While simulation offers a scalable and safe environment for robustness testing, existing frameworks typically lack comprehensive support for modeling multi-domain adversarial scenarios. This paper introduces a novel, open-source integrated simulation framework designed to generate adversarial attacks targeting both perception and communication layers of AVs. The framework provides high-fidelity modeling of physical environments, traffic dynamics, and V2X networking, orchestrating these components through a unified core that synchronizes multiple simulators based on a single configuration file. Our implementation supports diverse perception-level attacks on LiDAR sensor data, along with communication-level threats such as V2X message manipulation and GPS spoofing. Furthermore, ROS 2 integration ensures seamless compatibility with third-party AV software stacks. We demonstrate the framework's effectiveness by evaluating the impact of generated adversarial scenarios on a state-of-the-art 3D object detector, revealing significant performance degradation under realistic conditions.",
      "published": "2025-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isc266238.2025.11293316",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "spoofing",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christos Anagnostopoulos",
        "Ioulia Kapsali",
        "Αλέξανδρος Γκίλλας",
        "Nikos Piperigkos",
        "Aris S. Lalos"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Smart Cities Conference (ISC2)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/isc266238.2025.11293316",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscait64916.2025.11010535",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electronic Control Unit Authentication Mechanism Based on Endogenous Security",
      "description": "With the rapid development of intelligent Internet-connected vehicles, the electronic control unit (ECU), as a core component of the automotive electronic system, plays a key role in the control and monitoring of vehicle sub systems. The ECU mainly relies on the controller local area network (LAN) bus ID for identification and communication, and an attacker can realize an attack on the ECU communication system by tampering with the ID, which has a certain security risk. Aiming at the problem of ECU trusted authentication, this study proposes an ECU authentication mechanism based on endogenous security theory. The mechanism adopts a dual authentication architecture: the first one is access authentication, and the second one is message authentication based on dynamic heterogeneous redundancy (DHR) architecture. By constructing the dual authentication system, the security of ECU authentication and message transmission is effectively improved. Simulation experiments show that the proposed authentication mechanism ensures the credibility and strong robustness of ECU authentication.",
      "published": "2025-03-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscait64916.2025.11010535",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junli Guo",
        "Qing Liu",
        "Yongteng Ou",
        "Xiangge Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 4th International Symposium on Computer Applications and Information Technology (ISCAIT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscait64916.2025.11010535",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.388,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/iscait64916.2025.11010535 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: strong, applications, access, information, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscas51556.2021.9401087",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Signature-Based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for In-Vehicle CAN Bus Network",
      "description": "In-vehicle CAN (Controller Area Network) bus network does not have any network security protection measures, which is facing a serious network security threat. However, most of the intrusion detection solutions requiring extensive computational resources cannot be implemented in in- vehicle network system because of the resource constrained ECUs. To add additional hardware or to utilize cloud computing, we need to solve the cost problem and the reliable communication requirement between vehicles and cloud platform, which is difficult to be applied in a short time. Therefore, we need to propose a short-term solution for automobile manufacturers. In this paper, we propose a signature-based light-weight intrusion detection system, which can be applied directly and promptly to vehicle's ECUs (Electronic Control Units). We detect the anomalies caused by several attack modes on CAN bus from real-world scenarios, which provide the basis for selecting signatures. Experimental results show that our method can effectively detect CAN traffic related anomalies. For the content related anomalies, the detection ratio can be improved by exploiting the relationship between the signals.",
      "published": "2021-04-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscas51556.2021.9401087",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shiyi Jin",
        "Jin-Gyun Chung",
        "Yinan Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems proceedings",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscas51556.2021.9401087",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 86,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscas58744.2024.10558008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning with Real-time and Small Footprint Anomaly Detection System for In-Vehicle Gateway",
      "description": "Anomaly Detection System (ADS) is an essential part of a modern gateway Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to detect abnormal behaviors and attacks in vehicles. Among the existing attacks, ``one-time`` attack is the most challenging to be detected, together with the strict gateway ECU constraints of both microsecond or even nanosecond level real-time budget and limited footprint of code. To address the challenges, we propose to use the self-information theory to generate values for training and testing models, aiming to achieve real-time detection performance for the ``one-time`` attack that has not been well studied in the past. Second, the generation of self-information is based on logarithm calculation, which leads to the smallest footprint to reduce the cost in Gateway. Finally, our proposed method uses an unsupervised model without the need of training data for anomalies or attacks. We have compared different machine learning methods ranging from typical machine learning models to deep learning models, e.g., Hidden Markov Model (HMM), Support Vector Data Description (SVDD), and Long Short Term Memory (LSTM). Experimental results show that our proposed method achieves 8.7 times lower False Positive Rate (FPR), 1.77 times faster testing time, and 4.88 times smaller footprint.",
      "published": "2024-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscas58744.2024.10558008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Wang",
        "Yuan-Jin Zheng",
        "Yajun Ha"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscas58744.2024.10558008",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscc53001.2021.9631426",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing the Cost of Quantum Security for Automotive Over -The-Air Updates",
      "description": "Over- The-Air (OTA) update is an innovative paradigm that is rapidly spreading through the automotive industry. Software updates can be capillary distributed thanks to the many Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication infrastructures that are part of a Smart City. Unfortunately, the majority of the existing OTA frameworks and schemes are not quantum resistant, meaning that when quantum computing will become reality, they will not be secure anymore. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has announced a contest to determine the post-quantum standards for digital signatures schemes. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of the digital signature verification algorithms of two out of the three finalists for the NIST contest, namely FALCON and CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM. These algorithms are tested on automotive-oriented evaluation board, namely the Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ ZCU102. The results show that FALCON is a more promising algorithm compared to DILITHIUM both regarding signature verification execution time and signature size.",
      "published": "2021-09-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscc53001.2021.9631426",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michele La Manna",
        "Pericle Perazzo",
        "Luigi Treccozzi",
        "Gianluca Dini"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscc53001.2021.9631426",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscc58397.2023.10217917",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cryptanalysis of a Lightweight Privacy Enhancing Authentication Scheme for Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Recent attention has been focused on using authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to allow secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. Typically, such security solutions are effective against passive eavesdroppers who tap the lines and attempt to decipher the message. It has been noted, however, that an improperly designed protocol could be susceptible to an active saboteur, who could impersonate another vehicle or alter the broadcast message. In this paper, we conduct cryptanalytic attacks on a recently proposed energy-efficient authentication protocol. To do this, we employ hybrid techniques to solve the algebraic systems that occur naturally while mounting multiple forgeries. Based on cryptanalysis, we demonstrate that the algorithms and characterizations utilized in this protocol are susceptible to several security flaws, such as inappropriate anonymity, session-independent key agreement, exposing multiple keys, replay, and vehicle impersonation. In addition, this paper provides precepts for constructing a safe V2X authentication system.",
      "published": "2023-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscc58397.2023.10217917",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arijit Karati",
        "Li-Chun Chang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscc58397.2023.10217917",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscc65549.2025.11325787",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fuse and Federate: Enhancing EV Charging Station Security with Multimodal Fusion and Federated Learning",
      "description": "The rapid global adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has established electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) as a critical component of smart grid infrastructure. While essential for ensuring reliable energy delivery and accessibility, EVSE systems face significant cybersecurity challenges, including network reconnaissance, backdoor intrusions, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. These emerging threats, driven by the interconnected and autonomous nature of EVSE, require innovative and adaptive security mechanisms that go beyond traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS). Existing approaches, whether network-based or host-based, often fail to detect sophisticated and targeted attacks specifically crafted to exploit new vulnerabilities in EVSE infrastructure. This paper proposes a novel intrusion detection framework that leverages multimodal data sources, including network traffic and kernel events, to identify complex attack patterns. The framework employs a distributed learning approach, enabling collaborative intelligence across EVSE stations while preserving data privacy through federated learning. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework outperforms existing solutions, achieving a detection rate above $98 \\%$ and a precision rate exceeding $97 \\%$ in decentralized environments. This solution addresses the evolving challenges of EVSE security, offering a scalable and privacypreserving response to advanced cyber threats.",
      "published": "2025-06-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscc65549.2025.11325787",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rabah Rahal",
        "A. A. Korba",
        "Y. Ghamri-Doudane"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Computers and Communications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscc65549.2025.11325787",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscc65549.2025.11326414",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PQ-CAN: A Framework for Simulating Post-Quantum Cryptography in Embedded Systems",
      "description": "The rapid development of quantum computers threatens traditional cryptographic schemes, prompting the need for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Although the NIST standardization process has accelerated the development of such algorithms, their application in resource-constrained environments such as embedded systems remains a challenge. Automotive systems relying on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus for communication are particularly vulnerable due to their limited computational capabilities, high traffic, and need for real-time response. These constraints raise concerns about the feasibility of implementing PQC in automotive environments, where legacy hardware and bit rate limitations must also be considered. In this paper, we introduce PQ-CAN, a modular framework for simulating the performance and overhead of PQC algorithms in embedded systems. We consider the automotive domain as our case study, testing a variety of PQC schemes under different scenarios. Our simulation enables the adjustment of embedded system computational capabilities and CAN bus bit rate constraints. We also provide insights into the trade-offs involved by analyzing each algorithm's security level and overhead for key encapsulation and digital signature. By evaluating the performance of these algorithms, we provide insights into their feasibility and identify the strengths and limitations of PQC in securing automotive communications in the post-quantum era.",
      "published": "2025-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscc65549.2025.11326414",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Francesco Marchiori",
        "Sebastiano Matarazzo",
        "Marco Rubin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscc65549.2025.11326414",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iscsic54682.2021.00037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security assessment in Vehicle-to-Everything communications with the integration of 5G and 6G networks",
      "description": "In Vehicle-to-Everything Communications (V2X-C), the integration of high throughput, reduced latency-5G and Artificial Intelligence (AI) enabled-6G would add new levels to smart mobility. However, it would introduce a multitude of new vulnerabilities in the form of cyber-attacks. Therefore, a robust V2X-C cyber-safe framework that considers cross-industry information-sharing mechanisms must be proactively developed and evaluated. This study aims to provide a comprehensive security assessment in V2X-C with the integration of 5G and 6G networks. The evolution of V2X-C is outlined and vehicular connectivity in a consolidated manner is demonstrated, visualising all communication interfaces. The Quality of Service (QoS) vs. security provisions for next-generation cars is illustrated. The security and privacy challenges that would be evident after the convergence of the 5G and 6G networks in V2X-C architecture is then described. Lastly, state-of-the-art V2X-C security enhancement mechanisms for a cyber-safe ITS operation is detailed. It is believed that the findings and discussions from this study could be used for decision-making and would stimulate a roadmap for a secure V2X-C architecture.",
      "published": "2021-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iscsic54682.2021.00037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shah Khalid Khan",
        "Nirajan Shiwakoti",
        "Peter Stasinopoulos",
        "Matthew J. Warren"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Computer Science and Intelligent Control (ISCSIC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/iscsic54682.2021.00037",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isdfs.2019.8757512",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Statistical Modulation Type Identifier for Remote Keyless Entry Transmitters Based on Extended Energy Detector",
      "description": "Remote keyless entry (RKE) systems are an integral part of modern daily life. Vehicle access, drive authorization, and arming/disarming the alarm systems for houses, garages, and/or facilities are instances for popular uses of RKE. Despite their obvious advantages such as gaining access/authorization solely by carrying them, any security breach experienced with remote keyless entrys (RKEs) could end up with cataclysmic consequences. Therefore, manufacturers continuously develop new methods and techniques to fortify their RKEs systems. One of the prominent ways of tackling the inherent security concern is to establish a rapid wireless message exchange mechanism/protocol such that intruders could not have time to place their attacks. However, with recent advances in digital technology along with software-defined radio (SDR), quantification of rapidness becomes crucial for RKE manufacturers. Therefore, in this study, a statistical modulation type identifier for RKEs systems is proposed. Both an automatic modulation type identifier based on complex baseband equivalent of the received signal and an automatic mode detector are employed as an extension of traditional energy detector. This way, presumable bottlenecks for the receiver at intruder side are identified and elaborated. Measurement results are provided along with relevant discussions. Results demonstrate that frequency compensation along with energy detection are the two indispensable serial modules and provide the bottleneck for any receiver at intruder's side.",
      "published": "2019-06-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isdfs.2019.8757512",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ozgur Alaca",
        "A. Boyacı",
        "S. Yarkan",
        "Muhammed Ali Aydn"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Digital Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/isdfs.2019.8757512",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isdfs69419.2026.11459074",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning-Based Intrusion Detection and Cybersecurity Framework for Connected Vehicle CAN Bus Communication Networks",
      "description": "Modern connected and autonomous cars are more dependent on Controller Area Network Communication (CAN) for operation, which makes them more vulnerable to cyberattacks that might compromise their vital safety features. This study presents a deep learning-based IDS capable of detecting a huge range of CAN bus attacks with excellent accuracy and operational effectiveness. A number of techniques were used in combination to preprocess the OTIDS dataset (enhanced feature engineering, temporal analysis of network communications, and balanced classes) to improve the discriminability of these models. To evaluate model performance, it created and tested three architectures: a Deep Neural Network (DNN), a 1D Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and a hybrid CNN-Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) Network. Results demonstrated that the best network, a hybrid CNN-BiLSTM Network, achieved 90.18 percent accuracy, indicating that it successfully captured spatial and temporal relationships among CAN-related network data. A Real-time Cybersecurity Framework was implemented to provide real-time threat prediction, threat-level assessment, and analytical visualization. This proposed model has demonstrated great promise for adoption within Cyber Security Infrastructures for Intelligent Vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-03-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isdfs69419.2026.11459074",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shiva Kumara",
        "Henry P. Cyril"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Digital Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/isdfs69419.2026.11459074",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iseae64934.2025.11042026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Security Protection System Design for Complex V2X Scenarios",
      "description": "The vehicular network's external communication layer, known as Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X), serves as the information exchange core of intelligent transportation systems while facing diversified security threats and privacy leakage risks. This paper systematically analyse the three-layer technical architecture and typical security threats of out-of-vehicle network, and design a security model for the threats in the areas of device identity security, intrusion detection, and privacy protection. Research shows that the security protection capability of out-of-vehicle network can be effectively improved through the synergy of encryption authentication, intelligent detection, and privacy enhancement techniques.",
      "published": "2025-04-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iseae64934.2025.11042026",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xinli Zhou",
        "Simeng Wang",
        "Xiaolin Han",
        "Mengtong Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Science, Electrical and Automation Engineering (ISEAE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iseae64934.2025.11042026",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isgteurope.2019.8905444",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Non-Repudiation and End-to-End Security for Electric-Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "In this paper we propose a cryptographic solution that provides non-repudiation and end-to-end security for the electric-vehicle-charging ecosystem as it exists in the Netherlands. It is designed to provide long-term non-repudiation, while allowing for data deletion in order to comply with the GDPR. To achieve this, we use signatures on hashes of individual data fields instead of on the combination of fields directly, and we use Merkle authentication trees to reduce the overhead involved.",
      "published": "2019-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isgteurope.2019.8905444",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "gdpr",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pol Van Aubel",
        "Erik Poll",
        "Joost Rijneveld"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/isgteurope.2019.8905444",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isgteurope64741.2025.11305682",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Probabilistic Evaluation of the Contribution of Smart EV Charging Strategies to Security of Supply",
      "description": "As climate change accelerates and the energy crisis deepens, electric vehicle adoption is growing rapidly with strong governmental support. However, this growth is straining electricity networks, prompting expensive infrastructure upgrades and a need for smart charging solutions, including Grid-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Grid. This research synthesizes residential vehicle travel patterns from statistical data to model the electrical demand profile from uncoordinated charging, capturing the diversity in driving behaviour. It then develops scalable models for unidirectional and bidirectional smart charging to assess their impact on system reliability and their capacity credit within a probabilistic Monte Carlo framework. The case studies additionally present sensitivities on smart charging participation, electric vehicle uptake, and installed wind capacity. Results show that both smart charging concepts enhance reliability and that their capacity contributions grow with increased user engagement and wind generation, though the benefits plateau beyond certain thresholds.",
      "published": "2025-10-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isgteurope64741.2025.11305682",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yiyao Wang",
        "Stefan Borozan",
        "Tala El Samad",
        "Goran Strbac"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/isgteurope64741.2025.11305682",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isgtlatinamerica52371.2021.9543036",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Physical Review of a Battery Electric Vehicle Power Train: Vulnerabilities and Challenges",
      "description": "This paper analyzes and reports the vulnerabilities and threats of an experimental electric vehicle. The proposed approach employs an electric vehicle (EV) and communication instrumentation for collecting CAN bus messages. Data was collected through the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and the battery management system (BMS) interface. Our focus is on decoding the CAN messages and injecting false messages to exploit EV cyber-physical performance by observing the electrical and mechanical data. We found out that the electric car powertrain can be degraded severely without the fault systems' activation. Due to different communication between the engine and the ECU, the overall efficiency and electrical power performance were compromised.",
      "published": "2021-09-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isgtlatinamerica52371.2021.9543036",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploit",
        "threats",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manuel Mar",
        "Julien G. Noel",
        "J. Eric Dietz"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference - Latin America (ISGT Latin America)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/isgtlatinamerica52371.2021.9543036",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isicir.2016.7829737",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive security state of the art and future challenges",
      "description": "In the last 20 years, most vehicles have seen a large increase in complexity of the electronic and software systems, e.g. the number of electronic control units (ECUs) increased to over 70 in many cars and connectivity to the Internet or over Bluetooth is possible. In combination, the increased complexity and a large attack surface due to the connectivity makes it necessary to investigate the security of each ECU as well as the overall vehicle architecture. Most of the security countermeasures that are implemented to date or will be implemented in the future require some kind of hardware support. This paper identifies which security mechanisms are already implemented, and which should be introduced in the future. It further discusses which parts of each mechanism require special hardware support.",
      "published": "2016-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isicir.2016.7829737",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bernhard Jungk"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Integrated Circuits",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/isicir.2016.7829737",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isie62713.2025.11124726",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Cyber-Physical Security in Electric Vehicle Charging Technologies",
      "description": "The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and the development of advanced charging technologies have initiated a new era of smart transportation. However, these advancements also introduce significant cyber-physical security challenges. This paper investigates the cyber-physical security challenges of two pivotal EV charging technologies: Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X), with an emphasis on Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) systems, and wireless charging systems. As these technologies form the backbone of future smart transportation systems, this paper provides an in-depth analysis of their unique vulnerabilities, examines the potential threats from cyber-physical attacks, and studies existing mitigation strategies. By combining research insights, industry standards and real world examples, this paper aims to shed light on cyber-physical security issues. This review emphasizes the importance of cyber-physical security measures to safeguard the safety, dependability and privacy of the evolving intelligent transportation network from threats such as data breaches, unauthorized access, and grid destabilization.",
      "published": "2025-06-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isie62713.2025.11124726",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samaneh Yazdanipour",
        "V.S.R. Varaprasad Oruganti",
        "Jeonggi Son",
        "Mohammadreza F. M. Arani",
        "Sheldon S. Williamson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Industrial Electronics (ISIE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/isie62713.2025.11124726",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ismvl.2018.00018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Intrusion Detection Technique for an In-vehicle Network Based on Time-Series Feature Extraction",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose a systematic intrusion detection algorithm based on time-series feature extraction for an in-vehicle network. Since packet-type valid data are transmitted inside an in-vehicle network periodically, illegal data due to unauthorized intrusion attack can be easily and uniformly detected by using periodical time-series feature of valid data, where recurrent neural network is a key tool to efficiently extract their time-series feature. In fact, through an evaluation using data acquired from actual vehicles, we show that the proposed method can detect typical intrusion attack patterns such as data modification attack and injection attack.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ismvl.2018.00018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hiroki Suda",
        "Masanori Natsui",
        "Takahiro Hanyu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic (ISMVL)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ismvl.2018.00018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isncc52172.2021.9615864",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Diagnostic-based Secure Framework for Electronic Control Units in Vehicles",
      "description": "Cyber-physical security has become a central and primary concern in the automotive field due to its rapid development. Thus, the necessity to introduce intrusion detection system (IDS) has raised recently to counter the possible malicious attacks. However, the location of the IDS in the vehicle network is considered a problem due to several limitations. We introduce a novel design for a lightweight intrusion detection framework. Gradient boosting (XGBoost) technique is used in the proposed framework to detect the anomalies in diagnostics data. Experimental results show that the model is capable to detect anomalies with reasonable false acceptance rate (FA) and high accuracy. Also, the results highlight the superiority of the model against the others. Additionally, to show that the model is robust and stable to be used for different datasets, two datasets collected from real vehicles are used. Moreover, an attack generation algorithm is proposed to introduce the anomalies in the datasets.",
      "published": "2021-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isncc52172.2021.9615864",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tasneem A. Awaad",
        "Mohamed Watheq El-Kharashi",
        "Mohamed Taher"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/isncc52172.2021.9615864",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isncc62547.2024.10759012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust In-Vehicle Diagnostic-Based Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "Cybersecurity has become a significant concern for automotive manufacturers as modern cars increasingly incorporate electronic components. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) have evolved to become the central control units for critical car functions such as engines and brakes, experiencing rapid technological advancements. However, this swift progression in ECU technology has also made them prime targets for cyber attacks. This vulnerability has spurred researchers to focus on securing ECUs. Numerous studies have proposed intrusion detection systems (IDS) to protect against attacks on ECUs in vehicles. Yet, these IDSs are not impenetrable; attackers can exploit them by launching evasion attacks, which can trigger numerous false positive alarms. Such false alarms can be disruptive and potentially hazardous for drivers. Additionally, attackers can evade IDSs from detecting malicious data that can cause harm to the vehicle. Accordingly, in this paper, we propose a novel training framework to train a robust in-vehicle IDS that can encounter evasion attacks. Our methodology is based on implementing two rounds of mimic learning technique for training Random Forest (RF) based IDS. RF has been chosen to incorporate the randomness of the RF architecture to enhance the robustness of the model. Additionally, in each round of the two rounds of the mimic learning technique, an RF model with a different architecture is chosen to improve the resilience of the model against evasion attacks without affecting its accuracy. Our Experimental results have shown the effectiveness of our framework against evasion attacks.",
      "published": "2024-10-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isncc62547.2024.10759012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed A. Shafee",
        "Tasneem A. Awaad",
        "Ahmed Moro"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/isncc62547.2024.10759012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isocc50952.2020.9332998",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN Security Protocol Using Modified MAC",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) was developed by Bosch in the early 1980s. CAN has been widely applied due to its high reliability and low cost. In 2012, the standard for WLAN-based vehicle to everything(V2X) was published in IEEE, and V2X is steadily evolving. As V2X advances, the possibility of security attacks in vehicles has increased. However, security issues are not being addressed properly in CAN. In this paper, we propose an improved security protocol based on a data compression algorithm.",
      "published": "2020-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isocc50952.2020.9332998",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Do-Yeon Hwang",
        "Yeon-Jin Kim",
        "Jin-Gyun Chung"
      ],
      "venue": "International SoC Design Conference",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/isocc50952.2020.9332998",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ispa-bdcloud-socialcom-sustaincom59178.2023.00138",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multi-attention Based CNN-BiLSTM Intrusion Detection Model for In-vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The development of vehicular networking technology continuously enhances the internet connectivity of modern vehicles. However, for in-vehicle networks, constant communication with the outside world dramatically increases vehicle security risks, posing serious security threats to automotive systems and occupants. This paper proposes a CNN-BiLSTM vehicular network intrusion detection model based on multi-head attention by analyzing the information security vulnerabilities in the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By extracting only the communication features of CAN messages, including CAN ID and Data field, this paper conducted a multiclass classification study on the real-time traffic dataset CarHacking. The model achieved a detection accuracy of 99.992%. The reduction of features effectively simplifies the model and improves its computation efficiency.",
      "published": "2023-12-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ispa-bdcloud-socialcom-sustaincom59178.2023.00138",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kai Gao",
        "Hao Ming Huang",
        "Linhong Liu",
        "Ronghua Du",
        "Jinlai Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications (ISPA)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/ispa-bdcloud-socialcom-sustaincom59178.2023.00138",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ispdc67428.2025.00027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bitrate Hopping: An Intrusion Prevention Technique to Secure the CAN Bus-Based Distributed Network",
      "description": "Modern in-vehicle networks are increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks due to the lack of built-in security in protocols such as the Controller Area Network (CAN). This paper introduces bitrate hopping, a proactive intrusion prevention technique that defends against message injection, denial-of-service (DoS), and passive eavesdropping. Bitrate hopping periodically changes the CAN bitrate among synchronized, trusted ECUs using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom sequence, preventing unauthorized nodes from communicating. Unlike cryptographic authentication mechanisms that often require a change in the CAN packet structure or add overhead that may result in violation of real-time constraints in some applications, bitrate hopping operates at the physical layer with minimal overhead. We first implement and evaluate a CAN-only version of bitrate hopping to maintain full backward compatibility with existing networks, demonstrating that it can be effective in short bursts to disrupt attacks without requiring additional hardware. Building on these results, we develop a more robust Ethernet-based implementation, which maintains consistently high message success rates at faster hop intervals and represents our primary focus for future system development. Our contributions include the design of a synchronization protocol for bitrate transitions, a dual-mode implementation over CAN and Ethernet, and an empirical study validating its feasibility and effectiveness.",
      "published": "2025-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ispdc67428.2025.00027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "William Luke Lambert",
        "Sheikh Ghafoor",
        "Samuel Hollifield"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ispdc67428.2025.00027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isscc.2016.7417892",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "1.4 The road ahead for securely-connected cars",
      "description": "Large-scale proliferation of self-driving fully-connected cars will only materialize if they are secure and reliable. Automotive quality and security are essential to ensure consumer confidence in these new technologies. Key functions needed to enable autonomous driving like V2X, car radar, and Ethernet become already available today but will continue to evolve in performance as well as integration level. Advanced mixed-signal RFCMOS technology enables the integration of high-performance wireless functionality, together with digital signal processing at low power and low cost.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isscc.2016.7417892",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected cars",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lars Reger"
      ],
      "venue": "Digest of technical papers/Digest of technical papers - IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/isscc.2016.7417892",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isscs66034.2025.11105612",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Analysis for V2X Scenarios",
      "description": "This paper addresses cybersecurity concerns for smart intersections utilizing Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. We identify critical assets, potential threats, and propose countermeasures to mitigate risks. Utilizing the Threat Analysis Risk Assessment (TARA) method, we conduct a comprehensive threat and risk assessment. By identifying assets, threats, and damage scenarios, and implementing appropriate security measures, we can mitigate the risks associated with V2X communication.",
      "published": "2025-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isscs66034.2025.11105612",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iulius-Stefan Ambros",
        "Roxana-Emanuela Ambrozie",
        "Vlad Mihai Chiriac",
        "Tiberius-George Sorescu",
        "Tudor-Gabriel Ghețău",
        "Ciprian-Romeo Comşa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Signals, Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/isscs66034.2025.11105612",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isse51541.2021.9582462",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Model-based Attack Tree Generation for Cybersecurity Risk-Assessments in Automotive",
      "description": "Networked and highly automated driver assistance systems require interfaces to the outside world and within the vehicle. These can potentially be used for cybersecurity attacks. Therefore, cybersecurity risk analyses are essential to adequately counter cybersecurity threats. Through UNECE Regulations No. 155, cybersecurity risk assessments, are mandatory for all new cars from 2024. The ISO/SAE 21434 standard “Road vehicles Cybersecurity engineering”, defines requirements for cybersecurity risk management with regard to electrical/electronic systems and components. In this context, it is imperative that possible attack paths are investigated. The creation of these attack paths is labor-intensive and should relate to the preliminary system architecture. Automatic attack tree generation could help to reduce the effort to create attack paths manually. This paper presents a new approach to generate relevant attack paths in a semi-automated way, taking the attack motivation and functional dependencies into account. This can shift the effort of creating attack trees in the concept phase to the preliminary system description and allows cybersecurity experts to focus more on aspects that require their creativity and expertise.",
      "published": "2021-09-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isse51541.2021.9582462",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Matthias Kern",
        "Bo Liu",
        "Victor Pazmino Betancourt",
        "Jürgen Becker"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Systems Engineering",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/isse51541.2021.9582462",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/isse65546.2025.11370017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Model-Based Approach to Automotive Security Analysis: Cross-Domain Application of the Cybersecurity Toolbox",
      "description": "As modern vehicles become increasingly complex and connected, integrating cybersecurity into early design stages is crucial. This paper presents the adaptation of the Cybersecurity Toolbox, a graphical domain-specific language (DSL) originally developed for smart grids, to the automotive domain. The DSL was reviewed and aligned with automotive standards like ISO/SAE 21434 and compliments the applicability of cybersecurity guidance normatives like UN R155. A controlled experiment about a FlexRay-based braking system validated the generic method and applicability of the Cybersecurity Toolbox in this cross-domain use case. In synergy with the ARAM Toolbox for creating a high-level architecture description, traceability across systems architecture and cybersecurity views was achieved by an abstraction pattern. The study demonstrates the DSL's usability, semantic clarity, and automation potential, validated by students who conducted a well-structured, specification-compliant security analysis based on publicly available documentation of the Cybersecurity Toolbox.",
      "published": "2025-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/isse65546.2025.11370017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "flexray",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simon Eschlberger",
        "Katharina Polanec",
        "Thomas Ploner",
        "Bernhard Braschel",
        "Christian Neureiter"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Systems Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/isse65546.2025.11370017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/issrew60843.2023.00065",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk-Aware Intrusion Detection and Prevention System for Automated UAS",
      "description": "This paper designs a proof-of-concept for a Deep Learning-based IDS for UAS. As the drone market grows, safety becomes crucial. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) attacks can endanger lives and facilities. With the increasing complexity of attacks, detection has become challenging. Machine Learning-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS), trained on the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, can handle defined attacks. Combining IDS with an Intrusion Prevention System(IPS), using Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) from the automotive domain ensures the system’s safety even after attacks. The implementation involves Raspberry Pi as an attacker and defender. The ISO/SAE 21434 standard serves as the foundation for cybersecurity adaptation.",
      "published": "2023-10-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/issrew60843.2023.00065",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Raphael Schermann",
        "Thomas Ammerer",
        "Philipp Stelzer",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Christian Steger"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/issrew60843.2023.00065",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/istas65609.2025.11269613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Breaking the Theft Cycle: Data-Driven Defense Against Unauthorized Access Attacks in Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Vehicle theft remains a significant issue that impacts consumers globally. Despite the widespread adoption of anti-theft mechanisms such as GPS tracking, alarms, and immobilizers, these systems are frequently bypassed by well-equipped criminals. One particular bypass mechanism that adversaries utilize is unauthorized access attacks, like replay attacks on key fobs, which result in unauthorized access to a vehicle. In this paper, we propose a machine learning (ML) framework to detect unauthorized access attacks in vehicle security. The work aims to detect unauthorized access by using kinematic sensors to analyze driver behavior metrics such as acceleration, orientation, and gyroscopic data. Using recurring neural networks (RNNs), our model can successfully differentiate between authorized and unauthorized drivers in multi-vehicle multiple drivers (MVMD) and single-vehicle multiple drivers (SVMD) scenarios, respectively, with accuracy, precision, recall, and F-measure scores of ≥ 90%. The proposed system offers a real-time, data-driven approach to enhancing vehicle security and aims to contribute to safer and smarter automotive security systems.",
      "published": "2025-09-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/istas65609.2025.11269613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gafur Mammadov",
        "Pham Anh Thu Nguyen",
        "Tapadhir Das"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society (ISTAS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/istas65609.2025.11269613",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iswcs.2018.8491221",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Estimation in V2X Networks with Injection and Packet Drop Attacks",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications are essential for facilitating cooperative intelligent transport system (C- ITS) components such as traffic safety and traffic efficiency applications. Integral to proper functioning of C- ITS systems is sensing and telemetery. To this end, this paper examines how to ensure security in sensing systems for V2X networks. In particular, secure remote estimation of a Gauss-Markov process based on measurements done by a set of vehicles is considered. The measurements are collected by the individual vehicles and are communicated via wireless links to the central fusion center. The system is attacked by malicious or compromised vehicles with the goal of increasing the estimation error. The attack is achieved by two mechanisms: false data injection (FDI) and garbage packet injection. This paper extends a previously proposed adaptive filtering algorithm for tackling FDI to accommodate both FDI and garbage packet injection, by filtering out malicious observations and thus enabling secure estimates. The efficacy of the proposed filter is demonstrated numerically.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iswcs.2018.8491221",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arpan Chattopadhyay",
        "U. Mitra",
        "E. Ström"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/iswcs.2018.8491221",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iswcs.2019.8877144",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk assessment of SDR-based attacks with UAVs",
      "description": "The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is rising constantly whether for leisure or professional purposes in civilian or Defense domains. We consider in this study small civilian aerial drones of different types, which are low cost, available off the shelf and so affordable for individuals. Simultaneously, they have also raised security concerns for critical sites such as nuclear stations, strategic locations like official buildings, crowded places as stadiums, etc. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the risks assessment with and for UAVs in general. Regarding the security concern we pay a specific attention to attacks that are facilitated and can benefit from an easy access to Software Defined Radio (SDR) boards that can be embedded in the UAV or in the ground segment.",
      "published": "2019-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iswcs.2019.8877144",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "risk assessment",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Frédéric Le Roy",
        "Christian Roland",
        "Denis Le Jeune",
        "Jean-Philippe Diguet"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Wireless Communication Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/iswcs.2019.8877144",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itc-egypt58155.2023.10206114",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security of Vehicle-To-Everything Communication (V2X) in AUTOSAR Architecture",
      "description": "Vehicular networks are becoming more popular every day. Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) will benefit substantially from vehicular communication (VC) technologies. However, a requirement for deployment is the security and privacy of their consumers. European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) has introduced a security architecture that brings pseudonymity, confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity into Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET) communications using Certificate Authorities (CAs) and identity management procedures. AUTOSAR has introduced an open interface architecture that can make different manufacturers cooperate with each other. For OEMs and Tier-l suppliers, AUTOSAR improves ECU software quality, reduces development costs, and avoids the re-development of similar ECU software components repeatedly for the same vehicular applications. AUTOSAR has supported the V2X standard produced by ETSI. This paper will discuss the merging between AUTOSAR implementation of the V2X security requirements and IEEE security standards and how authentication and integrity are applied to the messages between two nodes. and also how CAR-2-CAR consortium requirements are applied in the AUTOSAR platform.",
      "published": "2023-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itc-egypt58155.2023.10206114",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autosar",
        "ecu",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamed AbdelAzeem",
        "Mona Helmy"
      ],
      "venue": "International Telecommunications Conference (ITC-Egypt)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/itc-egypt58155.2023.10206114",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itec-india59098.2023.10471410",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Homomorphic Encryption Technique in Over the Air (OTA) update in ECUs",
      "description": "The paper talks about securing software in electric vehicles (EV). With the advancement in the over the air (OTA) technology, there has been increase in potential threats as well. OTA helps the OEMs to update the software in lesser cost and lesser time. However, as it is wireless communication, it is prone to security attacks. OTA consists of several steps and each step is prone to different security attack. The possible security attack area lines are pointed out and discussed in this paper and validated proposed results. The probable threats that can happen during data transfer from cloud to the vehicle main unit (VMU) and VMU to sub units such as but not limited to traction controller. This paper proposes a new type of cipher. It has several benefits that are not limited to confidentiality. Its nature allows calculations to be performed directly on translated data without the need for decryption as opposed to conventional ways. The proposed system helps in reducing the time to market further and provides extra layer of security. It helps in reducing the bigwig attacks as the data is not visible during the computing.",
      "published": "2023-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itec-india59098.2023.10471410",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Neetigya Abichandani",
        "S A Lakshmanan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transportation Electrification Conference (ITEC-India)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/itec-india59098.2023.10471410",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itec-india59098.2023.10471495",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of Connected Cars that Promise Zero Accidents",
      "description": "Road traffic accidents result in the death of approximately 1.3 million people worldwide each year, and 20 to 50 million people suffer injuries. The goal of zero accidents on the road is becoming more achievable thanks to the advent of connected vehicles. As more and more vehicles become connected, the potential for zero accidents becomes increasingly realistic. However, these possibilities will also present new problems for the automakers. One such is cyber security in the reason because software flaws could jeopardize the security of connected car features and systems. This paper sheds light on another possible way of preventing cyber-attacks by isolating the cloud from cellular traffic in connected cars architecture and appending the cloud with cloud Access Security Brokers to provide security and control access to cloud resources. We outline ways to various access control modules in the architecture.",
      "published": "2023-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itec-india59098.2023.10471495",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seela Sainath",
        "Sandhya SC",
        "Kirankumar N Tuppad",
        "A. Subba Rao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transportation Electrification Conference (ITEC-India)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/itec-india59098.2023.10471495",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.425,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/itec-india59098.2023.10471495 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: 1.3, car, access, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itec60657.2024.10599086",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Object-focused Risk Evaluation of AI-driven Perception Systems in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "One of the primary motivations for autonomous vehicle (AV) technology is to reduce road accidents compared to human-driven cars. This necessitates having robust perception systems to detect and classify objects correctly in real-time environments. Various factors, including the complexity of the scene, the type of object, the capability of the perception sensors, and the performance of AI-based algorithms, can affect its robustness. Furthermore, vulnerabilities in these factors can be exploited as cyber-physical attacks. Hence, this paper presents a novel mathematical model for system-level risk evaluation of AV perception systems that incorporates the relevant objects for AV applications and the machine learning (ML) algorithms used to detect and classify them. This model is adapted from the ISO/SAE 21434 threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) model with an enhancement in impact rating and attack feasibility assessment. Additionally, a case study for impact rating is demonstrated with real data from traffic crashes where the most important objects are impacted. Also, the effect of the robustness of the detection algorithm on attack feasibility assessment is illustrated with some AI/ML-based state-of-the-art detection algorithms used in AVs.",
      "published": "2024-06-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itec60657.2024.10599086",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Subhadip Ghosh",
        "Aydin Zaboli",
        "Jun-Ho Hong",
        "Jaerock Kwon"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transportation Electrification Conference and Expo",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/itec60657.2024.10599086",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iteceats66641.2026.11593013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Context-Aware Functional Security for V2X-Enabled Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication and edge-assisted intelligence are essential for safety-critical connected and autonomous vehicle services, but their reliance on wireless channels, shared compute resources, and control-plane orchestration exposes them to cyber-physical disturbances such as jamming, compute starvation, spoofing, and misconfiguration. This paper proposes an unsupervised, context-aware framework for functional security monitoring that detects anomalous operating conditions without labeled attack data. Our methodology combines domain-informed KPI features, safetyweighted reconstruction scoring, and explicit per-context threshold calibration. To evaluate this framework, we introduce a synthetic stress-testing protocol that perturbs KPIs relative to robust within-context statistics. Expanding on our preliminary work, we benchmark six unsupervised model families (including CVAE, VAE, and plain Autoencoders) under 5-fold stratified cross-validation at a safety-oriented 1% false-positive rate. Our extended analysis reveals that calibration granularity is a critical operational factor: SliceχWeather calibration improves the true positive rate by roughly 2-4 times across all models relative to a single global threshold. Furthermore, we find that on our small snapshot dataset, explicit calibration captures much of the contextual information, allowing a simpler deterministic autoencoder to outperform conditional generative models at the final operating point. These results establish context-aware calibration as a highly practical mechanism for operational V2X security monitoring.",
      "published": "2026-06-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iteceats66641.2026.11593013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "jamming",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "T. Tahi",
        "Sujay Saha",
        "Mostafa Zaman",
        "Yan-Xiao Zhao",
        "S. Abdelwahed"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transportation Electrification Conference and Expo",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iteceats66641.2026.11593013",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itechsecom64750.2025.11307242",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Behavioral Authentication in EV Charging Terminals Using Operator Interaction Pattern Recognition",
      "description": "Electric vehicle (EV) charging terminals are an essential infrastructure, and secure and reliable user authentication is becoming more important to prevent unprivileged access to charging terminals. Behavioral authentication is an exciting new space for security that uses the unique patterns of operator engagement to provide an extra layer of protection. Traditional authentication methods, such as Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), or Radio-Frequency Identification cards (RFID), can be stolen, replicated, or exploited through social engineering, which can violate security. To address these challenges, the paper provides a new Behavioral Authentication Framework for EV Terminals (BAF-ET), which uses the unique patterns of button presses, touch gestures, and operational timing of people interacting with the charging terminal. BAF-ET is capable of real-time authentication without added hardware since it continuously learns and adapts to standard operator behavior, using machine learning techniques. It improves terminal security by lessening reliance on traditional credentials and expediting seamless, unobtrusive authentication. In simulated and field tests, BAFET has proved to have a high degree of accuracy in discriminating authorized operator behavior from unauthorized user behavior, thus reducing the probability of fraudulent access. The results confirm that behavioral authentication is a smart, flexible, and user-centric way to protect facilities with electric vehicle charging stations.",
      "published": "2025-10-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itechsecom64750.2025.11307242",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "José Luis Sampietro Saquicela",
        "V. Hidalgo",
        "Silvana del Rocío Bermúdez Herrera",
        "Leandro Alexander Bermúdez Herrera",
        "Viviana Elizabeth Cajas Cajas",
        "Ponce Villacis Paulina de los Ángeles"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 Second International Conference on Intelligent Technologies for Sustainable Electric and Communications Systems (iTech SECOM)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/itechsecom64750.2025.11307242",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ithings-greencom-cpscom-smartdata.2016.52",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicle Security: A Taxonomy of Attacks and Defences",
      "description": "In recent years, we have seen significant advancement in technologies to bring about smarter cities worldwide. The interconnectivity of things is the key enabler in these initiatives. An important building block is smart mobility, and it revolves around resolving land transport challenges in cities with dense populations. A transformative direction that global stakeholders are looking into is autonomous vehicles and the transport infrastructure to interconnect them to the traffic management system (that is, vehicle to infrastructure connectivity), as well as to communicate with one another (that is, vehicle to vehicle connectivity) to facilitate better awareness of road conditions. A number of countries had also started to take autonomous vehicles to the roads to conduct trials and are moving towards the plan for larger scale deployment. However, an important consideration in this space is the security of the autonomous vehicles. There has been an increasing interest in the attacks and defences of autonomous vehicles as these vehicles are getting ready to go onto the roads. In this paper, we aim to organize and discuss the various methods of attacking and defending autonomous vehicles, and propose a comprehensive attack and defence taxonomy to better categorize each of them. Through this work, we hope that it provides a better understanding of how targeted defences should be put in place for targeted attacks, and for technologists to be more mindful of the pitfalls when developing architectures, algorithms and protocols, so as to realise a more secure infrastructure composed of dependable autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2016-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ithings-greencom-cpscom-smartdata.2016.52",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vrizlynn L. L. Thing",
        "Jiaxi Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/ithings-greencom-cpscom-smartdata.2016.52",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 189,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itmc.2018.8691242",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain Enabled Traceability – Securing Process Quality in Manufacturing Chains in the Age of Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Autonomous driving (AD) promises to disrupt current process management practices in the automotive industry, as processes now have to fulfill increasing requirements for safety, quality and liability. This paradigm change especially manifests itself among electrical system suppliers, as the electrical components transmit the vehicle's energy and communication flow, determining safety critical functions in the vehicle such as steering and braking. In this research, we conducted a multiple embedded case study in the electrical supplier industry in order to derive current challenges as well as future requirements for production processes of safety critical products in the age of autonomous driving. Our data suggest, that the established manufacturing process and practices are unable to fulfill the increasing need for digital continuity, transparency and documentation. To overcome those barriers, we propose a blockchain (BC) and Internet of Things (IoT) enabled traceability system. Through the application of BC, processes can be interconnected, tracked and audited, achieving higher security, liability and quality. This is the first paper, which investigates manufacturing of electrical systems for self-driving vehicles as a suitable use case for BC application.",
      "published": "2018-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itmc.2018.8691242",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marlene Kuhn",
        "Huong Giang Nguyen",
        "Heiner Otten",
        "Jörg E. Franke"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Technology Management, Operations and Decisions (ICTMOD)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/itmc.2018.8691242",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itnac50341.2020.9315024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MLIDS: Handling Raw High-Dimensional CAN Bus Data Using Long Short-Term Memory Networks for Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "CAN uses no authentication and encryption mechanisms for secure communication. To solve the security issues of the CAN bus, a deep learning-based intrusion detection systems have been proposed. But due to the high dimensional property of the CAN bus data, it was not possible to create an effective Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in the CAN bus that can take the property of the CAN data into consideration. In this paper, we are proposing a Long Short-Term Memory Networks (LSTM) based IDS that can handle the high dimensional property of the CAN bus data . Unlike the conventional methods which required a single network architecture for each unique arbitration ID, our method gives a single overall anomaly signal over a certain detection window without the need for reverese-engineering the CAN bus data. Using this anomaly signal we have managed to achieve 100% detection precision for insertion, fuzzy and targeted attacks in our data and in a public data that is prepared for this specific purpose.",
      "published": "2020-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itnac50341.2020.9315024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (ITNAC)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/itnac50341.2020.9315024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc.2018.8569635",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Deep Reinforcement Learning for Security and Safety in Autonomous Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "The dependence of autonomous vehicles (AVs) on sensors and communication links exposes them to cyber-physical (CP) attacks by adversaries that seek to take control of the AVs by manipulating their data. In this paper, the state estimation process for monitoring AV dynamics, in presence of CP attacks, is analyzed and a novel adversarial deep reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm is proposed to maximize the robustness of AV dynamics control to CP attacks. The attacker's action and the AV's reaction to CP attacks are studied in a game-theoretic framework. In the formulated game, the attacker seeks to inject faulty data to AV sensor readings so as to manipulate the inter-vehicle optimal safe spacing and potentially increase the risk of AV accidents or reduce the vehicle flow on the roads. Meanwhile, the AV, acting as a defender, seeks to minimize the deviations of spacing so as to ensure robustness to the attacker's actions. Since the AV has no information about the attacker's action and due to the infinite possibilities for data value manipulations, each player uses long short term memory (LSTM) blocks to learn the expected spacing deviation resulting from its own action and feeds this deviation to a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. Then, the attacker's RL algorithm chooses the action which maximizes the spacing deviation, while the AV's RL algorithm seeks to find the optimal action that minimizes such deviation. Simulation results show that the proposed adversarial deep RL algorithm can improve the robustness of the AV dynamics control as it minimizes the intra-AV spacing deviation.",
      "published": "2018-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc.2018.8569635",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aidin Ferdowsi",
        "Ursula Challita",
        "Walid Saad",
        "Narayan B. Mandayam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc.2018.8569635",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 138,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc.2018.8569679",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Standardized Mapping from Automotive Security Levels to Security Mechanisms",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are becoming targets and need to be secured throughout their lifetime. There exist several risk assessment models which can be used to derive security levels that describe to what extent components, functions and messages (signals), need to be protected. These models provide methods to gather application specific security requirements based on identified threat and item combinations that need to be coped with. However, a standardized mapping between security levels and required mandatory security mechanisms and design rules is currently missing. We address this problem first by suggesting that the risk assessment process should result in five security levels, similar to the functional safety standard ISO 26262. Second, we identify suitable security mechanisms and design rules for automotive system design and associate them with appropriate security levels. Our proposed methodology is as much as possible aligned with ISO 26262 and we believe that it should therefore be realistic to deploy in existing organizations.",
      "published": "2018-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc.2018.8569679",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Rosenstatter",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc.2018.8569679",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc.2019.8916877",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Geo-spatial Screening using Anomaly Detection for Efficient Security Analysis of V2X Sensor Data on C-ITS Service",
      "description": "Security for cooperative intelligent transport systems (C-ITS), which are expected to contribute to realizing a safe and efficient transportation environment, will become more important in the near future. Among various proposed C-ITS services, this study examines security measures against cyber attacks for navigation services that collect sensor data from vehicles to estimate real-time traffic and distribute trip planning and route selection. In such services, a threat is assumed in which a malicious attacker prevents the traffic condition from being correctly recognized by injecting false data. As a result of such attacks, the services may fail to decide appropriate routes, and there is a concern that this cyber attack will likely disrupt traffic in the real world. By using a simulator on the basis of actual traffic data, we experimentally clarify that false data injection attacks against C-ITS services cause artificial congestion. Due to the potential for serious consequences of traffic disruption, security countermeasure technology is vital. To respond to cyber attacks that use false sensor data, technology to analyze sensor data and detect abnormalities is required. For this reason, we propose an analysis technique that efficiently analyzes sensor data transmitted from a huge number of vehicles to identify an attacker. The idea of the proposed method is to narrow down the sensor data for detailed analysis by screening on the basis of simple statistical analysis. The evaluation results show that the proposed method can efficiently detect false data injection attacks against C-ITS navigation services.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc.2019.8916877",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Keita Hasegawa",
        "Takafumi Harada",
        "T. Washio",
        "Yoshihito Oshima"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc.2019.8916877",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc.2019.8916999",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recurrent Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks for Autonomous Driving Sensor Modelling",
      "description": "Simulation of the real world is a widely researched topic in various fields. The automotive industry in particular is very dependent on real world simulations, since these simulations are needed in order to prove the safety of advance driver assistance systems (ADAS) and autonomous driving (AD). In this paper we propose a deep learning based model for simulating the outputs from production sensors used in autonomous vehicles. We introduce an improved Recurrent Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (RC-GAN) consisting of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) that use Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) in both the generator and the discriminator networks in order to generate production sensor errors that exhibit long-term temporal correlations. The network is trained in a sequence-to-sequence fashion where we condition the output from the model on sequences describing the surrounding environment. This enables the model to capture spatial and temporal dependencies, and the model is used to generate synthetic time series describing the errors in a production sensor which can be used for more realistic simulations. The model is trained on a data set collected from real roads with various traffic settings, and yields significantly better results as compared to previous works.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc.2019.8916999",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "adversarial",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "driver assistance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Henrik Arnelid",
        "Edvin Listo Zec",
        "Nasser Mohammadiha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc.2019.8916999",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc.2019.8917066",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of a Misbehavior Detection System for Objects Based Shared Perception V2X Applications",
      "description": "The recent trend of integrating vehicular communications with advanced sensors installed on vehicles, enables Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) to share their own driving information as well as perception information, such as a list of perceived objects (e.g., dynamic obstacles such as vehicles, pedestrians, and cyclists, and static obstacles). This has the potential to improve driving safety by expanding collective perception of vehicles. However, adversaries may also populate false information to other Connected Vehicles (CVs) via Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications. This paper investigates the security aspects of mixed deployment of CAVs, CVs and legacy vehicles, and in particular with regards to misbehavior detection. We provide a generic design framework that is independent from the specific algorithms of the underlying perception system, and can be used to implement a practical Misbehavior Detection System (MDS). We analyze the MDS framework w.r.t. a ghost vehicle attack. While no computing system can be completely secure, we believe this work would help the industry to develop a practical MDS design within a common framework while allowing individual techniques to mature and evolve over time with future academic research.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc.2019.8917066",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moreno Ambrosin",
        "Lily L. Yang",
        "Xiruo Liu",
        "Manoj R. Sastry",
        "Ignacio J. Alvarez"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc.2019.8917066",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3974,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/itsc.2019.8917066 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: sensors, well, applications, information, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc.2019.8917500",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is considered as the de-facto standard for the in-vehicle communications due to its real-time performance and high reliability. Unfortunately, the lack of security protection on the CAN bus gives attackers the opportunity to remotely compromise a vehicle. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) with low cost and high efficiency to address the security issue of the CAN bus. LEAP exploits the security-enhanced stream cipher primitive to provide encryption and authentication for the CAN messages. Compared with the state-of-the-art Message Authentication Code (MAC) based approaches, LEAP requires less memory, is 8X faster, and thwarts the most recently proposed attacks.",
      "published": "2019-09-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc.2019.8917500",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhaojun Lu",
        "Qian Wang",
        "Xi Chen",
        "Gang Qu",
        "Yongqiang Lyu",
        "Zhenglin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc.2019.8917500",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc55140.2022.9922235",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comparative Study on Supervised versus Semi-supervised Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection of In-vehicle CAN Network",
      "description": "As the central nerve of the intelligent vehicle control system, the in-vehicle network bus is crucial to the security of vehicle driving. One of the best standards for the in-vehicle network is the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) protocol. However, the CAN bus is designed to be vulnerable to various attacks due to its lack of security mechanisms. To enhance the security of in-vehicle networks and promote the research in this area, based upon a large scale of CAN network traffic data with the extracted valuable features, this study comprehensively compared fully-supervised machine learning with semi-supervised machine learning methods for CAN message anomaly detection. Both traditional machine learning models (including single classifier and ensemble models) and neural network based deep learning models are evaluated. Furthermore, this study proposed a deep autoencoder based semi-supervised learning method applied for CAN message anomaly detection and verified its superiority over other semi-supervised methods. Extensive experiments show that the fully-supervised methods generally outperform semi-supervised ones as they are using more information as inputs. Typically the developed XGBoost based model obtained state-of-the-art performance with the best accuracy (98.65%), precision (0.9853), and ROC AUC (0.9585) beating other methods reported in the literature.",
      "published": "2022-07-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc55140.2022.9922235",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yongqi Dong",
        "Ke Chen",
        "Yinxuan Peng",
        "Zhiyuan Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "2022 IEEE 25th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc55140.2022.9922235",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc57777.2023.10422100",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Gap Analysis of ISO/SAE 21434 – Improving the Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering Life Cycle",
      "description": "Due to the ongoing legislative shift towards mandated cybersecurity for road vehicles, the automotive cybersecurity engineering standard ISO/SAE 21434 is seeing fast adoption throughout the industry. Early efforts are focusing on threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) in the concept and development phases, exposing the challenge of managing TARA results coherently throughout the supply chain and life cycle. While the industry focuses on TARA, other aspects such as vulnerability or incident handling are receiving less attention. However, the increasing threat landscape makes these processes increasingly important, posing another industry challenge. In order to better address these two challenges, we analyze the cybersecurity engineering framework of ISO/SAE 21434 for gaps or deficiencies regarding TARA management and vulnerability and incident handling, as well as similar processes for incident handling in IT security. The result is a proposal for modifications and augmentations of the ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity engineering framework. In particular, we propose a TARA management process to facilitate the coordination and information exchange between different systems and life cycle phases, and we propose improvements to the vulnerability and incident handling processes in ISO/SAE 21434 so that they are more aligned with established standards. This amounts to 13 new terminology definitions, 4 new process steps, 2 modified process steps and 1 entirely new process.",
      "published": "2023-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc57777.2023.10422100",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel Grimm",
        "Aljoscha Lautenbach",
        "Magnus Almgren",
        "Tomas Olovsson",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc57777.2023.10422100",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itsc60802.2025.11423606",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Toward Secure and Safe Railway Operations: Embedding Safety in Cybersecurity Frameworks",
      "description": "The digital transformation of railway systems is enhancing automation, connectivity, and operational efficiency. However, it also introduces complex cybersecurity risks that can propagate into safety-critical failures. Existing frameworks often treat cybersecurity and safety as separate domains, limiting their ability to address the interdependent threats facing modern railway infrastructures. This paper presents a novel, integrated risk management framework that explicitly links cybersecurity threats to their potential safety consequences. Our approach is attacker-oriented, considering adversarial capabilities and intent, and safety-informed, meaning the security analysis is guided by safety-related principles and constraints to ensure the protection of safety-critical functions. The framework is grounded in, and harmonized with, international standards including ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/SAE 21434, and EN 50126, ensuring methodological consistency with current industry practices. To demonstrate the framework's practical applicability, we conduct a detailed case study on the ERTMS/ETCS Level 1 signaling system. Using a dynamic driving emulator under realistic operational conditions, we identify key vulnerabilities, assess their exploitability by plausible attackers, and evaluate their potential to compromise safety integrity.",
      "published": "2025-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itsc60802.2025.11423606",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yasmine Benghename",
        "Ahmed Lounis",
        "Mohamed Sallak"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/itsc60802.2025.11423606",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/itw.2016.7606824",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless authentication in the presence of a simultaneously transmitting adversary",
      "description": "If Alice must communicate with Bob over a channel shared with the adversarial Eve, then Bob must be able to validate the authenticity of the message. In particular we consider the model where Alice and Eve share a discrete memoryless multiple access channel with Bob, thus allowing simultaneous transmissions from Alice and Eve. By traditional random coding arguments, we demonstrate an inner bound on the rate at which Alice may transmit, while still granting Bob the ability to authenticate. Furthermore this is accomplished in spite of Alice and Bob lacking a pre-shared key, as well as allowing Eve prior knowledge of both the codebook Alice and Bob share and the messages Alice transmits.",
      "published": "2016-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/itw.2016.7606824",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eric Graves",
        "Paul L. Yu",
        "Predrag Spasojević"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/itw.2016.7606824",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iucc-css.2016.017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Behaviour-Based Anomaly Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks on a Robotic Vehicle",
      "description": "Security is one of the key challenges in cyberphysical systems, because by their nature, any cyber attack against them can have physical repercussions. This is a critical issue for autonomous vehicles; if compromised in terms of their communications or computation they can cause considerable physical damage due to their mobility. Our aim here is to facilitate the automatic detection of cyber attacks on a robotic vehicle. For this purpose, we have developed a detection mechanism, which monitors real-time data from a large number of sources onboard the vehicle, including its sensors, networks and processing. Following a learning phase, where the vehicle is trained in a non-attack state on what values are considered normal, it is then subjected to a series of different cyber-physical and physical-cyber attacks. We approach the problem as a binary classification problem of whether the robot is able to self-detect when and whether it is under attack. Our experimental results show that the approach is promising for most attacks that the vehicle is subjected to. We further improve its performance by using weights that accentuate the anomalies that are less common thus improving overall performance of the detection mechanism for unknown attacks.",
      "published": "2016-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iucc-css.2016.017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anatolij Bezemskij",
        "George Loukas",
        "Richard John Anthony",
        "Diane Gan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing and Communications (IUCC)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/iucc-css.2016.017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv47402.2020.9304812",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on 3D LiDAR Localization for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "LiDAR sensors are becoming one of the most essential sensors in achieving full autonomy for self driving cars. LiDARs are able to produce rich, dense and precise spatial data, which can tremendously help in localizing and tracking a moving vehicle. In this paper, we review the latest finding in 3D LiDAR localization for autonomous driving cars, and analyse the results obtained by each method, in an effort to guide the research community towards the path that seems to be the most promising.",
      "published": "2020-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv47402.2020.9304812",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahdi Elhousni",
        "Xinming Huang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv47402.2020.9304812",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 115,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827191",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CVGuard: Mitigating Application Attacks on Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) applications promise to revolutionize our transportation systems, improving safety and traffic capacity while reducing environmental footprint. Many CV applications have been proposed towards these goals, with the US Department of Transportation (USDOT) recently initiating some designated deployment sites to enable experimentation and validation. While the focus of this initial development effort is on demonstrating the functionality of a range of proposed applications, recent attacks have demonstrated their vulnerability to application level attacks. In these attacks, a malicious actor operates within the application’s parameters but providing falsified information. This paper explores a framework that protects against such application-level attacks. Then, we analyze the impact of the attacks, showing that an individual attacker can have substantial effects on the safety and efficiency of traffic flow even in the presence of message security standards developed by USDOT, motivating the need for our defense. Our defense relies on physically modeling the vehicles and their interaction using dynamic models and state estimation filters as well as reinforcement learning. It combines these observations with knowledge of application rules and guidelines to capture logic deviations. We demonstrate that the resultant defense, called CVGuard, can accurately and promptly detect attacks, with low false positive rates over a range of attack scenarios for different CV applications.",
      "published": "2022-06-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827191",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Abdo",
        "Guoyuan Wu",
        "Qi Zhu",
        "Nael Abu‐Ghazaleh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827191",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827222",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attack and Defense of YOLO Detectors in Autonomous Driving Scenarios",
      "description": "Visual detection is a key task in autonomous driving, and it serves as a crucial foundation for self-driving planning and control. Deep neural networks have achieved promising results in various visual tasks, but they are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A comprehensive understanding of deep visual detectors’ vulnerability is required before people can improve their robustness. However, only a few adversarial attack/defense works have focused on object detection, and most of them employed only classification and/or localization losses, ignoring the objectness aspect. In this paper, we identify a serious objectness-related adversarial vulnerability in YOLO detectors and present an effective attack strategy targeting the objectness aspect of visual detection in autonomous vehicles. Furthermore, to address such vulnerability, we propose a new objectness-aware adversarial training approach for visual detection. Experiments show that the proposed attack targeting the objectness aspect is 45.17% and 43.50% more effective than those generated from classification and/or localization losses on the KITTI and COCO_traffic datasets, respectively. Also, the proposed adversarial defense approach can improve the detectors’ robustness against objectness-oriented attacks by up to 21% and 12% mAP on KITTI and COCO_traffic, respectively.",
      "published": "2022-06-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827222",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jung Im Choi",
        "Qing Tian"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827222",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827256",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Authentication Mechanism for Remote Keyless Entry Systems in Cars to Prevent Replay and RollJam Attacks",
      "description": "Modern cars come with Keyless Entry Systems that can be either Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems or Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES) systems. In the initial versions of RKE implementation, fixed code was used by the key fob to unlock the car door. However, this method is vulnerable to replay attacks as an adversary may capture and replay the same code later to unlock the car. A rolling code system was introduced to protect RKE systems from such replay attacks. Studies have shown that even the rolling code system is vulnerable to certain attacks. In this work, we investigate the attacks possible on RKE systems and propose an efficient and effective authentication mechanism to defend RKE systems against such attacks with minimal changes to the existing RKE system. The proposed mechanism makes use of hashing and asymmetric cryptographic techniques for the secure transmission of signals from the key fob to the car that cannot be replayed. The security of the proposed mechanism is shown using informal security proof and simulation of the proposed solution is also provided.",
      "published": "2022-06-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827256",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rohini Poolat Parameswarath",
        "Biplab Sikdar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827256",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827285",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unsupervised Network Intrusion Detection System for AVTP in Automotive Ethernet Networks",
      "description": "Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) are widely regarded as efficient tools for securing in-vehicle networks against diverse cyberattacks. However, since cyberattacks are always evolving, signature-based intrusion detection systems are no longer adopted. An alternative solution can be the deployment of deep learning based intrusion detection system which play an important role in detecting unknown attack patterns in network traffic. Hence, in this paper, we compare the performance of different unsupervised deep and machine learning based anomaly detection algorithms, for real-time detection of anomalies on the Audio Video Transport Protocol (AVTP), an application layer protocol implemented in the recent Automotive Ethernet based in-vehicle network. The numerical results, conducted on the recently published “Automotive Ethernet Intrusion Dataset show that deep learning models significantly outperfom other state-of-the art traditional anomaly detection models in machine learning under different experimental settings.",
      "published": "2022-06-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827285",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Natasha Alkhatib",
        "Maria Mushtaq",
        "Hadi Ghauch",
        "Jean‐Luc Danger"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv51971.2022.9827285",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv55152.2023.10186386",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Driving: Attacking End-to-End Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "As research in deep neural networks advances, deep convolutional networks become promising for autonomous driving tasks. In particular, there is an emerging trend of employing end-to-end neural network models for autonomous driving. However, previous research has shown that deep neural network classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While for regression tasks, the effect of adversarial attacks is not as well understood. In this research, we devise two white-box targeted attacks against end-to-end autonomous driving models. Our attacks manipulate the behavior of the autonomous driving system by perturbing the input image. In an average of 800 attacks with the same attack strength (epsilon=1), the image-specific and image-agnostic attack deviates the steering angle from the original output by 0.478 and 0.111, respectively, which is much stronger than random noises that only perturbs the steering angle by 0.002 (The steering angle ranges from [-1, 1]). Both attacks can be initiated in real-time on CPUs without employing GPUs. Demo video: https://youtu.be/I0i8uN2oOP0.",
      "published": "2021-03-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv55152.2023.10186386",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Han Wu",
        "Syed Usama Yunas",
        "Sareh Rowlands",
        "Wenjie Ruan",
        "Johan Wahlström"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv55152.2023.10186386",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv64158.2025.11097632",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Collaborative Perception: Combining Adversarial Training with Consensus Mechanism for Enhanced V2X Security",
      "description": "Collaborative perception enhances the robustness and accuracy of autonomous systems by leveraging shared perceptual data across agents, particularly through feature-level fusion, which balances communication efficiency with contextual preservation. However, this data-sharing introduces vulnerabilities, as adversaries can inject malicious perturbations, compromising system reliability in safety-critical scenarios. In this work, we address the adversarial robustness of feature-level fusion in collaborative perception under white-box untargeted attack settings. We propose a novel framework that combines adversarial training with a consensus mechanism, enhancing resilience to adversarial perturbations in a model-agnostic manner. Our approach not only improves robustness against attacks but also enhances performance on clean data, achieving at least 5% improvement in average precision. Extensive experiments on the V2XSet dataset with four adversarial attack types and two collaborative perception methods demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, outperforming consensus defense and adversarial training alone consistently under different adversarial perturbation magnitudes. These findings underscore the potential of our approach to advance secure and reliable collaborative perception systems.",
      "published": "2025-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv64158.2025.11097632",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Atanas Poibrenski",
        "Farzad Nozarian",
        "Farzaneh Rezaeianaran",
        "Christian Müller"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv64158.2025.11097632",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iv64158.2025.11097790",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fleet Consensus: OTA Update Framework for Autonomous Systems",
      "description": "Over-the-Air (OTA) updates present significant challenges for autonomous vehicle fleets and UAV swarms, particularly in maintaining system integrity while minimizing operational disruption. This paper proposes a hierarchical update management framework for coordinated software deployment across heterogeneous autonomous systems. We implement a distributed consensus protocol based on a modified Raft algorithm, combined with a lightweight validation mechanism on edge computing nodes. Our approach introduces a two-phase update strategy: first, a leader-follower architecture validates updates on a subset of vehicles under controlled conditions, followed by gradual fleet-wide deployment with automated rollback capabilities. We evaluate our framework on a testbed of 12 autonomous vehicles and 24 UAVs across urban and suburban virtualized environments, comparing against three baseline update strategies. Results demonstrate a 47% reduction in update completion time compared to traditional sequential deployment, while maintaining a 99.9% success rate for update validation. Our system achieves these improvements while requiring only 23 % of the bandwidth utilized by existing fleet-wide update solutions. We also present a comprehensive security analysis, identifying potential attack vectors in V2X communication during updates and implementing countermeasures through PKI-based authentication and real-time anomaly detection.",
      "published": "2025-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iv64158.2025.11097790",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andy Shahbazian",
        "Dave Walsh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iv64158.2025.11097790",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ivs.2017.7995934",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly detection of CAN bus messages through analysis of ID sequences",
      "description": "This paper proposes a novel intrusion detection algorithm that aims to identify malicious CAN messages injected by attackers in the CAN bus of modern vehicles. The proposed algorithm identifies anomalies in the sequence of messages that flow in the CAN bus and is characterized by small memory and computational footprints, that make it applicable to current ECUs. Its detection performance are demonstrated through experiments carried out on real CAN traffic gathered from an unmodified licensed vehicle.",
      "published": "2017-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2017.7995934",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mirco Marchetti",
        "Dario Stabili"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/ivs.2017.7995934",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 256,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ivs.2018.8500421",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simulation-based Adversarial Test Generation for Autonomous Vehicles with Machine Learning Components",
      "description": "Many organizations are developing autonomous driving systems, which are expected to be deployed at a large scale in the near future. Despite this, there is a lack of agreement on appropriate methods to test, debug, and certify the performance of these systems. One of the main challenges is that many autonomous driving systems have machine learning (ML) components, such as deep neural networks, for which formal properties are difficult to characterize. We present a testing framework that is compatible with test case generation and automatic falsification methods, which are used to evaluate cyber-physical systems. We demonstrate how the framework can be used to evaluate closed-loop properties of an autonomous driving system model that includes the ML components, all within a virtual environment. We demonstrate how to use test case generation methods, such as covering arrays, as well as requirement falsification methods to automatically identify problematic test scenarios. The resulting framework can be used to increase the reliability of autonomous driving systems.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2018.8500421",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cumhur Erkan Tuncali",
        "Georgios Fainekos",
        "Hisahiro Ito",
        "James P. Kapinski"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ivs.2018.8500421",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 207,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ivs.2018.8500423",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Security Model for Intelligent Vehicles and Smart Traffic Infrastructure",
      "description": "Intelligent vehicles require to communicate with other vehicles as well as with the road-side infrastructure for gathering information such as traffic management, cooperative driving, telematics and road construction. However, vehicle-to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communications can impose some serious security threats against vehicles' safety and other sensitive information which can lead to catastrophic consequences. Therefore, there is a pressing need to develop appropriate security protocols facilitating V2I and V2V communication. This paper presents a model for smart traffic infrastructure consisting of numerous entities like smart sensors, intelligent vehicles, base stations along with a new user authentication and key-exchange protocol which aids in the establishment of a secure session for communication between the entities. In the proposed protocol, any SUF-CMA (Strong Unforgeable- Chosen Message Attack) secure digital signature algorithm can be used for authenticating the users and any NM-CCA2 (Non-Malleability Chosen Ciphertext Attack) secure algorithm can also be used for the challenge response phase between the users authenticating themselves.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2018.8500423",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S Rajesh Kumar",
        "Sonu Kumar Jha",
        "Sumit Kumar Pandey",
        "Anupam Chattopadhyay"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ivs.2018.8500423",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ivs.2018.8500450",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improved Robustness and Safety for Autonomous Vehicle Control with Adversarial Reinforcement Learning",
      "description": "To improve efficiency and reduce failures in autonomous vehicles, research has focused on developing robust and safe learning methods that take into account disturbances in the environment. Existing literature in robust reinforcement learning poses the learning problem as a two player game between the autonomous system and disturbances. This paper examines two different algorithms to solve the game, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning and Neural Fictitious Self Play, and compares performance on an autonomous driving scenario. We extend the game formulation to a semi-competitive setting and demonstrate that the resulting adversary better captures meaningful disturbances that lead to better overall performance. The resulting robust policy exhibits improved driving efficiency while effectively reducing collision rates compared to baseline control policies produced by traditional reinforcement learning methods.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2018.8500450",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaobai Ma",
        "Katherine Driggs-Campbell",
        "Mykel J. Kochenderfer"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ivs.2018.8500450",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ivs.2019.8813865",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Opportunistic Use of In-Vehicle Wireless Networks for Vulnerable Road User Interaction",
      "description": "In-vehicle wireless networks (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth) are experiencing a faster market penetration than dedicated V2V technologies and are compatible with non-V2X devices. In this paper, we assess whether commodity in-vehicle networks can leverage opportunistic V2X communication to nodes outside of the vehicle, particularly with Vulnerable Road Users. We characterize the radiation pattern and performance of communication links in the 2.4 GHz band between in-car wireless networks and a wireless-enabled bicycle in two representative interaction scenarios (i.e. parallel and perpendicular vehicle-VRU trajectories) using both production hardware (i.e. built-in WiFi hotspot) and dedicated measurement equipment. Empirical results show that (i) the signal propagation to the outside of the vehicle is strongly affected (up to 20 dB) by the vehicle elements (e.g. pillars) and by the placement of the wireless system inside the car, and (ii) the communication performance (in terms of RSSI, IRT, Throughput) is also impaired by the spatial arrangement of vehicle and VRU, and other time-varying phenomena (e.g., human body and bicycle shadowing). We conclude that the in-car system performance allows supporting a wide range of safety and infotainment applications (e.g., IRT under 300 ms) even at large TX-RX distances, and that the placement of an in-car wireless system should be tailored according to the target application.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2019.8813865",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "penetration",
        "v2x",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pedro M. d’Orey",
        "Pedro M. Santos",
        "José Pintor",
        "Ana Aguiar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ivs.2019.8813865",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ivs.2019.8814265",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integration of Attribute-based Access Control into Automotive Architectures",
      "description": "The transformation in the automotive industry continues and topics such as intelligent software applications and over-the-air connectivity push future vehicle innovations, which will lead to a further increase in the number of connected vehicles in the upcoming years. Many wireless connections between vehicles to the infrastructure or mobile devices arise. In order to protect this communication against security attacks, various protection mechanisms have to be integrated into the vehicle to ensure information security. One of these measures is the implementation of a distributed access control to protect different communication channels against unauthorized access attempts. This requires a well-defined assignment of access permissions for each communication node combined with certain environmental conditions such as location, time or vehicle state. However, current automotive systems do not have extensive access controls. Only for the execution of safety-critical diagnostic services an extended authorization level is available. In this publication, we present an attribute-based access control, which is specifically designed for an automotive E/E architecture with several domain controllers. Furthermore, we evaluate our approach with a proof-of-concept for an exemplary diagnostic service request.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2019.8814265",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcel Rumez",
        "Alexander Duda",
        "Patrick Grunder",
        "Reiner Kriesten",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ivs.2019.8814265",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4322,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ivs.2019.8814265 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: years., location, unauthorized, requires, extensive, services, service, applications."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ivworkshops71735.2026.11624009",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Roadside Guardian: V2X-based Trajectory Monitoring and Intervention for Securing Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles rely heavily on onboard sensors, making them vulnerable to physical layer attacks such as sensor spoofing. While V2X-based cooperative perception has been proposed to extend sensing capabilities, checking the integrity of a vehicle’s final decision—its trajectory—remains a challenge. This paper proposes \"Roadside Guardian\": a V2X-based security architecture where a Roadside Unit (RSU) acts as a guardian to monitor and, if necessary, physically intervene in the vehicle’s control. Unlike conventional approaches that share raw perception data, our system shares the \"planning intention.\" The RSU independently generates a reference trajectory and compares it with the vehicle’s planned path. If a significant deviation indicative of an attack (e.g., ignoring an obstacle due to cloaking or braking for a ghost object) is detected, the RSU overrides the vehicle’s control with a safe corrected trajectory. We implemented this system using Autoware Universe on a real vehicle (PIXKIT) and an experimental RSU. Field experiments demonstrated that the system successfully detected attacks including ghost object injection and object cloaking. Furthermore, it safely stopped or rerouted the vehicle even at 20 km/h, establishing a robust fail-safe mechanism against sensor spoofing.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ivworkshops71735.2026.11624009",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shotaro Nakamura",
        "Alexander Carballo"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium Workshops (IV Workshops)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ivworkshops71735.2026.11624009",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwcmc.2018.8450305",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Systems for Networked Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: A Survey",
      "description": "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)-based civilian or military applications become more critical to serving civilian and/or military missions. The significantly increased attention on UAV applications also has led to security concerns particularly in the context of networked UAVs. Networked UAVs are vulnerable to malicious attacks over open-air radio space and accordingly intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been naturally derived to deal with the vulnerabilities and/or attacks. In this paper, we briefly survey the state-of-the-art IDS mechanisms that deal with vulnerabilities and attacks under networked UAV environments. In particular, we classify the existing IDS mechanisms according to information gathering sources, deployment strategies, detection methods, detection states, IDS acknowledgment, and intrusion types. We conclude this paper with research challenges, insights, and future research directions to propose a networked UAVIDS system which meets required standards of effectiveness and efficiency in terms of the goals of both security and performance.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwcmc.2018.8450305",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gaurav Choudhary",
        "Vishal Sharma",
        "Ilsun You",
        "Kangbin Yim",
        "Ing-Ray Chen",
        "Jin-Hee Cho"
      ],
      "venue": "International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwcmc.2018.8450305",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 131,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwcmc48107.2020.9148360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Semi-centralized Security Framework for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Despite the benefits of electric and autonomous vehicles, current in-vehicle networks lack a robust and feasible security framework that considers the authentication, confidentiality, and integrity for the communication of Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Although a centralized key management mechanism offers an efficient solution, the security fully relies on this centralized unit, which leads to a single point of failure problem. In this paper, we present a semi-centralized key management framework to secure in-vehicle networks. It provides a decentralized and dynamic key distribution during the vehicle's operation and considers different aspects such as ECU's broadcast communication, ECU manufacturing process and ECU authentication without the use of certificates from external third parties. Finally, the implementation and the simulation of our framework validate the feasibility and practical use of our approach.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwcmc48107.2020.9148360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ivan E. Carvajal-Roca",
        "Jian Wang",
        "Jun Du",
        "Shuangqing Wei"
      ],
      "venue": "International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwcmc48107.2020.9148360",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwcmc61514.2024.10592450",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DDoS Attack Prevention in Autonomous Vehicle’s OTA Updates: Combining PBFT Consensus and Distributed Firewall in Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain",
      "description": "The advent of connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) is bringing forth a revolutionary new era of technology transforming transportation. For traffic to be optimized and safe, efficient vehicle-to-everything collaboration and improved autonomous vehicles (AV) decision-making are crucial. It becomes essential to make decisions in real time using information from vehicle sensors, software, and traffic data. As a part of such an In-Vehicle Network (IVN), over-the-air (OTA) software update service in CAVs needs to be facilitated rapidly, reliably, and securely. However, by taking advantage of vulnerabilities, attackers may quickly target the OTA software update as part of botnets to execute distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. The enormous volume and widespread nature of these DDoS cyber-attacks make it vital for the CAV industry to work quickly on identifying and preventing these threats. This paper proposes proof-of-concept experiments with the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) Blockchain model to detect and prevent DDoS attacks in CAVs, OTA update systems. The proposed method implements Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) as the consensus mechanism and a distributed firewall to ensure the ledger is secure and tamper’ proof. The system is tested on the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) Blockchain (BC) platform. The results show that the proposed approach effectively prevents DDoS attacks while ensuring fast transaction execution time.",
      "published": "2024-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwcmc61514.2024.10592450",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sadia Yeasmin",
        "Anwar Haque"
      ],
      "venue": "International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwcmc61514.2024.10592450",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwcmc65282.2025.11059625",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OCSVM-Siamese Framework for Detecting Adversarial Attacks for Autonomous Driving Cars",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose a robust adversarial detection framework to secure AI models against adversarial threats specifically in autonomous driving cars. The proposed framework combines two levels of security. The first level is based on the anomaly detection capability of the One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) for detecting adversarial inputs with large perturbations. The second level leverages the Siamese network’s ability to extract the embedding feature vector of the input. The embedding vector is used to identify the input belonging to a certain category based on the cosine similarity index. The proposed method is adversarial training-agnostic and model-agnostic. To evaluate the proposed method, we compare its performance with the state-of-the-art detection method, Feature Squeezing. The experimental results show the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed method in detecting various adversarial perturbations with a remarkable detection accuracy of 100% as opposed to 88.5% for Feature Squeezing under eleven adversarial attacks on the speed limit signs of the GTSRB dataset.",
      "published": "2025-05-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwcmc65282.2025.11059625",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Fakhr Aldeen Sattout",
        "Ali Chehab"
      ],
      "venue": "International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwcmc65282.2025.11059625",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwcmc65282.2025.11059702",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security of Over-the-Air Updates in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles using Blockchain: Proof of Concept",
      "description": "Over-the-Air (OTA) updates provide a convenient and cost-effective way to deliver software updates to vehicles without needing a visit to the dealership in person. However, they also introduce significant cybersecurity risks known to come with wireless connectivity, such as Man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. This paper presents a novel method for enhancing the security of OTA updates in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) using permissioned Blockchain technology with smart contracts for automation. Our proposed solution involves adding a second point of trust to the traditional OTA update architecture, utilizing permissioned Blockchain technology to verify the integrity of the OTA update before the CAV proceeds with the installation. Thereby ensuring the security and reliability of the vehicle’s functionality. This paper outlines the context and motivation for this research, reviews current Blockchain-based secure mechanisms for OTA updates, details the proposed method, and presents the implementation and evaluation results from our proof of concept. The results demonstrate that the proposed Blockchain-based verification system significantly enhances the security of OTA updates against common cyber attacks, with minimal overhead and low impact on system performance. Additionally, the proposed architecture can be easily integrated into existing OTA update infrastructures, making it a cost-effective solution for protecting CAVs against potential cyber threats at a scale.",
      "published": "2025-05-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwcmc65282.2025.11059702",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zeeman Memon",
        "Ikjot Saini"
      ],
      "venue": "International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwcmc65282.2025.11059702",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwcmc69287.2026.11579870",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A MITRE ATT&CK-Driven Risk Assessment Methodology for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) operate as complex cyber-physical systems, exposing critical vehicle assets to sophisticated cyber threats that can propagate into unsafe physical behaviors. In this paper, we present a MITRE ATT&CK-driven risk assessment methodology for CAVs, integrating systematic identification of 8 critical assets, adversary-centric threat mapping, and quantitative risk evaluation. We analyze assets across perception, communication, computing and planning, and motion control layers, and identify 22 potential threats mapped to ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and sub-techniques. Threat exploitability is assessed using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3.1 and combined with 5 defined impact levels. Risk prioritization is then performed via a 5×5 probability–impact matrix to support actionable cybersecurity decisions, aligned with ISO/SAE 21434. Based on the results, we analyze ITS-specific countermeasures, including secure authentication, integrity verification, encrypted communications, and intrusion detection. The findings underline that integrity and availability represent the most critical systemic risks, especially in motion control and communication subsystems, while also highlighting the value of a behavior-driven knowledge-based approach for guiding cybersecurity decisions in CAVs.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwcmc69287.2026.11579870",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sihem Baccari",
        "Mohamed Hadded",
        "Anis Laouiti",
        "Mourad Elhadef",
        "Prosper Kandabongee Yeng"
      ],
      "venue": "International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwcmc69287.2026.11579870",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwqos70441.2026.11661132",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANListener: A Lightweight and Adaptive Intrusion Detection System for In-vehicle CAN Bus",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the core communication backbone in modern vehicles, responsible for connecting Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and coordinating real-time in-vehicle operations. However, it is intrinsically without built-in security mechanisms. Existing works proposed Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to protect CAN bus, ranging from rulebased to machine learning and deep learning-based methods. But most of them either require significant labeled samples or computational resources, or they suffer from severe detection performance degradation. Toward this end, this paper proposes CANListener, a lightweight and adaptive IDS for in-vehicle CAN bus. CANListener first employs a Reinforced Active Learning (RAL)-based method to train detection models with minimal but valuable labeled samples, enabling label-effective but accurate learning. Then, it integrates a Reinforcement Learning (RL)gated two-stage framework to dynamically allocate computational resources by routing inputs between lightweight and deep expert ensembles. Experimental results on real automotive datasets demonstrate that CANListener can achieve strong detection performance (99.48% TPR, 0.01% FPR) using only 1% labeled data, while maintaining real-time detection with an average CPU usage of 4.5% under hardware deployment.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwqos70441.2026.11661132",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiacheng Jin",
        "Yihe Zhang",
        "Chong Zhang",
        "Feng Lin",
        "Xiaohang Wang",
        "Li Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Quality of Service",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwqos70441.2026.11661132",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/iwssip58668.2023.10180290",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey and Risk Assessment on Virtual and Augmented Reality Cyberattacks",
      "description": "Nowadays, Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) systems are not exclusively associated with the gaming industry. Their potential is also useful for other business areas such as healthcare, automotive, and educational domains. Companies need to accompany technological advances and enhance their business processes and thus, the adoption of VR or AR technologies could be advantageous in reducing resource usage or improving the overall efficiency of processes. However, before implementing these technologies, companies must be aware of potential cyberattacks and security risks to which these systems are subject. This study presents a survey of attacks related to VR and AR scenarios and their risk assessment when considering healthcare, automation, education, and gaming industries. The main goal is to make companies aware of the possible cyberattacks that can affect the devices and their impact on their business domain.",
      "published": "2023-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/iwssip58668.2023.10180290",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tânia Silva",
        "Sara Paiva",
        "Pedro Pinto",
        "António Pinto"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Systems, Signals and Image Processing",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/iwssip58668.2023.10180290",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jas.2018.7511186",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Parallel planning: a new motion planning framework for autonomous driving",
      "description": "Motion planning is one of the most significant technologies for autonomous driving. To make motion planning models able to learn from the environment and to deal with emergency situations, a new motion planning framework called as “parallel planning” is proposed in this paper. In order to generate sufficient and various training samples, artificial traffic scenes are firstly constructed based on the knowledge from the reality. A deep planning model which combines a convolutional neural network (CNN) with the Long Short-Term Memory module (LSTM) is developed to make planning decisions in an end-toend mode. This model can learn from both real and artificial traffic scenes and imitate the driving style of human drivers. Moreover, a parallel deep reinforcement learning approach is also presented to improve the robustness of planning model and reduce the error rate. To handle emergency situations, a hybrid generative model including a variational auto-encoder (VAE) and a generative adversarial network (GAN) is utilized to learn from virtual emergencies generated in artificial traffic scenes. While an autonomous vehicle is moving, the hybrid generative model generates multiple video clips in parallel, which correspond to different potential emergency scenarios. Simultaneously, the deep planning model makes planning decisions for both virtual and current real scenes. The final planning decision is determined by analysis of real observations. Leveraging the parallel planning approach, the planner is able to make rational decisions without heavy calculation burden when an emergency occurs.",
      "published": "2018-07-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jas.2018.7511186",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Long Fei Chen",
        "Xuemin Hu",
        "Wei Tian",
        "Hong Wang",
        "Dongpu Cao",
        "Fei–Yue Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/jas.2018.7511186",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 136,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jestpe.2020.3045667",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber–Physical Security of Powertrain Systems in Modern Electric Vehicles: Vulnerabilities, Challenges, and Future Visions",
      "description": "Power electronics systems have become increasingly vulnerable to cyber-physical threats due to their growing penetration in the Internet-of-Things (IoT)-enabled applications, including connected electric vehicles (EVs). In response to this emerging need, a cyber-physical-security initiative was recently launched by the IEEE Power Electronics Society (PELS). With increasing connectivity due to vehicle-to-everything (V2X) and the number of electronic control units, connected EVs are facing greater cyber-physical security challenges. However, existing research extensively focuses on the network security of internal combustion engine vehicles and fails to address the cyber-physical security of EVs specifically. In this article, the challenges and future visions of cyber-physical security are discussed for connected EVs from the perspective of firmware security, vehicle charging safety, and powertrain control security. The vulnerabilities of EVs are investigated under a variety of cyberattacks, ranging from energy-efficiency-motivated attacks to safety-motivated attacks. Simulation results, including hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) results, are provided to further analyze the cyberattack impacts on both converter (device) and vehicle (system) levels. More importantly, an architecture for the next-generation power electronics systems is proposed to address the cyber-physical security challenges of EVs. Finally, potential research opportunities are discussed in detail, including detection and migration for firmware security, model-based, and data-driven detection and mitigation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study on cyber-physical security of powertrain systems in modern EVs.",
      "published": "2020-12-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jestpe.2020.3045667",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "penetration",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Ye",
        "Lulu Guo",
        "Bowen Yang",
        "Fangyu Li",
        "Liang Du",
        "Le Guan",
        "Wen‐Zhan Song"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Journal of Emerging and Selected Topics in Power Electronics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/jestpe.2020.3045667",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 120,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2697949",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure LTE-Based V2X Service",
      "description": "Internet of Things (IoT) is the reality of a new and powerful ubiquitous technology. One of its main driving forces is the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long-Term Evolution (LTE), seeking to encompass all the applications of IoT. With this trend, 3GPP has finally made the Release 14 for LTE-based vehicle to everything (V2X) service. In this proposed paper, we evaluated the new LTE-based V2X architecture in regards to V2X message delivery and security requirements. We showed that a proper resource allocation and reference point (channel) selection could accommodate all types of V2X message deliveries. However, focusing more on security, we deemed that LTE-based V2X security falls short of meeting adequate security requirements, especially, to well preserve the privacy. Hence, we proposed a privacy preserving security for LTE-based V2X service. Considering the privacy as the top security requirement, we seamlessly integrate our security scheme with the specified LTE security architecture. Our scheme is scalable while fulfilling basic wireless message security requirements. We also provide the security and performance analysis to show the robustness and effectiveness of our proposed schemes.",
      "published": "2017-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2017.2697949",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kazi J. Ahmed",
        "Myung Jong Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2017.2697949",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey",
      "description": "With the exponential growth of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), new security challenges have emerged. Various vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, and controls have been introduced for the new generation of CPS. However, there lacks a systematic review of the CPS security literature. In particular, the heterogeneity of CPS components and the diversity of CPS systems have made it difficult to study the problem with one generalized model. In this paper, we study and systematize existing research on CPS security under a unified framework. The framework consists of three orthogonal coordinates: 1) from the security perspective, we follow the well-known taxonomy of threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and controls; 2) from the CPS components perspective, we focus on cyber, physical, and cyberphysical components; and 3) from the CPS systems perspective, we explore general CPS features as well as representative systems (e.g., smart grids, medical CPS, and smart cars). The model can be both abstract to show general interactions of components in a CPS application, and specific to capture any details when needed. By doing so, we aim to build a model that is abstract enough to be applicable to various heterogeneous CPS applications; and to gain a modular view of the tightly coupled CPS components. Such abstract decoupling makes it possible to gain a systematic understanding of CPS security, and to highlight the potential sources of attacks and ways of protection. With this intensive literature review, we attempt to summarize the state-of-the-art on CPS security, provide researchers with a comprehensive list of references, and also encourage the audience to further explore this emerging field.",
      "published": "2017-05-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cars",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdulmalik A. Humayed",
        "Jingqiang Lin",
        "Fengjun Li",
        "Bo Luo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1262,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2800281",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "NOTSA: Novel OBU With Three-Level Security Architecture for Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Internet of Vehicles has become a massive network, which enables multinetwork fusion, including in-vehicle network, wireless local area network, dedicated short range communication, device-to-device communication, and cellular network (e.g., 5G). Proverbially, in-vehicle network is considered as a closed network and thus absolutely secure. However, multiple networks access and fusion can introduce different threats. Current on board units (OBUs) fail to protect in-vehicle network. Therefore, illegal vehicle control can be easily performed for attackers. In this paper, in consideration of vulnerabilities of current OBUs and in-vehicle controller area network, we show main attack model for actual vehicles, and assess introduced threats using the approach based on ISO 13335 guidelines for the management of IT security. Then, we design the novel OBU with three-level security architecture (NOTSA) and propose multilevel security protocols. It cannot only improve the security of external networks, but also protect the in-vehicle network by collaborating with current in-vehicle security schemes. Thereafter, we analyze security of proposed scheme, and evaluate it on hardware platform. The reliability of NOTSA and vehicular ad-hoc networks are then discussed using reliability block diagrams. In addition, we also verify the correctness of proposed protocols. Finally, the simulation results and comparison show that our scheme is feasible and more efficient than existing schemes in term of time overhead, security and reliability.",
      "published": "2018-02-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2018.2800281",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liangmin Wang",
        "Xiaolong Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2018.2800281",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2867917",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analyzing and Enhancing the Security of Ultrasonic Sensors for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles rely on sensors to measure road condition and make driving decisions, and their safety relies heavily on the reliability of these sensors. Out of all obstacle detection sensors, ultrasonic sensors have the largest market share and are expected to be increasingly installed on automobiles. Such sensors discover obstacles by emitting ultrasounds and analyzing their reflections. By exploiting the built-in vulnerabilities of sensors, we designed random spoofing, adaptive spoofing, and jamming attacks on ultrasonic sensors, and we managed to trick a vehicle to stop when it should keep moving, and let it fail to stop when it should. We validate our attacks on stand-alone sensors and moving vehicles, including a Tesla Model S with the “Autopilot” system. The results show that the attacks cause blindness and malfunction of not only sensors but also autonomous vehicles, which can lead to collisions. To enhance the security of ultrasonic sensors and autonomous vehicles, we propose two defense strategies, single-sensor-based physical shift authentication that verifies signals on the physical level, and multiple sensor consistency check that employs multiple sensors to verify signals on the system level. Our experiments on real sensors and MATLAB simulation reveal the validity of both schemes.",
      "published": "2018-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2018.2867917",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "jamming",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenyuan Xu",
        "Chen Yan",
        "Weibin Jia",
        "Xiaoyu Ji",
        "Jianhao Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2018.2867917",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 171,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2876419",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Achieving Differentially Private Location Privacy in Edge-Assistant Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicles can provide safer and more satisfying services for drivers by using information sensing and sharing. However, current network architecture cannot support massive and real-time data transmissions due to the poor-quality wireless links. To provide real-time data processing and improve drivers' security, edge computing is regarded as a promising method to offer more efficient services by placing computing and storage resources at the network edge. In this paper, we will introduce the concept of edge-assistant connected vehicles and propose some promising applications to reduce the network traffic and provide real-time services with the help of massive edge nodes. Unlike in the traditional cloud-based connected vehicles, edge nodes are introduced to enable vehicles to obtain real-time and distributed processing services. Furthermore, considering the location privacy issue in the new architecture, we propose a novel differentially privacy-preserving location-based service usage framework deployed on the edge node, designed to provide an adjustable privacy protection solution to balance the utility and privacy. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments to verify the proposed framework.",
      "published": "2018-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2018.2876419",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lu Zhou",
        "Le Yu",
        "Suguo Du",
        "Haojin Zhu",
        "Cailian Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2018.2876419",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4099,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2876419 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: location, extensive, services, service, applications, privacy, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2019.2947339",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BoSMoS: A Blockchain-Based Status Monitoring System for Defending Against Unauthorized Software Updating in Industrial Internet of Things",
      "description": "The role of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) in critical infrastructure sectors, such as power, chemistry, and manufacturing, will be increasingly important as we move toward Industry 5.0. For example, IIoT devices are deployed in factories to help the manufacturing companies (e.g., automotive) gain in-depth insight into the various states of production, and thus improving production efficiency and achieving cost reductions. However, malicious code may compromise IIoT devices if either the devices are exposed to outside or unexposed inner devices are updated unauthentically. Due to their limited resources and features, it is challenging to implement strong security solutions for such embedded devices. In this article, we propose a blockchain-based software status monitoring system, called BoSMoS. The system is designed to monitor the software status of IIoT devices to detect and respond to identified malicious behaviors (e.g., intrusions). BoSMoS takes a snapshot of the statue of monitored software and monitors its file system calls. In order to ensure the software integrity information, we use blockchain as the distributed ledger to store a snapshot of software status. The blockchain network of BoSMoS can employ different consensus algorithms. We also evaluate the performance of BoSMoS, in terms of exception response delay, resistance performance to various intrusions, and scalability. The experimental results justify that BoSMoS is practical and sound. In addition, the evaluation of scalability and security demonstrates that the system can carry deployment of large-scale IIoT devices and can guarantee authenticated software updating, as well as detect unauthorized software status.",
      "published": "2019-10-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2019.2947339",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sen He",
        "Wei Ren",
        "Tianqing Zhu",
        "Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2019.2947339",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 76,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2019.2950083",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recommendation-Based Trust Model for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)",
      "description": "An intelligent transportation system (ITS) is one of the main systems which have been developed to achieve safe traffic and efficient transportation. It enables the vehicles to establish connections with other road entities and infrastructure units using vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. As a consequence, all road entities become exposed to either internal or external attacks. Internal attacks cannot be detected by traditional security schemes. In this article, a recommendation-based trust model for V2X communications is proposed to defend against internal attacks. Four types of malicious attacks are analyzed. In addition, we conduct various experiments with different percentage of malicious nodes to measure the performance of the proposed model. In comparison with the existing model, the proposed model shows an improvement in network throughput and the detection rate for all types of considered malicious behaviors. Our model improves the packet dropping rate (PDR) with 36% when the percentage of malicious nodes is around 87.5%.",
      "published": "2019-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2019.2950083",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljawharah Alnasser",
        "Hongjian Sun",
        "Jing Sai Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2019.2950083",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2967568",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MARINE: Man-in-the-Middle Attack Resistant Trust Model in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), a novel technology, holds a paramount importance within the transportation domain due to its abilities to increase traffic efficiency and safety. Connected vehicles propagate sensitive information which must be shared with the neighbors in a secure environment. However, VANET may also include dishonest nodes such as man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attackers aiming to distribute and share malicious content with the vehicles, thus polluting the network with compromised information. In this regard, establishing trust among connected vehicles can increase security as every participating vehicle will generate and propagate authentic, accurate, and trusted content within the network. In this article, we propose a novel trust model, namely, MiTM attack resistance trust model in connected vehicles (MARINE), which identifies dishonest nodes performing MiTM attacks in an efficient way as well as revokes their credentials. Every node running MARINE system first establishes trust for the sender by performing multidimensional plausibility checks. Once the receiver verifies the trustworthiness of the sender, the received data are then evaluated both directly and indirectly. Extensive simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance and accuracy of MARINE rigorously across three MiTM attacker models and the benchmarked trust model. The simulation results show that for a network containing 35% of MiTM attackers, MARINE outperforms the state-of-the-art trust model by 15%, 18%, and 17% improvements in precision, recall, and F-score, respectively.",
      "published": "2020-01-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2020.2967568",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Farhan Ahmad",
        "Fatih Kurugöllü",
        "Asma Adnane",
        "Rasheed Hussain",
        "Fatima Ali Hussain"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2020.2967568",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 167,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3995,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2967568 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information., sensitive, extensive, trust, well, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3032935",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Cluster-Based Multidimensional Approach for Detecting Attacks on Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Nowadays, modern vehicles are becoming even more connected, intelligent, and smart. A modern vehicle encloses several cyber-physical systems, such as actuators and sensors, which are controlled by electronic control units (ECUs). Such ECUs are connected through in-vehicle networks, and, in turn, such networks are connected to the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) to provide advanced and smart features. However, the increase in vehicle connectivity and computerization, although it brings clear advantages, it introduces serious safety problems that can also endanger the life of the driver and passengers of the vehicle, as well as that of pedestrians. Such problems are mainly caused by the security weaknesses affecting the controller area network (CAN) bus, used to exchange data between ECUs. In this article, we provide two algorithms that implement a data-driven anomaly detection system. The first algorithm (cluster-based learning algorithm), is used to learn the behavior of messages passing on the CAN bus, for base-lining purposes, while the second one (data-driven anomaly detection algorithm) is used to perform real-time classification of such messages (licit or illicit) for early alerting in the presence of malicious usages. The experimental results, obtained by using data coming from a real vehicle, have shown that our approach is capable of performing better than other anomaly detection-based approaches.",
      "published": "2020-10-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2020.3032935",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianni D’Angelo",
        "Arcangelo Castiglione",
        "Francesco Palmieri"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2020.3032935",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3888,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3032935 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: purposes, serious, even, sensors, well, safety, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3084796",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MTH-IDS: A Multitiered Hybrid Intrusion Detection System for Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles, including connected vehicles and autonomous vehicles, nowadays involve many electronic control units connected through intra-vehicle networks to implement various functionalities and perform actions. Modern vehicles are also connected to external networks through vehicle-to-everything technologies, enabling their communications with other vehicles, infrastructures, and smart devices. However, the improving functionality and connectivity of modern vehicles also increase their vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks targeting both intra-vehicle and external networks due to the large attack surfaces. To secure vehicular networks, many researchers have focused on developing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that capitalize on machine learning methods to detect malicious cyber-attacks. In this paper, the vulnerabilities of intra-vehicle and external networks are discussed, and a multi-tiered hybrid IDS that incorporates a signature-based IDS and an anomaly-based IDS is proposed to detect both known and unknown attacks on vehicular networks. Experimental results illustrate that the proposed system can detect various types of known attacks with 99.99% accuracy on the CAN-intrusion-dataset representing the intra-vehicle network data and 99.88% accuracy on the CICIDS2017 dataset illustrating the external vehicular network data. For the zero-day attack detection, the proposed system achieves high F1-scores of 0.963 and 0.800 on the above two datasets, respectively. The average processing time of each data packet on a vehicle-level machine is less than 0.6 ms, which shows the feasibility of implementing the proposed system in real-time vehicle systems. This emphasizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed IDS.",
      "published": "2021-05-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2021.3084796",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Yang",
        "Abdallah Moubayed",
        "Abdallah A. Shami"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2021.3084796",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 433,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3899,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3084796 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: unknown, large, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3090397",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VehicleEIDS: A Novel External Intrusion Detection System Based on Vehicle Voltage Signals",
      "description": "Intelligent and connected vehicles (ICVs) have become the mainstream in the development of automobile industry. Many emerging technologies have been proposed to provide users with comfortable and convenient driving experience. However, even though these technologies significantly improve the quality of service, some of the communication interfaces they used are vulnerable and easily attacked. Note that although many malicious attacks can be carried out in various ways, their final step must be in the in-vehicle network, i.e., the controller area network (CAN) bus. In order to protect the security of the CAN bus, it is of great importance to design an intrusion detection system (IDS), which can monitor the message transmission in real time. In this article, we design a novel external IDS based on vehicle voltage signals, named VehicleEIDS. It does not occupy the bandwidth or computing resources of the CAN bus and maintains the original CAN bus protocol as well. The system can be directly installed in the automobile gateway to monitor the external intrusion, and can be connected to the CAN bus as an independent external device to protect the automobile security. In addition, VehicleEIDS is robust against the factors of vehicle status, the number of attacking electronic control units (ECUs), and the sending frequency of attack data. It is only related to the voltage signals of external intrusion device. Once external intrusion devices send attack data to the CAN bus, VehicleEIDS can quickly identify its abnormal voltage signals, with the accuracy of more than 97%.",
      "published": "2021-06-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2021.3090397",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yijie Xun",
        "Yilin Zhao",
        "Jiajia Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2021.3090397",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 62,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3822,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3090397 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: well., though, even, service, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3108698",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multimicrogrid Load Balancing Through EV Charging Networks",
      "description": "Energy demand and supply vary from area to area, where an unbalanced load may occur and endanger the system security constraints and cause significant differences in the locational marginal price (LMP) in the power system. With the increasing proportion of local renewable energy (RE) sources in microgrids that are connected to the power grid and the growing number of electric vehicle (EV) charging loads, the imbalance will be further magnified. In this article, we first model the EV charging network as a cyber–physical system (CPS) that is coupled with both the transportation networks and the smart grids. Then, we propose an EV charging station recommendation algorithm. With a proper charging scheduling algorithm deployed, the synergy between the transportation network and the smart grid can be created. The EV charging activity will no longer be a burden for power grids, but a load-balancing tool that can transfer energy between the unbalanced distribution grids. The proposed system model is validated via simulations. The results show that the proposed algorithms can optimize the EV charging behaviors, reduce charging costs, and effectively balance the regional load profiles of the grids.",
      "published": "2021-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2021.3108698",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xi Chen",
        "Haihui Wang",
        "Fan Wu",
        "Yujie Wu",
        "Marta C. González",
        "Junshan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2021.3108698",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 104,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3122021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BDTwin: An Integrated Framework for Enhancing Security and Privacy in Cybertwin-Driven Automotive Industrial Internet of Things",
      "description": "The rapid development of the automotive Industrial Internet of Things requires secure networking infrastructure toward digitalization. Cybertwin (CT) is a next-generation networking architecture that serves as a communication, and digital asset owner, and can make the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) network flexible and secure. However, CT itself can publish end users’ digital assets to other entities as a service, making data security and privacy major obstacles in the realization of V2X applications. Motivated from the aforementioned discussion, this article presents BDTwin, a blockchain and deep-learning-based integrated framework to enhance security and privacy in CT-driven V2X applications. Specifically, a blockchain scheme is designed to ensure secure communication among vehicles, roadside units, CT-edge server, and cloud server using a smart contract-based enhance-Proof-of-Work (ePoW) and Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP)-based verification process. Smart contracts are used to enforce rules and regulations that govern the behavior of V2X entities in a nondeniable and automated manner. In a deep-learning scheme, an autoregressive-deep variational autoencoder model is combined with attention-based bidirectional long short-term memory (A-BLSTM) for automatic feature extraction and attack detection by analyzing CT-edge servers data in a V2X environment. Security analysis and experimental results using two different sources, ToN-IoT and CICIDS-2017 show the superiority of the proposed BDTwin framework over some baseline and recent state-of-the-art techniques.",
      "published": "2021-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2021.3122021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Randhir Kumar",
        "Prabhat Kumar",
        "Rakesh Tripathi",
        "Govind P. Gupta",
        "Sahil Garg",
        "Mohammad Mehedi Hassan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2021.3122021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3130054",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Driving Security: State of the Art and Challenges",
      "description": "The autonomous driving industry has mushroomed over the past decade. Although autonomous driving has undoubtedly become one of the most promising technologies of this century, its development faces multiple challenges, of which security is the major concern. In this article, we present a thorough analysis of autonomous driving security. First, the attack surface of autonomous driving is presented. After an analysis of the operation of autonomous driving in terms of key components and technologies, the security of autonomous driving is elaborated in four dimensions: 1) sensors; 2) operating system; 3) control system; and 4) vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. Sensor security is examined from five components, which are mainly responsible for self-positioning and environmental perception. The analysis of operating system security, the second dimension, is concentrated on the robot operating system. Concerning the control system security, the controller area network is approached mainly from vulnerabilities and protection measures. The fourth dimension, V2X communication security, is probed from four categories of attacks: 1) authenticity/identification; 2) availability; 3) data integrity; and 4) confidentiality with corresponding solutions. Moreover, the drawbacks of existing methods adopted in the four dimensions are also provided. Finally, a conceptual multilayer defense framework is proposed to secure the information flow from external communication to the physical autonomous vehicle.",
      "published": "2021-11-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2021.3130054",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cong Gao",
        "Geng Wang",
        "Weisong Shi",
        "Zhongmin Wang",
        "Yanping Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2021.3130054",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 185,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3135342",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bift: A Blockchain-Based Federated Learning System for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Machine learning (ML) algorithms are essential components in autonomous driving. In most existing connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), a large amount of driving data collected from multiple vehicles are sent to a central server for unified training. However, data privacy and security have become crucial during the data-sharing process. Federated learning (FL) for data security has arisen nowadays, and it can improve the data privacy of distribute machine learning. However, the malicious attackers can still be able to attack the training process. Due to the complete reliance on the central server, FL is very fragile. To address the above problem, we propose Bift: 1) a fully decentralized ML system combined with FL and 2) blockchain to provide a privacy-preserving ML process for CAVs. Bift enables distributed CAVs to train ML models locally using their own driving data and then to upload the local models to get a better global model. More importantly, Bift provides a consensus algorithm named Proof of Federated Learning to resist possible adversaries. We evaluate the performance of Bift and demonstrate that Bift is scalable and robust, and can defend against malicious attacks.",
      "published": "2021-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2021.3135342",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ying He",
        "Ke Huang",
        "Guangzheng Zhang",
        "Fei Richard Yu",
        "Jianyong Chen",
        "Jianqiang Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2021.3135342",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3149038",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Adversarial Learning System for Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "In this article, the design of a rational decision support system (RDSS) for a connected and autonomous vehicle charging infrastructure (CAV-CI) is studied. In the considered CAV-CI, the distribution system operator (DSO) deploys electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) to provide an electrical vehicle (EV) charging facility for human-driven connected vehicles (CVs) and AVs. The charging request by the human-driven EV becomes irrational when it demands more energy and charging period than its actual need. Therefore, the scheduling policy of each EVSE must be adaptively accumulated the irrational charging request to satisfy the charging demand of both CVs and autonomous vehicles (AVs). To tackle this, we formulate an RDSS problem for the DSO, where the objective is to maximize the charging capacity utilization by satisfying the laxity risk of the DSO. Thus, we devise a rational reward maximization problem to adapt the irrational behavior by CVs in a data-informed manner. We propose a novel risk adversarial multiagent learning system (RAMALS) for CAV-CI to solve the formulated RDSS problem. In RAMALS, the DSO acts as a centralized risk adversarial agent (RAA) for informing the laxity risk to each EVSE. Subsequently, each EVSE plays the role of a self-learner agent to adaptively schedule its own EV sessions by coping advice from RAA. The experiment results show that the proposed RAMALS affords around 46.6% improvement in charging rate, about 28.6% improvement in the EVSE’s active charging time, and at least 33.3% more energy utilization, as compared to a currently deployed ACN EVSE system, and other baselines.",
      "published": "2022-02-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2022.3149038",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md. Shirajum Munir",
        "Ki Tae Kim",
        "Kyi Thar",
        "Dusit Tao Niyato",
        "Choong Seon Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2022.3149038",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3151377",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ClockIDS: A Real-Time Vehicle Intrusion Detection System Based on Clock Skew",
      "description": "Although intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) can better assist drivers and improve their driving experience, they have huge network security problems and are frequently attacked. This is because the vehicle network is connected to the Internet, which expands the attack surface of ICV, and attackers have more ways to launch attacks. In recent years, many security experts fight against attackers and propose various types of vehicle intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to protect the controller area network (CAN). However, with the continuous enhancement of attack means, especially the appearance of the masquerade attack, most IDSs are no longer applicable. In this article, we design a new fingerprint-based vehicle IDS to protect the CAN, called ClockIDS. It establishes a unique fingerprint for each electronic control unit (ECU) based on clock skew. On this basis, ClockIDS realizes the functions of intrusion detection and attack source identification by utilizing the empirical rule and dynamic time warping. It neither occupies the bandwidth of CAN bus nor needs to modify the CAN protocol. Our experiments on two real vehicles show that ClockIDS can establish a unique fingerprint for ECU without being affected by the size of message period, and can detect three types of attack with a detection accuracy of 98.63%. In addition, this system can identify the attack source, and the average recognition accuracy is 96.77%. Furthermore, ClockIDS has high real-time performance, and the average time cost of each detection is only 1.99 ms.",
      "published": "2022-02-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2022.3151377",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yilin Zhao",
        "Yijie Xun",
        "Jiajia Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2022.3151377",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3841,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3151377 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: functions, without, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3153271",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LbSP: Load-Balanced Secure and Private Autonomous Electric Vehicle Charging Framework With Online Price Optimization",
      "description": "Nowadays, autonomous electric vehicles (AEVs) are increasingly popular due to low resource consumption, low pollutant emission, and high efficiency. In practice, Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) networks supply energy power to EVs to ensure the usage of EVs. However, there are still certain security and privacy concerns in V2G connections, such as identity impersonation and message manipulation. Additionally, the widespread usage of EVs brings significant pressure on the power grid, leading to undesirable effects like voltage deviations if EVs’ charging is not well coordinated. In this article, to tackle these issues, we design a novel load-balanced secure and private EV charging framework named load-balanced secure and private framework (LbSP) for secure, private, and efficient EV charging with a minimal negative effect on the existing power grid. It assures reliable and efficient charging services by a lightweighted encryption technique. Also, it balances the energy consumption of power grids via an online pricing strategy that minimizes load variance by optimizing energy prices in real time. Moreover, it preserves users’ privacy while not affecting online pricing using an advanced differential privacy technique. Furthermore, LbSP deploys on an edge-cloud structure for fast response and more precise pricing, where clouds balance overall load consumption by online price optimization while edges gather data for clouds and respond to charging requests from EVs. The evaluation results show that the proposed framework ensures secure and private EV charging, balances energy load consumption, and preserves users’ privacy.",
      "published": "2022-02-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2022.3153271",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yachao Yuan",
        "Yali Yuan",
        "Parisa Memarmoshrefi",
        "Thar Baker",
        "Dieter Hogrefe"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2022.3153271",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3209687",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Framework for Studying the Business Impact of Ransomware on Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicle technology is rapidly evolving. In the U.S., the government targets that 50% of all vehicles be electric by 2030 in order to reduce climate change. This initiative comes in the wake of an increased spate of ransomware attacks targeting transportation companies. Unlike traditional ransomware targeting computer networks, the compromise of vehicles can have disastrous consequences on businesses and ultimately the national economy as was evident in the recent Colonial pipeline attack. This research proposes a novel framework to study the spread of ransomware and its impact on connected vehicles. Our contribution is fourfold: 1) three different ransomware infection vectors are considered for connected vehicles, namely, a hotspot attack, OBD dongle attack, and malicious over-the-air updates; 2) business impact of the ransomware is analyzed on a ride-hailing service; 3) a fog computing architecture is used to reduce latency in vehicle-to-vehicle communication and vehicle to base station communication; and 4) the effectiveness of safeguard controls are studied in mitigating the ransomware spread. Our results show that ransomware can have a debilitating impact on connected vehicle businesses due to their high mobility and connectivity with attacks on average impacting earnings by 45% per hour.",
      "published": "2022-09-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2022.3209687",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "obd",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asad Waqar Malik",
        "Zahid Anwar",
        "Anis Ur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2022.3209687",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3224465",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Based One-Time Authentication for Secure V2X Communication Against Insiders and Authority Compromise Attacks",
      "description": "One significant security challenge in vehicular networks is defending against malicious members’ attacks, including insiders and compromised authorities. Insiders are legitimate vehicles who have passed the registration process. Since they can exploit all the information related to the network and other members’ communication, it is easier to perform various attacks with a high impact. In addition, an authority takes charge of registering and managing legitimate vehicles. Thus, if the authority is compromised, it will cause significant damage to the system, including the leaking of private information, such as identity, location, and membership. Many authentication schemes have been proposed to protect vehicular communication from these security issues. However, most existing schemes still face the vulnerability of malicious members. Furthermore, most conventional schemes require additional interactions between the vehicles and infrastructure for authentication, which can cause communication overheads. To overcome these issues, we propose a novel blockchain-based one-time authentication scheme to protect vehicular communication against malicious members. One-time authentication provides higher security and efficiency as every message is authenticated with different proof at a time. We use publicly verifiable secret sharing with blockchain for this property, which brings two benefits. First, it prevents even an authority from obtaining members’ identities by distributing encrypted shares instead of their real identities. Second, it enables robust vehicular communication against insiders’ attacks by allowing a vehicle to send unique proof generated from its private information with messages. Receivers can authenticate the messages by comparing attached values to the information through the blockchain in a noninteractive manner. Security analysis shows that our scheme assures secure vehicle-to-everything communication against insider attacks, and efficiency analysis shows how both authentication and consensus delay change.",
      "published": "2022-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2022.3224465",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "exploit",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaewon Noh",
        "Yongseok Kwon",
        "Junggab Son",
        "Sunghyun Cho"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2022.3224465",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2023.3236623",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proof of Travel for Trust-Based Data Validation in V2I Communication",
      "description": "Previous work on misbehavior detection and trust management for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication security is effective in identifying falsified and malicious V2X data. Each vehicle in a given region can be a witness to report on the misbehavior of other nearby vehicles, which will then be added to a \"blacklist.\" However, there may not exist enough witness vehicles that are willing to opt-in in the early stage of connected-vehicle deployment. In this paper, we propose a \"whitelisting\" approach to V2X security, titled Proof-of-Travel (POT), which leverages the support of roadside infrastructure. Our goal is to transform the power of cryptography techniques embedded within Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) protocols into game-theoretic mechanisms to incentivize connected-vehicle data sharing and validate data trustworthiness simultaneously. The key idea is to determine the reputation of and the contribution made by a vehicle based on its distance traveled and the information it shared through V2I channels. In particular, the total vehicle miles traveled for a vehicle must be testified by digital signatures signed by each infrastructure component along the path of its movement. While building a chain of proofs of spatial movement creates burdens for malicious vehicles, acquiring proofs does not result in extra costs for normal vehicles, which naturally want to move from the origin to the destination. The POT protocol is used to enhance the security of previous voting-based data validation algorithms for V2I crowdsensing applications. For the POT-enhanced voting, we prove that all vehicles choosing to cheat are not a pure Nash equilibrium using game-theoretic analysis. Simulation results suggest that the POT-enhanced voting is more robust to malicious data.",
      "published": "2021-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2023.3236623",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dajiang Suo",
        "Baichuan Mo",
        "Jinhua Zhao",
        "Sanjay E. Sarma"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2023.3236623",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3889,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2023.3236623 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: movement., costs, normal, trust, digital, there, information, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2023.3303271",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANShield: Deep-Learning-Based Intrusion Detection Framework for Controller Area Networks at the Signal Level",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on a fleet of electronic control units (ECUs) connected through controller area network (CAN) buses for critical vehicular control. With the expansion of advanced connectivity features in automobiles and the elevated risks of internal system exposure, the CAN bus is increasingly prone to intrusions and injection attacks. As ordinary injection attacks disrupt the typical timing properties of the CAN data stream, rule-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) can easily detect them. However, advanced attackers can inject false data to the signal/semantic level, while looking innocuous by the pattern/frequency of the CAN messages. The rule-based IDS, as well as the anomaly-based IDS, are built merely on the sequence of CAN messages IDs or just the binary payload data and are less effective in detecting such attacks. Therefore, to detect such intelligent attacks, we propose CANShield, a deep learning-based signal-level intrusion detection framework for the CAN bus. CANShield consists of three modules: a data preprocessing module that handles the high-dimensional CAN data stream at the signal level and parses them into time series suitable for a deep learning model; a data analyzer module consisting of multiple deep autoencoder (AE) networks, each analyzing the time-series data from a different temporal scale and granularity, and finally an attack detection module that uses an ensemble method to make the final decision. Evaluation results on two high-fidelity signal-based CAN attack datasets show the high accuracy and responsiveness of CANShield in detecting advanced intrusion attacks.",
      "published": "2022-05-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2023.3303271",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Hasan Shahriar",
        "Yang Xiao",
        "Pablo Moriano",
        "Wenjing Lou",
        "Y. Thomas Hou"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2023.3303271",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3379556",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "UAVA: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Assisted Vehicular Authentication Scheme in Edge Computing Networks",
      "description": "In the pursuit of autonomous driving and intelligent traffic management, the core goal of 5G Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is to enhance the safety and efficiency of transportation systems. Modern transportation networks have evolved into 3-D structures, including bridges and tunnels from traditional 2-D ones, which poses a challenge to fixed base stations-based networks reliant on supporting continuous and seamless coverage. Against this backdrop, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) play a crucial role in developing multidimensional wireless networks due to their flexibility and functionality. This article proposes a UAV-assisted vehicle authentication (UAVA) scheme. It harnesses the efficiency of edge computing and the security of zero-trust architecture, focusing on enhancing the safety and efficiency of V2X communications. The UAVA scheme employs Chebyshev chaotic mapping and elliptic curve cryptography to strengthen communication security, adapting to the dynamic interactions between vehicles and UAVs. We validate the security using BAN logic and the Scyther tool and assess performance through experiments in a real hardware environment. The results indicate that UAVA offers higher security and lower communication overhead in serverless scenarios compared to existing solutions. These comprehensive evaluations show the potential of UAVA for application in intelligent transportation systems, especially in ensuring secure communications.",
      "published": "2024-03-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3379556",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhenyang Guo",
        "Jin Ping Cao",
        "Xinyi Wang",
        "Yinghui Zhang",
        "Ben Niu",
        "Hui Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3379556",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3380619",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CTPP: A Conditional Trajectory Privacy Preservation Scheme Using Blockchain in V2X",
      "description": "In Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X), the periodic broadcasting and reception of safety beacons by vehicles are pivotal for ensuring security. Nevertheless, the transmission of these messages in unencrypted formats over public channels presents substantial security risks. Adversaries with prior knowledge can potentially reconstruct the trajectories of targeted vehicles, thereby compromising sensitive information such as the behavioral patterns of drivers. To combat this issue, this article proposes a novel blockchain-based conditional trajectory privacy preservation (CTPP) scheme, which consists of two primary components: first, an attack-and-defense model is designed where a message blurring technique is utilized to resist the correlational background knowledge attack; second, the blockchain is introduced to enable the decentralized storage of beacon messages, thereby facilitating CTPP. Additionally, we develop two novel metrics, namely, the utility loss and the privacy loss, to evaluate the effectiveness of our CTPP. The former is quantified as the disparity between data sets pre and post the application of the privacy preservation mechanism. The latter is calculated as the proportion of the longest common subtrajectory (LCST) length to the original trajectory length. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our CTPP significantly enhances trajectory privacy while incurring a moderate utility loss compared to the existing methods.",
      "published": "2024-06-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3380619",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yujing Gong",
        "Bin-Jie Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3380619",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3393122",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CCID-CAN: Cross-Chain Intrusion Detection on CAN Bus for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on controller area network (CAN), which ensures the communication between massive electronic control units (ECUs) and passenger safety. Although CAN is a lightweight and reliable broadcast protocol, its vulnerability has caused CAN to confront serious security threats. Adversaries and malicious organizations can impair CAN bus in a variety of ways, such as injecting malicious messages into CAN bus. These malicious messages can directly intervene the functions inside AVs. Therefore, this article proposes a novel cross-chain-based intrusion detection for CAN bus (CCID-CAN) model that uses rule-based Valid Bit index (VBIN) model for initial intrusion detection on CAN bus inside AVs, followed by the Kalman filter and Naïve Bayes model for detecting attacks missed in the VBIN, where a cross-chain mechanism implements the exchange of attack logs among connected AVs that may not trust each other so as to optimize the Naïve Bayes detector. Afterwards, a series of experiments against several types of attacks are conducted on real vehicle supported by XPeng, and the results reveal that the CCID-CAN model outperforms existing models in terms of detection performance, time overhead, and memory footprint. In addition, attack log exchange for cross-chain networks in this proposed model is of high performance in latency, memory footprint, and throughput.",
      "published": "2024-04-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3393122",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heng Sun",
        "Weilin Huang",
        "Jian Weng",
        "Zhiquan Liu",
        "Weihua Tan",
        "Zaobo He",
        "Mingyang Chen",
        "Biaobang Wu",
        "Long Li",
        "Xinyuan Peng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3393122",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3453910",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security of HRP UWB Ranging System Based on Channel Characteristic Analysis",
      "description": "Ultra-wideband (UWB) communication is emerging as a prominent technology to enhance the security of proximity verification systems (e.g., passive keyless entry and start systems, financial payment, and user authentication) against signal-relaying attacks. Leveraging the short-duration pulse (1–2 ns) in the physical-layer pulse, UWB communication enables a precise Time-of-Arrival (ToA) measurement for the received frame, which in turn leads to precise distance measurement. The current UWB communication is based on the IEEE 802.15.4z standard, which defines a scrambled timestamp sequence (STS) field that provides a secure ranging capability. However, exploiting the lack of integrity checks in the STS field, recent studies showed that an attacker could maliciously reduce the distance measurement between UWB devices. In this article, we present a distance reduction attack detection method for high-rate pulse repetition frequency (HRP) UWB ranging system. The proposed method analyzes the distribution of the channel impulse response (CIR) computed at the receiver for a ToA measurement. Since IEEE standard-compliant devices measure the ToA based on the CIR, our method can be widely implemented for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices. Through simulation and real-world experiments, we show that our method can effectively detect distance reduction attacks with a false alarm rate of 1%.",
      "published": "2024-12-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3453910",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyungho Joo",
        "W. Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3453910",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3453920",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Passive Keyless Entry and Start System in Modern Vehicles Based on LF-Band Signal Analysis",
      "description": "The low-frequency-band (LF-band) communication in the passive keyless entry and start (PKES) system is basically designed to enable short-range communication (1 to 2 m) through which a key fob determines whether it is in the vicinity of its paired vehicle. However, this short-range communication is vulnerable because it is unable to precisely verify the distance, as the LF-band signals can be easily relayed or amplified. In this article, we present a novel method (named low-frequency fingerprinting, LOFI) to detect LF-band signals generated by an attacker. LOFI is designed as a subauthentication method that supports existing authentication systems for PKES systems. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that LOFI effectively detects attacks on the PKES system, achieving an average false positive rate (FPR) of 0.92% and an average false negative rate (FNR) of 0.01% under Non-Line-of-Sight (NLoS) conditions. Moreover, using a physics-based ray-tracing simulation, we analyze detection boundaries against feature impersonation attackers.",
      "published": "2024-09-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3453920",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyungho Joo",
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Wonsuk Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3453920",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3468472",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reliable Routing for V2X Networks: A Joint Perspective of Trust Prediction and Attack Resistance",
      "description": "In intelligent transportation systems, data routing in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks is key to ensuring efficient information transfer among vehicles, pedestrians, and infrastructure. The quality of data routing directly affects communication efficiency and system performance. However, data routing in V2X networks often faces potential security threats, which may lead to communication interruption, data delay, or information loss. Unreliable routing fails to meet the communication Quality of Service (QoS) requirements for V2X networks. Therefore, this article proposes a joint scheme that combines trust prediction and attack resistance to ensure reliable routing in V2X networks. First, this scheme employs a fuzzy control-based trust evaluation method to provide direct trust indicators. Second, a trust prediction method based on deep belief networks is utilized to evaluate vehicle status. A classification scheme based on the trust levels is used to filter candidate sets for network repair to help the network resist malicious behavior. Finally, a novel routing decision function is introduced to plan reliable routes. Routes planned on the basis of this function not only meet the basic requirements of reliable routing but are also suitable for routing requirements in different scenarios, such as minimizing transmission latency. The experimental results show that, compared with the three baseline schemes, this scheme improves the accuracy and false alarm rate on the UNSW-NB15 dataset by 2.94% and 6.31%, respectively, and this scheme also performs better in terms of the data reception rate and transmission delay rate in actual application scenarios.",
      "published": "2024-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3468472",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ye Wang",
        "Hong-Hao Gao",
        "Zhengzhe Xiang",
        "A. Al-Dulaimi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3468472",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3518636",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid Transfer and Self-Supervised Learning Approaches in Neural Networks for Intelligent Vehicle Intrusion Detection and Analysis",
      "description": "Intrusion detection is crucial for safeguarding intelligent vehicle systems, aiming to identify abnormal network traffic and operational anomalies. Traditional methods primarily focus on spatial features of attacks, often neglecting temporal dynamics essential for detecting complex, evolving threats. Additionally, the effectiveness of existing techniques is limited by the scope and quality of available datasets, reducing their ability to detect novel, unseen attacks. To address these challenges, this article introduces a Transformer-based transfer learning intrusion detection system (TIDS), designed to capture and analyze spatiotemporal sequence features from vehicle data. TIDS generates high-dimensional feature representations of intricate intrusion patterns, improving the detection of known attack types through instance-based transfer learning, enhancing domain adaptability. Moreover, we proposed a novel self-supervised box classification method that enhances the system’s capability to detect previously unknown attacks, thereby increasing the overall robustness of the intrusion detection process. Comparative experiments demonstrate that TIDS outperforms traditional methods in detection speed and accuracy across various intrusion scenarios, effectively responding to emerging threats in intelligent vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2024-12-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3518636",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tian Zhang",
        "Cuifeng Du",
        "Yuyu Zhou",
        "Quanlong Guan",
        "Zhiquan Liu",
        "Xiujie Huang",
        "Zhiguo Gong",
        "Lianbing Deng",
        "Yang Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3518636",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4067,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3518636 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: unknown, patterns, ability, operational, limited."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3521372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Iterative Intelligent Attack With Integrated Strategy for Resource-Constrained Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The integration of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) and Internet of Vehicles (IoV) technologies is reshaping vehicular communication, necessitating robust protocols capable of supporting low-power and lossy networks (LLNs). The routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPLs) plays a vital role in enhancing data exchange efficiency and reliability within dynamic vehicular environments. However, RPL faces significant security challenges when adapted to vehicular networks, which differ markedly from the less hostile environments originally envisioned for RPL. In this article, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of RPL in the complex interactive environment of vehicular networks. Specifically, we introduce a novel deep learning-based dynamic attack algorithm to expose the limitations of existing defense mechanisms and highlight RPL’s security vulnerabilities in IoV applications. The experimental results reveal that the proposed attack outperforms traditional attacks in multiple metrics, increasing packet loss by 43%, end-to-end delay by 300%, and reducing link quality throughput by 60% and vehicle node battery life by 50%. Even with in place defense mechanisms, our attack demonstrates greater effectiveness 70% over traditional methods, including version number attacks, wormhole attacks, and DIS flooding attacks. These findings underscore the insufficiency of current security measures and confirm the urgent need for advanced protective strategies to safeguard RPL deployments, particularly in complex IoV communication scenarios.",
      "published": "2025-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3521372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yingjie Cui",
        "Hange Zhou",
        "Yong-Qi Zhang",
        "Feng Xue",
        "Jiabin Zheng",
        "Zhen-Yu Lu",
        "Yong Chen",
        "Chuan-Hai Li",
        "Zhong-Lin Jiang",
        "Hui Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3521372",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3524504",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding GRU-Based Intrusion Detection Systems From Adversarial Attacks With Dynamic Label Watermark in CAN Bus Communication",
      "description": "Intrusion detection systems (IDS) for control area network (CAN) bus communication using deep learning models face threats from adversarial closed-box. attacks in the Internet of Vehicles (IoVs). Although watermark techniques are proposed as defences, they lack concealment and are vulnerable. Current watermark methods for time-series data-based applications need cloud-based verification and terminal-based generation, and they cannot meet real-time requirements with large resources. To address these issues, we propose a real-time gated recurrent units (GRUs) based IDS with for CAN bus communication via a novel dynamic label watermark (DLW) method. In detail, we design a multitask learning structure at the terminal side only to detect conventional intrusion attacks. At the same time, we propose a novel DLW method applied to time-series data to defend against adversarial closed-box. attacks. Experimental results show that for the detection of Denial of Service (DoS), revolutions per minute (RPM) spoofing, and fuzzing attacks, our model achieves 1.00000, 1.00000, and close to 1.00000 with the recall, accuracy, F1 score, and precision, respectively. For detection of gear spoofing, our model with the same metrics achieves 1.00000, which are 0.0882, 0.0001, 0.0459, and 0.0208 better than CANLite and the same as ConvLSTM-GNB. Finally, we construct a new adversarial closed-box. attack embedded with four attacks above to validate the resistance and performance of our model (achieving 116 KB code size), which is 58% smaller, 0.9%–35.7% faster, and 1.52%–10.5% improvement of same metrics compared to the baseline model (LSTM).",
      "published": "2025-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2024.3524504",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haihang Zhao",
        "Yi Wang",
        "Anyu Cheng",
        "Shanshan Wang",
        "Jing Yuan",
        "Hong-Rong Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2024.3524504",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3559559",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PRISE: Privacy-pReserving Image Searchable Encryption Scheme for Intelligent Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "With the continuous advancement of intelligent vehicle technology, the image data generated by vehicles has become increasingly critical in various applications, including driver assistance, traffic monitoring, and safety warning systems. However, this growing reliance on image data also raises pressing concerns regarding its security and privacy protection. Searchable encryption technology, as an effective means to protect data security, shows significant potential for application in the field of intelligent vehicles. In this paper, we propose a novel Privacy-pReserving Image Searchable Encryption Scheme (PRISE) to address the security and privacy challenges associated with image data in intelligent vehicles. The PRISE scheme employs Multilinear Principal Component Analysis (MPCA) to extract data features and integrates symmetric encryption and matrix encryption techniques to ensure image privacy protection. To enhance search efficiency, we utilize a Mahalanobis distance-based fuzzy C-means (FCM) clustering method, which accelerates the search process on the cloud server. We conducted comprehensive experiments to evaluate our proposed scheme, and the results were consistent with our analytical findings, confirming the security of our approach. Comparative experiments with existing schemes demonstrated that our proposed method achieves higher accuracy while maintaining a comparable query time.",
      "published": "2026-03-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3559559",
      "matched_terms": [
        "driver assistance",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuemei Fu",
        "Laurence T. Yang",
        "Na Song",
        "Jinxiong Gao",
        "Zhixing Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2025.3559559",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3569845",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Enhanced Feature Engineered Data Falsification Detection in 6G In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Increased automation, connectivity, and data sharing enabled by 6G technology have heightened the vulnerability of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) networks. Addressing this challenge requires an intrusion detection system (IDS) capable of accurately identifying data falsification within IoV while adhering to real-time constraints. This article presents a Blockchain-enhanced feature-engineered IDS to ensure precise attack detection and classification with minimal computational overhead in in-vehicle networks (IVNs). The proposed lightweight IDS utilizes a hybrid Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (PCC) feature selection technique designed for deployment on the Telematics Control Unit (TCU). Furthermore, we propose a custom private blockchain network utilizing the proof of authority and association (PoA2) consensus mechanism, deployable on the roadside unit (RSU), for the secure logging of vehicle electronic control unit (ECU) information, detection results, and the automatic isolation of malicious ECUs via smart contracts. Experimentation analysis demonstrates that the proposed approach achieves notable performance, with a 99.9% detection accuracy and minimal computation times of 0.24 and 1.32 s on the CICIoV2024 and CAN-Intrusion datasets. Furthermore, the system achieves high blockchain scalability, maintaining stable throughput of 16 tx/s and low transaction latency of 0.062 s under increasing ECU density and RSU coverage.",
      "published": "2025-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3569845",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hope Leticia Nakayiza",
        "Love Allen Chijioke Ahakonye",
        "Dong‐Seong Kim",
        "Jae‐Min Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2025.3569845",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3579034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FSL-IDS: Federated Semi-Supervised Learning Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Intelligent in-vehicle networks are increasingly exposed to complex security threats. Traditional supervised deep learning methods depend heavily on extensive labeled datasets, resulting in significant manual labeling costs, while centralized training methods incur substantial communication overhead due to the transfer of raw data. To address the dual challenges of limited labeled data and communication efficiency in in-vehicle networks, this paper proposes a Federated Semi-Supervised Learning-based Intrusion Detection System (FSL-IDS). FSL-IDS integrates a Convolutional Autoencoder (CAE) with the Federated Averaging (FedAvg) algorithm to enable a distributed and efficient intrusion detection solution. In this framework, vehicle CAN traffic data are first converted into grayscale images. The CAE is utilized for unsupervised feature extraction from unlabeled data at each local client, capturing latent representations of traffic patterns. The server then aggregates model parameters from local clients using FedAvg, forming a global autoencoder model and applying INT8 weight quantization, which reduces communication overhead by 48.7%. Subsequently, a fully connected supervised neural network is constructed atop the global encoder, requiring only 20% labeled data for fine-tuning. Experiments on the Car-Hacking dataset demonstrate that FSL-IDS achieves a detection accuracy of 98.83% and an F1-score of 94.14% across various attack types. On low-performance devices and in real vehicular environments, the inference time per sample is under 10 ms and memory consumption is only 15.28 MB. This approach provides a low-label, high-accuracy, and communication-efficient distributed paradigm for intrusion detection in in-vehicle networks, effectively balancing data utilization and edge device resource constraints.",
      "published": "2025-06-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3579034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kun Huang",
        "Huimei Wang",
        "Lin Ni",
        "Yifan Wang",
        "Ming Xian"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2025.3579034",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3580537",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FedGAN-ID: Federated-Learning-Based Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Network Using GANs",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs), in-vehicle networks (IVNs) have increasingly become active targets for cyberattacks. The controller area network (CAN), a widely used IVN, lacks security mechanisms, making it vulnerable to attacks that may lead to system failures and even endanger passenger safety. Existing intrusion detection models depend on centralized data processing and limited real attack data, which raises privacy concerns and restricts detection capabilities. Therefore, we propose a novel federated learning (FL)-based solution, called FedGAN-ID, which aims to generate realistic attack data to enhance the intrusion detection performance using generative adversarial networks (GANs) in ICVs. This article generates CAN message graph within given interval based on CAN ID, message content, and timestamps, enabling comprehensive detection of various attacks that existing models can only partially detect, such as DoS, spoofing, fuzzy, replay, and masquerade attacks. Considering there are few known real attack signatures for IVNs, this article develops a two-level cascade detector. Specifically, we first propose a novel GAN model that is trained to mimic the normal data distribution to enable detection of both known and unknown attacks. Subsequently, we introduce a FL scheme in which each vehicle generates differentially private synthetic data and uploads these data to the cloud server to improve the attack classification ability of FedGAN-ID without sharing real data. Extensive experiments have been conducted on three real vehicles supported by XPeng, demonstrating that FedGAN-ID can accurately detect all these attacks in 1.96 milliseconds.",
      "published": "2025-06-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3580537",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mingyang Chen",
        "Biaobang Wu",
        "Heng Sun",
        "Zhaoxiang Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2025.3580537",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4602,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3580537 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: unknown, ability, normal, extensive, limited, making, even, there."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3605066",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Internet of Vehicles Security Threats, Countermeasures, Open Challenges With Future Research Directions",
      "description": "Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is growing rapidly with the potential to revolutionize transportation systems. Considering the promising future and potential contributions of IoV’s technology, it has attracted the attention of researchers, industry stakeholders, and potential intruders. However, the IoV’s network topological infrastructure faces several connectivity and communication challenges, along with security issues that are beyond the scope of current literature. Although each aspect and challenge has its own consequences, this work focuses on Physical Layer Security (PhyLaySec) threats, which are the most devastating because they undermine the trust of all stakeholders associated with this technology. In the literature, this topic is bearly focused, which demonstrates that the existing PhyLaySec countermeasures would not be able to counter future security challenges in IoV in terms of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) authentication, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication, vehicles-to-everything (V2X) authentication, etc., due to factors such as high vehicle mobility, dynamic network topologies, limited bandwidth, and ultra-fast communication. Therefore, this paper aims to provide a systematic review of state-of-the-art PhyLaySec techniques from 2017 to 2025, with a focus on their strengths and weaknesses. Through our review, we identify key open research questions that require further investigation to enhance the security of IoV’s technologies. Moreover, we highlight potential future research directions that aim to ensure the foolproof security of IoV technology with respect to underlined challenges. Finally, we acknowledge that this is the first paper to comprehensively address the topic of PhyLaySec of IoV technology, which makes it a valuable resource for researchers and professionals working in this field.",
      "published": "2025-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3605066",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Safayat Bin Hakim",
        "Muhammad Adil",
        "Aitizaz Ali",
        "Ahmed Farouk",
        "Houbing Herbert Song"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2025.3605066",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3611875",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security Through Task Migration in Software-Defined Vehicles",
      "description": "The growing trend of software-controlled operation, control, and development of modern vehicles has led to the emergence of the software-defined vehicle (SDV) design paradigm. SDVs contain increasing software components and, like other cyber-physical systems, are more susceptible to cyber-attacks. However, patching vulnerabilities in these systems may take time, exposing them to cyber threats. To limit the effect of an attack, one solution is to migrate critical tasks co-located on the same electronic control unit (ECU) with a compromised component to another ECU. However, existing migration solutions, often designed for fault tolerance, introduce overhead and ignore security parameters. This article introduces ShiftGuard, a security-aware, distributed task migration mechanism for SDVs. We explore various design decisions that may affect the performance of ShiftGuard. We implemented and demonstrated the efficacy of ShiftGuard on an automotive platform running the controller area network (CAN) protocol and found that the end-to-end latency of the task migration decision is less than 17 ms for a system with 15 tasks hosted in three ECUs. We also performed extensive design-space exploration using a custom-developed simulator. Our experiments with synthetic workloads show that any task migration request has a 76%–100% success rate. In addition, we demonstrate ShiftGuard’s scalability for large networks of up to 70 ECUs, making it highly suitable for automotive systems with SDV capabilities.",
      "published": "2025-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3611875",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Zain A. H. Hammadeh",
        "Davide Alessi",
        "Monowar Hasan",
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Daniel Lüdtke",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2025.3611875",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2025.3618153",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PQ-V2X: A Novel Postquantum Cryptographic Dataset for Secure Vehicular Communications",
      "description": "Quantum computing threatens the cryptographic foundations of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) security. We present PQ-V2X, a large-scale dataset and benchmarking suite for postquantum intrusion detection that integrates cryptographic artifacts, vehicular mobility, and zone-aware channel conditions. The dataset comprises five million labeled records spanning 23 attack types across postquantum, hybrid, and classical families, including 10.05% real traces generated from Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. We evaluate ten machine-learning models under synthetic and hybrid settings and introduce the detection efficiency-resource (DER) metric to capture accuracy–cost tradeoffs. LightGBM attains perfect detection with high DER while training substantially faster than CatBoost; nonboosted models close the classical–quantum gap as data scales from 100K to 200K, though SPHINCS+-based vectors remain challenging. Tunnel zones amplify risk, underscoring the value of zone-aware features. PQ-V2X is, to the best of our knowledge, the first V2X dataset to combine NIST PQC traces, hybrid threats, mobility, and resource-aware benchmarking; data and code are released to enable reproducible, quantum-resilient IDS research.",
      "published": "2025-12-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3618153",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "intrusion",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shimaa A. Abdel Hakeem",
        "Hyungwon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2025.3618153",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2026.3662027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unknown Attack Detection Based on Class Incremental Learning in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) is the dominant protocol for in-vehicle electronic control unit (ECU) communication due to its efficiency and reliability, but its lack of built-in security mechanisms exposes vehicles to severe risks. Intrusion detection system (IDS) is essential for CAN security, yet existing approaches suffer from two key limitations: reliance on the closed-set assumption, which restricts unknown attack detection, and vulnerability to catastrophic forgetting during incremental learning. To address these challenges, this article proposes an open-set incremental detection method that integrates a three-feature extraction with data augmentation strategy. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves an average of 2.72% higher $F1$ score for unknown attack detection compared to the SOTA method in open set recognition. In incremental learning, it yields a 1.09% lower accuracy degradation rate than the SOTA method.",
      "published": "2026-04-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2026.3662027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Te-Yu Yin",
        "Y. Lai",
        "Congai Zeng",
        "Chen-Xin Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2026.3662027",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2026.3711962",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Monitoring Vulnerabilities in Next-Generation Automotive Operating Systems",
      "description": "Software-defined vehicles (SDVs) are revolutionizing transportation by integrating complex, interconnected hardware, and software systems. This evolution introduces significant security challenges. We present a comprehensive security analysis for SDVs, focusing on software vulnerabilities. We note that existing vulnerability assessment tools fall short in addressing operating systems vulnerabilities, particularly when it comes to efficiently analyzing diverse software stacks in realistic environments. We present and release a vulnerability assessment solution that efficiently addresses these limitations. Our approach combines systematic vulnerability discovery, leveraging public Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases, within a dockerized development environment that evaluates exploitability risks. The results reveal both breadth of potential threats and the practical constraints we faced during exploitation. We discuss the implications for industry and research, and propose directions for building more resilient SDVs.",
      "published": "2026-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2026.3711962",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "exploitation",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dimitri Simon",
        "Badis Hammi",
        "Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro",
        "Hervé Debar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal,2026",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2026.3711962",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2026.3725487",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hybrid Intrusion Detection System for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "The integration of Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCSs) into the smart grid necessitates sophisticated digital infrastructure for their management and coordination, which expands the attack surface and makes both the power grid and EVCSs vulnerable to cyberattacks. This research addresses critical gaps in existing EVCS Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) by proposing a hybrid IDS that integrates attack detection on both the cyber and physical layer of the EVCS ecosystem. The proposed hybrid IDS utilizes a dual-layer integration method, which combines network-based IDS (NIDS) and host-based IDS (HIDS). This approach facilitates for comprehensive monitoring of both network traffic through the NIDS and host-level activities via the HIDS, effectively addressing the unique challenges posed by the interconnected nature of EVCS ecosystems. Utilizing the recent CICEVSE2024 dataset, the IDS presented in this work performs multiclass classification across various attack types, including False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), reconnaissance, denial of service, backdoor, and cryptojacking attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves excellent detection accuracy, with the NIDS component reaching 99.99% accuracy for network-based attacks and the HIDS component achieving 83.47% accuracy on FDIA, cryptojacking, backdoor, all DoS, all Recon except Slowloris Scan attacks. This dual-layer detection significantly outperforms single-source detection approaches previously presented in literature.",
      "published": "2026-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2026.3725487",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Charukeshi Joglekar",
        "Chijioke Eze",
        "Danni Xiang",
        "Antonello Monti"
      ],
      "venue": "C. Joglekar, C. Eze, D. Xiang and A. Monti, \"A Hybrid Intrusion Detection System for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure,\" in IEEE Internet of Things Journal. 2026",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2026.3725487",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2026.3741007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Clustered Federated Learning in the Internet of Vehicles for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection Using Temporal CNN and Vehicle Attributes",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2026.3741007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fadwa Darwaish",
        "Safa Otoum",
        "C. D'Amours",
        "H. Mouftah"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2026.3741007",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jiot.2026.3744483",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Co-design of Lightweight Intrusion Detection and FPGA Deployment for Resource-Constrained In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With the increasing openness and interconnectivity of in-vehicle networks (IVN), the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, carrying critical control information, is highly vulnerable to various malicious attacks due to the lack of security protection mechanisms. The trade-off between reliability, real-time performance, and computational efficiency presents a significant challenge for CAN intrusion detection methods (IDS) deployed on resource-constrained automotive hardware. To address this challenge, this paper proposes an algorithm-hardware co-design method based on post-training quantization (PTQ). The lightweight IDS algorithm achieves high detection accuracy with minimal data dependency and a single-path, simplified inference architecture by utilizing refined hybrid temporal features (HTF) and structural re-parameterization approaches. To ensure that the inference process accurately matches the fixed-point arithmetic features of field-programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware, the algorithm additionally preprocesses heterogeneous feature data using string decomposition (SD) techniques. Finally, a joint fixed-point reconstruction of inter-layer scaling (ILS) and per-channel scaling (PCS) factors is designed and integrated with dyadic quantization (DQ) to transform scaling factors into bitshift multiplications, and a division folding strategy is employed to achieve joint deployment optimization of the global average pooling (GAP) and fully connected (FC) layers. These strategies improve the efficiency of IDS hardware deployment and ensure high precision and low latency by avoiding hardware floating-point and division operations. Extensive experiments on public datasets demonstrate that the proposed method achieves a favorable balance between detection performance and deployment efficiency. Tests on FPGA deployment show that the system achieved an IDS accuracy of 99.47% with an inference time of 5.71 μs, fully validating its feasibility at the edge of IVN.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2026.3744483",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sha Huan",
        "Ziyang Chen",
        "Zhiquan Liu",
        "Cong Peng",
        "Yuanqin Xu",
        "Yan He",
        "Wenli Shang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet of Things Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/jiot.2026.3744483",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jproc.2017.2725339",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy and Integrity Considerations in Hyperconnected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The rapid advances in technology can be witnessed in the emergence of cyber-physical systems that pertain to several domains of our society. In transportation, we see the emergence of self-driving vehicles that utilize a multitude of sensors and intelligent learning techniques to navigate autonomously. Such vehicles are complex cyber-physical systems that are mobile and due to their sensor and intrinsic intelligence are able to collect, analyze, and capitalize upon an unprecedented amount of fine-grained data, as well as collaborate in real time with multiple stakeholders. Although such rich data can play a key role in data-driven economies of scale, this raises questions with respect to privacy- and integrity-dependent scenarios. In this work, the feasibility of ensuring integrity, and hence safety, while preserving privacy in the emerging hyperconnected vehicle scenarios is discussed. An exemplary case study on real-time vehicle interactions pertaining to map updates exemplifies the combination of privacy-enhancing technologies with integrity-protecting mechanisms.",
      "published": "2017-09-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2017.2725339",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stamatis Karnouskos",
        "Florian Kerschbaum"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the IEEE",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/jproc.2017.2725339",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 83,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3984,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/jproc.2017.2725339 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: stakeholders., scale, collect, sensor, case, sensors, intelligence, well."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2915983",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Edge Computing for Autonomous Driving: Opportunities and Challenges",
      "description": "Safety is the most important requirement for autonomous vehicles; hence, the ultimate challenge of designing an edge computing ecosystem for autonomous vehicles is to deliver enough computing power, redundancy, and security so as to guarantee the safety of autonomous vehicles. Specifically, autonomous driving systems are extremely complex; they tightly integrate many technologies, including sensing, localization, perception, decision making, as well as the smooth interactions with cloud platforms for high-definition (HD) map generation and data storage. These complexities impose numerous challenges for the design of autonomous driving edge computing systems. First, edge computing systems for autonomous driving need to process an enormous amount of data in real time, and often the incoming data from different sensors are highly heterogeneous. Since autonomous driving edge computing systems are mobile, they often have very strict energy consumption restrictions. Thus, it is imperative to deliver sufficient computing power with reasonable energy consumption, to guarantee the safety of autonomous vehicles, even at high speed. Second, in addition to the edge system design, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) provides redundancy for autonomous driving workloads and alleviates stringent performance and energy constraints on the edge side. With V2X, more research is required to define how vehicles cooperate with each other and the infrastructure. Last, safety cannot be guaranteed when security is compromised. Thus, protecting autonomous driving edge computing systems against attacks at different layers of the sensing and computing stack is of paramount concern. In this paper, we review state-of-the-art approaches in these areas as well as explore potential solutions to address these challenges.",
      "published": "2019-06-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2019.2915983",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaoshan Liu",
        "Liangkai Liu",
        "Jie Tang",
        "Yu Bo",
        "Yifan Wang",
        "Weisong Shi"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the IEEE",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/jproc.2019.2915983",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 780,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2948302",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G Vehicle-to-Everything Services: Gearing Up for Security and Privacy",
      "description": "5G is emerging to serve as a platform to support networking connections for sensors and vehicles on roads and provide vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services to drivers and pedestrians. 5G V2X communication brings tremendous benefits to us, including improved safety, high reliability, large communication coverage, and low service latency. On the other hand, due to ubiquitous network connectivity, it also presents serious trust, security, and privacy issues toward vehicles, which may impede the success of 5G V2X. In this article, we present a comprehensive survey on the security of 5G V2X services. Specifically, we first review the architecture and the use cases of 5G V2X. We also study a series of trust, security, and privacy issues in 5G V2X services and discuss the potential attacks on trust, security, and privacy in 5G V2X. Then, we offer an in-depth analysis of the state-of-the-art strategies for securing 5G V2X services and elaborate on how to achieve the trust, security, or privacy protection in each strategy. Finally, by pointing out several future research directions, it is expected to draw more attention and efforts into the emerging 5G V2X services.",
      "published": "2019-11-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2019.2948302",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rongxing Lu",
        "Lan Zhang",
        "Jianbing Ni",
        "Yuguang Michael Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the IEEE",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/jproc.2019.2948302",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 157,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2948775",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Security of Autonomous Driving: Threats, Defenses, and Future Directions",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have promised to drastically improve the convenience of driving by releasing the burden of drivers and reducing traffic accidents with more precise control. With the fast development of artificial intelligence and significant advancements of the Internet of Things technologies, we have witnessed the steady progress of autonomous driving over the recent years. As promising as it is, the march of autonomous driving technologies also faces new challenges, among which security is the top concern. In this article, we give a systematic study on the security threats surrounding autonomous driving, from the angles of perception, navigation, and control. In addition to the in-depth overview of these threats, we also summarize the corresponding defense strategies. Furthermore, we discuss future research directions about the new security threats, especially those related to deep-learning-based self-driving vehicles. By providing the security guidelines at this early stage, we aim to promote new techniques and designs related to AVs from both academia and industry and boost the development of secure autonomous driving.",
      "published": "2019-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2019.2948775",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kui Ren",
        "Qian Wang",
        "Cong Wang",
        "Zhan Qin",
        "Xiaodong Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the IEEE",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/jproc.2019.2948775",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 225,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jproc.2025.3600903",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle-to-Everything Cooperative Perception for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Achieving fully autonomous driving with enhanced safety and efficiency relies on vehicle-to-everything (V2X) cooperative perception (CP), which enables vehicles to share perception data, thereby enhancing situational awareness and overcoming the limitations of the sensing ability of individual vehicles. V2X CP plays a crucial role in extending the perception range, increasing detection accuracy, and supporting more robust decision-making and control in complex environments. This article provides a comprehensive survey of recent developments in V2X CP, introducing mathematical models that characterize the perception process under different collaboration strategies. Key techniques for enabling reliable perception sharing, such as agent selection, data alignment, and feature fusion, are examined in detail. In addition, major challenges are discussed, including differences in agents and models, uncertainty in perception outputs, and the impact of communication constraints such as transmission delay and data loss. This article concludes by outlining promising research directions, including privacy-preserving artificial intelligence methods, collaborative intelligence, and integrated sensing frameworks to support future advancements in V2X CP.",
      "published": "2025-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2025.3600903",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tao Huang",
        "Jianan Liu",
        "Xi Zhou",
        "Dinh C. Nguyen",
        "Mostafa Rahimi Azghadi",
        "Yuxuan Xia",
        "Qing‐Long Han",
        "Sumei Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the IEEE",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/jproc.2025.3600903",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 116,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jsac.2023.3322756",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Dilemma of Reliability or Security in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Communications Assisted by Energy Harvesting Relaying",
      "description": "In this study, we investigate the trade-off between reliability and security in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications systems, considering a UAV-terrestrial network aided by a relay powered by a dedicated power beacon. For this system, we derive the outage probability (OP) under both exact and approximate frameworks and compute the approximations in the closed-form expressions. For the security aspect, we also derive the intercept probability (IP) under exact and approximated frameworks. To minimize the IP, a friendly jamming technique is employed whereby the power beacon constantly broadcasts artificial noise (AN) toward an eavesdropper. Based on the derived mathematical framework, we then formulate a bi-objective optimization problem by jointly minimizing the OP and IP with respect to the UAV’s position and the time-switching (TS) ratio. A suitable algorithm, named non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm version II (NSGA-II), is deployed to obtain the sub-optimal solution. Finally, numerical results are presented to verify the accuracy of the proposed mathematical framework and the superiority of jointly minimizing both the OP and IP using only the channel statistics.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jsac.2023.3322756",
      "matched_terms": [
        "jamming",
        "relay",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "T. N. Nguyen",
        "L. Tu",
        "Peppino Fazio",
        "C. Trinh",
        "C. Le",
        "B. Huynh",
        "M. Vozn̆ák"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/jsac.2023.3322756",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jsen.2017.2782751",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proactive Threat Detection for Connected Cars Using Recursive Bayesian Estimation",
      "description": "Upcoming disruptive technologies around autonomous driving of connected cars have not yet been matched with appropriate security by design principles and lack approaches to incorporate proactive preventative measures in the wake of increased cyber-threats against such systems. In this paper, we introduce proactive anomaly detection to a use-case of hijacked connected cars to improve cyber-resilience. First, we manifest the opportunity of behavioral profiling for connected cars from recent literature covering related underpinning technologies. Then, we design and utilize a new data set file for connected cars influenced by the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast surveillance technology used in the aerospace industry to facilitate data collection and sharing. Finally, we simulate the analysis of travel routes in real time to predict anomalies using predictive modeling. Simulations show the applicability of a Bayesian estimation technique, namely, Kalman filter. With the analysis of future state predictions based on the previous behavior, cyber-threats can be addressed with a vastly increased time window for a reaction when encountering anomalies. We discuss that detecting real-time deviations for malicious intent with the predictive profiling and behavioral algorithms can be superior in effectiveness than the retrospective comparison of known-good/known-bad behavior. When quicker action can be taken while connected cars encounter cyberattacks, more effective engagement or interception of command and control will be achieved.",
      "published": "2017-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jsen.2017.2782751",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected cars",
        "resilience",
        "security",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haider Al‐Khateeb",
        "Gregory Epiphaniou",
        "Adam Reviczky",
        "Petros Karadimas",
        "Hadi Heidari"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Sensors Journal",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/jsen.2017.2782751",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jsen.2020.3004275",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Attacks in Vehicular Sensors",
      "description": "Today's modern vehicles contain anywhere from sixty to one-hundred sensors and exhibit the characteristics of Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS). There is a high degree of coupling, cohesiveness, and interactions among vehicle's CPS components (e.g., sensors, devices, systems, systems-of-systems) across sensing, communication, and control layers. Cyber-attacks in the sensing or communication layers can compromise the security of the control layer. This paper provides a detailed review of potential cyber threats related to the sensing layer. Notably, the focus is mainly towards two categories of sensors: vehicle dynamics sensors (e.g., Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS), magnetic encoders, and inertial sensors) and environment sensors (e.g., Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), ultrasonic, camera, Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar) systems, and Global Positioning System (GPS) units). The paper also offers perspectives through existing countermeasures from literature and stresses the need for data-driven cybersecurity solutions.",
      "published": "2020-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jsen.2020.3004275",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "tpms",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zeinab El-Rewini",
        "Karthikeyan Sadatsharan",
        "Niroop Sugunaraj",
        "Daisy Flora Selvaraj",
        "Siby Jose Plathottam",
        "Prakash Ranganathan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Sensors Journal",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/jsen.2020.3004275",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 121,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jsen.2023.3249240",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-Time Security Warning and ECU Identification for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Vehicle intelligence and networking have manifested the significance of the embedded controller area network (CAN) bus. However, the lack of message encryption and identity (ID) authentication leaves electric control units (ECUs) exposed to cyber attacks. To identify the potential attacks on the CAN, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are required with consideration of their computational burden and their application in vehicles. Therefore, we propose a lightweight ECU identification scheme. Explicitly, the proposed method records the periodic intervals of frames and calculates accumulated clock offsets with the recursive least square (RLS) algorithm; meanwhile, the empirical rules (ERs) are adopted to eliminate the noises. Then, the ECU fingerprints have been formulated with the derived clock skew, clock offsets, as well as their expectations. Furthermore, to accurately identify the attackers in the masquerade attacks, a double-verified attacker identification approach is proposed, in which the data dependency and intra–inter-class algorithm are, respectively, utilized for better executability. Finally, we have tested the proposed method with an actual vehicle, and the results manifest that the proposed method could identify the abnormal ECUs with an identification accuracy of at least 98%, and its execution time is less than 3 ms.",
      "published": "2023-03-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jsen.2023.3249240",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hongqian Wei",
        "Qiang Ai",
        "Wenqiang Zhao",
        "Youtong Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Sensors Journal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/jsen.2023.3249240",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jsyst.2018.2851140",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Decentralized Deadline-Driven Electric Vehicle Charging Recommendation",
      "description": "The electric vehicle (EV) industry has been rapidly developing internationally due to a confluence of factors, such as government support, industry shifts, and private consumer demand. Envisioning for the future connected vehicles, the popularity of EVs will have to handle a massive information exchange for charging demand. This inevitably brings much concern on network traffic overhead, information processing, security, etc. Data analytics could enable the move from Internet of EVs to optimized EV charging in smart transportation. In this paper, a mobile edge computing (MEC) supporting architecture along with an intelligent EV charging recommendation strategy is designed. The global controller behaves as a centralized cloud server to facilitate analytics from charging stations (CSs) (service providers) and charging reservation of on-the-move EVs (mobile clients) to predict the charging availability of CSs. Besides, road side units behave as MEC servers to help with the dissemination of the CSs' charging availability to EVs, and collecting their charging reservations, as well as operating decentralized computing on reservations mining and aggregation. Evaluation results show the features of the MEC-based charging recommendation system in terms of communication efficiency (low cost for information dissemination and collection) and improvement of charging performance (reduced charging waiting time and increased fully charged EVs).",
      "published": "2018-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jsyst.2018.2851140",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "connected vehicles",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yue Cao",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya",
        "Yuan Zhuang",
        "Naveed Ahmad",
        "Yan Sun",
        "Jaime Lloret"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Systems Journal",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/jsyst.2018.2851140",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/jsyst.2022.3230097",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System and Bayesian Network Model",
      "description": "As a promising technology, connected and autonomous vehicle (CAV) can reduce energy consumption and improve transportation safety. Nevertheless, as more enabling technologies are embedded in vehicles, the CAV is becoming more vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. Priority must be given to highly sensitive, life-threatening vulnerabilities. Therefore, an improved vulnerability assessment method for CAVs is proposed in this article, in which the common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) and Bayes theory are adopted. Compared to the classical CVSS method, our scheme considers the impact of exploited vulnerabilities on the real world. In the meantime, a Bayesian network vulnerability classification model based on the $\\text{CVSS}_{\\text{CAV}}$ method is designed to resolve the problem that the CAVs' vulnerability dataset is small and incomplete. The case study as well as simulation results with different datasets or algorithms indicate that our proposal is effective for vehicle vulnerability evaluation.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/jsyst.2022.3230097",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ying-hu Wang",
        "Bin Yu",
        "Hai-Yang Yu",
        "Lingyun Xiao",
        "Haojie Ji",
        "Ya-Nan Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Systems Journal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/jsyst.2022.3230097",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lcn58197.2023.10223397",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Tree-IDS: An Incremental Intrusion Detection System for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The rapid development of Internet of Vehicles technology has led to the continuous upgrading of the functions of connected vehicles. While connected vehicles bring convenience to people’s life, there are also many security threats. Connected vehicles not only have intra-vehicle networks communication, but also communicate with the external network. The diversity of communication methods makes the attack surface wider, and some new attacks are constantly emerging. In order to ensure vehicle security, This paper focuses on the attacks that are vulnerable to vehicles, and proposes an incremental intrusion detection system, which can not only detect attacks, but also incrementally learn new types of attacks. Experimental results illustrate that the proposed system can incrementally learn new attacks and avoid catastrophic forgetting problems, and can detect various types of known attacks with 99.99% accuracy on the Car-Hacking Dataset and 99.37% accuracy on the CICIDS2017.",
      "published": "2023-09-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lcn58197.2023.10223397",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuxin Zhao",
        "Zixiang Bi",
        "Guosheng Xu",
        "Chenyu Wang",
        "Guoai Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Local Computer Networks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/lcn58197.2023.10223397",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4068,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/lcn58197.2023.10223397 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: makes, functions, there, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lcomm.2019.2937097",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attacker Identification and Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "As the most wide-spread in-vehicle data bus protocol, CAN (Controller Area Network) has attracted more and more attention due to its lack of security protection mechanism. A variety of attacks against CAN bus have emerged, posing serious threat to vehicle safety. Accordingly, some methods have been proposed to detect CAN bus attacks, however, they have certain shortcomings such as additional computing burden and obvious false detection rate. Therefore, using the physical characteristics of voltage signal on CAN bus, we propose an LOF (Local Outlier Factor)-based intrusion detection method, which can greatly reduce the false detection rate as well as improve the detection accuracy. The modification of CAN protocol and the additional computation burden can also be avoided. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to implement bus-off intrusion detection on real vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-08-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lcomm.2019.2937097",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jing Ning",
        "Jiadai Wang",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Nei Kato"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Letters",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/lcomm.2019.2937097",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3966,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/lcomm.2019.2937097 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serious, well, physical."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lcomm.2019.2953722",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Topology Verification Enabled Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle CAN-FD Networks",
      "description": "Controller area network with flexible data rate (CAN-FD) is a widely used communication protocol for in-vehicle sensing and control. However, due to the lack of inherent security mechanisms, unauthorized devices could access the CAN-FD by embedding external intruding devices (XIDs) to in-vehicle networks. Malicious intrusion into CAN-FD can expose a compromised vehicle to significantly increased safety, security, and privacy related risks. To enhance the security of CAN-FD networks, a novel intrusion detection method based on verification of network topology is proposed, where XIDs can be reliably detected through a simple random walk based network topology construction and subsequent verification. When an intrusion is detected, a secure mode would be triggered to further protect the network from being attacked. Simulation results indicate that multiple XIDs can be accurately detected, while the increment in the number of XIDs from 1 to 8 can lead to the convergence time increasing from 48 to 102 steps in the powertrain subnet and from 189 to 416 steps in the body subnet.",
      "published": "2019-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lcomm.2019.2953722",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tianqi Yu",
        "Xianbin Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Letters",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/lcomm.2019.2953722",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lcomm.2022.3195486",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Domain Adversarial Neural Network-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network Variant Attacks",
      "description": "A controller area network (CAN) bus that controls real-time communication and data transmission of electronic control units in vehicles lacks security mechanisms and is highly vulnerable to attacks. The detection effectiveness of existing In-Vehicle network intrusion detection systems (IDSs) is usually reliant on training samples of known attacks. Owing to the simple structure of the CAN bus protocol, attackers can easily create variants based on known attacks. In this study, we propose a CAN bus IDS based on a domain adversarial neural network, which can achieve high detection performance on unlearned variant attack data. In addition, we used feature fusion techniques to synthetically extract the features of the attack data to improve detection capability. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed model has high performance and generalization ability in attack detection.",
      "published": "2022-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lcomm.2022.3195486",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jingwen Wei",
        "Ye Chen",
        "Yingxu Lai",
        "Yuhang Wang",
        "Zhaoyi Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Letters",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/lcomm.2022.3195486",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/les.2023.3299217",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LOCoCAT: Low-Overhead Classification of CAN Bus Attack Types",
      "description": "Although research has shown vulnerabilities and shortcomings of the CAN bus and proposed alternatives, the CAN bus protocol is still the industry standard and present in most vehicles. Due to its vulnerability to potential intruders that can hinder execution or even take control of the vehicles, much work has focused on detecting intrusions on the CAN bus. However, most literature does not provide mechanisms to reason about, or respond to the attacks so that the system can continue to execute safely despite the intruder. This paper proposes a low-overhead methodology to automatically classify intrusions into pre-defined types once detected. Our framework (i) groups messages of the same attacks into blocks, (ii) extracts relevant features from each block, and (iii) predicts the type of attack using a lightweight classifier model. The initial models depicted in this paper show an accuracy of up to 99.16% within the first 50 ms of the attack, allowing the system to quickly react to the intrusion before the malicious actor can conclude their attack. We believe this paper lays the groundwork for vehicles to have specialized runtime reactions based on the attack type.",
      "published": "2023-09-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/les.2023.3299217",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Caio Batista de Melo",
        "Nikil D. Dutt"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Embedded Systems Letters",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/les.2023.3299217",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/les.2024.3432593",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Endogenous Security Study of Telematics Box in Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) are the result of technological advancements in the new era, greatly enhancing the driving experience. However, due to the complex nature of the system, the intelligence of devices, and the connectivity of data, a complex physical fusion system has been created. The in-vehicle Telematics Box (T-Box), serving as the central communication and data hub, faces challenges, such as network vulnerabilities, data privacy, and malicious attacks through untrusted software updates. Therefore, an in-vehicle T-Box with high reliability, security, and performance is an urgent product in the era of the Internet of Vehicles. This article investigates the endogenous security of the T-Box in ICV, with a focus on the integration of dynamic heterogeneous redundancy (DHR) architecture. The underlying idea is to transform the original system into multiple heterogeneous systems, where some of them handle the same business functions. By applying a consensus mechanism to detect malicious nodes and dynamically scheduling healthy nodes into the working mode, a self-purifying defense system with intrinsic security is formed. This design approach endows the T-Box with inherent defense capabilities against unknown vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, the in-vehicle T-Box is redesigned in the software and hardware implementation scheme. Experimental results demonstrate that the new design notably enhances and ensures the robust stability and elevated reliability of the in-vehicle T-Box. Evidently, the upgraded T-Box ensures the safe processing of in-vehicle CAN bus data.",
      "published": "2024-07-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/les.2024.3432593",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhen Zhang",
        "Yuezhong Zhang",
        "Jinfeng Zhang",
        "Jichao Xie",
        "Shaoxun Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Embedded Systems Letters",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/les.2024.3432593",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3951,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/les.2024.3432593 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: stability, unknown, nature, intelligence, where, physical, privacy, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/les.2024.3475470",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TinyML-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network Using Convolutional Neural Network on Embedded Devices",
      "description": "This letter proposes a novel model for effectively detecting malicious messages in controller area network (CAN) communication, which is widely used in automotive networks. Because in-vehicle networks operate in resource-constrained environments, an intrusion detection system (IDS) must simultaneously provide a low computational load and excellent detection performance. However, existing models are unsuitable for deployment on low-power embedded devices owing to their high computational requirements. This letter presents a low-complexity convolutional neural network (CNN)-based IDS for deployment on embedded edge devices. The proposed model applies CNN operations separately to the CAN ID sequence and the data field of the CAN frame to extract features and concatenate them for feature fusion. Experimental results demonstrate that this approach requires considerably less computational load and provides superior detection performance. Furthermore, the proposed model is deployed on a resource-constrained nRF52840 microcontroller using TensorFlow Lite for Microcontrollers with 20.44-kB flash memory and 26.44-kB RAM without quantization.",
      "published": "2024-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/les.2024.3475470",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Embedded Systems Letters",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/les.2024.3475470",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/les.2026.3726688",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Concealing CAN Message Sequences to Prevent Schedule-based Bus-off Attacks",
      "description": "This work focuses on eliminating timing-side channels in real-time safety-critical cyber-physical network protocols like Controller Area Networks (CAN). Automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs) implement predictable scheduling decisions based on task level response time estimation. Such levels of determinism exposes timing information about task executions and therefore corresponding message transmissions via the network buses (that connect the ECUs and actuators). With proper analysis, such timing side channels can be utilized to launch several schedule-based attacks that can lead to eventual denial-of-service or man-in-the-middle-type attacks. To eliminate this determinism, we propose a novel schedule obfuscation strategy by skipping certain control task executions and related data transmissions along with random shifting of the victim task instance. While doing this, our strategy contemplates the performance of the control task as well by bounding the number of control execution skips. We analytically demonstrate how the attack success probability (ASP) is reduced under this proposed attack-aware skipping and randomization. We also demonstrate the efficacy and real-time applicability of our attack-aware schedule obfuscation strategy Hide-n-Seek by applying it to synthesized automotive task sets in a real-time Hardware-in-loop (HIL) setup.",
      "published": "2023-06-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/les.2026.3726688",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sunandan Adhikary",
        "Ipsita Koley",
        "Arkaprava Sain",
        "Soumyadeep das",
        "Shuvam Saha",
        "Soumyajit Dey"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/les.2026.3726688",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/logistiqua66323.2025.11122753",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity and Digital Marketing in Smart Supply Chains: Resilience Challenges in the Face of Inflation and Recession",
      "description": "In an economic context impacted by inflation and recession, organizations are required to transform their supply chains by integrating new technologies and highly interconnected networks, where digital marketing plays a key role in managing customer-supplier relationships, predicting demand, and enhancing market visibility. However, these practices expose companies to increased cyber threat vulnerabilities, threatening not only the logistics system but also personal data security. Based on three core dimensions: technological, organizational, and legal, our study explores cyberattacks' impact on smart supply chain performance, focusing on the risks associated with using personal data in digital marketing methods. To obtain this result, a systematic literature review was carried out to summarize existing studies, identify gaps, and suggest areas for future research. This theoretical foundation is further supported by an exploratory qualitative study conducted through semi-structured interviews with four Moroccan automotive supply chain companies. the findings highlight the critical importance of a solid cybersecurity strategy in an uncertain environment.",
      "published": "2025-05-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/logistiqua66323.2025.11122753",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "personal data",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soukaina Charroud",
        "Zakia Errabih",
        "Kenza Raissouni"
      ],
      "venue": "International Colloquium on Logistics and Supply Chain Management (LOGISTIQUA)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/logistiqua66323.2025.11122753",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lra.2018.2857402",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Failing to Learn: Autonomously Identifying Perception Failures for Self-Driving Cars",
      "description": "One of the major open challenges in self-driving cars is the ability to detect cars and pedestrians to safely navigate in the world. Deep learning-based object detector approaches have enabled great advances in using camera imagery to detect and classify objects. But for a safety critical application, such as autonomous driving, the error rates of the current state of the art are still too high to enable safe operation. Moreover, the characterization of object detector performance is primarily limited to testing on prerecorded datasets. Errors that occur on novel data go undetected without additional human labels. In this letter, we propose an automated method to identify mistakes made by object detectors without ground truth labels. We show that inconsistencies in the object detector output between a pair of similar images can be used as hypotheses for false negatives (e.g., missed detections) and using a novel set of features for each hypothesis, an off-the-shelf binary classifier can be used to find valid errors. In particular, we study two distinct cues-temporal and stereo inconsistencies-using data that are readily available on most autonomous vehicles. Our method can be used with any camera-based object detector and we illustrate the technique on several sets of real world data. We show that a state-of-the-art detector, tracker, and our classifier trained only on synthetic data can identify valid errors on KITTI tracking dataset with an average precision of 0.94. We also release a new tracking dataset with 104 sequences totaling 80,655 labeled pairs of stereo images along with ground truth disparity from a game engine to facilitate further research.",
      "published": "2018-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lra.2018.2857402",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "self-driving",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manikandasriram Srinivasan Ramanagopal",
        "Cyrus Anderson",
        "Ram Vasudevan",
        "Matthew Johnson‐Roberson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Robotics and Automation Letters",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/lra.2018.2857402",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 115,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lra.2022.3192802",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2X-Sim: Multi-Agent Collaborative Perception Dataset and Benchmark for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication techniques enable the collaboration between vehicles and many other entities in the neighboring environment, which could fundamentally improve the perception system for autonomous driving. However, the lack of a public dataset significantly restricts the research progress of collaborative perception. To fill this gap, we present V2X-Sim, a comprehensive simulated multi-agent perception dataset for V2X-aided autonomous driving. V2X-Sim provides: (1) multi-agent sensor recordings from the road-side unit (RSU) and multiple vehicles that enable collaborative perception, (2) multi-modality sensor streams that facilitate multi-modality perception, and (3) diverse ground truths that support various perception tasks. Meanwhile, we build an open-source testbed and provide a benchmark for the state-of-the-art collaborative perception algorithms on three tasks, including detection, tracking and segmentation. V2X-Sim seeks to stimulate collaborative perception research for autonomous driving before realistic datasets become widely available.",
      "published": "2022-07-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lra.2022.3192802",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "tracking",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yiming Li",
        "Dekun Ma",
        "Ziyan An",
        "Zixun Wang",
        "Yiqi Zhong",
        "Siheng Chen",
        "Chen Feng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Robotics and Automation Letters",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/lra.2022.3192802",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 336,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lra.2025.3580923",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Semantic Hierarchy-Guided Adversarial Attack for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles employ semantic segmentation as a foundational component for perception and scene understanding, upon which driving decisions can be informed. Despite their performance, these deep learning models remain susceptible to subtle input perturbations that can cause severe deviation in model output. To enhance algorithmic robustness by examining such vulnerabilities, researchers have investigated adversarial examples, which are visually imperceptible yet can severely degrade model performance. However, traditional attacks produce arbitrary misclassifications that ignore semantic relationships, making the attack less effective. This paper introduces a semantic hierarchy-guided adversarial attack (SHAA), a white-box adversarial attack against semantic segmentation for autonomous driving. By combining semantic hierarchy and adaptive momentumbased updates across the image, SHAA produces semantically nontrivial yet highly effective perturbations. The SHAA method exposes deeper vulnerabilities with a higher attack success rate in semantic segmentation than existing methods, aiding the design of a more resilient perception system for autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-06-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lra.2025.3580923",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gwangbin Kim",
        "SeungJun Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Robotics and Automation Letters",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/lra.2025.3580923",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/lsens.2020.2993522",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Long Short-Term Memory Neural Network-Based Attack Detection Model for In-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": "In this letter, we create two types of attacks to investigate in-vehicle network security: replay attack and amplitude-shift attack. We use these two attacks to create attack datasets from two attack-free in-vehicle controller area network bus datasets (dataset-I and dataset-II), which represent a collection of correlated time series data. We develop a long short-term memory (LSTM) neural-network-based model for detecting replay attack and amplitude-shift attack. For attacks on the dataset-I, the LSTM detection model achieves accuracy of 87.8% and 87.9%, and area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) of 0.63 and 0.88, for replay attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively. For attacks on the dataset-II, the LSTM detection model achieves accuracy of 83.7% and 83.8%, and AUPRC of 0.53 and 0.75, for replay attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively. Overall, the LSTM detection model shows improvement in accuracy, precision, recall, and AUPRC over the baseline detection models considered in this letter.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/lsens.2020.2993522",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zadid Khan",
        "M. Chowdhury",
        "Mhafuzul Islam",
        "Chin-Ya Huang",
        "Mizanur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Sensors Letters",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/lsens.2020.2993522",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mass62177.2024.00091",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MARISMA-CAR: A Preliminary Approach to Risk Assessment in Automotive Security",
      "description": "With the introduction of software components that allow them to interact with each other, modern vehicles can make decisions and make driving safer. Nevertheless, the use of communication technologies between vehicles and infrastructure, known as Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X), is a reality and is expected to be implemented in the near future. Although these sophisticated technologies bring great opportunities in the automotive field, they could introduce cybersecurity threats and security risks if compromised. For this reason, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has released ISO/SAE 21434 to introduce the cybersecurity process in developing hardware components for upcoming vehicles. However, it only defines requirements rather than a practical approach. In addition, methodologies must also be defined in order to respond to threats up to the components design phase. For these reasons, this paper proposes a preliminary approach by defining a security pattern called MARISMA-CAR in the automotive environment to manage and control the risk of threats in modern vehicles and future Smart Cars by combining the ENISA report and the ISO/SAE 21434. This work can help the automotive industry to set up security controls to identify, protect, and respond to automotive threats. Finally, the proposed models align with the ISO/SAE 21434 standard for the proposal of risk assessment methodologies.",
      "published": "2024-09-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mass62177.2024.00091",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Luis Enrique Sanchez",
        "Antonio Santos-Olmo",
        "Manuel Serrano"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/mass62177.2024.00091",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mass66014.2025.00111",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PA-JJAMA: An LLM Based Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus Networks",
      "description": "Recent studies have demonstrated significant success in detecting attacks on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus network using machine learning and deep learning models, including convolutional neural networks and transformer-based architectures. Building on this foundation, our work investigates the use of large language models (LLMs) not only for intrusion detection but also for providing interpretable explanations of their decisions. We fine-tuned three LLMs, i.e., SecureBERT, LLaMA-2, and LLaMA-3, for intrusion detection on CAN bus data. Among them, LLaMA-3 delivered the best results, achieving SOTA performance on the Car-Hacking dataset. Beyond attack classification, we evaluated LLaMA-3’s ability to generate reasoning for its decisions through zero-shot prompting. The model successfully articulated its rationale, particularly for Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, demonstrating strong potential for explain-ability in intrusion detection systems. These findings highlight the potential of LLMs to serve as a highly accurate intrusion detection system while simultaneously providing interpretable explanations, thereby enhancing the investigative capabilities of cybersecurity professionals.",
      "published": "2025-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mass66014.2025.00111",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joshua Quintano",
        "Yao Qiang",
        "Huirong Fu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/mass66014.2025.00111",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mc.2019.2891334",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Telematics: The Good, Bad and Ugly",
      "description": "Reports on vehicular telematics. Here, suggests that vehicular telematics is but one of the later instantiations of Orwellian digital dystopia, but with its own distinvehictive twists including the increased exposure to malicious hacking and the potential for abuse of individual privacy. As with other innovative technologies, modern vehicular telematics is a mixed blessing. There is no doubt that some telematics associated with convenience, safety, mechanical reliability, and entertainment are welcomed by many consumers and to varying degrees. With my latest vehicle, I most appreciate features like forward collision alert, 360° surround vision, distance indication, front pedestrian braking, cross traffic alerts, active cruise control, lane-keeping assistance, parking sensors, blind-spot monitoring,",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mc.2019.2891334",
      "matched_terms": [
        "hacking",
        "privacy",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hal Berghel"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mc.2019.2891334",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mce.2019.2941345",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Tree-Based Attack–Defense Model for Risk Assessment in Multi-UAV Networks",
      "description": "Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) networks are attack-prone networks due to high mobility and distributed nature. Most of the existing approaches focus on prevention instead of analyzing the security vulnerabilities. For an efficient analysis, the interaction between attackers and defenders need to be investigated. Hence, a tree-based attack-defense model for security analysis of multi-UAV networks has been discussed in this paper. An attack-defense tree has been designed that depicts every move of the defender with respect to the attacker's strategies. Using this attack-defense tree, a game theoretic scheme for risk assessment is formulated. The efficiency of the proposed scheme has been evaluated using a case study for the distributed denial-of-service attack.",
      "published": "2019-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mce.2019.2941345",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "risk assessment",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sahil Garg",
        "Gagangeet Singh Aujla",
        "Neeraj Kumar",
        "Shalini Batra"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mce.2019.2941345",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mce.2019.2941392",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware Security Primitives for Vehicles",
      "description": "In the last few decades, advances in vehicular technology have necessitated large increases in the number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within vehicles. These ECUs are required to communicate with other ECUs in order to achieve full functionality. The communication networks that connect the ECUs have been shown to pose significant security risks, as they can be the target for attacks. Establishing security in vehicles against attacks is a complex topic that has generated much interest as a focus of research. In this article, we will highlight current security approaches in terms of hardware modules and physically unclonable functions (PUFs).",
      "published": "2019-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mce.2019.2941392",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carson Labrado",
        "Himanshu Thapliyal"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mce.2019.2941392",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mce.2020.3012425",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Defense Mechanism Against Replay Attack in Remote Keyless Entry Systems Using Timestamping and XOR Logic",
      "description": "Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems are essential in modern lifestyle with applications including vehicle and garage entry. However, the convenience such systems facilitate comes at the expense of their vulnerability to different attacks such as jamming, replay, jamming-and-replay, and cryptanalysis. These attacks, if lightly taken, may lead to catastrophic consequences to the general public, such as property theft and human casualties. To this end, an improved RKE system using timestamping and XOR encoding is proposed to countermeasure the aforementioned attacks. In addition, the integrated defense mechanism protects the authentication code in scenarios where the encrypted transmitter-receiver communications are compromised. The defense mechanism in the proposed RKE is demonstrated and tested in realistic setups, and is found to outperform the conventional RKE.",
      "published": "2020-07-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mce.2020.3012425",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyle Greene",
        "Deven Rodgers",
        "Henry Dykhuizen",
        "Quamar Niyaz",
        "Khair A. Al Shamaileh",
        "Vijay Devabhaktuni"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mce.2020.3012425",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mce.2020.3023538",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reverse Engineering Controller Area Network Messages Using Unsupervised Machine Learning",
      "description": "The smart city landscape is rife with opportunities for mobility and economic optimization, but also presents many security concerns spanning the range of components and systems in the smart ecosystem. One key enabler for this ecosystem is smart transportation and transit, which is foundationally built upon connected vehicles. Ensuring vehicular security, while necessary to guarantee passenger and pedestrian safety, is itself challenging due to the broad attack surfaces of modern automotive systems. A single car contains dozens to hundreds of small embedded computing devices known as electronic control units (ECUs) executing hundreds of millions of lines of code; the inherent complexity of this tightly integrated cyber-physical system (CPS) is one of the key problems that frustrate effective security. We describe an approach to help reduce the complexity of security analyses by leveraging unsupervised machine learning to learn clusters of messages passed between ECUs that correlate with changes in the CPS state of a vehicle as it moves throughout the world. Our approach can help to improve the security of vehicles in a smart city, and can leverage smart city infrastructure to further enrich and refine the quality of the machine learning output.",
      "published": "2020-09-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mce.2020.3023538",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Uchenna Ezeobi",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Clinton Young",
        "Joseph Zambreno",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mce.2020.3023538",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mce.2021.3116923",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unsupervised Deep Learning Approach for In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) is a standard communication protocol used for sending messages between electronic control unit of a modern automotive system. CAN protocol does not have any in-built security mechanisms and, hence, various attacks can affect the vehicle and cause life threats to the passengers. This article presents an unsupervised deep learning architecture for detecting intrusions on a CAN bus. The CAN intrusion detection system (IDS) architecture has an autoencoder that helps to learn the optimal features from CAN packets to differentiate between the normal and attacks. The optimal features are passed as input to the Gaussian mixture model, which helps us to cluster the CAN network packet data samples into normal and attacks. A detailed analysis of the proposed architecture is done on the CAN IDS dataset. To develop a robust CAN IDS system and achieve generalization, the proposed method is evaluated on the other two computer network intrusion datasets and a wireless sensor network dataset. In all the experiments, the proposed method has performed better than the existing unsupervised method and mainly showed a performance gain of 6.4% on the CAN IDS dataset. This indicates that the proposed method is robust and generalizable across detecting various attacks in a CAN bus and most importantly, the method can be used in real time to effectively monitor the CAN network traffic to proactively alert possible attacks.",
      "published": "2021-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mce.2021.3116923",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Harini Narasimhan",
        "Vinayakumar Ravi",
        "Nazeeruddin Mohammad"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/mce.2021.3116923",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mce.2022.3154346",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Roadmap for Cybersecurity in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles are on the horizon and will be transforming transportation safety and comfort. These vehicles will be connected to various external systems and utilize advanced embedded systems to perceive their environment and make intelligent decisions. However, this increased connectivity makes these vehicles vulnerable to various cyber-attacks that can have catastrophic effects. Attacks on automotive systems are already on the rise in today's vehicles and are expected to become more commonplace in future autonomous vehicles. Thus, there is a need to strengthen cybersecurity in future autonomous vehicles. In this article, we discuss major automotive cyber-attacks over the past decade and present state-of-the-art solutions that leverage artificial intelligence. We propose a roadmap toward building secure autonomous vehicles and highlight key open challenges that need to be addressed.",
      "published": "2022-02-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mce.2022.3154346",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vipin Kumar Kukkala",
        "Sooryaa Vignesh Thiruloga",
        "Sudeep Pasricha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/mce.2022.3154346",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 86,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.001.1800242",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cooperative Passive Coherent Location: A Promising 5G Service to Support Road Safety",
      "description": "5G promises many new vertical service areas beyond simple communication and data transfer. We propose CPCL (cooperative passive coherent location), a distributed MIMO radar service, which can be offered by mobile radio network operators as a service for public user groups. CPCL comes as an inherent part of the radio network and takes advantage of the most important key features proposed for 5G. It extends the well-known idea of passive radar (also known as passive coherent location, PCL) by introducing cooperative principles. These range from cooperative, synchronous radio signaling, and MAC up to radar data fusion on sensor and scenario levels. By using software-defined radio and network paradigms, as well as real-time mobile edge computing facilities intended for 5G, CPCL promises to become a ubiquitous radar service which may be adaptive, reconfigurable, and perhaps cognitive. As CPCL makes double use of radio resources (both in terms of frequency bands and hardware), it can be considered a green technology. Although we introduce the CPCL idea from the viewpoint of vehicle-to-vehicle/infrastructure (V2X) communication, it can definitely also be applied to many other applications in industry, transport, logistics, and for safety and security applications.",
      "published": "2018-02-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.001.1800242",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Reiner S. Thomä",
        "Carsten Andrich",
        "Giovanni Del Galdo",
        "Michael Döbereiner",
        "Matthias A. Hein",
        "Martin Käske",
        "Günter Schäfer",
        "Steffen Schieler",
        "Christian Schneider",
        "Andreas Schwind",
        "Philip Wendland"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 57, no. 9, pp. 86-92, September 2019",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.001.1800242",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.001.1900141",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical-Layer Security and Privacy for Vehicle-to-Everything",
      "description": "Vehicular communications in intelligent transportation systems promise to improve traffic efficiency, road utilization, and safety. Achieving secure vehicular communications is vital for the deployment of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) applications. This article provides a comprehensive overview of physical-layer security (PLS) strategies employed for V2X. By exploiting the randomness and the physical characteristics of wireless channels, PLS offers reliable solutions against eavesdropper attacks as complementary approaches to cryptographic techniques. We give a brief introduction to the architecture and characteristics of V2X networks. Then the fundamental principles of PLS technology are proposed, followed by security threats in V2X. Additionally, we discuss some open issues and challenges for future research. Finally, we investigate a case study where different challenges and technologies coexist in one V2X scenario.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.001.1900141",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Basem M. ElHalawany",
        "Ahmad A. Aziz El-Banna",
        "Kaishun Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.001.1900141",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.001.1900143",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MBID: Micro-Blockchain-Based Geographical Dynamic Intrusion Detection for V2X",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) aims to make transportation system more intelligent through linking everything with the moving vehicles, but it brings geographical dynamic intrusions. However, existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) of vehicles just deploy the preset statics strategies. As a novel security technology, blockchain can realize decentralized tamper- resistance. However, it has not been used for IDSs because of its rigid structure. In this article, we propose Micro-Blockchain based geographical dynamic Intrusion Detection, MBID, for V2X. A novel nested micro-blockchain structure is proposed, where each micro-blockchain deployed in a small region can construct local intrusion detection strategies for vehicles with tamper- resistance. When a vehicle moves to another region, spatial-temporal dynamic IDSs strategies are constructed through the proposed repeatedly nested scheme for micro-blockchains. Moreover, the control plane is proposed to dynamically configure IDSs strategies into the micro-blockchain. Simulation results show the accuracy of MBID.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.001.1900143",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haoran Liang",
        "Jun Wu",
        "Shahid Mumtaz",
        "Jianhua Li",
        "Xi Lin",
        "Miaowen Wen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.001.1900143",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 96,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.001.1900170",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Meets Vehicle-to-Everything in Secure Communications",
      "description": "Enabling vehicles to communicate with other vehicles, infrastructure, pedestrians, and everything for use cases such as road safety, automatic driving, and infotainment is important for the future cellular networks. However, some vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services need secure transmissions and should be prevented from eavesdropping. Physical layer security, an information- theoretical framework, utilizes the randomness of underlying channels to ensure secrecy in the physical layer. Different from ground communications, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) create line-of-sight connections to vehicles and mobile users making them an ideal platform to conduct physical layer security strategies. In this article, we embrace UAV to V2X communications to enhance the V2X security from the physical layer security's perspective. To be specific, we present security problems in V2X systems, highlight security threats in V2X networks, and illustrate some potential applications of UAVs in V2X security. Open problems for UAV-assisted V2X secure communications are also discussed.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.001.1900170",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bodong Shang",
        "Lingjia Liu",
        "Junchao Ma",
        "Pingzhi Fan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.001.1900170",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 93,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.2015.7120028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security vulnerabilities of connected vehicle streams and their impact on cooperative driving",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles capable of navigating unpredictable real-world environments with little human feedback are a reality today. Such systems rely heavily on onboard sensors such as cameras, radar/LIDAR, and GPS as well as capabilities such as 3G/4G connectivity and V2V/V2I communication to make real-time maneuvering decisions. Autonomous vehicle control imposes very strict requirements on the security of the communication channels used by the vehicle to exchange information as well as the control logic that performs complex driving tasks such as adapting vehicle velocity or changing lanes. This study presents a first look at the effects of security attacks on the communication channel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle stream equipped to achieve CACC. Our simulation results show that an insider attack can cause significant instability in the CACC vehicle stream. We also illustrate how different countermeasures, such as downgrading to ACC mode, could potentially be used to improve the security and safety of the connected vehicle streams.",
      "published": "2015-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.2015.7120028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mani Amoozadeh",
        "Arun Raghuramu",
        "Chen‐Nee Chuah",
        "Dipak Ghosal",
        "Michael Zhang",
        "Jeff Rowe",
        "Karl Levitt"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.2015.7120028",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 418,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.2017.1600913",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Cost-Efficient Communication Framework for Battery-Switch-Based Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "Charging management for EVs on the move has become an increasingly important research problem in smart cities. Major technical challenges include the selection of charging stations to guide charging plans, and the design of cost-efficient communication infrastructure between the power grid and EVs. In this article, we first present a brief review on state-of-the-art EV charging management schemes. Next, by incorporating battery switch technology to enable fast charging service, a publish/subscribe communication framework is provisioned to support the EV charging service. After that, we develop a fully distributed charging management scheme with consideration of urban travel uncertainties, for example, traffic congestion and drivers' preferences. This would benefit from low privacy sensitivity, as EVs' status information will not be released through management. Results demonstrate a guidance for the provisioning of a P/S communication framework to improve EV drivers' experience, for example, charging waiting time and total trip duration. Also, the benefit of a P/S communication framework is reflected in terms of the communication efficiency. Open research issues in this emerging area are also presented.",
      "published": "2017-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.2017.1600913",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yue Cao",
        "Shusen Yang",
        "Geyong Min",
        "Xi Zhang",
        "Houbing Herbert Song",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya",
        "Nauman Aslam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.2017.1600913",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 69,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.2018.1800137",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Block4Forensic: An Integrated Lightweight Blockchain Framework for Forensics Applications of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Today's vehicles are becoming cyber-physical systems that not only communicate with other vehicles but also gather various information from hundreds of sensors within them. These developments help create smart and connected (e.g., self-driving) vehicles that will introduce significant information to drivers, manufacturers, insurance companies, and maintenance service providers for various applications. One such application that is becoming crucial with the introduction of self-driving cars is forensic analysis of traffic accidents. The utilization of vehicle-related data can be instrumental in post-accident scenarios to discover the faulty party, particularly for self-driving vehicles. With the opportunity of being able to access various information in cars, we propose a permissioned blockchain framework among the various elements involved to manage the collected vehicle-related data. Specifically, we first integrate vehicular public key infrastructure (VPKI) to the proposed blockchain to provide membership establishment and privacy. Next, we design a fragmented ledger that will store detailed data related to vehicles such as maintenance information/ history, car diagnosis reports, and so on. The proposed forensic framework enables trustless, traceable, and privacy-aware post-accident analysis with minimal storage and processing overhead.",
      "published": "2018-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.2018.1800137",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mumin Cebe",
        "Enes Erdin",
        "Kemal Akkaya",
        "Hidayet Aksu",
        "Arif Selcuk Uluagac"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.2018.1800137",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 325,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4027,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/mcom.2018.1800137 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: providers, next, sensors, service, car, applications, significant, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcom.2019.8875718",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Wireless Communications for Vehicle-to-Everything",
      "description": "The four articles in this special section focus on secure wireless networks for vehicle-to-everything communications. Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) will support more efficient vehicular traffic flow, increased vehicular and pedestrian safety, and, eventually, autonomous driving. Wireless communications is fundamental for enabling ITS, and recent advances in communications technology and systems support establishing reliable wireless links and networks among cars, cars and pedestrians, and cars and fixed infrastructure. The success of ITS will be measured in terms of how well it can scale to the ever-increasing mobility application scenarios and harsh environmental conditions. Research and development is ongoing to make vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems more reliable and more secure for providing safety-critical applications. This Feature Topic brings together researchers and practitioners in V2X security to share their latest research contributions and expert insights.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.2019.8875718",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vuk Marojevic",
        "Charles Kamhoua",
        "Jeffrey H. Reed",
        "Friedrich K. Jondral"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcom.2019.8875718",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2000078",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Threats and Countermeasures of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Communications",
      "description": "Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been widely applied in various fields, including but not limited to military, industry, and agriculture. But UAVs also confront severe security threats, which slows down their wide application. Current research mainly focuses on the security of a single UAV system, while paying little attention to UAV-related communications, especially in the physical and network layers. Thus, it becomes necessary to summarize potential security threats and corresponding countermeasures. To this end, we study mainstream attacks on UAV communications in order to propose security requirements. Then we present a comprehensive review on existing security countermeasures for enhancing UAV communication security in both the physical and network layers. We conclude with open issues and future prospects of UAV security.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2000078",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Wang",
        "Yu Chen",
        "Pu Wang",
        "Zheng Yan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Standards Magazine",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2000078",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2100060",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Post-Quantum Era in V2X Security: Convergence of Orchestration and Parallel Computation",
      "description": "Along with the potential emergence of quantum computing, safety and security of new and complex communication services such as automated driving need to be redefined in the post-quantum era. To ensure reliable, continuous, and secure operation of these scenarios, quantum-resistant security algorithms (QRSAs) that enable secure connectivity must be integrated into the network management and orchestration systems of mobile networks. This article explores a road-map study of post-quantum era convergence with cellular connectivity using the Service & Computation Orchestrator (SCO) framework for enhanced data security in radio access and backhaul transmission with a particular focus on vehicle-to-everything services. Using NTRU as a QSRA, we show that the parallelization performance of the Toom-Cook and Karatsuba computation methods can vary based on different CPU load conditions through extensive simulations, and that the SCO framework can facilitate the selection of the most efficient computation for a given QRSA. Finally, we discuss the evaluation results, identify the current standardization efforts, and present possible directions for the coexistence of post-quantum and mobile network connectivity through an SCO framework that leverages parallel computing.",
      "published": "2021-12-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2100060",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Engin Zeydan",
        "Yekta Türk",
        "Berkin Aksoy",
        "Yaman Yagiz Tasbag"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Standards Magazine",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2100060",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2100080",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Depth Exploration of ISO/SAE 21434 and Its Correlations with Existing Standards",
      "description": "In recent years, the evolution of road vehicles has strongly required common rules to manage cybersecurity in the automotive industry. In this article, we summarize the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, focusing on the main requirements, work products, and innovations. We identify with an ego-network the possible correlation of ISO/SAE 21434 with the already existing automotive standards, reporting a strong correlation with the ISO 26262 safety standard. Following, we discuss the relationship between safety and security in the automotive field, and between ISO/SAE 21434 and regulation UNECE WP.29 R155. Then we focus on possible limits and implementations of the standard such as the introduction of application methods or specific thresholds for the required security risk analysis. Finally, we propose a structured list of documents that can be used as a landmark to achieve compliance with the cyber-security standard and an example of the application of ISO/SAE 21434 to an electric window power regulator system.",
      "published": "2022-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2100080",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Standards Magazine",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2100080",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2400042",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Electric Vehicles Against CAN Bus Replay Attacks: A Message Authentication Approach",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a critical communication system of an automobile, which enables various electronic control units (ECU) to communicate to each other and share information. CAN faces security vulnerabilities due to its limited security features and broadcast nature. This article investigated replay attacks on CAN bus and proposed an integrated intrusion prevention systems (IPS) for active defense against CAN bus attacks. Specifically, a secure message authentication scheme was introduced to verify and authenticate and freshness and integrity of message received on CAN bus against replay attack, in which each message were a freshness value and MAC tag were attached with the workload. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed scheme.",
      "published": "2024-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2400042",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunlong Sun",
        "Shancang Li",
        "Muddesar Iqbal",
        "Fatma Taher"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Standards Magazine",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcomstd.0001.2400042",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcomstd.001.2000069",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G NR-V2X: Toward Connected and Cooperative Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "5G New Radio (NR) is touted as a pivotal enabling technology for the genuine realization of connected and cooperative autonomous driving. Despite numerous research efforts in recent years, a systematic overview on the role of 5G NR in future connected autonomous communication networks is missing. To fill this gap and to spark more future research, this article introduces the technology components of 5G NR and discusses the evolution from existing cellular vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology toward NR-V2X. We primarily focus on the key features and functionalities of the physical layer, sidelink communication and its resource allocation, architecture flexibility, security and privacy mechanisms, and precise positioning techniques. Moreover, we envisage and highlight the potential of machine learning for further performance enhancement in NR-V2X services. Lastly, we show how 5G NR can be configured to support advanced V2X use cases.",
      "published": "2020-09-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcomstd.001.2000069",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamidreza Bagheri",
        "Md. Noor‐A‐Rahim",
        "Zilong Liu",
        "Haeyoung Lee",
        "Dirk Pesch",
        "Klaus Moessner",
        "Pei Xiao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Standards Magazine",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcomstd.001.2000069",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 232,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcomstd.2018.1700087",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent and Connected Vehicles: Current Situation, Future Directions, and Challenges",
      "description": "Given their large retention number worldwide, vehicles, as a very important part of the emerging Internet of Things, have been stably evolving toward becoming highly connected, intelligent, and autonomous. Since the very first experiment on an American Wonder by Francis P Houdina in 1925, autonomous driving has attracted intensive research interest from standards organizations, industry, as well as academia. In this article, we first present an overview of the current progress and achievements, then envision the future evolution directions of autonomous driving systems. Besides describing the representative functional modules, we also discuss the critical enabling technologies, and identify the security concerns and corresponding countermeasures.",
      "published": "2018-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcomstd.2018.1700087",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Jianhao Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Standards Magazine",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcomstd.2018.1700087",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcomstd.2019.1900008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ultra-High Reliable 5G V2X Communications",
      "description": "The work on enhancing real-time vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications is advancing in 3GPP with ongoing efforts in the radio and core network working groups. At the same time, concerted efforts are underway on the application layer to ensure successful deployment and provisioning of real-time communications to enable interworking V2X services. V2X relies on the 5G mobile network capabilities to ensure the desired capacity, throughput, and low latency, as well as resiliency, high reliability, and security in delivering and receiving information among vehicles. This article summarizes the latest ongoing work in 3GPP, providing insight into the main developments in terms of the radio, network architecture, and application domains.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcomstd.2019.1900008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Syed S. Husain",
        "Andreas Kunz",
        "Athul Prasad",
        "Emmanouil Pateromichelakis",
        "Konstantinos Samdanis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Communications Standards Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcomstd.2019.1900008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 55,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mcs.2016.2643239",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Implementation of Attack-Resilient Cyberphysical Systems: With a Focus on Attack-Resilient State Estimators",
      "description": "Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in the number of security-related incidents in control systems. These include high-profile attacks in a wide range of application domains, from attacks on critical infrastructure, as in the case of the Maroochy Water breach [1], and industrial systems (such as the StuxNet virus attack on an industrial supervisory control and data acquisition system [2], [3] and the German Steel Mill cyberattack [4], [5]), to attacks on modern vehicles [6]-[8]. Even high-assurance military systems were shown to be vulnerable to attacks, as illustrated in the highly publicized downing of the RQ-170 Sentinel U.S. drone [9]-[11]. These incidents have greatly raised awareness of the need for security in cyberphysical systems (CPSs), which feature tight coupling of computation and communication substrates with sensing and actuation components. However, the complexity and heterogeneity of this next generation of safety-critical, networked, and embedded control systems have challenged the existing design methods in which security is usually consider as an afterthought.",
      "published": "2017-03-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mcs.2016.2643239",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miroslav Pajić",
        "James E. Weimer",
        "Nicola Bezzo",
        "Oleg V. Sokolsky",
        "George J. Pappas",
        "Insup Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Control Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mcs.2016.2643239",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 147,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mdat.2018.2863106",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lessons learned from hacking a car",
      "description": "Editor's note: In 2015, Miller and Valasek demonstrated one of the most celebrated hacks on automotive systems, when they managed to remotely compromise a 2014 Jeep Cherokee. They showed how to exploit a vulnerability in head unit to control the physical aspects of the driving subsystem, including steering and braking. In this article, with the hindsight of over three years, Miller reflects on the lessons learned from this experience. -Sandip Roy, University of Florida",
      "published": "2019-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mdat.2018.2863106",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "hacking",
        "jeep",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Charlie Miller"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Design and Test",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mdat.2018.2863106",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mdat.2019.2899062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey of Automotive Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "Editor's note: Control Area Network (CAN) is one of the most popular targets for malicious attacks and exploitations in modern automotive systems. The goal of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is to identify and mitigate security attacks; consequently, they are of paramount importance to automotive security. This article surveys the state of the art in IDS, with special emphasis on techniques for detecting attacks on CAN modules. -Sandip Ray, University of Florida",
      "published": "2019-02-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mdat.2019.2899062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Clinton Young",
        "Joseph Zambreno",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Design and Test",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mdat.2019.2899062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 143,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/meco55406.2022.9797224",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Network Anomaly Detection Using Extreme Gradient Boosting Machine",
      "description": "Modern vehicles have significantly increased the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices called electronic control units (ECUs) connected by in-vehicle networks to provide enhanced features and safety. These devices communicate with the environment and have brought the notion of the Internet of vehicles. The controller area network (CAN) bus facilitates efficient ECU communications and is the standard protocol used by every vehicle, but it is susceptible to remote attacks. Consequently, it is desirable to monitor the CAN bus for malicious activities, such as data injection attacks, that can compromise the vehicular operations. We present an anomaly detection technique that uses an extreme gradient boosting machine (GBM) learning algorithm to categorize unexpected occurrences in the CAN data payload. We further combine GBM with a ten-fold cross-validation method to improve prediction performance. Moreover, we use the early -stopping and grid search approaches to overcome overfitting without affecting model accuracy. We evaluate our detection approach on real CAN bus datasets collected from Hyundai Sonata, a KIA Soul, and Chevrolet Spark with different attack scenarios, such as Denial-of-Service (DoS), fuzzy, spoofing, and malfunction attacks. Using standard metrics, such as accuracy, recall, precision, F1 score, and false-positive rate, the performance analysis of the proposed model achieved an overall accuracy of over 99 percent.",
      "published": "2022-06-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/meco55406.2022.9797224",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "hyundai",
        "in-vehicle",
        "kia",
        "spoofing",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "hyundai",
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Afia Anjum",
        "Paul Agbaje",
        "Sena G. Hounsinou",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi"
      ],
      "venue": "Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/meco55406.2022.9797224",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mecom67453.2025.11439729",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks on LiDAR-Based Localization in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles are becoming a common part of the technology scene. LiDAR-based localization is fundamental to the safe navigation of autonomous vehicles, yet remains vulnerable to security threats. This paper investigates attack vectors targeting the communication and processing pipeline of LiDAR sensors, particularly those that compromise localization integrity. Through simulation and analysis, we design multiple adversarial scenarios and evaluate their impact on localization accuracy and system reliability. Our findings demonstrate the potential for severe operational disruption, underscoring the need for robust security mechanisms. This work contributes to the growing domain of autonomous system security by emphasizing the critical role of protecting LiDAR-based localization against malicious interference.",
      "published": "2025-11-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mecom67453.2025.11439729",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sarah Sedrak",
        "Alia El Bolock",
        "Amr El Mougy"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Middle East Conference on Communications and Networking (MECOM)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/mecom67453.2025.11439729",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/meditcom49071.2021.9647514",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reinforcement Learning-based Misbehaviour Detection in V2X Scenarios",
      "description": "Emerging vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services rely on the secure exchange of periodic messages between vehicles and between vehicles and infrastructure. However, transmission of false/incorrect data by malicious vehicles may pose important security perils. Therefore, it is essential to detect safety-threatening erroneous information and mitigate potentially detrimental effects on road users. In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of a reinforcement learning (RL) approach for misbehaviour detection in V2X scenarios using an open-source dataset. Considering the case of sudden-stop attacks, the performance of RL-based detection is evaluated over commonly used detection metrics. Our research outcomes reveal that misbehaving vehicles can be accurately detected by exploiting real-time position and speed patterns.",
      "published": "2021-09-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/meditcom49071.2021.9647514",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roshan Sedar",
        "Charalampos Kalalas",
        "Francisco Vázquez-Gallego",
        "Jesús Alonso-Zárate"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Mediterranean Conference on Communications and Networking (MeditCom)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/meditcom49071.2021.9647514",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/meet67398.2025.11335665",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel OCPP-Centric Hybrid Testbed and Dataset for EV Charging Infrastructure Security Threats Feasibility Testing",
      "description": "The rapid adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) has intensified demands on the Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI), where operational security is critical to ensuring confidentiality, availability, integrity, and consumer trust. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 1.6, central to EVCI interoperability, remains vulnerable to authentication spoofing, man-in-the-middle (MiTM) interception, and protocol manipulation attacks when deployed without robust security extensions. However, there is a notable lack of publicly available protocol-centric datasets that capture realistic EVCI traffic under benign and adversarial conditions. Therefore, this paper addresses this gap through the design of a novel hybrid testbed that combines virtual and physical components, including real OCPP-compliant chargers, EV Supply Equipment (EVSE) testers, and simulated EVs, to produce a semantically rich and attack-inclusive dataset. The dataset contains over 55 features spanning semantic message fields, finite-state machine (FSM) transitions, timing metrics, payload complexity, and network-level characteristics, derived from the official OCPP 1.6 and 2.0 specification. Comparative analysis with the important and widely used internet of things (IoT) and EVCI datasets highlights the superior semantic depth, FSM structure, and realistic stealth attack representation of our dataset. This work provides a reproducible foundation for developing protocol-centric intrusion detection and prevention systems to detect sophisticated and context-driven anomalies in EV charging ecosystems.",
      "published": "2025-10-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/meet67398.2025.11335665",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Remy Odimegwu",
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Mohammed Al-Mhiqani",
        "Soufiene Djahel",
        "Chadi M. Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Meta-Networking (MEET)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/meet67398.2025.11335665",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/menacomm62946.2025.10911022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Malicious Artificial Congestion in Connected Cars Environment",
      "description": "By 2030, the global connected car market size is projected to be USD 361 billion. Automakers such as Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Peugeot, Toyota, and others are investing billions of dollars in software development, autonomous driving, and connected vehicle technology. Many companies are developing strong products to secure connected cars and their environment. However, when a vehicle becomes more connected, it also becomes much more vulnerable to intrusion and cyber-attacks. We investigate the use of classification-based algorithms called supervised machine learning techniques such as Decision Tree, Random Forest, XGBoost, AdaBoost, Support Vector Machines (SVM), Naive Bayes, and K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) to detect attacks on vehicles’ identities. We demonstrate, through implementation, the high precision (99%) results obtained with Random Forest, XGBoost, and Support Vector Machines (SVM). However, the execution time for XGboost seems to be faster than for the other methods. Furthermore, for generalization purposes, we evaluated these techniques on synthetic data generated using Conditional Tabular GANs. Our findings indicate that most techniques exhibit low accuracy in detecting vehicle identity attacks. To address this issue, we propose employing ensemble learning to enhance detection accuracy.",
      "published": "2025-02-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/menacomm62946.2025.10911022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "bmw",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "mercedes-benz",
        "secure",
        "toyota"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "bmw",
        "mercedes-benz",
        "toyota"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali El Attar",
        "Mohammad Ali Awali",
        "Rida Khatoun",
        "Makram W. Hatoum",
        "Khouloud Samrouth"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Middle East and North Africa Communications Conference (MENACOMM)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/menacomm62946.2025.10911022",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mepcon66918.2026.11360231",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Agentic AI for Enhancing Cyber-Resilience in EV Charging Microgrids",
      "description": "This paper explores the application of Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance the cybersecurity of Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure within microgrids. The rapid integration of EVs into distributed energy systems increases vulnerability to cyberattacks, particularly false data injection attacks (FDIAs), which can disrupt operations and compromise safety. Agentic AI, with its autonomous decisionmaking and adaptive learning capabilities, is well-suited to address these challenges. This study synthesizes recent research to demonstrate how Agentic AI strengthens anomaly detection, autonomously executes defensive strategies, and supports realtime mitigation of cyber threats. Beyond security, the framework optimizes power distribution and coordinates charging schedules, improving operational reliability and efficiency. The analysis also addresses implementation challenges, including computational demands, interoperability, and the need for standardized protocols. Overall, the findings highlight Agentic AI’s potential to establish a secure, resilient, and adaptive foundation for EV-integrated microgrids, contributing to the development of a more sustainable and reliable decentralized energy ecosystem.",
      "published": "2025-12-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mepcon66918.2026.11360231",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chou-Mo Yang",
        "M. Elsisi",
        "Chun-Lien Su"
      ],
      "venue": "International Middle East Power Systems Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/mepcon66918.2026.11360231",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mesa68091.2025.11278875",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hypervisor-Mediated Co-Design of Cybersecurity and Functional Safety in Vehicle E/E Architectures: A Cross-Domain Assurance Framework",
      "description": "The rise of embodied intelligence in autonomous vehicles, driven by software-defined capabilities, demands a fundamental shift in their underlying Electrical/Electronic (E/E) architectures. While centralized architectures promise the computational power for advanced autonomy, they introduce critical challenges in ensuring safety and cybersecurity. The consolidation of mixed-criticality functions on shared hardware creates significant risks of fault propagation and vulnerability to cyber-attacks. This paper proposes a hypervisor-driven frame-work that provides a resilient foundation for intelligent vehicles. We present an E/E architecture that leverages a Type-1 hypervisor to enforce hardware-level isolation between functions. By partitioning the system into independent virtual machines, we safely co-locate ASIL-D (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) tasks with general-purpose applications, preventing interference and containing threats. Our evaluation demonstrates that this partitioned architecture improves fault coverage by 21.4% compared to non-isolated approaches, significantly enhancing system resilience. This approach ensures that the vehicle’s intelligent systems operate safely, securely, and deterministically, even under complex, dynamic conditions.",
      "published": "2025-11-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mesa68091.2025.11278875",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuzheng Zhang",
        "Yiming Shu",
        "Zejian Deng",
        "Huizhe Zheng",
        "Chen K. Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/ASME International Conference on Mechatronic and Embedded Systems and Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/mesa68091.2025.11278875",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/metroautomotive57488.2023.10219103",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GNSS Threat Identification and Mitigation, Cyber-Security aspects in Automotive Scenarios",
      "description": "In this paper GNSS Threat Identification and Mitigation are discussed, focusing on Cyber-Security aspects in Automotive scenarios. The first section shows common threats to GNSS systems, in the second section a review of common mitigations is made, comparing pros and cons of each one. Finally cyber-security methods and new possible testing approaches are discussed.",
      "published": "2023-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/metroautomotive57488.2023.10219103",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "threat",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carmine Giannì",
        "Rosario Giordano",
        "Gregorio Pitolli",
        "Graziano Lubello Lincenti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Workshop on Metrology for Automotive (MetroAutomotive)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/metroautomotive57488.2023.10219103",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/metrocad48866.2020.00015",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Autoencoder Based Approach to Defend Against Adversarial Attacks for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Boosted by the evolution of machine learning technology, large amount of data and advanced computing system, neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance that even exceeds human capability in many applications [1] [2] . However, adversarial attacks targeting neural networks have demonstrated detrimental impact in autonomous driving [3] . The adversarial attacks are capable of arbitrarily manipulating the neural network classification results with different input data which is non-perceivable to human.",
      "published": "2020-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/metrocad48866.2020.00015",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Houchao Gan",
        "Chen Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Connected and Autonomous Driving (MetroCAD)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/metrocad48866.2020.00015",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/metroxraine58569.2023.10405720",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Artificial Intelligence for Automotive Security: How to Support Developers in Automotive Solutions",
      "description": "With newer and more advanced technologies in the automotive industry come complex and sinister threats. To thwart attacks targeted at a vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN), developing new and increasingly sophisticated algorithms exploiting Machine Learning and Deep Learning is not enough. Thus, where some of these techniques are impractical to embed into vehicles mounting Electronic Control Units (ECUs) with limited computational power, others may even require high prediction time, a critical factor in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) like modern vehicles. Moreover, help and support for developers during the automotive development life cycle are unorganized and inconsistent. This paper presents a study of Traditional and Quantum Machine Learning algorithms to improve the identification of in-vehicle attacks and redefine the security life cycle in this context serving as a baseline to define a vision model based on Artificial Intelligence that supports developers' decisions to integrate concrete design methods in the automotive development life-cycle.",
      "published": "2023-10-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/metroxraine58569.2023.10405720",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Christian Catalano",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Anibrata Pal",
        "Michele Scalera"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Metrology for eXtended Reality, Artificial Intelligence and Neural Engineering (MetroXRAINE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/metroxraine58569.2023.10405720",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mic.2017.37",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fog Computing for the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy Issues",
      "description": "The inherent characteristics of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as limited storage and computational power, require a new platform to efficiently process data. The concept of fog computing has been introduced as a technology to bridge the gap between remote data centers and IoT devices. Fog computing enables a wide range of benefits, including enhanced security, decreased bandwidth, and reduced latency. These benefits make the fog an appropriate paradigm for many IoT services in various applications such as connected vehicles and smart grids. Nevertheless, fog devices (located at the edge of the Internet) obviously face many security and privacy threats, much the same as those faced by traditional data centers. In this article, the authors discuss the security and privacy issues in IoT environments and propose a mechanism that employs fog to improve the distribution of certificate revocation information among IoT devices for security enhancement. They also present potential research directions aimed at using fog computing to enhance the security and privacy issues in IoT environments.",
      "published": "2017-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mic.2017.37",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arwa Alrawais",
        "Abdulrahman Alhothaily",
        "Chunqiang Hu",
        "Xiuzhen Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Internet Computing",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mic.2017.37",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 742,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3991,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/mic.2017.37 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: limited, services, applications, privacy, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/miccis58901.2023.00034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Automotive CAN Bus Safety System Based On Safety Level",
      "description": "The Control Area Network (CAN) bus is the most widely used internal control network in automobiles. With the development of networked vehicles and self-driving technology, the sealing nature of automotive internal control networks has gradually broken down, and its safety no longer meets the standard of today's auto industry. A proposed encryption authentication mechanism based on classification of security levels of electronic control units (ECUs) is intended to address the security defects of the common CAN bus. Using the CAN bus communication principle and communication data frame, this mechanism makes CAN bus capable of authentication and communication encryption. This can prevent replay attack, prevents fake commands from being injected, and reduces costs.",
      "published": "2023-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/miccis58901.2023.00034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "raotao deng",
        "Yilin Wang",
        "Dan Chen",
        "JunHao Wei",
        "Shan Ding"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Mobile Internet, Cloud Computing and Information Security (MICCIS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/miccis58901.2023.00034",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/milcom.2016.7795496",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing commercial WiFi-based UAVs from common security attacks",
      "description": "We posit that commercial Wi-Fi-based unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are vulnerable to common and basic security attacks, capable by beginner to intermediate hackers. We do this by demonstrating that the standard ARDiscovery Connection process and the Wi-Fi access point used in the Parrot Bebop UAV are exploitable such that the UAV's ability to fly can be disrupted mid-flight by a remote attacker. We believe that these vulnerabilities are systemic in Wi-Fi-based Parrot UAVs. Our approach observed the normal operation (i.e., ARDiscovery Connection process over Wi-Fi) of the Parrot Bebop UAV. We then used a fuzzing technique to discover that the Parrot Bebop UAV is vulnerable to basic denial of service (DoS) and buffer-overflow attacks during its ARDiscovery Connection process. The exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in catastrophic and immediate disabling of the UAV's rotors midflight. Also, we discovered that the Parrot Bebop UAV is vulnerable to a basic ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) Cache Poisoning attack, which can disconnect the primary mobile device user and in most cases cause the UAV to land or return home. Based on the literature and our own penetration testing, we assert that Wi-Fi-based commercial UAVs require a comprehensive security framework that utilizes a defense-in-depth approach. This approach would likely mitigate security risks associated with the three zero-day vulnerabilities described in this paper as well as other vulnerabilities reported in the literature. This framework will be effective for Parrot Wi-Fi-based commercial UAVs and likely others with similar platforms.",
      "published": "2016-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/milcom.2016.7795496",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael James Hooper",
        "Yifan Tian",
        "Runxuan Zhou",
        "Bin Cao",
        "Adrian P. Lauf",
        "Lanier A. Watkins",
        "William H. Robinson",
        "Alexis Wlajimir"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/milcom.2016.7795496",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 172,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/milcom52596.2021.9652900",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Threats Analysis of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System",
      "description": "Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) find increasing use in the civil airspace where multi-UAV systems are deployed to perform operations supervised by remote control facilities. Since these multi-UAV systems operate in public locations and connect using open communication standards, it raises significant security concerns. While most UAV designers befittingly deal with the complexity of autonomy, communication, and control, they often ignore to consider system security aspects in the early design phase. To support the security design process of multi-UAV systems, this paper provides an analysis of cybersecurity threats of multi-UAV systems based on the STRIDE model. The identified threats are subsequently linked with a risk assessment to be prioritized according to severity. We conclude by establishing a set of security design recommendations for connected inspection UAVs to contribute with guidance for the design of future multi-UAV systems.",
      "published": "2021-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/milcom52596.2021.9652900",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rune Hylsberg Jacobsen",
        "Ali Marandi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/milcom52596.2021.9652900",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/milcom61039.2024.10773966",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Response System for In-Vehicle Networks: Uncertainty-Aware Deep Reinforcement Learning-based Approach",
      "description": "Modern vehicles use the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system to manage communication between electronic control units (ECUs). The CAN bus lacks authentication and authorization mechanisms, and cryptographic protections are rarely used. This creates vulnerabilities to attacks such as Denial of Service, spoofing, and fuzzing, which can disrupt ECU functionality. Injection attacks through external connections (e.g., telematic unit, head unit, OBD-II port) can cause ECU malfunctions, leading to abnormal vehicle behavior or catastrophic events like car crashes. To address these issues, we propose a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based intrusion response system (IRS). Upon detecting an attack with an intrusion detection system (IDS), our IRS responds with the optimal defense strategy, maximizing defense utility. Our goal is to minimize the attack's success while ensuring mission completion within deadlines. We define an action space representing defense strategies for detected intrusions. Our extensive experiments prove that our IRS significantly outperforms state-of-the-art and baseline counterparts in minimizing the attack's success by up to 60% and maximizing the mission performance by up to 70%. This work is the first to propose a DRL-based IRS for managing multiple attacks in in-vehicle networks under ML-based IDS alerts.",
      "published": "2024-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/milcom61039.2024.10773966",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Han Jun Yoon",
        "David Soon",
        "Terrence J. Moore",
        "Seunghyun Yoon",
        "Hyuk Lim",
        "Dong Seong Kim",
        "Frederica F. Nelson",
        "Jin-Hee Cho"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/milcom61039.2024.10773966",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mipr70517.2026.00030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "3D Object Recovery for Data Tampering Attack on In-vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Inherent security vulnerabilities in in-vehicle networks pose a severe threat to safe autonomous driving, such as the detected 3D object missing caused by the data tampering attack in CAN bus. Existing research focuses on detecting the attack itself, ignoring the information recovery from the manipulated data. In this paper, we propose a 3D object recovery framework by utilizing both temporal and spatial context for the tampering attack occurred in in-vehicle networks. For temporal context, we employ the previous frames before attack to learn the coordinate offsets of 3D objects, improving the position accuracy of the recovered objects. To fully exploit the unmanipulated data, the adjacent views of the attacked objects in the current frame are chosen as the spatial guidance to locate the recovered objects from the overlapped regions. By integrating the temporal and spatial clues, the proposed framework is capable of recovering the missing objects from the resting ones, thereby enhancing the immunity of in-vehicle networks for the tampering attack. Extensive experiments on the nuScenes dataset demonstrate that the proposed framework achieves effective recovery for the missing objects, improving the 3D object detection performance under the attack. Additionally, the framework displays a greater recovery capability along with the attack intensity rising. The source will be available upon publication.",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mipr70517.2026.00030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gangtao Han",
        "Yurui Chen",
        "Song Wang",
        "Enqing Chen",
        "Lingling Li",
        "Gaofeng Pan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Multimedia Information Processing and Retrieval (MIPR)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/mipr70517.2026.00030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mis.2017.3711644",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fully Autonomous Driving: Where Technology and Ethics Meet",
      "description": "The prospect of automatized car traffic confronts ethics, law, and politics with novel and far-reaching questions. It cannot be excluded that automatized cars meet with critical situations in which losses of life and limb are inevitable and in which the necessity arises to negotiate between two or more evils. Despite all security measures, a residual risk is unavoidable, which raises questions: How safe is safe enough? How safe is too safe? This contribution argues that it is important to clearly separate between the tasks of technology and ethics as well as between the responsibilities of different stakeholders.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mis.2017.3711644",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dieter Birnbacher",
        "Wolfgang Birnbacher"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mis.2017.3711644",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mits.2018.2889714",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Transportation System Security: Impact-Oriented Risk Assessment of in-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The concept of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) was developed in the 1980s when then upcoming technologies and cognitive information were incorporated into the road infrastructures and vehicles. The ITS infrastructure is critical yet not immune to both physical and cyber threats. Vehicles are cyber-physical systems which are a core component of ITS, can be either a target or a launching point for an attack on the ITS network. Unknown vehicle security vulnerabilities trigger a race among adversaries to exploit the weaknesses and security experts to mitigate the vulnerability. In this study, we identified opportunities for adversaries to take control of the in-vehicle network, which can compromise the safety, privacy, reliability, efficiency, and security of the transportation system. This study contributes in three ways to the literature of ITS security and resiliency. First, we aggregate individual risks that are associated with hacking the in-vehicle network to determine system-level risk. Second, we employ a risk-based model to conduct a qualitative vulnerability-oriented risk assessment. Third, we identify the consequences of hacking the in-vehicle network through a risk-based approach, using an impact-likelihood matrix. The qualitative assessment communicates risk outcomes for policy analysis. The outcome of this study would be of interest and usefulness to policymakers and engineers concerned with the potential vulnerabilities of such critical infrastructures.",
      "published": "2019-01-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mits.2018.2889714",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "exploit",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaveh Bakhsh Kelarestaghi",
        "Mahsa Foruhandeh",
        "Kevin P. Heaslip",
        "Ryan Gerdes"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mits.2018.2889714",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mits.2019.2898973",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Issues in Intelligent Transportation Systems: Classification and Challenges",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) aim at integrating sensing, control, analysis, and communication technologies into travel infrastructure and transportation to improve mobility, comfort, safety, and efficiency. Car manufacturers are continuously creating smarter vehicles, and advancements in roadways and infrastructure are changing the feel of travel. Traveling is becoming more efficient and reliable with a range of novel technologies, and research and development in ITS. Safer vehicles are introduced every year with greater considerations for passenger and pedestrian safety, nevertheless, the new technology and increasing connectivity in ITS present unique attack vectors for malicious actors. Smart cities with connected public transportation systems introduce new privacy concerns with the data collected about passengers and their travel habits. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive classification of security and privacy vulnerabilities in ITS. Furthermore, we discuss challenges in addressing security and privacy issues in ITS and contemplate potential mitigation techniques. Finally, we highlight future research directions to make ITS more safe, secure, and privacy-preserving.",
      "published": "2019-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mits.2019.2898973",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dalton A. Hahn",
        "Arslan Munir",
        "Vahid Behzadan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mits.2019.2898973",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 192,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mits.2020.3014124",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Softwarization, Virtualization, and Machine Learning for Intelligent and Effective Vehicle-to-Everything Communications",
      "description": "The concept of the fifth generation (5G) mobile network system has emerged in recent years as telecommunication operators and service providers look to upgrade their infrastructure and delivery modes to meet the growing demand. Concepts such as softwarization, virtualization, and machine learning will be key components as innovative and flexible enablers of such networks. In particular, paradigms such as software-defined networks, software-defined perimeter, cloud & edge computing, and network function virtualization will play a major role in addressing several 5G networks' challenges, especially in terms of flexibility, programmability, scalability, and security. In this work, the role and potential of these paradigms in the context of V2X communication is discussed. To do so, the paper starts off by providing an overview and background of V2X communications. Then, the paper discusses in more details the various challenges facing V2X communications and some of the previous literature work done to tackle them. Furthermore, the paper describes how softwarization, virtualization, and machine learning can be adapted to tackle the challenges of such networks.",
      "published": "2020-06-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mits.2020.3014124",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdallah Moubayed",
        "Abdallah A. Shami"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mits.2020.3014124",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mits.2020.3037315",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driving Data Dissemination: The \"Term\" Governing Connected Car Information",
      "description": "As automotive data increase in scale and value, it is important to understand who owns and has the ability to access information generated by connected vehicles. The plummeting costs of sensing, connectivity, and storage mean that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), their suppliers, and end users have access to more realtime data than ever [1]. Data collection is complicated by the public?s perception that data are kept locally to the vehicle, as opposed to being sent to the connected car service. We have seen in other industries how confusion about terms of service can lead to large and potentially harmful misunderstanding. This article explores the complexi ties of automotive data ownership, privacy, accessibility, and stewardship by comparing and contrasting automotive terms of service (\"Terms\"), agreements critical to an emerging US$11.6-$92.6 billion market, from multiple stakeholders? perspectives [2]. In the comparison, we aim to highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities that may prevent connected-vehicle services from suffering the same pitfalls as related industries. Our discussion is highlighted in a matrix comparing and contrasting information ownership, access, and control Terms for customers, OEMs, their subsidiaries, partners, affiliates in the U.S. market, and regulatory agencies. The results are useful for service designers, end users, and regulators to evaluate Terms for differing and often competing interests and constraints.",
      "published": "2021",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mits.2020.3037315",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Da-Jiang Suo",
        "J. Siegel",
        "Alexander M. Soley"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/mits.2020.3037315",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5654,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/mits.2020.3037315 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: suppliers, scale, collection, regulatory, costs, ability, large, services."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mlise70044.2026.11607613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Sequence-Linguistic Re-Modeling-Based Intrusion Detection Method for In-Vehicle CAN Buses",
      "description": "This paper presents a sequence-linguistic re-modeling method for in-vehicle CAN bus intrusion detection. Instead of treating CAN frames as isolated classification samples, the method maps frame IDs, payload bytes, and inter-frame intervals into semantically partitioned token sequences and trains an autoregressive language model only on normal communication. Detection is performed by measuring sliding-window perplexity, enabling unknown attacks to be identified without labeled attack samples. To address collaborative attacks that are weak at a single ECU but abnormal across nodes, timestamp-aligned joint context windows and node-identifier tokens are introduced, and singlenode and joint perplexity scores are fused. Experiments on the HCRL Car-Hacking benchmark show consistent gains over raw byte encoding and representative baselines. With GLM 4.6-10B, the complete method achieves $\\mathbf{9 8. 7 1 \\%} \\mathbf{F 1}, \\mathbf{1. 4 5 \\%}$ false positive rate, and 0.9956 AUC.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mlise70044.2026.11607613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yixuan Liu",
        "Jun Xu",
        "Meng Wang",
        "Yixuan Wang",
        "童鑫康"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Machine Learning and Intelligent Systems Engineering (MLISE)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/mlise70044.2026.11607613",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mlise70044.2026.11607643",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Reverse Knowledge Distillation for Unsupervised In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Unsupervised anomaly detection is essential for securing in-vehicle CAN buses when attack labels are unavailable. This paper proposes a reverse knowledge distillation (RKD) framework that trains only on normal traffic. A pretrained and frozen teacher encoder provides multi-layer anchors for the normal feature distribution, while a lightweight student decoder reconstructs teacher features from the bottleneck in the reverse direction. Layer-wise cosine mismatch is fused into an anomaly score, and an extreme-value-theory threshold is calibrated from normal validation traffic. The large teacher is used only during offline distillation; deployed inference is performed by the compact student-side detector. Experiments on the HCRL CarHacking dataset, with supplementary ROAD signal-forgery validation, show that the GLM 4.6-10B teacher configuration achieves 99.17% accuracy, 98.77% F1, 0.9974 AUROC, and 0.9958 AUPRC.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mlise70044.2026.11607643",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yixuan Liu",
        "Shuyue Wang",
        "M Wang",
        "Peng Liu",
        "Haibo Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Machine Learning and Intelligent Systems Engineering (MLISE)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/mlise70044.2026.11607643",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.001.1900220",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Challenges in 5G-Enabled Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Recently, many academic institutions and standardization organizations have conducted research on vehicular communications based on LTE or 5G. As the most important standardization organization of cellular systems, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has been developing the standard supporting vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services based on LTE, and has already prepared the roadmap toward 5G-based V2X services. With the emergence of new technologies and applications, such as connected autonomous vehicles, 5G-enabled vehicular networks face a variety of security and privacy challenges, which have not been fully investigated. In this article, we first present the infrastructure of 5G-enabled vehicular networks. Then the essential security and privacy aspects of V2X in LTE specified by 3GPP are introduced. After that, as a case study, we investigate the security and privacy issues of a 5G-enabled autonomous platoon, and propose several candidate solutions, including secure group setup with privacy preservation, distributed group key management, and cooperative message authentication. Finally, we discuss the security and privacy challenges in 5G-enabled vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2020-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.001.1900220",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chengzhe Lai",
        "Rongxing Lu",
        "Dong Zheng",
        "Xuemin Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.001.1900220",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 186,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.001.1900243",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure V2X Communication Network based on Intelligent PKI and Edge Computing",
      "description": "The current remarkable development of communication technology is enabling the intelligent driving system by providing a V2X network to exchange and process transportation data. However, security, as a fundamental requirement, is still lacking in many aspects of current V2X networks. For V2X networks, low latency, as a critical requirement for V2X networks, restrains usage of traditional security functions as security related operations like Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems also introduce latency. In this article, we propose an efficient scheme by intelligently distributing keys for authentication in V2X networks. The general design is to distribute key pairs valid according to the location information for vehicles and RoadSide Units (RSUs). Thus, based on this authentication scheme relying on location information, keys can be pre-distributed according to the vehicles' future locations. Also, we propose to use the Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to predict the future route and locations which can let the key requests started from the vehicles' ends. The key idea is to provide an intelligent and efficient key distribution protocol for V2X networks. Some experimental results prove the efficiency with evaluations on our proposal compared with the existing solution.",
      "published": "2019-09-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.001.1900243",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Han Qiu",
        "Meikang Qiu A",
        "Ruqian Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.001.1900243",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 147,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.001.1900348",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Detailed Security Assessment of the EV Charging Ecosystem",
      "description": "The drive for efficient, reliable, green, and connected smart cities has promoted the use of electric vehicles (EVs) as the main future means of transportation. This resulted in a breakthrough in the anticipated number of adopted EVs by the year 2020, and consequently an urge for an available and trustworthy EV charging infrastructure. The diversity of the involved players, the used technologies, the bulk data exchange, and the widespread nature of the charging network give rise to security concerns in the form of message tampering, spoofing, or delaying among others to disconcert the charging service along with the underlying power layer. Furthermore, confidentiality and privacy of user information (i.e. identity, location, payment information, etc.) is another major concern associated with the deployment and use of the charging infrastructure. Thus, there is a need to identify and classify such concerns, and devise suitable solutions for a secure charging infrastructure. In this paper, we present a security assessment of the EV charging infrastructure. We highlight and categorize cyber threats targeting different players in a charging system, along with the security solutions presented in the literature. Finally, we present a gap analysis and insights into future research directions for EV charging system security.",
      "published": "2020-02-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.001.1900348",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J. Antoun",
        "Mohammad Ekramul Kabir",
        "Bassam Moussa",
        "R. Atallah",
        "C. Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.001.1900348",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 121,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.001.1900504",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges and Solutions in Autonomous Driving: A Blockchain Approach",
      "description": "The autonomous driving era is coming with tremendous potential to revolutionize transportation systems with improved safety, comfort, and intelligence on the road. Integrating connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) and rising social networking, autonomous vehicular social networks (AVSNs) can facilitate the data dissemination in safety-critical and entertainment-related applications for autonomous driving. However, with time-varying, delay-constrained, and location-dependent characteristics in autonomous driving, it faces great challenges to incentivize CAVs to disseminate massive content in AVSNs. Meanwhile, attackers may not only disseminate fake information to confuse the network, but also pose security vulnerabilities and privacy issues for CAVs. In this article, we investigate secure and incentive content delivery in AVSNs based on the advanced blockchain. Specifically, we first present a blockchain-enabled AVSN framework to safeguard content delivery. Then, we investigate the task-based and credit-based reputation models to evaluate the trustworthiness of CAVs and RSUs, respectively. The reputation increase and task reward are explored as incentives for CAVs delivering reliable content. In addition, a novel proof of reputation consensus protocol is devised to efficiently reach consensus in blockchain-enabled AVSNs while motivating RSUs to behave honestly. Experimental results indicate that the proposed framework outperforms the existing approaches, delivering vehicular content more reliably and securely. Finally, future research directions in this emerging area are discussed.",
      "published": "2020-03-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.001.1900504",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuntao Wang",
        "Zhou Su",
        "Kuan Zhang",
        "Abderrahim Benslimane"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.001.1900504",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 62,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.001.1900593",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain Enabled Named Data Networking for Secure Vehicle-to-Everything Communications",
      "description": "A huge amount of information is expected to be exchanged in vehicular networks through vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications for enhancing overall traffic efficiency and road safety. However, there are several critical challenges to be addressed before completely realizing the full potential of V2X networking. Privacy-aware security is one of the central components to be addressed for V2X communications. This paper presents a novel framework by leveraging the best features of two emerging technologies: blockchain technology and named data networking (NDN) for privacy-aware secure V2X communications. The proposed framework does not use the private information of users (owners, drivers, pedestrians, passengers, cyclists, etc.) in vehicular networks while providing verifiable secure V2X communications by using non-private information such as number plate of the vehicle (like in ParkMobile App or E-ZPass systems use) for integrity and accountability of the communications. Specifically, integrity and accountability in the proposed framework for its users are achieved by amalgamating the best features of blockchain technology and NDN. Furthermore, the proposed approach aims to increase the trust and transparency and reduce the business friction in smart transplantation systems.",
      "published": "2020-03-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.001.1900593",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Danda B. Rawat",
        "Ronald Doku",
        "Abdulhamid A. Adebayo",
        "Chandra Bajracharya",
        "Charles Kamhoua"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.001.1900593",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.003.2100522",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy in V2X Communications: How Can Collaborative Learning Improve Cybersecurity?",
      "description": "Advances in cellular technology are a key driver of the growing automotive vehicle-to-everything (V2X) market. In V2X communications, information from sensors and other sources travels via high-bandwidth, low-latency, high-reliability links, paving the way to fully autonomous driving and intelligent mobility. With the future adoption of 5G and beyond (5G&B) networks, V2X is likely to generate a huge volume of data, which encourages the use of edge computing and pushes the system to learn the model locally to support real-time applications. However, the edge computing paradigm raises concerns about the security and privacy of local nodes (e.g., vehicles) and the increased risk of cyberattacks. In this article, we identify open research questions, key requirements, and potential solutions to provide cyber resilience in V2X communications.",
      "published": "2022-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.003.2100522",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pradip Kumar Sharma",
        "Deepansu Vohra",
        "Shailendra Rathore"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.003.2100522",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2017.1600257",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Network Attacks and Countermeasures: Challenges and Future Directions",
      "description": "The emergence of in-vehicle networks, which are composed of controller area network (CAN) buses and a great number of ECUs, significantly reduces the difficulty of vehicle designing, repairing and refitting. While owing to the intrinsic vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks and the increasingly rich interfaces to connect in-vehicle networks to the outside, adversarial attacks can be easily implemented on in-vehicle networks. Such attacks cause serious threats to automobile security and drivers' privacy. In light of this, we provide in this article a detailed guidance, explain the basic concepts, introduce the vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks, and summarize the attacking methodologies. We also provide countermeasures for in-vehicle networks and point out challenges and future directions.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2017.1600257",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Shubin Zhang",
        "Wen Yao Sun",
        "Yongpeng Shi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2017.1600257",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 280,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2017.1600321nm",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Insurance for Plug-In Electric Vehicle Charging in Vehicle-to-Grid Systems",
      "description": "V2G systems bring many benefits to power systems in stabilizing energy demand and supply fluctuations as well as to PEV users in reducing energy costs. To achieve the maximum efficiency of V2G systems, data communication plays an important role. However, it is subject to cyber attack and failure, which hinder the effectiveness of V2G systems. In this article, we introduce a novel concept of using cyber insurance to \"transfer\" cyber risk from a user to a third party in PEV charging. We first introduce V2G systems and briefly discuss the cyber risks. Additionally, the basic concepts of cyber insurance are presented. We then introduce the use of cyber insurance to remove the risk of paying high energy costs of PEV charging due to the unavailability of data communication. We show that the PEV user can achieve the maximum benefit in deciding to charge its PEV and to buy insurance.",
      "published": "2017-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2017.1600321nm",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dusit Tao Niyato",
        "Dinh Thai Hoang",
        "Ping Wang",
        "Zhu Han"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2017.1600321nm",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2017.1700098",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Toward Secure Crowd Sensing in Vehicle-to-Everything Networks",
      "description": "V2X communication facilitates information sharing between a vehicle and the infrastructure, pedestrians, devices, or any other entity that may affect the vehicle, which is known as a critical component in 5G that promises to realize the vision of connected and autonomous vehicles. Crowd sensing, a.k.a. collective perception, is one of the essential concepts of V2X networks, where vehicles share their information collected by local perception sensors about the environment for improving safety, saving energy, optimizing traffic, and so on. Although the operational aspects of V2X networks are being studied actively, its security aspect has received little attention. In this article, we discuss security issues that may pose serious threats to crowd sensing in V2X networks, and we focus on V2X-specific threats that are unique in V2X networks, e.g. platoon disruption and perception data falsification. We also discuss countermeasures against these threats and the technical challenges that must be overcome to implement such methods.",
      "published": "2017-11-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2017.1700098",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaigui Bian",
        "Gaoxiang Zhang",
        "Lingyang Song"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2017.1700098",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2018.1700319",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicles' Security from the Perspective of the In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Connected vehicles are generally equipped with many (dozens of, or even hundreds of) electronic and intelligent devices so that drivers can gain a more comfortable driving experience. Despite their numerous benefits, these technological developments have also created serious safety/security concerns. This article recapitulates the diversified attack surfaces of connected vehicles related to the technological developments from the perspective of the in-vehicle network. For each of the attacks, we discuss the rationale and the concrete methods presented in the literature. In particular, we illustrate how to launch successful attacks through the controlled area network (CAN) bus, electronic control units (ECUs), and in-vehicle infotainment system. The article also suggests some feasible solutions to the attacks demonstrated by the community. Considering the fact that vehicles are safety- critical, more practical and effective steps should be taken within the connected vehicle network toward securing connected vehicles and protecting drivers and passengers.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2018.1700319",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiangxue Li",
        "Yu Yu",
        "Guannan Sun",
        "Kefei Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2018.1700319",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2018.1700344",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Enabled Security in Electric Vehicles Cloud and Edge Computing",
      "description": "EVCE computing is an attractive network paradigm involving seamless connections among heterogeneous vehicular contexts. It will be a trend along with EVs becoming popular in V2X. The EVs act as potential resource infrastructures referring to both information and energy interactions, and there are serious security challenges for such hybrid cloud and edge computing. Context-aware vehicular applications are identified according to the perspectives of information and energy interactions. Blockchain-inspired data coins and energy coins are proposed based on distributed consensus, in which data contribution frequency and energy contribution amount are applied to achieve the proof of work. Security solutions are presented for securing vehicular interactions in EVCE computing.",
      "published": "2018-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2018.1700344",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hong Liu",
        "Yan Zhang",
        "Tao Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2018.1700344",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 381,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2024.3367303",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Open World Intrusion Detection: An Open Set Recognition Method for CAN Bus in Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a bus protocol widely used in intelligent connected vehicles for communication between electronic and electronic systems. However, the continuous increase in inter- and intra-vehicle communication traffic makes the CAN bus vulnerable to cyber-attacks, including unknown attacks that have never been seen before. Previous studies either use closed set scenarios to misclassify unknown attacks as known classes with high confidence or use closed set models to calculate thresholds to identify unknown attacks ignoring the relationship between feature representation and thresholds. To handle this challenge, we formulate the problem as an open set recognition problem to accurately detect K known classes and identify 1 unknown class. Following this, we propose CLUSTER for CAN bus intrusion detection. CLUSTER utilizes the distance from known class inputs to cluster centroids as the training loss to be consistent with the threshold for open set recognition. Then it learns feature representations for intra-class compactness and inter-class separation, thereby classifying fine-grained known classes and identifying unknown attacks. Extensive experimental results on the car-hacking dataset demonstrate that the proposed open set recognition model is significantly superior to existing methods. In addition, due to the different operating environments of intelligent connected vehicles, intelligent connected vehicles will encounter different unknown attacks that have not been seen by each other. In order to share attack knowledge about unknown attacks among intelligent connected vehicles to protect them from intrusions, we propose an open world vehicle-cloud collaborative intrusion detection framework.",
      "published": "2024-02-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2024.3367303",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lei Du",
        "Zhaoquan Gu",
        "Ye Wang",
        "Cuiyun Gao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2024.3367303",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4094,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/mnet.2024.3367303 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: confidence, following, loss, unknown, makes, extensive, studies, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2024.3369907",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy in Space-Air-Ocean Integrated Unmanned Surface Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With the development of wireless communication technologies, the space-air-ocean integrated unmanned surface vehicle (USV) networks are significantly promising to provide various intelligent services, e.g., marine resource exploration, disaster rescue, maritime monitoring, etc. However, owing to the node diversity, data vulnerability and resource limitation, the USV networks face a series of security threats, e.g., eavesdropping attack and sybil attack, etc. In this article, to enhance the security of maritime communication networks, we investigate the security and privacy in space-air-ocean integrated USV networks. Specifically, we first introduce the architecture of space-air-ocean integrated USV networks and present its typical applications. Second, we discuss the security threats faced by space-air-ocean integrated USV networks in different application fields including sybil attack, collusion attack, and eavesdropping attack, etc. Third, a case study of space-air-ocean integrated USV networks regarding data backup perspective is presented to enhance the security and integrity of the stored data. Finally, we discuss the future research directions in this area.",
      "published": "2024-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2024.3369907",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hui Zeng",
        "Z. Su",
        "Qi-Chao Xu",
        "Rui-Dong Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2024.3369907",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2024.3481262",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DNA Storage Promotes Long-Term Storage of Internet of Vehicles Data",
      "description": "With the proliferation of Telematics and autonomous driving, vehicles are generating increasing volumes of data from numerous sensors. To accommodate this influx of in-vehicle data, Data Centers (DCs) must possess ample storage capacity and bandwidth to cater to the rising demand for in-vehicle data uploads. Meanwhile, ensuring the security and integrity of this data is paramount to providing reliable information when needed by car companies or users. The cold nature of in-vehicle data, where most of the data remains unused for long periods of time, poses significant challenges to the storage and operation of DCs. In this paper, we propose a potentially feasible solution for information storage by leveraging DNA molecules. We present the architecture of the new DC and its storage process. Compared to conventional approaches, utilizing DNA molecules for storing in-vehicle data can substantially reduce the operating costs of DCs, while greatly enhancing the storage lifespan and density of information. Finally, we address the practical challenges associated with implementing DNA storage and propose potential solutions to overcome them.",
      "published": "2024-10-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2024.3481262",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guanjin Qu",
        "Huaming Wu",
        "Ruidong Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2024.3481262",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mnet.2024.3486220",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deploying Intrusion Detection on In-Vehicle Networks: Challenges and Opportunities",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the most widely used communication protocol in automobile systems that provides an efficient and safe way of transmitting information between the system’s Electronic Control Units (ECU). Alongside its wide adoption, however, inherent design flaws in the CAN bus make it subject to various attacks, such as masquerade and bus-off attacks, that exploit its vulnerable authentication mechanisms. Accordingly, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are proposed to defend against specific attacks. In this paper, we systematically summarize the state-of-the-art IDSs that are based on either a single feature or multiple features to understand their advantages and disadvantages with respect to their target attacks. We will also discuss the limitations and challenges and suggest several improvements, hoping to shed light on future research directions.",
      "published": "2024-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mnet.2024.3486220",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Longxiang Wang",
        "Qingchuan Zhao",
        "Wei‐Bin Lee",
        "Cong Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Network",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/mnet.2024.3486220",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mobisecserv58080.2023.10329152",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of Machine Learning Algorithms for DDoS Attack Detection in Connected Cars Environment",
      "description": "Cyberattacks against the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) will continue to evolve as the industry continues to adopt new and advanced connected technologies. These advances should result in a complex ecosystem that integrates different technologies (5G, 6G, Cloud, IoT, etc.) and presents a large attack surface. Denial of service (DoS) attacks are among the most dangerous attacks against connected vehicles, where an attacker overwhelm the network with random generated messages. An effective detection of the occurrence of such attacks is a key step for any defense scheme. Machine-Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) algorithms have attracted a lot of attention in the literature for DoS detection. However, there is no comprehensive comparative analysis of their efficiency in the IoV context. In this paper, we study the detection performance of several classification algorithms such as Decision Tree, Random Forest, XGBoost, AdaBoost, Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes, and K-nearest neighbors to differentiate normal CAM messages from flooding CAM ones launched by the vehicular bot in Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) environment. The obtained results demonstrate that XGBoost, Random Forest, and SVM algorithms have a very high detection precision.",
      "published": "2023-11-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mobisecserv58080.2023.10329152",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali El Attar",
        "Ayoub Wehby",
        "Fadlallah Chbib",
        "Hassane Aissaoui-Mehrez",
        "Ahmad Fadlallah",
        "Joel Hachem",
        "Rida Khatoun"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Mobile and Secure Services (MobiSecServ)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/mobisecserv58080.2023.10329152",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4083,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/mobisecserv58080.2023.10329152 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: very, normal, large, services, service, where, there, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mosicom67153.2025.11398234",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding the Electric Vehicle Ecosystem: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cybersecurity Threats",
      "description": "The accelerating global adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) introduces a new frontier of cybersecurity challenges, far surpassing those of conventional automotive systems. Modern EVs are intrinsically software-defined, integrating intricate architectures of embedded systems, pervasive wireless communication, extensive cloud connectivity, and diverse charging infrastructure interfaces. This inherent complexity dramatically expands their attack surface, making them prime targets for sophisticated cyber threats. This paper presents a systematic analysis of cybersecurity risks specific to the electric vehicle ecosystem, thoroughly investigating attack vectors spanning vehicle internal systems, charging infrastructure, and associated communication networks. We meticulously categorize potential attacks across seven critical domains: Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, charging infrastructure, over-the-air (OTA) updates, autonomous driving systems, data privacy, and supply chain vulnerabilities. Through an in-depth examination of real-world incidents and reported vulnerabilities, our research identifies prevalent attack patterns and assesses their potential ramifications on vehicle safety, user privacy, and grid stability. Key findings reveal that a significant majority of identified vulnerabilities—specifically, 73%—originate from inadequate authentication mechanisms, while 65% involve the exploitation of unencrypted communication channels. We propose a robust, multi-layered defense framework that integrates advanced hardware security modules, a zero-trust architectural approach, and AI-powered threat detection capabilities. Our findings aim to significantly contribute to the development of comprehensive cybersecurity standards tailored for the evolving electric vehicle ecosystem, offering actionable recommendations for EV manufacturers, charging infrastructure operators, and regulatory policymakers globally.",
      "published": "2025-12-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mosicom67153.2025.11398234",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sonali B. Wankhede",
        "Dhiren Patel"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Modeling, Simulation & Intelligent Computing (MoSICom)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/mosicom67153.2025.11398234",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mpcon69668.2026.11508546",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Enhancement of PKI-Based OTA Update Mechanisms in Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs)",
      "description": "Modern Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) are relying on Over-the-Air (OTA) updates to deliver security patches, performance improvements, and feature enhancements throughout the vehicle lifecycle. Although Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is mostly used to secure OTA updates through digital signatures and certificate verification, its depend entirely on secure key management. This paper presents a structured evaluation framework to analyze the security strength of the PKI-based OTA update mechanism. A detailed simulation of the entire OTA workflow is implemented, including key generation, X.509 certificate validation, digital signature verification, and vehicle integrity checks. In addition, an attacker model is introduced to demonstrate how arbitrary software installation becomes possible if the OTA private key is compromised. Risk probability analysis and penetration testing–based severity evaluation reveal that private key compromise leads to a critical breakdown of trust, enabling malicious firmware installation and large-scale supply chain attacks. The results highlight that although PKI provides strong protection under normal conditions, it introduces a single point of failure centered on private key security. This study emphasizes the need for lightweight and decentralized authentication mechanisms to enhance the resilience of OTA ecosystems in next-generation connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-03-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mpcon69668.2026.11508546",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bansi Pambhar",
        "Jayapandian N",
        "Shrikant Tangade"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Madhya Pradesh Section Conference (MPCON)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/mpcon69668.2026.11508546",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4078,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/mpcon69668.2026.11508546 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: fleet_scale; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: large-scale, strong, normal, trust, digital, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mprv.2016.14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Shifting Gears: User Interfaces in the Age of Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "The field of automotive user interfaces has developed rapidly over the last several years. To date, the field has primarily focused on creating user interfaces that promote safe driving, including when the driver is engaged in a secondary task in addition to operating the vehicle. However, researchers now need to prepare for a major change in the automotive domain: the automated driving revolution. The authors argue for a new research agenda that focuses on four challenges for automotive user interfaces: assuring safety in the age of automation, transforming vehicles into places for productivity and play, taking advantage of new mobility options made possible by automated vehicles, while throughout all this preserving user privacy and data security. This article is part of a special issue on smart vehicle spaces.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mprv.2016.14",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrew L. Kun",
        "Susanne Boll",
        "Albrecht Schmidt"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Pervasive Computing",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/mprv.2016.14",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 158,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ms.2023.3342974",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Continuous Compliance in the Automotive Industry",
      "description": "Safety and security are increasingly important in critical and smart systems. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers are moving toward Over-the-Air (OTA) updates, bringing new benefits and challenges. Updating the software after production permits fixing bugs and improving functionalities from a safety and security point of view, but given that OTA updates will be increasingly frequent, we need tools and procedures capable of guaranteeing compliance with standards continuously, so that each new version of the software has the same security as the previous one. Although the need to comply with standards has been identified, the concept of continuous compliance has never been defined and characterized. In this paper, we present how compliance with standards can be ensured continuously. We provide a precise definition of continuous compliance, together with an overview of the main stakeholders, components, and steps. To achieve this objective, we analyzed academic and industrial points of view.",
      "published": "2023-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ms.2023.3342974",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tiziano Santilli",
        "Patrizio Pelliccione",
        "Rebekka Wohlrab",
        "Ali Shahrokni"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Software",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/ms.2023.3342974",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/msec.2021.3093137",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Seven Pain Points of Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "Delivering new features connected to the Internet while enforcing security in vehicles has pushed the automotive industry into turmoil. The automotive industry will inevitably face seven pain points while adapting their threat analysis and risk assessment practices.",
      "published": "2021-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/msec.2021.3093137",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Katja Tuma",
        "Mathias Widman"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Security & Privacy",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/msec.2021.3093137",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/msec.2023.3247374",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Real-Time Cosimulation Testbed for Electric Vehicle Charging and Smart Grid Security",
      "description": "Faced with the threat of climate change, the world is rapidly adopting electric vehicles (EVs); however, the EV ecosystem is vulnerable to cyberattacks. In this article, we present a security-oriented real-time cosimulation testbed for the EV ecosystem and the power grid.",
      "published": "2023-03-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/msec.2023.3247374",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khaled Sarieddine",
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Danial Jafarigiv",
        "Ribal F. Atallah",
        "Mourad Debbabi",
        "Chadi M. Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Security & Privacy",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/msec.2023.3247374",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/msec.2026.3735626",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hermes Seal: Zero-Knowledge Assurance for Autonomous Vehicle Communications",
      "description": "The application of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) in autonomous systems is an emerging area of research, motivated by the growing need for regulatory compliance, transparent auditing, and trustworthy operation in decentralized environments. zk-SNARK is a powerful cryptographic tool that allows a party (the prover) to prove to another party (the verifier) that a statement about its own internal state is true, without revealing sensitive or proprietary data about that state. This paper proposes Hermes Seal: a zk-SNARK-based ZKP framework for enabling privacy-preserving, verifiable communication in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) networks. The framework allows autonomous systems to generate cryptographic proofs of perception and decision-related computations without revealing proprietary models, sensor data, or internal system states, thereby supporting interoperability across heterogeneous autonomous systems. We present two real-world case studies implemented and empirically evaluated within our framework, demonstrating a step toward verifiable autonomous system information exchanges. The first demonstrates real-time proof generation and verification, achieving 8 ms proof generation and 1 ms verification on a GPU, while the second evaluates the performance of an autonomous vehicle perception stack, enabling proof of computation without exposing proprietary or confidential data. Furthermore, the framework can be integrated into AV perception stacks to facilitate verifiable interoperability and privacy-preserving cooperative perception. The demonstration code for this project is open source, available on Github.",
      "published": "2026-03-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/msec.2026.3735626",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Munawar Hasan",
        "Apostol Vassilev",
        "Edward Griffor",
        "Thoshitha Gamage"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 24, no. 6, 2026",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/msec.2026.3735626",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/msn60784.2023.00060",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Zone Authentication Scheme with Auto-Refreshing Pseudonyms for C-V2X",
      "description": "Vehicular communications are bringing a wave of privacy issues in the boom of Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C- V2X), one of which is privacy-preserving authentication. Thus we propose the concept of zone authentication. Zone authentication is an approach to transmitting Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) data in an authentic and confidential manner, where the vehicles and authorization authorities generate pseudonymous key pairs to further sign and verify messages associated to static geographic zones close to their location. To help the resourceconstrained devices fit in the C-V2X environment more preferably, we were motivated to lessen the overhead and heighten the efficiency of zone authentication. For this purpose, we designed a scheme of lightweight zone authentication with auto-refreshing pseudonyms. The proposed scheme not only enables authorization authorities to work hierarchically in line with the geographic division of the zones, but also allows vehicles to transmit zone-associated parameters in accordance with universal hash function family (UHF). Considering the characteristics of zone authentication, we computed the pseudonymous parameters concerning both time epochs and zones, which guarantees the confidentiality of the communication process. As a consequence, the performance analysis on the basis of computation time cost, storage cost, and the number of operations demonstrates that our zone authentication scheme performs better than existing schemes.",
      "published": "2023-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/msn60784.2023.00060",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xijie Ba",
        "Jiaqi Yang",
        "Cong Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/msn60784.2023.00060",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/msn63567.2024.00184",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Poster Abstract:Intrusion Detection for In-vehicle Networks Based on Parc-net Architecture",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) serves as a pivotal communication protocol for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern automotive systems. However, the increasing interconnectivity and sophistication of these ECUs introduce significant vulnerabilities, rendering in-vehicle networks susceptible to a variety of cyber threats. This work presents a multi-class classification model for intrusion detection within vehicle CAN networks, utilizing Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BILSTM) and Parc-Net architectures. We also introduce a novel feature extraction module that computes the rate of ID changes, significantly enhancing the model's detection capabilities. The proposed method was evaluated on the CAR-HACKING dataset, demonstrating remarkable performance. The proposed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) greatly contributes to the security of vehicle CAN networks by facilitating real-time detection and localization of potential intrusions.",
      "published": "2024-12-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/msn63567.2024.00184",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mingming Tan",
        "Heng Zhang",
        "Xin Wang",
        "Hongran Li",
        "Meng Huang",
        "Jian Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/msn63567.2024.00184",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/msp.2019.2901501",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Call for Papers: Special Issue on Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Special Issue on Autonomous DrivingThe integration of advanced sensing, signal processing, artificial intelligence, and controls technologies into vehicles is enabling intelligent automated vehicles that can navigate autonomously in various environments.In particular, autonomous driving and, more generally, automated driving is receiving a growing attention with significantly increasing resources being deployed to enable safe, reliable, and efficient automated mobility in complex uncontrolled real-world environments and for various applications ranging from automated transportation, and farming to public safety and environmental exploration.Signal processing is a critical component of automated driving.Some of the needed enabling technologies include affordable sensing platforms that can acquire useful data under varying environmental conditions, reliable simultaneous localization and mapping, machine learning that can effectively handle varying real-world conditions and unforeseen events, \"machine-learning friendly\" signal processing to enable more effective classification and decision making, hardware and software co-design for efficient real-time performance, resilient and robust platforms that can withstand adversarial attacks and failures, and end-to-end system integration of sensing, signal processing, machine learning, and controls.",
      "published": "2019-04-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/msp.2019.2901501",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "IEEE Signal Processing Magazine",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/msp.2019.2901501",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/msp.2020.2983666",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Vulnerability of Semantic Segmentation Networks to Adversarial Attacks in Autonomous Driving: Enhancing Extensive Environment Sensing",
      "description": "Enabling autonomous driving (AD) can be considered one of the biggest challenges in today?s technology. AD is a complex task accomplished by several functionalities, with environment perception being one of its core functions. Environment perception is usually performed by combining the semantic information captured by several sensors, i.e., lidar or camera. The semantic information from the respective sensor can be extracted by using convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for dense prediction. In the past, CNNs constantly showed stateof-the-art performance on several vision-related tasks, such as semantic segmentation of traffic scenes using nothing but the red-green-blue (RGB) images provided by a camera. Although CNNs obtain state-of-the-art performance on clean images, almost imperceptible changes to the input, referred to as adversarial perturbations, may lead to fatal deception. The goal of this article is to illuminate the vulnerability aspects of CNNs used for semantic segmentation with respect to adversarial attacks, and share insights into some of the existing known adversarial defense strategies. We aim to clarify the advantages and disadvantages associated with applying CNNs for environment perception in AD to serve as a motivation for future research in this field.",
      "published": "2020-12-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/msp.2020.2983666",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Bär",
        "Jonas Löhdefink",
        "Nikhil Kapoor",
        "Serin Varghese",
        "Fabian Hüger",
        "Peter Schlicht",
        "Tim Fingscheidt"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Signal Processing Magazine",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/msp.2020.2983666",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mtits.2015.7223297",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security issues and vulnerabilities in connected car systems",
      "description": "The Connected Revolution has reached the automotive industry and the Internet penetrates into the modern vehicles. Formerly acquiring data from a vehicle was the tool of Fleet Management Systems handling commercial vehicles. In the recent years connectivity began to appear in the passenger vehicles also. The first features were infotainment and navigation, having low security needs remaining far from the vehicular networks. Then telematics and remote control, such as keyless entry appeared and created a new security threat in the vehicle. The paper shows how the connected feature changes the vehicle and also presents vulnerabilities of each element to show the importance of cautious system security design.",
      "published": "2015-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mtits.2015.7223297",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "infotainment",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tamás Bécsi",
        "Szilárd Aradi",
        "Péter Gáspár"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Models and Technologies for Intelligent Transportation Systems (MT-ITS)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/mtits.2015.7223297",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mtits.2017.8005670",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trade-off analysis of safety and security in CAN bus communication",
      "description": "While safety is thoroughly applied to the development of transportation systems, one of the prominent challenges of the last years is the integration with security concepts, required by the ubiquitous connectivity and increased value in data. A joint safety/security design can expose sometimes to trade-offs, since safety and security requirements may not match perfectly or even be incompatible to a certain degree. On the other hand, well-known solutions or best-practices in one field may create new issues in the other. This paper analyses an example of this joint design, that is the combination of integrity with encryption considering the constraints of a typical CAN network and real-time traffic. The analysis is presented considering different attacker models, packet fragmentation issues and the residual probability of error of the combined scheme.",
      "published": "2017-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mtits.2017.8005670",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luca Dariz",
        "Michele Selvatici",
        "Massimiliano Ruggeri",
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Fabio Martinelli"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Models and Technologies for Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mtits.2017.8005670",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mts.2018.2795093",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicle Security Vulnerabilities [Commentary]",
      "description": "In the history of mandatory regulation of computerized vehicles, an E-Letter entitled, “Black box is not safe at all,” was published in Science [1] in 2017. It mentioned that on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) specifications were made mandatory for all cars sold in the United States in 1996. The European Union made European OBD (EOBD) mandatory for all gasoline (petrol) vehicles sold in the European Union starting in 2001. The paper discussed the security vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles. Vehicle access attacking affects not only autonomous vehicles but also conventional vehicles. Vehicle access attacking includes key fob clone and telematics service attacking.",
      "published": "2018-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mts.2018.2795093",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "key fob",
        "obd",
        "obd-ii",
        "regulation",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yoshiyasu Takefuji"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Technology and Society Magazine",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mts.2018.2795093",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mvt.2017.2669348",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driving with Sharks: Rethinking Connected Vehicles with Vehicle Cybersecurity",
      "description": "In a public service announcement on 17 March 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation jointly with the U.S. Department of Transportation and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) released a warning regarding the increasing vulnerability of motor vehicles to remote exploits [18]. Engine shutdowns, disabled brakes, and locked doors are a few examples of possible vehicle cybersecurity attacks. Modern cars grow into a new target for cyberattacks as they become increasingly connected. While driving on the road, sharks (i.e., hackers) need only to be within communication range of a vehicle to attack it. However, in some cases, they can hack into it while they are miles away. In this article, we aim to illuminate the latest vehicle cybersecurity threats including malware attacks, on-board diagnostic (OBD) vulnerabilities, and automobile apps threats. We illustrate the in-vehicle network architecture and demonstrate the latest defending mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats.",
      "published": "2017-04-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mvt.2017.2669348",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahmoud Hashem Eiza",
        "Qiang Ni"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mvt.2017.2669348",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 151,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mvt.2017.2736344",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Solutions for the Controller Area Network: Bringing Authentication to In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Vehicles cannot be secured while the in-vehicle network remains insecure. The growing number of attacks reported each year shows that in-vehicle buses are not isolated from the outside world. By exploiting their lack of security, adversaries can gain control over virtually any functionality inside the car. We discuss the most promising approaches for assuring security on the controller area network (CAN) bus after a decade of attacks and security proposals. Most of the proposals are based on cryptographic mechanisms, but some exploit the physical layer or even the physical characteristics of the controllers. The surveyed solutions prove a significant degree of maturity and sophistication, which suggests that the moment for adoption and standardization by the industry has come.",
      "published": "2018-01-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mvt.2017.2736344",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mvt.2017.2736344",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mvt.2017.2758179",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Connected Car: A Security-Enhancement Methodology",
      "description": "A new era is upon us-an era where Internet connectivity is available everywhere and at all times. Cars have become very complex computer systems with about 100 million lines of code and more than 100 electronic control units (ECUs) interconnected to control everything, including steering, acceleration, brakes, and other safety-critical systems. However, cars were never created with Internet connectivity in mind, and adding this connectivity as an afterthought raises many security concerns. As a result, a security-enhancing approach that considers the entire process from product development to market introduction is required.",
      "published": "2018-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mvt.2017.2758179",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kim Strandberg",
        "Tomas Olovsson",
        "Erland Jonsson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mvt.2017.2758179",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mvt.2017.2778751",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Uptane: Security and Customizability of Software Updates for Vehicles",
      "description": "In this article we discuss Uptane, the first, to our knowledge, compromise-resilient software update security system designed specifically for vehicles. It is designed to make obtaining all the pieces required to control a vehicle extremely difficult for attackers.",
      "published": "2018-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mvt.2017.2778751",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Trishank Karthik Kuppusamy",
        "Lois Anne DeLong",
        "Justin Cappos"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mvt.2017.2778751",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mvt.2020.2980097",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Transformation, Systemic Design, and Automotive Electronics [Automotive Electronics]",
      "description": "Digital transformation, systemic Design, and automotive electronics cars are moving beyond simple automation car makers have gone beyond automation to create a new type of digital plant, which produces more than 100 million lines of code for each connected vehicle. This will change the way the industry works, moving from old practices and traditions to new requirements for specialized workers combined with new business models. The digital transformation of the automotive industry exposes information technology security, commonly called cybersecurity, to new threats. Auto manufacturers face new challenges to protect connected cars and customers from hackers. In the past, what happened in your car usually stayed in your car. This is no longer the case. The influx of digital innovations, from infotainment connectivity to over-the-air (OTA) software updates, has turned cars into powerful high-tech gadgets. Although they bring significant value to customers, these changes also expose vehicles to the rougher side of digital innovation. Hackers and other shadow invaders are struggling to gain access to crucial electronic units and vehicle data, which can compromise critical security functions and customer privacy.",
      "published": "2020-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mvt.2020.2980097",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "João Pedro F. Trovão"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mvt.2020.2980097",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/mvt.2020.2980097 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: turned, usually, expose, vehicle., functions, digital, car, significant."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwc.001.2000292",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Edge Intelligence for Autonomous Driving in 6G Wireless System: Design Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": "In a level-5 autonomous driving system, the autonomous driving vehicles (AVs) are expected to sense the surroundings via analyzing a large amount of data captured by a variety of onboard sensors in near-real-time. As a result, enormous computing costs will be introduced to the AVs for processing the tasks with the deployed machine learning (ML) model, while the inference accuracy may not be guaranteed. In this context, the advent of edge intelligence (EI) and sixth-generation (6G) wireless networking are expected to pave the way to more reliable and safer autonomous driving by providing multi-access edge computing (MEC) together with ML to AVs in close proximity. To realize this goal, we propose a two-tier EI-empowered autonomous driving framework. In the autonomous-vehicles tier, the autonomous vehicles are deployed with the shallow layers by splitting the trained deep neural network model. In the edge-intelligence tier, an edge server is implemented with the remaining layers (also deep layers) and an appropriately trained multi-task learning (MTL) model. In particular, obtaining the optimal offloading strategy (including the binary offloading decision and the computational resources allocation) can be formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem, which is solved via MTL in near-real-time with high accuracy. On another note, an edge-vehicle joint inference is proposed through neural network segmentation to achieve efficient online inference with data privacy-preserving and less communication delay. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, and open research topics are finally listed.",
      "published": "2021-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwc.001.2000292",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bo Fan Yang",
        "Xuelin Cao",
        "Kai Xiong",
        "Chau Yuen",
        "Yong Liang Guan",
        "Supeng Leng",
        "Lijun Qian",
        "Zhu Han"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwc.001.2000292",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 190,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwc.2016.1600039wc",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Network Security and Privacy Challenges in Smart Vehicle-to-Grid",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-03-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwc.2016.1600039wc",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Neetesh Saxena",
        "S. Grijalva",
        "Victor Chukwuka",
        "A. Vasilakos"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE wireless communications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwc.2016.1600039wc",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 109,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwc.2018.1700364",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Wireless Telematics Systems in Emerging Intelligent and Connected Vehicles: Threats and Solutions",
      "description": "Intelligent and Connected Vehicles (ICVs), which are equipped with various wireless communication technologies and many smart systems, significantly improve the driving experience. Nevertheless, due to the potential vulnerabilities in their advanced cyber physical features and growing numbers of interfaces, malicious attacks can be easily implemented toward ICVs, in particular by utilizing the interfaces of wireless telematics systems. Remote vehicle attacks can even be launched by a malicious application or a smart connected device. Toward this end, we provide in this article an essential tutorial summarizing the threats, attacking methodologies, and promising solutions specifically for wireless telematics systems in the emerging ICVs.",
      "published": "2018-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwc.2018.1700364",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "telematics",
        "threats",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qian Luo",
        "Jiajia Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwc.2018.1700364",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwc.2019.1800289",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TSP Security in Intelligent and Connected Vehicles: Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": "The rapid development of IoT, cloud computing, Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data, and 5G technologies has promoted the transformation of traditional vehicles toward ICVs. Compared to traditional vehicles, ICVs face many security threats introduced by network technologies and intelligent devices, especially in the field of remote wireless communications using Telematics Service Provider (TSP). As the core communication system in ICVs, TSP integrates diverse communication systems, and thus inherits the original vulnerabilities of these systems inevitably. TSP provides various methods for the ICVs to access the Internet, which makes them vulnerable to remote attacks. However, existing auto manufacturers mostly focused on the user experiences of the ICVs, and paid little attention to these potential security risks raised by TSP. Toward this end, in this article we analyze and summarize the TSP security threats in ICVs, and present some attack methodologies. After that, we discuss a practical attack case against an ICV by leveraging the vulnerabilities of TSP, and some countermeasures are proposed to enhance ICV security against TSP attacks.",
      "published": "2019-02-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwc.2019.1800289",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yansong Li",
        "Qian Luo",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Hongzhi Guo",
        "Nei Kato"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwc.2019.1800289",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 85,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwc.2019.1800503",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Internet of Autonomous Vehicles Communications Security: Overview, Issues, and Directions",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology that has gained a huge user base by facilitating Internet-connected devices being used in numerous applications including smart vehicular infrastructure. In this context, we focus on the traditional vehicular ad hoc network that has evolved into a new perception called the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), and is expected to soon transform into the Internet of Autonomous Vehicles (IoAV). IoAV hopes to facilitate smart vehicular infrastructure and autonomous driving without the need for human involvement. However, as the number of connected vehicles keeps increasing, so does the need for autonomous decision making. Hence, the IoAV must provide robust, secure, seamless, and scalable communication among the vehicles as well as the roadside units. This article provides an overview of autonomous vehicle communication layers, its associated properties, and security threats. Further, this article also briefly discusses the current research trends and future research issues.",
      "published": "2019-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwc.2019.1800503",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashish Nanda",
        "Deepak Puthal",
        "Joel J. P. C. Rodrigues",
        "S. A. Kozlov"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwc.2019.1800503",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 149,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwc.2019.1800533",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Localization and Navigation in Autonomous Driving: Threats and Countermeasures",
      "description": "With the growing number of research studies on autonomous driving, a lot of new technologies for self-driving cars are also constantly emerging. While significantly promoting the development of autonomous vehicles, these emerging technologies also have potential vulnerabilities, which may bring up some nonnegligible security threats. Loopholes existing in localization and navigation technologies, which are the key elements of route planning and navigation, could be utilized by adversaries to manipulate autonomous driving navigation by hijacking valuable vehicles, goods, or even target characters. Toward this end, we provide in this article a basic guide summarizing the security threats and attack schemes, and we propose countermeasures specifically for localization and navigation technologies in autonomous vehicles. After that, we present a novel route spoofing attack that could also be implemented against future autonomous driving navigation. With such implementation, we demonstrate that effectively, routes of targeted drivers can be usurped and hence mislead drivers to take a wrong route, go by a malicious place, and even be tracked in real time.",
      "published": "2019-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwc.2019.1800533",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qian Luo",
        "Yurui Cao",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Abderrahim Benslimane"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwc.2019.1800533",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 119,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwscas48704.2020.9184472",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability of Deep Learning Model based Anomaly Detection in Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been widely applied in Anomaly Detection System (ADS) in-vehicle networks. ADS should be able to detect abnormal behaviors and attacks at the gateway Electronic Control Unit(ECU). The detection is usually required with low latency to leave as much as possible time budget to apply proper protections once an anomaly is successfully detected. However, AI models are very vulnerable to the type of Blackbox attacks, which do not require prior knowledge of either the deep learning model internals or the model's training data for a hacker. In this paper, first, we propose a new optimized method to adopt Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) deep learning model for the ADS in-vehicle network, which leads to an efficient detection system. The optimization has been done based on the characteristics of the dataset from practical CAN in-vehicle network together with tuning existing parameters of the LSTM model. Second, we propose an efficient Blackbox attack to the adopted ADS using the LSTM model, which only requires a small test dataset to train a new victim model (input/output is compatible with the original model). Experimental results show that we only require around 50 man-hours to build a victim model that leads to the wrong interpretation compared to the original model without the Blackbox attack. It proves that the whole community should not only focus on developing efficient ADS, but also on how to protect it in future work.",
      "published": "2020-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwscas48704.2020.9184472",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in vehicle network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Wang",
        "Wei Ming Dan Chia",
        "Yajun Ha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwscas48704.2020.9184472",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/mwscas67364.2026.11680599",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distill-and-Rank: Evaluating Fast Transformer Models for Keyless PQC Side-Channel Recovery",
      "description": "Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) schemes such as the NIST-standardized ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber) are entering deployment, yet their resilience to side-channel attacks (SCAs) remains insufficiently understood. We study a realistic keyless attack on ML-KEM’s pointwise multiplication: a leakage model trained only on a disjoint known-key set recovers each target’s secret by ranking candidate coefficients without ever using its key, relying solely on the public ciphertext r and the traces. On low-noise simulated traces and real CW305 FPGA measurements, we recover the NTT-domain coefficients of $s_{1}$ and benchmark CPA, a 1-D CNN, and a compact hybrid (Reg-Net) against our Distill-and-Rank framework, which pairs PatchSCA-Lite, a lightweight patch-based Transformer (153k parameters, ~2 ms/trace), with EMA self-distillation, correlation ranking, and keyless confidence measures (margin, bootstrap stability). On low-noise traces all learned models beat CPA (25 traces to disclosure); the compact hybrid needs the fewest (12) and PatchSCA-Lite 17, with EMA distillation essential for the Transformer to converge. Under high noise and on real hardware, learned models degrade sharply: the compact hybrid gives the best efficiency-robustness tradeoff, while pure attention collapses where low SNR and scale mismatch dominate. Standardized PQC implementations remain vulnerable to leakage, and lightweight hybrid models are the more practical choice for keyless SCA.",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/mwscas67364.2026.11680599",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nouf Nur Nabilah",
        "Mani Rupak Gurram",
        "Yamini Swetha Nadella",
        "Sarita Bista",
        "Christopher Josiah Stance",
        "Hussein Ahmed Hussein",
        "Akshay “Ak” Raghavendra Kulkarni",
        "Annamalai Annamalai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/mwscas67364.2026.11680599",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/nca67271.2025.00044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Risk Analysis of Multi-Stage Attacks in Zonal Automotive E/E Architecture",
      "description": "The automotive industry’s shift to zonal Electrical/Electronic (E/E) architectures introduces new lateral movement pathways for multi-stage cyberattacks, posing significant end-user risks. Modeling these “automotive kill chains” is challenging due to the lack of a standardized framework for adversary tactics. This paper presents a methodology that integrates the Automotive Threat Matrix (ATM) with the ISO/SAE 21434 Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process to systematically construct and analyze attack paths. Based on this analysis, we propose the Automotive Kill Chain Correlation (AKCC), a dynamic threat response framework that correlates security alerts along modeled attack paths for high-confidence detection. Applying the methodology to a representative zonal architecture reveals systemic vulnerabilities and enables the design of targeted, stateful countermeasures. The practical utility of this approach is validated through a qualitative survey of industry experts, who confirmed it significantly simplifies and clarifies attack path analysis.",
      "published": "2025-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/nca67271.2025.00044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ramakrishnan Pitchaimani",
        "Sébastien Canard",
        "Badis Hammi",
        "Sorin Aurel Spornic"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/nca67271.2025.00044",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/nelex69209.2026.11590579",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Proximity-Aware Vehicle Access Using UWB and RF Command Control with BLE based Telemetry",
      "description": "With the advancement in vehicle access systems and technology, risk of relay attacks, signal amplification, and spoofing have increased for those systems that rely solely on RF key fobs or Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). This is partially true if the system solely relies on BLE strength (RSSI) or Radio Frequency (RF) signals. Also, car manufacturers mainly focus on features that attract a lot of customers like keyless entry, push based request sensors, mobile connectivity, etc. This document introduces a functional access system that uses (i) Ultra-Wideband (UWB) technology for precise distance measurement and keyfob validation, (ii) a radio frequency (RF) command channel for locking and unlocking, and (iii) Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) for remote unlocking/locking, data transmission, diagnostics, and secure communication with users, (iv) CAN (Controller Area Network) transceiver that sends the unlock command to the car via OBD 2 port. The proposed system uses UWB distance logic to allow unlock commands only when the key fob tag is within the assigned range. BLE offers unlocking feature while key fob is not physically present and transmits verified status updates and event logs to a mobile application. CAN sends unlock command to car and parallelly receives the diagnostic data from car. The prototype uses ESP32 nodes and Decawave/Qorvo DW1000 UWB modules that provides consistent distance-based authorization and lowers the chance of false unlocking compared to methods that rely solely on RSSI. The evaluation of the project is based on parameters like stability, measuring the time it takes to unlock from start to finish, and testing reliability in situations with multiple paths and non-line-of-sight conditions. The Anchor connects received RF commands with recent UWB distance measurements and sends approved commands to the vehicle’s Controller Area Network (CAN) bus for action, BLE is used for remote unlock and diagnostic data transmission and Mobile App is used for monitoring, diagnostics, and configuration.",
      "published": "2026-05-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/nelex69209.2026.11590579",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "obd",
        "relay",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tarun Venkatesh",
        "A Karthikeyan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Next Generation Electronics (NELEX)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/nelex69209.2026.11590579",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/niss55057.2022.10085633",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Streamlining Security Relevance Analysis According to ISO 21434",
      "description": "ISO 21434, as the cybersecurity standard for automotive systems, was released not long ago. Nevertheless, the automotive industry needed to adhere to the standard since its draft release due to long development times. Therefore, most automotive companies accomplished the first development cycle according to ISO 21434. The biggest problem still is the efficiency of the cybersecurity process. In order to enable a continuous, traceable, and efficient cybersecurity process, each step needs to be evaluated and integrated into a common framework. As a first step, we analyze ISO 21434s concept of security relevance evaluation (SRE). We evaluate the suggested method of ISO 21434 and extend it to the notion of criticality. The initial criticality rating allows prioritization of the subsequent security process and accomplishment of the assessment requirement in ISO 21434. Additionally, we propose the idea of clustered SREs to raise efficiency.",
      "published": "2022-03-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/niss55057.2022.10085633",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christine Jakobs",
        "Billy Naumann",
        "Matthias Werner",
        "Karsten Schmidt",
        "Jörn Eichler",
        "Holger Heskamp"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Networking, Information Systems & Security (NISS)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/niss55057.2022.10085633",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/nkcon62728.2024.10774595",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performance Comparison of Security Credential Management Systems for V2X: North American Standard IEEE 1609.2.1 and European Standard ETSI TS 102 941",
      "description": "This study examines the performance and structural differences between the two primary standards for Security Credential Management Systems (SCMS) in Vehicular-to-Everything (V2X) communication: the North American IEEE standards and the European ETSI standards. It focuses on comparing their respective Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) architectures, certificate application workflows, and the formats of request/response messages used during certificate applications. The research includes a theoretical analysis of message length and security features inherent in each standard. Additionally, practical implementations of both systems are conducted to evaluate their efficiency in certificate management processes. Based on the findings, the study provides recommendations to guide future development of SCMS.",
      "published": "2024-12-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/nkcon62728.2024.10774595",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel C. H. Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/nkcon62728.2024.10774595",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/nof58724.2023.10302810",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid Approach to Detect Position Forgery Attacks in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The use of vehicles on the road plays a significant role in our daily lives. However, the growing number of vehicles is also contributing to increased occurrences of collisions, traffic jams, air pollution, and other related problems. Recently, the use of Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) has been proposed for implementing an intelligent transportation system (ITS), with the aim of alleviating these issues. VANET communication is vulnerable to various types of attacks, and appropriate security mechanisms must be in place to ensure that exchanged messages are not altered or false messages created by malicious attackers. In this paper, we propose a new hybrid approach consisting of a combination of Machine Learning and Plausibility Checks to detect position forgery attacks in basic safety messages (BSMs). Our results indicate that the proposed approach outperforms the existing work available in the literature in terms of different well-accepted performance metrics such as accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score.",
      "published": "2023-10-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/nof58724.2023.10302810",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Anwar Shahid",
        "Arunita Jaekel"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on the Network of the Future (NOF)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/nof58724.2023.10302810",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/noms54207.2022.9789873",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mobile applications for connected cars: Security analysis and risk assessment",
      "description": "As connected vehicles continue to become more advanced and widespread, it is vital to ensure that vehicle to everything (V2X) communications are secure. Connected car mobile applications have become a key feature in the vehicular ecosystem and represent a new attack vector that can be used to compromise vehicles. This paper undertakes a threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) of connected car mobile applications using known vulnerabilities. The found vulnerabilities are analysed to highlight common weaknesses. This paper thus outlines how a TARA can be adapted in the context of connected car mobile applications with reference to established security models.",
      "published": "2022-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/noms54207.2022.9789873",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nicholas Topman",
        "Asma Adnane"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/noms54207.2022.9789873",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ntms.2018.8328675",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Addressing Security in OCPP: Protection Against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks",
      "description": "The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) is a communication standard for the exchange of data between a Charge Point (CP) and the Central Server (CS) in the electric vehicle domain. This protocol is envisioned to offer interoperability between the different manufacturers of charging points, network systems and IT back-end vendors. However, the current version of the specification is quite vague in terms of handling security and privacy, which results in a set of non-addressed threats, which we look at in this paper. Specifically, this paper focuses on Man-in-the-Middle attacks between the CP and the CS that may expose sensitive data of special interest to the various stake-holders involved in this context. As a counter-measure, we present a feasible solution and assess its behaviour in a simulator. The inclusion of additional security mechanisms is also studied, in compliance with the IEC 62351 standard.",
      "published": "2018-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ntms.2018.8328675",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ocpp",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Juan Enrique Rubio",
        "Cristina Alcaraz",
        "Javier López"
      ],
      "venue": "IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/ntms.2018.8328675",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ntms65597.2025.11076942",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks on Faster R-CNN Model for Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Object detection models used in autonomous driving systems provide environmental awareness of vehicles by making reliable and accurate predictions. However, these models show significant vulnerabilities in the face of adversarial attacks that can jeopardize system security. In this research, we compare the test performance and evaluation of the Faster R-CNN model under adversarial attacks using the ApolloScape dataset. We apply adversarial attacks to object detection models of autonomous driving systems on the ApolloScape dataset, which contains real-world scenes and high-resolution images for the first time. We analyze the prediction performance of the model using two common attack methods, FGSM and PGD. Our results show that PGD severely reduces the accuracy of the model due to its iterative nature and increases the false detection rate, especially in real-life scenes of the ApolloScape dataset. FGSM, on the other hand, showed a more limited effect, although it caused performance loss in critical categories. This research emphasizes that the Faster R-CNN model, which shows high performance on complex real-world datasets, is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. It also highlights the need for robust defense mechanisms tailored to the challenges of autonomous driving systems. We aim to contribute to the development of safer and more secure object detection systems in the face of hostile threats.",
      "published": "2025-06-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ntms65597.2025.11076942",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Melike Başer",
        "Şerif Bahtıyar"
      ],
      "venue": "IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ntms65597.2025.11076942",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2022.3169500",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Issues in Autonomous Vehicles: A Layer-Based Survey",
      "description": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing every technology we are used to deal with. Autonomy has long been a sought-after goal in vehicles, and now more than ever we are very close to that goal. Big auto manufacturers as well are investing billions of dollars to produce Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). This new technology has the potential to provide more safety for passengers, less crowded roads, congestion alleviation, optimized traffic, fuel-saving, less pollution as well as enhanced travel experience among other benefits. But this new paradigm shift comes with newly introduced privacy issues and security concerns. Vehicles before were dumb mechanical devices, now they are becoming smart, computerized, and connected. They collect huge troves of information, which needs to be protected from breaches. In this work, we investigate security challenges and privacy concerns in AVs. We examine different attacks launched in a layer-based approach. We conceptualize the architecture of AVs in a four-layered model. Then, we survey security and privacy attacks and some of the most promising countermeasures to tackle them. Our goal is to shed light on the open research challenges in the area of AVs as well as offer directions for future research.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojcoms.2022.3169500",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Hataba",
        "Ahmed Sherif",
        "Mohamed M. Abdallah",
        "Waleed Alasmary"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojcoms.2022.3169500",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 84,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2023.3239115",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Survey of V2X Cybersecurity Mechanisms and Future Research Paths",
      "description": "Recent advancements in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication have notably improved existing transport systems by enabling increased connectivity and driving autonomy levels. The remarkable benefits of V2X connectivity come inadvertently with challenges which involve security vulnerabilities and breaches. Addressing security concerns is essential for seamless and safe operation of mission-critical V2X use cases. This paper surveys current literature on V2X security and provides a systematic and comprehensive review of the most relevant security enhancements to date. An in-depth classification of V2X attacks is first performed according to key security and privacy requirements. Our methodology resumes with a taxonomy of security mechanisms based on their proactive/reactive defensive approach, which helps identify strengths and limitations of state-of-the-art countermeasures for V2X attacks. In addition, this paper delves into the potential of emerging security approaches leveraging artificial intelligence tools to meet security objectives. Promising data-driven solutions tailored to tackle security, privacy and trust issues are thoroughly discussed along with new threat vectors introduced inevitably by these enablers. The lessons learned from the detailed review of existing works are also compiled and highlighted. We conclude this survey with a structured synthesis of open challenges and future research directions to foster contributions in this prominent field.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojcoms.2023.3239115",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roshan Sedar",
        "Charalampos Kalalas",
        "Francisco Vázquez-Gallego",
        "Luis Alonso",
        "Jesús Alonso-Zárate"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojcoms.2023.3239115",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 170,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2026.3679935",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning to Secure Wheels: A Survey of Misbehavior Detection for the Next-Generation of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) rely on 5G vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications to enable safety critical and cooperative applications such as emergency braking, collective perception, platooning, and hazard warning. Public key infrastructure (PKI) ensures authentication and message integrity but is insufficient against insider attacks, data manipulation, and fault induced anomalies in highly dynamic vehicular environments. As a result, misbehaviour detection systems (MDSs), supported by machine learning (ML), have become an essential complement to cryptographic security. This survey presents a comprehensive and deployment-oriented review of ML-based MDSs for next-generation CAV ecosystems. Unlike existing surveys that focus mainly on attack-centric or algorithm-centric perspectives, this work explicitly considers both intentional misbehaviour, including Sybil attacks, message falsification, and denial of service, and unintentional misbehaviour arising from sensor faults, protocol deviations, and environmental interference. We introduce a novel five-dimensional classification of misbehaviour detection approaches, encompassing knowledge-driven, data-driven, trust and reputation-driven, context-aware and adaptive, and hybrid and fusion-based systems, organized around how evidential information is generated, validated, and fused. Furthermore, the survey proposes a structured taxonomy of ML-based MDSs that separates learning regimes, including supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised, and reinforcement learning, from deployment and adaptation mechanisms such as federated and transfer learning, reflecting the non-IID data, mobility, and privacy constraints of CAV networks. We examine representative V2X use cases to connect operational requirements with suitable detection strategies, and open challenges related to zero-day detection, adversarial robustness, real-time operation, and standardization are highlighted.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojcoms.2026.3679935",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aadil Hussain Lone",
        "A. A. Nasir",
        "Muhammad Khurram Khan",
        "A. Al-shaikhi",
        "M. Mohandes",
        "Mahmoud M. Salim",
        "D. D. da Costa"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojcoms.2026.3679935",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojits.2022.3142612",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Countering Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles Using Denoising Techniques: A Review",
      "description": "The evolution of automotive technology will eventually permit the automated driving system on the vehicle to handle all circumstances. Human occupants will be just passengers. This poses security issues that need to be addressed. This paper has two aims. The first one investigates strategies for robustifying scene analysis of adversarial road scenes. A taxonomy of the defense mechanisms for countering adversarial perturbations is initially presented, classifying those mechanisms in three major categories: those that modify the data, those that propose adding extra models, and those that focus on modifying the models deployed for scene analysis. Motivated by the limited number of surveys in the first category, we further analyze the approaches that utilize input transformation operations as countermeasures, further classifying them in supervised and unsupervised methods and highlighting both their strengths and weaknesses. The second aim of this paper is to publish CarlaScenes dataset produced using the CARLA simulator. An extensive evaluation study, on CarlaScenes, is performed testing the supervised deep learning approaches that have been either proposed for image restoration or adversarial noise removal. The study presents insights on the robustness of the aforementioned approaches in mitigating adversarial attacks in scene analysis operations.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojits.2022.3142612",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Kloukiniotis",
        "A. Papandreou",
        "Aris S. Lalos",
        "Petros Kapsalas",
        "Duong-Van Nguyen",
        "K. Moustakas"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojits.2022.3142612",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojits.2022.3181510",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicles on the Edge: A Survey on Autonomous Vehicle Racing",
      "description": "The rising popularity of self-driving cars has led to the emergence of a new research field in recent years: Autonomous racing. Researchers are developing software and hardware for high-performance race vehicles which aim to operate autonomously on the edge of the vehicle’s limits: High speeds, high accelerations, low reaction times, highly uncertain, dynamic, and adversarial environments. This paper represents the first holistic survey that covers the research in the field of autonomous racing. We focus on the field of autonomous racecars only and display the algorithms, methods, and approaches used in the areas of perception, planning, control, and end-to-end learning. Further, with an increasing number of autonomous racing competitions, researchers now have access to high-performance platforms to test and evaluate their autonomy algorithms. This survey presents a comprehensive overview of the current autonomous racing platforms, emphasizing the software-hardware co-evolution to the current stage. Finally, based on additional discussion with leading researchers in the field, we conclude with a summary of open research challenges that will guide future researchers in this field.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojits.2022.3181510",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Johannes Betz",
        "Hongrui Zheng",
        "Alexander Liniger",
        "Ugo Rosolia",
        "Phillip Karle",
        "Madhur Behl",
        "Venkat Krovi",
        "Rahul Mangharam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojits.2022.3181510",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 332,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojits.2026.3727244",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Convergent Safety-Security Risk Assessment for V2X-Enabled Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: A Comprehensive Survey and Research Roadmap",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) with Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication are transforming transportation systems, but their increasing connectivity and automation introduce critical challenges where safety and cybersecurity intersect. Traditional approaches treat safety analysis through Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) under ISO 26262 and cybersecurity assessment through Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) under ISO/SAE 21434 as separate disciplines, yet cyberattacks on V2X-enabled CAVs can directly trigger safety-critical failures such as collision risks, system malfunctions, and compromised vehicle control. This survey presents a comprehensive analysis of convergent HARA-TARA methodologies specifically designed for V2X-enabled CAVs. The fundamentals of safety and security risk assessment are systematically reviewed; a structured taxonomy of challenges arising from their convergence is presented; and existing methodologies are classified into five categories, including model-based approaches, formal methods, data-driven techniques, ontology-based frameworks, and hybrid solutions. The analysis reveals critical gaps in current practices, particularly the inability of traditional methods to address machine learning uncertainties and adaptive cyber threats, while advanced verification techniques face practical deployment challenges. Major convergence frameworks are examined, and fundamental trade-offs between analytical rigor, practical applicability, and lifecycle coverage are identified. Systematic insights into the state of the art in integrated safety-security risk assessment are provided, and a comprehensive research roadmap is proposed to address near-term standardization needs, medium-term advances in compositional verification, and long-term challenges in certifying learning-enabled autonomous systems for safe and secure deployment at scale.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojits.2026.3727244",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chaima Zaghouani",
        "Mohamed K. Elhadad",
        "Hakim Ghazzai",
        "Anis Laouiti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojits.2026.3727244",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2020.2999885",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recent Advances and Challenges in Security and Privacy for V2X Communications",
      "description": "In recent studies, vehicular networks have been considered as a promising solution to achieve better traffic management and to improve the driving experience of drivers. In vehicular networks, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services, e.g. on-road traffic information exchange and location-based services, are provided to facilitate road safety for vehicles and traffic management for the relevant authorities. Dedicated Short Range Communications is specifically designed for V2X communications, and recently the cellular network has shown great potential to support V2X with better performance and more applications. Due to the wireless nature of V2X communications, how to secure V2X communications and guarantee the privacy of users are great challenges that have hampered the implementation of vehicular services. Many solutions have been proposed by researchers in last two decades. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey on the state-of-the-art solutions concerning security and privacy for V2X communications. For security, detailed discussions on cryptography based schemes and trust based schemes are provided. For privacy, we summarize and compare general solutions in preserving identity privacy and location privacy. Cellular based V2X communications have shown many advantages over DSRC, and the oncoming fifth-generation cellular technology is going to provide more possibilities to V2X. Thus, security architectures and solutions for cellular based communications are also illustrated and discussed. Finally, we summarize the remaining challenges and point out future research directions.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2020.2999885",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiaqi Huang",
        "Dongfeng Fang",
        "Yi Qian",
        "Rose Qingyang Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2020.2999885",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 110,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2023.3265363",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity of Autonomous Vehicles: A Systematic Literature Review of Adversarial Attacks and Defense Models",
      "description": "Autonomous driving (AD) has developed tremendously in parallel with the ongoing development and improvement of deep learning (DL) technology. However, the uptake of artificial intelligence (AI) in AD as the core enabling technology raises serious cybersecurity issues. An enhanced attack surface has been spurred on by the rising digitization of vehicles and the integration of AI features. The performance of the autonomous vehicle (AV)-based applications is constrained by the DL models' susceptibility to adversarial attacks despite their great potential. Hence, AI-enabled AVs face numerous security threats, which prevent the large-scale adoption of AVs. Therefore, it becomes crucial to evolve existing cybersecurity practices to deal with risks associated with the increased uptake of AI. Furthermore, putting defense models into practice against adversarial attacks has grown in importance as a field of study amongst researchers. Therefore, this study seeks to provide an overview of the most recent adversarial defensive and attack models developed in the domain of AD.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2023.3265363",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mansi Girdhar",
        "Junho Hong",
        "John Moore"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2023.3265363",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 132,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2024.3358893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Future Trends in Smart Green IoV: Vehicle-to-Everything in the Era of Electric Vehicles",
      "description": "The electrification of the transportation sector is an important step to ensure a sustainable system. It offers a promising solution to reduce oil consumption, decrease Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, improve air quality, increase transportation sector efficiency, and it can play an important role in the integration of renewable energy resources into the electric grid. However, one of the biggest bottlenecks of the electrification of vehicles is the requirement for various charging infrastructure options. Three technologies have emerged as game-changers: Dynamic Wireless Charging (DWC), Battery Swapping Stations, and Fast Charging Stations (FCSs). These advancements have the potential to increase the adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) by addressing critical challenges such as range anxiety and charging downtime issues of EV users. The primary focus of this work is on FCS, which currently represents the most readily available option in the market. To ensure the optimal utilization of this charging infrastructure, it is important to address the challenges related to routing EVs to the nearest FCS that can meet the EV charging requirements, such as wait time, charging duration and charging cost. Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) and the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) will play a critical role in enhancing EV routing to the FCS. Additionally, the coordination of EV charging demand is essential to achieve grid load balancing and prevent grid overload. The main focus of this paper is to present the vision and future trends of Smart Green IoV in the era of electric vehicles for sustainable V2X connectivity, grid integration, vehicular networking, data security, and services.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2024.3358893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tasneim Aldhanhani",
        "Anuj Abraham",
        "Wassim Hamidouche",
        "Mostafa F. Shaaban"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2024.3358893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 147,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2024.3375448",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ZSM-Based E2E Security Slice Management for DDoS Attack Protection in MEC-Enabled V2X Environments",
      "description": "Research on vehicle-to-everything (V2X) is attracting significant attention nowadays, driven by the recent advances in beyond-5G (B5G) networks and the multi-access edge computing (MEC) paradigm. However, the inherent heterogeneity of B5G combined with the security vulnerabilities of MEC infrastructure in dynamic V2X scenarios introduces unprecedented challenges. Efficient resource and security management in multi-domain V2X environments is vital, especially with the growing threat of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against critical V2X services within MEC. Our approach employs the zero-touch network and service management (ZSM) standard, integrating autonomous security into end-to-end (E2E) slicing management. We consider an entire 5G network, including vehicular user equipment, radio access networks, MEC, and core components, in the presence of DDoS targeting V2X services. Our framework complies with security service-level agreements (SSLAs) and policies, autonomously deploying and interconnecting security sub-slices across domains. Security requirements are continuously monitored and, upon DDoS detection, our framework reacts with a coordinated E2E strategy. The strategy mitigates DDoS at the MEC and deploys countermeasures in neighboring domains. Performance assessment reveals effective DDoS detection and mitigation with low latency, aligned with the mission-critical nature of certain V2X services. This work is part of ETSI ZSM PoC “security SLA assurance in 5G network slices”.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2024.3375448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rodrigo Asensio-Garriga",
        "Pol Alemany",
        "Alejandro Molina Zarca",
        "Roshan Sedar",
        "Charalampos Kalalas",
        "Jordi Ortiz",
        "Ricard Vilalta",
        "Raül Muñoz",
        "Antonio Skármeta"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2024.3375448",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2024.3418201",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EV Charging Management and Security for Multi-Charging Stations Environment",
      "description": "The widespread adoption of Electric Vehicles (EV) has emphasized the urgent need for efficient and secure charging infrastructure. While existing research in EV charging infrastructure has primarily concentrated on minimizing charging time at charging stations (CSs), neglecting security-centric charging optimization, particularly with scaled charging infrastructure considering multiple CSs. To address this gap, this paper presents an enhanced Hybrid-Electric Vehicle Charging Management and Security (H-EVCMS) framework. The H-EVCMS framework is meticulously designed to optimize charging price, manage load balancing, and provide security across multiple CS by leveraging the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP). The proposed framework's performance is evaluated by examining various charging scenarios and analyzing the booking and power consumption patterns of each CS. The results demonstrate the advantages of the hybrid approach used by the proposed H-EVCMS over traditional charging infrastructure management, showcasing its potential to address the challenges of scaling EV charging infrastructure while ensuring security and efficiency.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2024.3418201",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Safa Hamdare",
        "David Joseph Brown",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Mohammad Aljaidi",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya",
        "Rahul Yadav",
        "Pratik Vyas",
        "Manish Jugran"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2024.3418201",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2024.3422253",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning in the Fast Lane: A Survey on Advanced Intrusion Detection Systems for Intelligent Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of modern automobiles into intelligent and interconnected entities presents new challenges in cybersecurity, particularly in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs). This survey paper offers an in-depth examination of advanced machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) approaches employed in developing sophisticated IDS for safeguarding IVNs against potential cyber-attacks. Specifically, we focus on the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is prevalent in in-vehicle communication systems, yet exhibits inherent security vulnerabilities. We propose a novel taxonomy categorizing IDS techniques into conventional ML, DL, and hybrid models, highlighting their applicability in detecting and mitigating various cyber threats, including spoofing, eavesdropping, and denial-of-service attacks. We highlight the transition from traditional signature-based to anomaly-based detection methods, emphasizing the significant advantages of AI-driven approaches in identifying novel and sophisticated intrusions. Our systematic review covers a range of AI algorithms, including traditional ML, and advanced neural network models, such as Transformers, illustrating their effectiveness in IDS applications within IVNs. Additionally, we explore emerging technologies, such as Federated Learning (FL) and Transfer Learning, to enhance the robustness and adaptability of IDS solutions. Based on our thorough analysis, we identify key limitations in current methodologies and propose potential paths for future research, focusing on integrating real-time data analysis, cross-layer security measures, and collaborative IDS frameworks.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2024.3422253",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Almehdhar",
        "Abdullatif Mohammed Albaseer",
        "Muhammad Asif Khan",
        "Mohamed M. Abdallah",
        "Hamid Menouar",
        "Saif M. Al-Kuwari",
        "Ala Al‐Fuqaha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2024.3422253",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 152,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2024.3524088",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Risks and Designs in the Connected Vehicle Ecosystem: In-Vehicle and Edge Platforms",
      "description": "The evolution of Connected Vehicles (CVs) has introduced significant advancements in both in-vehicle and vehicle-edge platforms, creating a highly connected ecosystem. These advancements, however, have heightened exposure to cybersecurity risks. This work reviews emerging security challenges in the CV ecosystem from a new perspective, focusing on the integration of in-vehicle platforms such as the infotainment system and vehicle-edge platforms. By analyzing case studies such as Android Automotive, Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and the Robot Operating System (ROS), we identify the primary security threats, including malware attacks, data manipulation, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The discussion extends to privacy concerns and the lack of trust-building mechanisms in CVs, highlighting how these gaps can be exploited. To mitigate these risks, we retrieve solutions drawn from the broader field of Internet of Things (IoT) security research, including Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and trust-based systems. The proposed framework aims to increase the trustworthiness of devices within the CV ecosystem. Finally, we identify future research directions in adaptive mechanisms and cross-domain security.",
      "published": "2024-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2024.3524088",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "John M. Moore",
        "Bradley Smith",
        "Sanjay Emani Sarma",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2024.3524088",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4529,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ojvt.2024.3524088 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: exposure, creating, primary, platforms, transport, studies, case, service."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2025.3550307",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Threat Susceptibility Assessment for Heavy-Duty Vehicles Based on ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "TARA, which stands for Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment, serves as the foundational stage of cybersecurity implementation, particularly in the context of vehicular systems. While various considerations and risk assessment frameworks have been discussed in recent years, there is a notable lack of TARA models specifically designed for heavy-duty (HD) vehicles. The security considerations and vulnerabilities in HD vehicles differ significantly from those in light-duty (LD) vehicles, leading to different security impacts and varying attack feasibility. This makes existing models inadequate for accurately assessing risks in the context of HD vehicles. This study introduces a novel risk assessment model tailored for HD vehicles, addressing gaps in existing TARA frameworks such as EVITA, HEAVENS, and ISO/SAE 21434. The key contribution of this work lies in the customization of impact and feasibility metrics within the ISO/SAE framework to better account for the unique security challenges posed by HD vehicles. Unlike prior models, this approach adapts the impact criteria to reflect the diverse range of security concerns specific to HD vehicles, which have been inadequately addressed in existing frameworks. Additionally, through a comprehensive analysis of threat vectors and vehicle interfaces, the model refines feasibility criteria, ensuring a more accurate and context-aware assessment of security risks. By adopting these enhancements, the proposed model offers more precise risk assessments that align with HD vehicle considerations, helping to prioritize threats and make optimal decisions regarding risk treatment.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2025.3550307",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narges Rahimi",
        "Beth‐Anne Schuelke‐Leech",
        "Mitra Mirhassani"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2025.3550307",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2025.3576366",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Explainable Federated Framework for Enhanced Security and Privacy in Connected Vehicles Against Advanced Persistent Threats",
      "description": "The increasing adoption of autonomous and intelligent vehicles within ground transportation systems faces new security challenges. This shift from human-controlled operations opens up a broader attack surface for malicious players. As the interconnected Internet of Things (IoT) become ubiquitous in vehicles, they continuously generate and exchange a large amount of data. This tendency creates vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit using sophisticated techniques, such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). Detecting APTs in IoT-enabled vehicular environments is crucial. These APTs demand advanced detection mechanisms. The critical need for vehicular data privacy restricts traditional centralized Machine Learning (ML) approaches. Furthermore, the absence of publicly available APT datasets in the vehicular domain complicates model development and validation, creating a significant gap in cybersecurity capabilities for this evolving vehicular domain. This research proposes a novel Federated Deep Neural Network (FDNN) framework with a privacy-preserving technique to address these concerns. This study presents the key challenges in the APT detection phase and outlines the novel contributions to the body of knowledge. The research questions guiding the investigation are addressed and discussed. The features of the UNSW-NB15, Edge-IIoTset, and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 datasets are aligned with different stages of APT attacks. Using these datasets, the developed framework is analyzed and evaluated. For the mentioned datasets, the framework without privacy-preserving technique shows high APT detection accuracies of 97.32%, 96.81% and 98.06%, respectively. However, with the privacy-preserving technique, the framework shows 95.62%, 96.11% and 95.63% accuracies, respectively. All results with other evaluation metrics, such as Precision, False positive rate, F1 score etc., are tabulated. The developed framework is subjected to “Shapley Additive explanations (SHAP),” analysis to filter the considerably influential features in APT detection. This research establishes the efficacy of a novel framework for detecting APTs in distributed vehicular environments. The framework achieves superior performance by minimizing the number of data and reducing the number of features, which is demonstrated through rigorous experimentation on multiple benchmark datasets. The potential of the developed framework to detect the APTs in the cross-domain is discussed in future works.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2025.3576366",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "G. K. Sudhina Kumar",
        "Krishna Prakash",
        "Balachandra Muniyal",
        "Muttukrishnan Rajarajan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2025.3576366",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4543,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/ojvt.2025.3576366 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: persistent, continuously, creating, large, without, significant, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2025.3580538",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicle Security: Hybrid Threat Modeling Approach",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are poised to revolutionize modern transportation, offering enhanced safety, efficiency, and convenience. However, AV architectures' increasing connectivity and complexity have introduced significant cybersecurity risks. This survey provides a comprehensive review of AV security challenges, focusing on widely adopted threat modeling frameworks such as STRIDE, DREAD, and MITRE ATT&CK. By examining common attack vectors and real-world case studies, including the Jeep Cherokee and Tesla Model S exploits, we highlight the urgent need for robust cybersecurity in in-vehicle systems and external interfaces. To complement existing modeling practices, we introduce Hybrid-SCDM, a novel framework that combines STRIDE-based threat classification with CVSS-derived DREAD scoring. This model transforms qualitative threat identification into quantitative risk prioritization by mapping CVSS metrics to DREAD dimensions through normalization. Applied to a generic multi-layered AV architecture, our findings show that intra-vehicle networks, especially CAN bus spoofing and fuzzing attacks, and suspension attacks, represent the most critical vulnerabilities due to their high exploitability and systemic impact. Beyond technical modeling, the survey explores emerging defense mechanisms such as blockchain-enabled Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication, AI-driven anomaly detection, and secure Over-The-Air (OTA) updates. We also examine legal and ethical considerations surrounding data privacy, user safety, and regulatory compliance. By integrating analytical modeling with broad system insights, this work provides actionable recommendations for advancing the cybersecurity posture of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2025.3580538",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "jeep",
        "tesla",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amal Yousseef",
        "Yu-Zheng Lin",
        "Shalaka Satam",
        "Banafsheh Saber Latibari",
        "Jesús Pacheco",
        "Soheil Salehi",
        "Salim Hariri",
        "Pratik Satam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2025.3580538",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ojvt.2026.3720811",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital-Only Phase Compensation for Secure Phase-Based Ranging in Vehicular RKE Systems",
      "description": "Phase-based ranging is effective for mitigating relay attacks in remote keyless entry (RKE) systems; however, it typically requires costly radio frequency architecture redesigns to maintain phase coherency. Such hardware modifications increase development costs and compromise the low power consumption and compact integration advantages of vehicular systems-on-chip (SoCs). The fundamental issue arises when conventional transceivers switch frequencies for transmission and reception, rendering the local oscillator’s (LO’s) initial phase non-coherent. This paper proposes a digital-only phase compensation scheme that enables high-precision ranging on existing non-coherent transceiver architectures without hardware modifications to the radio frequency front-end. By estimating and compensating for phase variations introduced during frequency switching, this method utilizes a duplicated digital integrator architecture within the fractional-N phase-locked loop (PLL). This integrator operates independently of frequency-switching feedback, serving as a stable phase reference for precise estimation. Mathematical analysis and mixed-signal simulations at the register-transfer level verify that the proposed method achieves a steady-state detection error within $\\pm 0.27^\\circ$, ensuring robust performance for secure vehicular localization. With a minimal area increase of approximately 30% to the digital integrator block and power consumption of less than 1 mW, this approach can be seamlessly integrated into legacy systems to support secure localization, dynamic modulation (e.g., frequency shift keying (FSK)), and phase-sensitive applications such as angle-of-arrival (AoA) estimation.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ojvt.2026.3720811",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Masaki Nishikawa",
        "S. Otaka",
        "I. Seto",
        "Tomoaki Otsuki"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/ojvt.2026.3720811",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/oncon68412.2025.11384646",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Autonomous Vehicle Security: An Adaptive CAN Bus Testbed Architecture",
      "description": "This paper introduces a versatile CAN Bus testbed to enhance autonomous vehicle security. Our testbed offers significant flexibility by easily creating new datasets from DBC files through random value generation, supporting diverse usage scenarios beyond pre-established logs. The automatic API generation from DBC files allows quick adaptations for different vehicles, while our system supports comprehensive CAN Bus protocols, including Extended IDs, with minimal delay and packet loss. The testbed stands out with its low deployment cost, using an inexpensive USB CAN interface. Our innovative approach also facilitates the integration of various attack scenarios, such as DoS, Flooding, Fuzzing, Replay, and Suspension, without additional hardware costs. With up to eleven nodes in simulation, the testbed effectively supports comprehensive research without constraints from physical transmission arbitration. This work highlights the feasibility and benefits of a low-cost, flexible, and adaptive CAN Bus testbed for advancing autonomous vehicle security research.",
      "published": "2025-12-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/oncon68412.2025.11384646",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bastien Morantin",
        "Robin Hatier",
        "Tarek Ould Bachir",
        "Nora Cuppens-Boulahia",
        "Frédéric Cuppens"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Industrial Electronics Society Annual On-Line Conference (ONCON)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/oncon68412.2025.11384646",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/orss71174.2026.11684334",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Genetic Algorithm Approach for Risk-Based ECU Vulnerability Selection",
      "description": "Cybersecurity is essential for autonomous vehicles, as they represent attractive targets for cyberattacks that can undermine safety mechanisms and endanger passengers. Weaknesses in Electronic Control Units (ECUs)—which control critical functions like braking, steering, powertrain, and communications—may cause serious outcomes, such as complete system failures or unauthorized remote control. This paper focuses on determining the optimal subset of ECUs that maximizes the overall risk score while adhering to budget limitations. A Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based method is introduced because of its effectiveness in navigating large combinatorial search spaces. The findings show strong convergence behavior and a successful prioritization of the most critical, high-risk ECUs.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/orss71174.2026.11684334",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cordell Johnson",
        "Balaji Iyangar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Opportunity Research Scholars Symposium (ORSS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/orss71174.2026.11684334",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/parc68365.2026.11453575",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Vehicle Lifecycle Security: A Systematic Framework for Cyber Risk Assessment",
      "description": "The increasing sophistication and connectedness of the contemporary automobile makes the cybersecurity of modern vehicles a major concern, and encompasses such issues like breach of privacy, interference with the working process, and even jeopardizing national security. The present study offers a broad paradigm of evaluating risk in the entire lifecycle of vehicles in terms of design, development and decommissioning. Its methodology incorporates sophisticated techniques to determine potential cybersecurity risks, such as the STRIDE model and attack tree analysis, to identify, quantify, and prioritize future cybersecurity risks. The framework will result in a quantitative risk matrix that will incorporate a dynamic threat environment and complete picture of asset vulnerabilities to determine the extent to which something is hazardous. It is a case study of a telematics box (T-Box) that has an in-depth description of its drawbacks and specific suggestions on how they can be corrected. This paper demonstrates the relevance of developing a consistent approach to cybersecurity risks management within the automobile sector. The development will improve the resiliency of intelligent transportation systems.",
      "published": "2026-02-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/parc68365.2026.11453575",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R Sarath Babu",
        "Prasanth Kumar Jujjarapu",
        "Md Ankushavali",
        "Suriya M",
        "Vinay Goyal",
        "Sujeet Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Power Electronics & IoT Applications in Renewable Energy and its Control (PARC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/parc68365.2026.11453575",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3985,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/parc68365.2026.11453575 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: asset, concern, national, makes, like, even, case, risks."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pci66488.2025.11219786",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lattice-Based Lightweight Multi-Authentication Scheme for Vehicle-to-Everything Communication",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication stands out by providing services that increase efficiency, drive traffic experience, and ensure security. Like all other environments that use public-key cryptosystems for secure communication, the emergence of large-scale quantum computers affected the security of V2X. Although some postquantum authentication schemes have been proposed to enhance the security of V2X communication, most of the existing approaches involve complex operations such as privacy preservation and digital signatures, which introduce computational burden due to cryptosystem assumptions. In this paper, a post-quantum secure multi-authentication protocol using a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF), hash-based message authentication code (MAC), and bitwise or (XOR) for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication to obtain lightweight solution with lattice assumptions. In the proposed idea, identity authentication is provided based on lightweight primitives, and entity authentication is captured using lattice assumptions. The post-quantum security of the constructed protocol is based on the module version of the short integer solution (MSIS) problem. In the proposed scheme, additional security features for V2I communication, such as authenticity, integrity, and anonymity, are captured with the help of additional primitives and computations. Finally, the correctness of successful multi-authentication is presented, and an informal security analysis is done to show whether or not the proposed protocol resists modification, man-in-the-middle (MIMT), and replay attacks.",
      "published": "2025-08-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pci66488.2025.11219786",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kübra Seyhan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Problems of Cybernetics and Informatics (PCI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/pci66488.2025.11219786",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pdgc50313.2020.9315804",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using Optimization and Auction Approach: Security provided to Vehicle network through Blockchain Technology",
      "description": "The internet of vehicles (IoV) a distributed network to allow the vehicles to communicate and data exchanged in real-time with other vehicles., humans., roadside infrastructures., etc. To communicate vehicles within non-trusted environments is difficult to evaluate the trustworthiness. By integrated blockchain with IoV., we improved the data sharing among vehicles., driving safety., security., and traceability. In this paper., miners are selected through the integration of multi attribute and two-stage auction to increase the trusted security between nodes. Further., to avoid the internal collision between miners., the blocks are selected through the Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm for miner-centric block validation selection. In every timeslot., the blocks are verified by miners and their positions updated dynamically. The proposed incentive mechanism performance is shown in the experiment results to improve the trustworthiness and security for data sharing in Blockchain-based IoV.",
      "published": "2020-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pdgc50313.2020.9315804",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Devi",
        "G. Rathee",
        "H. Saini"
      ],
      "venue": "2020 Sixth International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing (PDGC)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/pdgc50313.2020.9315804",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pdp50117.2020.00070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SEPAD – Security Evaluation Platform for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "The development and evaluation of security solutions for autonomous vehicles is a challenging task. Many researchers have no access to real vehicles to implement and test their solutions. In addition, vehicle E/E architectures of different brands or even model series of one car manufacturer differ significantly. Also, vehicles may be the source of physical hazards, e.g., an exploding airbag. To enable researchers to develop, implement, and evaluate new security solutions for autonomous vehicles, we propose a new security evaluation platform called SEPAD and a dedicated development process for testing security mechanisms with it. SEPAD allows to model realistic E/E architectures where the developed security solutions can be integrated and evaluated without causing safety risks for the researcher or other road users.",
      "published": "2020-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pdp50117.2020.00070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel Zelle",
        "Roland Rieke",
        "Christian Plappert",
        "Christoph Kraus",
        "Dmitry Sergeevich Levshun",
        "Andrey Alexeevich Chechulin"
      ],
      "venue": "Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/pdp50117.2020.00070",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pdp52278.2021.00050",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Surface Assessment for Cybersecurity Engineering in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "Connected smart cars enable new attacks that may have serious consequences. Thus, the development of new cars must follow a cybersecurity engineering process as defined for example in ISO/SAE 21434. A central part of such a process is the threat and risk assessment including an attack feasibility rating. In this paper, we present an attack surface assessment with focus on the attack feasibility rating compliant to ISO/SAE 21434. We introduce a reference architecture with assets constituting the attack surface, the attack feasibility rating for these assets, and the application of this rating on typical use cases. The attack feasibility rating assigns attacks and assets to an evaluation of the attacker dimensions such as the required knowledge and the feasibility of attacks derived from it. Our application of sample use cases shows how this rating can be used to assess the feasibility of an entire attack path. The attack feasibility rating can be used as a building block in a threat and risk assessment according to ISO/SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2021-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pdp52278.2021.00050",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Plappert",
        "Daniel Zelle",
        "Henry Gadacz",
        "Roland Rieke",
        "Dirk Scheuermann",
        "Christoph Kraus"
      ],
      "venue": "Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/pdp52278.2021.00050",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pdp66500.2025.00025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ZeroCAN: Anomaly-Based Zero-Day Attack Detection in Vehicular CAN Bus Networks",
      "description": "Zero-day attacks present a significant security threat to vehicular networks, exploiting vulnerabilities at both software and hardware levels within such systems that remain undiscovered. Mitigating these threats is essential to ensuring the safety and security of vehicular systems. Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a good candidate for anomaly detection of zero-day attacks within vehicular networks because it can handle highdimensional data and effectively distinguish between normal and abnormal patterns in complex and dynamic environments. A trained SVM on the normal operation data of in-vehicular network can identify flag deviations, thus making it effective in the detection of any previously unknown attack patterns, which is a common behaviour of zero-day attacks. In this paper, we introduce an anomaly detection method called “ZeroCAN” which models the behaviour of every single electronic control unit on the network with a separate SVM and a set of high-level features that capture the timing and data payload aspects of CANbus traffic. This approach achieves an anomaly detection rate of over $\\mathbf{9 9 \\%}$ and a false positive rate below $\\mathbf{0. 0 1 \\%}$ during normal operation in most cases.",
      "published": "2025-03-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pdp66500.2025.00025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jonathan Rendel",
        "William Balte",
        "Harrison Kurunathan",
        "Hazem Ismail Ali",
        "Alexandre dos Santos Roque",
        "Wagner Ourique de Morais",
        "Mahdi Fazeli"
      ],
      "venue": "Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/pdp66500.2025.00025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/peeic59336.2023.10450812",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reinforcement Learning and loT for Real-time Payment and Security in Electric Vehicle Charging System",
      "description": "Rapid Electric Vehicle (EV) adoption has increased the need for efficient and safe charging infrastructure. This research proposes a unique strategy that combines Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Internet of Things (loT) technologies to improve EV charging system real-time payment processing and security. It uses RL algorithms to improve payment routing, dynamically alter pricing, and prioritize charging sessions depending on user preferences and network circumstances. EV owners benefit from more efficient and affordable charging, making EV adoption more desirable. The connectivity through the loT architecture allows safe, remote charging station monitoring and administration. The integration of RL and loT increases user experience and charging network stability. Predictive maintenance reduces downtime and costs via real-time data analytics. Our solution also optimizes charging schedules for cost savings and grid stability by adapting to dynamic power costs and grid conditions.",
      "published": "2023-12-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/peeic59336.2023.10450812",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Akansha Singh",
        "Ramakrishnan Raman"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Power Energy, Environment and Intelligent Control (PEEIC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/peeic59336.2023.10450812",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/percom45495.2020.9127389",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Analysis of Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Autonomous Driving Models",
      "description": "Nowadays, autonomous driving has attracted much attention from both industry and academia. Convolutional neural network (CNN) is a key component in autonomous driving, which is also increasingly adopted in pervasive computing such as smartphones, wearable devices, and IoT networks. Prior work shows CNN-based classification models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, it is uncertain to what extent regression models such as driving models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, the effectiveness of existing defense techniques, and the defense implications for system and middleware builders.This paper presents an in-depth analysis of five adversarial attacks and four defense methods on three driving models. Experiments show that, similar to classification models, these models are still highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This poses a big security threat to autonomous driving and thus should be taken into account in practice. While these defense methods can effectively defend against different attacks, none of them are able to provide adequate protection against all five attacks. We derive several implications for system and middleware builders: (1) when adding a defense component against adversarial attacks, it is important to deploy multiple defense methods in tandem to achieve a good coverage of various attacks, (2) a black-box attack is much less effective compared with a white-box attack, implying that it is important to keep model details (e.g., model architecture, hyperparameters) confidential via model obfuscation, and (3) driving models with a complex architecture are preferred if computing resources permit as they are more resilient to adversarial attacks than simple models.",
      "published": "2020-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/percom45495.2020.9127389",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yao Deng",
        "Xi Zheng",
        "Tianyi Zhang",
        "Chen Chen",
        "Guannan Lou",
        "Miryung Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/percom45495.2020.9127389",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 187,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/percomworkshops48775.2020.9156250",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ID Sequence Analysis for Intrusion Detection in the CAN bus using Long Short Term Memory Networks",
      "description": "The number of computer controlled vehicles throughout the world is rising at a staggering speed. Even though this enhances the driving experience, it opens a new security hole in the automotive industry. To alleviate this issue, we are proposing an intrusion detection system (IDS) to the controller area network (CAN), which is the de facto communication standard of present-day vehicles. We implemented an IDS based on the analysis of ID sequences. The IDS uses a trained Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) to predict an arbitration ID that will appear in the future by looking back to the last 20 packet arbitration IDs. The output from the LSTM network is a softmax probability of all the 42 arbitration IDs in our test car. The softmax probability is used in two approaches for IDS. In the first approach, a single arbitration ID is predicted by taking the class which has the highest softmax probability. This method only gave us an accuracy of 0.6. Applying this result in a real vehicle would give us a lot of false negatives, hence we devised a second approach that uses log loss as an anomaly signal. The evaluated log loss is compared with a predefined threshold to see if the result is in the anomaly boundary. Furthermore, We have tested our approach using insertion, drop and illegal ID attacks which greatly outperform the conventional method with practical F1 scores of 0.9, 0.84, and 1.0 respectively.",
      "published": "2020-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/percomworkshops48775.2020.9156250",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PerCom Workshops)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/percomworkshops48775.2020.9156250",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pesgm48719.2022.9916999",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic Load Altering EV Attacks Against Power Grid Frequency Control",
      "description": "Driven by the necessity to combat climate change, Electric Vehicles (EV) are being deployed to take advantage of their ability in reducing emissions generated by the transportation sector. This deployment has left the power grid vulnerable to attacks through the EV infrastructure. This paper is written from an attackerś perspective and proposes a dynamic load altering strategy through manipulating EV charging to destabilize the grid. The attack is formulated based on feedback control theory, i.e., designing an attack based on Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs). After the stability metric and controller design have been established, we demonstrate our attack method against the Kundur 2 area grid. The attack scenario includes a cap of 200 MW EV load controlled by the attacker. However, the results show that even with this limitation, the attacker would be successful in pushing the grid toward instability and blackout.",
      "published": "2022-07-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pesgm48719.2022.9916999",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Mohsen Ghafouri",
        "Mourad Debbabi",
        "Chadi Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "2022 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/pesgm48719.2022.9916999",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pesgm52003.2023.10253305",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving Resiliency for Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "Electric vehicles adoption continues to grow. While charging infrastructure is anticipated to expand to meet the increased need, lack of EV charger system robustness is concerning and further compounds range anxiety. This paper discusses potential outage conditions associated with EV charging and presents new technology in development to improve EV charging resilience.",
      "published": "2023-07-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pesgm52003.2023.10253305",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael R Starke",
        "Madhu Sudhan Chinthavali",
        "Namwon Kim",
        "T. Carroll",
        "Francis Tuffner",
        "B. Varghese",
        "Craig G Rieger",
        "Kenneth W Rohde",
        "Timothy Pennington"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/pesgm52003.2023.10253305",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pesgre65581.2025.11521147",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study of Cybersecurity and Resilience of Dual Active Bridge Converters in Electric Vehicle Fast Charging Systems",
      "description": "The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and the growing need for high-power EV fast charging infrastructure have led to the widespread use of advanced power electronic topologies, notably the Dual Active Bridge (DAB) converter. While DAB-based DC fast chargers offer efficient bidirectional power flow and galvanic isolation, their integration into cyber-physical systems introduces new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Existing research primarily focuses on communication protocols (e.g., OCPP, ISO 15118), backend networks, or electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) firmware security, often overlooking the converter level where actual power processing occurs as a critical attack surface. This study investigates recent literature on cyber threats specific to DAB-based fast charging systems and reviews resilience strategies that enhance system robustness. Emphasis is placed on the unique attack surfaces of the DAB architecture, potential impacts on the control loop and power flow, and the integration of real-time monitoring, secure communication protocols, and anomaly detection systems. The objective is to provide the EV charging and smart grid research communities with an understanding of emerging threats at the converter and its controller level and to propose recommendations for designing cyber-resilient EV fast charging systems. The paper concludes by outlining key research gaps and offering directions for future work to support the development of secure and reliable DAB-based EV fast charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2025-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pesgre65581.2025.11521147",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "V. S. R. Varaprasad Oruganti",
        "Kushan Tharuka Lulbadda",
        "Tarlochan S. Sidhu",
        "Sheldon S. Williamson"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE International Conference on Power Electronics, Smart Grid, and Renewable Energy (PESGRE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/pesgre65581.2025.11521147",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pkia62599.2024.10729035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed Estimation Based Public Key Infrastructure for In-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": "Automotive Electronic Control Unit (ECU) security is a challenging problem due to over-the-air updates, cloud services, peripherals from third parties, and other third-party interfaces. In these scenarios, alongside the security triad (confi-dentiality, integrity, and availability), entity identity also becomes crucial to secure vehicles. This paper presents distributed estimation for the public key infrastructure (DE4PKI) technique which enhances the PKI framework with an encryption scheme that uses distributed estimation and cipher text. The main idea is to establish identity using PKI whereas data encryption uses a symmetric key alongside distributed estimation of CPS ciphertext to verify attacked nodes. The technique provides multiple layers of security through dynamic graphs, CPS variables, and PKI framework. It helps identify attacked nodes and eliminate them without hardware interventions and re-issuance of certificates once the ECUs are recovered from the attack. The distributed estimation framework provides scalability and localizes the at-tacks. The proposed technique is demonstrated on a typical ECU topology in a vehicle.",
      "published": "2024-09-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pkia62599.2024.10729035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karthika Venkatesan",
        "Seshadhri Srinivasan",
        "Padmapritha Thamodharan",
        "Nimesh Nagar",
        "P Haribabu",
        "S D Sudarsan",
        "K K Soundara Pandian"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Public Key Infrastructure and its Applications (PKIA)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/pkia62599.2024.10729035",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/powertech55446.2023.10202972",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle Charging with Fractional Renewable Energy Certificates Using Blockchain Technology",
      "description": "Renewable Energy certificates (RECs), as Environ-mental, Social and Governance (ESG) assets, are growing in value globally, based on the need to solve climate challenges. RECs are also proven viable market-friendly instruments, with carbon markets exponentially growing for trading them, since they facilitate measuring and tracking energy from clean renewable sources. However, RECs are subject to traceability, reliability, security, and high costs challenges, especially when used within a system for decentralised energy assets. This article explored RECs with blockchain technology, to manage traceability of RECs for making smaller, decentralised energy assets green by matching energy consumption with renewable energy production. A proof-of-concept (POC) was developed around EV charging with fractional RECs, with three RECs use cases tested in a microgrid demonstrator in Singapore. The prioritized use cases were used to depict scenarios for how individuals and businesses with or without renewable energy assets can acquire RECs to achieve their decarbonisation goals.",
      "published": "2023-06-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/powertech55446.2023.10202972",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Olayinka O. Ayo",
        "Huajun Zhang",
        "Roberto Moreira",
        "Dominique Bertin",
        "Nidhal Zribi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE PowerTech Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/powertech55446.2023.10202972",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/prdc67299.2025.00013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Threat Analysis and Formal Verification for Secure OTA Updates",
      "description": "The automotive industry increasingly relies on Over-the-Air (OTA) updates to deliver essential security patches to vehicles. However, this dependence may introduce significant cy-bersecurity vulnerabilities, particularly concerning the integrity and privacy of updates. This paper presents an integrated framework that combines threat modeling and formal verification by employing an identical system model across all stages. The process begins with applying the ThreatGet tool to identify potential threats in the OTA update process, which directly guide the formulation of formal security requirements expressed as Computation Tree Logic (CTL) properties. The same high-level model encompassing a Cloud Server (CS), Telematics Control Unit (TCU), Central Gateway Unit (CGU), Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) module, and an attacker module is consistently used for both threat modeling and encoding in the NuSMV model checker. This unified approach ensures that identified threats translate seamlessly into verifiable properties. Experimental threat analysis and verification results demonstrate the effectiveness of our integrated approach in uncovering OTA update vulnerabilities properties.",
      "published": "2025-11-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/prdc67299.2025.00013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sheraz Mazhar",
        "Abdur Rakib",
        "Robin Doss",
        "Adnan Anwar",
        "Frank Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/prdc67299.2025.00013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pst.2017.00017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OTIDS: A Novel Intrusion Detection System for In-vehicle Network by Using Remote Frame",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is a bus communication protocol which defines a standard for reliable and efficient transmission between in-vehicle nodes in real-time. Since CAN message is broadcast from a transmitter to the other nodes on a bus, it does not contain information about the source and destination address for validation. Therefore, an attacker can easily inject any message to lead system malfunctions. In this paper, we propose an intrusion detection method based on the analysis of the offset ratio and time interval between request and response messages in CAN. If a remote frame having a particular identifier is transmitted, a receiver node should respond to the remote frame immediately. In attack-free state, each node has a fixed response offset ratio and time interval while these values vary in attack state. Using this property, we can measure the response performance of the existing nodes based on the offset ratio and time interval between request and response messages. As a result, our methodology can detect intrusions by monitoring offset ratio and time interval, and it allows quick intrusion detection with high accuracy.",
      "published": "2017-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pst.2017.00017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyunsung Lee",
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/pst.2017.00017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 427,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pst.2017.00018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Precedence Graph-Based Approach to Detect Message Injection Attacks in J1939 Based Networks",
      "description": "Vehicles now include Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate with each other via broadcast networks. Cyber-security professionals have shown that such embedded communication networks can be compromised. Very recently, it has been shown that embedded devices connected to commercial vehicle networks can be manipulated to perform unintended actions by injecting spoofed messages. Such attacks can be hard to detect as they can mimic safety critical actions performed by ECUs. We present a precedence graph-based anomaly detection technique to detect malicious message injections. Our approach can detect malicious message injections and is able to distinguish them from safety critical actions like hard braking.",
      "published": "2017-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pst.2017.00018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cyber-security",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Subhojeet Mukherjee",
        "Jacob Walkery",
        "Indrakshi Rayz",
        "Jeremy S. Daily"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/pst.2017.00018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pst.2018.8514157",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GIDS: GAN based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "A Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in the vehicles is an efficient standard bus enabling communication between all Electronic Control Units (ECU). However, CAN bus is not enough to protect itself because of lack of security features. To detect suspicious network connections effectively, the intrusion detection system (IDS) is strongly required. Unlike the traditional IDS for Internet, there are small number of known attack signatures for vehicle networks. Also, IDS for vehicle requires high accuracy because any false-positive error can seriously affect the safety of the driver. To solve this problem, we propose a novel IDS model for in-vehicle networks, GIDS (GAN based Intrusion Detection System) using deep-learning model, Generative Adversarial Nets. GIDS can learn to detect unknown attacks using only normal data. As experiment result, GIDS shows high detection accuracy for four unknown attacks.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pst.2018.8514157",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eunbi Seo",
        "Hyun Min Song",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/pst.2018.8514157",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 599,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/pst62714.2024.10788058",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Extending ISO 15118-20 EV Charging: Preventing Downgrade Attacks and Enabling New Security Capabilities",
      "description": "Previous works have identified that EV charging can be weaponised to attack the power grid. As a case study, we consider the newest charging protocol ISO 15118–20, which provides a high-level communication protocol for EV charging. We first highlight fundamental issues in ISO 15118–20 which prevent the development of security features within the existing standard: We show that an attacker can perform a downgrade attack on ISO 15118–20, and propose modifications to the standard to prevent this. We show how this can be used to enable the development of additional security features within the modified protocol. A proof of concept is developed to prove functionality, determine interoperability between various parties, verify that it meets the original standard's timing requirements, and does not impact charging speed nor noticeably affect the length of a charging session.",
      "published": "2024-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/pst62714.2024.10788058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ross Porter",
        "Morteza Biglari-Abhari",
        "Benjamin Tan",
        "Duleepa J. Thrimawithana"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/pst62714.2024.10788058",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00015",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Method for Constructing Automotive Cybersecurity Tests, a CAN Fuzz Testing Example",
      "description": "There is a need for new tools and techniques to aid automotive engineers performing cybersecurity testing on connected car systems. This is in order to support the principle of secure-by-design. Our research has produced a method to construct useful automotive security tooling and tests. It has been used to implement Controller Area Network (CAN) fuzz testing (a dynamic security test) via a prototype CAN fuzzer. The black-box fuzz testing of a laboratory vehicle's display ECU demonstrates the value of a fuzzer in the automotive field, revealing bugs in the ECU software, and weaknesses in the vehicle's systems design.",
      "published": "2019-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00015",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel S. Fowler",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Madeline Cheah",
        "Paul Wooderson",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00015",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 44,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00016",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adding Cyberattacks To An Industry-Leading CAN Simulator",
      "description": "Recent years have seen an increase in the data usage in cars, particularly as they become more autonomous and connected. With the rise in data use have come concerns about automotive cyber-security. An in-vehicle network shown to be particularly vulnerable is the Controller Area Network (CAN), which is the communication bus used by the car's safety critical and performance critical components. Cyber attacks on the CAN have been demonstrated, leading to research to develop attack detection and attack prevention systems. Such research requires representative attack demonstrations and data for testing. Obtaining this data is problematical due to the expense, danger and impracticality of using real cars on roads or tracks for example attacks. Whilst CAN simulators are available, these tend to be configured for testing conformance and functionality, rather than analysing security and cyber vulnerability. We therefore adapt a leading, industry-standard, CAN simulator to incorporate a core set of cyber attacks that are representative of those proposed by other researchers. Our adaptation allows the user to configure the attacks, and can be added easily to the free version of the simulator. Here we describe the simulator and, after reviewing the attacks that have been demonstrated and discussing their commonalities, we outline the attacks that we have incorporated into the simulator.",
      "published": "2019-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00016",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cyber-security",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Janine Hayward",
        "Andrew Tomlinson",
        "J. Bryans"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00016",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Vulnerability Metrics for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Software integration in modern vehicles is continuously expanding. This is due to the fact that vehicle manufacturers are always trying to enhance and add more innovative and competitive features that may rely on complex software functionalities. However, these features come at a cost. They amplify the security vulnerabilities in vehicles and lead to more security issues in today's automobiles. As a result, the need for identifying vulnerable components in a vehicle software system has become crucial. Security experts need to know which components of the vehicle software system can be exploited for attacks and should focus their testing and inspection efforts on it. Nevertheless, it is a challenging and costly task to identify these weak components in a vehicle's system. In this paper, we propose some security vulnerability metrics for connected vehicles that aim to assist software testers during the development life-cycle in order to identify the frail links that put the vehicle at highsecurity risks. Vulnerable function assessment can give software testers a good idea about which components in a connected vehicle need to be prioritized in order to mitigate the risk and hence secure the vehicle. The proposed metrics were applied to OpenPilot - a software that provides Autopilot feature - and has been integrated with 48 different vehicles.. The application shows how the defined metrics can be effectively used to quantitatively measure the vulnerabilities of a vehicle software system.",
      "published": "2019-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lama J. Moukahal",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/qrs-c.2019.00017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/qrs-c55045.2021.00124",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Formalising UPTANE in CSP for Security Testing",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are susceptible to cybersecurity attacks due to the complexity of their electronics architecture and a progressive integration of connectivity technologies. A promising solution to resolve cybersecurity issues is Over-The-Air (OTA) updates. Recently, Uptane has been introduced and is currently considered as the de facto security standard for automotive OTA system solutions. To ensure that a system, Uptane, can deliver updates to secure a vehicle, the system itself must be sufficiently secure as to not become an attack vector itself. To this end, we present a model-based security testing approach to OTA updates for automotive vehicles. This is done by modelling the OTA update system and the Dolev-Yao attackers in Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). The combined models can be verified to generate security test cases and provide a comprehensive evaluation of attackers on the Uptane system.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs-c55045.2021.00124",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rhys Kirk",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "David M Evans",
        "David Price"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/qrs-c55045.2021.00124",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/qrs-c63300.2024.00109",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Fuzzing Method for Embedded Bus Based on Dynamic Mutation of Message Sequences",
      "description": "As an important support for the communication link of embedded systems, the bus protocol faces many security threats while meeting diverse business needs, and how to ensure the security of the bus link of embedded systems has become an important security issue. In order to meet the requirements of generalized security detection of embedded system bus protocols, this paper proposes a fuzzing method for embedded bus protocol based on dynamic mutation of message sequences. Based on the bus protocol specification, we model the protocol message and interaction process, and realize the fuzzing test of the protocol process in combination with the association of messages in the message sequence. At the same time, we combined the fuzzer with a timer to increase the time perception of the method. In order to verify the effectiveness of our method, this paper applies the proposed method to the CAN bus fuzzing of the Internet of Vehicles simulation platform, and successfully finds a security flaw in the process of motor speed data frame processing of the platform. Moreover, we carry out a comparative experiment with several common fuzzing tools, and the experimental results show that in the defect detection of the CAN bus of the Internet of Vehicles simulation platform, our method can increase the automatic mutation support for the interval_time field, and can discover more security defects.",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs-c63300.2024.00109",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fengjiao He",
        "Chi Hu",
        "Wansheng Yang",
        "Hao Zhang",
        "Feiqi Deng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/qrs-c63300.2024.00109",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/qrs-c63300.2024.00141",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure OTA Software Updates for Connected Vehicles Using LoRaWAN and Blockchain",
      "description": "Over-the-Air (OTA) software updates are becoming essential for connected vehicles, allowing remote updates that eliminate the need for physical access to each vehicle. This significantly reduces downtime and operational costs while keeping vehicular software up-to-date against emerging threats and technological advancements. However, this conventional approach is susceptible to various challenges, including security vulnerabilities, limited connections, and potential network unreliability, which may impede the effective deployment of updates. To address these issues, we investigate the integration of LoRaWAN with blockchain technology and the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) for the connected vehicles. LoRaWAN offers long-range communication with end-to-end encryption, while blockchain provides transparency and IPFS offers efficient’ distributed storage. This dual-layered security approach also benefits from LoRaWAN's coverage and low power usage, and blockchain's tamper-proof nature. Furthermore, this paper assesses the feasibility of LoRaWAN through simulations, to determine the ideal conditions for effective OTA execution utilizing LoRaWAN technology in the connected vehicles. Our findings indicate that this approach is viable for updates targeting performance enhancements and a wide range of applications.",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs-c63300.2024.00141",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anika Anwar",
        "Nilesh Chakraborty",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/qrs-c63300.2024.00141",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/qrs60937.2023.00058",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Wireless Threats Against V2X Communication",
      "description": "As the automotive industry increasingly relies on wireless technologies, a new attack surface emerges, posing significant security threats to modern cars. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities and risks of wireless vehicle attacks, including eavesdropping, message tampering, spoofing, and jamming. It highlights vulnerabilities in the CAN bus communication interface. By exploring these attacks and their potential consequences, this paper aims to shed light on the urgent need for robust security measures to safeguard the safety and privacy of vehicle owners. The focus is on understanding the evolving landscape of wireless threats in the automotive industry, providing valuable insights for researchers, practitioners, and stakeholders involved in developing effective countermeasures and enhancing overall vehicle security. In contrast to other research articles, this paper presents the ISO/SAE DIS 21434 standard, which offers a systematic and structured approach to enhance cybersecurity in the automotive industry, even in the face of emerging wireless threats. In addition, this paper highlights notable examples of attacks on modern cars, where researchers gained access to vehicle systems through wireless vulnerabilities, demonstrating the potential dangers of interconnected car systems to illustrate the real-world implications.",
      "published": "2023-10-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/qrs60937.2023.00058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Axel Boström",
        "Franz Wotawa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/qrs60937.2023.00058",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rasse64357.2024.10773922",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systems Engineering Approach for Compliant Over-the-Air Update Development",
      "description": "A broad spectrum of technical innovations in-fluences the automotive industry. Vehicles are increasingly governed by software, enabling continuous development over the entire product life cycle. In this context, software updates, especially those conducted Over The Air (OTA), represent a significant technological advancement. Regularly implementing OTA updates enhances the sustainability of vehicles as they lead to the possibility of keeping cars continuously functional, safe, secure, and performant. Requirements for OTA updates, their development, and implementation are formulated in industry standards and regulations. With the entry into force of UN Regulation 156, manufacturers operating in the member countries must establish processes for the development and overall management of OTA updates. At the same time, there are numerous other standards that apply in the industry. Furthermore, development process models and standardized approaches, such as the V-model for systems and software engineering, are widely adopted. Following the aim to develop a framework that focuses on secure and efficient OTA updates while adhering to legal and industry-specific requirements, a unified process model is presented in this paper. Requirements from the ISO 24089 standard and the UN Regulation 156 are extracted for that purpose. Interrelationships and overlaps between them, and further applicable standards for vehicle design, system, and software development are identified. Processes and work products not yet covered by other norms and legal guidelines are extracted. These activities are then linked content-wise and organizationally to the established V-model. The resulting integrated concept provides a basis for compliant and efficient software update management.",
      "published": "2024-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rasse64357.2024.10773922",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "regulation",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jacqueline Henle",
        "S. Otten",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "2024 IEEE International Conference on Recent Advances in Systems Science and Engineering (RASSE)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/rasse64357.2024.10773922",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/re51729.2021.00073",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards the development of the cybersecurity concept according to ISO/SAE 21434 using model-based systems engineering",
      "description": "Cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as autonomous vehicles, are intelligent and networked. Close collaboration between stakeholders from different disciplines is necessary right from the start of development. In the automotive sector in particular, the collaboration of the car manufacturer extends to several suppliers. The increasing complexity in the design of such CPSs makes interdisciplinary and cross-company collaboration more difficult. Here, requirements specifications serve as a support for communication. A lack of overall understanding of such CPSs and their numerous interfaces jeopardizes the assurance of safety-relevant security. ISO/SAE 21434, which applies to the automotive industry, requires the creation of a cybersecurity concept at the beginning of the product development process. The problem is that ISO/SAE 21434 only prescribes WHAT must be done, but does not define HOW this is supposed to be done methodically.Existing methods are not applicable to the concept phase without extensive tailoring, according to the challenges I identified in this paper and the literature review I conducted. Furthermore, I present four papers I have written and four papers I plan to write, which serve as building blocks for the required overall method. Finally, I explain how I plan to evaluate my approach.",
      "published": "2021-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/re51729.2021.00073",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sergej Japs"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/re51729.2021.00073",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rest59987.2024.10645447",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "E-mobility transition overview and insights from the Greek market",
      "description": "The Electric Vehicle (EV) grid integration opens up a new dynamic market in the Greek area that is expected to experience rapid growth in the coming years. During the first years of its introduction though, it has provided initial insights into the operation of EV charging stations, and compliance with charging protocols as well as faced challenges, such as charger availability due to connectivity interruptions, power loss due to increased load demand or leakage currents/overvoltage as well as lack of fast DC chargers in highways causing \"range anxiety\". Along with these challenges, new services are being gradually introduced by operators in the European market to improve their positioning. The most known amongst them are the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) technologies, which enable bidirectional charging. This paper introduces the protocols enabling the V2G transition as the ISO 15118 and Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) through its 2.0.1 version, by comparing their added functionalities with the currently offered EV charging services. Additionally, it underlines the faced V2G barriers at regulatory, EV charging station, remuneration strategy, and security level, and proposes improvements for achieving the planned V2G roadmap.",
      "published": "2024-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rest59987.2024.10645447",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexios Lekidis"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Renewable Energies and Smart Technologies (REST)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/rest59987.2024.10645447",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rew61692.2024.00037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Electric Vehicle Charging Stations: A Critical Analysis of Authentication Vulnerabilities",
      "description": "Charging stations are essential for accelerating the adoption of electric vehicles, reducing emissions, enhancing energy security, promoting economic growth, and facilitating the transition to a cleaner and more sustainable transportation system. Authentication of electric vehicle drivers at charging stations is crucial to prevent unauthorized access, protect user data, and secure payment transactions associated with charging operations. Researchers and practitioners lack an overview of vulnerabilities concerning the authentication of electric vehicle drivers. While others have previously surveyed the domain, no one has provided a clear framework so far. In this paper, we focus on analyzing threats to authentication use cases of the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP). We conducted a literature review to survey threats to the authentication of electric vehicle drivers and grounded it in established terminology of threat modeling (STRIDE). Furthermore, we demonstrated the practicality of our framework by conducting simulations of a user spoofing attack on an industrial charging station implementing the latest version of OCPP. The paper's contribution lies in presenting a comprehensive framework of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, specifically focusing on the authentication of electric vehicle drivers at charging stations. This framework empowers requirements engineers to derive cybersecurity requirements and thus establish a security-by-design development process for OCPP-enabled products.",
      "published": "2024-06-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rew61692.2024.00037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Stichow",
        "Patrick Rempel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference Workshops (REW)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/rew61692.2024.00037",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rivf60135.2023.10471804",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Malicious Vehicle Detection for Security Threats and Attacks in Vehicle Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) Communications",
      "description": "With the rapid growth of Vehicle Ad-hoc Network (VANET) as a promising technology for efficient and reliable communication among vehicles and infrastructure, the security and integrity of VANET communications has become a critical concern. One of the significant threats to VANET is the presence of blackhole attacks, where malicious nodes disrupt the network's functionality and compromise data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In this paper, we propose a machine learning-based approach for blackhole detection in VANET. To achieve this task, we first create a comprehensive dataset comprising normal and malicious traffic flows. Afterward, we study and define a promising set of features to discriminate the blackhole attacks. Finally, we evaluate various machine learning algorithms, including Gradient Boosting, Random Forest, Support Vector Machines, k-Nearest Neighbors, Gaussian Naive Bayes, and Logistic Regression. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of these algorithms in distinguishing between normal and malicious nodes. Our findings also highlight the potential of machine learning based approach in enhancing the security of VANET by detecting and mitigating blackhole attacks.",
      "published": "2023-12-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rivf60135.2023.10471804",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "T. Canh",
        "Xiem HoangVan"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference on Research, Innovation and Vision for the Future in Computing & Communication Technologies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/rivf60135.2023.10471804",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/roedunet68395.2025.11208468",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sim2Real Cybersecurity Testbed for Modern Automotive Architectures",
      "description": "This paper introduces a unified testbed for evaluating the security of modern automotive networks through the integration of the CARLA driving simulator with a physical platform based on the open-source Toyota PASTA architecture. The proposed simulation environment facilitates realistic generation, manipulation, and visualization of Controller Area Network (CAN) traffic, including packet injection, message modification, cyberattack emulation, and JSON-based traffic import. The physical testbed follows original CAN specifications and identifiers. It includes four software-identical Electronic Control Units (ECUs), connected via a CAN bus and housed in a modular structure designed to emulate key vehicle subsystems. Ethernet connectivity between driving simulator and the physical platform enables bidirectional communication, allowing virtual driving scenarios to dynamically interact with the physical ECUs and, conversely, for physical system responses to influence the simulated environment. This tight coupling supports synchronized, high-fidelity testing of vehicle behavior under various CAN-based cyberattacks, offering a practical and extensible foundation for cybersecurity research in intelligent transportation systems.",
      "published": "2025-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/roedunet68395.2025.11208468",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "toyota"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "toyota"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jan-Alexandru Văduva",
        "C. Popescu",
        "Radu Florea",
        "Andrei-Florian Ciorgan",
        "V. Tîrsu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Networking in Education and Research",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/roedunet68395.2025.11208468",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rtsi.2016.7740627",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of anomaly detection for in-vehicle networks through information-theoretic algorithms",
      "description": "This paper evaluates the effectiveness of information-theoretic anomaly detection algorithms applied to networks included in modern vehicles. In particular, we focus on providing an experimental evaluation of anomaly detectors based on entropy. Attacks to in-vehicle networks were simulated by injecting different classes of forged CAN messages in traces captured from a modern licensed vehicle. Experimental results show that if entropy-based anomaly detection is applied to all CAN messages it is only possible to detect attacks that comprise a high volume of forged CAN messages. On the other hand, attacks characterized by the injection of few forged CAN messages attacks can be detected only by applying several independent instances of the entropy based anomaly detector, one for each class of CAN messages.",
      "published": "2016-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rtsi.2016.7740627",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mirco Marchetti",
        "Dario Stabili",
        "Alessandro Guido",
        "Michele Colajanni"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Forum on Research and Technology for Society and Industry (RTSI)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/rtsi.2016.7740627",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 154,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rtss52674.2021.00051",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability of Controller Area Network to Schedule-Based Attacks",
      "description": "The secure functioning of automotive systems is vital to the safety of their passengers and other roadway users. One of the critical functions for safety is the controller area network (CAN), which interconnects the safety-critical electronic control units (ECUs) in the majority of ground vehicles. Unfortunately CAN is known to be vulnerable to several attacks. One such attack is the bus-off attack, which can be used to cause a victim ECU to disconnect itself from the CAN bus and, subsequently, for an attacker to masquerade as that ECU. A limitation of the bus-off attack is that it requires the attacker to achieve tight synchronization between the transmission of the victim and the attacker’s injected message. In this paper, we introduce a schedule-based attack framework for the CAN bus-off attack that uses the real-time schedule of the CAN bus to predict more attack opportunities than previously known. We describe a ranking method for an attacker to select and optimize its attack injections with respect to criteria such as attack success rate, bus perturbation, or attack latency. The results show that vulnerabilities of the CAN bus can be enhanced by schedulebased attacks.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rtss52674.2021.00051",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sena G. Hounsinou",
        "Mark Stidd",
        "Uchenna Ezeobi",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Mitra Nasri",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/rtss52674.2021.00051",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rws52686.2021.9611800",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital data provenance for the power grid based on a Keyless Infrastructure Security Solution",
      "description": "In this work a data provenance system for grid-oriented applications is presented. The proposed Keyless Infrastructure Security Solution (KISS) provides mechanisms to store and maintain digital data fingerprints that can later be used to validate and assert data provenance using a time-based, hash tree mechanism. The developed solution has been designed to satisfy the stringent requirements of the modern power grid including execution time and storage necessities. Its applicability has been tested using a lab-scale, proof-of-concept deployment that secures an energy management system against the attack sequence observed on the 2016 Ukrainian power grid cyberattack. The results demonstrate a strong potential for enabling data provenance in a wide array of applications, including speed-sensitive applications such as those found in control room environments.",
      "published": "2021-10-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rws52686.2021.9611800",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "D. Jonathan Sebastian-Cardenas",
        "Sri Nikhil Gupta Gourisetti",
        "Michael Mylrea",
        "Anthony Moralez",
        "G. Day",
        "Vinod Tatireddy",
        "Craig H. Allwardt",
        "Rajveer Singh",
        "Randy Bishop",
        "K. Kaur",
        "Judah Plummer",
        "Gabby Raymond"
      ],
      "venue": "Resilience Week (RWS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/rws52686.2021.9611800",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rws58133.2023.10284654",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Disrupting EV Charging Sessions and Gaining Remote Code Execution with DoS, MITM, and Code Injection Exploits using OCPP 1.6",
      "description": "Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 1.6 is widely used in the electric vehicle (EV) charging industry to communicate between Charging System Management Services (CSMSs) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). Unlike OCPP 2.0.1, OCPP 1.6 uses unencrypted websocket communications to exchange information between EVSE devices and an on-premise or cloud-based CSMS. In this work, we demonstrate two machine-in-the-middle attacks on OCPP sessions to terminate charging sessions and gain root access to the EVSE equipment via remote code execution. Second, we demonstrate a malicious firmware update with a code injection payload to compromise an EVSE. Lastly, we demonstrate two methods to prevent availability of the EVSE or CSMS. One of these, originally reported by SaiFlow, prevents traffic to legitimate EVSE equipment using a DoS-like attack on CSMSs by repeatedly connecting and authenticating several CPs with the same identities as the legitimate CP. These vulnerabilities were demonstrated with proof-of-concept exploits in a virtualized Cyber Range at Wright State University and/or with a 350 kW Direct Current Fast Charger at Idaho National Laboratory. The team found that OCPP 1.6 could be protected from these attacks by adding secure shell tunnels to the protocol, if upgrading to OCPP 2.0.1 was not an option.",
      "published": "2023-10-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rws58133.2023.10284654",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "exploits",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Elmo",
        "George Fragkos",
        "Jay D. Johnson",
        "Kenneth W Rohde",
        "Sean Salinas",
        "Junjie Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Resilience Week (RWS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/rws58133.2023.10284654",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/rws62797.2024.10799447",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Goaltender: Cloud-Based Defense and Response Tools for the DER Ecosystem",
      "description": "Many distributed energy resources (DERs), electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) manufacturers and third-party vendors utilize persistent cloud connections and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) through standardized protocols such as IEEE 2030.5 and Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP). Due to the increasing risk of attacks and malicious data, there is a strong need to safeguard the cloud infrastructure when interconnected with DER and EVSE networks. We propose a defense-in-depth system named Goaltender for distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) with next-generation firewalls (NGFWs) and security orchestration, automation, and response (SOAR) solutions. We present our design, ongoing research, and development to improve the state-of-the-art of the DER/EVSE ecosystem.",
      "published": "2024-12-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/rws62797.2024.10799447",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "evse",
        "ocpp",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yung Ryn Choe",
        "Dalton A. Brucker-Hahn",
        "George Fragkos",
        "Keshav Sreekumar",
        "Bailey Nelson",
        "Alexander Safonov",
        "Ryan Sullivant",
        "Aisha B Rahman",
        "Sean Tsikteris",
        "Md Sadman Siraj",
        "Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou",
        "Jorge Pineda"
      ],
      "venue": "Resilience Week (RWS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/rws62797.2024.10799447",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/saci66288.2025.11030166",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Attack to Defense: Automotive Cyber Range for Can Bus Security Research",
      "description": "In today's rapidly developing world, the automotive industry has experienced significant growth, making cars a new target from a cybersecurity perspective. Every automotive company must understand how cars operate to provide customers with a safe product. Modern vehicles rely on Controller Area Network (CAN) systems, where multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs) exchange critical data. However, these systems lack built-in security mechanisms, making them vulnerable to cyber threats. The lack of open-source tools for analyzing CAN networks in real-world scenarios remains limited, making it harder to develop effective security solutions. This research presents an open-source solution for emulating a virtual CAN network within a vehicle simulator, providing a controlled environment for studying cyber threats and enhancing security measures. The gap between simulation and real-world applications will break, this approach enables researchers and industry professionals to analyze, test, and develop strategies for securing next-generation vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/saci66288.2025.11030166",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kristóf Zsombor Kövesi",
        "Anna Bánáti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics (SACI)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/saci66288.2025.11030166",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sami68106.2026.11420741",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid AI-Driven Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus Networks",
      "description": "In today’s automotive market, the OEM’s bring out more and more new connected features in their cars to make the users driving experience more safe and amusing than ever, but this comes with a very big price: the attackers gain even more attack surface thanks to the broad connectivity. One of the biggest problem is the approach of the manufacturers to this subject, most of them are not really implementing the much needed security solutions and testing the system’s cyber resilience unless they are forced to do it by the law or regulations. But to be able to defend themselves against the attacks, first they have to detect it. To address this problem, we developed a hybrid solution that uses multiple machine learning models to leverage the classification capabilities of these algorithms and to combine this with a human-modifiable IDS ruleset to effectively detect various attacks, while providing explainability and auditablity.",
      "published": "2026-01-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sami68106.2026.11420741",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Benedek Máté Tóth",
        "Anna Bánáti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE World Symposium on Applied Machine Intelligence and Informatics (SAMI)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/sami68106.2026.11420741",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sasow.2015.10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Keyless Gossip Algorithm Providing Light-Weight Data Privacy for Prosumer Markets",
      "description": "We propose secure multi-party computation techniques for the distributed computation of the average using a privacy-preserving extension of gossip algorithms. While recently there has been mainly research on the side of gossip algorithms (GA) for data aggregation itself, to the best of our knowledge, the aforementioned research line does not take into consideration the privacy of the entities involved. More concretely, it is our objective to not reveal a node's private input value to any other node in the network, while still computing the average in a fully-decentralized fashion. Not revealing in our setting means that an attacker gains only minor advantage when guessing a node's private input value. We precisely quantify an attacker's advantage when guessing - as a mean for the level of data privacy leakage of a node's contribution. Our results show that by perturbing the input values of each participating node with pseudo-random noise with appropriate statistical properties (i) only a minor and configurable leakage of private information is revealed, by at the same time (ii) providing a good average approximation at each node. Our approach can be applied to a decentralized prosumer market, in which participants act as energy consumers or producers or both, referred to as prosumers.",
      "published": "2015-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sasow.2015.10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "keyless",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sascha Niro",
        "Jose Lopez",
        "Dirk Westhoff",
        "Andreas Christ"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems Workshops (SASOW)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/sasow.2015.10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/satc69565.2026.11542547",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical Evaluation of Naturalistic Adversarial Patches for Camera-Based Traffic-Sign Detection",
      "description": "This paper studies how well Naturalistic Adversarial Patches (NAPs) transfer to a physical traffic sign setting when the detector is trained on a customized dataset for an autonomous vehicle (AV) environment. We construct a composite dataset, CompGTSRB (which is customized dataset for AV environment), by pasting traffic sign instances from the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) onto undistorted backgrounds captured from the target platform. CompGTSRB is used to train a YOLOv5 model and generate patches using a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) with latent space optimization, following existing NAP methods. We carried out a series of experiments on our Quanser QCar testbed utilizing the front CSI camera provided in QCar. Across configurations, NAPs reduce the detector's STOP class confidence. Different configurations include distance, patch sizes, and patch placement. These results along with a detailed step-by-step methodology indicate the utility of CompGTSRB dataset and the proposed systematic physical protocols for credible patch evaluation. The research further motivate researching the defenses that address localized patch corruption in embedded perception pipelines.",
      "published": "2026-02-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/satc69565.2026.11542547",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brianna D'Urso",
        "Tahmid Hasan Sakib",
        "Syed Rafay Hasan",
        "Terry N. Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 IEEE 2nd International Conference on Secure IoT, Assured and Trusted Computing (SATC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/satc69565.2026.11542547",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sbr/wre66973.2025.11249566",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bridging the Gaps: A Comparative Analysis of ISO 21434, ISO 26262 and Machine Learning in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The integration of Machine Learning (ML) in Au-tonomous Vehicles (AV s) raises challenges not fully addressed by current automotive standards, specifically ISO 26262 (functional safety) and ISO/SAE 21434 (cybersecurity). This paper reviews gaps in these standards concerning ML-enabled systems, focusing on explainability, data lifecycle, runtime assurance, and ethical compliance. To bridge these gaps, we propose the ML-Aware Compliance Bridge, a four-layer framework covering: (i) Data Lifecycle Management, (ii) Model Governance, (iii) Runtime Assurance, and (iv) Ethics and Explainability. The framework maps standard deficiencies to actionable recommendations, sup-porting the development of safer and more trustworthy AI -driven autonomous systems.",
      "published": "2025-10-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sbr/wre66973.2025.11249566",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suelen Daiene de Oliveira Bastos",
        "Kalinka Regina Lucas Jaquie Castelo Branco",
        "André Luiz de Oliveira"
      ],
      "venue": "Brazilian Symposium on Robotics and Workshop on Robotics in Education (SBR/WRE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/sbr/wre66973.2025.11249566",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/scam51674.2020.00017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Approach for the Identification of Information Leakage in Automotive Infotainment systems",
      "description": "The advancements in the digitization world has revolutionized the automotive industry. Today's modern cars are equipped with internet, computers that can provide autonomous driving functionalities as well as infotainment systems that can run mobile operating systems, like Android Auto and Apple CarPlay. Android Automotive is Google's android operating system tailored to run natively on vehicle's infotainment systems, it allows third party apps to be installed and run on vehicle's infotainment systems. Such apps may raise security concerns related to user's safety, security and privacy. This paper investigates security concerns of in-vehicle apps, specifically, those related to inter component communication (ICC) among these apps. ICC allows apps to share information via inter or intra apps components through a messaging object called intent. In case of insecure communication, Intent can be hijacked or spoofed by malicious apps and user's sensitive information can be leaked to hacker's database. We investigate the attack surface and vulnerabilities in these apps and provide a static analysis approach and a tool to find data leakage vulnerabilities. The approach can also provide hints to mitigate these leaks. We evaluate our approach by analyzing a set of Android Auto apps downloaded from Google Play store, and we report our validated results on vulnerabilities identified on those apps.",
      "published": "2020-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/scam51674.2020.00017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdul Moiz",
        "Manar H. Alalfi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Working Conference on Source Code Analysis and Manipulation (SCAM)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/scam51674.2020.00017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/scsp54748.2022.9792557",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Protection of personal data in autonomous vehicles and its data categorization",
      "description": "In the last ten years, autonomous vehicles have proved to be one of the major themes for smart mobility and a vision for the future. The possibilities of autonomous vehicle control are gradually being discussed, as we move from driving assistance systems through occasional vehicle control to fully automated driving without driver intervention.Currently developed autonomous systems work on the principle of recording and processing of a large amount of information from sensors and taken from other entities. Such recorded data may be of a technical nature, but may also be categorized as personal data. If personal data is handled improperly, there is a potential threat of misuse, resulting in a breach of the digital privacy of individuals and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) valid in the European Union. Sensitive and systematic handling of personal data is crucial not only for reasons of GDPR regulations but also for conformity of users of autonomous vehicles and thus the trouble-free development of autonomous vehicles and use in the future.The aim of the presented article is to outline the functioning and use of data in autonomous systems and their basic elements. The next part focuses on the processing of data from autonomous vehicles, their categorization and evaluation in terms of potential severity for security misuse. The article contains an analysis and description of individual elements of autonomous systems and the development of elements of autonomous vehicles from the point of view of the application of privacy protection.The primary target is to address the issues of privacy rights from the development by the manufacturer of autonomous systems. With this target in mind, the article also comes with measures and steps that need to be taken to successfully secure the personal data of data subjects involved within these autonomous systems in general.",
      "published": "2022-05-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/scsp54748.2022.9792557",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "gdpr",
        "personal data",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michal Mlada",
        "Radek Holý",
        "Jakub Jirovský",
        "Tomas Kasalicky"
      ],
      "venue": "Smart City Symposium Prague (SCSP)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/scsp54748.2022.9792557",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/seaa.2018.00029",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Concerns in Connected Cars: A Systematic Mapping Study",
      "description": "Significant strides are being made in research towards security and privacy concerns associated with connected cars. Being a relatively novel research domain, it is crucial to examine the state of the art to formulate future research strategies. The objective of the paper is to aggregate the research progress made in identifying security and privacy concerns in connected cars, and the concomitant solutions. Using systematic mapping study, we reviewed the state of the art to address the research objective. Results indicate that in the last couple of years, there has been an exponential increase in investigation into this research topic. Compromised vehicular communication has received more attention than any other concern, and the popularity has only increased in recent years. A secure system design and infrastructure is the most common solution for all the identified concerns in this paper, but securing communication is the most popular one. Real-world applicability of the devised solutions is debatable, as most researchers have preferred simulations to empirical evaluation. Overall, insecure system design or infrastructure warrants more attention from solution point of view. In this context, the principles of Prevention by Design and Privacy by Design can be among the most effective strategies.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/seaa.2018.00029",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prabhat Ram",
        "Jouni Markkula",
        "Ville Friman",
        "Arian Raz"
      ],
      "venue": "Euromicro Conference on Software Engineering and Advanced Applications (SEAA)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/seaa.2018.00029",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/secdev66745.2025.00029",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Carot: A Secure RISC-V ECU with Trusted Execution and Moving Target Defense",
      "description": "The modern vehicle implements Electronic Control Units (ECUs) for various safety-critical features, such as engine management, safety systems, and advanced driver assistance systems. However, ECUs and their interconnecting Controller Area Network (CAN) bus have not been developed from a security-first perspective, and are susceptible to various attacks. In particular, an attacker may use remote or physical attack vectors to breach an ECU, thus gaining access to the CAN bus and allowing for attacks on other ECUs within the In-Vehicle Network (IVN). To mitigate these issues, we present Carot: a secure, efficient, open-source ECU based on RISC-V. We use Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Instruction Set Randomization (ISR), a Moving Target Defense (MTD) technique, to protect against common code injection and operating system attacks that ECUs face. We implement our design on real hardware via an FPGA-based RISC-V prototype, and perform evaluations in a simulated IVN environment using CARLA. We report that our ECU provides security against our threat model while only incurring a $\\mathbf{1. 0 5 \\%}$ response latency overhead.",
      "published": "2025-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/secdev66745.2025.00029",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmer Raza",
        "Zhen-Kai Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Cybersecurity Development",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/secdev66745.2025.00029",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/secon.2018.8479266",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware Based Root of Trust for Electronic Control Units",
      "description": "Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are enriched devices to control mechanical parts through communication of control signals between them. Vehicles, like other internet of things, are vulnerable to device and network level attacks that are undeniably a safety concern. In this paper, we present a hardware-based framework with Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) enabled secure boot, traffic control for secure communication and mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by whitelisting, blacklisting and thresholding mechanism. Additionally, at the time of possible compromise, the proposed system provides self-perseverance constructs that are discussed with respect to architecture, implementation and security analysis.",
      "published": "2018-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/secon.2018.8479266",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yutian Gui",
        "Ali Shuja Siddiqui",
        "Fareena Saqib"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE SoutheastCon",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/secon.2018.8479266",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/secon48991.2020.9158440",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CaraoKey : Car States Sensing via the Ultra-Wideband Keyless Infrastructure",
      "description": "Automobile manufacturers are building cars with passive keyless entry support – the ability for users to unlock and start their cars while having the car keys \"in their pockets\". In this regard, car manufacturers are currently installing Ultra-Wideband (UWB) radios in cars owing to their robustness to relay attacks and their precise ranging estimates. In this paper, we explore the possibility of using these UWB radios (that exist for keyless entry) as an orthogonal sensing modality. To test this hypothesis, we build CaraoKey, the first system that exploits the UWB keyless infrastructure as a \"sensor\". More specifically, CaraoKey leverages the UWB radios to infer the state of a car (empty, door, window or trunk open, person inside the car, etc.). It does so by building a multipath profile based on the Channel Impulse Response (CIR) that is computed by each UWB node. We design and implement a 14-node system (a superset of all possible node locations) and evaluate it at 7 different indoor and outdoor locations while capturing a wide range of factors such as cars, people, walls on the sides, etc. Our results indicate that CaraoKey can distinguish 8 different car states with 98% accuracy using 8 nodes, and nearly 94% accuracy using just 4 nodes.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/secon48991.2020.9158440",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "exploits",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Avinash Kalyanaraman",
        "Yunze Zeng",
        "Sushanta Mohan Rakshit",
        "Vivek Jain"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/secon48991.2020.9158440",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/seeda-cecnsm53056.2021.9566277",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Twins and Cyber Security – solution or challenge?",
      "description": "Digital twin technology today is diverse and emerging and its full potential is not yet widely understood. The concept of a digital twin allows for the analysis, design, optimisation and evolution of systems to take place fully digital, or in conjunction with a cyber-physical system to improve speed, accuracy and efficiency when compared to traditional engineering approaches. Digital twins continue to be a technology that enables new paradigms, such as Industry 4.0 and Factories of the Future as well as generating improved efficiencies within existing systems. The development of digital twin technology in traditional industries such as manufacturing, construction, the automotive industry, agriculture and transportation has highlighted its potential, but often insufficiently explored the risks associated with their integration. In this paper we explore risks relating to the cyber-security of systems employing digital twin technology and also consider the opportunities for digital twins themselves to mitigate cyber-security risks and become an integral part of a security in-depth defence.",
      "published": "2021-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/seeda-cecnsm53056.2021.9566277",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Holmes",
        "Maria Papathanasaki",
        "Leandros A. Maglaras",
        "Mohamed Amine Ferrag",
        "‪Surya Nepal‬",
        "Helge Janicke"
      ],
      "venue": "South-East Europe Design Automation, Computer Engineering, Computer Networks and Social Media Conference (SEEDA-CECNSM)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/seeda-cecnsm53056.2021.9566277",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 123,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sefet57834.2023.10244921",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Determination of Voltage Security Constrained Maximum Loadability Limit for EV Charging Station with and Without DG",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle (EV) is increasing day-by-day and replacing the conventional internal combustion engine in the transportation system. To charge the EVs multiple charging station is required. But charging of an EV is a challenging task mainly for the less availability of the electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) and its poor infrastructure. Hence, it is essential to find the optimal location of the EVCS and to determine its maximum permissible load (MPL) for those nodes of a radial distribution system (RDS) after satisfying the voltage security constraint. Allocation of the EVCS s affects the energy loss and voltage profile of the overall system. Therefore, solar distributed generation (DG) along with the EVCS is considered for reducing the energy loss. Therefore, in this paper, a modified forward backward sweep (MFBS) algorithm is proposed to find the MPL for a particular node for installing EVCS and simultaneously optimization is performed to determine the optimal location by minimizing the energy loss considering security constraints. As the load and solar PV output varies throughout the day, 2m-point estimation is applied for handling these uncertainties.",
      "published": "2023-08-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sefet57834.2023.10244921",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sayak Mondal",
        "P. Acharjee",
        "A. Bhattacharya"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Sustainable Energy and Future Electric Transportation (SEFET)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/sefet57834.2023.10244921",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sefet65155.2025.11255102",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure EV Charging and Communication: A Hybrid GNN-IDS and Post-Quantum Cryptographic Approach",
      "description": "The transition towards autonomous electric vehicles offers a sustainable and eco-friendly solution to pollution but introduces the possibility of cyber threats due to their intense reliance on interconnected systems. This paper proposes an integrated security system ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for vehicle-to-vehicle(V2V) communication. It employs a combination of Falcon and Kyber two post-quantum cryptographic algorithms to maintain Autonomous Electric Vehicles(EVs) authentication and integrity respectively. Both of these algorithms are resistant to quantum attacks and viable for IoT devices. In addition, a Graph Neural Network-based intrusion detection system is introduced in another layer to monitor charging stations and identify network attacks. Promising experimental outcomes concerning communication rate, communication time, energy consumption, throughput, and packet delivery ratio of the Falcon and Kyber algorithm witnessed effective V2V communication. Similarly, the graph neural network model achieves a 98.7% accuracy while maintaining the overall Quality of service and marking a significant step in secure communication for autonomous EVs.",
      "published": "2025-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sefet65155.2025.11255102",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ratul Chowdhury",
        "Prianka Dey",
        "Soumadip Mondal",
        "Shankhadeep Purkait",
        "Nisha Mishra",
        "Sudipto Chatterjee"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE 5th International Conference on Sustainable Energy and Future Electric Transportation (SEFET)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/sefet65155.2025.11255102",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sennet64220.2025.11135991",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-Time Intrusion Detection System for Automotive CAN Bus Using Machine Learning and Virtual Simulation",
      "description": "As cars are getting more connected and autonomous, the security for in-car communication has progressively become more crucial. The CAN bus protocol, the vehicular communication bus among ECUs today, was initially designed with emphasis on real-time performance and reliability rather than security. This intrinsic deficiency exposes vehicles to various forms of cyberattacks like spoofing, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, fuzzing, and replay attacks. In this proposed work, we present a real-time machine learning-powered Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for CAN bus networks with use of the Isolation Forest algorithm. Unlike existing conventional rule-based or supervised-based designs, our design does not demand labeled training data and can accommodate unknown or adaptive attacks. The system runs on a virtual setup on vcan0 and facilitates live attack injection through a Flask-based API. Real-time traffic is sniffed, anomalies are identified by the Isolation Forest model that is pre-trained, and output is displayed by way of an interactive dashboard through Dash and Plotly. The system is light, modular, and embeddable, and it provides an energy-efficient solution towards improving vehicular cybersecurity",
      "published": "2025-07-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sennet64220.2025.11135991",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kirubhagaran G",
        "P. M",
        "N. K",
        "Manish Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 International Conference on Sensors and Related Networks (SENNET) Special Focus on Digital Healthcare(64220)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/sennet64220.2025.11135991",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sera69989.2026.11618675",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity for Internet of Medical Vehicles (IoMV): Mitigating Attacks and Protecting Data Infrastructures",
      "description": "Cybersecurity for life-critical telemetry and connected medical devices is fundamental to the safety of the Internet of Medical Vehicles (IoMV). The IoMV has evolved from a simple emergency transport system into a transformative infrastructure that integrates high-speed vehicle technologies with remote healthcare delivery. Although these innovations bring advanced medical care closer to patients, high-speed mobility and real-time data exchange requirements make them susceptible to systemic disruptions and data breaches. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the current state of IoMV cybersecurity, focusing on the unique vulnerabilities of mobile medical environments. We identify a critical gap in the literature: the lack of standardized cybersecurity frameworks specifically tailored for high-mobility medical contexts where low latency and data integrity are paramount. By synthesizing automotive safety standards with healthcare privacy regulations, this study establishes a foundation for developing secure, adaptive-driven IoMV systems capable of defending against evolving cyber threats in underdeveloped research areas.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sera69989.2026.11618675",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Babajide J. Asaju",
        "Kamorudeen A. Amuda",
        "Rahanatu Suleiman",
        "Almustapha Abdullahi Wakili",
        "Woosub Jung"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering Research, Management and Applications (SERA)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/sera69989.2026.11618675",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sgc69320.2025.11372419",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An AI-Driven Integrated Framework for EV Charging: Demand Forecasting, Load Balancing, SoC Estimation, and Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The rapid growth of EV adoption and the resulting stress on electrical grids have highlighted the crucial need for advanced and intelligent energy management solutions. This study introduces a unified AI-driven architecture designed to improve the overall efficiency of EV charging infrastructures. The proposed framework comprises four main components: a hybrid SoC estimation scheme combining deep learning methods with estimation filters, charge demand forecasting based on the analysis of user behavioral data, load balancing in single-phase networks using reinforcement learning algorithms, and finally, the application of blockchain technology to enhance data security and prevent cyber-attacks. By leveraging advanced machine learning models, the proposed structure increases the accuracy, stability, and security of the charging system, and demonstrates a significant improvement over classical methods in terms of efficiency, unit coordination, and resilience against cyber-attacks.",
      "published": "2025-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sgc69320.2025.11372419",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahdi Mahdlou Torkamani",
        "Naser Khodabakhshi-Javinani",
        "Shima Valizadeh"
      ],
      "venue": "Smart Grid Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/sgc69320.2025.11372419",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sibcon.2017.7998555",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive and telematics transportation systems",
      "description": "Security mechanisms of a telematics system are exceedingly intersecting as they could pretend the ordinary influence of the vehicle and perhaps terminate in accidents. This paper includes a new look at automotive and telematics transportation systems, also refers to methods in modelling, facility location, data processing and assessment of risk in telematics networks.",
      "published": "2017-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sibcon.2017.7998555",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tomasz Neumann"
      ],
      "venue": "International Siberian Conference on Control and Communications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/sibcon.2017.7998555",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sibcon.2019.8729626",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing the Possibility of Integration LPWAN Technology into Tracking and Monitoring Systems for Special Vehicles",
      "description": "Low-power wide area networking technology offers long-range communication, which enables new types of services. In this paper, an approach to enhance the efficiency of tracking and monitoring systems for special vehicles, by integrating LoRaWAN technology for telematic data transmission is proposed. This article provides an analysis of the LoRa modulation and LoRaWAN protocol. Furthermore, LoRaWAN security features were overviewed and network size limitations were analyzed. Assessment of the feasibility of LoRaWAN integration showed the full vitality of the concept. This work serves as a basis for further research in LoRaWAN technology and practical implementation of the concept.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sibcon.2019.8729626",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "tracking",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ilin Alexander Dmitrievich",
        "Bogdan Belogurov"
      ],
      "venue": "International Siberian Conference on Control and Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/sibcon.2019.8729626",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sieds69358.2026.11540301",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Functional Safety and Cybersecurity in Zonal ECU Architectures: A Unified Architectural and Experimental Approach",
      "description": "The shift to zonal electronic control units (ECUs) is transforming vehicle electrical architectures by consolidating multiple functions into fewer and more powerful computing nodes. While this reduces wiring and improves scalability, it also concentrates both safety and security risks. This paper presents a unified design approach that examines how ISO 26262 functional-safety mechanisms and ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity mechanisms can be co-engineered in a zonal ECU context. The proposed architecture uses dual-core lockstep processing for ASIL-D fault detection, along with secure boot, hardware security modules (HSMs), and an in-vehicle intrusion-detection concept. A prototype implementation on an NXP S32G platform demonstrates high diagnostic coverage and stable runtime behavior. Case studies show how coordinated safety-security co-engineering improves system behavior under both faults and security eventsThis work provides practical architectural and experimental insight for designers of zonal ECUs that can meet safety and cybersecurity expectations for next-generation ADAS and electrification programs. The study also reports measured values from the prototype, including strong lockstep fault coverage, IDS false-positive behavior near 1.8%, and a secure-boot delay of about 12 ms. These results help show how safety and security mechanisms can be combined without major performance penalties",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sieds69358.2026.11540301",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahsanul Karim"
      ],
      "venue": "Systems and Information Engineering Design Symposium",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/sieds69358.2026.11540301",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sielmen53755.2021.9600343",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous and Electrical Vehicles Development using Optimized Processes Defined by Cyber Security and Safety Management System",
      "description": "The current trend in automotive is to develop electrical and autonomous vehicles (EV&AV). The paper presents an original concept which can be used to develop AV&EV, but the same concept can be used also for \"classical vehicles\". The work paper begins with a brief review on the evolution of safety and cyber security standards applicable in the automotive industry. Most of the players in the automotive market do not have dedicated processes for safety and for cybersecurity. The authors propose a list of processes developed based on ISO 26262[1] and ISO/SAE 21434[2] requirements. Beside this proposal they are coming with an innovative concept which is coming into one integrated system called CSSMS (Cybersecurity and Safety Management System). This concept has as main purpose the reduction of time and resources used for development but also the fulfillment of all the requirements of the standards. In the end the concept proposed is partially validated using a steering product and proposes some steps for validating the entire system.",
      "published": "2021-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sielmen53755.2021.9600343",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simona Gifei",
        "Alexandru Sălceanu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electromechanical and Energy Systems (SIELMEN)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/sielmen53755.2021.9600343",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sin60469.2023.10474941",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unveiling Threats: A Comprehensive Taxonomy of Attacks in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Innovative automobiles are typically outfitted with numerous electrical and intelligent gadgets to offer users a better driving experience. Technological advancements have also raised severe safety and security issues despite their apparent advan-tages. This article summarizes the various attack surfaces of connected automobiles as they relate to technology advancements from the standpoint of the in-vehicle network. In particular, we described how attacks are launched through the physical interface using On-board Diagnostic (OBD-II) and USB ports and through the remote surface using various components such as ECU, sensors, infotainment system, Global Positioning Sys-tem (GPS), data centers, and cellular data. Given the importance of automobiles in terms of safety, more practical and effective efforts should be made within the connected vehicle network to secure linked vehicles and protect drivers and passengers.",
      "published": "2023-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sin60469.2023.10474941",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "obd-ii",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ritu Rai",
        "Jyoti Grover",
        "Soumya Pandey"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/sin60469.2023.10474941",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637090",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automated Fuzzing of Automotive Control Units",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are governed by a network of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), which are programmed to sense inputs from the driver and the environment, to process these inputs, and to control actuators that, e.g., regulate the engine or even control the steering system. ECUs within a vehicle communicate via automotive bus systems such as the Controller Area Network (CAN), and beyond the vehicles boundaries through upcoming vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure channels. Approaches to manipulate the communication between ECUs for the purpose of security testing and reverse-engineering of vehicular functions have been presented in the past, all of which struggle with automating the detection of system change in response to message injection. In this paper we present our findings with fuzzing CAN networks, in particular while observing individual ECUs with a sensor harness. The harness detects physical responses, which we then use in a oracle functions to inform the fuzzing process. We systematically define fuzzers, fuzzing configurations and oracle functions for testing ECUs. We evaluate our approach based on case studies of commercial instrument clusters and with an experimental framework for CAN authentication. Our results show that the approach is capable of identifying interesting ECU states with a high level of automation. Our approach is applicable in distributed cyber-physical systems beyond automotive computing.",
      "published": "2019-09-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637090",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Timothy Werquin",
        "Roos Hubrechtsen",
        "Ashok Samraj Thangarajan",
        "Frank Piessens",
        "Jan Tobias Mühlberg"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop Secure Internet Things",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637090",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637109",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Finding Security Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Using Software Verification",
      "description": "The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) embedded with vulnerable monolithic software has recently raised serious concerns about their security due to concurrency aspects and fragile communication links. However, verifying security in UAV software based on traditional testing remains an open challenge mainly due to scalability and deployment issues. Here we investigate software verification techniques to detect security vulnerabilities in typical UAVs. In particular, we investigate existing software analyzers and verifiers, which implement fuzzing and bounded model checking (BMC) techniques, to detect memory safety and concurrency errors. We also investigate fragility aspects related to the UAV communication link. All UAV components (e.g., position, velocity, and attitude control) heavily depend on the communication link. Our preliminary results show that fuzzing and BMC techniques can detect various software vulnerabilities, which are of particular interest to ensure security in UAVs. We were able to perform successful cyber-attacks via penetration testing against the UAV both connection and software system. As a result, we demonstrate real cyber-threats with the possibility of exploiting further security vulnerabilities in real-world UAV software in the foreseeable future.",
      "published": "2019-09-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637109",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "fuzzing",
        "penetration",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omar M. K. Alhawi",
        "Mustafa Mustafa",
        "Lucas C. Cordiro"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop Secure Internet Things",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/siot48044.2019.9637109",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/siu55565.2022.9864762",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Elliptic Curve Cryptography for Security in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The concept of a connected vehicle refers to the linking of vehicles to each other and to other things. Today, developments in the Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G have made a significant contribution to connected vehicle technology. In addition to many positive contributions, connected vehicle technology also brings with it many security-related problems. In this study, a digital signature algorithm based on elliptic curve cryptography is proposed to verify the message and identity sent to the vehicles. In the proposed model, with the anonymous identification given to the vehicle by the central unit, the vehicle is prevented from being detected by other vehicles and third parties. Thus, even if the personal data produced in the vehicles is shared, it cannot be found which vehicle it belongs to.",
      "published": "2022-05-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/siu55565.2022.9864762",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "personal data",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yasin Genç",
        "Muhammed Habek",
        "Nilay Aytas",
        "Ahmet Akkoc",
        "Erkan Afacan",
        "Erdem Yazgan"
      ],
      "venue": "Signal Processing and Communications Applications Conference (SIU)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/siu55565.2022.9864762",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4122,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/siu55565.2022.9864762 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: personal, even, digital, applications, significant, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartcomp-companion70724.2026.00072",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Cyber-Attacks in Connected Vehicles through Context-Aware Multilevel Graph Modeling",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of connected vehicles and Internet of Things (IoT) technologies has significantly increased the complexity of modern automotive systems while simultaneously expanding their attack surface. In particular, the Controller Area Network (CAN-Bus), which enables communication among Electronic Control Units (ECUs), represents a critical component of in-vehicle networks and a potential target for cyber-attacks. The absence of built-in security mechanisms such as authentication and encryption makes CAN-based communication vulnerable to message injection and manipulation attacks. This paper proposes a context-aware intrusion detection approach based on a Multilevel Graph (MuG) representation to identify anomalous behaviors in connected vehicles. The proposed framework integrates data acquisition from the CAN-Bus, semantic context modeling and probabilistic inference mechanisms to analyze relationships between system components and detect abnormal system states. The architecture is organized into four layers—Acquisition, Knowledge, Inference Engine and Application—allowing structured management of data collection, contextual knowledge representation and anomaly detection. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed methodology, a case study focused on automotive cybersecurity was developed using the CARLA simulation environment, where multiple attack scenarios were simulated through the injection of malicious CAN messages. The experimental evaluation was conducted on a dataset generated during simulation runs and analyzed using precision, recall and F1-score metrics. The results demonstrate that the proposed multilevel graph-based approach significantly improves the detection of anomalous behaviors, achieving high accuracy in identifying both normal system conditions and simulated attack scenarios. The findings suggest that integrating context-aware modeling with graph-based inference represents a promising direction for enhancing intrusion detection capabilities in connected vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartcomp-companion70724.2026.00072",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mario Casillo",
        "Francesco Colace",
        "Angelo Lorusso",
        "Domenico Santaniello",
        "Giusy Strollo",
        "Carmine Valentino"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Smart Computing Workshops and Other Affiliated Events (SMARTCOMP Companion)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartcomp-companion70724.2026.00072",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3871,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/smartcomp-companion70724.2026.00072 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collection, normal, makes, case, where, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartcomp.2016.7501710",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OBD_SecureAlert: An Anomaly Detection System for Vehicles",
      "description": "Vehicles can be considered as a specialized form of Cyber Physical Systems with sensors, ECU''s and actuators working together to produce a coherent behavior. With the advent of external connectivity, a larger attack surface has opened up which not only affects the passengers inside vehicles, but also people around them. One of the main causes of this increased attack surface is because of the advanced systems built on top of old and less secure common bus frameworks which lacks basic authentication mechanisms. To make such systems more secure, we approach this issue as a data analytic problem that can detect anomalous states. To accomplish that we collected data flowing between different components from real vehicles and using a Hidden Markov Model, we detect malicious behaviors and issue alerts, while a vehicle is in operation. Our evaluations using single parameter and two parameters together provide enough evidence that such techniques could be successfully used to detect anomalies in vehicles. Moreover our method could be used in new vehicles as well as older ones.",
      "published": "2016-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartcomp.2016.7501710",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "ecu",
        "obd",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandeep Nair Narayanan",
        "Sudip Mittal",
        "Anupam Joshi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Smart Computing",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartcomp.2016.7501710",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 104,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm.2016.7778810",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Maximizing aggregator profit through energy trading by coordinated electric vehicle charging",
      "description": "Due to the increasing concern for greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel security, electric vehicles (EVs) have attracted much attention in recent years. EVs can aggregate together constituting the vehicle-to-grid system. Coordination of EVs is beneficial to the power system in many ways. In this paper, we formulate a novel large-scale EV charging problem with energy trading in order to maximize the aggregator profit. This problem is non-convex and can be solved with a centralized iterative approach. To overcome the computation complexity issue brought by the non-convexity, we develop a distributed optimization-based heuristic. To evaluate our proposed approach, a modified IEEE 118 bus testing system is employed with 10 aggregators serving 30 000 EVs. The simulation results indicate that our proposed distributed heuristic with energy trading can effectively increase the total profit of aggregators. In addition, the proposed distributed optimization-based heuristic strategy can achieve near-optimal performance.",
      "published": "2016-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartgridcomm.2016.7778810",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "James J. Q. Yu",
        "Junhao Lin",
        "Albert Y. S. Lam",
        "Victor O. K. Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartgridcomm.2016.7778810",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm52983.2022.9961027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Threats in Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "The electric vehicle (EV) charging system plays a significant role in the future of energy systems. The widespread adoption of operating EV charging is accelerates the integration of transmission and distribution systems, this helps to accommodate a clean atmosphere and drop conventional fuel dependence. An EV interacts with different objects while recharging in the charging station. The charging stations that power up such vehicles can also be connected to the internet and make them particularly to malicious attack through hacking or remote accessing. Thus, this technology has caught the attention of many researchers who have proposed authentication protocols to provide a secure connection for exchanging information between electric vehicles and the charging station. This article discusses comprehensive security threats in the EV charging systems. Moreover, it reviews the architecture of the charging station system and the protocols between electric vehicles and charging stations.",
      "published": "2022-10-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartgridcomm52983.2022.9961027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anchal Ahalawat",
        "Sridhar Adepu",
        "Joseph Gardiner"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartgridcomm52983.2022.9961027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm65349.2025.11204647",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ML-based Multiclass Anomaly Detection System for Charge Profile Manipulation Attacks in EV Charging Ecosystem",
      "description": "The rapid growth of Electric Vehicles (EVs) requires expanded charging infrastructure, highlighting the need for a smart EV charging system. However, integrating more smart EV charging systems into existing power grids raises significant cyber-physical system (CPS) security concerns. This is due to interdependencies and reliance on protocols like the open charge point protocol (OCPP). This paper considers the security vulnerabilities in the latest version of OCPP 2.0.1, particularly focusing on communication between the central system (CS) and the EV charging stations (EVCS). We considered a charge profile manipulation attack (CPMA) that stealthily manipulates the charge profile of EV users, resulting in charging schedule disruptions. Large-scale CPMA manipulation alters the expected load distribution on the power grid, potentially shifting in peak demand. To address this, we propose an ML-based anomaly detection system (ML-MADS) that uses multiclass supervised learning to detect and classify different types of CPMAs. Proposed ML-MADS uses statistically derived features to develop machine learning models that effectively distinguish between normal operations and various types of CPMA. To ensure robustness and practical relevance, we considered real-world, open-source datasets (ACN-Caltech, Elaad NL) that offer diverse charging session data. The proposed ML-MADS achieves high detection and classification accuracy while minimizing false positives.",
      "published": "2025-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartgridcomm65349.2025.11204647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pradeep Kumar M",
        "Nazmus Saqib",
        "Shaurya Purohit",
        "Manimaran Govindarasu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartgridcomm65349.2025.11204647",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartnets58706.2023.10215881",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Collaborative DDoS Attack Defense for OTA Updates in CAVs using Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain",
      "description": "Recent developments in the Connected Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) industry have triggered the proliferation of Over-the-Air (OTA) update systems for vehicles, providing increased safety, efficiency, and convenience. However, with the increased adoption of these OTA update systems, the threat of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks has become a major concern. DDoS attacks on OTA update processes could lead to the disruption of vehicular communication networks, resulting in the loss of control and putting the safety of the vehicles and passengers in jeopardy. To ensure the security of CAVs, it is essential to protect the OTA update process. In this paper, we propose a Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) blockchain-based Collaborative DDoS Attack Defense (CDAD) architecture on OTA update systems in CAVs. This collaborative approach provides a secure and resilient solution that ensures the integrity of the data and minimizes the risk of malicious actors disrupting the OTA update process. It allows multiple OTA service providers to collaborate in real time and protect against potential malicious cyber-attacks. The experimental results show that the system is able to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks with minimal latency and higher throughput while providing improved privacy and security.",
      "published": "2023-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartnets58706.2023.10215881",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sadia Yeasmin",
        "Anwar Haque"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Smart Applications, Communications and Networking (SmartNets)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartnets58706.2023.10215881",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartnets61466.2024.10577640",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Robust Physical Layer IDS for Intra-Vehicle Communication Security",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network protocol is widely adopted in the automotive industry to enable efficient communication between electronic control units (ECU s). While CAN protocol offers impressive speed, reliability, and robustness, its vulnerability to security threats arises from the absence of message authentication and encryption. Unfortunately, current CAN bus anomaly detection mechanisms mainly focus on detecting data link layer attacks, overlooking the critical task of identifying attackers who specifically target identity falsification. These malicious actors manipulate the identities of legitimate ECU s to launch attacks, potentially resulting in severe consequences, including the unwarranted blocking of genuine nodes. To counter this critical security concern, this paper specifically investigates the importance of the identification of the attacker and its behavior in maximizing the strengths of the CAN bus security while enhancing data-link level anomaly detection. Our approach leverages signal fingerprints generated by semiconductor imperfections, contextual message features, and the correlation of the decoded messages over time to accurately identify malicious ECU s and detect any packet manipulations. More precisely, we propose a multitask learning approach that extracts features from voltage signals measured on the CAN bus and the encoded data within the messages, enabling accurate identification of the attack type and its source. Through validation using a voltage dataset, we demonstrate the effectiveness and resilience of our approach against prominent attacks.",
      "published": "2024-05-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartnets61466.2024.10577640",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wassila Lalouani",
        "Ivan Omorogbe",
        "Christopher Dube",
        "Mohamed Baza",
        "Amar A. Rasheed",
        "Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Smart Applications, Communications and Networking (SmartNets)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartnets61466.2024.10577640",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smartworld-uic-atc-scalcom-digitaltwin-pricomp-metaverse56740.2022.00293",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection System for In-vehicle Networks with Incremental Learning Based on Cloud-Edge Collaborative Architecture*",
      "description": "The development of vehicle networking and self-driving technology has increased the integration of communication interfaces into modern vehicles and the interaction between the connected vehicles and roadside unites. This situation also brings security threats. Controller area network (CAN) is the main bus system in modern automobiles. It easily suffers from cyberattacks because it lacks security protection mechanisms. Intrusion detection system is an effective method to defend cyberattacks. However, the detection accuracy may be affected by the change in driving environment and the occurrence of unknown attacks. A detection model based on incremental learning is used to improve detection performance. In addition, a cloud-edge collaborative architecture is designed to implement the detection model for reducing the burden of calculation and storage of on-board system and maintaining the timeliness of detection. Deep Neural Network(DNN) is applied in the offline training stage to obtain a basic classification model using marked actual CAN data. Then, the trained model is stored in the cloud server. After the edge server receives detection request from a vehicle, it will download the model from the cloud server and perform intrusion detection. At the same time, it will update the model with incremental learning technology based on new unlabeled data. Experimental results show the effectiveness of the proposed method.",
      "published": "2022-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smartworld-uic-atc-scalcom-digitaltwin-pricomp-metaverse56740.2022.00293",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiaying Lin",
        "Yehua Wei",
        "Haoran Jiang",
        "Jing Long"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Smart World Congress (SWC)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/smartworld-uic-atc-scalcom-digitaltwin-pricomp-metaverse56740.2022.00293",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3889,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/smartworld-uic-atc-scalcom-digitaltwin-pricomp-metaverse56740.2022.00293 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: unknown, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smc.2019.8914448",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Brain-based control of car infotainment",
      "description": "Nowadays, the possibility to run advanced AI on embedded systems allows natural interaction between humans and machines, especially in the automotive field. We present a custom portable EEG-based Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) that exploits Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) induced with an oddball experimental paradigm to control the infotainment menu of a car. A preliminary evaluation of the system was performed on 10 participants in a standard laboratory setting and while driving on a closed private track. The task consisted of repeated presentations of 6 different menu icons in oddball fashion. Subject-specific models were trained with different machine learning approaches on cerebral data from either only laboratory or driving experiments (in-lab and in-car models) or a combination of the two (hybrid model) to classify EEG responses to target and non-target stimuli. All models were tested on the subjects' last in-car sessions that were not used for the training. Analysis of ERPs amplitude showed statistically significant (p <; 0.05) differences between the EEG responses associated with target and non-target icons, both in the laboratory and while driving. Classification Accuracy (CA) was above chance level for all subjects in all training configurations, with a deep CNN trained on the hybrid set achieving the highest scores (mean CA = 53 ± 12 %, with 16 % chance level for the 6-class discrimination). The ranking of the features importance provided by a classical BCI approach suggests an ERP-based discrimination between target and non-target responses. No statistical differences were observed between the CAs for the in-lab and in-car training sets, nor between the EEG responses in these conditions, indicating that the data collected in the standard laboratory setting could be readily used for a real driving application without a noticeable decrease in performance. However, refining the model with real-world data might be beneficial. While there is still room for improvement, the results demonstrate the feasibility of a brain-based control of the car infotainment while driving.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smc.2019.8914448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "exploits",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrea Bellotti",
        "Sergey Antopolskiy",
        "Anna Marchenkova",
        "Alessia Colucciello",
        "Pietro Avanzini",
        "Giovanni Vecchiato",
        "Jonas Ambeck-Madsen",
        "Luca Ascari"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference proceedings/Conference proceedings - IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/smc.2019.8914448",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/smc53992.2023.10394532",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Relevance of ISO/SAE 21434 in Vehicular Architecture Development",
      "description": "Research in terms of security in vehicular architecture has been a focal point of deliberation in the automotive sector. The Automotive industry development has continuously evolved the scenario of adding more integration to networked vehicles or semi-autonomous vehicles. The end product of such manufacturing practices is a vehicle becoming a networked computer on wheels. In spite of providing numerous advantages, these developments in the automotive industry are also bringing more challenges in terms of security. Hence, the industry has been forced to emphasise the principle of Security by Design. Efforts in this direction have resulted in the formulation of the ISO/SAE 21434 standard. In this work, we focus on summarising the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and analysing its relevance for automotive architecture development. Related works in the standard's approach of Security by Design are summarised. Additionally, we propose an application work of the standard in the context of automotive Architecture development as future work.",
      "published": "2023-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/smc53992.2023.10394532",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "V Kethareswaran",
        "Sanjay Moulik"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference proceedings/Conference proceedings - IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/smc53992.2023.10394532",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/socc.2018.8618564",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Entropy Analysis Based Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Network in Vehicles",
      "description": "Dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) can be found on modern vehicles for safety and driving assistance. These ECUs also introduce new security vulnerabilities as recent attacks have been reported by plugging the in-vehicle system or through wireless access. In this paper, we focus on the security of the Controller Area Network (CAN), which is a standard for communication among ECUs. CAN bus by design does not have sufficient security features to protect it from insider or outsider attacks. Intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the most effective ways to enhance vehicle security on the insecure CAN bus protocol. We propose a new IDS based on the entropy of the identifier bits in CAN messages. The key observation is that all the known CAN message injection attacks need to alter the CAN ID bits and analyzing the entropy of such bits can be an effective way to detect those attacks. We collected real CAN messages from a vehicle (2016 Ford Fusion) and performed simulated message injection attacks. The experimental results showed that our entropy based IDS can successfully detect all the injection attacks without disrupting the communication on CAN.",
      "published": "2018-08-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/socc.2018.8618564",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qian Wang",
        "Zhaojun Lu",
        "Gang Qu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/socc.2018.8618564",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/socc66126.2025.11235443",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial and Backdoor Threats in Autonomous-Vehicle and Embodied-AI Systems",
      "description": "Deep-learning models are central to every stage of both autonomous-driving and embodied-AI pipelines. Given the safety-critical nature of these platforms, their machine-learning components should be subjected to rigorous evaluation for adversarial and backdoor vulnerabilities. Different pipeline blocks are vulnerable to distinct categories of adversarial attack, depending on their function. For example, perception modules are exposed to physical patch–based adversarial attacks and stealthy backdoor triggers, whereas planning and control modules are susceptible to trajectory-perturbation and command-injection attacks. In this paper, we first present the autonomous driving and embodied-AI systems pipelines. We then highlight the threat surfaces associated with every machine learning and deep learning-based block, survey state-of-the-art attack methods, and review the corresponding defense strategies. Finally, we present some case studies to highlight how selected attacks and defenses perform in real-world environments.",
      "published": "2025-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/socc66126.2025.11235443",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Sajid Shafique",
        "Muhammad Abdullah Hanif",
        "Amira Guesmi",
        "Nandish Chattopadhyay",
        "Bassem Ouni"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/socc66126.2025.11235443",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/southeastcon63549.2026.11476062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strengthening IEC 61851 Charging Security Through Image-Based Vehicle Presence Verification",
      "description": "Electric vehicle charging stations use IEC 61851 control-pilot signaling to infer whether a vehicle is present, but this signal can be spoofed with simple analog circuits, allowing charging to begin without a vehicle connected. This paper introduces an image-based verification approach that adds a physical presence check to the charge authorization process without altering existing standards. A camera mounted at the electric vehicle supply equipment captures images of the charging bay, and lightweight convolutional neural networks classify whether the detected vehicle is an electric vehicle. Gasoline-powered internal combustion engine vehicles were included as negative samples, allowing the classifier to distinguish EVs from non-EVs before authorization. MobileNetV3 and EfficientNet-B0 were evaluated using precision, recall, and F1-score derived from confusion-matrix analysis. The results show a clear trade-off between the two models. EfficientNet-B0 achieves higher recall and a higher F1-score, reducing missed detections of legitimate EVs. MobileNetV3 achieves slightly higher precision, resulting in fewer false-positive authorizations. These findings show that visual verification can provide a practical, deployable layer of protection against IEC 61851 spoofing by grounding charge authorization in physical vehicle presence.",
      "published": "2026-02-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/southeastcon63549.2026.11476062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ernest Fiko Morgan",
        "Mohd. Hasan Ali"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE SoutheastCon",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/southeastcon63549.2026.11476062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00122",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANNON: Reliable and Stealthy Remote Shutdown Attacks via Unaltered Automotive Microcontrollers",
      "description": "Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles have recently been targets for shutdown attacks, which can disable safety-critical vehicle functions and be used as means to launch more dangerous attacks. Existing attacks operate either by physical manipulation of the bus signals or message injection. However, we argue that these cannot simultaneously be remote, stealthy, and reliable. For instance, message injection is detected by modern Intrusion Detection System (IDS) proposals and requires strict synchronization that cannot be realized remotely. In this work, we introduce a new class of attacks that leverage the peripheral clock gating feature in modern automotive microcontroller units (MCUs). By using this capability, a remote adversary with purely software control can reliably \"freeze\" the output of a compromised ECU to insert arbitrary bits at any time instance. Utilizing on this insight, we develop the CANnon attack for remote shutdown. Since the CANnon attack produces error patterns indistinguishable from natural errors and does not require message insertion, detecting it with current techniques is difficult. We demonstrate this attack on two automotive MCUs used in modern passenger vehicle ECUs. We discuss potential mitigation strategies and countermeasures for such attacks.",
      "published": "2021-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sp40001.2021.00122",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sekar Kulandaivel",
        "Shalabh Jain",
        "Jorge Guajardo",
        "Vyas Sekar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/sp40001.2021.00122",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sp54263.2024.00080",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Revisiting Automotive Attack Surfaces: a Practitioners’ Perspective",
      "description": "As modern vehicles become increasingly complex in terms of both external attack surfaces and internal in-vehicle network (IVN) topology, ensuring their cybersecurity remains a challenge. Existing standards and regulations, such as WP29 R155e and ISO 21434, attempt to establish a baseline for automotive cybersecurity, but their sufficiency in addressing the evolving threats is unclear. To fill in this gap, we first carried out an in-depth interview study with 15 experts in automotive cybersecurity, uncovering the particular challenges encountered during security activities and the limitations of current regulations. We identified 20 key insights from the interview data, ranging from the challenges and gaps in the existing automotive security industry to the limitations and recommendations for current regulations. Notably, we discovered that the quality of threat cases provided by existing regulations is unsatisfactory, and the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process is often highly inefficient due to the lack of automatic tools. In response to the above limitations, we first built an improved threat database for automotive systems using the collected interview data, which enhanced the existing database both quantitatively and qualitatively. Additionally, we present CarVal, a datalog-based approach designed to infer multi-stage attack paths in IVNs and calculate risk values, thereby making TARA more efficient for automotive systems. By applying CarVal to five real vehicles, we performed extensive security analysis based on the generated attack paths and successfully exploited the corresponding attack chains in the newly gateway-segmented IVN, uncovering new automotive attack surfaces that previous research failed to cover, including the in-vehicle browser, official mobile app, backend server, and in-vehicle malware.",
      "published": "2024-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sp54263.2024.00080",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso 21434",
        "malware"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pengfei Jing",
        "Zhiqiang Cai",
        "Yingjie Cao",
        "Le Yu",
        "Yuefeng Du",
        "Wenkai Zhang",
        "Chenxiong Qian",
        "Xiapu Luo",
        "Sen Nie",
        "Shi Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/sp54263.2024.00080",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sp63933.2026.00129",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Banshee: Target Switch Attacks on Gimbal-Stabilized Visual Tracking Systems via Acoustic Injection",
      "description": "Gimbal-stabilized visual tracking is critical for modern autonomous systems such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). While prior work shows acoustic signals can disturb gimbal internals, the impact of such attacks on real-world applications like UAV tracking and following remains underexplored. Existing demonstrations largely overlook practical challenges for real-world attacks, such as object-motion uncertainty and runtime latency. To bridge this gap, we present Banshee, the first physically realizable attack that induces target switching in UAV visual tracking systems by exploiting acoustic vulnerabilities in gimbal-camera systems. Banshee generates carefully crafted acoustic waveforms that induce optimized adversarial gimbal oscillations, causing directionally biased camera-view drifts that break inter-frame target associations. Consequently, the onboard tracker is driven to switch from the original target to an attacker-selected object with high probability, with occasional target loss. Banshee achieves a 93.6% success rate in simulation across two commercial gimbal systems and five trackers. Real-world benchtop and in-flight black-box attacks against a commercial drone across varied scenarios show an overall 95.5% attack success rate. Our results reveal a practical cross-domain vulnerability between acoustics and vision, highlighting the need for robust designs of gimbal systems and applications. Our code is available at: https://github.com/U1ltra/Banshee.",
      "published": "2026-07-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sp63933.2026.00129",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "tracking",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiarui Li",
        "Joseph Brewington",
        "Qingzhao Zhang",
        "Z. Morley Mao"
      ],
      "venue": "2026 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 1539-1557, 2026",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/sp63933.2026.00129",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/spw.2019.00032",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ensuring the Safe and Secure Operation of Electronic Control Units in Road Vehicles",
      "description": "With the increasing connectivity and complexity of road vehicles, security heavily impacts the safety of vehicles. In fact, researchers demonstrated that the lack of security in vehicles can lead to dangerous and even life-threatening situations. A threat that has been insufficiently addressed in existing vehicular security solutions are software attacks, in which the adversary compromises the software of Electronic Control Units (ECUs). A promising technique to defend against software attacks is remote attestation, as it enables to detect compromised devices. This paper presents a novel attestation scheme that ensures the software integrity of ECUs to warrant the vehicle's safety. In our scheme, a trusted master ECU verifies the integrity of all safety-critical ECUs and refuses to start the engine in case an untrustworthy, and hence, unsafe state is detected. As modern vehicles are highly heterogeneous system of systems, we propose two different attestation techniques that enable the attestation of simple ECUs, such as basic sensors or actuators, as well as advanced, more complex ECUs like sensor fusion systems. We implement our attestation scheme on an exemplary automotive network that incorporates CAN and Ethernet, and show that our solution imposes an imperceptible overhead for passengers.",
      "published": "2019-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/spw.2019.00032",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Florian Kohnhäuser",
        "Dominik Püllen",
        "Stefan Katzenbeisser"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/spw.2019.00032",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/srds60354.2023.00024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ScaIOTA: Scalable Secure Over-the-Air Software Updates for Vehicles",
      "description": "Over-the-Air (OTA) software updates are becoming essential for electric/electronic vehicle architectures in order to reduce recalls amid the increasing software bugs and vulnera-bilities. Current OTA update architectures rely heavily on direct cellular repository-to-vehicle links, which makes the repository a communication bottleneck, and increases the cellular bandwidth utilization cost as well as the software download latency. In this paper, we introduce ScalOTA, an end-to-end scalable OTA software update architecture and secure protocol for modern vehicles. For the first time, we propose using a network of update stations, as part of Electric Vehicle charging stations, to boost the download speed through these stations, and reduce the cellular bandwidth overhead significantly. Our formalized OTA update protocol ensures proven end-to-end chain-of-trust including all stakeholders: manufacturer, suppliers, update stations, and all layers of in-vehicle Electric Control Units (ECUs). The empirical evaluation shows that ScalOTA reduces the bandwidth utilization and download latency up to an order of magnitude compared with current OTA update systems.",
      "published": "2023-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/srds60354.2023.00024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ecus",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "EV charging",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali Shoker",
        "Fernando Alves",
        "Paulo Verı́ssimo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/srds60354.2023.00024",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ssci44817.2019.9002791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Game Theory Approach to Attack-Defense Strategy for Perception of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The malicious attacks to vehicle communication facilities can expose connected vehicles to security threats, making them lose control and causing traffic accidents. It is usually hard to predict the attacked targets, which makes it difficult to design a proactive defensive strategy. This study tackles the issue of connected vehicles under bounded data injection attacks. We propose an active attack-defense model based on game theory and solve the model using a reinforcement learning-based method. The vehicle-attacker system is modeled as a game-theoretic framework based on the generalized weakened fictitious play, in which each player uses the best actions to react to the opponents' empirical actions. A novel mixed adversarial reinforcement learning is employed to learn the attack-defense model which makes the model self-evolutionary. Moreover, our model is validated in a car-following scenario through numerical simulations and comparative studies under different forms of attacks. Results show that our model can recognize the attacked sensors and the defensive effectiveness of connected vehicles increases by nearly 30% under bounded attacks.",
      "published": "2019-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ssci44817.2019.9002791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ziqing Gu",
        "Yunlong An",
        "Fangyuan Tan",
        "Yang Li",
        "Sifa Zheng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (SSCI)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ssci44817.2019.9002791",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ssd.2019.8893165",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cryptographic and Intrusion Detection System for automotive CAN bus: Survey and contributions",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is today the most used protocol in automotive networks. However, CAN bus cannot guarantee the safety of vehicles against cybernetic attacks. Moreover, external connectivity is the most important trends of modern cars. However, hackers can exploit automotive network vulnerabilities to make attacks. Therefore, to protect in-vehicle systems from external attacks, numerous researches proposed security mechanisms based on cryptography and intrusion detection system (IDS). In this paper, we give a survey on the various security approaches which are designed to solve CAN bus security. Along with that, we introduce our contributions o deal with this problem.",
      "published": "2019-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ssd.2019.8893165",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mabrouka Gmiden",
        "Mohamed Hedi Gmiden",
        "Hafedh Trabelsi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals & Devices (SSD)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ssd.2019.8893165",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ssi58917.2023.10387965",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Relay Station Attacks on Different RFID Access Systems",
      "description": "The advance of digitalization in today's society also has an impact on the field of security technology. Whereas in the past simple constructions were used as locks and keys, nowadays electronic access systems are increasingly used. These can be utilized either as a replacement or as an extension to traditional access systems. One technology used for this purpose is Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), which is often employed in access systems in office buildings, corporate buildings or for Passive Keyless Entry (PKE) systems in vehicles. Due to the increasing use of RFID systems, they are increasingly being targeted by attackers. One method used is the Relay Station attack. The general task of the paper is the investigation of Relay Station attacks on different RFID access systems. The aim is a successful realization of this attack method. Different approaches are considered, from which the applied methods are derived in order to be able to understand the functional principles. Due to the wide range of applications and the differences between the individual systems, two examples of RFID access systems are examined and implemented.",
      "published": "2023-03-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ssi58917.2023.10387965",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Laura Pistorius",
        "Heiko Polster",
        "Dirk Labudde"
      ],
      "venue": "Smart Systems Integration Conference and Exhibition (SSI)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/ssi58917.2023.10387965",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ssps.2017.8071577",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle network security testing",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-05-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ssps.2017.8071577",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jihas Khan"
      ],
      "venue": "2017 Third International Conference on Sensing, Signal Processing and Security (ICSSS)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/ssps.2017.8071577",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sst61991.2024.10755196",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment and Countermeasures Against Threat Scenarios for Steer-by-Wire System",
      "description": "The advent of relevant sophisticated technologies has led to the development of numerous intelligent and interconnected vehicle functions. While this has undoubtedly enhanced drivers’ quality of driving experience, it also has generated a multitude of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. One illustrative example is the evolution of the steering system. With the introduction of steer-by-wire (SbW) systems, the traditional hydraulic steering mechanism has been transformed into a more sophisticated electronic system. Furthermore, since steer-by-wire systems are networked to communicate with other connected components and systems inside and outside the vehicle, they introduce a new layer susceptible to cyberattacks. This paper is focused on the security vulnerabilities of the SbW in the context of threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) as well as countermeasures that are advised to be considered against possible threats. The study overall sets out to provide an initial analysis and measures for achieving the cybersecurity of the SbW system. Firstly, the boundaries of the SbW as an item are demonstrated in the item definition. Subsequently, TARA and countermeasures against determined threat scenarios are represented. In the TARA, respectively, asset identification, identification of damage scenarios that compromise cybersecurity properties of assets, impact ratings of damage scenarios, identification of threat scenarios with spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privileges (STRIDE) methodology, attack feasibility rating determination, risk value/cybersecurity assurance level (CAL) determination, risk treatment decisions, and cybersecurity goal determination are addressed. Finally, countermeasures are determined against the threat scenarios based on the set cybersecurity goals.",
      "published": "2024-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sst61991.2024.10755196",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "threat",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Okan Özçetin",
        "M. T. Emirler"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on Sustainable Systems and Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/sst61991.2024.10755196",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sta.2016.7952095",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An intrusion detection method for securing in-vehicle CAN bus",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) bus has become the most used protocol in automotive network since its robustness and efficiency. However, CAN bus does not have enough security prosperities to protect the whole automotive system even to protect its network. So, security mechanism to protect CAN bus became an emergency need. One of the efficient methods for securing CAN bus, is Intrusion Detection System (IDS). In this work, a simple intrusion detection method for CAN bus is proposed. Our algorithm does not require any modification in standard procedure of CAN bus nor to be implemented in each calculators of network.",
      "published": "2016-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sta.2016.7952095",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mabrouka Gmiden",
        "Mohamed Hedi Gmiden",
        "Hafedh Trabelsi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Sciences and Techniques of Automatic Control and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/sta.2016.7952095",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 111,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sta.2017.8314877",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security issues in controller area networks in automobiles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles may contain a considerable number of ECUs (Electronic Control Units) which are connected through various means of communication, with the CAN (Controller Area Network) protocol being the most widely used. However, several vulnerabilities such as the lack of authentication and the lack of data encryption have been pointed out by several authors, which ultimately render vehicles unsafe to their users and surroundings. Moreover, the lack of security in modern automobiles has been studied and analyzed by other researchers as well as several reports about modern car hacking have (already) been published. The contribution of this work aimed to analyze and test the level of security and how resilient is the CAN protocol by taking a BMW E90 (3-series) instrument cluster as a sample for a proof of concept study. This investigation was carried out by building and developing a rogue device using cheap commercially available components while being connected to the same CAN-Bus as a man in the middle device in order to send spoofed messages to the instrument cluster.",
      "published": "2017-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sta.2017.8314877",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "bmw",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "bmw"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Robert Buttigieg",
        "Mario Farrugia",
        "Clyde Meli"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Sciences and Techniques of Automatic Control and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/sta.2017.8314877",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sti64222.2024.10951138",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Graph-Based Intrusion Detection for CAN Bus Security with Minimal Training Data",
      "description": "In this study, we explore the efficacy of using a graph-based intrusion detection system (GBIDS) for Controller Area Network (CAN) bus security with minimal training data. Traditional machine learning models often require extensive data for training, typically around 70%, to achieve high accuracy and reliability. However, our approach demonstrates that even with significantly reduced training data—specifically, using just 30% of the available 70% of data (21% of total data)—we can maintain high levels of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score. This minimal data training is facilitated by on-the-fly training capabilities akin to edge computing, allowing for real-time adaptation and learning. Our results indicate that it is not always necessary to rely on the conventional 70% training data benchmark to ensure robust CAN bus security. By leveraging advanced graph-based algorithms and edge computing techniques, we achieve efficient and effective intrusion detection with reduced data requirements, thus offering a promising solution for real-time CAN bus security in resource-constrained environments.",
      "published": "2024-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sti64222.2024.10951138",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md. Abul Ala Walid",
        "Maloy Kumar Devnath",
        "Bakhtiar Muiz",
        "Md Mehedi Hassan Melon",
        "Pronob Kumar Barman"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Sustainable Technologies for Industry 5.0 (STI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/sti64222.2024.10951138",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/stpec66316.2025.11490822",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Lightweight Symmetric Encryption and Decryption Hardware for CPS Application Security",
      "description": "With the growing reliance on wireless communication in modern technologies, security remains a critical concern, especially in applications like Remote Keyless Entry [1] (RKE) and smart door systems. This paper presents a secure text encryption and decryption system implemented in Verilog, designed specifically to prevent replay attacks in applications such as smart door locks. The system utilizes symmetric key encryption enhanced with a dynamically generated salt and a counter-based mechanism to ensure message uniqueness. Each character of an input message is encrypted using an XOR operation with a symmetric key and then combined with a salt value and a message counter to form a unique encrypted packet. During decryption, the receiver verifies the counter to detect and reject any repeated or previously used messages, effectively mitigating replay attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that the system successfully encrypts and decrypts messages while identifying and blocking repeated unlock commands based on stale counters. This lightweight and hardware-friendly approach provides a robust security layer for smart locks and other embedded IoT systems, ensuring secure communication with minimal resource overhead..",
      "published": "2025-12-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/stpec66316.2025.11490822",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "P. Ram",
        "Vikas Mittal"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE 4th International Conference on Smart Technologies for Power, Energy and Control (STPEC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/stpec66316.2025.11490822",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/sustech51236.2021.9467438",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using OCPP for Data Collection in BC Hydro Time-of-Use Measurement Trial for Residential EV Charging",
      "description": "Rapid adoption of electric vehicles has introduced new challenges to power utilities by increasing demand on distribution systems. To avoid costly system reinforcements, power utilities can reduce adverse grid impacts and excessive costs for the customers using time-of-use pricing or smart charging programs. Proper infrastructure and data acquisition methodology are the necessities of such program. The data acquisition methodology should be accurate, secure, and economically viable. Different methodologies have been introduced and utilized during the past few years that may not be economically viable or may not provide acceptable accuracy and security levels. In this paper, OCPP has been used to transfer measured data from onboard meters of OCPP-enabled AC Level 2 chargers used in a BC Hydro TOU measurement trial for residential EV charging. The accuracy of the collected data from different chargers has been verified against a utility-grade smart meter. It is shown that the measured data is within a reasonable accuracy range, and it is transferred and stored securely without loss of accuracy. Finally, the collected EV load data is assessed over a period of 24 hours to demonstrate the impact of TOU on the total household load and the importance of proper scheduling.",
      "published": "2021-04-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/sustech51236.2021.9467438",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael Zhang",
        "H. Atighechi",
        "Mehran Zamani",
        "Anupam Das"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Technologies for Sustainability",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/sustech51236.2021.9467438",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/syscon64521.2025.11014781",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "System Engineering-Based Threat Modeling for Heavy-Duty Vehicles",
      "description": "With rapid advancements in connected vehicle technologies, modern vehicles have become increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. While concerns about automotive cybersecurity are growing, research specifically addressing the cybersecurity of heavy-duty vehicles, such as freight trucks, remains limited. Given that disruptions in the operation of these vehicles can have significant impacts on the economy, supply chains, and transportation systems, it is urgent to explore the cybersecurity of such vehicles. This study addresses this gap by performing a cybersecurity threat analysis of a freight truck. As highlighted in ISO/SAE 21434, threat analysis and risk assessment are fundamental steps in implementing cybersecurity. This study focuses on the interfaces of heavy-duty vehicles, using the STRIDE framework. The process begins by identifying critical assets and analyzing potential attack vectors. Following a systems engineering approach, the truck's system is decomposed into subsystems to identify potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities. After constructing a data flow diagram based on the system engineering results, the STRIDE framework is then applied using the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool to systematically identify and classify possible attack scenarios. The study also outlines the features of extracted threats related to heavy-duty vehicle interfaces. This work presents a structured approach to threat modeling, focusing on truck interfaces, and contributes to a deeper understanding of cybersecurity risks in connected heavyduty vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-04-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/syscon64521.2025.11014781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narges Rahimi",
        "Beth‐Anne Schuelke‐Leech",
        "Mitra Mirhassani"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/syscon64521.2025.11014781",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/taes.2024.3456090",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Specific Emitter Identification With Different Transmission Codes and Multiple Receivers",
      "description": "A specific emitter identification (SEI) system that expands previously published results by identifying remote keyless-entry (RKE) remotes with an accuracy of over 95% even when different digital transmission codes are used is described. This system successfully rejects replay attacks with no replay attacks being incorrectly identified as known remotes. The effect of using multiple receivers is then evaluated using this SEI system. It was found that poor accuracy of under 33% was obtained when attempting to identify transmitters using an SEI system trained on data recorded by other receivers. However, including recordings from all receivers among the receivers used to provide the training data was found to increase the accuracy to over 91%. Increasing the number of receivers used to record the training data was found to slightly reduce the identification accuracy.",
      "published": "2025-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/taes.2024.3456090",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lodewicus J. Diedericks",
        "W. P. du Plessis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/taes.2024.3456090",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tai.2021.3111139",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges and Countermeasures for Adversarial Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning",
      "description": "Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has numerous applications in the real world, thanks to its ability to achieve high performance in a range of environments with little manual oversight. Despite its great advantages, DRL is susceptible to adversarial attacks, which precludes its use in real-life critical systems and applications (e.g., smart grids, traffic controls, and autonomous vehicles) unless its vulnerabilities are addressed and mitigated. To address this problem, we provide a comprehensive survey that discusses emerging attacks on DRL-based systems and the potential countermeasures to defend against these attacks. We first review the fundamental background on DRL and present emerging adversarial attacks on machine learning techniques. We then investigate the vulnerabilities that an adversary can exploit to attack DRL along with state-of-the-art countermeasures to prevent such attacks. Finally, we highlight open issues and research challenges for developing solutions to deal with attacks on DRL-based intelligent systems.",
      "published": "2021-09-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tai.2021.3111139",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Inaam Ilahi",
        "Muhammad Usama",
        "Junaid Qadir",
        "Muhammad Umar Janjua",
        "Ala Al‐Fuqaha",
        "Dinh Thai Hoang",
        "Dusit Tao Niyato"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tai.2021.3111139",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 171,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tase.2023.3293955",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimal Planning of Fast EV Charging Stations in a Coupled Transportation and Electrical Power Distribution Network",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) can effectively mitigate global warming issues while ensuring energy security, when compared with conventional fuel-based vehicles. Therefore, proper planning and development of charging infrastructure are essential to promote EVs. This paper proposes a multi-objective formulation to determine fast charging stations’ optimal placement and sizing on intra-city corridors in a coupled transportation and Electrical Power Distribution Network (EPDN). The proposed formulation does a distance-based mapping between all transportation and EPDN nodes for precisely observing the impact of EV charging on EPDN. The proposed planning simultaneously considers the objectives and constraints of the transportation network and EPDN while satisfying the EV charging requirements. The EV charging demand, utilized in planning, is predicted using the Random Forest technique while considering the day type, hourly weather, and traffic flow that affect the forecasting accuracy. The improved Particle Swarm Optimization with Constriction Factor solves the proposed formulation for a 30-node EPDN coupled with a 25-node transportation network. The analysis of various cases, including varying initial State-Of-Charge of EVs and percentage growth of EVs per year, proves the efficacy and robustness of the proposed work. Note to Practitioners—The planned deployment of charging infrastructure is critical to facilitate EVs’ adoption and sustainable growth of EV industries. Since, EV charging stations couple transportation network and EPDN, the planning strategy should consider requirements of both networks. For satisfactory driving experience of EV users, the planning should also consider driving range constraints and charging requirements of EV users. Several works on charging infrastructure planning have been carried out. However, several aspects relevant to EV users, transportation networks, EPDN, and determining EV charging demand have been overlooked in existing literature (as evidenced through Table I). These aspects must be considered simultaneously while planning charging stations. Hence, this work proposes a planning strategy for optimal placement and sizing of fast EV charging stations in a metropolitan city connecting multiple suburbs while considering several aspects of transportation networks and EPDNs. The proposed strategy can be utilized by utilities for efficient deployment of charging infrastructure on metropolitan city intra-city corridors. It establishes a distance-based mapping between all transportation and EPDN nodes for observing the impact of EV charging on EPDN. The determination of EV charging demand is a crucial step in the planning, which is determined by forecasting hourly traffic flow while considering several key attributes. The proposed approach achieves the EPDN objectives of reducing power loss, voltage deviation, and total charging stations’ establishment cost, and transportation network objectives of maximising captured traffic flow while satisfying driving range constraints and charging requirements of EVs. Therefore, the focus is to utilize the existing grid infrastructure optimally while achieving the objectives and satisfying constraints of EV users, transportation network, and EPDN. Relevant case studies demonstrate the efficacy and robustness of proposed approach. The uncertainties in EVs’ injections and arrival/departure times will be considered in our future work.",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tase.2023.3293955",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aastha Kapoor",
        "Viresh S. Patel",
        "Ankush Sharma",
        "A. Mohapatra"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tase.2023.3293955",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tbdata.2022.3227336",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Data Privacy Threat Modelling for Autonomous Systems: A Survey From the GDPR's Perspective",
      "description": "Artificial Intelligence-based applications have been increasingly deployed in every field of life including smart homes, smart cities, healthcare services, and autonomous systems where personal data is collected across heterogeneous sources and processed using ”black-box” algorithms in opaque centralised servers. As a consequence, preserving the data privacy and security of these applications is of utmost importance. In this respect, a modelling technique for identifying potential data privacy threats and specifying countermeasures to mitigate the related vulnerabilities in such AI-based systems plays a significant role in preserving and securing personal data. Various threat modelling techniques have been proposed such as STRIDE, LINDDUN, and PASTA but none of them is sufficient to model the data privacy threats in autonomous systems. Furthermore, they are not designed to model compliance with data protection legislation like the EU/UK General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is fundamental to protecting data owners’ privacy as well as to preventing personal data from potential privacy-related attacks. In this article, we survey the existing threat modelling techniques for data privacy threats in autonomous systems and then analyse such techniques from the viewpoint of GDPR compliance. Following the analysis, We employ STRIDE and LINDDUN in autonomous cars, a specific use-case of autonomous systems, to scrutinise the challenges and gaps of the existing techniques when modelling data privacy threats. Prospective research directions for refining data privacy threats & GDPR-compliance modelling techniques for autonomous systems are also presented.",
      "published": "2022-12-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tbdata.2022.3227336",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cars",
        "gdpr",
        "privacy",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Naila Azam",
        "Anna Lito Michala",
        "Shuja Ansari",
        "Nguyen Binh Truong"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Big Data",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tbdata.2022.3227336",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tc.2025.3647888",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FBRE: Fuzzing Based Bit-Level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as a foundational communication architecture in modern vehicles, supporting a wide range of functions, from engine control to auxiliary systems. However, lacking built-in security mechanisms makes CAN vulnerable to cyberattacks. Accurately mapping CAN signals to specific car-control actions becomes critical as it allows the detection of security breaches by pinpointing potential vulnerabilities exploited to compromise vehicular functions. Existing mapping techniques rely on CAN reverse engineering, which struggle to achieve bit-level resolution due to the huge search space of IDs and payload combinations. To address this challenge, we propose a systematic framework that includes signal boundary identification, targeted fuzz testing, and control bit analysis. Our method achieves high efficiency and precision in mapping control bits in CAN frames to car-control actions. Additionally, we developed a compact and user-friendly reverse engineering toolkit, incorporating a graphical interface to facilitate practical vehicle function testing and CAN message monitoring. Experiments on Tesla Model 3 and Leapmotor C11/C10 demonstrate that our framework is validated across different vehicle models and capable of identifying a wide range of car-control actions. Compared with previous works, our method significantly improves the resolution and automation of CAN reverse engineering.",
      "published": "2025-12-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tc.2025.3647888",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "tesla",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hanxue Shi",
        "Yu Cai",
        "Xiaohang Wang",
        "Haoting Shen",
        "Li Lü",
        "Kui Ren",
        "Kaiwei Wu",
        "Yinhe Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computers",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tc.2025.3647888",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tc.2026.3724651",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "System-Level Isolation for Mixed-Criticality RISC-V SoCs: A \"World\" Reality Check",
      "description": "As RISC-V adoption accelerates, domains such as automotive, the Internet of Things (IoT), and industrial control are attracting growing attention. These domains are subject to stringent Size, Weight, Power, and Cost (SWaP-C) constraints, which have driven a shift toward heterogeneous Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) integrating general-purpose CPUs, tightly coupled accelerators, and diverse I/O devices with different integrity levels. While such integration improves cost efficiency and performance, it introduces a fundamental safety and security challenge: enforcing system-level isolation in mixed-criticality environments. Although RISC-V International has proposed several hardware isolation primitives, including RISC-V Worlds, IOPMP, and SmMTT, their interoperability, scalability, and suitability for real-time systems remain insufficiently understood. In this paper, we present a comparative analysis of these primitives from the perspective of practical heterogeneous SoC designs. We implement an IOPMP, a World-based checker, and a modified RISC-V World checker that addresses key limitations of the baseline specification, and evaluate their trade-offs in terms of security guarantees and power-performance-area (PPA). Our results show that the World-based checker introduces a fixed, configuration-independent access latency, achieving lower worst-case delay than the evaluated alternatives while scaling predictably with system size. At the macro level, we estimate that the proposed modifications reduce SoC area by up to approximately 5% compared to a baseline design. All artifacts will be released as open source, and we expect these findings to directly contribute to the evolution and ratification of RISC-V specifications, as well as to the design of future RISC-V SoCs.",
      "published": "2026-02-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tc.2026.3724651",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luis Cunha",
        "Jose Martins",
        "Manuel Rodriguez",
        "Tiago Gomes",
        "Sandro Pinto",
        "Uwe Moslehner",
        "Kai Dieffenbach",
        "Glenn Farrall",
        "Kajetan Nuernberger",
        "Thomas Roecker"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computers, Early Access, 2026",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tc.2026.3724651",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tcad.2016.2523937",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-Layer Codesign for Secure Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "description": "Security attacks may have disruptive consequences on cyber-physical systems, and lead to significant social and economic losses. Building secure cyber-physical systems is particularly challenging due to the variety of attack surfaces from the cyber and physical components, and often to limited computation and communication resources. In this paper, we propose a cross-layer design framework for resource-constrained cyber-physical systems. The framework combines control-theoretic methods at the functional layer and cybersecurity techniques at the embedded platform layer, and addresses security together with other design metrics such as control performance under resource and real-time constraints. We use the concept of interface variables to capture the interactions between control and platform layers, and quantitatively model the relation among system security, performance, and schedulability via interface variables. The general codesign framework is customized and refined to the automotive domain, and its effectiveness is demonstrated through an industrial case study and a set of synthetic examples.",
      "published": "2016-02-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2016.2523937",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bowen Zheng",
        "Peng Deng",
        "Rajasekhar Anguluri",
        "Qi Zhu",
        "Fabio Pasqualetti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/tcad.2016.2523937",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tcad.2016.2633961",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design Automation of Cyber-Physical Systems: Challenges, Advances, and Opportunities",
      "description": "A cyber-physical system (CPS) is an integration of computation with physical processes whose behavior is defined by both computational and physical parts of the system. In this paper, we present a view of the challenges and opportunities for design automation of CPS. We identify a combination of characteristics that define the challenges unique to the design automation of CPS. We then present selected promising advances in depth, focusing on four foundational directions: combining model-based and data-driven design methods; design for human-in-the-loop systems; component-based design with contracts, and design for security and privacy. These directions are illustrated with examples from two application domains: smart energy systems and next-generation automotive systems.",
      "published": "2016-12-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2016.2633961",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanjit Arunkumar Seshia",
        "Shiyan Hu",
        "Wenchao Li",
        "Qi Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/tcad.2016.2633961",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 150,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tcad.2017.2666605",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Electrical and Electronic Architecture Security via Distributed In-Vehicle Traffic Monitoring",
      "description": "Due to the growing interconnectedness and complexity of in-vehicle networks, in addition to safety, security is becoming an increasingly important topic in the automotive domain. In this paper, we study techniques for detecting security infringements in automotive electrical and electronic (E/E) architectures. Toward this we propose in-vehicle network traffic monitoring to detect increased transmission rates of manipulated message streams. Attacks causing timing violations can disrupt safety-critical functions and have severe consequences. To reduce costs and prevent single points of failure, our approach enables an automatic distribution of detection tasks among selected E/E architecture components, such as a subset of electronic control units. First, we analyze a concrete E/E system architecture to determine the communication parameters and properties necessary for detecting security attacks. These are then used for a parametrization of the corresponding detection algorithms and the distribution of attack detection tasks. We use a lightweight message monitoring method and optimize the placement of detection tasks to ensure a full-coverage of the E/E system architecture and a timely detection of an attack.",
      "published": "2017-02-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2017.2666605",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Peter Waszecki",
        "Philipp Mundhenk",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst",
        "Martin Lukasiewycz",
        "Ramesh Karri",
        "Samarjit Chakraborty"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/tcad.2017.2666605",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tcad.2020.3012749",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "INDRA: Intrusion Detection Using Recurrent Autoencoders in Automotive Embedded Systems",
      "description": "Today's vehicles are complex distributed embedded systems that are increasingly being connected to various external systems. Unfortunately, this increased connectivity makes the vehicles vulnerable to security attacks that can be catastrophic. In this article, we present a novel intrusion detection system (IDS) called INDRA that utilizes a gated recurrent unit (GRU)-based recurrent autoencoder to detect anomalies in controller area network (CAN) bus-based automotive embedded systems. We evaluate our proposed framework under different attack scenarios and also compare it with the best known prior works in this area.",
      "published": "2020-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2020.3012749",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vipin Kumar Kukkala",
        "Sooryaa Vignesh Thiruloga",
        "Sudeep Pasricha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tcad.2020.3012749",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tcad.2025.3541566",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MULSAM: Multidimensional Attention With Hardware Acceleration for Efficient Intrusion Detection on Vehicular CAN Bus",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) protocol is an efficient standard enabling communication among electronic control units (ECUs). However, the CAN bus is vulnerable to malicious attacks because of a lack of defense features. In this article, a novel vehicle intrusion detection system (IDS) is developed. The challenge is that existing techniques of IDSs rarely consider attacks with small-batch, which are characterized by their small attack scale and concealed attack patterns, posing a significant threat to driving safety. To solve this problem, we developed an algorithm model that merges multidimensional long short-term memory (MD-LSTM) and self-attention mechanism (SAM), shortly named MULSAM. The MULSAM model was compared with other baseline models, including stacked long short-term memory (LSTM), MD-LSTM, etc. Experiments show that our approach has the best-detection accuracy (98.98%) and training stability. Further, to speed up the inference of MULSAM on edge, the hardware accelerator is implemented on FPGA devices using technologies, such as parallelization, modular, pipeline, and fixed-point quantization. Experiments show that our FPGA-based acceleration scheme has a better-energy efficiency than the CPU platform. Even with a certain degree of quantification, the acceleration model for MULSAM still displays a high-detection accuracy of 98.81% and a low latency of 1.88 ms.",
      "published": "2025-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2025.3541566",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "He Xu",
        "Xiaokang Shi",
        "Hansheng Liu",
        "Yan-Wen Wang",
        "Jiwu Lu",
        "Haibo Zeng",
        "Ren-Fa Li",
        "Di Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tcad.2025.3541566",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tce.2023.3297965",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Attacks via Consumer Electronics: Studying the Threat of Covert Malware in Smart and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "In Industry 5.0, man and machine work alongside each other in production, but smart and autonomous vehicles are examples that show this notion is now being extended to the end consumers. In 2015, a Jeep was remotely hacked through its head unit. This incident drew the public attention to vehicles security and showed how entertainment/infotainment consumer electronics can be used to intrude vehicles. In this paper, we study a novel covert attack that can be launched by malwares spreading through Intelligent Transportation Systems, e.g., via consumer electronics. This malware infects a vehicle module, like the Adaptive Cruise Controller (ACC), and manipulates its setting in a way that is not noticeable to human observers, but gives rise to accidents statistics. We show how this is done and analyze the effect mathematically. We also propose a new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) whose architecture is non-disruptive and can be readily adopted by car manufacturers. We evaluate our proposal with real-world datasets. We demonstrate how a malware/attacker can engineer the crash statistics by manipulating the safe distance value in cruise control scenarios. Then, we put an anomaly-based IDS for ACC modules into test and show how it can effectively detect such covert attacks.",
      "published": "2023-08-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tce.2023.3297965",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "jeep"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Sayad Haghighi",
        "Faezeh Farivar",
        "Alireza Jolfaei",
        "Azin Bayrami Asl",
        "Wei Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tce.2023.3297965",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tce.2023.3338818",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sustainable Secure Communication in Consumer-Centric Electric Vehicle Charging in Industry 5.0 Environments",
      "description": "Industry 5.0, a revolutionary paradigm focused on intelligent manufacturing, has profoundly impacted the automotive industry. It offers reliable data transmission and enhances the security of vehicle network systems, meeting evolving consumer needs. With a growing emphasis on energy conservation and environmental protection, electric vehicles have become a prominent segment of clean energy vehicles. Ensuring convenient and secure charging services is crucial for their widespread adoption. To address this, we propose an authentication protocol that uses digital signatures for secure communication in consumer-centric electric vehicle charging in Industry 5.0 environments. The protocol’s security was rigorously validated through a comprehensive analysis employing the real-or-random model. Furthermore, a systematic assessment was carried out to gauge the protocol’s computational performance, communication efficiency, and energy expenditure, yielding highly favorable outcomes. The optimization of the communication protocol was instrumental in enhancing data transmission efficiency and reliability, thereby contributing to an improved user experience during the charging process. Simultaneously, the reduction in energy costs underscores the exceptional sustainability of our protocol. Consequently, our protocol guarantees secure charging and exhibits enhanced adaptability and sustainability.",
      "published": "2023-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tce.2023.3338818",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chien‐Ming Chen",
        "Qingkai Miao",
        "Fazlullah Khan",
        "Gautam Srivastava",
        "Saru Kumari"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tce.2023.3338818",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tce.2025.3634753",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adaptive Federated Reinforcement Learning With Temporal Hybrid Deep Model for Consumer Internet of Vehicles Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Consumer devices that are integrated into the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) systems are becoming more susceptible to the sophisticated intrusion attacks, which are a major threat to user safety and the overall integrity of the system. Federated Learning (FL) has been a prominent technique for collaborative training models while maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information. In addition, conventional FL-based IDS approaches have problems to handle non-identical IID (IID) data distributions across clients, and usually use a fixed aggregation method like FedAvg and FedProx, which has poor adaptability to changeable client behaviors. To tackle these limitations, this research proposes an adaptive federated learning framework by preprocessing IoVs network traffic through standardization and IID (independent and identical distributed) distribution of data among clients. A Temporal Hybrid Deep Model (CNN-LSTM-Attention) is trained on each client locally (starting from the global model). After training, client models and performance metrics are updated to a central server, where a Reinforcement Learning (RL) agent based on Deep Q-Network (DQN) optimally decides aggregation weights based on client Q-values, which maximizes global accuracy as a reward. Iterative aggregation greatly improves intrusion detection performance, with detection accuracies of 99.85% and 95.18% on the benchmark datasets CICIOV2024 and CICEVSE2024, respectively. The proposed method makes it possible to develop a lightweight, edge-deployable intrusion detection system for consumer IoV device like telematics and electric car chargers. By leveraging federated learning, the approach provides real-time, privacy-preserving protection.",
      "published": "2025-11-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tce.2025.3634753",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hamad Naeem",
        "Amjad Alsirhani",
        "Faeiz Alserhani",
        "Maha M. Althobaiti",
        "Eatedal A. Alabdulkreem"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tce.2025.3634753",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tce.2026.3720706",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware-Assisted Mutual Authentication and Decentralized Trust Management for Secure V2X Communication",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication has become the foundation of intelligent transportation systems. It provides cooperative driving and real-time safety applications, and is also key to traffic optimisation. However, the considerable openness and dynamic topology of vehicular networks raise a lot of security and privacy issues, including replay attacks, impersonation and long-term key compromise. This work presents a hardware-assisted mutual authentication framework that combines Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) with a blockchain-based smart contract for decentralized credential management between vehicles and RSUs. Our proposed protocol implements a two-tier verification strategy, combining both timestamp-based freshness and on-chain historical validation and employs periodic pseudonym rotation to achieve forward secrecy and unlinkability. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme has an end-to-end authentication latency of 21.4 ms and a communication overhead of 3 messages and a total payload of 1408 bits, thus showing competitive performance among schemes that provide mutual authentication, pseudonym rotation, and decentralized credential management under the considered threat model. Together, these results show the feasibility of combining hardware-based trust with decentralized blockchain governance to realize scalable, privacy-preserving and tamper-resistant authentication for next-generation V2X environments. The proposed framework is directly applicable to consumer-grade V2X devices, including smartphone-connected OBUs, in-vehicle infotainment systems, and aftermarket connected-vehicle dongles, that require strong authentication without custom cryptographic co-processors.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tce.2026.3720706",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emmanuel Thangiah",
        "Shubh Singhvi",
        "Vinay Chamola",
        "Fei Richard Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tce.2026.3720706",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tce.2026.3738403",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AG-TARA: Attack Graph-Enhanced Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment for Consumer-Grade Connected Vehicles Using Graph Neural Networks and Explainable AI",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous consumer vehicles face escalating cybersecurity threats as their attack surfaces expand through Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication, over-the-air (OTA) updates, and complex electronic architectures. Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA), mandated by ISO/SAE 21434, is essential for systematic threat mitigation, yet many automated TARA pipelines still rely on tree-structured threat models that fail to capture shared attack paths, on rule-based or LLM-driven reasoning without graph-structural learning, and on black-box risk scoring that lacks the traceability expected for safety-critical systems. Attack-graph–based automotive TARA has been studied for more than a decade (e.g., MulVAL, CarVal, GAPP, THREATGET); our contribution is not to introduce attack graphs to this area, but to integrateunifiedgraph construction, multi-task Graph Attention Network (GAT) inference, and a layered explanation mechanism into a single learnable pipeline. In this paper, we propose AG-TARA, which combines attack graph modeling, Graph Attention Networks (GAT), and a three-level explainable AI architecture for automotive cybersecurity assessment: it first constructs a unified attack graph from vehicle configuration data, vulnerability databases, and standardized attack pattern repositories to enable node sharing and edge reuse across threat scenarios; a multi-head GAT-based risk inference engine then learns structural attack patterns for simultaneous node risk classification and attack path prediction; finally, a three-level explainability architecture combining attention weight visualization, GNNExplainer-based feature attribution, and attack path contribution analysis provides traceable risk explanations aligned with the auditability principles of ISO/SAE 21434. Extensive experiments on a real-world automotive cybersecurity dataset demonstrate that AG-TARA achieves 82.35% accuracy and 0.8367 Macro-F1 in risk classification and 0.9873 AUC in attack path prediction, matching or exceeding state-of-the-art GNN and LLM-based baselines while reducing per-scenario analysis time by over 97% compared to LLM-agent methods. We additionally outline a federated AG-TARA deployment mode and report a small-scale FedAvg experiment as a preliminary validation; full federated deployment remains future work.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tce.2026.3738403",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Baozhan Chen",
        "S S Chen",
        "Yun Cong Lu",
        "Tianyi Feng",
        "Huan Ma",
        "Yunkai Zhai",
        "Dalong Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tce.2026.3738403",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3839,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tce.2026.3738403 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: patterns, extensive, without, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tcsvt.2025.3525725",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Unified Framework for Adversarial Patch Attacks Against Visual 3D Object Detection in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "The rapid development of vision-based 3D perceptions, in conjunction with the inherent vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples, motivates us to investigate realistic adversarial attacks for the 3D detection models in autonomous driving scenarios. Due to the perspective transformation from 3D space to the image and object occlusion, current 2D image attacks are difficult to generalize to 3D detectors and are limited by physical feasibility. In this work, we propose a unified framework to generate physically printable adversarial patches with different attack goals: 1)instance-level hiding—pasting the learned patches to any target vehicle allows it to evade the detection process; 2)scene-level creating—placing the adversarial patch in the scene induces the detector to perceive plenty of fake objects. Both crafted patches areuniversal, which can take effect across a wide range of objects and scenes. To achieve above attacks, we first introduce the differentiable image-3D rendering algorithm that makes it possible to learn a patch located in 3D space. Then, two novel designs are devised to promote effective learning of patch content: 1) a Sparse Object Sampling Strategy is proposed to ensure that the rendered patches follow the perspective criterion and avoid being occluded during training, and 2) a Patch-Oriented Adversarial Optimization is used to facilitate the learning process focused on the patch areas. Both digital and physical-world experiments are conducted and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approaches, revealing potential threats when confronted with malicious attacks. We also investigate the defense strategy using adversarial augmentation to further improve the model’s robustness.",
      "published": "2025-01-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tcsvt.2025.3525725",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jian Wang",
        "Fan Li",
        "Lijun He"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tcsvt.2025.3525725",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/td47997.2024.10556091",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigating Cyberattacks Against Off-Grid Solar-Powered Electric Vehicle Charging Stations",
      "description": "The rapid installation of charging stations is imperative to facilitate the transition to decarbonization of the transport sector and cope with the booming sales of electric vehicles (EVs) in recent years. Yet, the installation of charging stations requires capital intensive and time-consuming network reinforcement investments. The installation of off-grid EV charging stations can be considered as a viable solution to address this challenge in locations where the electric grid is not nearby, or the required investments to upgrade the grid is expensive Solar generation, a battery energy storage system (BESS) and an energy management system (EMS) can be incorporated into EV charging stations to realize off-grid solar-powered EV charging stations. The incorporation of solar generation, a BESS and an EMS transforms the EV charging station into a complex cyber-physical system which is prone to various cyberattacks. In this paper, we investigate vulnerability of off-grid solar-powered EV charging stations to cyberattacks. We demonstrate an attacker can compromise the measurements and control commands in an off-grid solar-powered EV charging station to force the charging station out of service.",
      "published": "2024-05-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/td47997.2024.10556091",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samaneh Yazdanipour",
        "F. M. Arani",
        "Amir Abiri Jahromi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/td47997.2024.10556091",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdc.2018.8440380",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Signature Blockchain Infrastructure: Facilitating NERC CIP Compliance and Responding to Evolving Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities to Energy Infrastructure",
      "description": "The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires secure, reliable and trustworthy energy delivery systems. Grid modernization has increased the speed and size of data sets exchanged on these systems. Exasperating the challenge is these systems are increasingly distributed creating new data fidelity and interoperability challenges for grid operators struggling to balance and incorporate distributed energy resources. Blockchain technology provides an atomically verifiable cryptographic signature to help increase the trustworthiness of energy delivery systems at the grid's edge. This is especially important as distribution level as energy delivery systems and field devices have increasing operational and security requirements that are often diametrically opposed: as data, speed and analytic requirements increase, security and functionality requirements increase, as the grid's edge incorporate distributed energy resources and transacts in real time, availability is prioritized over the integrity and confidentially of that data. This paper explores how a keyless signature blockchain infrastructure (KSBI) technology may help facilitate NERC CIP compliance and securing critical energy infrastructure from evolving cyber threats and vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2018-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdc.2018.8440380",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael Mylrea",
        "Sri Nikhil Gupta Gourisetti",
        "Randy Bishop",
        "Matt Johnson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdc.2018.8440380",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdmr.2022.3157000",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EXT-TAURUM P2T: An Extended Secure CAN-FD Architecture for Road Vehicles",
      "description": "The automobile industry is no longer relying on pure mechanical systems; instead, it benefits from advanced Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in order to provide new and complex functionalities in the effort to move toward fully connected cars. However, connected cars provide a dangerous playground for hackers. Vehicles are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks as they come equipped with more connected features and control systems. This situation may expose strategic assets in the automotive value chain. In this scenario, the Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most widely used communication protocol in the automotive domain. However, this protocol lacks encryption and authentication. Consequently, any malicious/hijacked node can cause catastrophic accidents and financial loss. Starting from the analysis of the vulnerability connected to the CAN communication protocol in the automotive domain, this paper proposes EXT-TAURUM P2T a new low-cost secure CAN-FD architecture for the automotive domain implementing secure communication among ECUs, a novel key provisioning strategy, intelligent throughput management, and hardware signature mechanisms. The proposed architecture has been implemented, resorting to a commercial Multi-Protocol Vehicle Interface module, and the obtained results experimentally demonstrate the approach’s feasibility.",
      "published": "2021-12-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdmr.2022.3157000",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "connected cars",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Franco Oberti",
        "Alessandro Savino",
        "Ernesto Sánchez",
        "Filippo Parisi",
        "Stefano Di Carlo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Device and Materials Reliability",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdmr.2022.3157000",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdsc.2018.2883057",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Evaluation of a Reconfigurable ECU Architecture for Secure and Dependable Automotive CPS",
      "description": "The next generation of automobiles integrate a multitude of electronic control units (ECUs) to implement various automotive control and infotainment applications. However, recent works have demonstrated that these pervasively computerized modern automobiles are susceptible to security attacks that could compromise the physical safety of the driver and/or passengers. In this paper, we propose a novel ECU architecture for automotive cyber-physical systems (CPS) that simultaneously integrates both security and dependability primitives in the design with negligible performance, energy, and resources overhead. We implement our proposed ECU architecture on Xilinx Automotive (XA) Spartan-6 FPGA. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed architecture using a steer-by-wire (SBW) application over controller area network (CAN) with flexible data rate (CAN FD) as a case study. We also optimize and implement a prior secure and dependable automotive work on NXP quad-core iMX6Q SABRE automotive board. We quantify the performance, energy, and error resilience of our proposed architecture for the SBW case study. Results reveal that our proposed architecture can attain a speedup of 47.9× while consuming 2.4× lesser energy than the optimized SABRE board implementation of security and dependability primitives. We further perform a comparative analysis of prior designs and the proposed ECU architecture for different in-vehicle networks, viz., CAN, CAN FD, and FlexRay. Results verify the feasibility as well as the superiority of the proposed ECU over other prior designs in terms of response time, energy efficiency, and error resilience.",
      "published": "2018-11-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2018.2883057",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "resilience",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bikash Poudel",
        "Arslan Munir"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdsc.2018.2883057",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdsc.2020.2990192",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Performance of Detecting Injection of Fabricated Messages into the CAN Bus",
      "description": "There have been several public demonstrations of attacks on connected vehicles showing the ability of an attacker to take control of a targeted vehicle by injecting messages into their Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. In this article, using injected speed reading and Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) reading messages in in-motion vehicle, we examine the ability of the Pearson correlation and the unsupervised learning methods k-means clustering and Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to differentiate ’no-attack’ and ’under-attack’ states of the given vehicle. We found that the Pearson correlation distinguishes the two states, the k-means clustering method has an acceptable accuracy but high false positive rate and HMM detects attacks with acceptable detection rate but has a high false positive in detecting attacks from speed readings when there is no attack. The accuracy of these unsupervised learning methods are comparable to the ones of the supervised learning methods used by CAN bus Intrusion Detection System (IDS) suppliers. In addition, the article shows that studying CAN anomaly detection techniques using off-vehicle test facilities may not properly evaluate the performance of the detection techniques. The results suggest using other features besides the data content of the CAN messages and integrate knowledge about how the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) collaborate in building effective techniques for the detection of injection of fabricated message attacks.",
      "published": "2020-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2020.2990192",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lotfi ben Othmane",
        "Lalitha Dhulipala",
        "Moataz Abdelkhalek",
        "Nicholas J. Multari",
        "Manimaran Govindarasu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdsc.2020.2990192",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4711,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tdsc.2020.2990192 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: targeted, ability, vehicle., there, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdsc.2023.3345406",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Provably Secure and Efficient Cryptographic-Key Update Protocol for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Wireless broadcast transmission technology enables vehicles to communicate with other nearby vehicles and with nearby fixed equipment. Vehicles and equipment within transmission range establish a self-organizing network called Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET). The communication in VANETs is vulnerable to message manipulation attacks. Thus, mechanisms should be applied to ensure both the authenticity and integrity of the data broadcast. Any cryptographic technique employed for authentication requires the use of a cryptographic key, and mechanisms to restore the system quickly when either long-term and short-term cryptographic keying material are leaked or expired. Such mechanisms must be carefully designed to satisfy both perfect-forward-secrecy and security against known-key attacks. To achieve this, there should be no direct dependencies among keying material. Unfortunately, many existing proposals for authentication are not fully effective in VANETs, since many of them do not take a key-management mechanism into consideration or they fail to satisfy the requirements for secure key-update. In this paper, we first present a case study demonstrating that dependency among keying material is an exploitable vulnerability that violates perfect-forward-secrecy, and results in known-key attacks and message forgery attacks. Secondly, we propose a new cryptographic-key update protocol that consists of two sub-protocols: a long-term-key update protocol (for updating the long-term cryptographic keying material) and a short-term-key update protocol (for session-key establishment). Our scheme is accompanied by both security and efficiency analysis: we provide a formal security proof and demonstrate efficiency by conducting extensive performance analysis. This is compared with the security and efficiency of existing schemes in public literature.",
      "published": "2023-12-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2023.3345406",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mir Ali Rezazadeh Baee",
        "Leonie Ruth Simpson",
        "Xavier Boyen",
        "Ernest Foo",
        "Josef Pieprzyk"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdsc.2023.3345406",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3926,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tdsc.2023.3345406 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: dependency, direct, requires, extensive, case, there, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdsc.2025.3564278",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MISP: An Efficient Quantum-Resistant Misbehavior Preventing Scheme With Self-Enforcement for Vehicle-to-Everything",
      "description": "In the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication system, the presence of ambiguous warnings significantly increases the risk of severe accidents, posing a substantial threat to the safety of autonomous driving. It is crucial to detect such confusing warnings to avoid danger. Existing solutions to address this issue heavily rely on trust entities or are constructed based on number theory assumptions, leading to low efficiency and vulnerability to quantum attacks. In this paper, we leverage the double authentication-preventing signature scheme (DAPS) to present a revocable identity-based double-authentication preventing signature scheme (RIDAPS) and provides an instantiation from lattice. Furthermore, we propose a post-quantum secure misbehavior preventing scheme (Misp) based on our RIDAPS scheme. We give a detailed proof in the random oracle model (ROM) to demonstrate that our contribution achieves security requirements. Additionally, the efficiency evaluation results demonstrate that our scheme is suitable to be applied in V2X.",
      "published": "2025-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2025.3564278",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ying Chen",
        "Debiao He",
        "Zijian Bao",
        "Huaqun Wang",
        "Min Luo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdsc.2025.3564278",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdsc.2025.3596516",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANLP: Intrusion Detection for Controller Area Networks Using Natural Language Processing and Embedded Machine Learning",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the most widely used standard in the automotive industry for in-vehicle networks. However, the CAN protocol lacks essential security features such as encryption and message authentication. Absence of such security features has been shown to make the vehicle network vulnerable to exploits by an adversary. Although multiple types of intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been developed for CAN, it can be difficult to deploy them in real-time with low latency. Further, many of these IDSs are unable to isolate specific CAN frames on which an attack has been mounted, which makes it challenging to design defense mechanisms. In this paper, we develop CANLP, a Natural Language Processing (NLP)-based intrusion detection system to determine whether each transmitted message originated from a legitimate ECU or an adversary. CANLP uses Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), a NLP technique to discern complex features associated with CAN data and trains machine learning models to identify <italic>three types of attacks</italic>- fuzzing, spoofing, and masquerade. When an attack is detected, CANLP identifies the malicious CAN frame, which is important for developing resilient systems. Extensive experiments on 4 publicly available vehicle network datasets (which represent data collected from over three vehicle makes and four models) show that CANLP performs attack classification with high F1-scores of 0.9974. We also show that CANLP can be deployed for attack detection on resource-constrained hardware through implementation using RaspberryPi and experiments on a testbed with latency as low as <inline-formula><tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\">$< \\text{0.05}~ms$</tex-math><alternatives><mml:math><mml:mrow><mml:mo><</mml:mo><mml:mtext>0.05</mml:mtext><mml:mspace width=\"3.33333pt\"/><mml:mi>m</mml:mi><mml:mi>s</mml:mi></mml:mrow></mml:math><inline-graphic xlink:href=\"ramasubramanian-ieq1-3596516.gif\"/></alternatives></inline-formula>, making it suitable for real-world automotive applications such as fleet monitoring within the same vehicle class.",
      "published": "2025-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2025.3596516",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kavya Balasubramanian",
        "Adithya Gowda Baragur",
        "Denis Donadel",
        "Dinuka Sahabandu",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Bhaskar Ramasubramanian",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdsc.2025.3596516",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdsc.2025.3646041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LigSecOTA: Lightweight Over-the-Air (OTA) Software Updates With Integrated Security",
      "description": "Over-The-Air (OTA) software updates are widely used in automotive embedded systems to remotely address software defects and vulnerabilities. However, the distribution of software packages is vulnerable to malicious attacks, posing severe security threats. Various cryptographic algorithms are used to secure automotive OTA software updates. However, existing secure OTA software updates rely on digital certificates for identity authentication. These digital certificates are often provided by third-party Certificate Authorities (CAs) and issued based on physical identifiers (e.g., Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), engine number, or Electronic Control Unit-ID (ECU-ID)), which are susceptible to illegal modification. Additionally, these secure OTA software updates fail to provide integrated security that encompasses authentication, confidentiality, integrity, access control, and data freshness. To tackle these existing drawbacks, we propose LigSecOTA, a lightweight OTA software update with integrated security based on a one-machine-one-certificate digital identity management system. The one-machine-one-certificate digital identity management system issues a unique and trusted digital certificate for each ECU based on bit time information instead of physical identifiers; these certificates are then used for ECU authentication. LigSecOTA ensures integrated security, including authentication, confidentiality, integrity, access control, and data freshness, through three processes: authentication, authorization, and package distribution. The authorization dy namically provides keys for the package distribution, significantly enhancing security. The security attributes of LigSecOTA are formally verified using the ProVerif tool. Finally, we evaluate LigSecOTA on the NXP LS1028A platform with an ARM Cortex A72 core. Experimental results demonstrate that LigSecOTA outperforms state-of-the-art secure OTA software updates in terms of computation and communication overhead, highlighting its lightweight nature.",
      "published": "2025-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2025.3646041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ruiqi Lu",
        "Guoqi Xie",
        "Lida Huang",
        "Xinzhong Liu",
        "Wei Xu",
        "Jianmei Lei",
        "Junqiang Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdsc.2025.3646041",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tdsc.2026.3737210",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "It Takes Two to Tango: Exposing Interoperability Oriented Vulnerabilities in EV Charging",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen rapid adoption, but their expansion is constrained by limited interoperability, namely the ability of an EV to charge seamlessly across stations. Interoperability defects pose not only functional challenges but also security risks, as they can be exploited by attackers to trigger incidents such as privacy leakage and denial-of-service attacks. However, systematically uncovering these interoperability vulnerabilities remains challenging. A common approach is protocol fuzzing, but our analysis finds that it has a high false positive rate and cannot cover most vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present TANGOFUZZ, the first fuzzing framework tailored for discovering interoperability oriented vulnerabilities (IOVs), including a physical emulator. To achieve this, TANGOFUZZ addresses two challenges. First, identify interoperability bugs as attack entry points by modeling realistic behaviors and finding interoperability-critical categories in specifications. We use collected packets and three critical categories to infer real behaviors. Second, escalate bugs to IOVs by analyzing security implications. We define state-specific metrics to indicate security implications. Our experiments demonstrate that TANGOFUZZ achieves 100% state coverage, exceeding AFLNet, Snipuzz and ChatAFL by 62%, 62% and 56%, respectively. Additionally, TANGOFUZZ discovers 15 interoperability bugs, of which 5 can be escalated to IOVs, and another 5 have been confirmed by vendors of charging stations.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2026.3737210",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Enze Dai",
        "Xian Li",
        "Zongyu Ling",
        "Xiaogang Zhu",
        "Xi Xiao",
        "Tianqing Zhu",
        "Sheng Wen",
        "Yang Xiang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tdsc.2026.3737210",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/telecom59629.2023.10409753",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Twin Management Systems – challenges, application, development",
      "description": "Digital twin technology has come into use in recent years and is generally the creation of a virtual copy of a physical system. This virtual copy is created by combining data received from multiple sensors, IoT devices. The resulting information is processed using machine learning algorithms to create an accurate model of the actual physical system. The application of the Digital Twin is increasingly widespread, often being used for product design, manufacturing optimization, productivity enhancement, urban planning and cybersecurity. The potential use of the Digital Blinker in the aerospace and automotive industries is revolutionary, as it is possible to simulate the operation of an engine or other component to improve its efficiency and reliability.",
      "published": "2023-11-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/telecom59629.2023.10409753",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ivan Stefanov Stankov",
        "Varbinka Stefanova-Stoyanova"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/telecom59629.2023.10409753",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/telfor63250.2024.10819049",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Decentralized Identities for Enhanced Security in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)",
      "description": "The rise of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) enhances road safety and traffic management but introduces security vulnerabilities like impersonation and data tampering. Traditional identity management systems such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are limited by their reliance on centralized authorities. This paper proposes a decentralized framework using Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), Verifiable Credentials (VCs), and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), integrating Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to secure identity management in V2X systems. The proposed framework achieves robust authentication, mitigates centralization risks, and enables privacy-preserving mechanisms, demonstrating enhanced scalability and resilience against attacks in V2X communication.",
      "published": "2024-11-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/telfor63250.2024.10819049",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ana Kovačević",
        "Nenad Gligorić",
        "S. Jokić"
      ],
      "venue": "Telecommunications Forum (TELFOR)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/telfor63250.2024.10819049",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/telfor67910.2025.11314224",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Applying Multi-Agent LLMS to Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment in Automotive Security",
      "description": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) is essential for identifying threats and managing risks, but is often resource-intensive due to manual steps, expert involvement, and iterative revisions. To address this, we propose an automated TARA framework using LLM agents that generate threat scenarios, derive cybersecurity goals and requirements, and refine them through a writer-reviewer loop. The proof of concept, demonstrated on a keyless entry system, produces structured JSON artifacts, ensuring traceability and supporting compliance-driven cybersecurity engineering in automotive systems.",
      "published": "2025-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/telfor67910.2025.11314224",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "keyless",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anja Obradov",
        "Bogdan Pavković",
        "Dimitrije Stojanović",
        "Nenad B. Cetic"
      ],
      "venue": "Telecommunications Forum (TELFOR)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/telfor67910.2025.11314224",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/temc.2016.2570303",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability of Remote Keyless-Entry Systems Against Pulsed Electromagnetic Interference and Possible Improvements",
      "description": "Remote keyless-entry systems are systems that are widely used to control access to vehicles or buildings. The system is increasingly secured against hacking attacks by use of encryption and code algorithms. However, there are effective hacker attacks that rely on jamming the wireless link from the key fob to the receiver, while the attacker is able to receive the signal from the key fob. In this paper, we show that typical envelope receivers that are often used in remote keyless-entry systems are highly vulnerable to pulsed interference as compared to continuous interference. The effects of pulsed interference on envelope detectors are analyzed through both simulations and measurements. An improved receiver design would use synchronous receivers instead, which are not very sensitive against pulsed interference.",
      "published": "2016-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/temc.2016.2570303",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "hacking",
        "key fob",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefan van de Beek",
        "Frank B. J. Leferink"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/temc.2016.2570303",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tetc.2021.3050733",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SHARKS: Smart Hacking Approaches for RisK Scanning in Internet-of-Things and Cyber-Physical Systems based on Machine learning",
      "description": "Cyber-physical systems (CPS) and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are increasingly being deployed across multiple functionalities. These devices are inherently insecure across their comprehensive software, hardware, and network stacks, thus presenting a large attack surface that can be exploited by hackers. In this article, we present an innovative technique for detecting unknown system vulnerabilities, manage associated vulnerabilities, and improve incident response when such vulnerabilities are exploited. The novelty of this approach lies in extracting intelligence from known real-world CPS/IoT attacks, representing them in the form of regular expressions, and employing machine learning (ML) techniques on this ensemble of regular expressions to generate new attack vectors and security vulnerabilities. Our results show that 10 new attack vectors and 122 new vulnerability exploits can be successfully generated that have the potential to exploit a CPS or an IoT ecosystem. The ML methodology achieves an accuracy of 97.4% and enables us to predict these attacks efficiently with an 87.2% reduction in the search space. We demonstrate the application of our method to the hacking of the in-vehicle network of a connected car. To defend against the known attacks and possible novel exploits, we discuss a defense mechanism for various classes of attacks.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tetc.2021.3050733",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected car",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tanujay Saha",
        "Najwa Aaraj",
        "Neel Ajjarapu",
        "Niraj Kumar Jha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tetc.2021.3050733",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 47,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tfuzz.2025.3597276",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Event Triggered Lane Keeping Security Control for Autonomous Vehicle Under DoS Attacks",
      "description": "This article addresses the issue of networked lane keeping security control for autonomous vehicles subject to aperiodic controller-targeted denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, taking into account time-varying driving speed and nonlinear tire cornering stiffness. To accurately estimate the incompletely measured states and capture the dynamic behaviors appearing at the end of aperiodic DoS attacks, full state gain adjustable switching observer is established for the fuzzy vehicle-road integrated dynamic systems obtained via the tensor product model transformation method. In order to ensure the control quality and simultaneously save the communication resource, new resilient adaptive event-triggered scheme is proposed with a reinforcement learning-based intelligent optimal threshold regulation mechanism based on observed states. Then, an augmented observer-based fuzzy switching system is constructed using the time delay method. In addition, sufficient conditions are established to guarantee global exponential stability of the closed-loop nonlinear lane keeping system with prescribed H∞ performance using a piecewise Lyapunov functional analysis approach. Subsequently, the gains for controller, observer, and trigger are co-designed and computed by solving certain matrix inequalities. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed security control method is demonstrated through typical maneuver scenario in terms of reasonable triggered times, better tracking performances and acceptable lateral dynamics.",
      "published": "2025-08-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tfuzz.2025.3597276",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fei Ding",
        "Zuoyu Liu",
        "Yafei Wang",
        "Jie Liu",
        "Chongfeng Wei",
        "Anh‐Tu Nguyen",
        "Ningsha Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tfuzz.2025.3597276",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 106,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tgcn.2022.3188674",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Aiden: Association-Learning-Based Attack Identification on the Edge of V2X Communication Networks",
      "description": "In vehicle security, attack identification has been proposed to identify the compromised electronic control units (ECUs) of a vehicle. Fingerprinting methods using a variety of features have been widely applied to identify attacks. However, these methods only consider the features of an individual ECU, and ignore the logical association among different ECUs. This condition leads to high requirements in terms of feature measurements, and a great deal of useful information is lost to achieve identification. In this paper, an association-learning-based model, designated Aiden, is proposed to identify the compromised ECUs on the edge of V2X communication networks and without feature measurements. Experiments on a real vehicle show the effectiveness of the proposed model.",
      "published": "2022-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tgcn.2022.3188674",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuanfang Chen",
        "Muhammad Alam",
        "Shahid Mumtaz"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Green Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tgcn.2022.3188674",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tgrs.2023.3292372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVAA—Exchange Vanishing Adversarial Attack on LiDAR Point Clouds in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "In addition to RGB camera sensors, LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) plays an important role in autonomous vehicles (AVs) to perceive their surroundings. Deep neural networks (DNNs) are able to achieve cutting-edge 3D object detection and segmentation performance using LiDAR point clouds. LiDAR-enabled autonomous vehicles provide human perception by segmenting LiDAR point clouds into meaningful regions and providing semantic context to the AV user. However, the generation of point clouds to provide semantic segmentation in AVs is not reliable and secure, which may result in traffic accidents. We propose a novel adversarial attack against LiDAR point clouds in autonomous vehicles in this paper. We devised an exchange vanishing adversarial attack (EVAA) to deceive LiDAR point clouds by introducing targeted noise on specific objects (e.g., vehicles and driveways). On two autonomous driving datasets with 3D object annotations, NuScenes and PandaSet, we evaluate the performance of our proposed attack framework. We achieve an attack success rate (ASR) of ≈63% and ASR of ≈29% on both NuScenes and PandaSet datasets, respectively.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tgrs.2023.3292372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chalavadi Vishnu",
        "Jayesh Khandelwal",
        "Chalavadi Krishna Mohan",
        "Linga Reddy Cenkeramaddi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tgrs.2023.3292372",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 92,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ths.2017.7943477",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing wireless communications of connected vehicles with artificial intelligence",
      "description": "This work applies artificial intelligence (AI) to secure wireless communications of Connected Vehicles. Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) facilitates exchange of safety messages for collision avoidance, leading to self-driving cars. An AI system continuously learns to augment its ability in discerning and recognizing its surroundings. Such ability plays a vital role in evaluating the authenticity and integrity of safety messages for cars driven by computers. Falsification of meter readings, disablement of brake function, and other unauthorized controls by spoofed messages injected into VANET emerge as security threats. Countermeasures must be considered at design stage, as opposed to afterthought patches, effectively against cyber-attacks. However, current standards oversubscribe security measures by validating every message circulating among Connected Vehicles, making VANET subject to denial-of-service (DoS) Attacks. This interdisciplinary research shows promising results by searching the pivot point to balance between message authentication and DoS prevention, making security measures practical for the real-world deployment of Connected Vehicles. Message authentication adopts Context-Adaptive Signature Verification strategy, applying AI filters to reduce both communication and computation overhead. Combining OMNET++, a data network simulator, and SUMO, a road traffic simulator, with Veins, an open source framework for VANET simulation, the study evaluates AI filters comparatively under various attacking scenarios. The results lead to an effective design choice of securing wireless communications for Connected Vehicles.",
      "published": "2017-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ths.2017.7943477",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prinkle Sharma",
        "Hong Liu",
        "Honggang Wang",
        "Shelley Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/ths.2017.7943477",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tia.2020.2990096",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimal Electric Vehicle Charging Strategy With Markov Decision Process and Reinforcement Learning Technique",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have rapidly developed in recent years and their penetration has also significantly increased, which, however, brings new challenges to power systems. Due to their stochastic behaviors, the improper charging strategies for EVs may violate the voltage security region. To address this problem, an optimal EV charging strategy in a distribution network is proposed to maximize the profit of the distribution system operators while satisfying all the physical constraints. When dealing with the uncertainties from EVs, a Markov decision process model is built to characterize the time series of the uncertainties, and then the deep deterministic policy gradient based reinforcement learning technique is utilized to analyze the impact of uncertainties on the charging strategy. Finally, numerical results verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.",
      "published": "2020-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tia.2020.2990096",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tao Ding",
        "Ziyu Zeng",
        "Jiawen Bai",
        "Boyu Qin",
        "Yongheng Yang",
        "Mohammad Shahidehpour"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tia.2020.2990096",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 194,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tia.2020.3009906",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Retracted: An Evolutionary Deep Learning Anomaly Detection Framework for In-Vehicle Networks - CAN Bus",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are no longer considered as mere mechanical-based device, instead, they have been hugely replaced by sophisticated electric devices known as Electronic Control Unit (ECU). These ECUs are communicating with each other by publishing/receiving messages that complies with well-known protocol called Control Area Network (CAN). CAN bus is responsible to ensure all critical parts in vehicle e.g. engine, braking, airbag deployment, steering wheel, acceleration, etc. are functioning properly. This indicates that CAN bus is considered as the back-bone network protocol in modern vehicles. Unfortunately, the CAN bus protocol is vulnerable to various cyberattacks due to the lack of security mechanism in the protocol which has introduced several attack surfaces and allows attackers to have legitimate access to the bus and launch malicious activities. This paper proposes a new effective security solution that can detect three different types of message injected attacks namely Denial of Service (DoS), fuzzy, and impersonation attacks in the CAN traffic based on deep learning model. Moreover, the proposed method makes the use of evolutionary optimization algorithm to avoid premature convergence and manual selection of deep learning network architecture. To assess the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed method, CAN traffic is logged using unmodified license vehicle. Furthermore, the proposed method is evaluated using two other different CAN traffic dataset that proves the proposed method can be applied for different car make and models.",
      "published": "2020-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tia.2020.3009906",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yubin Lin",
        "Chengbin Chen",
        "Fen Xiao",
        "Omid Avatefipour",
        "Khalid Alsubhi",
        "Arda Yunianta"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tia.2020.3009906",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tia.2022.3184668",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ultra Super Fast Authentication Protocol for Electric Vehicle Charging Using Extended Chaotic Maps",
      "description": "Due to the explosive increase of electric vehicles (EVs) and universal charging stations (CS), achieving fast authentication is an important topic in the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) network at present. Fast authentication cannot only forcefully defend potential adversaries but also can greatly speed up the charging process between EVs and CSs. Although many researchers have realized this problem and proposed some lightweight cryptographic protocols for fast EV charging, desired security features are not entirely satisfied, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, and impersonation attacks. In this article, we propose an ultra super fast authentication protocol for EV charging by utilizing the characteristics of extended chaotic maps. Furthermore, in view of the unsolved security issues mentioned previously, our proposed protocol can provide elaborate solutions to eliminate these possible attacks in a provable manner. Finally, compared with the relevant authentication protocols for V2G network, the communication and computation costs of our protocol are decreased a lot.",
      "published": "2022-06-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tia.2022.3184668",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Weizheng Wang",
        "Zhaoyang Han",
        "Mamoun Alazab",
        "Thippa Reddy Gadekallu",
        "Xiaokang Zhou",
        "Chunhua Su"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tia.2022.3184668",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tia.2023.3240677",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Discussion of “Ultra Super Fast Authentication Protocol for Electric Vehicle Charging Using Extended Chaotic Maps”",
      "description": "Recently, Wang et al. proposed an ultra super fast authentication protocol for electric vehicle charging (IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, 2022, DOI: 10.1109/TIA.2022.3184668). The authors claimed that their protocol is secure and can resist known security attacks. However, in this comment paper, we demonstrate that their protocol is still vulnerable to session key leakage. In addition, we found that it has incorrect electric vehicle owner registration phase and mutual authentication and key agreement phase.",
      "published": "2023-01-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tia.2023.3240677",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chien‐Ming Chen",
        "Yiru Hao",
        "Tsu‐Yang Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tia.2023.3240677",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2015.2405891",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Optimality of Keyless Authentication in a Noisy Model",
      "description": "We further study the keyless authentication problem in a noisy model in our previous work, where no secret setup is available for sender Alice and receiver Bob while there is discrete memoryless channel (DMC) W1 from Alice to Bob and a two-way noiseless but insecure channel between them. We propose a construction such that the message length over DMC W1 does not depend on the size of the source space. If the source space is S and the number of channel W1 uses is n, then our protocol only has a round complexity of log* |S| - log* n + 4. In addition, we show that the round complexity of any secure protocol in our model is lower bounded by log* |S| - log* n - 5. We also obtain a lower bound on the success probability when the message size on DMC W1 is given. Finally, we derive the capacity for a noninteractive authentication protocol under general DMCs, which extends the result under Binary Symmetric Channels in our previous work.",
      "published": "2015-02-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2015.2405891",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaoquan Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2015.2405891",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2018.2812149",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VoltageIDS: Low-Level Communication Characteristics for Automotive Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "The proliferation of computerized functions aimed at enhancing drivers' safety and convenience has increased the number of vehicular attack surfaces accordingly. The fundamental vulnerability is caused by the fact that the controller area network protocol, a de facto standard for in-vehicle networks, does not support message origin authentication. Several methods to resolve this problem have been suggested. However, most of them require modification of the CAN protocol and have their own vulnerabilities. In this paper, we focus on securing in-vehicle CAN networks, proposing a novel automotive intrusion detection system (so-called VoltageIDS). The system leverages the inimitable characteristics of an electrical CAN signal as a fingerprint of the electronic control units. The noteworthy contributions are that VoltageIDS does not require any modification of the current system and has been validated on actual vehicles while driving on the road. VoltageIDS is also the first automotive intrusion detection system capable of distinguishing between errors and the bus-off attack. Our experimental results on a CAN bus prototype and on real vehicles show that VoltageIDS detects intrusions in the in-vehicle CAN network. Moreover, we evaluate VoltageIDS while a vehicle is moving.",
      "published": "2018-03-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2018.2812149",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Kyungho Joo",
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Moon Chan Park",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2018.2812149",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 314,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2018.2869351",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Intrusion Detection With Bloom Filtering in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Due to its cost efficiency, the controller area network (CAN) is still the most wide-spread in-vehicle bus, and the numerous reported attacks demonstrate the urgency in designing new security solutions for CAN. In this paper, we propose an intrusion detection mechanism that takes advantage of Bloom filtering to test frame periodicity based on message identifiers and parts of the data-field which facilitates detection of potential replay or modification attacks. This proves to be an effective approach since most of the traffic from in-vehicle buses is cyclic in nature and the format of the data-field is fixed due to rigid signal allocation. Bloom filters provide an efficient time-memory tradeoff which is beneficial for the constrained resources of automotive grade controllers. We test the correctness of our approach and obtain good results on an industry-standard CANoe-based simulation for a J1939 commercial-vehicle bus and also on CAN with flexible data-rate traces obtained from a real-world high-end vehicle. The proposed filtering mechanism is straightforward to adapt for any other time-triggered in-vehicle bus, e.g., FlexRay, since it is built on time-driven characteristics.",
      "published": "2018-09-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2018.2869351",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2018.2869351",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 113,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2018.2870826",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "READ: Reverse Engineering of Automotive Data Frames",
      "description": "Security analytics and forensics applied to in-vehicle networks are growing research areas that gained relevance after recent reports of cyber-attacks against unmodified licensed vehicles. However, the application of security analytics algorithms and tools to the automotive domain is hindered by the lack of public specifications about proprietary data exchanged over in-vehicle networks. Since the controller area network (CAN) bus is the de-facto standard for the interconnection of automotive electronic control units, the lack of public specifications for CAN messages is a key issue. This paper strives to solve this problem by proposing READ: a novel algorithm for the automatic Reverse Engineering of Automotive Data frames. READ has been designed to analyze traffic traces containing unknown CAN bus messages in order to automatically identify and label different types of signals encoded in the payload of their data frames. Experimental results based on CAN traffic gathered from a licensed unmodified vehicle and validated against its complete formal specifications demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can extract and classify more than twice the signals with respect to the previous related work. Moreover, the execution time of signal extraction and classification is reduced by two orders of magnitude. Applications of READ to CAN messages generated by real vehicles demonstrate its usefulness in the analysis of CAN traffic.",
      "published": "2018-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2018.2870826",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mirco Marchetti",
        "Dario Stabili"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2018.2870826",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 156,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2019.2895957",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Shape of the Cloak: Formal Analysis of Clock Skew-Based Intrusion Detection System in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "This paper presents a new masquerade attack called the cloaking attack and provides formal analyses for clock skew-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that detect masquerade attacks in the Controller Area Network (CAN) in automobiles. In the cloaking attack, the adversary manipulates the message inter-transmission times of spoofed messages by adding delays so as to emulate a desired clock skew and avoid detection. In order to predict and characterize the impact of the cloaking attack in terms of the attack success probability on a given CAN bus and IDS, we develop formal models for two clock skew-based IDSs, i.e., the state-of-the-art (SOTA) IDS and its adaptation to the widely used Network Time Protocol (NTP), using parameters of the attacker, the detector, and the hardware platform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides formal analyses of clock skew-based IDSs in automotive CAN. We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real vehicle (the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR), and demonstrate its effectiveness against both the SOTA and NTP-based IDSs. We validate our formal analyses through extensive experiments for different messages, IDS settings, and vehicles. By comparing each predicted attack success probability curve against its experimental curve, we find that the average prediction error is within 3.0% for the SOTA IDS and 5.7% for the NTP-based IDS.",
      "published": "2018-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2019.2895957",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuhang Ying",
        "Sang Uk Sagong",
        "Andrew Clark",
        "Linda G. Bushnell",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2019.2895957",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2020.2983285",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient Authentication Scheme for Intra-Vehicular Controller Area Network",
      "description": "Communication in modern cars is managed by a controller area network (CAN) bus protocol and its extensions for electronic control units (ECUs). The CAN bus is a preferred method for reliable real-time broadcast communication. However, unprotected CAN communications make the vehicles vulnerable to a variety of practical malicious wired/wireless attacks. In this work, we analyze the existing frame-level authentication protocol and identify weaknesses and limitations. To address this, we provide a protocol suite for entity authentication, key management, a secure message flow for remote transmission request frames and session key update to be applied for vehicle connection with external devices. We prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model and assess its resistance against known attacks. We formally verify the security of our protocol using the Tamarin tool. Our simulation results indicate that our protocol improves efficiency.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2020.2983285",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Basker Palaniswamy",
        "Seyit Ahmet Camtepe",
        "Ernest Foo",
        "Josef Pieprzyk"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2020.2983285",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 80,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2021.3069171",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Event-Triggered Interval-Based Anomaly Detection and Attack Identification Methods for an In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Vehicle communication technology has been steadily progressing alongside the convergence of the in-vehicle network (IVN) and wireless communication technology. The communication with various external networks further reinforces the connectivity between the inside and outside of a vehicle. However, this bears risks of malicious packet attacks on computer-assisted mechanical mechanisms that are capable of hijacking the vehicle's functions. The present study proposes a method to detect and identify abnormalities in vehicular networks based on the periodic event-triggered interval of the controller area network (CAN) messages. To this end, we first define four attack scenarios and then extract normal and abnormal driving data corresponding to these scenarios. Next, we analyze the CAN ID's event-triggered interval and measure statistical moments depending on the defined time-window. Finally, we conduct extensive evaluations of the proposed methods' performance by considering different attack scenarios and three types of machine learning models. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively detect an abnormality in the IVN, with up to 99% accuracy. Our results suggest that when tree-based machine learning models are used as the classifier, the proposed method of attack identification can achieve more than 94% accuracy.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2021.3069171",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mee Lan Han",
        "Byung Il Kwak",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2021.3069171",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2021.3087359",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Efficiency of Pairing-Based Authentication for Connected Vehicles: Time is Not on Our Side!",
      "description": "In the near future, intelligent vehicles will be connected via wireless communication links, forming Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs). This has potential to improve road safety and to optimize traffic. However, if the communications are not secure, VANETs are vulnerable to cyber attacks involving message manipulation. Research on this problem has produced multiple authentication protocols based on bilinear pairings (a variant of elliptic curve cryptography). The efficiency of such authentication schemes must be addressed before they can be used in real-world deployments. Standards bodies have begun standardizing various pairing-based schemes. The IEEE 1609.2 security standard has not yet selected any pairing-based scheme, leaving the settings related to pairing-based cryptography in the vehicular environments unspecified. In this work, we investigate the efficiency of pairing-based cryptographic primitives over the Barreto-Lynn-Scott and Barreto-Naehrig pairing friendly elliptic curves recommended in the IETF and ISO standards, to determine their suitability for practical application. We implement the algorithms and evaluate the effect of cryptographic pairings using theoretical and experimental analysis of four well-known pairing-based short signature schemes, including: Boneh-Lynn-Shacham, Boneh-Boyen, Zhang-Safavi-Susilo, and Boneh-Gentry-Lynn-Shacham. We use metrics including CPU clock cycles per operation, average computation time in milliseconds, and signature/public key size in bits to estimate the cost of implementing cryptographic pairings on modern processors. We demonstrate the effect of pairing-based cryptography on authentication in vehicular networks. We investigate a high-density highway scenario and show that a crash is possible, as a result of the evaluated authentication delay. We share our findings ahead of the IEEE 1609.2 recommendations for the use of cryptographic pairings.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2021.3087359",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mir Ali Rezazadeh Baee",
        "Leonie Ruth Simpson",
        "Xavier Boyen",
        "Ernest Foo",
        "Josef Pieprzyk"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2021.3087359",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2021.3098162",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of Message Injection Attacks Onto the CAN Bus Using Similarities of Successive Messages-Sequence Graphs",
      "description": "The smart features of modern cars are enabled by a number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) components that communicate through an in-vehicle network, known as Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. The fundamental challenge is the security of the communication link where an attacker can inject messages (e.g., increase the speed) that may impact the safety of the driver. Developing an effective defensive security solution depends on the knowledge of the identity of the ECUs, which is proprietary information. This paper proposes a message injection attack detection mechanism that is independent of the IDs of the ECUs, which is achieved by capturing the patterns in the message sequences. First, we represent the sequencing ofther messages in a given time-interval as a direct graph and compute the similarities of the successive graphs using the cosine similarity and Pearson correlation. Then, we apply threshold, change point detection, and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)-Recurrent NeuralNetwork (RNN) to detect and predict malicious message injections into the CAN bus. The evaluation of the methods using a dataset collected from a moving vehicle under malicious RPM and speed reading message injections show a detection accuracy of 98.45% when using LSTM-RNN and 97.32% when using a threshold method. Further, the pace of detecting the change isfast for the case of injection of RPM reading messagesbut slow for the case of injection of speed readingsmessages.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2021.3098162",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mubark Jedh",
        "Lotfi ben Othmane",
        "Noor O. Ahmed",
        "Bharat Bhargava"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2021.3098162",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2022.3152405",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EC-SVC: Secure CAN Bus In-Vehicle Communications With Fine-Grained Access Control Based on Edge Computing",
      "description": "In-vehicle communications are not designed for message exchange between the vehicles and outside systems originally. Thus, the security design of message protection is insufficient. Moreover, the internal devices do not have enough resources to process the additional security operations. Nonetheless, due to the characteristic of the in-vehicle network in which messages are broadcast, secure message transmission to specific receivers must be ensured. With consideration of the facts aforementioned, this work addresses resource problems by offloading secure operations to high-performance devices, and uses attribute-based access control to ensure the confidentiality of messages from attackers and unauthorized users. In addition, we reconfigure existing access control based cryptography to address new vulnerabilities arising from the use of edge computing and attribute-based access control. Thus, this paper proposes an edge computing-based security protocol with fine-grained attribute-based encryption using a hash function, symmetric-based cryptography, and reconfigured cryptographic scheme. In addition, this work formally proves the reconfigured cryptographic scheme and security protocol, and evaluates the feasibility of the proposed security protocol in various aspects using the CANoe software.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2022.3152405",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Donghyun Yu",
        "Ruei‐Hau Hsu",
        "Jemin Lee",
        "Sungjin Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2022.3152405",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2022.3217382",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Asymmetric Symbol and Skew Sender Identification for Automotive Networks",
      "description": "Over recent years, many vulnerabilities have been exposed in vehicles, whose probability of occurrence will rise in the future due to connectivity and increasing system complexity. Even more serious that the Controller Area Network (CAN), widely used by Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to exchange safety-critical messages within a vehicle, does not provide any security measures. In this context, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have recently been proposed that use time characteristics in the analog transmission signal to identify the sending ECU and detect unauthorized messages. However, realistic application of proposed approaches is not yet tangible, with the full potential of time-based systems yet to be determined. In this elaboration, we therefore establish a foundation by working out robust time characteristics first and analyze root causes for their variation between ECUs. Combining the results with insights from related research, we deduce properties which help to design reliable and feasible IDSs for CAN. Finally, we emphasize these properties by presenting ASSASSIN, an IDS that uses time characteristics to identify the sender of a CAN message and assess authenticity. Achieving an average detection rate of 99.02 %, real-time capable classification and an adaptability to temperature fluctuations, we demonstrate the potential of time-based IDSs on a prototype setup and a real vehicle using resource-limited hardware, also contrasting them with well-elaborated voltage-based IDSs.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2022.3217382",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Oleg Schell",
        "Claudio Oechsler",
        "Marcel Kneib"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2022.3217382",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2022.3221893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TOW-IDS: Intrusion Detection System Based on Three Overlapped Wavelets for Automotive Ethernet",
      "description": "Devices that ensure vehicle and driver safety or provide services to drivers generate a substantial amount of network traffic. The traffic is transmitted to the In-Vehicle Network (IVN) depending on the defined function. Consequently, to quickly process a lot of traffic transmitted to the IVN, an advanced network protocol such as Automotive Ethernet is necessary. However, owing to the connectivity reinforcement between devices inside a vehicle and external networks, attack vectors and vulnerabilities can be easily inherited from an established Ethernet to Automotive Ethernet. The present study proposes a method for detecting and identifying abnormalities in Automotive Ethernet based on wavelet transform and deep convolutional neural network. First, we define attack scenarios and extract normal and abnormal data corresponding to these scenarios. Second, we conduct several preprocesses, such as fixing the packet size and normalizing the network image data. Finally, we conduct extensive evaluations of the proposed method’s performance, considering the size of network image data and multi-resolution levels. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively detect an abnormality. Furthermore, the results suggest that the our method is more effective in terms of time-cost compared to default ResNet and EfficientNet methods.",
      "published": "2022-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2022.3221893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mee Lan Han",
        "Byung Il Kwak",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2022.3221893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 59,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2023.3240291",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated Graph Neural Network for Fast Anomaly Detection in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Due to the lack of CAN frame encryption and authentication, CAN bus is vulnerable to various attacks, which can in general be divided into message injection, suspension, and falsification. Existing CAN bus anomaly detection mechanisms either can only detect one or two of these attacks, or require numerous CAN messages during predictions, which can hardly realize real-time performance. In this paper, we propose a CAN bus anomaly detection system that can detect all these attacks simultaneously in as short as 3 milliseconds (ms) based on Graph Neural Network (GNN). This work generates directed attributed graphs based on CAN message streams in given message intervals. Node attributes denote data contents in CAN messages while each edge attribute represents the frequency of a typical CAN ID pair in the given interval. Afterwards, a GNN is trained based on generated CAN message graphs. Considering highly imbalanced training data, a two-stage classifier cascade is developed in this paper, which is composed of a one-class classifier for anomaly detection and a multi-class classifier for attack classification. An openmax layer is further introduced to the multi-class classifier to tackle new anomalies from unknown classes. To take advantage of crowdsourcing while protecting user data privacy, we adopt federated learning to train a universal model that covers different driving scenarios and vehicle states. Extensive experiment results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our methodology.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2023.3240291",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hengrun Zhang",
        "Kai Zeng",
        "Shuai Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2023.3240291",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 110,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2023.3297444",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-LOC: Spoofing Detection and Physical Intrusion Localization on an In-Vehicle CAN Bus Based on Deep Features of Voltage Signals",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is used for communication between in-vehicle devices. The CAN bus has been shown to be vulnerable to remote attacks. To harden vehicles against such attacks, vehicle manufacturers have divided in-vehicle networks into sub-networks, logically isolating critical devices. However, attackers may still have physical access to various sub-networks where they can connect a malicious device. This threat has not been adequately addressed, as methods proposed to determine physical intrusion points have shown weak results, emphasizing the need to develop more advanced techniques. To address this type of threat, we propose a security hardening system for in-vehicle networks. The proposed system includes two mechanisms that process deep features extracted from voltage signals measured on the CAN bus. The first mechanism uses data augmentation and deep learning to detect and locate physical intrusions when the vehicle starts; this mechanism can detect and locate intrusions, even when the connected malicious devices are silent. This mechanism's effectiveness (100% accuracy) is demonstrated in a wide variety of insertion scenarios on a CAN bus prototype. The second mechanism is a continuous device authentication mechanism, which is also based on deep learning; this mechanism's robustness (99.8% accuracy) is demonstrated on a real moving vehicle.",
      "published": "2021-06-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2023.3297444",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Efrat Levy",
        "Asaf Shabtai",
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay",
        "Yuval Elovici"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2023.3297444",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 44,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2023.3327026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IdentifierIDS: A Practical Voltage-Based Intrusion Detection System for Real In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "As innovative technologies such as autonomous driving, over-the-air technology, and vehicle-to-everything are widely applied to intelligent connected vehicles, people can gain a more convenient and safer driving experience. Although the application of these technologies facilitates our lives, they also bring a series of vulnerable interfaces (such as 5G, Bluetooth, and WiFi), which pose a significant security threat to existing in-vehicle networks. To address these threats, researchers have proposed two mainstream schemes, including message authentication and intrusion detection system (IDS), where the scheme of message authentication needs to occupy the limited bandwidth of controller area network (CAN) bus. Furthermore, most IDSs either cannot locate the sender of the attack, fail to detect aperiodic malicious frames, or require prior knowledge of which CAN identifiers (IDs) belong to which electronic control units (ECUs). To address these weaknesses, we propose a practical voltage-based IDS named IdentifierIDS for real in-vehicle networks. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first scheme to detect intrusions by establishing a voltage fingerprint for each ID without the need for prior knowledge. This allows IdentifierIDS to detect both periodic and aperiodic malicious frames without occupying the limited bandwidth of the CAN bus. As a self-learning IDS, it can adapt to different in-vehicle networks without the need for customization for them. Experiments on three real vehicles demonstrate the robustness of our scheme in different in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2023-10-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2023.3327026",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhouyan Deng",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Yijie Xun",
        "Junman Qin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2023.3327026",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3809,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tifs.2023.3327026 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: limited, where, without, significant, information, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2023.3329683",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Radio Frequency Fingerprint Identification Scheme for V2X Based on Temporal Correlation",
      "description": "Radio frequency fingerprinting identification (RFFI) is a promising physical layer authentication technique based on the inherent hardware defects of transmitters, yet there are bottlenecks in its application to vehicular networks. In this paper, we focus on the concerns of data dependency, channel effects, signal representation, and model efficiency to propose a lightweight RFFI scheme for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication based on temporal correlation. Specifically, modified gramian angular filed (MAGF) and Markov probability transition matrix with temporal dependency (MTTD) are proposed for signal representation to mine the temporal information related to device identity in terms of angular variation trajectory and first-order Markov transition probabilities, respectively. Due to the superiority of the proposed signal representation, paired with the customized pre-processing design, a lightweight feature extractor can achieve satisfactory RFFI performance in a very short time. We performed a comprehensive complexity analysis of existing models in the field and validated the proposed scheme using thirteen V2X devices in real wireless environments. In addition, the generalizability of the proposed pre-processing and representation method is demonstrated by testing on different deep learning models.",
      "published": "2023-11-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2023.3329683",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xinyu Qi",
        "Aiqun Hu",
        "Tianshu Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2023.3329683",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2024.3422920",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Stealthy and Effective Physical Adversarial Attacks in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "In autonomous assistance systems, accurate camera vision is indispensable for driving safety. Featuring this safety-critical scenario, physical adversarial examples are arguably the most threatening. However, existing physical adversarial attacks are either conspicuous or ineffective, leaving a dilemma for balancing between attack effectiveness and stealthiness. In this paper, we put forth a new type of adversarial patch attack, leveraging the behavior characteristic of high-speed shutters in autonomous driving cameras. Instead of deploying static images onto real-world objects, we embed adversarial examples into videos and cast them with projectors. By delicately deciding the frame contents and display frequencies, the adversarial frame contents are almost invisible to humans, but high-speed shutters can capture them (see our demos (https://anonymous.4open.science/r/7003)). We demonstrate the attack feasibility by fooling traffic sign detectors, altering speed limit signs to be mis-detected or undetected, and hence manipulating the driving speed of victims. We conduct extensive experiments under various conditions, confirming that our new attack is effective and robust: It can deceive state-of-the-art detector models with success rates of 99% and over 90% in untargeted and targeted manners, respectively. Our further investigations unravel the transferability of our attack to other detectors in a black-box setting.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2024.3422920",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Man Zhou",
        "Wenyu Zhou",
        "Jie Huang",
        "Junhui Yang",
        "Minxin Du",
        "Qi Lecky Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2024.3422920",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2025.3581117",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks Using Knowledge Distillation From BERT to CNN-BiLSTM",
      "description": "Under the development of intelligent transportation systems, In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) serve as a critical channel for both internal and external communications. However, the inherent complexity and diversity of data traffic present significant challenges for the detection of IVN anomalous flows. Meanwhile, the introduction of various novel technologies has introduced new security vulnerabilities to IVNs. These vulnerabilities significantly impact the security of IVNs and the accuracy of in-vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). To address these issues, this paper proposes a lightweight and efficient anomaly detection method based on knowledge distillation technology, termed Knowledge Distillation from BERT to CNN-BiLSTM (KDBC). Specifically, the KDBC distills the deep semantic knowledge from the BERT model into a more lightweight CNN-BiLSTM architecture, significantly reducing computational overhead and storage requirements without substantially compromising detection performance. Experimental results demonstrate that the KDBC model enhances both security and versatility, achieving superior detection accuracy in identifying abnormal attacks across diverse IVN data, including automotive Ethernet and CAN networks. Moreover, the KDBC model has been validated for its effectiveness and robustness in actual in-vehicle gateway environments, achieving an accuracy of over 0.98 and an F1 score greater than 0.98.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2025.3581117",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sifan Li",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Guojun Peng",
        "Meng Li",
        "Wei Sun",
        "Luan Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2025.3581117",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2025.3636019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Masquerade Attacks in Controller Area Networks Using Graph Machine Learning",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on a myriad of electronic control units (ECUs) interconnected via controller area networks (CANs) for critical operations. Despite their ubiquitous use and reliability, CANs are susceptible to sophisticated cyberattacks, particularly masquerade attacks, which inject false data that mimic legitimate messages at the expected frequency. These attacks pose severe risks such as unintended acceleration, brake deactivation, and rogue steering. Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) often struggle to detect these subtle intrusions due to their seamless integration into normal traffic. This paper introduces a novel framework for detecting masquerade attacks in the CAN bus using graph machine learning (ML). We hypothesize that the integration of shallow graph embeddings with time series features derived from CAN frames enhances the detection of masquerade attacks. We show that by representing CAN bus frames as message sequence graphs (MSGs) and enriching each node with contextual statistical attributes from time series, we can enhance detection capabilities across various attack patterns compared to using graph-based features only. Our method ensures a comprehensive and dynamic analysis of CAN frame interactions, improving robustness and efficiency. Extensive experiments on the ROAD dataset validate the effectiveness of our approach, demonstrating statistically significant improvements in the detection rates of masquerade attacks compared to a baseline that uses graph-based features only as confirmed by Mann-Whitney U and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests p < 0.05.",
      "published": "2024-08-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2025.3636019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "William Marfo",
        "Pablo Moriano",
        "Deepak K. Tosh",
        "Shirley V. Moore"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 20, pp. 13127-13142, 2025",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2025.3636019",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tifs.2026.3729511",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "3DGAA: Realistic and Robust 3D Gaussian-Based Adversarial Attack for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Camera-based perception in connected and autonomous vehicles remains exposed to physical adversarial attacks. Prior attacks often either optimize image-plane textures, weakening cross-view consistency, or rely on shape modifications that are difficult to fabricate and deploy. Both cases limit their value for security and safety assessment of camera-based perception. This paper introduces a fabrication-first framework that learns view-consistent, geometry-preserving adversarial wraps for vehicles. The method performs three-dimensional multi-view optimization with a 3D Gaussian splatting surrogate to enforce consistency under an expectation over viewpoint, illumination, and occlusion, while the final artifact is constrained to print-only textures that keep vehicle geometry unchanged. We evaluate the framework through matched CARLA simulations, controlled miniature-vehicle physical evidence, and tests on multiple modern detectors. The wraps produce substantial and stable reductions in detection confidence and average precision across views while maintaining perceptual realism. Ablation studies isolate the effects of physical filtering, physical augmentation, and shape-consistency regularization, while efficiency analyses report convergence time and memory profiles. Additional experiments report ASR, mIoU-based segmentation degradation, cross-detector transfer against physical attack baselines, perturbation-area fairness diagnostics, and robustness under common input preprocessing defenses. By coupling three-dimensional optimization with a geometry-preserving realization, the study supports a practical pathway to systematically stress-test camera perception in safety-critical autonomous driving systems and provides evidence that can inform defense design and evaluation protocols in information forensics and security.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2026.3729511",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yixun Zhang",
        "Lizhi Wang",
        "Junjun Zhao",
        "Wending Zhao",
        "Feng Zhou",
        "Yonghao Dang",
        "Jianqin Yin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tifs.2026.3729511",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2017.2776250",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient and Secure Automotive Wireless Software Update Framework",
      "description": "Future vehicles will be wirelessly connected to nearby vehicles, to the road infrastructure, and to the Internet, thereby becoming an integral part of the Internet of Things. New comfort features, safety functions, and a number of new vehicle-specific services will be integrated in future smart vehicles. These include a fast, secure, and reliable way to diagnose and reconfigure a vehicle, as well as the installation of new software (SW) on its integrated electronic control units (ECUs). Such wireless SW updates are beneficial for both automotive carmakers and customers, as they allow us to securely enable new features on the vehicle and to fix SW bugs by installing a new SW version over the air. A secure and dependable wireless SW update process is valuable in the entire lifetime of a modern vehicle as it can be used already during vehicle development and manufacturing process on the assembly line, as well as during vehicle maintenance in a service center. Additionally, future vehicles will allow us to remotely download up-to-date SW on the ECUs. To support this process over the entire vehicle's lifetime, a generic framework is needed. In this paper, SecUp, a generic framework enabling secure and efficient wireless automotive SW updates is proposed. SecUp utilizes IEEE 802.11s as wireless medium to interconnect vehicles and diagnostic devices in a dependable and fast way. Additionally, SecUp is enabling beneficial wireless SW update features such as parallel and partial SW updates to increase the efficiency, and comprises advanced security mechanisms to prevent abuse and attacks.",
      "published": "2017-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2017.2776250",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco Steger",
        "Carlo Alberto Boano",
        "Thomas Niedermayr",
        "Michael Karner",
        "Joachim Hillebrand",
        "Kay Römer",
        "Werner Rom"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2017.2776250",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2018.2879544",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recent Advances and Trends in On-Board Embedded and Networked Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Modern cars consist of a number of complex embedded and networked systems with steadily increasing requirements in terms of processing and communication resources. Novel automotive applications, such as automated driving, rise new needs and novel design challenges that cover a broad range of hardware/software engineering aspects. In this context, this paper provides an overview of the current technological challenges in on-board and networked automotive systems. This paper encompasses both the state-of-the-art design strategies and the upcoming hardware/software solutions for the next generation of automotive systems, with a special focus on embedded and networked technologies. In particular, this paper surveys current solutions and future trends on models and languages for automotive software development, on-board computational platforms, in-car network architectures and communication protocols, and novel design strategies for cybersecurity and functional safety.",
      "published": "2018-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2018.2879544",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lucia Lo Bello",
        "Riccardo Mariani",
        "Saad Mubeen",
        "Sergio Saponara"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2018.2879544",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 206,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2020.3011821",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Assessment of Cyber-Physical Security of Energy Management System for Connected and Automated Electric Vehicles",
      "description": "In this article, a systematic assessment of cyber-physical security on the energy management system for connected and automated electric vehicles is proposed, which, to our knowledge, has not been attempted before. The generalized methodology of impact analysis of cyber attacks is developed, including novel evaluation metrics from the perspectives of steady state and transient performance of the energy management system and innovative index-based resilience and security criteria. Specifically, we propose a security criterion in terms of dynamic performance, comfortability, and energy, which are the most critical metrics to evaluate the performance of an electronic control unit (ECU). If an attack does not impact these metrics, it perhaps can be negligible. Based on the statistical results and the proposed evaluation metrics, the impact of cyber attacks on ECU is analyzed comprehensively. The conclusions can serve as guidelines for attack detection, diagnosis, and countermeasures.",
      "published": "2020-07-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2020.3011821",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lulu Guo",
        "Bowen Yang",
        "Jin Ye",
        "Hong Chen",
        "Fangyu Li",
        "Wen‐Zhan Song",
        "Liang Du",
        "Le Guan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2020.3011821",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 85,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2020.3024643",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attack Against Urban Scene Segmentation for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Understanding the surrounding environment is crucial for autonomous vehicles to make correct driving decisions. In particular, urban scene segmentation is a significant integral module commonly equipped in the perception system of autonomous vehicles to understand the real scene like a human. Any missegmentation of the driving scenario can potentially result in uncontrollable consequences such as serious accidents or the exception of the perception system. In this article, we investigate the vulnerability of the popular scene segmentation models designed with the backbones of deep neural networks (DNNs), which have been shown to be sensitive to adversarial attacks. Specifically, we propose an iterative projected gradient-based attack method that can effectively fool several DNN-based segmentation models with a remarkably higher attacking successful rate, and much smaller adversarial perturbations. Moreover, we also develop an adversarial training algorithm with min-max optimization style to enrich the robustness of the scene segmentation models. Extensive experiments on the Cityscape benchmark dataset consisting of large-scale urban scene images for autonomous vehicles demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack method, as well as the benefit of the adversarial training scheme for the scene segmentation models.",
      "published": "2020-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2020.3024643",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xing Xu",
        "Jingran Zhang",
        "Yujie Li",
        "Yichuan Wang",
        "Yang Yang",
        "Heng Tao Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2020.3024643",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2022.3202539",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TCE-IDS: Time Interval Conditional Entropy- Based Intrusion Detection System for Automotive Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Intelligent connected vehicle is rapidly growing with the 5-G technology; the diversity of functional interfaces has significantly expanded the avenues of attack, making automotive controller area network (CAN) more vulnerable to cyberthreats. Automotive CAN network attacks are a direct threat to traffic safety, and in this study, we explore the use of intrusion detection techniques for mitigating cyberattacks. However, most automotive CAN network intrusion detection technologies are not capable of defending against sophisticated attacks, making it extremely challenging for detecting intrusions in practice. In this article, we propose a novel time interval conditional entropy method for detecting intrusions in automotive CAN networks. The time interval conditional entropy intrusion detection method is not susceptible to interference and is capable of detecting a variety of attacks. In our experiments, the conditional entropy values of regular communication messages are collected and utilized to distinguish and detect the attacks. The time interval conditional entropy detection method is implemented and evaluated in our controller area net-work bus (CAN-BUS) network platform. The experiments show that our method has higher detection accuracy and is easier to deploy compared to existing automotive CAN network intrusion detection methods.",
      "published": "2022-08-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2022.3202539",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhangwei Yu",
        "Yan Liu",
        "Guoqi Xie",
        "Renfa Li",
        "Siming Liu",
        "Laurence Tianruo Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2022.3202539",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2022.3209287",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "False Data Injection Attack on Electric Vehicle-Assisted Voltage Regulation",
      "description": "With the large scale penetration of electric vehicles (EVs) and the advent of bidirectional chargers, EV aggregators will become a major player in the voltage regulation market. This paper proposes a novel false data injection attack (FDIA) against the voltage regulation capacity estimation of EV charging stations, the process that underpins voltage regulation in distribution system. The proposed FDIA takes into account the uncertainty in EV mobility and network conditions. The attack vector with the largest expected adverse impact is the solution of a stochastic optimization problem subject to a constraint that ensures it can bypass bad data detection. We show that this attack vector can be determined by solving a sequence of convex quadratically constrained linear programs. The case studies examined in a co-simulation platform, based on two standard test feeders, reveal the vulnerability of the voltage regulation capacity estimation.",
      "published": "2022-03-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2022.3209287",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuan Liu",
        "Omid Ardakanian",
        "Ioanis Nikolaidis",
        "Hao Liang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. vol. 19 no. 5 (2023) 7122-7132",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2022.3209287",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2023.3283995",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Control System Level Intrusion Detection on J1939 Heavy-Duty Vehicle Buses",
      "description": "As the security vulnerabilities of controller area networks (CAN) become well known, heavy-duty vehicles implementing the SAE J1939 specification layer on this bus are immediate targets. Recently released standards provide clear cybersecurity requirements, but the exact methods to be implemented are not specified and remain up to the manufacturers. In this work, we address adversary actions and countermeasures at the control system level for a heavy-duty vehicle J1939 CAN bus. This low level approach allows us to complement regular attacks with more knowledgeable attacks that may evade detection and discuss realistic countermeasures. Indeed, as we also show by experiments, traditional approaches based on machine learning algorithms will largely fail to detect such attacks. We present experiments based on a model that links between the Simulink environment, an extension of the MATLAB platform for the simulation of in-vehicle control systems, with the CANoe environment, which facilitates the simulation of in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2023-06-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2023.3283995",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Camil Jichici",
        "Adriana Berdich",
        "Adrian Musuroi",
        "Bogdan Groza"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2023.3283995",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2023.3324949",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AERO: Automotive Ethernet Real-Time Observer for Anomaly Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Automotive Ethernet enables high-bandwidth in-vehicle networking, facilitating the transmission of sensor data among electronic control units. However, the increasing connectivity and potential vulnerability inheritance in connected and autonomous vehicles expose them to security risks. To address this challenge, an intrusion detection system (IDS) capable of analyzing automotive Ethernet traffic and detecting anomalies is essential. In thisarticle, we propose automotive Ethernet real-time observer (AERO), an unsupervised network IDS designed to protect in-vehicle networks. AERO consists of three components: a feature extractor that constructs three multimodal features, a neural network for processing the extracted features, and an online anomaly detector that calculates outlier scores in real time. We evaluate the performance of AERO using the TOW-IDS automotive Ethernet intrusion dataset. The experimental results demonstrate that AERO achieves high detection performance across five different attack types and is highly applicable to automotive-grade devices for real-time anomaly detection.",
      "published": "2023-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2023.3324949",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Huy Kang Kim",
        "Mee Lan Han",
        "Byung Il Kwak"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2023.3324949",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tii.2026.3722485",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure and Post-Quantum-Resilient OTA Software Update Framework for Industrial Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The continuous improvement in wireless connectivity, automation, and autonomy has led to software-defined industrial autonomous vehicles (AVs). However, the vulnerabilities in its outdated software and insecure vehicle-to-everything protocols have significantly increased the likelihood of security threats. Therefore, it is required to continuously fix the vulnerabilities through over-the-air (OTA) dynamic software updates. The update mechanism upgrades AV software packages and enhances quality of service and security. To address the security challenges in dynamic update mechanisms in AVs, a novel post-quantum secure OTA framework has been proposed. The framework, initially establishes key negotiation, mutual authentication, and secure OTA software packages between AV and the server. We employ post-quantum cryptographic primitives, including Kyber, Dilithium, polynomial commitment-based zero-knowledge proofs, and the advanced encryption standard, as part of this framework to secure the OTA update process. The phases in this process are implemented in a simulated environment, compared with other quantum and classical algorithms, and their performance is critically analyzed and discussed.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2026.3722485",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Utkarsh Kumar",
        "Indukuri Mani Varma",
        "Aadit Kumar Sahoo",
        "Adesh Palkar",
        "Abdullah Azeem",
        "Nisarg Prajapati",
        "Neetesh Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tii.2026.3722485",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tit.2018.2809779",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Authentication and Authenticated Capacity",
      "description": "We consider the problem of keyless message authentication over noisy channels in the presence of an active adversary. Different from the existing models, in our model, the legitimate users do not have any pre-shared key for authentication. Instead, we use the noisy channel connecting the legitimate users for authentication. The main idea is to utilize the noisy channel connecting the legitimate users to distinguish a legitimate message from a fake message, by generating an output at the receiver that is difficult for the adversary to replicate through its noisy channel. By interpreting the message authentication as a hypothesis testing problem, we investigate the authentication exponent and the authenticated channel capacity of the noisy channel. In the authentication exponent problem, for a given message rate, we investigate the speed at which the optimal successful attack probability can be driven to zero. We fully characterize the authentication exponent for the zero-rate message case and provide both an upper bound and a lower bound on the exponent for the non-zero message rate case. In the authenticated capacity problem, we study the largest data transmission rate under which the attacker's optimal successful attack probability can still be made arbitrarily small. We establish an all or nothing result. In particular, we show that the authenticated channel capacity is the same as the classic channel capacity if a simulatability condition is not satisfied, while the authenticated capacity will be zero if this condition is satisfied. We also provide efficient algorithms to check this condition. We further show that our results are robust to modeling uncertainties about the eavesdropper's channels.",
      "published": "2018-02-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tit.2018.2809779",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenwen Tu",
        "Lifeng Lai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tit.2018.2809779",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tit.2022.3205886",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Authentication for AWGN Channels",
      "description": "This work establishes that the physical layer can be used to perform information-theoretic authentication in additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, as long as the adversary is not omniscient. The model considered consists of an encoder, decoder, and adversary, where the adversary knows the message given to the encoder, has a non-causal noisy observation of the encoder’s transmission and may use unlimited transmission power, while the decoder observes a noisy version of the sum of the encoder and adversary’s outputs. A method to modify a generic existing channel code to enable authentication is presented. This method relies on injecting message-dependent noise into the transmission and accepting the transmission as authentic only if the correct noise levels for the decoded message are observed. One drawback to this method is that the encoder must still transmit a low-power signal in the case where there is no message to send. It is shown that this modification costs an asymptotically negligible amount of the coding rate, while still enabling authentication as long as the adversary’s observation is not noiseless. Also notable is that this modification is not (asymptotically) a function of the statistical characterization of the adversary’s channel and no secret key is required. We believe these features will pave the way for a robust practical implementation. Using these results, the channel-authenticated capacity is calculated and shown to be equal to the non-adversarial channel capacity. As our results will show, information-theoretic authentication in AWGN channels is possible without the need for the legitimate party to have a model-based advantage over the adversary. While this modular scheme is designed for use in the given channel model, it is applicable to a wide range of settings.",
      "published": "2022-09-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tit.2022.3205886",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eric Graves",
        "Allison Beemer",
        "Jörg Kliewer",
        "Oliver Kosut",
        "Paul L. Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tit.2022.3205886",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2014.2351612",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Practical Wireless Attack on the Connected Car and Security Protocol for In-Vehicle CAN",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2014.2351612",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samuel Woo",
        "H. Jo",
        "Dong-Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2014.2351612",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 510,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2016.2519464",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Practical Security Architecture for In-Vehicle CAN-FD",
      "description": "The controller area network with flexible data rate (CAN-FD) is attracting attention as the next generation of in-vehicle network technology. However, security issues have not been completely taken into account when designing CAN-FD, although every bit of information transmitted could be critical to driver safety. If we fail to solve the security vulnerabilities of CAN-FD, we cannot expect Vehicle-Information and Communications Technology (Vehicle-ICT) convergence to continue to develop. Fortunately, secure in-vehicle CAN-FD communication environments can be constructed using the larger data payload of CAN-FD. In this paper, we propose a security architecture for in-vehicle CAN-FD as a countermeasure (designed in accordance with CAN-FD specifications). We considered the characteristics of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 26262 Automotive Safety Integrity Level and the in-vehicle subnetwork to design a practical security architecture. We also evaluated the feasibility of the proposed security architecture using three kinds of microcontroller unit and the CANoe software. Our evaluation findings may be used as an indicator of the performance level of electronic control units for manufacturing next-generation vehicles.",
      "published": "2016-03-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2016.2519464",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samuel Woo",
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "In Seok Kim",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2016.2519464",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 140,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2017.2665968",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Threats Facing Autonomous and Connected Vehicles: Future Challenges",
      "description": "Vehicles are currently being developed and sold with increasing levels of connectivity and automation. As with all networked computing devices, increased connectivity often results in a heightened risk of a cyber security attack. Furthermore, increased automation exacerbates any risk by increasing the opportunities for the adversary to implement a successful attack. In this paper, a large volume of publicly accessible literature is reviewed and compartmentalized based on the vulnerabilities identified and mitigation techniques developed. This review highlighted that the majority of studies are reactive and vulnerabilities are often discovered by friendly adversaries (white-hat hackers). Many gaps in the knowledge base were identified. Priority should be given to address these knowledge gaps to minimize future cyber security risks in the connected and autonomous vehicle sector.",
      "published": "2017-03-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2017.2665968",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simon Parkinson",
        "Paul Ward",
        "Kyle Wilson",
        "J. Miller"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2017.2665968",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 523,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2017.2749459",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of the Connected Vehicle Landscape—Architectures, Enabling Technologies, Applications, and Development Areas",
      "description": "This paper summarizes the state of the art in connected vehicles-from the need for vehicle data and applications thereof, to enabling technologies, challenges, and identified opportunities. Connectivity is increasing around the world and its expansion to vehicles is no exception. With improvements in connectivity, sensing, and computation, the future will see vehicles used as development platforms capable of generating rich data, acting based on inference, and effecting great change in transportation, the human-vehicle dynamic, the environment, and the economy. Connected vehicle technologies have already been used to improve fleet safety and efficiency, with emerging technologies additionally allowing data to be used to inform aspects of vehicle design, ownership, and use. While the demand for connected vehicles and its enabling technology has progressed significantly in recent years, there remain challenges to connected and collaborative vehicle application deployment before the full potential of connected cars may be realized. From extensibility and scalability to privacy and security, this paper informs the reader about key enabling technologies, opportunities, and challenges in the connected vehicle landscape.",
      "published": "2017-10-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2017.2749459",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joshua Eric Siegel",
        "Dylan C. Erb",
        "Sanjay Emani Sarma"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2017.2749459",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 460,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4001,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2017.2749459 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: remain, platforms, there, applications, privacy, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2018.2791484",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-Time Detection and Estimation of Denial of Service Attack in Connected Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "Advanced connectivity features in today's smart vehicles are giving rise to several promising intelligent transportation technologies. Connected vehicle system is one among such technologies, where a set of vehicles can communicate with each other and the infrastructure via communication networks. Connected vehicles have the potential to improve the traffic throughput, minimize the risk of accidents and reduce vehicle energy consumption. Despite these promising features, connected vehicles suffer from the safety and security issues. Especially, vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication make the connected vehicles vulnerable to cyber attacks. In order to improve safety and security, advanced vehicular control systems must be designed to be resilient to such cyber attacks. The first step of designing such attack-resilient control system is detection of the occurrence of the cyber attack. In this paper, we address this need and propose a real-time scheme that can potentially 1) detect the occurrence of a particular cyber attack, namely denial of service; and 2) estimate the effect of the attack on the connected vehicle system. The scheme consists of a set of observers, which are designed using sliding mode and adaptive estimation theory. The mathematical convergence properties of the observers are analyzed via Lyapunov's stability theory. Finally, simulation demonstrates the performance of the approach and the robustness of the scheme under several forms of uncertainties.",
      "published": "2018-02-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2018.2791484",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zoleikha Abdollahi Biron",
        "Satadru Dey",
        "Pierluigi Pisu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2018.2791484",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 288,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4073,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2018.2791484 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: stability, service, where, safety, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2018.2797529",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Security Credential Management System for V2X Communications",
      "description": "The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) issued a proposed rule on January 12, 2017 to mandate vehicle-to-vehicle safety communications in light vehicles in the U.S. Cybersecurity and privacy are major challenges for such a deployment. We present a Security Credential Management System (SCMS) for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications in this paper, which has been developed by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partners LLC under a cooperative agreement with the USDOT. This system design is currently transitioning from research to proof-of-concept and is a leading candidate to support the establishment of a nationwide Public Key Infrastructure for V2X security. It issues digital certificates to participating vehicles and infrastructure devices for trustworthy communications among them, which is necessary for safety and mobility applications that are based on V2X communications. The SCMS supports four main use cases, namely, bootstrapping, certificate provisioning, misbehavior reporting, and revocation. The main design goal is to provide both security and privacy to the largest extent reasonable and possible. To achieve a reasonable level of privacy in this context, vehicles are issued pseudonym certificates, and the generation and provisioning of those certificates are divided among multiple organizations. Given the large number of pseudonym certificates per vehicle, one of the main challenges is to facilitate efficient revocation of misbehaving or malfunctioning vehicles, while preserving privacy against attacks from insiders. The proposed SCMS supports all identified V2X use-cases and certificate types necessary for V2X communication security. This paper is based upon work supported by the USDOT. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors (“we”) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the USDOT.",
      "published": "2018-02-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2018.2797529",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Benedikt Brecht",
        "Dean Therriault",
        "André Weimerskirch",
        "William Whyte",
        "Virendra Kumar",
        "Thorsten Hehn",
        "Roy Goudy"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2018.2797529",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 222,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2018.2870147",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicle-Based Lane Selection Assistance Application",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) technology has great potential to improve the performance of today's advanced driver assistance systems in terms of safety, energy efficiency, and driving comfort. The aim of this paper is to develop a specific CV application that assists with lane selection, i.e., finding the best travel lane in terms of travel time based on predicted lane-level traffic states. In this paper, a spatial-temporal model (ST-model) was developed, which utilizes spatial and temporal information of road cells to predict future traffic states. This information was used by the proposed lane selection assistance application to select an optimal lane sequence for the application-equipped vehicle. A comprehensive simulation-based evaluation was then conducted under various scenarios, e.g., with different traffic volumes, penetration rates of communication-capable vehicles, and information update cycles. The evaluation results reveal several interesting findings, including: 1) the proposed ST-model outperforms the basic estimation model in terms of traffic state prediction accuracy; 2) travel times of application-equipped vehicles can be reduced by up to 8% with the use of the proposed lane selection assistance application when compared with the baseline, under various traffic scenarios; 3) the application can be effective in the early deployment stage of CV technology, where the penetration rate of communication-capable vehicles is still low; and 4) the potential conflict risk of application-equipped vehicles is reduced, although the application is mainly designed for mobility benefits, due to the more strategic and informed lane changes suggested by the proposed application.",
      "published": "2018-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2018.2870147",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "driver assistance",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Danyang Tian",
        "Guoyuan Wu",
        "Peng Hao",
        "Kanok Boriboonsomsin",
        "Matthew Barth"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2018.2870147",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 44,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2019.2906038",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-Time Sensor Anomaly Detection and Identification in Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) are expected to revolutionize the transportation industry, mainly through allowing for a real-time and seamless exchange of information between vehicles and roadside infrastructure. Although connectivity and automation are projected to bring about a vast number of benefits, they can give rise to new challenges in terms of safety, security, and privacy. To navigate roadways, CAVs need to heavily rely on their sensor readings and the information received from other vehicles and roadside units. Hence, anomalous sensor readings caused by either malicious cyber attacks or faulty vehicle sensors can result in disruptive consequences and possibly lead to fatal crashes. As a result, before the mass implementation of CAVs, it is important to develop methodologies that can detect anomalies and identify their sources seamlessly and in real time. In this paper, we develop an anomaly detection approach through combining a deep learning method, namely convolutional neural network (CNN), with a well-established anomaly detection method, and Kalman filtering with a χ2-detector, to detect and identify anomalous behavior in CAVs. Our numerical experiments demonstrate that the developed approach can detect anomalies and identify their sources with high accuracy, sensitivity, and F1 score. In addition, this developed approach outperforms the anomaly detection and identification capabilities of both CNNs and Kalman filtering with a χ2-detector method alone. It is envisioned that this research will contribute to the development of safer and more resilient CAV systems that implement a holistic view toward intelligent transportation system (ITS) concepts.",
      "published": "2019-05-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2019.2906038",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Franco van Wyk",
        "Yiyang Wang",
        "Anahita Khojandi",
        "Neda Masoud"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2019.2906038",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 350,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2019.2908074",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The development of the complexity and connectivity of modern automobiles has caused a massive rise in the security risks of in-vehicle networks (IVNs). Nevertheless, existing IVN designs (e.g., controller area network) lack cybersecurity consideration. Intrusion detection, an effective method for defending against cyberattacks on IVNs while providing functional safety and real-time communication guarantees, aims to address this issue. Therefore, the necessity of its research has risen. In this paper, an IVN environment is introduced, and the constraints and characteristics of an intrusion detection system (IDS) design for IVNs are presented. A survey of the proposed IDS designs for the IVNs is conducted, and the corresponding drawbacks are highlighted. Various optimization objectives are considered and comprehensively compared. Lastly, the trend, open issues, and emerging research directions are described.",
      "published": "2019-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2019.2908074",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wufei Wu",
        "Renfa Li",
        "Guoqi Xie",
        "Jiyao An",
        "Yang Bai",
        "Jia Zhou",
        "Keqin Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2019.2908074",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 398,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2019.2918161",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Local Traffic Aware Unicast Routing Scheme for Connected Car System",
      "description": "Connected cars are equipped with a rich set of sensors, such as GPS, accelerometer, video cameras, and pollution detectors. The information generated by these sensors can be used to offer a wide range of on-demand services, such as congestion notification, parking lots, and video surveillance. These services need a reliable and low latency unicast communication scheme in order to efficiently deliver the information requested by drivers. In this paper, a local traffic aware unicast routing scheme is proposed. To overcome network fragmentation, the proposed scheme relies on base stations and virtual base stations to transmit information from source car to the destination car using backhaul link. In this model, as base stations are sparsely deployed in the junction areas, a car moving in the junction area acts as a virtual base station node to support the routing process in the absence of a base station. Moreover, it avoids the impact of unreliable channel on information delivery. In the proposed scheme, each base station and virtual base station uses the short status messages (beacons) exchanged by the cars to form a local database of car locations. The stored information is used to find a base station or virtual base station that offers a minimum delay path to the destination car. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms the existing routing schemes in terms of end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio. The proposed scheme is also validated by a connected car prototype built in an indoor laboratory environment.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2019.2918161",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sourav Kumar Bhoi",
        "P. Sahu",
        "Munesh Singh",
        "P. M. Khilar",
        "R. R. Sahoo",
        "R. Swain"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2019.2918161",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2019.2943620",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Algorithms for Distributed Charging Control of Electric Vehicles in Smart Grid",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) are an eco-friendly alternative to vehicles with internal combustion engines. Despite their environmental benefits, the massive electricity demand imposed by the anticipated proliferation of EVs could jeopardize the secure and economic operation of the power grid. Hence, proper strategies for charging coordination will be indispensable to the future power grid. Coordinated EV charging schemes can be implemented as centralized, decentralized, and hierarchical systems, with the last two, referred to as distributed charging control systems. This paper reviews the recent literature of distributed charging control schemes, where the computations are distributed across multiple EVs and/or aggregators. First, we categorize optimization problems for EV charging in terms of operational aspects and cost aspects. Then under each category, we provide a comprehensive discussion on algorithms for distributed EV charge scheduling, considering the perspectives of the grid operator, the aggregator, and the EV user. We also discuss how certain algorithms proposed in the literature cope with various uncertainties inherent to distributed EV charging control problems. Finally, we outline several research directions that require further attention.",
      "published": "2019-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2019.2943620",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nanduni I. Nimalsiri",
        "Chathurika P. Mediwaththe",
        "Elizabeth L. Ratnam",
        "Marnie Shaw",
        "David B. Smith",
        "Saman K. Halgamuge"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2019.2943620",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.2970295",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-Time Sensor Anomaly Detection and Recovery in Connected Automated Vehicle Sensors",
      "description": "In this paper we propose a novel observer-based method to improve the safety and security of connected and automated vehicle (CAV) transportation. The proposed method combines model-based signal filtering and anomaly detection methods. Specifically, we use adaptive extended Kalman filter (AEKF) to smooth sensor readings of a CAV based on a nonlinear car-following model. Using the car-following model the subject vehicle (i.e., the following vehicle) utilizes the leading vehicle's information to detect sensor anomalies by employing previously-trained One Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) models. This approach allows the AEKF to estimate the state of a vehicle not only based on the vehicle's location and speed, but also by taking into account the state of the surrounding traffic. A communication time delay factor is considered in the car-following model to make it more suitable for real-world applications. Our experiments show that compared with the AEKF with a traditional x2-detector, our proposed method achieves a better anomaly detection performance. We also demonstrate that a larger time delay factor has a negative impact on the overall detection performance.",
      "published": "2020-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.2970295",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yiyang Wang",
        "Neda Masoud",
        "Anahita Khojandi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.2970295",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 181,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.2972974",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Multi-Modal Object Detection and Semantic Segmentation for Autonomous Driving: Datasets, Methods, and Challenges",
      "description": "Recent advancements in perception for autonomous driving are driven by deep learning. In order to achieve robust and accurate scene understanding, autonomous vehicles are usually equipped with different sensors (e.g. cameras, LiDARs, Radars), and multiple sensing modalities can be fused to exploit their complementary properties. In this context, many methods have been proposed for deep multi-modal perception problems. However, there is no general guideline for network architecture design, and questions of “what to fuse”, “when to fuse”, and “how to fuse” remain open. This review paper attempts to systematically summarize methodologies and discuss challenges for deep multi-modal object detection and semantic segmentation in autonomous driving. To this end, we first provide an overview of on-board sensors on test vehicles, open datasets, and background information for object detection and semantic segmentation in autonomous driving research. We then summarize the fusion methodologies and discuss challenges and open questions. In the appendix, we provide tables that summarize topics and methods. We also provide an interactive online platform to navigate each reference: https://boschresearch.github.io/multimodalperception/.",
      "published": "2020-02-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.2972974",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Di Feng",
        "Christian Haase-Schutz",
        "Lars Rosenbaum",
        "Heinz Hertlein",
        "Claudius Gläser",
        "Fabian Timm",
        "W. Wiesbeck",
        "Klaus Dietmayer"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.2972974",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1442,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.2973859",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Vehicle Network Routing With Adaptive 3D Beam Alignment for mmWave 5G-Based V2X Communications",
      "description": "5G-based millimeter Waves (mmWave) systems have the prospective of enabling > 1Gbps communications in the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). ITS relies on vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications to share information among vehicles. However, the V2X Communications via existing technologies such as DSRC, 3G, 4G and LTE, are not able to achieve such a high data rate. Although 5G-based mmWave can support ultra-low-delay V2X transmissions, it comes with beam alignment difficulties as well as the routing stability issues due to rapid mobility of vehicles. The dynamic vehicle traffic causes frequent beam misalignment which tends to degrade the quality-of-service (QoS) performance. In this paper, we first propose a 3D-based position detection scheme for beam alignment/selection purpose. Then a group-based routing algorithm is performed to select a secure path for achieving trustworthy data transmissions. The road traffic is automatically segmented to divide the vehicles into different groups, and each group head is selected and members are added. Group members are authenticated by the group head via elliptic curve algorithms. Huffman coding is performed to compress the data and encrypt the binary files. This proposed novel intelligent beam control and secure stable routing scheme have been verified in simulations to demonstrate much better performance than existing schemes.",
      "published": "2020-02-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.2973859",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iftikhar Rasheed",
        "Fei Hu",
        "Yang‐Ki Hong",
        "Bharat Balasubramanian"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.2973859",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 87,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.2997003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Infotainment Systems: Using Bayesian Networks to Model Cognitive Selection of Music Genres",
      "description": "In the world of transportation, the ceaseless evolution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is reflected on their migration towards In-Vehicle-Infotainment (IVI) systems, which are characterized by innovative applications and services. Such systems aim to support drivers/passengers with a varying set of functions, enhancing the quality of driving through entertainment. The goal of this study is to introduce a novel IVI cognitive functionality that automatically and dynamically proposes the optimal music genre to the drivers/users when they want to make a certain journey with their owned (or shared) vehicles. The proposed recommender functionality utilizes in an automated manner (i) drivers/users’ profile data and current situation, (ii) drivers/users’ personal preferences, (iii) external environment information obtained from sensor measurements, and (iv) previous knowledge and experience. Knowledge is obtained through the exploitation of Bayesian networking principles in combination with a practical implementation of the Naive-Bayes model. Indicative simulation results showcase the efficiency of the proposed infotainment functionality, in terms of accuracy and speed of convergence, in proactively identifying the optimal music genre and accordingly notifying the drivers/users.",
      "published": "2020-06-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.2997003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploitation",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "George J. Dimitrakopoulos",
        "Ilias E. Panagiotopoulos"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.2997003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3000797",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicle: Security by Design",
      "description": "Security of (semi)-autonomous vehicles is a growing concern, first, due to the increased exposure of the functionality to potential attackers; second, due to the reliance of functionalities on diverse (semi)-autonomous systems; third, due to the interaction of a single-vehicle with myriads of other smart systems in urban traffic infrastructure. Beyond these technical issues, we argue that the security-by-design principle for smart and complex autonomous systems, such as an Autonomous Vehicle (AV) is poorly understood and rarely practiced. Unlike traditional IT systems, where the risk mitigation techniques and adversarial models are well studied and developed with security design principles such as security perimeter and defense-in-depth, the lack of such a framework for connected autonomous systems is plaguing the design and implementation of a secure AV. We attempt to identify the core issues of securing an AV. This is done methodically by developing a security-by-design framework for AV from the first principles. Subsequently, the technical challenges for AV security are identified.",
      "published": "2020-06-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3000797",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attackers",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anupam Chattopadhyay",
        "Kwok‐Yan Lam",
        "Yaswanth Tavva"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3000797",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 160,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3015143",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Evolutionary Deep Learning-Based Anomaly Detection Model for Securing Vehicles",
      "description": "This article proposes a deep learning based approach for cyber attack detection in the vehicles. The proposed method is constructed based on generative adversarial network (GAN) classification to assess the message frames transferring between the electric control unit (ECU) and other hardware in the vehicle. To this end, two networks called generator (G) and discriminator (D) will run an adversarial game to fool each other. In such a process, the most optimal structure is found which distinguish between the model normal behavior and abnormalities. Due to the instabilities existing in the GAN model, a new optimization method based on firefly algorithm is proposed to create a class of generators in a feasible region, i.e. the discriminator D. A three-stage modification method is also devised to increase the algorithm population diversity and reduce the possibility of falling in local optima. The performance of the model is assessed on the experimental dataset recorded from the OBD-II port of an undefined vehicle.",
      "published": "2021-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3015143",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "ecu",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Kavousi-Fard",
        "M. Dabbaghjamanesh",
        "T. Jin",
        "Wencong Su",
        "M. Roustaei"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3015143",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3017474",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mobility-Aware Proactive Edge Caching for Connected Vehicles Using Federated Learning",
      "description": "Content Caching at the edge of vehicular networks has been considered as a promising technology to satisfy the increasing demands of computation-intensive and latency-sensitive vehicular applications for intelligent transportation. The existing content caching schemes, when used in vehicular networks, face two distinct challenges: 1) Vehicles connected to an edge server keep moving, making the content popularity varying and hard to predict. 2) Cached content is easily out-of-date since each connected vehicle stays in the area of an edge server for a short duration. To address these challenges, we propose a Mobility-aware Proactive edge Caching scheme based on Federated learning (MPCF). This new scheme enables multiple vehicles to collaboratively learn a global model for predicting content popularity with the private training data distributed on local vehicles. MPCF also employs a Context-aware Adversarial AutoEncoder to predict the highly dynamic content popularity. Besides, MPCF integrates a mobility-aware cache replacement policy, which allows the network edges to add/evict contents in response to the mobility patterns and preferences of vehicles. MPCF can greatly improve cache performance, effectively protect users' privacy and significantly reduce communication costs. Experimental results demonstrate that MPCF outperforms other baseline caching schemes in terms of the cache hit ratio in vehicular edge networks.",
      "published": "2020-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3017474",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhengxin Yu",
        "Jia Wen Hu",
        "Geyong Min",
        "Zhiwei Zhao",
        "Wang Miao",
        "M. Shamim Hossain"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3017474",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 335,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4075,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3017474 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: patterns, response, making, applications, privacy, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3017882",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Novel Deep Learning-Enabled LSTM Autoencoder Architecture for Discovering Anomalous Events From Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), especially Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), are vulnerable to security and safety issues that threaten the lives of the people. Unlike manual vehicles, the security of communications and computing components of AVs can be compromised using advanced hacking techniques, thus barring AVs from the effective use in our routine lives. Once manual vehicles are connected to the Internet, called the Internet of Vehicles (IoVs), it would be exploited by cyber-attacks, like denial of service, sniffing, distributed denial of service, spoofing and replay attacks. In this article, we present a deep learning-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for ITS, in particular, to discover suspicious network activity of In-Vehicles Networks (IVN), vehicles to vehicles (V2V) communications and vehicles to infrastructure (V2I) networks. A Deep Learning architecture-based Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) autoencoder algorithm is designed to recognize intrusive events from the central network gateways of AVs. The proposed IDS is evaluated using two benchmark datasets, i.e., the car hacking dataset for in-vehicle communications and the UNSW-NB15 dataset for external network communications. The experimental results demonstrated that our proposed system achieved over a 99% accuracy for detecting all types of attacks on the car hacking dataset and a 98% accuracy on the UNSW-NB15 dataset, outperforming other eight intrusion detection techniques.",
      "published": "2020-09-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3017882",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Javed Ashraf",
        "Asim Dilawar Bakhshi",
        "Nour Moustafa",
        "Hasnat Khurshid",
        "Abdullah Javed",
        "Amin Beheshti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3017882",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 300,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3023541",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning for Image and Point Cloud Fusion in Autonomous Driving: A Review",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles were experiencing rapid development in the past few years. However, achieving full autonomy is not a trivial task, due to the nature of the complex and dynamic driving environment. Therefore, autonomous vehicles are equipped with a suite of different sensors to ensure robust, accurate environmental perception. In particular, the camera-LiDAR fusion is becoming an emerging research theme. However, so far there has been no critical review that focuses on deep-learning-based camera-LiDAR fusion methods. To bridge this gap and motivate future research, this article devotes to review recent deep-learning-based data fusion approaches that leverage both image and point cloud. This review gives a brief overview of deep learning on image and point cloud data processing. Followed by in-depth reviews of camera-LiDAR fusion methods in depth completion, object detection, semantic segmentation, tracking and online cross-sensor calibration, which are organized based on their respective fusion levels. Furthermore, we compare these methods on publicly available datasets. Finally, we identified gaps and over-looked challenges between current academic researches and real-world applications. Based on these observations, we provide our insights and point out promising research directions.",
      "published": "2021-03-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3023541",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yaodong Cui",
        "Ren Chen",
        "Wenbo Chu",
        "Long Fei Chen",
        "Daxin Tian",
        "Ying Li",
        "Dongpu Cao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3023541",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 561,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3024655",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey of Deep Reinforcement Learning for Motion Planning of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Academic research in the field of autonomous vehicles has reached high popularity in recent years related to several topics as sensor technologies, V2X communications, safety, security, decision making, control, and even legal and standardization rules. Besides classic control design approaches, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning methods are present in almost all of these fields. Another part of research focuses on different layers of Motion Planning, such as strategic decisions, trajectory planning, and control. A wide range of techniques in Machine Learning itself have been developed, and this article describes one of these fields, Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). The paper provides insight into the hierarchical motion planning problem and describes the basics of DRL. The main elements of designing such a system are the modeling of the environment, the modeling abstractions, the description of the state and the perception models, the appropriate rewarding, and the realization of the underlying neural network. The paper describes vehicle models, simulation possibilities and computational requirements. Strategic decisions on different layers and the observation models, e.g., continuous and discrete state representations, grid-based, and camera-based solutions are presented. The paper surveys the state-of-art solutions systematized by the different tasks and levels of autonomous driving, such as car-following, lane-keeping, trajectory following, merging, or driving in dense traffic. Finally, open questions and future challenges are discussed.",
      "published": "2020-01-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3024655",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Szilárd Aradi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3024655",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 664,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3025685",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) is the most widely used intra-vehicular communication network in the automotive industry. Because of its simplicity in design, it lacks most of the requirements needed for a security-proven communication protocol. However, a safe and secured environment is imperative for autonomous as well as connected vehicles. Therefore CAN security is considered one of the important topics in the automotive research community. In this article, we propose a four-stage intrusion detection system that uses the chi-squared method and can detect any kind of strong and weak cyber attacks in a CAN. This work is the first-ever graph-based defense system proposed for the CAN. Our experimental results show that we have a very low 5.26% misclassification for denial of service (DoS) attack, 10% misclassification for fuzzy attack, 4.76% misclassification for replay attack, and no misclassification for spoofing attack. In addition, the proposed methodology exhibits up to 13.73% better accuracy compared to existing ID sequence-based methods.",
      "published": "2020-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3025685",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Riadul Islam",
        "Rafi Ud Daula Refat",
        "Sai Manikanta Yerram",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3025685",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 116,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.393,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3025685 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: strong, very, service, well, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3045319",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning Based Semi-Supervised Control for Vertical Security of Maglev Vehicle With Guaranteed Bounded Airgap",
      "description": "The vertical security problem of maglev train is challenging for nonlinearity, external disturbances, unmeasurable airgap velocity and constrained output. To solve this problem, a semi-supervised controller based on deep belief network (DBN) algorithm is proposed in the presence of unknown external disturbances. Firstly, the extended state observer (ESO) is designed to ensure fast convergence of observation errors with high enough estimation precision. An output-constrained controller is designed by backstepping method, and the estimated value of ESO is introduced to ensure that the output airgap is constrained within a bounded range. Then, the stability of this method is proved based on the symmetric Barrier Lyapunov function. Subsequently, a semi-supervised controller is presented based on DBN algorithm and the output-constrained controller. The numerical simulation results show that this method can effectively deal with unmeasurable airgap velocity and generalized external disturbances, and guarantee the vertical security with output airgap within a bounded range. Finally, experiments are implemented on a full-scale maglev vehicle and the experimental results demonstrate that the developed deep learning controller can ensure the vertical security.",
      "published": "2021-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3045319",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yougang Sun",
        "Junqi Xu",
        "Han Wu",
        "G. Lin",
        "Shahid Mumtaz"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3045319",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 122,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2020.3046974",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-Bus Attack Detection With Deep Learning",
      "description": "Modern cars include a huge number of sensors and actuators, which continuously exchange data and control commands. The most used protocol for communication of different components in automotive system is the Controller Area Network (CAN). According to CAN, components communicate by broadcasting messages on a bus. In addition, the standard definition of the protocol does not provide information for authentication, so exposing it to attacks. This paper proposes a method based on deep learning aiming at discovering attacks towards the CAN-bus. In particular, Neural Networks and MultiLayer Perceptrons are the class of networks employed in our approach. We also validate our approach by analysing a real-world dataset with the injection of messages from different types of attacks: denial of service, fuzzy pattern attacks, and attacks against specific components. The obtained results are encouraging and demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach.",
      "published": "2021-01-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2020.3046974",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Flora Amato",
        "Luigi Coppolino",
        "Francesco Mercaldo",
        "Francesco Moscato",
        "Roberto Nardone",
        "Antonella Santone"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2020.3046974",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 87,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3053406",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Security of Networked Control Systems in Smart Vehicle and Its Adaptive Cruise Control",
      "description": "With the benefits of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) paradigm, come along unprecedented security challenges. Among many applications of inter-connected systems, vehicular networks and smart cars are examples that are already rolled out. Smart vehicles not only have networks connecting their internal components e.g. via Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, but also are connected to the outside world through road side units and other vehicles. In some cases, the internal and external network packets pass through the same hardware and are merely isolated by software defined rules. Any misconfiguration opens a window for the hackers to intrude into vehicles' internal components e.g. central lock system, Engine Control Unit (ECU), Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) or Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system. Compromise of any of these can lead to disastrous outcomes. In this paper, we study the security of smart vehicles' adaptive cruise control systems in the presence of covert attacks. We define two covert/stealth attacks in the context of cruise control and propose a novel intrusion detection and compensation method to disclose and respond to such attacks. More precisely, we focus on the covert cyber attacks that compromise the integrity of cruise controller and employ a neural network identifier in the IDS engine to estimate the system output dynamically and compare it against the ACC output. If any anomaly is detected, an embedded substitute controller kicks in and takes over the control. We conducted extensive experiments in MATLAB to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in a simulated environment.",
      "published": "2020-08-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3053406",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Faezeh Farivar",
        "Mohammad Sayad Haghighi",
        "Alireza Jolfaei",
        "Sheng Wen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3053406",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 73,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3055351",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis for Automotive CAN Networks: A GAN Model-Based Intrusion Detection Technique",
      "description": "With the rapid development of Internet of vehicles, connected vehicles, autonomous vehicles, and autonomous driving technologies, automotive Controller Area Networks (CAN) have suffered from numerous security threats. Deep learning models are the current mainstream intrusion detection techniques for threat analysis, and the state-of-the-art intrusion detection technique introduces the Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) model to generate usable attacked samples to supplement the training samples, but it exists the limitations of rough CAN message block construction and fails to detect the data tampering threat. Based on the CAN communication matrix defined by the automotive Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for a vehicle model, we propose an enhanced deep learning GAN model with elaborate CAN message blocks and the enhanced GAN discriminator. The elaborate CAN message blocks in the training samples can precisely reflect the real generated CAN message blocks in the detection phase. The GAN discriminator can detect whether each message has suffered from the data tampering threat. Experimental results illustrate that the enhanced deep learning GAN model has higher detection accuracy, recall, and F1 scores than the state-of-the-art deep learning GAN model under various attacks and threats.",
      "published": "2021-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3055351",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guoqi Xie",
        "Laurence Tianruo Yang",
        "Yuanda Yang",
        "Haibo Luo",
        "Renfa Li",
        "Mamoun Alazab"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3055351",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 94,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3937,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3055351 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3078740",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Attacks on Controller Area Networks and Corresponding Countermeasures",
      "description": "The development of vehicle technologies such as connected and autonomous vehicle environments provide drivers with functions for convenience and safety that are highly capable of remote vehicle diagnosis or lane-keeping assistance. Unfortunately, despite impressive advantages for drivers, these functions also have various vulnerabilities that could lead to cyber-physical attacks on automotive Controller Area Networks (i.e., automotive CAN). To deal with these security issues, a multitude of issue-specific countermeasures have already been proposed. In this paper, we introduce existing research on automotive CAN attacks and evaluate several state-of-the-art countermeasures. Particularly, we provide a comprehensive adversary model for automotive CAN and classify existing countermeasures into four system categories: (1) preventative protection, (2) intrusion detection, (3) authentication, and (4) post-protection. From the extensive literature review, we attempt to summarize the security research regarding automotive CAN and identify open research directions for in-vehicle networks of autonomous vehicle.",
      "published": "2021-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3078740",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Wonsuk Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3078740",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 153,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3085196",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "False Data Injection Attack in a Platoon of CACC: Real-Time Detection and Isolation With a PDE Approach",
      "description": "Connected vehicles are potential solutions to address some of the existing challenges in transportation systems, such as emission, traffic congestion, and fuel consumption. However, vehicular communication networks endure from reliability and security issues. Cyber-attacks with performance-disrupting purposes can lead to catastrophic collisions in connected vehicles and increase traffic congestion. To ensure safety and reliability, a monitoring system with the capability of diagnosing cyber-attacks is necessary for connected vehicles. In this study, we consider a platoon of connected vehicles equipped with cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) that is subjected to a specific type of cyber-attack, namely“False Data Injection”(FDI) attack. A smart FDI attack is modeled with ghost vehicles injection into the connected vehicles network to disrupt the performance of the whole system. To ease the analysis, we develop a partial differential equation (PDE) model for the CACC vehicle dynamics using its ordinary differential equations (ODE). Furthermore, a PDE observer is designed to detect the FDI attack and locate the attack’s injection point in the platoon. Lyapunov stability theory has been utilized to verify the observer’s convergence under no-attack scenario and study residuals’ behaviors in the presence of the attack. A non-zero constant threshold is considered to provide robustness in attack detection despite the measurement noises. Eventually, the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is evaluated with simulation studies.",
      "published": "2021-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3085196",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roghieh A. Biroon",
        "Zoleikha Abdollahi Biron",
        "Pierluigi Pisu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3085196",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 87,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3969,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3085196 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: purposes, stability, safety, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3085297",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Cyber-Security of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs)",
      "description": "As the general development trend of the automotive industry, connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) can be used to increase transportation safety, promote mobility choices, reduce user costs, and create new job opportunities. However, with the increasing level of connectivity and automation, malicious users are able to easily implement different kinds of attacks, which threaten the security of CAVs. Hence, this paper provides a comprehensive survey on the cyber-security in the environment of CAVs with the aim of highlighting security problems and challenges. Firstly, based on the types of communication networks and attack objects, it classifies various cyber-security risks and vulnerabilities in the environment of CAVs into in-vehicle network attacks, vehicle to everything network attacks, and other attacks. Next, it regards cyber-risk as another type of attacks in the environment of CAVs. Then, it describes and analyzes up-to-date corresponding defense strategies for securing CAVs. In addition, it concludes several available cyber-security and safety standards of CAVs, which is helpful for the practical application of CAVs. Finally, several challenges and open problems are discussed for the future research.",
      "published": "2021-06-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3085297",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaoqiang Sun",
        "Fei Richard Yu",
        "Peng Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3085297",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 376,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3088998",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Histogram-Based Intrusion Detection and Filtering Framework for Secure and Safe In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose H-IDFS, a Histogram-based Intrusion Detection and Filtering framework, which assembles the CAN packets into windows, and computes their corresponding histograms. The latter are fed to a multi-class IDS classifier to identify the class of the traffic windows. If the window is found malicious, the filtering system is invoked to filter out the normal CAN packets from each malicious window. To this end, we propose a novel one-class SVM, namedOCSVM-attackthat is trained on normal traffic and considers the invariant and quasi-invariant features of the attack. Experimental results on two CAN datasets: OTIDS and Car-Hacking, show the superiority of the proposed H-IDFS, as it achieves an accuracy of 100% for window classification, and correctly filters out between 94.93% and 100% of normal packets from malicious windows.",
      "published": "2021-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3088998",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelouahid Derhab",
        "Mohamed Belaoued",
        "Irfan Mohiuddin",
        "Fajri Kurniawan",
        "Muhammad Khurram Khan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3088998",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3090361",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of False Data Injection Attack in Connected and Automated Vehicles via Cloud-Based Sandboxing",
      "description": "In recent years, developments in vehicle-to-everything communication (V2X) have steadily increased in applications such as platooning and collision avoidance. V2X provides vehicles with long-range information regarding traffic congestion and routing, but also short and mid-range information allowing cooperative adaptive cruise control, automatic collision warnings, and others. Despite being potentially beneficial in several aspects, such interdependence poses a set of specific challenges from safety and reliability standpoint due to the possibility of cyber-attacks aimed at influencing the behavior of the vehicles. In this paper, a Cloud-based approach, a sandboxing framework is presented to detect the false data injection attack on connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). The sandboxing concept comes from computer security and it is adopted in a control framework as a way to isolate and evaluate the data exchanged by the CAVs affecting the vehicle control system. Numerical experiments are conducted to show the effectiveness of the approach using microscopic traffic simulation. Simulation results show that our proposed methodology is able to detect the false data injection attack existing in the V2X communication and identify the attacker in real-time less than 0.2 s.",
      "published": "2021-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3090361",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chunheng Zhao",
        "Jasprit Singh Gill",
        "Pierluigi Pisu",
        "Gurcan Comert"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3090361",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3103441",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overriding Autonomous Driving Systems Using Adaptive Adversarial Billboards",
      "description": "The success of deep neural networks (DNNs) has led to its increased deployment in various real-world applications, which provides strong incentives for motivated adversaries to manipulate the results and models generated by these algorithms. We present an automated, physically-realizable, dynamic adversarial attack to compromise an end-to-end trained DNN controlled autonomous vehicle. The attack is initiated by installing a billboard displaying videos on the roadside to incoming DNN controlled vehicles so that the vehicle tracks an adversary customized trajectory. The billboard contains an integrated camera to enable estimation of the pose of the approaching vehicle. The dynamic billboard images (i.e., a video) continuously adapt to the vehicle’s relative pose with respect to the billboard while being robust to variations in lighting, view angle, and weather. The attack’s effectiveness is shown on a recently developed off-the-shelf high-fidelity simulator, CARLA, for autonomous vehicles. CARLA utilizes an end-to-end learning-based autonomous navigation system. The proposed approach is applicable to other end-to-end trained autonomous cyber-physical systems.",
      "published": "2021-08-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3103441",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Naman Patel",
        "P. Krishnamurthy",
        "Siddharth Garg",
        "Farshad Khorrami"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3103441",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3113638",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Hybrid Similar Neighborhood Robust Factorization Machine Model for Can Bus Intrusion Detection in the In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) is the most commonly used bus technology for In-vehicle network and uses multicast communication without corresponding security measures. Therefore, the message data field is vulnerable to tampering and other attacks. Recent machine learning-based intrusion detection methods for CAN bus messages only use the information contained in the message data field and do not take into account the contribution made by the neighboring information of CAN bus messages. In addition, previous models considered the data domain information of CAN bus messages as separate features and did not consider the unique weight of each feature, as well as the second-order interaction information between features. Therefore, we propose a novel intrusion detection model, The Hybrid Similar Neighborhood Robust Factorization Machine Model (HSNRFM), for detecting anomalies in CAN bus messages to address the shortcomings and problems of the previous models. To be able to incorporate the contribution of similar neighborhood information and learn the unique weight parameters of each feature in the model decision process, as well as additional second-order interaction information between features, the HSNRFM model solves the above problem using a similarity calculation method and a factorization machine model. Comprehensive experimental results are compared on real vehicle datasets. The HSNRFM model has AUC values of 0.9216 and 0.901 and AUPR values of 0.9194 and 0.9018 on two real datasets, respectively. And the results show that our proposed HSNRFM model has excellent detection efficiency for intrusion detection of CAN bus messages.",
      "published": "2021-10-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3113638",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuchu He",
        "Zhijuan Jia",
        "Mingsheng Hu",
        "Chi Cui",
        "Yage Cheng",
        "Yanyan Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3113638",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.404,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3113638 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: well, without, information, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3113675",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Change Point Models for Real-Time Cyber Attack Detection in Connected Vehicle Environment",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) systems are subject to potential cyber attacks because of increasing connectivity between its different components, such as vehicles, roadside infrastructure, and traffic management centers. However, it is a challenge to detect security threats in real-time and develop appropriate or effective countermeasures for a CV system because of the dynamic behavior of such attacks, high computational power requirement, and a historical data requirement for training detection models. To address these challenges, statistical models, especially change point models, have potentials for real-time anomaly detection. Thus, the objective of this study is to investigate the efficacy of two change point models; Expectation Maximization (EM) and two forms of Cumulative Summation (CUSUM) algorithms (i.e., typical and adaptive), for real-time vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) cyber attack detection in a CV Environment. To prove the efficacy of these models, we evaluated these two models for three different types of cyber attack, denial of service (DOS), impersonation, and false information, using basic safety messages (BSMs) generated from CVs through simulation. Results from numerical analysis revealed that EM, CUSUM, and adaptive CUSUM (aCUSUM) could detect these cyberattacks, such as DOS, impersonation, and false information with low false positives.",
      "published": "2021-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3113675",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gurcan Comert",
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "Mhafuzul Islam",
        "Mashrur A. Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3113675",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3121125",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy and Trust in the Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles aims to fundamentally improve transportation by connecting vehicles, drivers, passengers, and service providers together. Several new services such as parking space identification, platooning and intersection control—to name just a few—are expected to improve traffic congestion, reduce pollution, and improve the efficiency, safety and logistics of transportation. Proposed end-user services, however, make extensive use of private information with little consideration for the impact on users and third parties (those individuals whose information is indirectly involved). This article provides the first comprehensive overview of privacy and trust issues in the Internet of Vehicles at the service level. Various concerns over privacy are formalised into four basic categories: personal information privacy, multi-party privacy, trust, and consent to share information. To help analyse services and to facilitate future research, the main relevant end-user services are taxonomised according to voluntary and involuntary information they require and produce. Finally, this work identifies several open research problems and highlights general approaches to address them. These especially relate to measuring the trade-off between privacy and service functionality, automated consent negotiation, trust towards the IoV and its individual services, and identifying and resolving multi-party privacy conflicts.",
      "published": "2021-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3121125",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Efstathios Zavvos",
        "Enrico Gerding",
        "Vahid Yazdanpanah",
        "Carsten R. Maple",
        "Sebastian Stein",
        "m.c. schraefel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3121125",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3122865",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Explanations in Autonomous Driving: A Survey",
      "description": "The automotive industry has witnessed an increasing level of development in the past decades; from manufacturing manually operated vehicles to manufacturing vehicles with a high level of automation. With the recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), automotive companies now employ blackbox AI models to enable vehicles to perceive their environment and make driving decisions with little or no input from a human. With the hope to deploy autonomous vehicles (AV) on a commercial scale, the acceptance of AV by society becomes paramount and may largely depend on their degree of transparency, trustworthiness, and compliance with regulations. The assessment of the compliance of AVs to these acceptance requirements can be facilitated through the provision of explanations for AVs’ behaviour. Explainability is therefore seen as an important requirement for AVs. AVs should be able to explain what they have ‘seen’, done, and might do in environments in which they operate. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of the existing work in explainable autonomous driving. First, we open by providing a motivation for explanations by highlighting the importance of transparency, accountability, and trust in AVs; and examining existing regulations and standards related to AVs. Second, we identify and categorise the different stakeholders involved in the development, use, and regulation of AVs and elicit their AV explanation requirements. Third, we provide a rigorous review of previous work on explanations for the different AV operations (i.e., perception, localisation, planning, vehicle control, and system management). Finally, we discuss pertinent challenges and provide recommendations including a conceptual framework for AV explainability. This survey aims to provide the fundamental knowledge required of researchers who are interested in explanation provisions in autonomous driving.",
      "published": "2021-11-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3122865",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel Omeiza",
        "Helena Webb",
        "Marina Denise Jirotka",
        "Lars Kunze"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3122865",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 362,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3123824",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GOLIATH: A Decentralized Framework for Data Collection in Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) technology has advanced during the past years, and it is now used for several applications that require vehicles to exchange real-time data, such as in traffic information management. Traditionally, road traffic information has been collected using on-site sensors. However, crowd-sourcing traffic information from onboard sensors or smartphones has become a viable alternative. State-of-the-art solutions currently follow a centralized model where only the service provider has complete access to the collected traffic data and represent a single point of failure and trust. In this paper, we proposeGOLIATH, a blockchain-based decentralized framework that runs on the In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system to collect real-time information exchanged between the network’s participants. Our approach mitigates the limitations of existing crowd-sourcing centralized solutions by guaranteeing trusted information collection and exchange, fully exploiting the intrinsic distributed nature of vehicles. We demonstrate its feasibility in the context of vehicle positioning and traffic information management. Each vehicle participating in the decentralized network shares its position and neighbors’ ones in the form of a transaction recorded on the ledger, which uses a novel consensus mechanism to validate it. We design the consensus mechanism resilient against a realistic set of adversaries that aim to tamper or disable the communication. We evaluate the proposed framework in a simulated (but realistic) environment, which considers different threats and allows showing its robustness and safety properties.",
      "published": "2021-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3123824",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Davide Maffiola",
        "Stefano Longari",
        "Michele Carminati",
        "Mara Tanelli",
        "Stefano Zanero"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3123824",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3128634",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle CAN Bus Tampering Attacks Detection for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles Using an Improved Isolation Forest Method",
      "description": "The development and applications of mobile communication technologies in intelligent autonomous transportation systems have led to an extraordinary rise in the mount of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). Ensuring the security of in-vehicle communication data is the basis for the safety of cooperative transportation systems. An in-vehicle controller area network (CAN) bus is an important issue in in-vehicle security, and some hackers have mastered remote vehicle control methods through the CAN bus network. This paper proposes an improved isolation forest method with data mass (MS-iForest) for data tampering attack detection, in which we use data mass instead of the number of divisions and give an anomaly score ranking to quantify the degree of anomalies. This method is promising to be used as part of the intrusion detection system, like a security component in the onboard gateway, which can effectively avoid the data tampering attacks. We compare the proposed method with other anomaly detection schemes based on the data collected from an in-vehicle simulated dataset and two standard datasets. The experiment results show that the proposed method performs better than the other anomaly detection schemes in terms of the area under the receiver operating curve (AUC).",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3128634",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuting Duan",
        "Huiwen Yan",
        "Daxin Tian",
        "Jianshan Zhou",
        "Jian Dong Su",
        "Wei Hao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3128634",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 68,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2021.3137826",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of Network Topology on the Resilience of Vehicle Platoons",
      "description": "This paper presents a comprehensive study on the impact of information flow topologies on the resilience of distributed algorithms that are widely used for estimation and control in vehicle platoons. In the state of the art, the influence of information flow topology on both internal and string stability of vehicle platoons has been well studied. However, understanding the impact of information flow topology on cyber-security tasks, e.g., attack detection, resilient estimation and formation algorithms, is largely open. By means of a general graph theory framework, we study connectivity measures of several platoon topologies and we reveal how these measures affect the ability of distributed algorithms to reject communication disturbances, to detect cyber-attacks, and to be resilient against them. We show that the traditional platoon topologies relying on interaction with the nearest neighbor are very fragile with respect to performance and security criteria. On the other hand, appropriate platoon topologies, namely $k$ -nearest neighbor topologies, are shown to fulfill desired security and performance levels. The framework we study covers undirected and directed topologies, ungrounded and grounded topologies, or topologies on a line and on a ring. We show that there is a trade-off in the network design between the robustness to disturbances and the resilience to adversarial actions. Theoretical results are validated via simulations.",
      "published": "2022-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2021.3137826",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Pirani",
        "S. Baldi",
        "K. Johansson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2021.3137826",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 69,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3140229",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Spatial-Temporal Multi-Scale Alignment Graph Neural Network Security Model for Vehicles Prediction",
      "description": "Traffic flow forecasting is indispensable in today’s society and regarded as a key problem for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), as emergency delays in vehicles can cause serious traffic security accidents. However, the complex dynamic spatial-temporal dependency and correlation between different locations on the road make it a challenging task for security in transportation. To date, most existing forecasting frames make use of graph convolution to model the dynamic spatial-temporal correlation of vehicle transportation data, ignoring semantic similarity between nodes and thus, resulting in accuracy degradation. In addition, traffic data does not strictly follow periodicity and hard to be captured. To solve the aforementioned challenging issues, we propose in this article CRFAST-GCN, a multi-branch spatial-temporal attention graph convolution network. First, we capture the multi-scale (e.g., hour, day, and week) long- short-term dependencies through three identical branches, then introduce conditional random field (CRF) enhanced graph convolution network to capture the semantic similarity globally, so then we exploit the attention mechanism to captures the periodicity. For model evaluation using two real-world datasets, performance analysis shows that the proposed CRFAST-GCN successfully handles the complex spatial-temporal dynamics effectively and achieves improvement over the baselines at 50% (maximum), outperforming other advanced existing methods.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3140229",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chun-Yan Diao",
        "Dafang Zhang",
        "Wei Liang",
        "Kuan Ching Li",
        "Yujie Hong",
        "J. Gaudiot"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3140229",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 103,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3144599",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilient Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control for Autonomous Vehicles Using Machine Learning",
      "description": "Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a fundamental connected vehicle application that extends Adaptive Cruise Control by exploiting vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. CACC is a crucial ingredient for numerous autonomous vehicle functionalities including platooning, distributed route management, etc. Unfortunately, malicious V2V communications can subvert CACC, leading to string instability and road accidents. In this paper, we develop a novel resiliency infrastructure, RACCON, for detecting and mitigating V2V attacks on CACC. RACCON uses machine learning to develop an on-board prediction model that captures anomalous vehicular responses and performs mitigation in real time. RACCON-enabled vehicles can exploit the high efficiency of CACC without compromising safety, even under potentially adversarial scenarios. We present extensive experimental evaluation to demonstrate the efficacy of RACCON.",
      "published": "2022-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3144599",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "exploit",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srivalli Boddupalli",
        "Akash K Rao",
        "Sandip Ray"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3144599",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3149449",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Cybersecurity of Traffic Signal Control System With Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) technology brings both opportunities and challenges to the traffic signal control (TSC) system. While safety and mobility performance could be greatly improved by adopting CV technologies, the connectivity between vehicles and transportation infrastructure may increase the risks of cyber threats. In the past few years, studies related to cybersecurity on the TSC systems were conducted. However, there still lacks a systematic investigation that provides a comprehensive analysis framework. In this study, our aim is to fill the research gap by proposing a comprehensive analysis framework for the cybersecurity problem of the TSC in the CV environment. With potential threats towards the major components of the system and their corresponding impacts on safety and efficiency analyzed, data spoofing attack is considered the most plausible and realistic attack approach. Based on this finding, different attack strategies and defense solutions are discussed. A case study is presented to show the impact of the data spoofing attacks towards a selected CV based TSC system and corresponding mitigation countermeasures. This case study is conducted on a hybrid security testing platform, with virtual traffic and a real V2X communication network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to present a comprehensive analysis framework to the cybersecurity problem of the CV-based TSC systems.",
      "published": "2022-02-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3149449",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yiheng Feng",
        "Shihong Huang",
        "Wai Hung Wong",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Zhuoqing Morley Mao",
        "Henry X. Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3149449",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3151712",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Effective Intrusion Detection and Prevention for the Commercial Vehicle SAE J1939 CAN Bus",
      "description": "Detecting and preventing intrusions on in-vehicle buses is a topic of great importance which may have an even greater significance in the context of commercial vehicles that are liable for the security of the demanding tasks they carry, passengers or goods not least. In this respect, the SAE J1939 protocol, which is a CAN based higher-layer protocol for commercial vehicles, requires special attention due to the existence of both specific procedures in the standard, e.g., address claims and multi-frame transmissions, as well as due to sharp specifications regarding the content of messages which may facilitate the deployment of a more targeted intrusion detection system. Needless to say, most of the research works on CAN intrusion detection are treating in-vehicle traffic as black-box with no concerns over the actual meaning of the frames content. In this context, we pursue the development of a targeted solution for J1939 buses. We collect real-world traffic from a commercial vehicle bus, compliant to the J1939 standard, and make a comprehensive analysis of its structure and content. This allows us to design an effective intrusion prevention system that detects and eliminates in real-time all frames that were manipulated by an adversary by overriding them with error flags. To prove the correctness of our approach, we present results with a proof-of-concept implementation on high-end automotive-grade controllers.",
      "published": "2022-02-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3151712",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Camil Jichici",
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Radu Ragobete",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay",
        "Tudor Andreica"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3151712",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3153718",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Model-Based Method for Enabling Source Mapping and Intrusion Detection on Proprietary Can Bus",
      "description": "With the deep integration of the Internet of Things (IoT) technology and the increase of computational power and memory, vehicles can also serve as the infrastructures for Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), e.g., as fog nodes. However, when connecting vehicles to the internet, alongside with the benefits it brings, it also opens many new challenges such as security attacks. Controller Area Network (CAN) is one of the main in-vehicle communication protocols in modern cars. Its lack of sender verification mechanism makes CAN particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks including masquerade attack. Fingerprinting Electronic Control Units (ECUs) based on hardware characteristics has been proved feasible and effective on defending CAN buses. However, most state-of-the-art works exploited the supervised learning algorithm to identify the transmitter based on the signal characteristics. This makes the decision process hard to understand, and it also limits the deployment on proprietary CAN bus without prior knowledge. To solve this, we design a novel clock-skew-based approach capable of pinpointing the sender and detecting intrusion on proprietary CAN bus. We take a single CAN frame as the object for measurement, and adjust the measuring process such that our approach can be independent of the transmission time of frames. Based on the statistical analysis of data from real vehicles, we propose a novel box-plot algorithm based on score mechanism to filter the raw data. Finally, the clock skews are estimated and accumulated to build a linear model for representing the transmitter ECU. The evaluation results on one CAN prototype and two production vehicles show that our approach is able to well identify and differentiate ECUs on the bus without prior knowledge. The data processed by the proposed box-plot algorithm can describe the hardware characteristics of ECUs precisely. We also show the ability of our approach to protecting the CAN bus against the masquerade attack.",
      "published": "2022-03-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3153718",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jia Zhou",
        "Guoqi Xie",
        "Haibo Zeng",
        "Weizhe Zhang",
        "Laurence Tianruo Yang",
        "Mamoun Alazab",
        "Renfa Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3153718",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3157394",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AoI Optimization in the UAV-Aided Traffic Monitoring Network Under Attack: A Stackelberg Game Viewpoint",
      "description": "Intelligent Vehicle Systems (IVSs) devote to integrating the data sensing, processing, and transmission in the Vehicle to Everything (V2X) scenarios, where the Unnamed Aircraft Vehicle (UAV)-aided traffic monitoring network is one of the most significant applications. Moreover, since the central premise to support the IVS is timely and effectively sensing data processing, Age of Information (AoI) can precisely reflect the timeliness and effectiveness of the communication process in the UAV-aided traffic monitoring network. However, recent researches pay little attention to AoI minimization issue, especially when the malicious attacker attempts to deteriorate the network performance. The accurately modelling of the adversarial relationship between legitimate UAVs and attacker is not fully investigated. To make up this research gap, we start from the Stackelberg game viewpoint to investigate the AoI optimization problem in the UAV-aided traffic monitoring network under attack. Firstly, the system model and three-layer Stackelberg game-based optimization goal are established. Secondly, based on the Backward Induction (BI) analysis, the follower’s data sensing rate, transmission power, and the leader’s attacking power are determined by the Lagrange duality optimization technology successively. Moreover, the sub-gradient update-based optimization technology is used to achieve the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). Finally, simulations are performed under various parameters. The evaluation results present better performance of our proposed approach when compared with the typical baselines.",
      "published": "2022-03-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3157394",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yaoqi Yang",
        "Weizheng Wang",
        "Lingjun Liu",
        "Kapal Dev",
        "Nawab Muhammad Faseeh Qureshi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3157394",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 78,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3202869",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Stage Intrusion Detection System in Intelligent Transportation Systems Using Rule Extraction Methods From Deep Neural Networks",
      "description": "In recent years, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are offering effective solutions to protect various types of cyber-attacks in different networks such as Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) network in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Deep learning models have largely been leveraged by these intrusion detection systems to achieve better effectiveness results. However, deep learning models are black boxes, which limits their acceptability in decision systems. Also, they require powerful processing capabilities such as GPU, which limit their deployments in resource-constrained devices in IoV environment. To deal with these issues, we propose a two-stage IDS in ITS to discover suspicious network activity of In-Vehicles Networks (IVN) and vehicles to everything (V2X) networks. Our proposed IDS system uses rule extraction methods from deep learning models, i.e., deep neural networks in two stages. In the first stage, we analyze network traffic to distinguish between normal and attack traffic. If the traffic is found malicious, the second stage is invoked to identify the type of attack. To this end, we propose three variants of rule extraction. The first and the second variants are homogeneous, and they apply$DeepRed$and$HypInv$rule extraction methods in both stages respectively. The third variant is heterogeneous, and it applies$HypInv$in the first stage to perform binary classification, and$DeepRed$in the second stage to perform attack classification. The key idea is to combine the advantages of rule extraction technique and two-stage IDS architecture to resource consumption and improve classification accuracy. The proposed IDS model was tested using four benchmark datasets, i.e. ISCXIDS2012, CIC-IDS2017, and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 datasets are used for external network communications and the car hacking dataset are used for in-vehicle communications. The evaluation results show that the homogeneous$DeepRed$is the optimal one in all cases of IDS system with an accuracy scores ranging between 92.43%-98.32% under CIC-IDS2017 dataset, between 91.32%-99.46% under CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, and between 96.05%-99.21% under Car-hacking dataset.",
      "published": "2022-09-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3202869",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samah Almutlaq",
        "Abdelouahid Derhab",
        "Mohammad Mehedi Hassan",
        "Kuljeet Kaur"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3202869",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3222486",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of Recent Deep-Learning-Based Intrusion Detection Methods for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The development and popularity of vehicle-to-everything communication have caused more risks to the in-vehicle networks security. As a result, an increasing number of various and effective intrusion detection methods appear to guarantee the security of in-vehicle networks, especially deep-learning-based methods. Nevertheless, the state-of-the-art deep-learning-based intrusion detection methods lack a quantitative and fair horizontal performance comparison analysis. Also, they have no comparative analysis of the detection capability for the unknown attacks as well as on the time and hardware resource consumption of their intelligent intrusion detection models. Therefore, this paper investigates ten representative advanced deep-learning-based intrusion detection methods and illustrates the characteristics and advantages of each method. Moreover, quantitative and fair experiments are set to make horizontal comparison analyses. Also, this study provides some significant suggestions on baseline method selection and valuable guidance, for the direction of future research about lightweight models and the ability to detect unknown attacks.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3222486",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kai Wang",
        "Aiheng Zhang",
        "Haoran Sun",
        "Bailing Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3222486",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 76,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2022.3229518",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Decision Making for Autonomous Vehicles at Highway On-Ramps: A Constrained Adversarial Reinforcement Learning Approach",
      "description": "Reinforcement learning has demonstrated its potential in a series of challenging domains. However, many real-world decision making tasks involve unpredictable environmental changes or unavoidable perception errors that are often enough to mislead an agent into making suboptimal decisions and even cause catastrophic failures. In light of these potential risks, reinforcement learning with application in safety-critical autonomous driving domain remains tricky without ensuring robustness against environmental uncertainties (e.g., road adhesion changes or measurement noises). Therefore, this paper proposes a novel constrained adversarial reinforcement learning approach for robust decision making of autonomous vehicles at highway on-ramps. Environmental disturbance is modelled as an adversarial agent that can learn an optimal adversarial policy to thwart the autonomous driving agent. Meanwhile, observation perturbation is approximated to maximize the variation of the perturbed policy through a white-box adversarial attack technique. Furthermore, a constrained adversarial actor-critic algorithm is presented to optimize an on-ramp merging policy while keeping the variations of the attacked driving policy and action-value function within bounds. Finally, the proposed robust highway on-ramp merging decision making method of autonomous vehicles is evaluated in three stochastic mixed traffic flows with different densities, and its effectiveness is demonstrated in comparison with the competitive baselines.",
      "published": "2022-12-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2022.3229518",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiangkun He",
        "Baichuan Lou",
        "Haohan Yang",
        "Chen Lv"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2022.3229518",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 116,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3236274",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicles Security: Challenges and Solutions Using Blockchain and Artificial Intelligence",
      "description": "The arrival of autonomous vehicles (AVs) promises many great benefits, including increased safety and reduced energy consumption, pollution, and congestion. However, these engines have many security and privacy issues that could undermine the expected benefits if not addressed. AVs will provide new opportunities for hackers to carry out malicious attacks, posing a great threat to the future of mobility and data protection. The research trend in this field indicates that combining Blockchain and AI could bring strong protection for AVs against malicious attacks. Blockchain and AI have different working paradigms, but when merged, they can empower each other, and solve many security and privacy issues of AVs. AI can optimise the construction of the Blockchain to make it more efficient, secure and energy-saving, where Blockchain provides data immutability and trust mechanism for AI-based solutions and makes them more transparent, trustful, and explainable. Although some research is being conducted on this area, the topic of applying Blockchain and AI for securing AVs is not deeply investigated. In this paper, we explore the possible application of an amalgamation of Blockchain and AI solutions for securing AVs. We first introduce a classification of security and privacy threats that may arise from the application of AVs. Then, we provide an overview of recent literature regarding Blockchain and AI usage for securing AVs. Finally, we highlight limitations and challenges that may face the integration of Blockchain and AI with AVs based on our systemic review and suggest potential future directions for research in this field.",
      "published": "2023-01-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3236274",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gueltoum Bendiab",
        "Amina Hameurlaine",
        "Georgios Germanos",
        "Nicholas Kolokotronis",
        "Stavros N. Shiaeles"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3236274",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 186,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3250402",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilient Distributed Event-Triggered Platooning Control of Connected Vehicles Under Denial-of-Service Attacks",
      "description": "The security control of a vehicle platoon depends on the network topology and communication quality. Denial of service (DoS) attacks force vehicle formations to destabilize by disrupting digital communications between vehicles. To this end, this paper develops a resilient distributed event-triggered security control strategy to resist the malicious impact of DoS attacks on connected vehicles. By designing a distributed event-triggered mechanism based on sampled data, the controller updating frequency is reduced, thereby promoting utilization rate of network resources. Since the end of the attack is not the sampling instant, this may prolong the duration of the attack. To overcome this problem, a switched sampled-data scheme is proposed to ensure that the control signal acts on the system immediately when the attack ends. Then, a switched system model with artificial delay is established to capture the sampling period, event triggering mechanism and DoS attack purpose. With the analysis methods of switched system and time-delay system, sufficient conditions are obtained to guarantee the same safe distance and speed between vehicles, so that the connected vehicle system can achieve the desired tracking effect. A co-design approach is given with respect to controller gains and triggering parameter. Finally, simulation and experimental studies are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed security control method.",
      "published": "2023-03-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3250402",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ning Zhao",
        "Xudong Zhao",
        "Meng Chen",
        "Guangdeng Zong",
        "Huiyan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3250402",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 127,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4063,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3250402 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: duration, disrupting, depends, studies, digital, service, impact, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3266195",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hierarchical Motion Planning and Tracking for Autonomous Vehicles Using Global Heuristic Based Potential Field and Reinforcement Learning Based Predictive Control",
      "description": "The autonomous vehicle is widely applied in various ground operations, in which motion planning and tracking control are becoming the key technologies to achieve autonomous driving. In order to further improve the performance of motion planning and tracking control, an efficient hierarchical framework containing motion planning and tracking control for the autonomous vehicles is constructed in this paper. Firstly, the problems of planning and control are modeled and formulated for the autonomous vehicle. Then, the logical structure of the hierarchical framework is described in detail, which contains several algorithmic improvements and logical associations. The global heuristic planning based artificial potential field method is developed to generate the real-time optimal motion sequence, and the prioritized Q-learning based forward predictive control method is proposed to further optimize the effectiveness of tracking control. The hierarchical framework is evaluated and validated by the numerical simulation, virtual driving environment simulation and real-world scenario. The results show that both the motion planning layer and the tracking control layer of the hierarchical framework perform better than other previous methods. Finally, the adaptability of the proposed framework is verified by applying another driving scenario. Furthermore, the hierarchical framework also has the ability for the real-time application.",
      "published": "2023-04-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3266195",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guodong Du",
        "Yuan Zou",
        "Xudong Zhang",
        "Zirui Li",
        "Qi Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3266195",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3286611",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning-Based Anomaly Detection for Connected Autonomous Vehicles Using Spatiotemporal Information",
      "description": "Although connected mymargin autonomous vehicles (CAVs) hold great potential to improve driving safety and experience significantly, cybersecurity remains a critical concern. As the de-facto standard for in-vehicle networks, the Controller Area Network (CAN) carries messages and commands vital to the operation of the vehicle. However, due to a lack of security mechanisms, intruders are able to conduct devastating attacks on drivers and passengers over CAN. In order to safeguard CAVs, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be deployed to monitor CAN network activities and detect suspicious behavior resulting from an attack. This paper proposes a prediction-based IDS framework for detecting anomalies and attacks on a CAN bus using temporal correlation of message contents. Two candidates are introduced as the prediction module. The first network is an LSTM that predicts time series data separately for each CAN ID, and the second is a ConvLSTM that predicts messages using correlated data of several CAN IDs. An attack is classified according to prediction errors by a Gaussian Naïve Bayes classifier. The proposed IDS is evaluated against other state-of-the-art one-class classifiers, including OCSVM, Isolation Forest, and Autoencoder, and three existing works, including ReducedInception-ResNet, NeuroCAN, and CANLite, using a real-world dataset, the Car Hacking Dataset. A comparison between the two suggested architectures and their use cases is given. Compared to baseline methods and related studies, the proposed method is shown to be more accurate and can achieve F-scores and detection accuracy of almost 100%.",
      "published": "2023-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3286611",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pegah Mansourian",
        "Ning Zhang",
        "Arunita Jaekel",
        "Marc Kneppers"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3286611",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 98,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3292188",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Assessment for Connected Vehicles Under Stealthy Attacks on Vehicle-to-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is an autonomous vehicle-following technology that allows groups of vehicles on the highway to form in tightly-coupled platoons. This is accomplished by exchanging inter-vehicle data through Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication networks. CACC increases traffic throughput and safety, and decreases energy consumption. However, the surge of vehicle connectivity has brought new security challenges as vehicular networks increasingly serve as new access points for adversaries trying to deteriorate the platooning performance or even cause collisions. In this manuscript, we propose a novel anomaly detection scheme that leverage real-time sensor/network data and physics-based mathematical models of vehicles in the platoon. Nevertheless, even the best detection scheme could lead to conservative detection results because of unavoidable modelling uncertainties, network effects (delays, quantization, communication dropouts), and noise. It is hard (often impossible) for any detector to distinguish between these different perturbation sources and actual attack signals. This enables adversaries to launch a range of attack strategies that can surpass the detection scheme by hiding within the system uncertainty. Here, we provide risk assessment tools (in terms of semi-definite programs) for Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) to quantify the potential effect of attacks that remain hidden from the detector (referred here as stealthy attacks). A numerical case-study is presented to illustrate the effectiveness of our methods.",
      "published": "2023-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3292188",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tianci Yang",
        "Carlos Murguia",
        "Chen Lv"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3292188",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.399,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3292188 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serve, points, remain, even, access, safety, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3296002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Many-Objective Optimization Based Intrusion Detection for in-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": "In-vehicle network security plays a vital role in ensuring the secure information transfer between vehicle and Internet. The existing research is still facing great difficulties in balancing the conflicting factors for the in-vehicle network security and hence to improve intrusion detection performance. To challenge this issue, we construct a many-objective intrusion detection model by including information entropy, accuracy, false positive rate and response time of anomaly detection as the four objectives, which represent the key factors influencing intrusion detection performance. We then design an improved intrusion detection algorithm based on many-objective optimization to optimize the detection model parameters. The designed algorithm has double evolutionary selections. Specifically, an improved differential evolutionary operator produces new offspring of the internal population, and a spherical pruning mechanism selects the excellent internal solutions to form the selected pool of the external archive. The second evolutionary selection then produces new offspring of the archive, and an archive selection mechanism of the external archive selects and stores the optimal solutions in the whole detection process. An experiment is performed using a real-world in-vehicle network data set to verify the performance of our proposed model and algorithm. Experimental results obtained demonstrate that our algorithm can respond quickly to attacks and achieve high entropy and detection accuracy as well as very low false positive rate with a good trade-off in the conflicting objective landscape.",
      "published": "2023-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3296002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiangjiang Zhang",
        "Bei Gong",
        "M. Waqas",
        "Shanshan Tu",
        "Sheng Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3296002",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3297996",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Incentive Mechanism of Incorporating Supervision Game for Federated Learning in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Federated learning (FL), as a distributed machine learning technology, allows large-scale nodes to utilize local datasets for model training and sharing without revealing privacy, which has significant efficiency and advantages in artificial intelligence (AI)-based knowledge sharing of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). However, for FL, there are challenges to ensure the security of knowledge, deal with the lazy behavior of participants, and enforce effective incentives. To bridge the gaps, in this paper, we first propose a hierarchical blockchain-supported FL architecture that utilizes the immutable and transparent properties of blockchain to enable secure storage and sharing of knowledge and transaction information with scalability. Then, considering the cost and laziness of the participants in the FL process, we propose an incentive mechanism combined with the supervision game to attract high-quality participants based on a comprehensive evaluation of model quality and participants’ reputation. Extensive simulation results validate that our proposal can improve learning accuracy and efficiency while ensuring security.",
      "published": "2023-08-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3297996",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuchuan Fu",
        "Changle Li",
        "Fei Richard Yu",
        "Tom H. Luan",
        "Pincan Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3297996",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 97,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3309817",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multilevel Electronic Control Unit Re-Encryption Scheme for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Electronic control units (ECUs) connected by a controller area network (CAN) are used to perform various functions in modern vehicles. In the latest autonomous vehicles, redundant ECUs and a backup bus (different from CAN) are always equipped to prevent a single point of failure or network attack. However, due to the lack of protection measures of CAN bus, attackers can remotely intrude into the vehicle. Many schemes have proposed to use encryption to solve the security problem of CAN bus. Considering the current ECU storage space is limited, it is impossible to store all ECUs’ keys. When a single point of failure or network attack against an ECU occurs, it is necessary for the backup ECU to process the messages related to the failed ECU. How to ensure that the backup ECU can decrypt the encrypted messages and at the same time securely isolates the backbone network from the backup network is an urgent issue to be solved. In order to solve the problem of forwarding and processing such messages under encryption conditions, we propose an efficient re-encryption scheme based on proxy re-encryption. The scheme is also suitable for cross-bus communication without backup networks. Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic, random oracle model and Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool are utilized to prove that the scheme is secure. The scheme is simulated based on the MIRACL cryptography library on the computer and Raspberry Pi. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme is secure compared with the existing scheme.",
      "published": "2023-09-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3309817",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jie Cui",
        "Yun Shen",
        "Hong Zhong",
        "Jing Zhang",
        "Lu Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3309817",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2023.3339787",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Post-Quantum Authentication Against Cyber-Physical Attacks in V2X-Based Autonomous Vehicle Platoon",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose a platoon access authentication system for initial access process in autonomous vehicle platoons (AVPs) in which post-quantum encryption and signal processing techniques are employed to protect against both active and passive cyber-physical attacks. To avoid passive quantum cyber attacks, a quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check code is used to encode and decode AVP messages. Moreover, an independent component analysis-based signal separation technique is employed to eliminate the effect of high-power active cyber attacks on AVP messages. To measure the reliability of the system, we derive an analytical expression for the system failure probability, taking into account the influence of both the cyber and physical planes. The simulations show that the proposed system is effective against attacks and can help reduce system failures caused by intentional and unintentional adverse cyber-physical effects. The proposed system offers a potential solution to the challenge of protecting initial access while maintaining ultra-reliable low-latency communications between AVPs and the infrastructure.",
      "published": "2023-12-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2023.3339787",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dongyang Xu",
        "Keping Yu",
        "Lei Liu",
        "Guolong Chen",
        "Neeraj Kumar",
        "Mohsen Guizani",
        "James A. Ritcey"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2023.3339787",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3351430",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Two-Lane Car-Following Model for Connected Vehicles Under Connected Traffic Environment",
      "description": "Connected vehicles (CVs) are conductive to promoting the transition from purely regular vehicles to purely connected autonomous vehicles where CVs are regarded as regular vehicles equipped with driver assistance systems (DASs). CVs can share status information (i.e., position, velocity, etc.) between each other through vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology, and DASs can provide CV drivers with motion suggestions (e.g., optimal velocity, etc.) based on the shared information. However, CV drivers may not completely follow these suggestions, and may combine them with their own driving experience and perception of traffic information which may be influenced by the interference of vehicles on the adjacent lane. Hence, this paper proposes a two-lane car-following model to simulate CVs under connected environment. The proposed model incorporates the compliance rate of CV drivers to DASs and considers the interference of vehicles on the adjacent lane to CV drivers by introducing the visual angle and its change rate of CV drivers. Linear stability analysis and numerical simulations of homogeneous and heterogeneous traffic flow are performed. Results show that the increases in the penetration rate of CVs and the compliance rate of CV drivers promote traffic stability, while the interference of vehicles on the adjacent lane reduces traffic stability.",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3351430",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "driver assistance",
        "penetration",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yong-Jie Xue",
        "Lin Wang",
        "Bin Yu",
        "Shao-Hua Cui"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3351430",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3377179",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Weeping to Wailing: A Transitive Stealthy Bus-Off Attack",
      "description": "The integration of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices and solutions into passenger vehicles has transformed cars into a complex system with intelligence and a platform for extending information technology possibilities. These devices communicate through in-vehicle networks that use the controller area network (CAN) as a de facto standard for the safety-critical functionality of the vehicles. One creative exploit against CAN is the bus-off attack, which uses the fault tolerance capabilities of the CAN bus to coerce a victim electronic control unit (ECU) into the bus-off state from which it is not allowed to access the bus. As a result, the victim ECU is unable to send or receive messages. The WeepingCAN attack is a stealthy variation of the bus-off attack that reduces its observability and therefore the effectiveness of detection-based mitigation. In this paper, we introduce three software-based improvements that greatly increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the WeepingCAN attack. First, we introduce a novel zero-phase approach for synchronizing the attack. Second, we discover an alternative approach to disable retransmissions, which is a key capability of WeepingCAN, that allows the attack to be conducted from more ECUs than before. Third, we identify a transitive attack strategy that enables an attacker to target many more ECUs than originally possible. We evaluate our improvements experimentally using a CAN benchmark and find that the zero-phase synchronization improves the attack success rate from 75% to over 90% and the transitive attack strategy enables all the ECUs in the benchmark to be attacked.",
      "published": "2024-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3377179",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Paul Agbaje",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Sena G. Hounsinou",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3377179",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3382313",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multichain-Assisted Lightweight Security for Code Mutated False Data Injection Attacks in Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) comprise a whole infrastructure of conventional vehicles, Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs), roadside units, and communication equipment. As a result, a variety of smart sensors, cloud, and edge services are used. Due to the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication involved in these, the infrastructure becomes prone to security attacks. The most common of these is False Data Injection Attack (FDIA), which causes serious consequences upon driving decisions of a CAV. Blockchain is an ascending technology to provide proficient data security solutions; however, its implementation in securing CAV data is restricted due to its parallel reliance on cloud services. Furthermore, a standalone blockchain is prone to transaction verification delay and reduced transaction throughput, which is intolerable in the fast-paced CAV communication. This paper presents a novel framework enabling multichain, an open-source blockchain platform. Components of the proposed framework include multiple blockchains running on CAVs. The hashing algorithm operates on their Basic Safety Messages (BSMs), inputted to it as blockchain transactions. Our findings reveal that this multichain framework eliminates reliance on cloud services by devising a fully decentralized security solution against stealthy FDIAs that jeopardize a CAV’s lane-changing. It provides an economy-building point for the CAV-metaverse by incentivizing the participating CAVs. Further, it manages transactions by employing multiple parallel blockchains for enhanced throughput. CAVs perform these security checks in as low as a few milliseconds compared to the existing centralized and computationally intensive frameworks.",
      "published": "2024-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3382313",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Siddiqi",
        "Bushra Tahir",
        "M. Jan",
        "M. Tariq"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3382313",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3384241",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Two-Layer Dynamic ECU Group Management Scheme for In-Vehicle CAN Bus",
      "description": "To enable the vehicle control system to provide better service, an increasing number of network nodes are being introduced into the vehicle; this also dramatically expands the attack surface of modern vehicles. In recent years, the security of vehicle communication buses and electronic control units (ECUs) has been extensively studied. However, in actual deployment, there is little concern for the fine management of secure communication schemes with respect to the security level of the ECU on the controller area network (CAN). On this basis, this paper proposes a two-layer ECU group dynamic management scheme based on the Chinese remainder theorem. Dynamic grouping management based on the credibility of ECUs while the vehicle is running can effectively balance efficiency and security. During communication, different groups use different modes to achieve higher efficiency. Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme can satisfy the requirements of security and privacy. Simulation results further demonstrate that the proposed scheme performs well in terms of computing and communication costs.",
      "published": "2024-04-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3384241",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yun Shen",
        "Jie Cui",
        "Hong Zhong",
        "Jing Zhang",
        "Irina Pavlovna Bolodurina",
        "Debiao He"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3384241",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3391372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating the Safety Control Against Cyber-Attacks on the Global Information in Coupled Map Car-Following Model Under Connected Vehicles Platoon Environment",
      "description": "The connected vehicles (CVs) technology mainly relies on the traffic cyber physical systems (T-CPS) to realize the interconnection between CVs. However, the vulnerability of open CVs environment gives illegal attackers an opportunity. Obviously, CVs are susceptible to unlawful cyber-attacks (CAs) from infiltrating malicious messages. Accordingly, underlying cybersecurity threats can cause information exchange errors and communication failures between CVs. For example, attackers can spread false messages that interfere with normal communication between CVs, which results in CVs receiving incorrect traffic information to affect their decisions and actions. In addition, attackers can also apply denial of service (DoS) attack to overload the communication network, causing communication failures and network congestion between CVs. Therefore, a new coupled map car-following model is established by integrating the safety control against CAs on the global information (called for CAGI-CM model) under CVs platoon environment. In terms of cybernetics, the necessary conditions are obtained for the smooth operation of the CVs platoon with CAs, and the value of compensating coefficient corresponding to different attacks intensity are observed according to the Bode diagrams. Moreover, the traffic dynamics are investigated for different types of CAs including the decreased or magnified headway and velocity information, replay or delay acceleration and deceleration through numerical simulation. The simulation results reveal that the control term incorporating the effect of delayed headway and safety distance can successfully alleviate the negative influences of CAs on CVs platoon operations to guarantee traffic security and stability.",
      "published": "2024-05-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3391372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guanghan Peng",
        "Xinhai Li",
        "Huili Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3391372",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4009,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3391372 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: normal, operation, service, physical, information, safety, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3419988",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Survey and Tutorial on Smart Vehicles: Emerging Technologies, Security Issues, and Solutions Using Machine Learning",
      "description": "According to research, the vast majority of road accidents (90%) are the result of human error, with only a small percentage (2%) being caused by malfunctions in the vehicle. Smart vehicles have gained significant attention as potential solutions to address such issues. In the future of transportation, travel comfort and road safety will be ensured while also offering several value-added services. The automotive industry has undergone a significant transformation through the use of emerging technologies and wireless communication channels, resulting in vehicles becoming more interconnected, intelligent, and safe. However, these technologies and communication systems are susceptible to numerous security attacks. The objective of this paper is to present a comprehensive overview of the smart vehicle’s architecture, encompassing emerging technologies and security challenges and solutions associated with smart vehicles. There has been a significant surge in the utilization of machine learning techniques in smart vehicles. We categorically discuss common security measures, including machine learning and deep learning based solutions that have been mentioned in the literature and implemented against security threats on smart vehicles. This paper has also been titled a tutorial due to its layout, which begins with covering preliminary knowledge, terminologies, and encompassing technologies required to comprehend smart vehicles. Following this, the paper addresses the overall challenges associated with smart vehicles and then focuses on security issues. In terms of solutions, the paper discusses overall solutions to security issues in smart vehicles before delving into a specific solution based on machine learning and deep learning.",
      "published": "2024-07-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3419988",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Usman Ahmad",
        "Mu Han",
        "Alireza Jolfaei",
        "Sohail Jabbar",
        "Muhammad Ibrar",
        "Aiman Erbad",
        "Houbing Herbert Song",
        "Yazeed Masaud Alkhrijah"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3419988",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3421381",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Quantum-Resistant Key Management Scheme Using Blockchain in C-V2X",
      "description": "Cellular-Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) is featured as a heterogenous network, with the support of cellular based uplink/downlink transmissions and sidelink communications as well as network backhauling, where infringement on security can happen. Additionally, the developing quantum attack strikes the original NP-hard problems to be solvable in polynomial time complexity. Therefore, it is fatal to build a secure environment for vehicles to communicate in C-V2X. In this paper, we propose a key management scheme utilizing blockchain deployed at the base station for distributed storage and retrieval of vehicles’ public keys. In the network, each vehicle is identified with a public-private key pair, upon which vehicular registration, authenticated key agreement and revocation rely. In particular, the lattice-based cryptography is applied to the distribution of the group key for broadcasting beacon messages and establishing session keys for a secure peer-to-peer (P2P) communication. Keys are updated as vehicles travel from one region to another and are revoked upon misbehavior detection. We analyzed the quantum resistance of our scheme theoretically and its conservation against certain attacks informally. Comparative analysis across computation, communication, storage and energy consumption demonstrates the characteristics of our scheme. Finally, the blockchain simulation demonstrates the scalability of our scheme.",
      "published": "2024-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3421381",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yujing Gong",
        "Bin-Jie Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3421381",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3436840",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantifying Cyber Risks: The Impact of DoS Attacks on Vehicle Safety in V2X Networks",
      "description": "This paper presents a novel framework for analyzing the interrelationships between vehicle dynamics, communication characteristics and cyberattacks on V2X-based functions, highlighting their impact on vehicle safety. The research implements a simulation-based approach and uses various regression models to describe the complex interactions between cyber-physical components, providing a nuanced understanding of the mathematical relationships. It provides a robust simulation framework for assessing DoS attack’s impact on the traffic safety risk. From a societal perspective, it addresses fundamental road safety issues in the face of increasing reliance on connected technologies. From a technical perspective, it presents an innovative ASIL-compatible risk classification methodology for DoS attacks, contributing to standardised cyber threat assessments in line with automotive security standards. The research serves as a methodological basis for investigating DoS attacks on vehicle safety and introduces a quantifiable risk assessment approach that can be used in adaptive security solutions. The risk classification system facilitates scenario assessment, improve intrusion detection and ensure the resilience of connected and intelligent transport systems.",
      "published": "2024-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3436840",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zsombor Pethő",
        "Tamás Márton Kazár",
        "Z. Szalay",
        "Á. Török"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3436840",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2024.3450726",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure Personalized Federated Learning Algorithm for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Federated learning (FL) is a promising technology for autonomous driving, enabling connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) to collaborate in decision-making and environmental perception while preserving privacy. However, traditional FL algorithms face challenges related to imbalanced data distribution, fluctuating channel conditions, and potential security risks associated with malicious attacks on local models. This paper proposes a fair and secure FL algorithm that not only addresses the challenges arising from imbalanced data distribution and fluctuating channel conditions, but defends against malicious attacks. Specifically, we first propose a personalized local training round allocation algorithm to balance energy costs and accelerate model convergence. Next, in order to further guarantee security, we embed an attack module based on Gini impurity. Extensive simulations demonstrate that the proposed algorithm achieves energy fairness, reduces global iteration time, and exhibits resistance against malicious attacks.",
      "published": "2024-09-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2024.3450726",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuchuan Fu",
        "Xinlong Tang",
        "Changle Li",
        "Fei Richard Yu",
        "Nan Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2024.3450726",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3530155",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "KG-ID: Knowledge Graph-Based Intrusion Detection on In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a widely adopted communication protocol in the automotive industry, facilitating connectivity among various electronic control units inside vehicles. However, with the growing intelligence and connectivity of modern vehicles, the in-vehicle network (IVN) faces significant security challenges due to the lack of inherent security mechanisms in the CAN protocol. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a monitoring and protection scheme for IVN. In this article, we propose a novel knowledge graph-based intrusion detection methodology, referred to as KG-ID. The proposed KG-ID methodology leverages a knowledge graph to analyze CAN frame and signal features for detecting several types of attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of knowledge graph technology for intrusion detection in the IVN. Subsequently, the selection of CAN signal feature, construction of in-vehicle ontology model, knowledge extraction, and robustness against various attacks are explained in detail. In addition, a series of experiments demonstrate that the proposed methodology can accurately detect fabrication, masquerade, and fuzzy attacks. In particular, the time overhead of intrusion detection in a real vehicle supported by XPeng is only 0.031 ms for KG-ID. The code for the methodology proposed in this article is available at:https://github.com/jingzhuwang/KG-ID.",
      "published": "2025-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3530155",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heng Sun",
        "Jingzhu Wang",
        "Jian Weng",
        "Weihua Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3530155",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3957,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3530155 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: intelligence, significant, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3545923",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Continuous Authentication via IMU Fingerprinting for V2X",
      "description": "Inertial measurement unit (IMU) fingerprinting is a promising physical authentication technique based on hardware imperfections produced during sensor manufacturing. This paper presents a two-stage feature extraction process that combines feature selection and mapping; the proposed approach is tailored for the lightweight vehicle-to-everything (V2X) application scenario. Specifically, the selected features are transformed into images via Gramian angular difference field (GADF), Gramian angular summation field (GASF), and Markov transition field (MTF) mappings, as well as feature extraction implemented via a convolutional neural network (CNN). Owing to the advances provided by the proposed scheme, a lightweight feature extraction system achieves satisfactory accuracy levels above 99.10% with fewer sample data and a short training time. The effectiveness and robustness of the developed approach were validated under various driving conditions via 20 IMU sensors, Arduino, and a Raspberry Pi across 20 vehicles. Additionally, tests conducted across different deep learning models demonstrated the generalizability of the proposed preprocessing and mapping methods.",
      "published": "2025-03-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3545923",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bei Gong",
        "Zhe Li",
        "Mowei Gong",
        "Haotian Zhu",
        "Weizhi Meng",
        "Chong Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3545923",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3556444",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Handover in 5G-V2X: Detecting and Localizing DoS Attack to Ensure Reliable Communication",
      "description": "A fifth-generation vehicle-to-everything (5G-V2X) communication network has been created by combining the capabilities of vehicular networks and 5G technologies. This advanced network provides assurance of increased comfort, reliability, and security for vehicle user data. However, because of the high mobility, one of the major difficulties in 5G-V2X is the Handover (HO) process when a vehicle switches from one base station to another. This procedure is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including impersonation, DoS, and Man in the Middle attacks. This study focuses specifically on the impersonation attack during the HO procedure, which can lead to critical DoS situations with potential real-life implications. The attack scenario involves rogue Femto Access Points (FAPs) exploiting the HO event. In this scenario, a malicious vehicle poses as a legitimate FAP, disrupting communication for nearby vehicles. To mitigate this attack, a novel attack detection model is proposed, relying on metrics like HO Failure Ratio (HFR) and Radio Link Failure (RLF). The adverse effects of this attack are demonstrated within the 5G-V2X context through measurable parameters such as packet loss rate, throughput, block rate, and HFR. Regarding the localization aspect, an ML-based multiclass classification mechanism is adopted. This mechanism leverages features particularly relevant to the handover scenario. A variety of classification methods, including k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF), Logistic Regression (LR), and Naive Bayes (NB), are employed for localization purposes. To enhance localization accuracy, an Ensemble Learning approach is implemented by involving the integration of KNN, LR, and RF techniques. Overall, the proposed approach effectively detects and localizes attackers during HO procedures, and also outperforms existing approaches.",
      "published": "2025-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3556444",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Dey",
        "Moumita Patra"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3556444",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3567940",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicular Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Network: A Comprehensive Survey and Evaluation",
      "description": "The progress of automotive technologies has made cybersecurity a crucial focus, leading to various cyber attacks. These attacks primarily target the Controller Area Network (CAN) and specialized Electronic Control Units (ECUs). In order to mitigate these attacks and bolster the security of vehicular systems, numerous defense solutions have been proposed. These solutions aim to detect diverse forms of vehicular attacks. However, the practical implementation of these solutions still presents certain limitations and challenges. In light of these circumstances, this paper undertakes a thorough examination of existing vehicular attacks and defense strategies employed against the CAN and ECUs. The objective is to provide valuable insights and inform the future design of Vehicular Intrusion Detection Systems (VIDS). The findings of our investigation reveal that the examined VIDS primarily concentrate on particular categories of attacks, neglecting the broader spectrum of potential threats. Moreover, we provide a comprehensive overview of the significant challenges encountered in implementing a robust and feasible VIDS. Additionally, we put forth several defense recommendations based on our study findings, aiming to inform and guide the future design of VIDS in the context of vehicular security.",
      "published": "2025-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3567940",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yangyang LIU",
        "Lei Xue",
        "Sishan Wang",
        "Xiapu Luo",
        "Kaifa Zhao",
        "Pengfei Jing",
        "Xiaobo Ma",
        "Yajuan Tang",
        "Haiying Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3567940",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3574638",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TARA 2.0 for Connected and Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected Automated Vehicles (CAVs) represent a transformative shift in transportation, offering enhanced safety, and efficiency. However, achieving full automation at levels four and five of the Society of Automotive Engineering (SAE) scale poses significant cybersecurity and privacy risks. To address these risks, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) regulations and ISO/SAE 21434 mandate Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) as a core methodology for cyber risk management. Existing TARA frameworks, designed for conventional vehicles, fall short for higher automation levels, neglecting complexities such as the absence of human control and data-driven decision making concerns. This work, conducted within ULTIMO, a project tackling the CAVs deployment challenges, introduces TARA 2.0, an enhanced framework addressing cybersecurity, privacy, and expert subjectivity in risk assessment. A step-by-step experimental implementation demonstrates its feasibility, compliance with standards, and potential to secure the deployment of fully automated vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-06-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3574638",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meriem Benyahya",
        "Anastasija Collen",
        "Teri Lenard",
        "Niels Alexander Nijdam"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3574638",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3590301",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Toward a Real-Time Intrusion Detection System for Modern In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Over the past decade, it has been demonstrated that the In-Vehicle Network (IVN) of a modern Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is vulnerable to several cyberattacks. Given the collaborative nature of these systems, detecting (remote) cyberattacks is of utmost importance in ensuring trusted interactions. One key technique that has been explored to detect adversarial presence in IVNs are Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). However, many existing solutions focus on legacy architectures or are not practically feasible due to their hardware requirements or inability to operate in real-time. To this end, we propose Modular Reduced Temporal Convolutional Network (MR-TCN), an efficient IDS architecture that can effectively be accelerated on hardware to enable real-time intrusion detection in low-cost embedded platforms. Additionally, we evaluate variants of MR-TCN on a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) platform across a diverse range of IVN traffic (i.e., CAN CC, CAN FD, and Automotive Ethernet), demonstrating its suitability in real-world applications.",
      "published": "2025-07-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3590301",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wouter Hellemans",
        "Laurens Le Jeune",
        "Md Masoom Rabbani",
        "Bart Preneel A",
        "Nele Mentens"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3590301",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3603250",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comparative Survey of Authentication Schemes Suitable for the Audit of V2X Communications",
      "description": "The rise of connected vehicles has transformed transportation by enhancing mobility, safety, and driving comfort. However, ensuring secure and trustworthy communications in vehicular networks remains a challenge due to the risks of malicious activities, privacy breaches, and unauthorized access. This paper aims to address these challenges by evaluating and comparing existing authentication schemes used in vehicular communications. Specifically, the article focuses on analyzing their efficiency, security, and applicability for audit systems in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications. The main objectives of this study are to provide a clear taxonomy of authentication strategies, evaluate their ability to preserve anonymity and integrity while ensuring accountability, and identify protocols suitable for robust audit mechanisms. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper highlights the strengths and limitations of current solutions, emphasizing aspects like scalability, privacy preservation, and infrastructure dependency. Findings indicate that combining Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based methods with Blockchain technology can yield secure and transparent communication solutions. Nevertheless, significant hurdles remain in scenarios lacking infrastructure support. The key contribution of this work consists in identifying authentication protocols that successfully balance security, efficiency, and privacy–while still enabling effective audits–thereby laying the groundwork for designing reliable, trust-oriented audit systems in tomorrow’s vehicular networks, including outside the infrastructure coverage.",
      "published": "2025-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3603250",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marwa Slimene",
        "Amira Chriki",
        "Nathalie Mitton",
        "Patrick Sondi",
        "Ahmed Meddahi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3603250",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5741,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3603250 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: activities, remain, unauthorized, ability, like, risks, significant, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3605465",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LiPar: A Lightweight Parallel Learning Model for Practical In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "With the development of intelligent transportation systems, vehicles are exposed to a complex network environment. As the main network of in-vehicle networks, the controller area network (CAN) has many potential security hazards, resulting in higher generalization capability and lighter security requirements for intrusion detection systems to ensure safety. Among intrusion detection technologies, methods based on deep learning work best without prior expert knowledge. However, they all have a large model size and usually rely on large computing power such as cloud computing, and are therefore not suitable to be installed on the in-vehicle network. Therefore, we explore computational resource allocation schemes in in-vehicle network and propose a lightweight parallel neural network structure, LiPar, which achieve enhanced generalization capability for identifying normal and abnormal patterns of in-vehicle communication flows to achieve effective intrusion detection while improving the utilization of limited computing resources. In particular, LiPar adaptationally allocates task loads to in-vehicle computing devices, such as multiple electronic control units, domain controllers, computing gateways through evaluates whether a computing device is suitable to undertake the branch computing tasks according to its real-time resource occupancy. Through experiments, we prove that LiPar has great detection performance, running efficiency, and lightweight model size, which can be well adapted to the in-vehicle environment practically and protect the in-vehicle CAN bus security. Furthermore, with only the common multi-dimensional branch convolution networks for detection, LiPar can have a high potential for generalization in spatial and temporal feature fusion learning.",
      "published": "2023-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3605465",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aiheng Zhang",
        "Qiguang Jiang",
        "Kai Wang",
        "Ming Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2025",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3605465",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3623319",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DiffGuess: Password Strength Assessment With Diffusion Models in Intelligent Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communications",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems rely on advanced technologies and artificial intelligence, forming the backbone of modern traffic management. With the widespread application of Vehicle-to-Everything, autonomous driving and intelligent transportation devices, the security of user information and system controls is facing increasingly severe challenges. As the most common authentication method in ITS, password will bring significant risks to the system once it is breached or leaked. Therefore, proactively understanding the potential password guessing attacks and assessing password strength is vital for enhancing ITS security. In this paper, we present DiffGuess, a novel password guessing framework based on the diffusion model. The motivation stems from the observation that password creation and modification are not isolated, random acts, but rather iterative processes where users often make incremental changes to existing passwords in an effort to balance memorability and security. DiffGuess models this behavior as a diffusion process, enabling effective password guessing in various scenarios. To validate DiffGuess, we tested it on 11 large-scale password datasets: 1) In reuse password guessing scenarios, DiffGuess exhibited superior or comparable performance to other models; 2) In the conditional password guessing scenario, DiffGuess surpassed all current state-of-the-art models. It achieved a password cracking success rate improvement of 0.8% to 36.0%, with an average increase of 19.1% compared to the most advanced counterparts. These results demonstrate the significant potential of DiffGuess in advancing the field of password security and highlight its ability to offer more efficient password guessing strategies across various scenarios. Finally, we propose a password strength meter to mitigate security risks in ITS.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3623319",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hu Xiong",
        "Xiaoyu Wu",
        "Xudong Yang",
        "Kaiwen Xing",
        "Kuo‐Hui Yeh"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3623319",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3628885",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Revisiting the Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "An in-vehicle network (IVN) is the internal communication network that connects all sensors and control units in an autonomous vehicle. Sensors and control units use the IVN to send perception-related messages and control commands for the normal and safe operation of the vehicle. However, the IVN, by design, is vulnerable to network attacks due to a lack of adequate security mechanisms. This paper presents a Dynamic Windowing Intrusion Detection System (DWIDS) that adapts its detection window in real-time based on observed anomalies, enabling accurate and responsive attack detection. Unlike prior methods that focus on static configurations or single-attack detection, DWIDS supports multi-label classification and real-time tuning of detection parameters. The system is evaluated using two public benchmark datasets (CHD and IVN-IDS challenge) which feature diverse and imbalanced attack types. Experimental results demonstrate high performance across key metrics (e.g., >98% precision, >97% recall and F1-score), including for rare attacks. The findings confirm DWIDS’s practicality and robustness for deployment in real-world autonomous vehicle environments.",
      "published": "2025-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tits.2025.3628885",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Asif Khan",
        "Hamid Menouar",
        "Mohamed M. Abdallah"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tits.2025.3628885",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tiv.2020.2987430",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication Platforms",
      "description": "Modern vehicular wireless technology enables vehicles to exchange information at any time, from any place, to any network -- forms the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication platforms. Despite benefits, V2X applications also face great challenges to security and privacy -- a very valid concern since breaches are not uncommon in automotive communication networks and applications. In this survey, we provide an extensive overview of V2X ecosystem. We also review main security/privacy issues, current standardization activities and existing defense mechanisms proposed within the V2X domain. We then identified semantic gaps of existing security solutions and outline possible open issues.",
      "published": "2020-03-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tiv.2020.2987430",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Monowar Hasan",
        "Sibin Mohan",
        "Takayuki Shimizu",
        "Hongsheng Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tiv.2020.2987430",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 280,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tiv.2022.3165178",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Lane Change Decision Making for Autonomous Vehicles: An Observation Adversarial Reinforcement Learning Approach",
      "description": "Reinforcement learning holds the promise of allowing autonomous vehicles to learn complex decision making behaviors through interacting with other traffic participants. However, many real-world driving tasks involve unpredictable perception errors or measurement noises which may mislead an autonomous vehicle into making unsafe decisions, even cause catastrophic failures. In light of these risks, to ensure safety under perception uncertainty, autonomous vehicles are required to be able to cope with the worst case observation perturbations. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel observation adversarial reinforcement learning approach for robust lane change decision making of autonomous vehicles. A constrained observation-robust Markov decision process is presented to model lane change decision making behaviors of autonomous vehicles under policy constraints and observation uncertainties. Meanwhile, a black-box attack technique based on Bayesian optimization is implemented to approximate the optimal adversarial observation perturbations efficiently. Furthermore, a constrained observation-robust actor-critic algorithm is advanced to optimize autonomous driving lane change policies while keeping the variations of the policies attacked by the optimal adversarial observation perturbations within bounds. Finally, the robust lane change decision making approach is evaluated in three stochastic mixed traffic flows based on different densities. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can not only enhance the performance of an autonomous vehicle but also improve the robustness of lane change policies against adversarial observation perturbations.",
      "published": "2022-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tiv.2022.3165178",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiangkun He",
        "Haohan Yang",
        "Zhongxu Hu",
        "Chen Lv"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tiv.2022.3165178",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 226,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tiv.2022.3186897",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Attack Detection and Resilience for Connected and Automated Vehicles: From Vehicle Dynamics and Control Perspective",
      "description": "Recent advances in attack/anomaly detection and resilience strategies for connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) are reviewed from vehicle dynamics and control perspective. Compared to traditional vehicles, CAVs are featured in the increasing number of perception sensors, advanced intra-vehicle communication technologies, capabilities of driving automation and connectivity between single vehicles. These features bring about safety issues which are not encountered in traditional vehicle systems. One main type of these issues is the attack or anomaly launched onto the perception sensors and the communication channels. With such a consideration, this survey summarizes and reviews the existing results on attack/anomaly detection and resilience of CAVs in control frameworks. This paper reviews the results according to the positions at which the attacks/anomalies occur. These positions are divided into three categories, namely, intra-vehicle communication network, perception sensors and inter-vehicle communication network. From this perspective, the recent attack/anomaly detection and resilience results are reviewed according to different positions attacked. After reviewing existing results, some potential research directions and challenges are identified.",
      "published": "2022-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tiv.2022.3186897",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "resilience",
        "vehicle",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhiyang Ju",
        "Hui Zhang",
        "Xiang Li",
        "Xiaoguang Chen",
        "Jinpeng Han",
        "Manzhi Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tiv.2022.3186897",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 218,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tiv.2022.3188340",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Systematic Literature Review on Automotive Digital Forensics: Challenges, Technical Solutions and Data Collection",
      "description": "A modern vehicle has a complex internal architecture and is wirelessly connected to the Internet, other vehicles, and the infrastructure. The risk of cyber attacks and other criminal incidents along with recent road accidents caused by autonomous vehicles calls for more research on automotive digital forensics. Failures in automated driving functions can be caused by hardware and software failures and cyber security issues. Thus, it is imperative to be able to determine and investigate the cause of these failures, something which requires trustable data. However, automotive digital forensics is a relatively new field for the automotive where most existing self-monitoring and diagnostic systems in vehicles only monitor safety-related events. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic literature review on the current research within this field. We identify and assess over 300 papers published between 2006–2021 and further map the relevant papers to different categories based on identified focus areas to give a comprehensive overview of the forensics field and the related research activities. Moreover, we identify forensically relevant data from the literature, link the data to categories, and further map them to required security properties and potential stakeholders. Our categorization makes it easy for practitioners and researchers to quickly find relevant work within a particular sub-field of digital forensics. We believe our contributions can guide digital forensic investigations in automotive and similar areas, such as cyber-physical systems and smart cities, facilitate further research, and serve as a guideline for engineers implementing forensics mechanisms.",
      "published": "2022-07-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tiv.2022.3188340",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kim Strandberg",
        "Nasser Nowdehi",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tiv.2022.3188340",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tiv.2023.3304762",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Operations of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "With features of collaborative interaction and autonomous decision-making, connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) offer a viable solution for a sustainable and efficient future of transportation. However, with the development of CAVs, questions have been raised about weaknesses in cybersecurity and autonomous driving capabilities. In particular, CAVs provide new opportunities for cyberattackers, posing a significant threat to future road and vehicle data security. Therefore, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the cybersecurity environment of CAVs. First, we propose a systematic classification of six security threats from cybersecurity principles: false data, information theft, privilege escalation, block communication, and time delay. We review the cybersecurity environment of CAVs from a lifecycle perspective, covering aspects from development to accident, and present the existing cybersecurity countermeasures. These involve security standards designation, verification and validation of vehicle networks, resilient strategies for self-defined driving, and attack detection and digital forensics. Finally, based on our systematic review, we propose a conceptual vehicle security operations center (VSOC) framework that provides valuable inspiration and references for future research and industrial applications for CAVs cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2023-08-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tiv.2023.3304762",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jinpeng Han",
        "Zhiyang Ju",
        "Xiaoguang Chen",
        "Manzhi Yang",
        "Hui Zhang",
        "Rouxing Huai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tiv.2023.3304762",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5177,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tiv.2023.3304762 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: escalation, valuable, digital, applications, significant, information, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tiv.2023.3337993",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Road Ahead: DAO-Secured V2X Infrastructures for Safe and Smart Vehicular Management",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology relies on wireless communication and coordination, aiming to improve road safety and traffic efficiency by orchestrating the interaction among the vehicles, infrastructures, and various entities. However, existing organizational and operational forms of V2X infrastructures encounter significant challenges, such as the capability to guarantee communication security, privacy, and efficiency especially when a centralized management system is used. The emerging Decentralized Autonomous Organizations and Operations (DAOs) present a solution to these challenges. DAOs embed managerial and operational protocols within a blockchain via smart contracts, facilitating smooth and efficient management of organizations without the necessity for centralized oversight. This letter introduces DAOs into the coordination of V2X infrastructures. Through a tripartite functional architecture including organization, coordination, and execution, we can achieve intelligent collaborative management among road infrastructures and vehicles. The DAO-secured V2X infrastructures are anticipated to augment the safety and efficiency of vehicular management in complex road scenarios, holding applicable potential for developing the intelligent roadways of tomorrow.",
      "published": "2023-11-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tiv.2023.3337993",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xingyuan Dai",
        "Mauro Vallati",
        "Rongge Guo",
        "Yutong Wang",
        "Shuangshuang Han",
        "Yilun Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tiv.2023.3337993",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tiv.2026.3690410",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Architectural Strategies for Automotive Predictive Maintenance: Balancing System Efficiency and Security Through Advanced Risk Analysis",
      "description": "The increasing complexity of modern vehicles calls for advanced predictive maintenance strategies to ensure safety, reliability, and security. While preventive maintenance improves vehicle lifespan, growing connectivity exposes systems to cybersecurity threats that may compromise operational integrity. This paper proposes architectural strategies for automotive predictive maintenance, balancing system performance with safety and cybersecurity. The Holistic Vehicle-Cloud Network Architecture (HVNA) integrates Internet of Things (IoT) devices, cloud computing, and machine learning to predict and mitigate failures in both in-vehicle and over-the-air communications. Cybersecurity assessment follows the International Organization for Standardization/Society of Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 standard, combining Medini Analysis with Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) and the Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE) model to identify, classify, and mitigate vulnerabilities across system components and communication channels. Results reveal 162 threats in the vehicle architecture and 198 in the external communication architecture, including a notable share of high-level threats (1.8% and 5.6%, respectively). These findings highlight the importance of integrating predictive maintenance with robust cybersecurity measures to ensure resilience in connected and autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-05-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tiv.2026.3690410",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "resilience",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Constantin-Laurentiu Paraschiv",
        "Franco Cirillo",
        "Christian Esposito",
        "Rahamatullah Khondoker",
        "Mohammed Salman",
        "Marius Vochin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tiv.2026.3690410",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tmc.2023.3243772",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MTSFBet: A Hand-Gesture-Recognition-Based Identity Authentication Approach for Passive Keyless Entry Against Relay Attack",
      "description": "The Passive Keyless Entry and Start system (PKES) has become an essential element of vehicle systems since it allows owners to lock or unlock their properties without having to take out the keys. However, the system suffers from a potential and serious security problem because of a relay attack. This paper introduces dynamic biometrics to resolve such potential problems. Precisely, it opts for hand-gesture and proposes a Multi-Task Siamese Feature-pyramid network with Bidirectional Gated Recurrent Units (MTSFBet) against relay attack. MTSFBet is made up of a Dynamic Biometrics Extraction Module (DBEM) and Multi-Task Operation Module (MTOM). DBEM extracts trajectory and kinematic features from the gesture data of owners, whereas MTOM performs gesture classification and identity authentication using these features. Moreover, we designed a loss function for the identity authentication part. Eventually, based on the dataset collected by mobile devices, we constructed comparative experiments and ablation studies to demonstrate the effectiveness of the method. Our comprehensive model achieves an accuracy of 0.86 in gesture classification and an accuracy of 0.73 in identity authentication. The results showed that our MTSFBet significantly outperforms other comparison methods. The MTSFBet can also be used in any scenario associated with identity authentication based on hand gestures.",
      "published": "2023-02-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2023.3243772",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaohan Zhang",
        "Peng Liu",
        "Bohao Lu",
        "Yang Wang",
        "Xiaohan Chen",
        "Yanxin Zhang",
        "Zhi Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tmc.2023.3243772",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tmc.2023.3283295",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Selection and Resource Allocation for Federated Learning-Assisted Vehicular Network",
      "description": "To exploit the massive amounts of onboard data in vehicular networks while protecting data privacy and security, federated learning (FL) is regarded as a promising technology to support enormous vehicular applications. Despite that FL has great potential to improve the architecture of intelligent vehicular networks, the mobility of the vehicles and the dynamic nature of wireless channels make the integration of FL and vehicular networks more challenging. In this paper, we propose a vehicle mobility- and channel dynamic-aware FL (MADCA-FL) scheme to fit vehicular networks and enhance learning performances. This novel scheme enables the RSU to select appropriate vehicles and weightedly average the local models. Afterward, MADCA-FL formulates a problem to maximize the model accuracy while assuring the latency and energy restrictions, by jointly optimizing the computation and communication resources. With a mixed-integer non-linear programming structure, the problem is NP-hard. First, we utilize the successive convex approximation algorithm to handle the non-convexity, and then apply the Lagrange multiplier method and the block coordinate descent method to obtain the optimal solution. Extensive experiments are conducted to confirm the effectiveness of our proposed scheme.",
      "published": "2024-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2023.3283295",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xinran Zhang",
        "Zheng Chang",
        "T. Hu",
        "Weilong Chen",
        "Xin Zhang",
        "Ge-Yong Min"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tmc.2023.3283295",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 64,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tmc.2024.3368331",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Factor Authentication for Keyless Entry System via Finger-Induced Vibrations",
      "description": "Keyless entry systems (KES) have become popular due to their high user-friendliness, while fingerprint and digital password authentication are two of the most widely used unlocking ways. However, current KES are vulnerable to security threats, such as fingerprint films that deceive fingerprint sensors and stolen passcodes. To address these issues, this paper presents${\\sf Fingerbeat}$, a two-factor authentication system to defend the security risks of the current widely deployed KES devices.${\\sf Fingerbeat}$combines original credentials, such as fingerprints and passcodes, with unique and persistent finger-induced vibrations to create a two-factor secure authentication model, while ensuring user-friendliness.${\\sf Fingerbeat}$leverages the fact that each person's finger structure is distinct and can be represented in distinct vibration patterns. During authentication, FIV is triggered and embodied in the mechanical vibration of the force-bearing body (i.e., KES panel), which can be captured by a low-cost accelerometer. We develop a proof-of-concept prototype of${\\sf Fingerbeat}$, extracting FIV features from mixed vibration recordings and eliminating the impacts of variable behaviors and external disturbance. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate its security and effectiveness.",
      "published": "2024-02-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tmc.2024.3368331",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hongbo Jiang",
        "Panyi Ji",
        "Taiyuan Zhang",
        "Hangcheng Cao",
        "Daibo Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tmc.2024.3368331",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tmech.2021.3064816",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Covert Attacks Through Adversarial Learning: Study of Lane Keeping Attacks on the Safety of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Road management systems are to improve in terms of integrity, mobility, sustainability, and safety by the adoption of artificial intelligence and Internet of Things services. This article introduces the concept of covert attacks on autonomous vehicles which can jeopardize the safety of passengers. Covert attacks are designed to manipulate outputs of cyber physical systems through network channels in a way that while the changes are not easily perceptible by human beings, systems are negatively affected in the long run. We argue that future smart vehicles are vulnerable to viruses which can use adversarial learning methods to adapt themselves to hosts and remain stealth for a long period. As a case study, we design a covert attack on the lane keeping system of autonomous vehicles. In the scenario, an intelligent adversary manipulates sensor readings (lane position, curvature, etc.) in order to deceive the controller to drive the vehicle closer to the boundaries. The virus/attacker interactively learns the host vehicle behaviors in terms of lateral deviation and maneuverability and tries to increase the errors to the extent that remains unnoticeable to the driver. This process is carried out through actor-critic learning based on the Newton--Raphson method. We additionally design an intrusion detection system for such covert attacks. We use the GPS data and offline maps to reconstruct road curves and match them against readings. A simulation testbed is developed based on the map of Nurburgring-Grand Prix track to evaluate our models. Results confirm the validity and effectiveness of the proposed models.",
      "published": "2021-03-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tmech.2021.3064816",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Faezeh Farivar",
        "Mohammad Sayad Haghighi",
        "Alireza Jolfaei",
        "Sheng Wen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/ASME Transactions on Mechatronics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tmech.2021.3064816",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3912,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tmech.2021.3064816 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: remain, sensor, case, intelligence, physical, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tmlcn.2024.3410208",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sybil Attack Detection Based on Signal Clustering in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "With the growing adoption of vehicular networks, ensuring the security of these networks is becoming increasingly crucial. However, the broadcast nature of communication in these networks creates numerous privacy and security concerns. In particular, the Sybil attack, where attackers can use multiple identities to disseminate false messages, cause service delays, or gain control of the network, poses a significant threat. To combat this attack, we propose a novel approach utilizing the channel state information (CSI) of vehicles. Our approach leverages the distinct spatio-temporal variations of CSI samples obtained in vehicular communication signals to detect these attacks. We conduct extensive real-world experiments using vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data, gathered from dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) in vehicular networks. Our results demonstrate a high detection rate of over 98% in the real-world experiments, showcasing the practicality and effectiveness of our method in realistic vehicular scenarios. Furthermore, we rigorously test our approach through advanced ray-tracing simulations in urban environments, which demonstrates high efficacy even in complex scenarios involving various vehicles. This makes our approach a valuable, hardware-independent solution for the V2X technologies at major intersections.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tmlcn.2024.3410208",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Halit Bugra Tulay",
        "C. Emre Koksal"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Machine Learning in Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tmlcn.2024.3410208",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnnls.2023.3314512",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Real-World Adversarial Robustness of Real-Time Semantic Segmentation Models for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "The existence of real-world adversarial examples (RWAEs) (commonly in the form of patches) poses a serious threat for the use of deep learning models in safety-critical computer vision tasks such as visual perception in autonomous driving. This article presents an extensive evaluation of the robustness of semantic segmentation (SS) models when attacked with different types of adversarial patches, including digital, simulated, and physical ones. A novel loss function is proposed to improve the capabilities of attackers in inducing a misclassification of pixels. Also, a novel attack strategy is presented to improve the expectation over transformation (EOT) method for placing a patch in the scene. Finally, a state-of-the-art method for detecting adversarial patch is first extended to cope with SS models, then improved to obtain real-time performance, and eventually evaluated in real-world scenarios. Experimental results reveal that even though the adversarial effect is visible with both digital and real-world attacks, its impact is often spatially confined to areas of the image around the patch. This opens to further questions about the spatial robustness of real-time SS models.",
      "published": "2023-10-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnnls.2023.3314512",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giulio Rossolini",
        "Federico Nesti",
        "Gianluca D’Amico",
        "Saasha Nair",
        "Alessandro Biondi",
        "Giorgio Buttazzo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnnls.2023.3314512",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 62,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnse.2021.3059881",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANintelliIDS: Detecting In-Vehicle Intrusion Attacks on a Controller Area Network Using CNN and Attention-Based GRU",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) is a communication protocol that provides reliable and productive transmission between in-vehicle nodes continuously. CAN bus protocol is broadly utilized standard channel to deliver sequential communications between electronic control units (ECUs) due to simple and reliable in-vehicle communication. Existing studies report how easily an attack can be performed on the CAN bus of in-vehicle due to weak security mechanisms that could lead to system malfunctions. Hence the security of communications inside a vehicle is a latent problem. In this paper, we propose a novel approach named CANintelliIDS, for vehicle intrusion attack detection on the CAN bus. CANintelliIDS is based on a combination of convolutional neural network (CNN) and attention-based gated recurrent unit (GRU) model to detect single intrusion attacks as well as mixed intrusion attacks on a CAN bus. The proposed CANintelliIDS model is evaluated extensively and it achieved a performance gain of 10.79% on test intrusion attacks over existing approaches.",
      "published": "2021-02-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnse.2021.3059881",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdul Rehman Javed",
        "Saif Ur Rehman",
        "Mohib Ullah Khan",
        "Mamoun Alazab",
        "Thippa Reddy Gadekallu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnse.2021.3059881",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 335,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnse.2022.3142287",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of Blockchain-Based Lightweight V2I Handover Authentication Protocol for VANET",
      "description": "Connected vehicle means providing different services, such as advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS) from vehicles connected to the network. Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) can support vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications to realize connected vehicle. In VANETs, secure communication must be ensured, as otherwise it can lead to traffic accidents and human injuries. Recently, many studies on V2I authentication have been conducted to guarantee the security of V2I communications. However, recent V2I authentication protocols do not consider the handover situation, and it causes unnecessary computations. As vehicles have limited computing resources, unnecessary computation can lead to overload to the vehicles. In recent years, blockchain-based VANET is an active field of research because it can provide decentralization, data integrity and transparency. Using the strength of the blockchain technology, we design a blockchain-based handover authentication protocol for VANETs. In the proposed protocol, vehicles only perform lightweight computations in handover situations for efficiency of the network. We also conduct the formal analysis such as Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic, Real-Or-Random (ROR) oracle model, and Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) simulation to the proposed protocol. We simulate the proposed protocol using network simulator 3 (NS-3) to verify that the proposed protocol is practical. Finally, we compare the computational cost and security features of the proposed protocol with existing protocols to show that the proposed protocol is more secure and efficient.",
      "published": "2022-01-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnse.2022.3142287",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seunghwan Son",
        "Joonyoung Lee",
        "Yohan Park",
        "Youngho Park",
        "Ashok Kumar Das"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnse.2022.3142287",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 254,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnse.2022.3188304",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hybrid Deep Sensor Anomaly Detection for Autonomous Vehicles in 6G-V2X Environment",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) exchange real-time and seamless data between other AVs and the network, thus revolutionizing the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). Automated transportation brings numerous benefits to human beings. However, the concerns such as safety, security, and privacy keep rising. In navigation and trajectory planning, the AVs require exchanging sensory information from their own and other AVs. In such cases, when a malicious AV or faulty sensor-equipped AV comes into connectivity, it can have disruptive consequences. This paper proposes a Hybrid Deep Anomaly Detection (HDAD) approach for effective anomaly detection and cyber-attack mitigation in AVs. The Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) algorithm in HDAD approach acts over the 6G network to combat new-age cyber-attacks and provide a swift and accurate anomaly detection mechanism. In conjunction with Maximum Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (MaxEntIRL), the HDAD approach identifies and isolates malicious AVs. It is envisioned that the obtained results prove the effectiveness of HDAD and have an 8.2% higher accuracy rate than the existing systems.",
      "published": "2022-07-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnse.2022.3188304",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sahaya Beni Prathiba",
        "Gunasekaran Raja",
        "Sudha Anbalagan",
        "Arikumar K. Selvaraj",
        "Sugeerthi Gurumoorthy",
        "Kapal Dev"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnse.2022.3188304",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnse.2023.3304413",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Local Differential Privacy-Based Privacy-Preserving Data Range Query Scheme for Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "The local differential privacy (LDP)-based data range query method has gained significant attention in the field of electric vehicles (EVs). Due to the reliance of most EV charging services on third-party platforms, owner privacy is easily compromised. The range query is critical in addressing this problem. However, the current strategies face critical challenges in balancing privacy, accuracy, and efficiency. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving data range query (PPQ) scheme based on LDP. This innovative scheme comprises a data encryption optimization model, a data storage optimization (DSO) model, and a secure hierarchical decomposition (SHD) algorithm. The optimized unary encoding (OUE) protocol is used to solve privacy and accuracy issues. Furthermore, the efficiency problem is solved by optimizing the data storage structure and improving the speed of data aggregation using the DSO model and the SHD algorithm. The effectiveness of the PPQ scheme is verified by simulating V2G scenarios in different datasets. The discussion illustrates that the PPQ scheme can withstand various attacks, including collusion attacks, background knowledge attacks, membership inference attacks, and distributed denial of service attacks. It can also ensure query accuracy and query efficiency while ensuring data privacy.",
      "published": "2023-08-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnse.2023.3304413",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2g"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhichao Ju",
        "Yuancheng Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnse.2023.3304413",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnsm.2020.3038991",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANnolo: An Anomaly Detection System Based on LSTM Autoencoders for Controller Area Network",
      "description": "Automotive security has gained significant traction in the last decade thanks to the development of new connectivity features that have brought the vehicle from an isolated environment to an externally facing domain. Researchers have shown that modern vehicles are vulnerable to multiple types of attacks leveraging remote, direct and indirect physical access, which allow attackers to gain control and affect safety-critical systems. Conversely, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been proposed by both industry and academia to identify attacks and anomalous behaviours. In this article, we propose CANnolo, an IDS based on Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)-autoencoders to identify anomalies in Controller Area Networks (CANs). During a training phase, CANnolo automatically analyzes the CAN streams and builds a model of the legitimate data sequences. Then, it detects anomalies by computing the difference between the reconstructed and the respective real sequences. We experimentally evaluated CANnolo on a set of simulated attacks applied over a real-world dataset. We show that our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art model by improving the detection rate and precision.",
      "published": "2020-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnsm.2020.3038991",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefano Longari",
        "Daniel Humberto Nova Valcarcel",
        "Mattia Zago",
        "Michele Carminati",
        "Stefano Zanero"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnsm.2020.3038991",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 139,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnsm.2023.3318406",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EV Charging Infrastructure Discovery to Contextualize Its Deployment Security",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCSs) have been shown to be susceptible to remote exploitation due to manufacturer-induced vulnerabilities, demonstrated by recent attacks on this ecosystem. What is more alarming is that compromising these high-wattage IoT systems can be leveraged to perform coordinated oscillatory load attacks against the power grid which could lead to the instability of this critical infrastructure. In this paper, we investigate a previously sidelined aspect of EVCS security. We analyze the deployment security of EVCSs and highlight operator-induced vulnerabilities rendering the ecosystem exposed to remote intrusions. We create an advanced discovery technique that leverages Web interface artifacts to dynamically discover new charging station vendors. As a result, we uncover 33,320 charging station management systems in the wild. Consequently, we study the deployment security of the charging stations and identify that 28,046 EVCSs were found to be vulnerable to eavesdropping, and around 24% of the studied EVCSs are deployed with default configurations exposing the ecosystem to a Mirai-like attack vector. Aligned with this finding, we discover that the EVCS ecosystem has been targeted by nefarious IoT malware such as Mirai and its variants. This demonstrates that further security measures should be implemented by vendors and operators to ensure the security of this vital ecosystem. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive recommendation for securing the deployment of EVCSs.",
      "published": "2024-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnsm.2023.3318406",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploitation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khaled Sarieddine",
        "M. Sayed",
        "C. Assi",
        "R. Atallah",
        "Sadegh Torabi",
        "Joseph Khoury",
        "M. S. Pour",
        "E. Bou-Harb"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnsm.2023.3318406",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnsm.2024.3394842",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ECF-IDS: An Enhanced Cuckoo Filter-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of vehicle connectivity and intelligent technologies, an increasing number of vehicles are now connected to the Internet. However, these connected vehicles are vulnerable to malicious attacks, posing serious security events. In particular, the in-vehicle controller area network (CAN) bus has witnessed a rise in incidents involving various network attacks, such as denial of service (DoS), fuzzy attacks, and gear attacks. In response, this paper proposes an enhanced cuckoo filter-based intrusion detection system (ECF-IDS) for in-vehicle network. The ECF-IDS builds on an enhanced version of the cuckoo filter. It first utilizes the cuckoo filter to establish two lists (a normal list and an intrusion list) based on the labeled dataset using Car Hacking Dataset (CHD) and can-train-and-test dataset. Then, the input CAN traffic is sequentially compared with these two lists, where the conflicting traffic is further identified using a BERT-based model. The ECF-IDS is experimentally validated using the CHD and can-train-and-test dataset, demonstrating higher detection efficiency, lower resource consumption, and detection success exceeding 99% compared to other algorithms presented in previous studies. Furthermore, we conducted real in-vehicle environment testing on the ECF-IDS model, and its detection performance proved to be excellent.",
      "published": "2024-05-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnsm.2024.3394842",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sifan Li",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Hassan Jalil Hadi",
        "Feng Hao",
        "Faisal Bashir Hussain",
        "Luan Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnsm.2024.3394842",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4348,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tnsm.2024.3394842 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serious, normal, response, service, where, car, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnsm.2024.3517621",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Attacks Prevention Towards Prosumer-based EV Charging Stations: An Edge-assisted Federated Prototype Knowledge Distillation Approach",
      "description": "In this paper, cyber-attack prevention for the prosumer-based electric vehicle (EV) charging stations (EVCSs) is investigated, which covers two aspects: 1) cyber-attack detection on prosumers' network traffic (NT) data, and 2) cyber-attack intervention. To establish an effective prevention mechanism, several challenges need to be tackled, for instance, the NT data per prosumer may be non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID), and the boundary between benign and malicious traffic becomes blurred. To this end, we propose an edge-assisted federated prototype knowledge distillation (E-FPKD) approach, where each client is deployed on a dedicated local edge server (DLES) and can report its availability for joining the federated learning (FL) process. Prior to the E-FPKD approach, to enhance accuracy, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient is adopted for feature selection. Regarding the proposed E-FPKD approach, we integrate the knowledge distillation and prototype aggregation technique into FL to deal with the non-IID challenge. To address the boundary issue, instead of directly calculating the distance between benign and malicious traffic, we consider maximizing the overall detection correctness of all prosumers (ODC), which can mitigate the computational cost compared with the former way. After detection, a rule-based method will be triggered at each DLES for cyber-attack intervention. Experimental analysis demonstrates that the proposed E-FPKD can achieve the largest ODC on NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and IoTID20 datasets in both binary and multi-class classification, compared with baselines. For instance, the ODC for IoTID20 obtained via the proposed method is separately 0.3782% and 4.4471% greater than FedProto and FedAU in multi-class classification.",
      "published": "2024-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnsm.2024.3517621",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luyao Zou",
        "Quang Hieu Vo",
        "Kitae Kim",
        "Huy Q. Le",
        "Chu Myaet Thwal",
        "Chaoning Zhang",
        "Choong Seon Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnsm.2024.3517621",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tnsm.2025.3613415",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Based SDN-Enabled Lightweight Authentication Protocol for IoV Using zk-SNARK",
      "description": "Software-defined networking (SDN), an emerging networking paradigm, has been realized in the Internet of Vehicles to effectively manage the dynamic nature of vehicles and provide diverse vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services and security. Nevertheless, the lack of authentication mechanisms and malicious behavior of vehicle users has seriously threatened security and privacy concerns in the SDN-based vehicular network (SDVN). Furthermore, in a distributed SDVN, the SDN controllers (SDNCs) are prone to single point of failure (SPoF) due to various potential attack vectors. Such attacks can result in the loss of periodically exchanged vehicular information among SDNCs. To address the aforementioned issues, a novel privacy-preserving lightweight zk-SNARK-based authentication protocol in blockchain-enabled distributed SDVN is presented. To address the SPoF of SDNCs, the proposed network model removes the dependency of a controller on neighboring SDNCs as the authenticated information is validated and stored in the blockchain. As an integral part of the protocol, the vehicles are authenticated by providing succinct and constant size proofs during authentication across SDVN domains. The security and simulation performance analyses confirm the superior performance of the proposed protocol, surpassing state-of-the-art schemes in terms of authentication latency, computation time, and energy efficiency. The proposed protocol has achieved notable improvements of more than 55% in all the metrics considered during the protocol simulation when compared with other protocols.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tnsm.2025.3613415",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Indukuri Mani Varma",
        "Neetesh Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tnsm.2025.3613415",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tpds.2016.2520949",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security-Aware Mapping and Scheduling with Hardware Co-Processors for FlexRay-Based Distributed Embedded Systems",
      "description": "Automotive in-vehicle systems are distributed systems consisting of multiple ECUs (Electronic Control Units) interconnected with a broadcast network such as FlexRay. Message authentication is an effective mechanism to prevent attackers from injecting malicious messages into the network. In order to reduce timing interference of message authentication operations on application tasks, hardware coprocessors in the form of either FPGA or ASIC are adopted to offload computation-intensive cryptographic algorithms from the ECU. However, it may not be feasible or desirable to equip every ECU with a hardware coprocessor, as modern vehicles can contain more than one hundred ECUs, and the automotive industry is cost-sensitive. In this paper, we consider the problem of mapping an application task graph onto a FlexRay-based distributed hardware platform, to meet security and deadline requirements while minimizing the number of hardware coprocessors needed in the system. We present a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) formulation, a divide-and-conquer heuristic algorithm, and a Simulated Annealing algorithm. We evaluate the algorithms with industrial case studies.",
      "published": "2016-01-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tpds.2016.2520949",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zonghua Gu",
        "Gang Han",
        "Haibo Zeng",
        "Qingling Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/tpds.2016.2520949",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tpec67884.2026.11513031",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Semi-Supervised Hybrid Deep Autoencoder for Attack Detection in Electric Vehicle Charging Stations",
      "description": "The rapid proliferation of Electric Vehicles (EVs) has made charging stations an integral component of modern power systems. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) enables communication between charging stations and central management systems for functions such as smart charging and remote diagnostics. However, this interconnectivity also introduces cyber-physical vulnerabilities, including Charge Manipulation Attacks (CMAs) that can alter charging schedules, increase energy costs, and compromise grid reliability. This paper presents a Semi-Supervised Hybrid Deep Autoencoder (SS-HDA) for detecting such attacks in OCPP 2.1-based charging networks. The proposed method integrates unsupervised learning, to model normal charging behavior from unlabeled data, with a supervised classifier that refines decision boundaries using a small set of labeled attack samples. A hybrid scoring mechanism combining reconstruction error and classifier confidence enhances detection accuracy while minimizing false alarms. The approach is evaluated across six common CMA, and its market-level impact is analyzed through coordinated charging optimization under day-ahead and real-time market conditions. The proposed SS-HDA achieves 90.5% accuracy, 97.6% precision, and a weighted F1-score of 0.91, while reducing total charging costs by up to 25% compared with attack conditions.",
      "published": "2026-02-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tpec67884.2026.11513031",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ocpp",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Saleh Sadeghi Gougheri",
        "Wei Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/tpec67884.2026.11513031",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tpel.2023.3299959",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimized Magnetic Core Layer in Inductive Power Transfer Pad for Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "This article proposes a reduced ferrite inductive power transfer (IPT) system for electric vehicle (EV) charging using ferrite-based soft magnetic composites (SMCs). IPT pads typically consist of a significant amount of ferrite to improve field shaping for better magnetic coupling between the primary and the secondary pads. However, the costly and brittle nature of ferrite leaves the IPT pads vulnerable to harsh roadway conditions. The IPT pad design in this article either replaces ferrite with SMCs or removes the ferrite to reduce system cost and improve mechanical robustness. The design methodology uses a genetic algorithm to optimize the geometry of the primary magnetic core layer with a combination of SMC and ferrite using ANSYS Maxwell based on the magnetic coupling, ferrite volume, and magnetic leakage fields. This article experimentally validates the optimized pad that reduces ferrite volume by$63\\%$compared with a typical IPT pad that uses only ferrite. The optimized design has$11\\%$coupling reduction, but also reduces magnetic field leakage by$8\\%$. When considering end-to-end dc–dc efficiency, the reduction with the optimized system is no more than$0.65\\%$. The minimal deterioration is due to the optimized placement of SMC in low B-field regions.",
      "published": "2023-07-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tpel.2023.3299959",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brian S. Gu",
        "Tharindu Dharmakeerthi",
        "Seho Kim",
        "Michael O’Sullivan",
        "Grant Anthony Covic"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tpel.2023.3299959",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2015.2468062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Control of EV Charging Points for Thermal and Voltage Management of LV Networks",
      "description": "High penetrations of domestic electric vehicles (EVs) in U.K. low voltage (LV) networks may result in significant technical problems. This paper proposes an implementable, centralized control algorithm, currently being trialed in 9 U.K. residential LV networks, that uses limited information to manage EV charging points to mitigate these technical problems. Two real U.K. LV networks are used to quantify the potential impacts of different EV penetration levels and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the control algorithm (using different control cycles) for simultaneous thermal and voltage management. Monte Carlo simulations (adopting 1-min resolution data) are undertaken to cater for domestic and EV demand uncertainties. Results for these LV networks show that problems may occur for EV penetrations higher than 20%. More importantly, they highlight that even for a 100% penetration and control cycles of up to 10 min, the control algorithm successfully mitigates problems on the examined LV networks. Crucially, to determine effects on the comfort of EV users, a metric is introduced and discussed. The results of different control settings are presented to analyze potential adaptations of the control strategy. Finally, a comparison with an optimization framework highlights that the proposed algorithm is as effective while using limited information.",
      "published": "2015-09-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2015.2468062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jairo Quirós‐Tortós",
        "Luis F. Ochoa",
        "Sahban W. Alnaser",
        "Tim Butler"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Power Systems",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/tpwrs.2015.2468062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 140,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2582903",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Scalable Electric Vehicle Charging Protocols",
      "description": "Although electric vehicles are considered a viable solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, their uncoordinated charging could have adverse effects on power system operation. Nevertheless, the task of optimal electric vehicle charging scales unfavorably with the fleet size and the number of control periods, especially when distribution grid limitations are enforced. To this end, vehicle charging is first tackled using the recently revived Frank-Wolfe method. The novel decentralized charging protocol has minimal computational requirements from vehicle controllers, enjoys provable acceleration over existing alternatives, enhances the security of the pricing mechanism against data attacks, and protects user privacy. To comply with voltage limits, a network-constrained EV charging problem is subsequently formulated. Leveraging a linearized model for unbalanced distribution grids, the goal is to minimize the power supply cost while respecting critical voltage regulation and substation capacity limitations. Optimizing variables across grid nodes is accomplished by exchanging information only between neighboring buses via the alternating direction method of multipliers. Numerical tests corroborate the optimality and efficiency of the novel schemes.",
      "published": "2015-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2582903",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liang Zhang",
        "Vassilis Kekatos",
        "Georgios B. Giannakis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Power Systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2582903",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2024.3449339",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Domain-Adaptive Clustered Federated Transfer Learning for EV Charging Demand Forecasting",
      "description": "To address the privacy concerns for state-of-the-art cutting-edge centralized machine learning in electric vehicle (EV) charging demand forecasting applications, federated learning (FL) has been employed to transfer training processes from the cloud server to edge devices. Nevertheless, traditional FL still grapples with several challenges in terms of personalization, transferability, feature extraction, and data security. This study proposes a domain-adaptive clustered federated transfer learning (FTL) scheme for EV charging demand forecasting. This scheme combines the principles of transfer learning (TL) with FL by utilizing maximum mean discrepancy to measure the differences between local features and cluster them, weight local model parameters in the global model aggregation, and realize domain adaptation for projecting local data and new data to the trained FL model. A multi-head attention-based transformer is leveraged to construct a forecasting model to focus on the most relevant spatio-temporal features. Under multi-stage differential privacy protections, Laplace noise is injected into the local feature, model update and local model during the clustering, FL and TL processes, respectively. The case study demonstrates that the proposed domain-adaptive clustered FTL outperforms the conventional FTL and FL, local training, and other domain shift handling techniques in predictive accuracy and operational risk.",
      "published": "2025-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2024.3449339",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tian-Jin Wang",
        "Chao Ren",
        "Zhao-Yang Dong",
        "Christine Yip"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Power Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tpwrs.2024.3449339",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tr.2021.3112538",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability-Oriented Fuzz Testing for Connected Autonomous Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "In an era of connectivity and automation, the vehicle industry is adopting numerous technologies to transform driver-centric vehicles into intelligent mechanical devices driven by software components. Software integration and network connectivity inherit numerous security issues that open the door for malicious attacks. Software security testing is a scalable and practical approach to identify systems’ weaknesses and vulnerabilities at an early stage and throughout their life-cycle. Security specialists recommend fuzz testing to identify vulnerabilities within vehicle software systems. Nevertheless, the randomness and blindness of fuzzing hinder it from becoming a reliable security tool. This article presents a vulnerability-oriented fuzz (VulFuzz) testing framework that utilizes security vulnerability metrics designed particularly for connected and autonomous vehicles to direct and prioritize the fuzz testing toward the most vulnerable components. While most gray-box fuzzing techniques aim solely to expand code coverage, the proposed approach assigns weights to ensure a thorough examination of the most vulnerable components. Moreover, we employ an input structure-aware mutation technique that can bypass vehicle software systems’ input formats to boost test performance and avoid dropped test cases. Such a testing technique will contribute to the quality assurance of vehicle software engineering. We implemented the proposed approach on OpenPilot, a driver assistance system, and compared our results to American fuzzy lop (AFL) and an unguided mutation-based fuzzer. Within 16.8 h, VulFuzz exposed 335 crashes, 41 times more than AFL and two times more than an unguided mutation-based fuzzer. VulFuzz is explicitly efficient for automotive systems, reaching the same code coverage as AFL but with more exposed crashes and fewer dropped messages.",
      "published": "2021-10-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tr.2021.3112538",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "driver assistance",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lama J. Moukahal",
        "M. Zulkernine",
        "Martin Soukup"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Reliability",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tr.2021.3112538",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/trustcom.2016.0164",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Log Your Car: The Non-invasive Vehicle Forensics",
      "description": "Digital forensics is becoming an important feature for many embedded devices. In automotive systems, digital forensics involves multiple electronic control units (ECUs) used to support the connected and intelligent vehicle's technology. Digital evidence from these ECUs can be used in forensics investigation and analysis. Such a mechanism can potentially facilitate crash investigation, insurance claims and crime investigation. Issues related to forensics include the authenticity, integrity and privacy of the data. In this paper, the security of the forensic process and data in automotive systems is analysed. We propose an efficient, secure, privacy-preserving and reliable mechanism to provide a forensics data collection and storage process. A diagnostic application for smart phones, DiaLOG, is incorporated in the proposed process that uses a secure protocol to communicate the collected forensic data to a secure cloud storage. The proposed protocol for communicating forensic data is implemented to measure performance results and formally analysed using Scyther and CasperFDR with no known attack found.",
      "published": "2016-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/trustcom.2016.0164",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hafizah Mansor",
        "Konstantinos Markantonakis",
        "Raja Naeem Akram",
        "Keith E. Mayes",
        "Iakovos Gurulian"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/trustcom.2016.0164",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00040",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blind Points Between ASR and Intent Inferring: Vulnerability Discovering via Fuzzing in-Vehicle Voice Assistance",
      "description": "Currently, in-vehicle Voice Assistants (VAs) have been widely integrated into in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems to enhance driver safety when performing functions such as navigation and phone calls while driving. Although various studies have demonstrated the existence of vulnerabilities in general-purpose VAs, there is a lack of research specifically targeting in-vehicle VAs, which operate in a closed and black-box environment. In this paper, we utilize fuzzing testing to analyze how speech errors in voice commands affect the recognition performance of in-vehicle VAs. First, we simulate speech errors by applying linguistic knowledge to mutate voice commands. Then, we adopt a genetic algorithm to efficiently generate additional erroneous commands. To further improve the quality of these mutated commands, we assign a risk level to each original command and prioritize the mutation of those whose misrecognition by the in-vehicle VA results in an increased risk level. We conducted comprehensive fuzzing experiments on both local (Whisper–DistilBERT-based) and cloud-based (Amazon Lex) in-vehicle VA systems. Our approach generated 59112 speech-error commands in the local VA, achieving a 60.13% misrecognition rate, significantly outperforming Baseline-Fuzzing, which had an effectiveness of 40.26%. On the cloud-based VA, the effectiveness improved from 2.83% to 33.24%. These results confirm the superiority of our method in generating high-impact erroneous commands.",
      "published": "2025-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00040",
      "matched_terms": [
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerabilities",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Peilin Luo",
        "Wei Teng",
        "Jiachun Li",
        "Yan Meng",
        "Haojin Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00040",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00216",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DFAFuzz: Fuzzing for Embedded JavaScript Virtual Machines with Type-Directed DFA",
      "description": "JavaScript is rapidly being deployed in security-critical embedded domains, including IoT devices, edge computing, and smart automotive applications. Embedded JavaScript virtual machines (VMs) are critical in powering such deployments, which should be secure and trustworthy. Fuzzing is an effective approach in detecting deep bugs in these VMs by generating diverse VM bytecode programs. However, existing JavaScript fuzzers are still limited in generating diverse and valid bytecode that finds deep bugs, because they fail to track the VM operand-stack state, which leads to invalid programs and missed bugs.In this paper, we present a novel fuzzing approach called DFAFuzz, to detect deep bugs in embedded JavaScript VMs. Our key idea is to use a type-directed deterministic finite automaton (DFA) to track instruction type information, guiding the generation of new type-correct JavaScript bytecode programs from existing fuzzing seeds. First, our approach employs type reconstruction to track variable type changes during bytecode generation. Second, our approach utilizes type transitions with the aid of DFA to guide bytecode generation to produce valid bytecode. We implement a software prototype DFAFuzzer and conduct extensive experiments to evaluate its effectiveness on JerryScript and QuickJS. Our results show that DFAFuzzer improves the bytecode validity ratio by 7.6% and 2.8% for JerryScript and QuickJS over AFL++, respectively. Furthermore, DFAFuzzer detects 111 bugs that are missed by state-of-the-art fuzzers, AFL++ and Fuzzilli.",
      "published": "2025-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00216",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "fuzzing",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haiwei Lai",
        "Baojian Hua"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00216",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00310",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ghost Vehicle: A Game-Theoretical Attack Strategy Targeting CAV Platoons",
      "description": "With the rapid development of V2X and autonomous driving technologies, the security and stability of platoons based on Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) have become a critical research focus. However, these systems remain vulnerable when facing sophisticated attacks. In this study, we propose a Game Theory-based attack framework that introduces a Ghost Vehicle capable of executing three distinct attack modes, Leader Attack, Mid-Platoon Attack, and Follower Attack. Experimental results demonstrate that our attack effectively destabilizes the platoon during Leader Attack and Mid-Platoon Attack, while seamlessly integrating as a normal member during the Follower Attack. Unlike prior sensor-spoofing attacks that rely on hardware-intensive methods, the behavior of the Ghost Vehicle is dynamically controlled using Mode Predictive Control (MPC) and Finite State Machine (FSM), ensuring high efficiency with a maximum computation time of 40 seconds, which represents an average across multiple runs. Our attack modes are validated in a highway scenario, demonstrating the high effectiveness with low computational cost.",
      "published": "2025-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00310",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lanai Huang",
        "Winston Ellis",
        "Sana Belguith"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00310",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tse.2022.3195640",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Neural Network Guided Evolutionary Fuzzing for Finding Traffic Violations of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Self-driving cars and trucks, autonomous vehicles (avs), should not be accepted by regulatory bodies and the public until they have much higher confidence in their safety and reliability — which can most practically and convincingly be achieved by testing. But existing testing methods are inadequate for checking the end-to-end behaviors ofavcontrollers against complex, real-world corner cases involving interactions with multiple independent agents such as pedestrians and human-driven vehicles. While test-drivingavs on streets and highways fails to capture many rare events, existing simulation-based testing methods mainly focus on simple scenarios and do not scale well for complex driving situations that require sophisticated awareness of the surroundings. To address these limitations, we propose a new fuzz testing technique, calledAutoFuzz, which can leverage widely-usedavsimulators’ API grammars to generate semantically and temporally valid complex driving scenarios (sequences of scenes). To efficiently search for traffic violations-inducing scenarios in a large search space, we propose a constrained neural network (NN) evolutionary search method to optimizeAutoFuzz. Evaluation of our prototype on one state-of-the-art learning-based controller, two rule-based controllers, and one industrial-grade controller in five scenarios shows thatAutoFuzzefficiently finds hundreds of traffic violationsin high-fidelity simulation environments. For each scenario,AutoFuzzcan find on average 10-39% more unique traffic violationsthan the best-performing baseline method. Further, fine-tuning the learning-based controller with the traffic violationsfound byAutoFuzzsuccessfully reduced the traffic violationsfound in the new version of theavcontroller software.",
      "published": "2022-08-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tse.2022.3195640",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ziyuan Zhong",
        "Gail E. Kaiser",
        "Baishakhi Ray"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tse.2022.3195640",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 119,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2017.2669647",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OCPP Protocol: Security Threats and Challenges",
      "description": "One benefit postulated for the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) is their ability to act as stabilizing entities in smart grids through bidirectional charging, allowing local or global smoothing of peaks and imbalances. This benefit, however, hinges indirectly on the reliability and security of the power flows thus achieved. Therefore, this paper studies key security properties of the already-deployed Open Charge Point Protocol specifying communication between charging points and energy management systems. It is argued that possible subversion or malicious endpoints in the protocol can also lead to destabilization of power networks. While reviewing these aspects, we focus, from a theoretical and practical standpoint, on attacks that interfere with resource reservation originating with the EV, which may also be initiated by a man in the middle, energy theft, or fraud. Such attacks may even be replicated widely, resulting in over- or under-shooting of power network provisioning, or the (total/partial) disintegration of the integrity and stability of power networks.",
      "published": "2017-02-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2017.2669647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ocpp",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cristina Alcaraz",
        "Javier López",
        "Stephen Dirk Bjørn Wolthusen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2017.2669647",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 170,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2017.2705188",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Risk-Based Optimization Model for Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Response to Cyber Attacks",
      "description": "Security of the smart grid is at risk when the vulnerabilities of the electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure is not addressed properly. As vehicles are becoming smarter and connected, their risk of being compromised is increasing. On various occasions and venues, hacking into smart or autonomous vehicles have been shown to be possible. For most of the time, a compromised vehicle poses a threat to the driver and other vehicles. On the other hand, when the vehicle is electric, the attack may spread to the power grid infrastructure starting from the EV supply equipment (EVSE) all the way up to the utility systems. Traditional isolation-based protection schemes do not work well in smart grid since electricity services have availability constraints and few of the components have physical backups. In this paper, we propose a mixed integer linear programming model that jointly optimizes security risk and equipment availability in the interdependent power and EV infrastructure. We adopt an epidemic attack model to mimic malware propagation. We assume malware spreads during EV charging when an EV is charged from an infected EVSE and then travels and recharges at another EVSE. In addition, it spreads through the communication network of EVSEs. The proposed response model aims to isolate a subset of compromised and likely compromised EVSEs. The response model minimizes the risk of attack propagation while providing a satisfactory level of equipment availability to supply demand. Our analysis shows the theoretical and practical bounds for the proposed response model in smart grid in the face of attacks to the EV infrastructure.",
      "published": "2017-05-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2017.2705188",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seyedamirabbas Mousavian",
        "Melike Erol‐Kantarci",
        "Lei Wu",
        "Thomas Howard Ortmeyer"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2017.2705188",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 97,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2020.2994177",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Public Plug-in Electric Vehicles + Grid Data: Is a New Cyberattack Vector Viable?",
      "description": "High-wattage demand-side appliances such as Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) are proliferating. As a result, information on the charging patterns of PEVs is becoming accessible via smartphone applications, which aggregate real-time availability and historical usage of public PEV charging stations. Moreover, information on the power grid infrastructure and operations has become increasingly available in technical documents and real-time dashboards of the utilities, affiliates, and the power grid operators. The research question that this study explores is: Can one combine high-wattage demand-side appliances with public information to launch cyberattacks on the power grid? To answer this question and report a proof of concept demonstration, the study scrapes data from public sources for Manhattan, NY, USA using the electric vehicle charging station smartphone application and the power grid data circulated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, New York Independent System Operator, and the local utility in New York. It then designs a novel data-driven cyberattack strategy using state-feedback based partial eigenvalue relocation, which targets frequency stability of the power grid. The study establishes that while such an attack is not possible at the current penetration level of PEVs, it will be practical once the number of PEVs increases.",
      "published": "2019-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2020.2994177",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samrat Acharya",
        "Yury Dvorkin",
        "Ramesh Karri"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2020.2994177",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 172,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2021.3122106",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hidden Markov Models-Based Anomaly Correlations for the Cyber-Physical Security of EV Charging Stations",
      "description": "Over recent years, we have seen a significant rise in electric mobility to overcome the anthropogenic emissions by conventional gasoline vehicles. However, the prerequisite of smoothening of peaks and imbalances through bidirectional charging is concatenated with the undesired impacts on reliability and security of power system operation when there are probable intrusions in the eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) station, hence destabilizing the charging networks. So this paper applies STRIDE based threat modeling to analyze and identify multiple potential threats endured by the cyber-physical system (CPS) of XFC station by using weighted attack defense tree. Potential mitigation strategies are then suggested for the identified severe threats. In addition, this paper also develops a stochastic probabilistic tool, the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) for modeling the security attacks for a given range of identified attack vectors and hence employing an appropriate defense strategy against the malicious hacker. Also, a weighted attack defense tree has been developed to generate various attack scenarios. In the end, the results of the proposed work are substantiated and validated if it is able to considerably improve overall charging efficiency and cyber-physical security of the charging station network.",
      "published": "2022-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2021.3122106",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mansi Girdhar",
        "Junho Hong",
        "Hyojong Lee",
        "T. Song"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2021.3122106",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 66,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2023.3281782",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EV Charging Command Fast Allocation Approach Based on Deep Reinforcement Learning With Safety Modules",
      "description": "Efficient real-time management of electric vehicle (EV) charging in a charging station (CS) is vital to the integration of large-scale EVs in power grids. It faces critical challenges such as frequent changes in the grid’s dispatch commands, the complexity of EVs’ costs, and the uncertainties in the EVs’ charging/traveling behaviors and in the future dispatch commands. To tackle these challenges, this paper proposes a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based allocation approach that optimally and efficiently allocates the grid’s commands to the EVs and controls their charging in real time. It includes two stages. Stage 1 includes a data-driven EV cost quantification method, which efficiently quantifies the EVs’ flexibility contributions with long-term return consideration. Stage 2 proposes a high sample efficiency DRL-based allocation method, which optimizes the EVs’ charging and addresses the EV- and grid-related uncertainties. The proposed allocation has a fast computational speed. Finally, to address the security risk due to DRL’s stochastic exploratory actions, two safety modules are developed which ensure the EV charging security and the allocation accuracy. The effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed strategy are verified by comparing its performance against multiple benchmark approaches.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2023.3281782",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Zhang",
        "Yuxiang Guan",
        "Liang Che",
        "M. Shahidehpour"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2023.3281782",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2023.3324731",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Communication-Free Distributed Charging Control for Electric Vehicle Group",
      "description": "The disordered charging of electric vehicles (EVs) in residential areas leads to a rapid increase of the peak load, causing transformer overload, but the charging control of EV group can effectively alleviate this phenomenon. However, existing charging control methods need reliable two-way communication infrastructure, which brings high operation costs and security risks. To offer a backup strategy for charging control of EVs after communication facilities fail, this paper proposes a communication-free charging control scheme to provide a decentralized on-site charging strategy for EV group. First, an uncontrollable EV group baseline estimation considering charging behaviors enabled by Gaussian mixture model (GMM) is proposed to acquire the capacity margin forecasting for controllable EVs. Next, this paper proposes a probabilistic distributed control method to assist users formulate the charging plan autonomously. Here, the charging behavior of EV group is regulated from an optimization with uncertain boundary conditions to a sampling with uncertain feasible regions expressed by a probability distribution. Finally, the scheme is verified via real-world EV charging data from a residential area in Hangzhou, China. The results show that this method can reduce the probability of transformer overload caused by out-of-order EV charging after a communication failure.",
      "published": "2023-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2023.3324731",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heyang Yu",
        "Chuanzi Xu",
        "Weifeng Wang",
        "Guangchao Geng",
        "Quanyuan Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2023",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2023.3324731",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2024.3392910",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Reliable Evaluation Metric for Electrical Load Forecasts in V2G Scheduling Considering Statistical Features of EV Charging",
      "description": "An accurate electrical load forecast is essential for the effective implementation of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology to achieve optimal electric vehicle (EV) charging decisions, consequently, ensuring the security and stability of power grid. While prevailing evaluation metrics prioritize forecast quality, they often overlook the significant influence a forecast exerts when integrated into the V2G scheduling optimization. In this paper, a reliable metric is proposed for forecasts in the context of V2G scheduling from the perspective of forecast value. Firstly, we conducted meticulously designed experiments to expose the limitations of forecast quality metrics in the context of V2G scheduling, as well as reveal three key findings. Subsequently, to address computational challenges and enhance representativeness of scheduling results, statistical features of EV charging are used to construct the aggregate model of EV fleet. Then, a reliable metric called V2G scheduling value error (V2G-SVE) is proposed to evaluate the degradation rate of scheduling performance as the score for forecasting performance. Finally, extensive case studies provide compelling evidence for the effectiveness and broad applicability of V2G-SVE. Beyond proposing an evaluation metric, this paper also aims to provide valuable insights about potential direction of improvement for future load forecasting technology.",
      "published": "2024-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2024.3392910",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jia-Hao Zhong",
        "Xiang Lei",
        "Z. Shao",
        "Lin-Ni Jian"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2024.3392910",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsg.2024.3451970",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Developing a Security Metric for Assessing the Power Grid’s Posture Against Attacks From EV Charging Ecosystem",
      "description": "Providing reliable and efficient services for EV users necessitates the use of cyber layers on top of physical layers in EV ecosystems. The deployment of such cyber layers, however, makes these ecosystems an appealing target for various cyber-attacks—e.g., data manipulation, malware injection, and intrusions—which are crafted to deteriorate the operation of power distribution networks. On this basis, this paper develops a metric that captures the security posture of EV ecosystems, considering the possible attacks and their associated impacts on distribution grids. First, potential attack graphs are obtained to show the connections between the adversaries’ access points and the consequences of attack vectors. Then, a Markov decision process (MDP) tree is generated, using probabilities of adversaries’ success rates for a specific attack vector and unique reward functions. The developed MDP tree is then resolved by a policy iteration algorithm to calculate the value function of each state, related subsequent adversarial actions from the attackers’ viewpoint, and quantify the security posture of each state. Finally, using the obtained metric, a deep convolutional neural network (CNN) is trained offline to notify the distribution system operators (DSOs) of the security status of EV ecosystems, i.e., secure and alarm situations. DSOs can use the developed security metrics to design consequent corrective actions during critical cyber attacks. To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed security metric in quantifying the security status of the grid, a cyber-physical testbed is built. This testbed integrates a virtual sphere (vSphere) to simulate the cyber parts of the EV ecosystem as well as a real-time simulator to model two distribution networks, i.e., IEEE 33- and 141-bus, under DSO control center based on IEC 61850. For a distribution network with dynamic sections that can be created using the operation of tie-switches, a supplementary strategy has also been suggested. This strategy is evaluated under the IEEE 69-bus distribution network to calculate the related security metric and update the security monitoring framework.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2024.3451970",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmadreza Abazari",
        "Mohsen Ghafouri",
        "D. Jafarigiv",
        "R. Atallah",
        "C. Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsg.2024.3451970",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsmc.2020.2968606",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed Secure Platoon Control of Connected Vehicles Subject to DoS Attack: Theory and Application",
      "description": "This article addresses the distributed secure platoon control of connected vehicles with denial-of-service (DoS) attack phenomena, which may occur at some sampling time instant. First, a switched time-delay system model is introduced, which captures the time-varying sampling and the DoS attack phenomena simultaneously. Then, sufficient conditions are obtained based on the Lyapunov stability theory, the Jensen’s Inequality method, and the topology matrix decoupling technique, such that the vehicle platoon system under consideration achieves an exponential tracking performance. In this article, the presented system design conditions establish several quantitative relationships between attack parameters and system performance. Moreover, the critical values of attack frequency (AF) and the sampling interval (SI) are also derived, respectively. Finally, both of the simulation and experiment studies on a network of four vehicles are introduced to validate the design.",
      "published": "2020-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsmc.2020.2968606",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dan Zhang",
        "Ye-Ping Shen",
        "Siquan Zhou",
        "Xiwang Dong",
        "Li Juan Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsmc.2020.2968606",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 202,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4071,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tsmc.2020.2968606 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: stability, studies, privacy, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsp52935.2021.9522599",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A blockchain-based V2X communication system",
      "description": "The security proposed for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) systems in the European Union is specified in the ETSI Cooperative Intelligent Transport System (C-ITS) standards, and related documents are based on the trusted PKI/CAs. The C-ITS trust model platform comprises an EU Root CA and additional Root CAs run in Europe by member state authorities or private organizations offering certificates to individual users. A new method is described in this paper where the security in V2X is based on the Distributed Public Keystore (DPK) platform developed for Ethereum blockchain. The V2X security is considered as one application of the DPK platform. The DPK stores and distributes the vehicles, RSUs, or other C-ITS role-players’ public keys. It establishes a generic key exchange/ agreement scheme that provides mutual key, entity authentication, and distributing a session key between two peers. V2X communication based on this scheme can establish an end-to-end (e2e) secure session and enables vehicle authentication without the need for a vehicle certificate signed by a trusted Certificate Authority.",
      "published": "2021-07-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsp52935.2021.9522599",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hassan Farran",
        "David J. Khoury",
        "Elie F. Kfoury",
        "László Bokor"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Telecommunications and Signal Processing (TSP)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsp52935.2021.9522599",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tsp59544.2023.10197762",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performance Improvements of Vehicular PKI Protocol for the Security of V2X Communications",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology allows vehicles to communicate with numerous transportation system components. To provide safe communication between vehicles and other entities, V2X depends on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, the present PKI employed in V2X has certain drawbacks, including scalability and high computational cost. This article offers an enhancement to the current PKI in V2X that tackles these constraints by managing and distributing keys using blockchain technology. The suggested Public Key Infrastructure enhancement is intended to be secure, efficient, and scalable, providing a more solid and trustworthy foundation for V2Xcommunication. The article explains the suggested PKI enhancement and examines its advantages and disadvantages. Overall, the suggested Public Key Infrastructure enhancement has the potential to increase the security and dependability of Vehicle-to-Everything communication, allowing for a secure and more effective transportation system.",
      "published": "2023-07-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tsp59544.2023.10197762",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hassan Farran",
        "David J. Khoury"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Telecommunications and Signal Processing (TSP)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tsp59544.2023.10197762",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tte.2023.3309505",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simultaneous Wireless Power and Data Transfer for Electric Vehicle Charging: A Review",
      "description": "Wireless charging of Electric Vehicles (EVs) has become an important research topic in recent years. During the wireless charging process, wireless data exchange must take place between the EV and the charging station. Battery status, current and voltage of the charger or the EV identification may be required on the primary side in order for the system to operate properly. This data exchange can be carried out through commercial wireless communication solutions such as Bluetooth, 802.11 or ZigBee. However, these technologies introduce cybersecurity problems, high and variable transmission delays and possible connection losses during communication. To address these issues, numerous solutions have been proposed based on wireless data transmission through the wireless power transfer circuit. This paper gives a comprehensive review of the different issues that need to be considered for simultaneous wireless power and data transmission (SWPDT) for wireless EV charging applications. This context represents a challenge for SWPDT due to the power levels and the high probability of operating with notable misalignments or even with the EV on move. Specifically, a classification of SWPDT systems is described, and six different criteria to consider when designing a SWPDT system are analysed for EVs. The suitability of different system configurations is evaluated according to three representative use cases: (i) providing maximum efficiency, (ii) synchronisation for bidirectional wireless chargers and (iii) dynamic charging. We have also analysed the feasibility of using the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) together with ISO 15118, which is the most popular communication protocol used in EV charging infrastructures,.",
      "published": "2023-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tte.2023.3309505",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Inmaculada Casaucao",
        "Alicia Triviño",
        "Zhengyu Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tte.2023.3309505",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tte.2025.3636234",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of Joint Cyberattacks on Electric Vehicle Charging via Pricing and Traffic Manipulation to Threaten Secure Operation of Power Systems",
      "description": "The rapid development of electric vehicles (EVs) has strengthened the coupling between transportation and power systems. Meanwhile, the continuous growth in demand for EV charging would significantly impact the secure operation of power systems. Considering the vulnerability of vehicle navigation communication networks, this paper proposes a novel and practical joint cyber-attack scheme to manipulate the charging and route planning results of EV charging navigation. This cyber-attack can minimize both the charging price at the target EV charging station (EVCS) and the driving time required to reach the target EVCS, thus threatening the secure operation of power systems by attracting excessive EVs to charge at the target EVCS. Firstly, a two-level optimization model is proposed to identify the target EVCS based on the partially observable distribution network. This model identifies the EVCS that pose the greatest threat to the secure operation of power systems. Subsequently, a cyber-attack model is developed to manipulate the driving time of EVs to the target EVCS. The attack vector is designed to be stealthy to evade detection and sparse to minimize attack cost. Finally, based on the relationship between charging price and demand, an adaptive cyber-attack model for EV charging price is designed. When the joint cyber-attack is launched, EVs can be reasonably attracted to the target EVCS, regardless of the charging preferences of EV drivers. The coupled test system consisting of an IEEE 33-bus system and a 46-node transportation system verifies the effectiveness of the proposed methodology and model.",
      "published": "2025-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tte.2025.3636234",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Runzhuo Ma",
        "Siqi Bu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tte.2025.3636234",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2014.2371470",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Gateway Framework for In-Vehicle Networks Based on CAN, FlexRay, and Ethernet",
      "description": "This paper proposes a gateway framework for in-vehicle networks (IVNs) based on the controller area network (CAN), FlexRay, and Ethernet. The proposed gateway framework is designed to be easy to reuse and verify to reduce development costs and time. The gateway framework can be configured, and its verification environment is automatically generated by a program with a dedicated graphical user interface (GUI). The gateway framework provides state-of-the-art functionalities that include parallel reprogramming, diagnostic routing, network management (NM), dynamic routing update, multiple routing configuration, and security. The proposed gateway framework was developed, and its performance was analyzed and evaluated.",
      "published": "2015-01-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2014.2371470",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Ho Kim",
        "Suk-Hyun Seo",
        "Nguyen Tien Hai",
        "Bo Mu Cheon",
        "Young Seo Lee",
        "Jae Wook Jeon"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2014.2371470",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 111,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2018.2795384",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Shortcomings and Countermeasures for the SAE J1939 Commercial Vehicle Bus Protocol",
      "description": "In the recent years, countless security concerns related to automotive systems were revealed either by academic research or real life attacks. While current attention was largely focused on passenger cars, due to their ubiquity, the reported bus-related vulnerabilities are applicable to all industry sectors where the same bus technology is deployed, i.e., the CAN bus. The SAE J1939 specification extends and standardizes the use of CAN to commercial vehicles where security plays an even higher role. In contrast to empirical results that attest such vulnerabilities in commercial vehicles by practical experiments, here, we determine that existing shortcomings in the SAE J1939 specifications open road to several new attacks, e.g., impersonation, denial of service (DoS), distributed DoS, etc. Taking the advantage of an industry-standard CANoe based simulation, we demonstrate attacks with potential safety critical effects that are mounted while still conforming to the SAE J1939 standard specification. We discuss countermeasures and security enhancements by including message authentication mechanisms. Finally, we evaluate and discuss the impact of employing these mechanisms on the overall network communication.",
      "published": "2018-01-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2018.2795384",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay",
        "Bogdan Groza"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2018.2795384",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2018.2810232",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Identifying ECUs Using Inimitable Characteristics of Signals in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "In the last several decades, the automotive industry has come to incorporate the latest Information and Communications (ICT) technology, increasingly replacing mechanical components of vehicles with electronic components. These electronic control units (ECUs) communicate with each other in an in-vehicle network that makes the vehicle both safer and easier to drive. Controller Area Networks (CANs) are the current standard for such high quality in-vehicle communication. Unfortunately, however, CANs do not currently offer protection against security attacks. In particular, they do not allow for message authentication and hence are open to attacks that replay ECU messages for malicious purposes. Applying the classic cryptographic method of message authentication code (MAC) is not feasible since the CAN data frame is not long enough to include a sufficiently long MAC to provide effective authentication. In this paper, we propose a novel identification method, which works in the physical layer of an in-vehicle CAN network. Our method identifies ECUs using inimitable characteristics of signals enabling detection of a compromised or alien ECU being used in a replay attack. Unlike previous attempts to address security issues in the in-vehicle CAN network, our method works by simply adding a monitoring unit to the existing network, making it deployable in current systems and compliant with required CAN standards. Our experimental results show that the bit string and classification algorithm that we utilized yielded more accurate identification of compromised ECUs than any other method proposed to date. The false positive rate is more than 2 times lower than the method proposed by P.-S. Murvay et al. This paper is also the first to identify potential attack models that systems should be able to detect.",
      "published": "2016-07-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2018.2810232",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Samuel Woo",
        "Ji Young Chun",
        "Jooyoung Park",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2018.2810232",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 189,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2019.2907269",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mobile Edge Assisted Literal Multi-Dimensional Anomaly Detection of In-Vehicle Network Using LSTM",
      "description": "The development of Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) have introduced more intrusions to the vulnerabilities of in-vehicle network. It is important to detect in-vehicle network anomaly for the purpose of driving safety. The previous studies either focus on one-dimension anomaly behavior of in-vehicle network or looks into the semantics of in-vehicle network, which is neither effective nor efficient for vehicle pilot. In this paper, we propose a literal multi-dimensional anomaly detection approach using the distributed long-short-term-memory (LSTM) framework for in-vehicle network, especially the Control Area Network (CAN). The proposed approach only needs the literal binary CAN message instead of revealing the semantics of CAN message. To enhance the accuracy and efficiency of detection, it detects anomaly from both time and data dimension simultaneously by exploiting multi-task LSTM neural network on mobile edge. The extensive evaluation results show that the proposed anomaly detection achieves a satisfying accuracy of 90%. The detection speed is as fast as 0.61 ms on mobile edge.",
      "published": "2019-03-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2019.2907269",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Konglin Zhu",
        "Zhicheng Chen",
        "Yuyang Peng",
        "Lin Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2019.2907269",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 89,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2019.2961344",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SAIDuCANT: Specification-Based Automotive Intrusion Detection Using Controller Area Network (CAN) Timing",
      "description": "The proliferation of embedded devices in modern vehicles has opened the traditionally-closed vehicular system to the risk of cybersecurity attacks through physical and remote access to the in-vehicle network such as the controller area network (CAN). The CAN bus does not implement a security protocol that can protect the vehicle against the increasing cyber and physical attacks. To address this risk, we introduce a novel algorithm to extract the real-time model parameters of the CAN bus and develop SAIDuCANT, a specification-based intrusion detection system (IDS) using anomaly-based supervised learning with the real-time model as input. We evaluate the effectiveness of SAIDuCANT with real CAN logs collected from two passenger cars and on an open-source CAN dataset collected from real-world scenarios. Experimental results show that SAIDuCANT can effectively detect data injection attacks with low false positive rates. Over four real attack scenarios from the open-source dataset, SAIDuCANT observes at most one false positive before detecting an attack whereas other detection approaches using CAN timing features detect on average more than a hundred false positives before a real attack occurs.",
      "published": "2019-12-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2019.2961344",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Clinton Young",
        "Joseph Zambreno",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2019.2961344",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 167,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2019.2961765",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MAuth-CAN: Masquerade-Attack-Proof Authentication for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Numerous hacking attempts on modern vehicles have recently demonstrated that an adversary can remotely control a vehicle using vulnerable telematics services. In these attempts, a masquerade attack impersonating some safety-critical electronic control units (ECUs) is usually performed to control a vehicle. In the last decade, several message authentication protocols for controller area network (CAN) have been proposed to protect vehicles from masquerade attacks. However, some message authentication protocols are not enough to protect a vehicle from masquerade attacks by compromised ECUs. Other protocols that are secure against masquerade attacks fill the network capacity of CAN up to 100% or require hardware modifications of the CAN-controller, dedicated hardware used for CAN communications. In this paper, we propose a new authentication protocol, MAuth-CAN, that is secure against masquerade attacks. MAuth-CAN neither fills up to 100% of the network capacity nor requires hardware modifications of a CAN-controller. In addition, we propose a technique that protects ECUs from bus-off attacks, and apply the technique to MAuth-CAN for handling bus-off attacks.",
      "published": "2019-12-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2019.2961765",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyo Jin Jo",
        "Jin Hyun Kim",
        "Hyon‐Young Choi",
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Dong Hoon Lee",
        "Insup Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2019.2961765",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.2977378",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Poisoning and Evasion Attacks Against Deep Learning Algorithms in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "With the ongoing development and improvement of deep learning technology, autonomous vehicles (AVs) have made tremendous progress in recent years. Despite its great potential, AV supported by deep learning technology still faces numerous security threats, which prevent AV from being putting into large-scale practice. Aiming at this challenging situation, in this paper, we would like to exploit two attacks against deep learning algorithms in traffic sign recognition system by leveraging particle swarm optimization. Specifically, we first exploit the PAPSO (poisoning attack with particle swarm optimization) which focuses on the training process of the deep learning algorithms in the traffic sign recognition system, i.e., the attacker injects crafted samples into the training dataset, causing a reduction in classification accuracy of the traffic sign recognition system. Then, we also explore the EAPSO (evasion attack with particle swarm optimization) which on the other hand focuses on the interference process of the deep learning algorithms, i.e., the attacker adds some hardly perceptible perturbations to the targeted test sample, leading to a misclassification on it. Extensive experiments are conducted to shed light on the effectiveness of our attacks, and some corresponding defense strategies are also presented.",
      "published": "2020-03-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.2977378",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenbo Jiang",
        "Hongwei Li",
        "Sen Liu",
        "Xizhao Luo",
        "Rongxing Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.2977378",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 107,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.2980137",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed Deception Attack Detection in Platoon-Based Connected Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "This article investigates the distributed sensor deception attack and estimation for a class of platoon-based connected vehicles. In these systems, the information of each vehicle's position and its relative distances with respect to its neighbours plays a crucial role to achieve the desired group performance. When getting deception attacks on such important information, it will result in severe consequences including collision. In order to detect and estimate deception attacks, a longitudinal dynamic model of vehicle platoons with modelling uncertainties, measurement noises and piece-wise constant deception attacks on sensors is first presented. With the consideration of the practical issue that a local vehicle is not able to access to global information, a distributed Kalman filter is proposed to estimate the state information using local output information. Based on the residuals obtained by the distributed Kalman filter, a modified generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) algorithm is proposed to detect and estimate the sensor deception attacks. Finally, simulations with the help of standard Carsim software are provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. Fair comparisons between the proposed method and the standard $\\chi ^2$ detector are also presented in order to provide insights for engineering practitioners.",
      "published": "2020-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.2980137",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhiyang Ju",
        "Hui Zhang",
        "Ying Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.2980137",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 131,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3978,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.2980137 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information., sensor, sensors, access, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.2989808",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ensuring Safety and Security in CAN-Based Automotive Embedded Systems: A Combination of Design Optimization and Secure Communication",
      "description": "As automotive embedded systems comprised of electronic control units (ECUs) connected via a controller area network (CAN) have continued to develop, the volume of information these systems are required to handle has also rapidly increased. Cyber attacks targeting vulnerable points of automotive embedded systems in particular are on the rise to hinder normal operation of a vehicle. However, adding security mechanisms to defend against attacks cannot neglect timing requirements in terms of vehicle safety. This is because it may lead to a violation of automobile safety. In short, both sides of this issue must be addressed from the outset of the system design stage to provide optimal security and safety. As a response to this pressing issue, we propose a novel and efficient scheme. The design optimization during the system design phase not only ensures all the real-time applications are executed within their deadline but also reduces the number of transmitted messages over the CAN bus. After optimization, we apply a hash message authentication code (HMAC) to specific messages, providing secure communication between ECUs and protecting against cyber attacks. Security analysis and experimental results prove that the proposed scheme can counter attacks on the CAN bus while meeting timing requirements. Therefore, our proposed scheme is effective in satisfying improvement of both safety and security.",
      "published": "2020-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.2989808",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyeran Mun",
        "Kyusuk Han",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.2989808",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.2990417",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANeleon : Protecting CAN Bus With Frame ID Chameleon",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) has been widely used in the automotive and industrial automation for over two decades. However, due to the lack of security mechanisms, CAN is vulnerable to attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel protection scheme called CANeleon. It can defend CAN against a smart attacker who might inject malicious frames with legitimate frame IDs, which cannot be mitigated by existing countermeasures. Inspired by the idea of moving target defense technologies, CANeleon equips each legitimate CAN node with the ability to shift the spoofed frame ID. In this way, the IDs of malicious frames are exposed and can be further filtered by legitimate nodes. Moreover, CANeleon neither inserts new information to the frame, nor requires any modification to the CAN protocol, so it is in compliance with the existing standards. CANeleon is a decentralized mechanism guaranteeing that the protection could be done simultaneously without additional communication. Experiments on a CAN bus prototype and a real self-driving vehicle prove the effectiveness of CANeleon.",
      "published": "2020-04-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.2990417",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kun Cheng",
        "Yuebin Bai",
        "Yuan Hua Zhou",
        "Yun Tang",
        "David Sanán",
        "Yang Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.2990417",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.2990954",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Highly Efficient Authentication for CAN by Identifier Reallocation With Ordered CMACs",
      "description": "Most of the existing works on securing the CAN bus are using the limited data-field of CAN frames to embed a cryptographic payload. Only very few works have suggested the use of the identifier field since identifiers are critical for the arbitration procedure and changing them at random would interfere with message priorities. To preserve priority on the bus, in this work we use an ordered CMAC buffer. In this way, we can authenticate the identifiers of CAN frames and check that the sender is a legitimate node while arbitration on the bus remains unaltered. Moreover, we determine that for real-world scenarios the achieved security level is very close to the length of the ID field despite the constraints from ordering. This procedure easily circumvents replay attacks and fuzz testing on the bus, which were exploited by many recent works. We prove the feasibility of our approach by testing practical implementations on automotive-grade microcontrollers and CAN-bus traffic allocations from a high-end vehicle. The computational requirements are some of the lowest achievable for securing CAN, with a dozen CMAC-AES computations being sufficient for extracting a table of one hundred identifiers.",
      "published": "2020-04-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.2990954",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Lucian Popa",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.2990954",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.2999533",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SEDAN: Security-Aware Design of Time-Critical Automotive Networks",
      "description": "The increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in today's vehicles and their greater connectivity with the outside environment has made vehicles more vulnerable to security attacks. Integrating security mechanisms in ECUs has become essential, but incurs overheads, which can delay safety-critical task execution and message transfers. In this work, we introduce a methodology to derive security requirements for tasks and messages in automotive systems based on the ISO 26262 standard. We then propose a framework (SEDAN) to increase the security of the system without violating the real-time constraints and security requirements of messages, or ECU utilization limits.",
      "published": "2020-06-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.2999533",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vipin Kumar Kukkala",
        "Sudeep Pasricha",
        "Thomas H. Bradley"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.2999533",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.3020845",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Reset Speed Synchronization Control for an Integrated Motor-Transmission Powertrain System of a Connected Vehicle Under a Replay Attack",
      "description": "This paper deals with the speed synchronization control of a connected vehicle subject to a replay attack. A large number of replay attack signals are injected into controller area network (CAN) through external network, which greatly reduces the real-time control performance of a connected integrated motor-transmission (IMT) system. In order to ensure the performance of an IMT speed tracking system under large random message delays, a robust reset controller combined with a delay-robust speed synchronization controller satisfying energy-to-peak performance is designed in this paper. The uncertain impact caused by a replay attack is described by large random network delays which are modeled by polytopic inclusion. Then, a dynamic output-feedback controller considering the uncertainty caused by attack-delays is proposed for online speed tracking. Moreover, a robust reset controller is designed to obtain comparatively better transient response in the case of large attack-delays. In this control strategy, once the reset condition is triggered, the after-reset value calculated by linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) would replace the dynamic state vector. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed controller is verified by comparing it with model predictive control (MPC), existing PD control considering delays and energy-to-peak robust control in terms of performance.",
      "published": "2020-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.3020845",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiangyang Xu",
        "Xiang Li",
        "Peng Dong",
        "Yue Liu",
        "Hui Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.3020845",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.3028880",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing SOME/IP for In-Vehicle Service Protection",
      "description": "Although high-speed in-vehicle networks are being increasingly adopted by the industry to support emerging use cases, previous research already demonstrated that car hacking is a real threat. This paper formalizes a novel framework proposed to provide improved security to the emerging SOME/IP middleware, without introducing at the same time limitations in the communication patterns available. Most notably, the entire traffic matrix is designed to be configured using simple high-level rules, clearly stating who can talk to whom according to the service abstraction adopted by SOME/IP. Three incremental security levels are made available, accounting for different services being associated with different requirements. The core security protocol, encompassing a session establishment phase followed by the transmission of secured SOME/IP messages, has been formally verified, to prove its correctness in terms of authentication and secrecy properties. Performance-wise, in-depth experimental evaluations conducted with an extended version of vsomeip confirmed the introduction of quite limited penalties compared to the bare unsecured implementation.",
      "published": "2020-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.3028880",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco Iorio",
        "Massimo Reineri",
        "Fulvio Risso",
        "Riccardo Sisto",
        "Fulvio Valenza"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.3028880",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.3037899",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical Layer Security Enhancement Using Artificial Noise in Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) Networks",
      "description": "The secure transmission of confidential information in cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) communication networks is vitally important for user's personal safety. However, for C-V2X, there have not been many studies on the physical layer security (PLS). Since artificial noise (AN) and secure beamforming are popular PLS techniques for cellular communications, in this paper we investigate the potential of these PLS techniques for enhancing the security of C-V2X networks. In particular, leveraging stochastic geometry, we study the PLS of an AN assisted C-V2X network, where the locations of legitimate vehicular nodes, malicious vehicular nodes and road side units (RSUs) are modeled by Cox processes driven by a common Poisson line process (PLP), and the locations of cellular base stations (BSs) are modeled by a two-dimensional (2D) Poisson point process (PPP). Based on the maximum signal-to-interference-ratio (SIR) association scheme, we calculate the coverage probability of the network. We also derive bounds on the secrecy probability, which are validated by simulation results. Moreover, we obtain an analytical result of the effective secrecy throughput for characterizing the reliability and security of wiretap channels. Simulation results are given to validate the analytical result, and provide interesting insights into the impact of network parameters on the achievable secrecy performance. Simulation results show that a larger array antenna can provide a better robustness of the secure transmission strategy, and the optimal power allocation ratio between confidential information and AN remains almost unchanged for different numbers of antennas.",
      "published": "2020-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2020.3037899",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chao Wang",
        "Zan Li",
        "Xiang‐Gen Xia",
        "Jia Dong Shi",
        "Jiangbo Si",
        "Yulong Zou"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2020.3037899",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3051026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Self-Supervised Anomaly Detection for In-Vehicle Network Using Noised Pseudo Normal Data",
      "description": "As the risk of cyber and safety threats to vehicle systems has increased, the anomaly detection in in-vehicle networks (IVN) has received the attention of researchers. Although, machine-learning-based anomaly detection methods have been proposed, there are limitations in detecting unknown attacks that the model has not learned because general supervised learning-based approaches depend on training dataset. To solve this problem, we propose a novel self-supervised method for IVN anomaly detection using noised pseudo normal data. The proposed method consists of two deep-learning models of the generator and the detector, which generates noised pseudo normal data and detects anomalies, respectively. Firstly, the generator is trained with only normal network traffic to generate pseudo normal traffic data. Then, the anomaly detector is trained to classify normal traffic and noised pseudo normal traffic as normal and abnormal, respectively. The experimental results demonstrate that the anomaly detection models, trained with the proposed method, not only significantly improved in the detection of unknown attacks, but also outperformed other semi-supervised learning-based methods.",
      "published": "2021-01-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3051026",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyun Min Song",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3051026",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 113,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3057074",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Many-Objective Optimization Based Intelligent Intrusion Detection Algorithm for Enhancing Security of Vehicular Networks in 6G",
      "description": "With accelerated ensemble of the Internet of Things technology and automotive industry, vehicular network has been established as powerful tools. However, it is a significant challenge for dynamic and heterogeneous vehicular network to meet high requirements of the sixth-generation (6G) network such as high reliability and high security. To address this challenge, we design a novel weight-based ensemble machine learning algorithm (WBELA) to identify abnormal messages of vehicular Controller Area Network (CAN) bus network. Then, we establish a model based on many-objective optimization for intrusion detection of CAN bus network. To support this model, a many-objective optimization algorithm based on balance convergence and diversity (MaOEA-BCD) is designed. Open-source CAN bus message data sets and tamper attack scenarios are used to evaluate the effectiveness of proposed algorithm for different ID data frames. Experimental results revealed that proposed methods significantly enhance precision, reduce the false positive rate and have better performance than other methods so as to enhance security of vehicular networks in 6G.",
      "published": "2021-02-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3057074",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhixia Zhang",
        "Yang Cao",
        "Zhihua Cui",
        "Wensheng Zhang",
        "Jinjun Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3057074",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 100,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3061065",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Source Adversarial Sample Attack on Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Deep learning has an impressive performance of object detection and classification for autonomous vehicles. Nevertheless, the essential vulnerability of deep learning models to adversarial samples makes the autonomous vehicles suffer severe security and safety issues. Although a number of works have been proposed to study adversarial samples, only a few of them are designated for the scenario of autonomous vehicles. Moreover, the state-of-the-art attack models only focus on a single data source without considering the correlation among multiple data sources. To fill this blank, we propose two multi-source adversarial sample attack models, including the parallel attack model and the fusion attack model to simultaneously attack the image and LiDAR perception systems in the autonomous vehicles. In the parallel attack model, adversarial samples are generated from the original image and LiDAR data separately. In the fusion attack model, the adversarial samples of image and LiDAR can be generated from a low-dimension vector at the same time by fully exploring data correlation for data fusion and adversarial sample generation. Through comprehensive real-data experiments, we validate that our proposed models are more powerful and efficient to break down the perception systems of autonomous vehicles compared with the state-of-the-art. Furthermore, we simulate possible attack scenarios in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) to evaluate the attack performance of our proposed methods.",
      "published": "2021-02-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3061065",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zuobin Xiong",
        "Honghui Xu",
        "Wei Li",
        "Zhipeng Cai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3061065",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3076780",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain and Federated Learning for Collaborative Intrusion Detection in Vehicular Edge Computing",
      "description": "The vehicular networks constructed by interconnected vehicles and transportation infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber-intrusions due to the expanded use of software and the introduction of wireless interfaces. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can be customized efficiently in response to this increased attack surface. There has been significant progress in detecting malicious attack traffic using machine learning approaches. However, existing IDSs require network devices with powerful computing capabilities to continuously train and update complex network models, which reduces the efficiency and defense capability of intrusion detection systems due to limited resources and untimely model updates. This work proposes a cooperative intrusion detection mechanism that offloads the training model to distributed edge devices (e.g., connected vehicles and roadside units (RSUs). Distributed federated-based approach reduces resource utilization of the central server while assuring security and privacy. To ensure the security of the aggregation model, blockchain is used for the storage and sharing of the training models. This work analyzes common attacks and shows that the proposed scheme achieves cooperative privacy-preservation for vehicles while reducing communication overhead and computation cost.",
      "published": "2021-04-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3076780",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hong Liu",
        "Shuaipeng Zhang",
        "Pengfei Zhang",
        "Xinqiang Zhou",
        "Xuebin Shao",
        "Geguang Pu",
        "Yan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3076780",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 298,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4589,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3076780 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: continuously, response, limited, there, significant, privacy, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3077893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Layer Federated Learning With Heterogeneous Model Aggregation for 6G Supported Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The vision of the upcoming 6G technologies that have fast data rate, low latency, and ultra-dense network, draws great attentions to the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication for intelligent transportation systems. There is an urgent need for distributed machine learning techniques that can take advantages of massive interconnected networks with explosive amount of heterogeneous data generated at the network edge. In this study, a two-layer federated learning model is proposed to take advantages of the distributed end-edge-cloud architecture typical in 6G environment, and to achieve a more efficient and more accurate learning while ensuring data privacy protection and reducing communication overheads. A novel multi-layer heterogeneous model selection and aggregation scheme is designed as a part of the federated learning process to better utilize the local and global contexts of individual vehicles and road side units (RSUs) in 6G supported vehicular networks. This context-aware distributed learning mechanism is then developed and applied to address intelligent object detection, which is one of the most critical challenges in modern intelligent transportation systems with autonomous vehicles. Evaluation results showed that the proposed method, which demonstrates a higher learning accuracy with better precision, recall and F1 score, outperforms other state-of-the-art methods under 6G network configuration by achieving faster convergence, and scales better with larger numbers of RSUs involved in the learning process.",
      "published": "2021-05-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3077893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaokang Zhou",
        "Wei Liang",
        "Jinhua She",
        "Zheng Yan",
        "Kevin I‐Kai Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3077893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 306,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3092354",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-D: A Modular Four-Step Pipeline for Comprehensively Decoding Controller Area Network Data",
      "description": "Controller area networks (CANs) are a broadcast protocol for real-time communication of critical vehicle subsystems. Original equipment manufacturers of passenger vehicles hold secret their mappings of CAN data to vehicle signals, and these definitions vary according to make, model, and year. Without these mappings, the wealth of real-time vehicle information hidden in the CAN packets is uninterpretable, severely impeding vehicle-related research, including CAN cybersecurity and privacy studies, aftermarket tuning, efficiency and performance monitoring, and fault diagnosis to name a few. Guided by the four-part CAN signal definition, we present CAN-D (CAN-Decoder), a modular, four-step pipeline for identifying each signal's boundaries (start bit and length), endianness (byte ordering), signedness (bit-to-integer encoding), and by leveraging diagnostic standards, augmenting a subset of the extracted signals with meaningful, physical interpretation. En route to CAN-D, we provide a comprehensive review of the CAN signal reverse engineering research. All previous methods ignore endianness and signedness, rendering them incapable of decoding many standard CAN signal definitions. Incorporating endianness grows the search space from 128 to 4.72E21 signal tokenizations and introduces a web of changing dependencies. In response, we formulate, formally analyze, and provide an efficient solution to an optimization problem, allowing identification of the optimal set of signal boundaries and byte orderings. In addition, we provide two novel, state-of-the-art signal boundary classifiers—both of which are superior to previous approaches in precision and recall in three different test scenarios—and the first signedness classification algorithm, which exhibits a$>$97% F-score. Overall, CAN-D is the only solution with the potential to extract any CAN signal that is also the state of the art. In evaluation on 10 vehicles of different makes, CAN-D's average$\\ell ^1$error is five times better (81% less) than all previous methods and exhibits lower average error, even when considering only signals that meet prior methods’ assumptions. Finally, CAN-D is implemented in lightweight hardware, allowing for an on-board diagnostic (OBD-II) plugin for real-time in-vehicle CAN decoding.",
      "published": "2021-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3092354",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd-ii",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miki E. Verma",
        "Robert A. Bridges",
        "Jordan J. Sosnowski",
        "Samuel C. Hollifield",
        "Michael D. Iannacone"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3092354",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3100681",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Consortium Blockchain-Based Energy Trading for Demand Response Management in Vehicle-to-Grid",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading scheme between EVs and the SPs to manage the demand response in V2G environment. Unlike the traditional schemes, which consists of complex energy-transportation meshes, the proposed scheme achieves a balance between demand and response by providing incentives to EVs out of their self-interests. However, the online transactions security and privacy protection of EVs poses challenges with respect to confidentiality and integrity preservation. To cope up with the issues, we design a consortium blockchain-based scheme to ensure secure energy transactions between EVs and the SPs without trusted third-party intervention. Moreover, the energy pricing and the amount of traded energy problems for demand response are solved by a double auction mechanism to maximize the social welfare. Numerical results based on a real-time implementation on a private Ethereum network having smart contract demonstrated that the auction-based mechanism achieves social welfare maximization with privacy protection of online transactions between EVs and the SPs. The results obtained show that the rate of convergence, scalability metric average latency, and standard deviation of the energy transactions have been improved by approximately 18.18%, 15%, and 28.1%, respectively in comparison to the existing schemes. Moreover, security and privacy analysis of the proposed scheme shows that it improves the transaction security substantially in comparison to the existing state-of-the-art proposals.",
      "published": "2021-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3100681",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shubhani Aggarwal",
        "Neeraj Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3100681",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 71,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3106940",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection for In-Vehicle Network Using CNN-LSTM With Attention Mechanism",
      "description": "With the increasing connectivity between the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and the outside world, safety and security have become stringent problems. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the most commonly used in-vehicle network protocol, which lacks security mechanisms by design, so it is vulnerable to various attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel intrusion detection model called CNN-LSTM with Attention model (CLAM) for the in-vehicle network, especially CAN. The CLAM model uses one-dimensional convolution (Conv1D) to extract the abstract features of the signal values at each time step and feeds it into the Bidirectional Long Short Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) to extract the time dependence. By combining the attention mechanisms, we calculate the weight of each hidden state output by Bi-LSTM and perform a weighted summation, so that the model focuses only on locally important time steps, which can improve the convergence speed of the model and prediction accuracy. The proposed model uses the bit flip rate to extract continuous signal boundaries in the 64-bit CAN data, so it does not need to parse the CAN communication matrix and is suitable for different vehicles. The extensive evaluation results demonstrate that our proposed CLAM model can effectively detect CAN attacks, with an average F1-score of 0.951 and an error rate of 2.16%. Compared with the work in related research fields, the accuracy of attack detection is improved by 2.5%.",
      "published": "2021-08-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3106940",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heng Sun",
        "Miaomiao Chen",
        "Jian Weng",
        "Zhiquan Liu",
        "Guanggang Geng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3106940",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 202,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3132961",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CyberChain: Cybertwin Empowered Blockchain for Lightweight and Privacy-Preserving Authentication in Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) presents promising opportunities for vehicle to everything (V2X) applications, wherein authentication acts as the cornerstone to realize trustworthy vehicular context and to support advanced applications. However, existing authentication schemes mainly depend on centralized servers with both security and privacy issues. In this paper, we propose a CyberTwin (CT) empowered blockchain framework for authentication, namely CyberChain, to reduce both the communication and storage cost while maintaining vehicular privacy. By designing a blockchain system in the cyberspace, we decouple the consensus process from the physical world, so that the operation cost of blockchain can be reduced. A Privacy-Preserving Parallel Pedersen Commitment (P4C) algorithm is designed to protect the privacy of vehicles and accelerate the authentication process. To further enhance the operation efficiency of CyberChain, we propose a Diffused Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DPBFT) mechanism to reach consensus in the cyberspace that can reduce consensus latency. The proposed cyberchain framework and the associated mechanisms are evaluated by qualitative analysis and simulations. The evaluation results demonstrated that the proposed cyberchain based framework significantly improves the authentication performance in terms of authentication latency, privacy, communication overhead and storage cost.",
      "published": "2021-12-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3132961",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haoye Chai",
        "Supeng Leng",
        "Jianhua He",
        "Ke Zhang",
        "Baoyi Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3132961",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 71,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2021.3133308",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SecCDV: A Security Reference Architecture for Cybertwin-Driven 6G V2X",
      "description": "Recently, the proposed Cybertwin-driven 6G network architecture has attracted attentions from academia, which can support the communication anchor, security agent and other functions for physical devices. Especially, Cybertwin can provide promising Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) applications in future. However, security and privacy of Cybertwin still face various threats and challenges, which may impact future deployments for Cybertwin-driven 6G V2X. In this paper, we first introduce the architecture and promising applications of Cybertwin-driven 6G V2X. Then, we analyze essential data security and privacy preservation requirements for Cybertwin-driven 6G V2X. Particularly, we present the security reference architecture of Cybertwin-driven 6G V2X. As a case study, we investigate the migration of Cybertwin caused by vehicle mobility, and propose a handover authentication scheme to create new Cybertwin between vehicle and edge server based on proxy ring signature technique. Finally, we discuss several open research directions for achieving more secure Cybertwin-driven 6G V2X.",
      "published": "2021-12-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2021.3133308",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guanjie Li",
        "Chengzhe Lai",
        "Rongxing Lu",
        "Dong Zheng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2021.3133308",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2022.3181623",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sub-GHz Two-Way Ranging Based on Phase Detection for Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Remote keyless entry systems have penetrated the vehicular market due to its convenience. However, its vulnerability against relay attacks exploiting the wireless channel is a serious threat. One of the prominent countermeasures is radio ranging between the key fob and the vehicle. Taking into account radio regulations, usability and power consumption among other things, a suitable approach is necessary to devise. This article proposes sub-GHz two-way ranging based on phase detection which offers high tolerance against reference clock offset between a pair of transceiver devices and a novel compensation scheme against multipath effects. We present the operation principle and theoretical performance under a two-path model of radio propagation and additive white Gaussian noise. In field experiments with prototype devices, the ranging accuracy is validated. We show that the proposed ranging produces sufficient performance for remote keyless entry systems, confirming if the key fob is within a few meters of the vehicle.",
      "published": "2022-06-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2022.3181623",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "threat",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ichiro Seto",
        "Shoji Otaka",
        "Hiroshi Yoshida",
        "Katsuya Nonin",
        "Masaki Nishikawa",
        "Takayuki Kato",
        "Yoshiharu Nito",
        "Hideyuki Ishiwata",
        "Tomoaki Otsuki"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2022.3181623",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2022.3185111",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of ID Sequences Similarity Using DTW in Intrusion Detection for CAN Bus",
      "description": "Connected vehicles have recently attracted considerable attention for revolutionizing the transportation industry. Although connectivity brings about a vast number of benefits, it can give rise to a wider attack surface as more physical access interfaces have been introduced. In particular, anomalous behaviour of the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) caused by malicious attacks can result in serious consequences and possibly lead to fatal accidents. Hence, it is important to develop methodologies that can sniff vehicular data and detect it for further attack analysis. In this article, we develop a novel similarity-based intrusion detection methodology named SIDuDTW, which identifies malicious messages inside vehicle network, e.g., Controller Area Network (CAN), by using Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance between CAN ID sequences. Subsequently, the theoretical analysis for the recurring sequence pattern, wave splitting strategies, similarity metric, and optimal parameters providing strong robustness against several kinds of attacks in SIDuDTW are detailed. A series of experiments demonstrate that the developed methodology can detect attacks with high accuracy. In addition, this proposed methodology significantly outperforms the intrusion detection capabilities of existing approaches in terms of basic injection, replay and suppression attacks. It is envisioned that this work will contribute to the development of safer autonomous vehicle conceptualized as a key unit within broader smart city.",
      "published": "2022-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2022.3185111",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heng Sun",
        "Mengsi Sun",
        "Jian Weng",
        "Zhiquan Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2022.3185111",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.38,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tvt.2022.3185111 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serious, strong, physical, access, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2022.3190721",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DAGA: Detecting Attacks to In-Vehicle Networks via N-Gram Analysis",
      "description": "Recent research showcased several cyber-attacks against unmodified licensed vehicles, demonstrating the vulnerability of their internal networks. Many solutions have already been proposed by industry and academia, aiming to detect and prevent cyber-attacks targeting in-vehicle networks. The majority of these proposals borrow security algorithms and techniques from the classical ICT domain, and in many cases they do not consider the inherent limitations of legacy automotive protocols and resource-constrained microcontrollers. This paper proposesDAGA, an anomaly detection algorithm for in-vehicle networks exploiting$n-$gram analysis. DAGA only uses sequences of CAN message IDs for the definition of the$n-$grams used in the detection process, without requiring the content of the payload or other CAN message fields. The DAGA framework allows the creation of detection models characterized by different memory footprints, allowing their deployment on microcontrollers with different hardware constraints. Experimental results based on three prototype implementations of DAGA showcase the trade off between hardware requirements and detection performance. DAGA outperforms the state-of-the-art detectors on the most performing microcontrollers, and can execute with lower performance on simple microcontrollers that cannot support the vast majority of IDS approaches proposed in literature. As additional contributions, we publicly release the full dataset and our reference DAGA implementations.",
      "published": "2022-07-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2022.3190721",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dario Stabili",
        "Luca Ferretti",
        "Mauro Andreolini",
        "Mirco Marchetti"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2022.3190721",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2022.3227281",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Certificateless Authentication Protocol for the SAE J1939 Commercial Vehicles Bus",
      "description": "Authentication for controller area network (CAN) buses in an intra-vehicular network involving electronic control units (ECUs) is a challenging factor. The Society of Automotive Engineers standard (SAE J1939) incorporating the ISO 11898-1 specification for the data link and physical layers of the standard CAN and CAN-flexible data rate (CAN-FD) handles communication among ECUs. The SAE J1939 is vulnerable to replay, masquerading and machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. To prevent such attacks, there exist protocol suites for resource-constrained and resource-unconstrained nodes proposed in the literature which are not formally analysed. We formally analyse one of the comprehensive protocol suites using the state-of-the-art Tamarin automated validation tool. To mitigate the identified attacks, we propose two new authentication protocols. At first, we propose one pass authentication protocol for computationally restricted nodes. For nodes that are not restricted computationally, we present a certificateless signature-based authentication protocol. Additionally, we present a new certificateless key insulated manageable signature (CL-KIMS) scheme for signature-based authentication protocol. CL-KIMS ensures key insulation and random access key update properties, and assures self-healing property. The security of the proposed protocol suite and signature scheme is formally analysed using the random oracle model (ROM). Especially, CL-KIMS scheme is provably secure in the ROM against Type-I and Type-II adversaries. A detailed performance comparison and simulation study show that the proposed protocol suite has lesser communication overhead and ensures robust security as compared to the existing protocol suites.",
      "published": "2022-12-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2022.3227281",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Basker Palaniswamy",
        "Keyvan Ansari",
        "Alavalapati Goutham Reddy",
        "Ashok Kumar Das",
        "Sachin S. Shetty"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2022.3227281",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3236820",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Side Channel Analysis: A Novel Intrusion Detection System Based on Vehicle Voltage Signals",
      "description": "Intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) integrate advanced equipment and communication network technologies to realize information exchange and sharing between vehicles and people, roads, clouds, etc., bringing great convenience to people's lives. However, the interconnection of intelligent equipment and vehicles also brings many vulnerable interfaces, threatening the security of in-vehicle networks, e.g., controller area network (CAN) bus. For protecting the security of CAN bus, some researchers propose a data encryption and decryption protocol-based method. Note that due to the resource constraints of computing and bandwidth and the requirements for low-delay data transmission, the research on protocol-based data encryption and decryption method is progressing slowly. For this reason, more researchers study vehicle intrusion detection systems (IDSs) based on side channel analysis. It does not occupy the bandwidth of CAN bus, and detects intrusion by analyzing the physical characteristics of CAN bus. Nevertheless, most of the existing work either cannot locate the source electronic control unit (ECU) of the malicious data frames, or cannot detect malicious data frames from ECUs and external nodes simultaneously, which greatly limits their practical application value. Therefore, we propose a novel IDS based on vehicle voltage signals. Specifically, we map multiple identifiers (IDs) sent for each ECU without developer documentation. In addition, we creatively design FeatureBagging-CNN combined model to detect malicious intrusion. When the external nodes or compromised ECUs send malicious data frames, the system can accurately detect them and locate their sender.",
      "published": "2023-01-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2023.3236820",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yijie Xun",
        "Zhouyan Deng",
        "Jiajia Liu",
        "Yilin Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2023.3236820",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 55,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3849,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3236820 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: without, physical, information, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3247180",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Digital Watermark Method for In-Vehicle Network Security Enhancement",
      "description": "In recent years, automobiles have become increasingly networked with the development of information and communication technology (ICT). With the enhancement of the connectivity between the electronic control units of the vehicle and the external network, cybersecurity and driving safety issues have also arisen. However, as a traditional in-vehicle network standard, the controller area network (CAN) protocol lacks a network security mechanism design, making it vulnerable to hacker attacks. The current research on the cybersecurity enhancement method for in-vehicle CAN is a multi-objective optimization problem with response time, bandwidth consumption and computational complexity reduction. This study presents an in-vehicle message authentication method based on digital watermark and Huffman coding that are compatible with current CAN bus protocols. Our method not only minimize the delay of message authentication, but also save the storage resources to the greatest extent. Moreover, to tackle the issue of low computing resources, multiple messages can be authenticated at one time. In order to evaluate the performance, we implement our method on CAN communication platform and validate its high accuracy, low latency, and compatibility.",
      "published": "2023-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2023.3247180",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wu-Fei Wu",
        "Jun-Hao Dai",
        "Huijuan Huang",
        "Qinmin Zhao",
        "Gang Zeng",
        "Ren-Fa Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2023.3247180",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3281276",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Encryption and Authentication for Controller Area Network of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid development of autonomous vehicles (AVs), vehicle safety has attracted attention. Controller area network (CAN) bus without authentication and encryption mechanisms is a weakness of the in-vehicle network (IVN), and attackers always primarily target the CAN bus. Attacks on the AVs' CAN bus are more frequent because AVs have more external interfaces and sensors than ordinary vehicles. To address the abovementioned issues, this paper proposes a lightweight encryption and authentication scheme for the CAN bus of AVs using message authentication codes and Grain stream cipher. The scheme realizes efficient authentication between electronic control units and a counter re-synchronization protocol is used to ensure that authentication failure owing to counter inconsistency is prevented. Blom key management scheme is employed to rapidly distribute and update session keys, avoiding the complicated process of updating pairwise keys. In addition, considering the scalability of the IVN, a key distribution protocol for new nodes was provided. The security proof using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic and security analysis prove that the proposed scheme can satisfy the security requirements of the IVN. In addition, performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme can meet real-time requirements and has little impact on the busload.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2023.3281276",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jie Cui",
        "Yaning Chen",
        "Hong Zhong",
        "Debiao He",
        "Lu Wei",
        "Irina Pavlovna Bolodurina",
        "Lu Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2023.3281276",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3295695",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real Time Perfect Bit Modification Attack on In-Vehicle CAN",
      "description": "The vulnerabilities of controller area network (CAN) are often targeted by various types of vehicle hacking. To this end, conventional cyber attacks have used a frame injection and a dominant bit injection. However, these two techniques cannot modify data frames sent from an electronic control unit (ECU) in real time. Thus, the frame injection cannot perfectly control the target system. The dominant bit injection can only perform denial of service (DoS) attacks, which means that it cannot perfectly control the ECU. In this article, we propose a new attack technique for modifying either dominant or recessive bits represented in a CAN bus as the attacker intends. This technique is called perfect bit modification (PBM). We introduce two attack models using the PBM technique, the bus possession attack (BPA) and the target ID attack (TIA). The BPA can perform an attack without breaking the communication pattern of the CAN bus, and the TIA can perfectly seize control of a specific ECU. In addition, we produce an attack tool with the PBM functionality using the SN65HVD230 (CAN transceiver) and the FDS8949 (MOSFET). Both SN65HVD230 and FDS8949 are components that are commonly used to build ECUs, which cost less than two dollars. This means that our attack models are likely to be utilized for supply chain attacks. To demonstrate the feasibility of BPA and TIA, we conduct attack experiments using two real vehicles. Finally, we analyze the characteristics of existing attack techniques including PBM and suggest countermeasures to construct a secure CAN environment.",
      "published": "2023-07-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2023.3295695",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yousik Lee",
        "Yong-Eun Kim",
        "Jin-Gyun Chung",
        "Samuel Woo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2023.3295695",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3296705",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Detection for Intelligent Vehicles via CAN- Bus: A Lightweight Image Network Approach",
      "description": "This article investigates the security detection mechanism of intelligent vehicles under DoS attack. A lightweight CanNet-based attack detection mechanism is developed, which is suitable for both periodic and aperiodic DoS attacks. Different from the existing attack detection mechanisms, the proposed one utilizes a designed CAN image generation scheme to convert CAN traffic data into CAN images, which makes the attack visible and traceable. And the lightweight CanNet image classification network is constructed to detect the abnormalities in the generated CAN images. In order to exploit the maximum correlation of data attributes among the acquired CAN traffic data, copula entropy, the equivalent form of mutual information, is introduced into the CAN image generation scheme. In addition, an extended CAN image color coding scheme is also designed to cope with the secure detection of traffic data beyond the 12-bit CAN ID. Finally, the effectiveness of the designed detection mechanism is validated by the comparative experiments employing the CAN traffic data from YF Sonata (the type of car).",
      "published": "2023-07-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2023.3296705",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "exploit",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sheng Gao",
        "Linchuan Zhang",
        "Lei Ming He",
        "Xiaoyang Deng",
        "Huilin Yin",
        "Hao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2023.3296705",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3327275",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "X-CANIDS: Signal-Aware Explainable Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Network-Based In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is an essential networking protocol that connects multiple electronic control units (ECUs) in a vehicle. However, CAN-based in-vehicle networks (IVNs) face security risks owing to the CAN mechanisms. An adversary can sabotage a vehicle by leveraging the security risks if they can access the CAN bus. Thus, recent actions and cybersecurity regulations (e.g., UNR 155) require carmakers to implement intrusion detection systems (IDSs) in their vehicles. The IDS should detect cyberattacks and provide additional information to analyze conducted attacks. Although many IDSs have been proposed, considerations regarding their feasibility and explainability remain lacking. This study proposes X-CANIDS, which is a novel IDS for CAN-based IVNs. X-CANIDS dissects the payloads in CAN messages into human-understandable signals using a CAN database. The signals improve the intrusion detection performance compared with the use of bit representations of raw payloads. These signals also enable an understanding of which signal or ECU is under attack. X-CANIDS can detect zero-day attacks because it does not require any labeled dataset in the training phase. We confirmed the feasibility of the proposed method through a benchmark test on an automotive-grade embedded device with a GPU. The results of this work will be valuable to carmakers and researchers considering the installation of in-vehicle IDSs for their vehicles.",
      "published": "2023-03-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2023.3327275",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Sangho Lee",
        "Hwejae Lee",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2023.3327275",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 74,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3345156",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ODFa${}^{2}$: Overall Defense Framework Against Cyber-Attacks on Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous driving, as an emerging technology, is developing rapidly. However, a number of obstacles appear to be holding back the widespread adoption of autonomous driving. Cybersecurity issues, which have a significant impact both technically and psychologically on people's willingness to use autonomous driving, are one of the most significant barriers. Attackers have adopted increasingly diverse threat methods, increasing cyber-attacks. Despite these threats, global standards have been developed for road vehicle safety and cybersecurity. These standards are intended to guide manufacturers of automotive systems. For instance, the ISO and SAE have jointly released the international standard ISO/SAE 21434 (Road Vehicles-Cybersecurity Engineering) for road vehicle cybersecurity. However, focusing on the development of onboard systems alone when examining the application of these standards is not sufficient. Currently, we lack a methodology to directly apply the ISO/SAE 21434 standard to automotive system engineering projects. In particular, the overall framework of cybersecurity design for intelligent connected vehicle systems needs to be developed. This paper proposes an overall cybersecurity assurance framework (ODFa2) based on the ISO/SAE 21434 standard to assist system engineers in understanding security risks, evaluating the feasibility of attack implementation, and determining the trade-off methods for security countermeasures. We illustrate through a case study how this model-based framework may be applied to cybersecurity engineering in intelligent connected vehicles and mobility service platforms. Furthermore, the results of comparative experiments indicate that the proposed strategy optimization algorithm outperforms existing algorithms in terms of time efficiency under certain conditions.",
      "published": "2023-12-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2023.3345156",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhengshu Zhou",
        "Qiang Zhi",
        "Tao Lu",
        "Peng Ping",
        "Qian Long"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2023.3345156",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3998,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tvt.2023.3345156 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: onboard, currently, case, service, risks, impact, significant, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3363000",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure PUF-Based Authentication Protocol for Remote Keyless Entry Systems in Cars",
      "description": "This paper first investigates various attacks against Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems in cars. Then, we propose an authentication protocol based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to secure RKE systems. Detailed security analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol prevents common attacks against RKE systems such as replay and RollJam attacks as well as the recently devised RollBack attack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first protocol that addresses the RollBack attack. We also provide formal proofs to demonstrate the proposed protocol's security. A performance analysis shows that the proposed authentication protocol is cost-effective.",
      "published": "2024-02-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3363000",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rohini Poolat Parameswarath",
        "Biplab Sikdar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3363000",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3392944",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bilateral Control for Secure Communication Against Replay Attack in ORAN-Based Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Open radio access network (ORAN)-based vehicular networks play a pivotal role in future traffic data sharing. Due to the openness of the ORAN framework, it is necessary to encrypt the sharing data to prevent unauthorized access or misuse by malicious participants. However, current efforts struggle to address some emerging security requirements, such as the bilateral control of sending and access rights in cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) communications, as well as evolving replay attack on encrypted data. With these challenges, this paper presents a fine-grained access control encryption (FGACE) scheme for secure communication in ORAN-based vehicular networks. Our FGACE enables fine-grained and bilateral control over senders and receivers. We design a novel sanitization algorithm against dishonest sanitizer and replay attack. Furthermore, we deeply explore security models for replay attack on encrypted data to support secure sanitization, i.e., attribute-based replayable CCA security and related definitions. We prove that our FGACE satisfies the proposed security definitions. Feature comparison demonstrates that our scheme does better in security and privacy. Experimental results show that our scheme outperforms compared schemes. When the number of attributes increases to 50, our total computational overhead is lowest, and the total storage overhead is approximately less than 1/3 of other schemes. The impressive performance indicates that our FGACE is practical in ORAN-based vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2025-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3392944",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zongfeng Peng",
        "Chang-Gen Peng",
        "Youliang Tian",
        "Hong-Fa Ding"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3392944",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3402366",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IoV-BERT-IDS: Hybrid Network Intrusion Detection System in IoV Using Large Language Models",
      "description": "The traditional vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) gradually evolved into the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), which has also become a potential target for attacks and faces security challenges in an open network environment. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) based on machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) are introduced to mitigate security threats. However, existing ML/DL-based IDS suffer from challenges in IoV environments. First, due to the limitations of ML/DL-based methods, classification performance is unsatisfactory when they extract only unidirectional contextual features or spatial characteristics. Second, existing research on in-vehicle network IDS often limits validation and testing to a static dataset of a single vehicle model. This approach may not adequately address diverse potential attacks in a dynamic environment. Third, few studies of hybrid IDS can simultaneously implement in-vehicle and extra-vehicle network intrusion detection. Large language models (LLM) have shown outstanding applications in fields such as natural language processing (NLP) and computer vision (CV). In particular, bidirectional encoder representations from transformers (BERT) obtain new state-of-the-art results on eleven famous NLP tasks. Consequently, this paper introduces a hybrid network IDS in IoV utilising LLM, denoted as IoV-BERT-IDS. This framework encompasses four modules: semantic extractor (SE), input embedding, IoV-BERT-IDS pre-training, and IoV-BERT-IDS fine-tuning. To conform to the BERT model, the semantic extractor is introduced to transform traffic data devoid of apparent semantics into contextual semantics, comprising bidirectional and unidirectional SE. Through SE, controller area network (CAN) data is transformed into a CAN byte sentence (CBS), while extra-vehicle network traffic data is transformed into a traffic byte sentence (TBS). Additionally, two pre-training tasks, the masked byte word model (MBWM) and next byte sentence prediction (NBSP) are proposed to acquire bidirectional contextual features from contextual semantics. These features can be adapted to downstream tasks in both in-vehicle and extra-vehicle networks through fine-tuning. Experiments demonstrate that IoV-BERT-IDS outperforms in CICIDS, BoT-IoT, Car-Hacking, and In-vehicle network intrusion detection challenge (IVN-IDS) datasets and shows good generalisation capabilities to in-vehicle networks of different vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3402366",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meng-Yi Fu",
        "Pan Wang",
        "Minyao Liu",
        "Ze Zhang",
        "Xiao-Kang Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3402366",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 83,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3403455",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Private Metering in EV Charging Infrastructure: An OCPP Extension",
      "description": "The security of electrical vehicle (EV) charging systems has been improving over the past years. However, privacy concerns are yet to be addressed as profiling attacks can be accomplished on EV charging meter readings. This paper proposes a new communication protocol that preserves the privacy of users while retaining the aggregate metering values to be used by the EV charging management system. The proposed protocol extends the existing Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) specifications. OCPP is an open and widely used protocol for EV chargers but it provides no privacy-preserving mechanisms. Differential privacy concepts are applied in the proposed paper along with key masking to hide private data from different kinds of adversaries. A lightweight implementation of the proposed approach is implemented and tested on a hardware testbed to ensure the practicality of the implemented system. Experimental results and analysis show that this method is able to preserve the confidentiality of metering values with minimal computation.",
      "published": "2024-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3403455",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Naheel Faisal Kamal",
        "Ali Sharida",
        "Sertaç Bayhan",
        "Hussein Alnuweiri",
        "Haitham Abu‐Rub"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3403455",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3413849",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "HybridSecNet: In-Vehicle Security on Controller Area Networks Through a Hybrid Two-Step LSTM-CNN Model",
      "description": "The modern Intelligent Vehicle (IV) is a complex technological marvel that heavily relies on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system to enable seamless communication among different electronic control units (ECUs). However, the CAN bus system lacks security mechanisms for authentication and authorization, leaving it vulnerable to various attacks. Malicious actors can freely broadcast CAN messages without protection, making the system susceptible to DoS, Fuzzing, and Spoofing attacks. Therefore, it is crucial to devise methods to safeguard modern vehicles from such threats. In this research paper, we introduce HybridSecNet, A hybrid two-step LSTM-CNN Model for Intrusion Detection, a deep learning-based architecture specifically designed to bolster in-vehicle security on Controller Area Networks (CAN). HybridSecNet comprises two stages of classification: the first stage employs long short-term memory (LSTM) to categorize input data as either normal or attacked, and the second stage further classifies the attacks into specific types using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). This two-step approach significantly enhances classification accuracy and reliability, yielding remarkable results with accuracy, precision, recall, and an F1-score of approximately 99.5% for CAN bus network attacks. Comparative analyses with existing single-step models underscore the superiority of our proposed model, demonstrating its potential to revolutionize in-vehicle security in the realm of modern intelligent vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-06-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3413849",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit Chougule",
        "Ishan Kulkarni",
        "Tejasvi Alladi",
        "Vinay Chamola",
        "Fei Richard Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3413849",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3438929",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PE-Detector: Intrusion Detection of Periodic and Event Message Attacks on Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Recently, a number of cyber attacks on in-vehicle networks have been reported, with one of the main attack strategies being the masquerade attack, which impersonates other electronic control units (ECU). Subsequently, intrusion detection systems are mainly studied to detect masquerade attack attempts. However, existing research cannot detect certain masquerade attack attempts that use periodic and event messages, ultimately resulting in low detection rates. In this paper, we propose an acceptance filter-based intrusion detection system called PE-detector, which is able to detect a variety of masquerade attack types on the controller area network (CAN) bus including periodic and event message-based masquerade attacks with 100% accuracy when all ECUs are able to receive and transmit CAN messages from the CAN bus. If an arbitrary ECU cannot participate in CAN communications due to a DoS attack, PE-detector cannot detect a masquerade attack impersonating the corresponding node, but it is able to detect abnormal patterns of CAN bus caused by the DoS attack. In addition, since PE-detector is able to be added to the CAN bus as a dongle-type ECU board, no hardware changes to legacy ECUs are required. The proof-of-concept for PE-detector has been validated in a real vehicle.",
      "published": "2024-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3438929",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "H. Kim",
        "W. Choi",
        "H. Jo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3438929",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3466511",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Adversarial Attacks Against DRL-Based Resource Allocation in Intelligent O-RAN for V2X",
      "description": "Artificial intelligence (AI) is projected to be a critical part of open radio access networks (O-RAN) to enable intelligence for connectivity management in smart vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks and vehicle road cooperation systems. However, the openness and dependence of AI models on massive volumes of data render them subject to serious security vulnerabilities, such as adversarial attacks. This study investigates security issues in O-RAN's near real-time RAN intelligent controller (RIC), with an emphasis on deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based resource allocation. We introduce a novel attack manipulating environmental observations to mislead AI agents, resulting in erroneous allocations and decreased physical resource block (PRB) transmission rates for various vehicular communications. We also discover flaws where compromised users or signal jammers can fake signal power to trick the AI agent's state observation. This can lead to a policy infiltration attack that makes the network performance drop significantly. Evaluation results show up to a 40% decline in user data rates, a 77.74% reduction in packet delivery rates, and significant disruptions in ultra-reliable and low-latency communications (uRLLC) services such as remote driving and connected automated vehicles. The policy infiltration attack causes a 20% increase in packet losses and up to 150% delay overall. The attack efficiency emphasizes the need for adversarial training in protecting AI-driven applications, which should be addressed in future O-RAN security specifications and AI-powered vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2024-09-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3466511",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yared Abera Ergu",
        "Van-Linh Nguyen",
        "Ren‐Hung Hwang",
        "Ying–Dar Lin",
        "Chuan-Yu Cho",
        "Hui-Kuo Yang",
        "Hyundong Shin",
        "Trung Q. Duong"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3466511",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3469389",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VSRQ: Quantitative Assessment Method for Safety Risk of Vehicle Intelligent Connected System",
      "description": "The field of intelligent connected in modern vehicles continues to expand, and the functions of vehicles become more and more complex with the development of the times. This has also led to an increasing number of vehicle vulnerabilities and many safety issues. Therefore, it is particularly important to identify high-risk vehicle intelligent connected systems, because it can inform security personnel which systems are most vulnerable to attacks, allowing them to conduct more thorough inspections and tests. In this paper, we develop a new model for vehicle risk assessment by combining I-FAHP with FCA clustering: VSRQ model. We extract important indicators related to vehicle safety, use fuzzy cluster analys (FCA) combined with fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) to mine the vulnerable components of the vehicle intelligent connected system, and conduct priority testing on vulnerable components to reduce risks and ensure vehicle safety. We evaluate the model on OpenPilot and experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of the VSRQ model in identifying the safety of vehicle intelligent connected systems. The experiment fully complies with ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434 standards, and our model has a higher accuracy rate than other models. These results provide a promising new research direction for predicting the security risks of vehicle intelligent connected systems and provide typical application tasks for VSRQ. The experimental results show that the accuracy rate is 94.36%, and the recall rate is 73.43%, which is at least 14.63% higher than all other known indicators.",
      "published": "2023-05-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3469389",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tian Zhang",
        "Wenshan Guan",
        "Hao Miao",
        "Xiujie Huang",
        "Zhiquan Liu",
        "Chaonan Wang",
        "Quanlong Guan",
        "Liangda Fang",
        "Zhifei Duan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 2635-2651, 2025",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3469389",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3471334",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BlockPPA: Blockchain-Assisted Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Cross-Domain Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) bring convenience to public transport while having the potential to increase energy efficiency. With the rapid growth of the number of EVs, cross-domain charging will become a strong demand. Despite massive research on EV charging, existing schemes can hardly meet the security requirements of privacy protection and access control for cross-domain scenarios. Meanwhile, centralized methods bring the single point of failure and data modification. The problem of designing a secure cross-domain EV charging scheme to simultaneously ensure decentralization, privacy and access control has not been studied and remains open. Therefore, in this paper, we design BlockPPA, the first blockchain-assisted privacy-preserving authentication scheme for cross-domain EV charging in order to achieve this purpose. Our scheme makes each EV obtain an attribute-based secret key, which is used to authenticate itself and also anonymously illustrate that it really satisfies a designated access policy when cross-domain authentication happens. Only authorized EVs satisfying the policy do they have the ability to charge. We design three smart contracts and exploit Fabric blockchain to record the domain's detailed information and the authentication record of each cross-domain access from an EV, while achieving the decentralized verification of an authentication request. The results of security and performance analysis show the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed cross-domain authentication mechanism.",
      "published": "2024-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3471334",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploit",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Peng Li",
        "Haobin Ma",
        "Junzuo Lai",
        "Dehua Zhou",
        "Lianguan Huang",
        "Yuan Li",
        "Ruijia Zang",
        "Junbin Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3471334",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3521388",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cooperative Localization of Connected Vehicles With Attack Detection and Secure Fusion",
      "description": "The vulnerability from cyberattack undermines the security in cooperative localization of connected vehicles. This paper presents a localization framework for connected vehicles subject to false data injection attacks, featuring an attack detection scheme to get rid of abnormal position information from malicious vehicles. To this end, a refined kinematic model, measurement model, and attack model are introduced. By introducing a local Kalman decomposition procedure to extract the position measurements from the collection of connected vehicles, a fusion algorithm is presented to guarantee secure and accurate vehicle localization. The simulation and experimental results show that the method outperforms the state-of-the-art vehicle localization methods in urban environments.",
      "published": "2024-12-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3521388",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiageng Liu",
        "Ge Guo",
        "Xiaozheng Sun",
        "Zengbo Li",
        "Haodong Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3521388",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4049,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3521388 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collection, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3524644",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Historical Attack-Intensity-Based Event-Triggered Platoon Control of Connected Vehicles Under Actuator Failures and DoS Attacks",
      "description": "This paper considers the event-triggered (ET) platoon control of connected vehicles in the presence of actuator failures and DoS attacks. First, a historical attack-intensity-based ET mechanism is proposed to optimize communication resources. Compared with the existing event trigger mechanism, this mechanism utilizes not only the state error information but also historical attack intensity data to dynamically adjust the trigger threshold, which further conserves communication resources and enhances design flexibility in the case of DoS attacks. Next, a security platoon control scheme is designed to resist actuator faults and DoS attacks, and a delay switched system model is introduced to describe the vehicle platoon tracking error system. Then, a novel Lyapunov functional is developed and combined with switching techniques to establish sufficient conditions for the exponential stability of the tracking error system. Additionally, a co-design method of controller gain and event trigger parameters is proposed. Finally, simulation examples validate the superiority of the proposed historical attack-intensity-based ET platooning control scheme.",
      "published": "2025-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2024.3524644",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huichao Lin",
        "Jiuxiang Dong",
        "Ju H. Park"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2024.3524644",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4096,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/tvt.2024.3524644 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: stability, next, case, privacy, information, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2025.3570961",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Voltage-Based ECU Fingerprint Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle CAN Bus",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is the de facto industry standard of In-Vehicle Network (IVN) for connecting Electronic Control Units (ECUs). In recent years, related researchers have proposed various in-vehicle network security schemes to protect CAN bus. By leveraging the physical characteristics of signals sent by ECUs, ECU identification methods are proposed to implement intrusion detection system at the physical transmission layer. Voltage-based physical fingerprint techniques have gained significant attention in this research field. Considering the resource-constrained embedded environments of IVN, various methods attempt to reduce the resource requirements of physical fingerprint-based ECU identification methods. In this paper, a lightweight voltage-based fingerprint intrusion detection system is proposed, which achieves an identification accuracy of over 99% under conditions of low sampling rates, short signal segments, and a small feature set through comprehensive experiments on both CAN prototypes and a rich dataset of ten actual vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2025.3570961",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Man Zhang",
        "Jini Li",
        "Yu Lai",
        "Sha Huan",
        "Wenli Shang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2025.3570961",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/tvt.2025.3603056",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN Bus Intrusion Detection Based on Deep Learning With Data Augmentation for Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "As the de-facto standard for in-vehicle networks, the Controller Area Network (CAN) is exposed to different types of cyber-attacks due to the lack of security mechanisms. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be deployed to identify the attacks by monitoring host and network activities. However, there is little abnormal historical data that can be used to train deep learning models, resulting in data imbalance and biased trained model. Hence, we propose a prediction-based IDS framework for detecting the attacks on a CAN bus, which consists of two deep-learning models of the data augmentation module and the prediction module. Firstly, the Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) was utilized as the data augmentation module to automatically generate high-quality attack data and balance the training set. Two networks were introduced as the prediction module, and the first one is a convolutional neural networks (CNN) that predicts correlated data of all CAN IDs, and the second one is an LSTM that predicts messages individually using times series data for each CAN ID. Furthermore, an intrusion detection equipment for the CAN bus was designed and the real vehicle test was conducted. The experimental results show that the proposed method can detect CAN attacks, with an average F1-score of 99.74% and an accuracy of 99.78%. Compared with the reference work, the F1-score of attack detection is improved by 15.25%, and also the detection time is reduced by 29.11%.",
      "published": "2025-08-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2025.3603056",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiang Wang",
        "Jian Kui Zhao",
        "Pengbo Liu",
        "Nianmin Yao",
        "Zheng Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/tvt.2025.3603056",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/twc.2020.3047496",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Edge Computing Resource Allocation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Assisted Mobile Network With Blockchain Applications",
      "description": "Mobile edge computing is becoming a major trend in providing computation capacities at the edge of mobile networks. Meanwhile, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been considered as distinctly important integrated components to extend services coverage. In order to provide users with higher and satisfied quality of services, edge computing resources need to be allocated between edge computing stations (ECSs) and UAVs in mobile networks. However, there are significant security and privacy problems due to the open environments of ECSs and UAVs. In this paper, we propose a resource pricing and trading scheme based on Stackelberg dynamic game to optimally allocate edge computing resources between ECSs and UAVs, and blockchain technology is applied to record the entire resources trading process to protect the security and privacy. The ECSs control the resources price of the allocated edge computing resources, where the UAVs follow the price announced by the ECSs and make optimal decisions on the edge computing resources demands. Blockchain is integrated in the resource trading process to ensure the security and privacy. Numerical simulations are given to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.",
      "published": "2021-01-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/twc.2020.3047496",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hai-Tao Xu",
        "Wentao Huang",
        "Yun-Hui Zhou",
        "Dongmei Yang",
        "Ming Li",
        "Zhu Han"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/twc.2020.3047496",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 95,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/twc.2023.3249665",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Toward Protecting 5G Sidelink Scheduling in C-V2X Against Intelligent DoS Attacks",
      "description": "5G Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (5G C-V2X) is emerging as the globally dominant connected vehicle technology. One critical application of 5G C-V2X is the direct exchange of safety-critical messages between vehicles to prevent crashes and correspondingly reduce roadway injuries and fatalities. While current C-V2X security protocols concern only message payloads, we expose vulnerabilities in the physical-layer attributes and decentralized MAC-layer scheduling algorithm of 5G C-V2X by developing two stealthy denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to exploit them. These low-duty-cycle attacks dramatically degrade C-V2X availability, increasing the likelihood of prolonged travel times and even vehicle crashes. We further develop detection and mitigation techniques for each attack, in part by exploiting new C-V2X features of 3GPP Rel-17. We experimentally evaluate our attacks and countermeasures in a hardware testbed composed of USRPs and state-of-the-art C-V2X kits as well as through extensive network and roadway simulations, showing that within seconds of initiation our attacks can reduce a target’s packet delivery ratio by 90% or that of the C-V2X channel to under 25%. We further evaluate our machine-learning detection and low-cost mitigation techniques, showing the latter completely thwart one attack and reduce the impact of the other by 80%, providing insight towards developing a more robust 5G C-V2X.",
      "published": "2023-03-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/twc.2023.3249665",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "exploit",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Geoff Twardokus",
        "Hanif Rahbari"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/twc.2023.3249665",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ubmk.2019.8907026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey: Security and Privacy in 5G Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "With the fulfillment of communication capabilities, vehicles are planned to have autonomous driving features with collaboration between vehicles, infrastructure units, pedestrians and networks elements. The main goal of vehicular communication is to provide accident-free automated driving while increasing the efficiency of road usage and supporting greener transportation. Because of the stringent requirements of vehicular networks such as low latency, high reliability, high data rate, 5G becomes emerging solution for autonomous vehicles. 5G vehicle-to-everything communication uses several communication models and technologies which make it open to several attacks such as eavesdropping, jamming, DoS, DDoS and sybil attacks. In this paper, a comprehensive literature survey about security and privacy solutions which can be applied to 5G vehicular networks are proposed. Solutions are categorized into 4 security services: authentication, confidentiality, availability and integrity. Challenges such as providing trust model for security services in vehicular networks and privacy concerns are proposed.",
      "published": "2019-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ubmk.2019.8907026",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "jamming",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ezgi Tetik Saglam",
        "Şerif Bahtıyar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Science and Engineering (UBMK)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/ubmk.2019.8907026",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ubmk67458.2025.11206848",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure End2End Automotive Driving Assistant with Secure Remote SW Update System",
      "description": "The automotive industry is undergoing significant transformations with the growing adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies into the electric and hybrid vehicles. While the technological advances enhance driving safety and comfort, they also introduce new cybersecurity risks due to remote access functionality. Our work addresses the security in automotive systems by presenting an implementation of a secure end-to-end automotive driving assistant system with an Over-the-Air (OTA) software update mechanism. The proposed secure by design assistant integrates vehicle emulation, remote control features, driver profiling and road safety alerts, OTA software update management. Key hardware components include a Raspberry Pi-based vehicle emulator, a cloud-based central server, mobile-web user and admin interfaces and a secure OTA software update system compliant with international UN R156 regulation (Software update and software update management system). While the system was tested against common IoT security threats, performance metrics are deferred to future work. This research demonstrates the feasibility of building end-to-end secure automotive IoT systems and sets a foundation for future benchmarking and scalability analysis. Briefly, our work provides a comprehensive and regulation compliant environment for secure connected vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2025-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ubmk67458.2025.11206848",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "regulation",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sude Güngör",
        "Mehmet Hilal Özcanhan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Science and Engineering (UBMK)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/ubmk67458.2025.11206848",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/ucc63386.2024.00065",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comparative Survey of Blockchain-Based Security Mechanisms for OTA updates in CAVs",
      "description": "In Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs), there is an increasing demand and reliance on connected vehicle software systems. To keep these software systems up-to-date and secure from evolving threats, the OEM Manufacturers rely on the Over-the-Air (OTA) Updates. In this paper, we explore security challenges posed by remote OTA updates, emphasizing the need for robust OTA update mechanisms that preserve the integrity of the update and emerging requirements to adhere to global automotive cybersecurity regulations and standards. We provide a comparative survey of Blockchain-based security mechanisms for enhancing the security of OTA updates for CAVs by highlighting the existing approaches that use blockchain technology to create secure architectures for OTA updates compared to traditional methods. We also identified critical security challenges associated with OTA updates and outlined potential avenues for future research, guiding advancements in blockchain applications in CAVs.",
      "published": "2024-12-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/ucc63386.2024.00065",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zeeman Memon",
        "Ikjot Saini"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/ACM International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing (UCC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/ucc63386.2024.00065",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/uemcon53757.2021.9666745",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus In-Vehicle Network based on Machine Learning Algorithms",
      "description": "The advent of automotive industry has an increasing market demand pertaining to installation of intelligent transportation facilities in modern vehicles. Now more comfortable and safer travelling experience is one best trait of these vehicles. Moreover, it has opened new gates to advancement in automotive sector. Modern vehicles are connected to advance systems and technologies using various communication protocols. Amongst numerous communication protocols, one widely used protocol is the controller area network (CAN) bus which serves as a central medium for in-vehicle communications. However, the communication in these vehicles may impose greater threats and may ultimately compromise the security by breaching the system. Various attacks on CAN bus may compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of vehicular data through intrusions which may endanger the physical safety of vehicle and passengers. In this paper, a novel machine learning based approach is used to devise an Intrusion Detection System for the CAN bus network. The proposed system is scalable and adaptable to a diverse set of emerging attacks on autonomous vehicles. Results witnessed the accuracy of 100% of our proposed system in detecting and safeguarding threats against multiple impersonation and denial of service attacks as well as 99% accuracy of fuzzy attacks.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/uemcon53757.2021.9666745",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asma Alfardus",
        "Danda B. Rawat"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/uemcon53757.2021.9666745",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/uemcon62879.2024.10754676",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Dark Side of AI: Large Language Models as Tools for Cyber Attacks on Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of autonomous vehicles (AVs) presents significant opportunities for enhancing transportation safety and efficiency. However, with increasing connectivity and complex electronic systems, AVs also become vulnerable to cyberattacks. This paper investigates cybersecurity challenges in the realm of AVs, highlighting the role of artificial intelligence (AI), specifically Large Language Models (LLMs), in exploiting vulnerabilities. We analyze various attack vectors, including Controller Area Network (CAN) manipulation, Bluetooth vulnerabilities, and Key Fob hacking, emphasizing the need for proactive cybersecurity measures. Recent incidents, such as the remote compromise of various vehicle models, underscore the urgent need for robust security solutions in the automotive industry. By leveraging LLMs, attackers can craft sophisticated cyber threats targeting AVs, posing risks to both safety and privacy. We introduce HackerGPT, a customized LLM tailored for cyber attack generation, and demonstrate attacks on virtual CAN networks, Bluetooth systems, and Key Fobs. At the same time, our experiments reveal successful compromises in certain vehicle models; limitations exist, particularly in vehicles with advanced encryption and robust signal transmission protocols. However, this research underscores the broader need for increased awareness and proactive security measures in the automotive sector. Our findings aim to contribute significantly to the ongoing discourse on automotive cybersecurity, offering actionable insights for manufacturers and cybersecurity professionals to safeguard the future of mobility.",
      "published": "2024-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/uemcon62879.2024.10754676",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "key fob"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yusuf Usman",
        "Prashnna Gyawali",
        "Sohan Gyawali",
        "Robin Chataut"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/uemcon62879.2024.10754676",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/usbereit56278.2022.9923368",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modeling the Vulnerabilities of Information Network Nodes of a Connected Vehicle Using AND/OR Graphs",
      "description": "The purpose of the work is to develop a method for determining critical nodes in the subsystems of vehicle information networks. With the increase in the number of electronic devices in modern vehicles and the emergence of opportunities for communication between the vehicle and the outside world using wireless interfaces, the risk of hacking vehicle subsystems has increased, which can lead to accidents with serious consequences. To prevent hacking, it is necessary to ensure a sufficient level of security of the vehicle information network, for which it is necessary to identify the most vulnerable network nodes in terms of information security. The article uses the method of modeling the logical description of operational dependencies in the braking force distribution subsystem using AND/OR graphs. The protection measures that are applied to the subsystem elements are represented as an additional layer above the graph and, together with the subsystem nodes, are modeled as hyper-graph edges. Operational dependencies in the subsystem are presented as logical dependencies with AND/OR type connections and are presented in conjunctive normal form, after which the SAT satisfiability problem is solved. The proposed approach will make it possible to obtain a new method of mathematical modeling of the security of vehicle information network nodes to build the optimal configuration of protective equipment with known critical nodes of the vehicle information network and some maximum development costs.",
      "published": "2022-09-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/usbereit56278.2022.9923368",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "hacking",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "I. A. Sheviakov",
        "Andrey E. Barinov"
      ],
      "venue": "Ural Symposium on Biomedical Engineering, Radioelectronics and Information Technology (USBEREIT)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/usbereit56278.2022.9923368",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vitecon58111.2023.10157660",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Lightweight Encipher using Homomorphic and Binomial Coefficients for Smart Computing Applications",
      "description": "Globally, advanced technologies play a vital role to offer services to the user. But the major issue raised here is that the data utilization rate increasing day by day which causes attacks on data. With the increasing use of the internet and digital media, data theft, and piracy making became easy due to the lack of proper security services offered techniques. Existing techniques such as DES, AES, RSA are techniques that failed to achieve immutable, and decentralized features with Lightweight enciphers. In spite of this, attackers continue to attack sensitive data due to the technology's fast progress and the inherent fragility. As a result, a homomorphic encryption method was suggested based on the transformed ASCII values assigned to each character in plain text. In this proposed system, the secret key generated is a tetrahedral-based key, a Pentatope-based key. There is no need for the transmission of keys between users. This work proposes novel encryption using Homomorphic operations and binomial coefficients to secure sensitive information related to the academic industry.",
      "published": "2023-05-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vitecon58111.2023.10157660",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sk. Arshiya Sultana",
        "Ch. Rupa",
        "R. Pavana Malleswari"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vision Towards Emerging Trends in Communication and Networking (ViTECoN)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vitecon58111.2023.10157660",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vlsi-tsa.2019.8804701",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Driving Technologies and Computing Platform",
      "description": "Autonomous Driving is one of the most complex problems automotive and high-tech industries are facing today. This presentation first reviews the autonomous driving business landscape. Then it discusses current technologies used in HD mapping, localization, perception, prediction, motion planning and decision. Next, the presentation discusses future technology breakthroughs needed in order for autonomous vehicles to operate efficiently and safely in complex metropolitan areas. Finally the presentation discusses computing platform to support autonomous driving subsystems, AI training, safety and security requirements.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vlsi-tsa.2019.8804701",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Peter Hsieh"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on VLSI Technology, Systems and Applications (VLSI-TSA)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vlsi-tsa.2019.8804701",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc.2016.7835972",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.11p and visible light communication based platoon",
      "description": "Technology brings autonomous vehicles into the reality where vehicles become capable of cruising themselves. A vehicular platoon contains autonomous vehicles organized into groups with close proximity. It is envisioned that with the increased demand for autonomous vehicles, platoons would be the part of our lives in near future. From this perspective, vehicular platoon control using current dominant IEEE 802.11p (DSRC) is an active research field. However, DSRC suffers from problems of performance degradation due to congestion, the scarcity of radio-frequency (RF) and security. Visible Light Communication (VLC), on the other hand, is a promising complementary technology with the potential to address DSRC problems. In this paper, we investigate the security vulnerabilities of hybrid DSRC-VLC platoon in the presence of outside attackers. We develop a simulation platform to realize the hybrid platoon. We demonstrate that although VLC limits the effect of adversaries, hybrid architectures still suffer from the packet falsification and replay attacks.",
      "published": "2016-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc.2016.7835972",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seyhan Uçar",
        "Sinem Çöleri",
        "Öznur Özkasap"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc.2016.7835972",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc.2016.7835978",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "POSTER: Anomaly-based misbehaviour detection in connected car backends",
      "description": "As a novel way to protect connected cars, we are developing a Security Information and Event Management System (SIEM) called Security Management of Services in Connected Cars (SeMaCoCa) located in the backend of the connected car. For that we defined a connected car architecture and possible use cases which serve as a basis for the research. Using data from the connected cars and additional information, attacks on individual vehicles or fleets should be recognized. A combination of rule-based-, machine-learning-, deep learning-, real-time-based-, security-algorithms and algorithms for big data are used. Furthermore, we aim for a privacy-friendly solution that does not require the backend operator to have access to cleartext data. The new security system should be able to recognise misbehaviour under the conditions of a permanently growing number and variety of connected cars, upcoming services on the market and related constantly to changing user behavior. The challenge for the security system is, that under these conditions no stable system state exists, that the system can rely on. In this paper, we introduce the architecture of SeMaCoCa, user stories and the idea behind the approach of the system.",
      "published": "2016-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc.2016.7835978",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Olga Berlin",
        "Albert Held",
        "Matthias Matousek",
        "Frank Kargl"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc.2016.7835978",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc48660.2019.9062783",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure-by-Design Framework for Automotive On-board Network Risk Analysis",
      "description": "Vehicles have evolved from isolated and mechanical systems into complex ecosystems of on-board networks, composed of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), sensors and actuators, which govern their functionalities. These networks have been traditionally designed as trusted, closed systems, but modern needs have opened them to remote and local connections. Researchers have shown that modern vehicles are vulnerable to multiple types of attacks leveraging remote and physical access, which allow attackers to gain control and affect safety-critical systems. Therefore, the interest of manufacturers for embedding security into the design phase of new vehicles is rising. In this paper, we propose a semi-automated and topology-based risk analysis framework that helps in designing and assessing the security of automotive on-board networks. The tool receives the network topology as input and evaluates its security using state-of-the-art risk metrics. Then, it provides the analyst with security-hardened network topologies, as a countermeasure against the most dangerous attacks. We evaluate our approach on known topologies and demonstrate its effectiveness.",
      "published": "2019-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc48660.2019.9062783",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefano Longari",
        "Andrea Cannizzo",
        "Michele Carminati",
        "Stefano Zanero"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc48660.2019.9062783",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc48660.2019.9062815",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical signal-driven fusion for V2X misbehavior detection",
      "description": "While source authenticity and message integrity in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications can be well protected via cryptographic schemes, the validity of shared data raises tremendous concerns. An insider attacker can use a legitimate identity to pass the message authentication and disseminate false reports of information such as its location to the surrounding receivers. Without a reliable filter, the control of a host vehicle can be easily trapped to unexpected situations such as wrong acceleration, and that may lead to a crash, loss of life and assets. This work presents a novel misbehavior detection mechanism that can detect such insider attacks. Unlike prior work, our framework works based on the cooperative efforts of (1) the physical signal-based target tracking engine on the host vehicle and (2) the extensive RSSI-based verification of the presence of the target vehicles with spatial and temporal resolution from reliable entities such as road-side units (RSUs). The target is to verify the senders' presence at their claimed locations, validate the consistency of the trajectory movement, and further re-evaluate the reliability of their V2X messages, even without the applicability of radar and LIDAR (e.g., in a non-LOS area). We also demonstrate the example of using this work in various attack scenarios.",
      "published": "2019-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc48660.2019.9062815",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Van-Linh Nguyen",
        "Po‐Ching Lin",
        "Ren‐Hung Hwang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc48660.2019.9062815",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc51378.2020.9318372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategies for Integrating Control Flows in Software-Defined In-Vehicle Networks and Their Impact on Network Security",
      "description": "Current In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) connect Electronic Control Units (ECUs) via domain busses. A gateway forwards messages between these domains. Automotive Ethernet emerges as a flat, high-speed backbone technology for IVNs that carries the various control flows within Ethernet frames. Recently, Software-Defined-Networking (SDN) has been identified as a useful building block of the vehicular domain, as it allows the differentiation of packets based on all header fields and thus can isolate unrelated control flows. In this work, we systematically explore the different strategies for integrating automotive control flows in switched Ether-networks and analyze their security impact for a software-defined IVN. We discuss how control flow identifiers can be embedded on different layers resulting in a range of solutions from fully exposed embedding to deep encapsulation. We evaluate these strategies in a realistic IVN based on the communication matrix of a production grade vehicle, which we map into a modern Ethernet topology. We find that visibility of automotive control flows within packet headers is essential for the network infrastructure to enable isolation and access control. With an exposed embedding, the SDN backbone can establish and survey trust zones within the IVN and largely reduce the attack surface of connected cars. An exposed embedding strategy also minimizes communication expenses.",
      "published": "2020-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc51378.2020.9318372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Timo Hackel",
        "Anja Schmidt",
        "Philipp Meyer",
        "Franz Korf",
        "Thomas C. Schmidt"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc51378.2020.9318372",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc52810.2021.9644625",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Name-Based Secure Communications Architecture for Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Forthcoming automotive cybersecurity standards such as ISO 21434 and regulations such as WP.29 make it imperative that automakers establish cybersecurity-by-design practices. Vehicle communication cybersecurity (both in- and out-of-vehicle) is crucial in achieving this goal. With the adoption of automotive Ethernet, automakers are turning to the Internet protocol suite (IP) to achieve the desired cybersecurity properties. However, security was always an add-on to Internet protocols, resulting in well-known security weaknesses such as spoofing, denial of service attacks, lack of authentication and more. Such weaknesses may unwittingly be brought to the automotive space.In this position paper we take the position that the automotive industry should investigate other networking architectures besides IP as they move away from existing architectures such as CAN. Specifically, we propose Named Data Networking (NDN), an architecture that incorporates unified security-by-design from the network to the application layers. While NDN has not yet been used for in-vehicle communication, our position is that its superiority to IP, especially in security, makes it a strong candidate. Unlike IP, which secures the communication channel between two entities, NDN secures the content through digital signatures that cryptographically bind a name to the content, ensuring both authentication and integrity of the data. NDN is analogous to a pub-sub model and can be implemented directly over L2 or L3 layers.",
      "published": "2021-11-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc52810.2021.9644625",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso 21434",
        "vehicular",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christos Papadopoulos",
        "Alexander Afanasyev",
        "Susmit Shannigrahi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc52810.2021.9644625",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc57357.2023.10136285",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Resilience of Machine Learning-Based IDS for Automotive Networks",
      "description": "Modern automotive functions are controlled by a large number of small computers called electronic control units (ECUs). These functions span from safety-critical autonomous driving to comfort and infotainment. ECUs communicate with one another over multiple internal networks using different technologies. Some, such as Controller Area Network (CAN), are very simple and provide minimal or no security services. Machine learning techniques can be used to detect anomalous activities in such networks. However, it is necessary that these machine learning techniques are not prone to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we investigate adversarial sample vulnerabilities in four different machine learning-based intrusion detection systems for automotive networks. We show that adversarial samples negatively impact three of the four studied solutions. Furthermore, we analyze transferability of adversarial samples between different systems. We also investigate detection performance and the attack success rate after using adversarial samples in the training. After analyzing these results, we discuss whether current solutions are mature enough for a use in modern vehicles.",
      "published": "2023-04-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc57357.2023.10136285",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ivo Zenden",
        "Han Wang",
        "Alfonso Iacovazzi",
        "Arash Vahidi",
        "Rolf Blom",
        "Shahid Raza"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc57357.2023.10136285",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc57357.2023.10136349",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A New Approach To Pseudonym Certificate Management in V2X Communication",
      "description": "This paper proposes a new solution to the pseudonym certificate management and usage in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. This solution is a result of our critical analysis of the Issue First Activate Later (IFAL) pseudonym certificate management scheme, which is mentioned in an ETSI Intelligent Transport System (ITS) pre-standardization document. While the IFAL scheme improves over the existing ETSI ITS Security Credential Management System (CCMS) for Europe and the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) for the US, it still has significant issues when real-world deployment is considered. To address these issues, we propose a novel activation scheme that improves the security properties by combining the OAuth concept and Authentication Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) solution to provide confidentiality and authenticity of data. Our analysis and simulation show that our scheme significantly improves the security properties and efficiency of certificate usage. As a result, our solution is more robust, reliable, and efficient. We propose this solution for adoption in the ETSI ITS specifications.",
      "published": "2023-04-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc57357.2023.10136349",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takahito Yoshizawa",
        "Bart Preneel A"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc57357.2023.10136349",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc61989.2024.10575970",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Metrics for AI-Based In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become a crucial component in ensuring the security of in-vehicle networks. With the emergence of machine learning (ML), more flexible and efficient statistical methods have been introduced to the field of IDSs. However, the current metrics used to evaluate IDSs, including those based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), need to adequately capture the unique characteristics of in-vehicle networks. To address this issue, we propose a new metric based on CVSS, designed explicitly for in-vehicle IDSs. Our metric considers cybersecurity information, including the severity of attacks encountered, to provide a more informed representation of performance. By prioritizing high performance on severe attacks, our metric provides a more accurate representation of an IDS's effectiveness in the context of in-vehicle networks. This new metric bridges the gap between ML and the unique cybersecurity challenges of in-vehicle networks, enhancing the overall security posture of the automotive industry.",
      "published": "2024-05-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc61989.2024.10575970",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Lamine Bouchouia",
        "Hamza Khemissa",
        "Elies Gherbi",
        "Myriam Tami",
        "Duncan Lopes",
        "Natasha Alkhatib",
        "Maxime Ayrault"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc61989.2024.10575970",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vnc61989.2024.10575976",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Penetration Testing of In-Vehicle Infotainment Systems in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system of a modern connected vehicle is a critical attack point and must be thoroughly tested. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive methodology for penetration testing specifically tailored to IVI systems in connected vehicles and demonstrate its applicability with the case study of testing the IVI Wi-Fi interface of a Volkswagen (VW) ID.3. We define a generic IVI model as the basis for specifying the test scope. The type, depth, and complexity of the tests to be performed can be determined using our proposed attacker model. This ensures that all relevant aspects are tested. Our methodology consists of seven phases and contains detailed descriptions of the tasks to be carried out in each phase. Following our methodology in the case study, we identified vulnerabilities in the VW IVI system that could allow attackers with Wi-Fi access to crash the system, access data, or manipulate volume settings,",
      "published": "2024-05-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vnc61989.2024.10575976",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "volkswagen"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "volkswagen"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hannah Wieser",
        "Thomas Schäfer",
        "Christoph Krauß"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/vnc61989.2024.10575976",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2020-fall49728.2020.9348647",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Threat Analysis of Automotive Infotainment Systems",
      "description": "This paper presents a security threat that can be induced by exploiting the vulnerabilities of In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems installed in connected vehicles. Recent IVI systems provide a remote control service that enables control from outside the car through an Internet connection. These systems also provide an in-vehicle Internet service that connects to the outside world. If IVI systems are inadequately implemented, they represent attack targets and the attacker may induce abnormal remote control of the car. In this paper, we analyze the security threat to IVI systems that may be a remote attack target in connected vehicles. We focus on (a) the remote control service that controls the car from the outside and (b) the in-vehicle network service that connects from inside the car to the outside. Regarding (a), we analyze the attack possibilities to verify whether or not previous countermeasures in the IVI system are sufficient to protect against attacks. Analysis results show that an attacker can remotely perform abnormal body control such as unlocking of a door by bypassing previous countermeasures embedded in the remote control service. Regarding (b), we analyze the in-vehicle network service from the aspect of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, which has not been previously reported. Analysis results show that users are prevented from connecting to the Internet in the car by exploiting the improper implementation of the in-vehicle Wi-Fi service in an attack that has not been previously considered. Furthermore, for advanced attack techniques, (c) we analyze the IVI module itself and gain a root password through development interfaces to compromise the IVI module. We believe that this paper will contribute to the construction of improved secure designs and implementations in IVI systems.",
      "published": "2020-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2020-fall49728.2020.9348647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junko Takahashi",
        "Makoto Iwamura",
        "Masashi Tanaka"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2020-fall49728.2020.9348647",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2021-fall52928.2021.9625372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multi-Factor Authenticated Blockchain-Based OTA Update Framework for Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are embedded with dozens of electronic units and sensors heavily reliant on vehicle's software systems for their secure and reliable operations. This software system must always stay updated for providing a secure and uninterrupted service to CA V. While the automated OTA (Over-The-Air) software and firmware updates for autonomous vehicles is essential for their safe operation, the potential system failure and cybersecurity threats remain a major concern for secure OTA update. This paper introduces a blockchain-based, highly adaptable solution for keeping the CA V OTA software systems updated in real-time while offering faster processing speed and a high level of security against possible cyber-attacks. Our proposed scheme ensures that only authorized OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) can upload new software and updated versions in the cloud, and only the certified vehicles download and install the updates. Our framework guarantees a faster, scalable, and multi-factor authentication system for a secure real-time software update service for CA V s.",
      "published": "2021-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2021-fall52928.2021.9625372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sadia Yeasmin",
        "Anwar Haque"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2021-fall52928.2021.9625372",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2021-fall52928.2021.9625388",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Two-layer Collaborative Vehicle-Edge Intrusion Detection System for Vehicular Communications",
      "description": "With increased wireless connectivity and embedded sensors, vehicles are becoming more intelligent, offering Internet access, telematics, and advanced driver assistance systems. Along with all benefits, connectivity to the public network and automotive control systems introduces new threats and security risks to connected and autonomous driving systems. Therefore, it is highly critical to design robust security mechanisms to protect the system from potential attacks and security vulnerabilities. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a promising solution to detect and identify attacks and malicious behaviour within the network. This paper proposes a two-layer IDS mechanism that exploits machine learning (ML) solutions for collaborative attack detection between an on-vehicle IDS module and a developed IDS platform at a mobile edge computing (MEC) server. The results illustrate that the proposed solution can significantly reduce communication latency and energy consumption up to 80% while maintaining a high level of detection accuracy.",
      "published": "2021-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2021-fall52928.2021.9625388",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "driver assistance",
        "exploits",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Parya Haji Mirzaee",
        "Mohammad Shojafar",
        "Hamidreza Bagheri",
        "Tsz Hin Chan",
        "Haitham S. Cruickshank",
        "Rahim Tafazolli"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2021-fall52928.2021.9625388",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9448795",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2X Attack Vectors and Risk Analysis for Automated Cooperative Driving",
      "description": "Cooperative systems have finally entered the automotive mass market with the introduction of the 2020 VW Golf. These \"Day-1\" functions are aimed at driver information and warning only, but the integration of cooperative systems and automated driver assistance is already planned on several levels such as cooperative perception and cooperative driving maneuvers. The introduction of wireless open networks into highly critical systems sets highest demands to safety and security. In this paper we examine several cybersecurity attack vectors on Day-1 and future cooperative systems by applying the methodology used in functional safety. We evaluate attack difficulty (exposure), severity and controllability for a selection of current and next-gen functions. From this analysis, we derive associated risks and thus give recommendations to researchers and engineers. Finally, we simulate a selection of attacks on a platoon and evaluate function behavior and the possibility of critical system malfunction.",
      "published": "2021-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9448795",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Oliver Sawade",
        "I. Radusch",
        "M. Hauswirth"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9448795",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9448913",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Process to Facilitate Automated Automotive Cybersecurity Testing",
      "description": "Modern vehicles become increasingly digitalized with advanced information technology-based solutions like advanced driving assistance systems and vehicle-to-x communications. These systems are complex and interconnected. Rising complexity and increasing outside exposure has created a steadily rising demand for more cyber-secure systems. Thus, also standardization bodies and regulators issued standards and regulations to prescribe more secure development processes. This security, however, also has to be validated and verified. In order to keep pace with the need for more thorough, quicker and comparable testing, today's generally manual testing processes have to be structured and optimized. Based on existing and emerging standards for cybersecurity engineering, this paper therefore outlines a structured testing process for verifying and validating automotive cybersecurity, for which there is no standardized method so far. Despite presenting a commonly structured framework, the process is flexible in order to allow implementers to utilize their own, accustomed toolsets.",
      "published": "2021-01-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9448913",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefan Marksteiner",
        "Nadja Marko",
        "Andre Smulders",
        "Stelios Karagiannis",
        "Florian Stahl",
        "Hayk Hamazaryan",
        "Rupert Schlick",
        "Stefan Kraxberger",
        "Alexandr Vasenev"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9448913",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9449029",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilient Shield: Reinforcing the Resilience of Vehicles Against Security Threats",
      "description": "Vehicles have become complex computer systems with multiple communication interfaces. In the future, vehicles will have even more connections to e.g., infrastructure, pedestrian smartphones, cloud, road-side-units and the Internet. External and physical interfaces, as well as internal communication buses have shown to have potential to be exploited for attack purposes. As a consequence, there is an increase in regulations which demand compliance with vehicle cyber resilience requirements. However, there is currently no clear guidance on how to comply with these regulations from a technical perspective.To address this issue, we have performed a comprehensive threat and risk analysis based on published attacks against vehicles from the past 10 years, from which we further derive necessary security and resilience techniques. The work is done using the SPMT methodology where we identify vital vehicle assets, threat actors, their motivations and objectives, and develop a comprehensive threat model. Moreover, we develop a comprehensive attack model by analyzing the identified threats and attacks. These attacks are filtered and categorized based on attack type, probability, and consequence criteria. Additionally, we perform an exhaustive mapping between asset, attack, threat actor, threat category, and required mitigation mechanism for each attack, resulting in a presentation of a secure and resilient vehicle design. Ultimately, we present the Resilient Shield a novel and imperative framework to justify and ensure security and resilience within the automotive domain.",
      "published": "2021-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9449029",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kim Strandberg",
        "Thomas Rosenstatter",
        "Rodi Jolak",
        "Nasser Nowdehi",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2021-spring51267.2021.9449029",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2022-fall57202.2022.10012736",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated Learning-based Inter-slice Attack Detection for 5G-V2X Sliced Networks",
      "description": "As a leading enabler of 5G, Network Slicing (NS) aims at creating multiple virtual networks on the same shared and programmable physical infrastructure. Integrated with 5GVehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology, NS enables various isolated 5G-V2X networks with different requirements such as autonomous driving and platooning. This combination has generated new attack surfaces against Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs), leading them to road hazards and putting users’ lives in danger. More specifically, such attacks can either intra-slice targeting the internal service within each V2X Network Slice (V2X-NS) or inter-slice targeting the cross V2X-NSs and breaking the isolation between them. However, detecting such attacks is challenging, especially inter-slice V2X attacks where security mechanisms should maintain privacy preservation and NS isolation. To this end, this paper addresses detecting inter-slice V2X attacks. To do so, we leverage both Virtual Security as a Service (VSaS) concept and Deep learning (DL) together with Federated learning (FL) to deploy a set of DL-empowered security Virtual Network Functions (sVNFs) over V2X-NSs. Our privacy preservation scheme is hierarchical and supports FL-based collaborative learning. It also integrates a game-theory-based mechanism to motivate FL clients (CAVs) to provide high-quality DL local models. We train, validate, and test our scheme using a publicly available dataset. The results show our scheme’s accuracy and efficiency in detecting inter-slice V2X attacks.",
      "published": "2022-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2022-fall57202.2022.10012736",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelwahab Boualouache",
        "T. Engel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2022-fall57202.2022.10012736",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2022-spring54318.2022.9860373",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning-based Intra-slice Attack Detection for 5G-V2X Sliced Networks",
      "description": "Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) represent one of the main verticals of 5G to provide road safety, road traffic efficiency, and user convenience. As a key enabler of 5G, Network Slicing (NS) aims to create Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) network slices with different network requirements on a shared and programmable physical infrastructure. However, NS has generated new network threats that might target CAVs leading to road hazards. More specifically, such attacks may target either the inner functioning of each V2X-NS (intra-slice) or break the NS isolation. In this paper, we aim to deal with the raised question of how to detect intra-slice V2X attacks. To do so, we leverage both Virtual Security as a Service (VSaS) concept and deep learning (DL) to deploy a set of DL-empowered security Virtual Network Functions (sVNFs) within V2X-NSs. These sVNFs are in charge of detecting such attacks, thanks to a DL model that we also build in this work. The proposed DL model is trained, validated, and tested using a publicly available dataset. The results show the efficiency and accuracy of our scheme to detect intra-slice V2X attacks.",
      "published": "2022-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2022-spring54318.2022.9860373",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdelwahab Boualouache",
        "Taki Eddine Toufik Djaidja",
        "Sidi‐Mohammed Senouci",
        "Yacine M. Ghamri-Doudane",
        "Bouziane Brik",
        "Thomas Engel"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2022-spring54318.2022.9860373",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2023-fall60731.2023.10333756",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "can-train-and-test: A New CAN Intrusion Detection Dataset",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) bus facilitates communication between a vehicle's microcontrollers, known as electronic control units (ECUs). Developed in 1983, the CAN bus is exceedingly robust—and exceedingly insecure. The CAN bus lacks conventional security controls (e.g., authentication, authorization, access control, encryption—to name a few). Significant research work has focused on improving automotive security; however, it has been challenging to add security to the CAN bus ex post facto.The automotive intrusion detection system (IDS) has been popularized in the literature as a relatively low-cost, low-effort security improvement for the CAN bus. Unfortunately, would-be IDS designers are often confronted with a shortage of adequate datasets to facilitate IDS development and evaluation. For intrusion detection systems built from machine learning models, the dataset shortage is particularly problematic; machine learning models require a lot of data for training and testing. The shortage of CAN datasets might impede or even deter would-be automotive IDS researchers.In this work, we introduce a new CAN dataset, dubbed can-train-and-test, to ameliorate the shortage of CAN datasets for IDS development and evaluation. Our dataset contains CAN data from four different vehicles manufactured by two different organizations—Chevrolet (General Motors) and Subaru. We provide attack-free traffic captures as well as captures that demonstrate nine distinct types of attacks—e.g., denial of service (DoS), fuzzing, standstill. We conduct all nine attacks against each of the four vehicles; thus, IDS designers can use the attack captures to evaluate an IDS's ability to generalize to different vehicles. We provide (1) replayable .log files, (2) unlabeled .csv files, and (3) labeled .csv files in order to meet a variety of IDS development and evaluation needs.",
      "published": "2023-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2023-fall60731.2023.10333756",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "general motors"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "general motors"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Lampe",
        "Weizhi Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2023-fall60731.2023.10333756",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2023-fall60731.2023.10333825",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Quantum Safe Authentication Protocol for Remote Keyless Entry Systems in Cars",
      "description": "The keyless entry systems in cars enable users to lock or unlock cars remotely. One of the popular types of keyless entry systems used in cars is the Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) system. With the advent of quantum computers, quantum computing-enabled cyber-attacks are an imminent threat. The security offered by current cryptographic techniques is inadequate to protect systems such as RKE from such future quantum attacks. In this paper, we propose a quantum-safe authentication protocol leveraging Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) that authenticates a legitimate key fob before unlocking the car. We present a formal security proof and an informal analysis to show that the protocol is secure against several attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first protocol that protects RKE systems from future quantum computing-enabled cyber-attacks, in addition to the existing replay and RollJam attacks.",
      "published": "2023-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2023-fall60731.2023.10333825",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rohini Poolat Parameswarath",
        "Nalam Venkata Abhishek",
        "Biplab Sikdar"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2023-fall60731.2023.10333825",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10199410",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Vehicle Software Updates: Requirements for a Reference Architecture",
      "description": "A modern vehicle is no longer merely a transportation vessel. It has become a complex cyber-physical system containing over 100M lines of software code controlling various functionalities such as safety-critical steering, brake, and engine control. The amount of code is anticipated to rise to around 300M lines of code by 2030. Furthermore, even well-tested code will contain more than one bug per 1000 lines of code. Thus, it can be expected that there will be around 100k bugs in a modern vehicle and around 300k bugs in a few years, where some might have a safety-critical impact. Automotive companies are transforming into software companies with more software developed in-house. The ability to hastily and securely patch vulnerabilities has become vital and is a prerequisite when securing modern cars. The UN Regulation No. 156 and the ISO 24089 emphasize the ability to update vehicle software securely.Consequently, we focus on securing the vehicle software update process. Our contributions include defining an attacker model and general security requirements. We further map these requirements to common security goals and directives to ensure broad coverage. Additionally, we present UniSUF, a secure and versatile approach to vehicle software updates. We identify entities involved during vehicle software updates, perform a threat assessment, and map the identified threats to security goals and requirements. The results highlight a secure framework with high industrial relevance that can be used as a reference architecture to guide securing similar software update systems within automotive and related areas such as cyber-physical systems, internet-of-things, and smart cities.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10199410",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "regulation",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kim Strandberg",
        "Ulf Arnljung",
        "Tomas Olovsson",
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10199410",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10199651",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "QEVSEC: Quick Electric Vehicle SEcure Charging via Dynamic Wireless Power Transfer",
      "description": "Dynamic Wireless Power Transfer (DWPT) can be used for on-demand recharging of Electric Vehicles (EV) while driving. However, DWPT raises numerous security and privacy concerns. Recently, researchers demonstrated that DWPT systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In an EV charging scenario, an attacker can prevent the authorized customer from charging, obtain a free charge by billing a victim user and track a target vehicle. State-of-the-art authentication schemes relying on centralized solutions are either vulnerable to various attacks or have high computational complexity, making them unsuitable for a dynamic scenario. In this paper, we propose Quick Electric Vehicle SEcure Charging (QEVSEC), a novel, secure, and efficient authentication protocol for the dynamic charging of EVs. Our idea for QEVSEC originates from multiple vulnerabilities we found in the state-of-the-art protocol that allows tracking of user activity and is susceptible to replay attacks. Based on these observations, the proposed protocol solves these issues and achieves lower computational complexity by using only primitive cryptographic operations in a very short message exchange. QEVSEC provides scalability and a reduced cost in each iteration, thus lowering the impact on the power needed from the grid.",
      "published": "2022-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10199651",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tommaso Bianchi",
        "Surudhi Asokraj",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 IEEE 97th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2023-Spring), Florence, Italy, 2023, pp. 1-6",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10199651",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle Security and Privacy: A Comparative Analysis of Charging Methods",
      "description": "In the next decade, electric road vehicles have the potential to reduce climate change and improve mobility. However, not all charging methods are equally secure and private, so this work provides a comprehensive analysis of the security and privacy of various EV charging methods and highlights the importance of addressing vulnerabilities to meet homologation standards. Five charging methods are described in terms of physical components, communication protocols, and standards. This research identifies weaknesses in each method and determines which are less prone to cyber attacks or privacy disclosures. The impact of different charging methods on vehicle homologation is also discussed, as required by the cybersecurity regulation UNECE R155. A mapping is provided between vulnerabilities and suggested mitigations from the regulation. The evidence suggests that different charging methods result in different security and privacy levels, with conductive methods being more vulnerable to security attacks and privacy disclosure, while methods with fewer components may reduce security and privacy risks.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Fabio Martinelli",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200490",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Engineering: Bridging the Security Gaps in Advanced Automotive Systems and ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "Advanced Driver Assistance System is one of the enabling technologies for autonomous driving. It senses and analyses the vehicle surroundings, detects the presence of potential risks as well as hazards and generates advisories. These advisories assist the autonomous driving system to take corrective measures to reduce safety risks and avoid fatal road accidents. For this purpose, ADAS uses various advanced sensing and data communication technologies to gather, process and share vehicle data. Noentheless the use of these advanced connected technologies is expected to grow further in road infrastructure such as Vehicle-to-everything (V2X). In this regard, where this sharing of mix-critical data brings opportunities, if compromised, presents serious cybersecurity threats and safety risks due to the cyber-physical nature of these advanced automotive systems. Therefore, the automotive system design approach of adhering to functional safety standards (ISO 26262) alone is inadequate to protect the vehicle’s critical functions from a range of cyberattacks. To approach this challenge, the ISO/SAE 21434 standard provides a cybersecurity baseline for vehicle manufacturers to effectively manage cybersecurity risks and improve the cyber resilience of the automotive system. This paper adopts a holistic cybersecurity engineering process as a baseline and bridges the security gap by mapping the security engineering requirements of ISO/SAE 21434 to the traditional system design engineering processes including system generation and runtime phases. It also introduces an experimental automotive use case, defines the scope to establish the context, presents a comprehensive Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment and derives appropriate risk mitigation strategies. The proposed work facilitates automotive system designers to follow ISO/SAE 21434 standard guidelines by systematically identify, assess, protect and manage the cybersecurity risks across the automotive system life cycle.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200490",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "resilience",
        "risk assessment",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fahad Manzoor Siddiqui",
        "Rafiullah Khan",
        "Sena Busra Yengec-Tasdemir",
        "Henry Hui",
        "Balmukund Sonigara",
        "Sakir Sezer",
        "Kieran McLaughlin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200490",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.394,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200490 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serious, nature, functions, case, well, where, risks, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200555",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simutack - An Attack Simulation Framework for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "With the ongoing efforts toward autonomous driving, modern vehicles become increasingly digital and smart. Hence, the vehicle architecture including smart sensors, ECUs, and in-vehicle communication also faces new challenges to satisfy the ever-changing safety and security requirements. The complexity of the system naturally exposes many attack surfaces that demand for sound security solutions to protect the vehicle from potential intrusions. State-of-the-art approaches such as intrusion detection and intrusion response systems require lots of training and testing against various attack scenarios. However, implementing such attacks in real environments is difficult, expensive, and involves many legal and safety considerations. With Simutack, we present an open-source attack simulation framework that is capable of generating realistic attack scenarios for comprehensive security testing in the automotive development process. The framework integrates several classes of attacks, for instance, smart sensor attacks, V2X attacks, and attacks targeting the in-vehicle networks, which are all among the most commonly exploited attack vectors. We evaluate three common attack scenarios that showcase the applicability and capabilities of our work. In each scenario, the generated attack data is processed and returned to the simulation to visualize the attack’s effect on the vehicle and its environment. Furthermore, a custom autopilot application demonstrates the attack’s impact on autonomous driving systems.",
      "published": "2023-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200555",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Finkenzeller",
        "Anshu Mathur",
        "Jan Lauinger",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "S. Steinhorst"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2023-spring57618.2023.10200555",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2024-fall63153.2024.10757870",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trust-IVN : Proposal for Achieving a Trustworthy In-vehicle Network",
      "description": "The importance of methods for detecting anomalies, such as threats to automotive cybersecurity, in the in-vehicle networks has been increasing. Particularly crucial is the detection of hijackings of vehicle electronic control units (ECUs) by attackers. However, methods for detecting anomalies in hijacked ECUs have not been sufficiently developed. Therefore, this study proposes an ECU hijacking detection method that uses a trust model executed by each ECU. The proposed method aims to detect abnormal behavior by having all ECUs monitor each other. This study demonstrated the ability of the proposed method to detect anomalies in hijacked ECUs and their systems.",
      "published": "2024-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2024-fall63153.2024.10757870",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ryo Kurachi",
        "Hiroaki Takada",
        "Hiroshi Ueda"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2024-fall63153.2024.10757870",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Learning-Based Attack Detection for Automotive Cybersecurity: A CNN-Autoencoder Approach Against CAN Bus Spoofing and DoS Attacks",
      "description": "As intravehicular communication systems become increasingly complex and high-dimensional within the evolving paradigm of the Internet of Vehicles (loV), the need for resilient and intelligent cybersecurity mechanisms is rendered more critical. In this paper, a hybrid deep neural architecture is proposed, integrating Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) with autoencoder frameworks to extract both spatial feature hierarchies and latent structural patterns from multivariate vehicular telemetry. Unlike conventional approaches in the literature that rely on abstracted or non-vehicular datasets, the proposed method is trained and evaluated on the CICIoV2024 dataset-collected from a production-grade 2019 Ford vehicle under five distinct adversarial scenarios, including spoofing and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Through extensive experimentation, the effectiveness of the model is validated, achieving a classification accuracy of 98.88%, a mean precision of 93. 00%, recall of 93. 83%, and a Fl score of 92. 26%.",
      "published": "2025-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Titouni",
        "I. Messaoudene",
        "Yassine Himeur",
        "D. Dawoud",
        "Shadi Atalla",
        "W. Mansoor"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE 102nd Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2025-Fall)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310005",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310106",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ScoreCAM and Segmentation-Based Adversarial Attacks in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Machine learning (ML) has become essential for tasks like detection and classification in autonomous vehicles (AVs). However, ML models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which can weaken passenger trust and raise safety concerns in autonomous driving systems. This is especially critical in systems like traffic sign recognition (TSR), where a misclassification caused by an adversarial attack could lead to serious safety risks. This research work explored the vulnerabilities of TSR models to adversarial attacks focusing on projected gradient descent (PGD) and the fast gradient sign method (FGSM). An adversarial attack pipeline is proposed that leverages ScoreCAM-based region-of-interest (ROI) localization to enhance the effectiveness of these attacks. Adversarial attacks manipulate the input data to mislead the models, achieving a high attack success rate (ASR) by exploiting their vulnerabilities. Experimental results on multiple models such as VGG19, convolutional neural network (CNN), ResNet50 and vision transformers (ViT) demonstrate significant increases in ASR. For instance, our method achieved a 97.67% ASR using PGD on VGG19 and a 95.89% ASR using FGSM on the same model, marking a considerable performance gain over traditional approaches. Moreover, these results are achieved with high computational efficiency, with average query times as low as 69.8 milliseconds.",
      "published": "2025-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310106",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ifrah Andleeb",
        "Katsuya Suto",
        "Mitra Mirhassani",
        "Ning Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310106",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310212",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Intrusion Detection Using Deep CNN-Autoencoder: CAN Bus Spoofing and DoS Mitigation",
      "description": "As intravehicular communication systems become increasingly complex and high-dimensional within the evolving paradigm of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), the need for resilient and intelligent cybersecurity mechanisms is rendered more critical. In this paper, a hybrid deep neural architecture is proposed, integrating Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) with autoencoder frameworks to extract both spatial feature hierarchies and latent structural patterns from multivariate vehicular telemetry. Unlike conventional approaches in the literature that rely on abstracted or non-vehicular datasets, the proposed method is trained and evaluated on the CICIoV2024 dataset– collected from a production-grade 2019 Ford vehicle under five distinct adversarial scenarios, including spoofing and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Through extensive experimentation, the effectiveness of the model is validated, achieving a classification accuracy of 98.88%, a mean precision of 93. 00%, recall of 93. 83%, and a F1 score of 92. 26%.",
      "published": "2025-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310212",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Titouni",
        "I. Messaoudene",
        "Yassine Himeur",
        "D. Dawoud",
        "Shadi Atalla",
        "W. Mansoor"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE 102nd Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2025-Fall)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310212",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310645",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks Using a Semi-Supervised GAN Model",
      "description": "Recently, various intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed for in-vehicle networks. However, as vehicle network attacks become increasingly sophisticated, existing IDSs have shown limitations in effectively detecting new threats. In particular, supervised learning-based IDSs are incapable of detecting previously unseen attacks. On the other hand, while unsupervised learning-based IDSs can detect such attacks, they often suffer from relatively low detection performance. To address these limitations, we propose a semi-supervised generative adversarial network (SGAN)-based IDS for in-vehicle networks. In our proposed SGAN, the adversarially trained discriminator serves as an anomaly detector. Furthermore, we enhance the discriminator’s detection capability by incorporating labeled attack data during training. For instance, a discriminator trained on three distinct types of attacks can effectively detect unknown attack type. This approach enables more accurate and robust distinction between normal and attack data. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed approach is suitable for in-vehicle network security, achieving an average detection accuracy of 99.63% and a precision of 99.52% for unknown attack types.",
      "published": "2025-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310645",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jonggwon Kim",
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-fall65116.2025.11310645",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174448",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVOLVE: a Value-Added Services Platform for Electric Vehicle Charging Stations",
      "description": "A notable challenge in Electric Vehicle (EV) charging is the time required to fully charge the battery, which can range from 15 minutes to 2-3 hours. This idle period, however, presents an opportunity to offer time-consuming or data-intensive services such as vehicular software updates. ISO 15118 referred to the concept of Value-Added Services (VAS) in the charging scenario, but it remained underexplored in the literature. Our paper addresses this gap by proposing \\acronym, the first EV charger compute architecture that supports secure on-charger universal applications with upstream and downstream communication. The architecture covers the end-to-end hardware/software stack, including standard API for vehicles and IT infrastructure. We demonstrate the feasibility and advantages of \\acronym by employing and evaluating three suggested value-added services: vehicular software updates, security information and event management (SIEM), and secure payments. The results demonstrate significant reductions in bandwidth utilization and latency, as well as high throughput, which supports this novel concept and suggests a promising business model for Electric Vehicle charging station operation.",
      "published": "2025-03-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Erick Silva",
        "Tadeu Freitas",
        "Rehana Yasmin",
        "Ali Shoker",
        "Paulo Esteves-Verissimo"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174448",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174532",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy-Preserving and Simultaneous Authentication in High-Density V2x Networks",
      "description": "The rapid expansion of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) networks within the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) demands secure and efficient authentication to support high-speed, high-density and mobility-challenged environments. This paper presents a privacypreserving authentication scheme that incorporates batch authentication, mutual authentication, and secure key establishment, enabling users to authenticate one another without a central authority. Our proposed scheme facilitates simultaneous multi-user authentication, significantly enhancing scalability, robustness and security in dynamic IoV networks. Results from realistic implementations show that our method achieves average authentication and verification times of$\\mathbf{1 0. 6 1 ~ m s}$and$\\mathbf{1. 7 8 ~ m s}$, respectively, for a fleet of$\\mathbf{1 0 0}$vehicles, outperforming existing methods. Scalability tests demonstrate efficient processing for larger groups of up to 500 vehicles, where average authentication times remain low, establishing our scheme as a robust solution for secure communication in IoV systems.",
      "published": "2025-01-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174532",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Morteza Azmoudeh Afshar",
        "Nesrine Benchoubane",
        "Busra Cayoren",
        "Güneş Karabulut Kurt",
        "Enver Ozdemır"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174532",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174553",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2XFormer: Transformer-Based Anomaly Detection for Vehicle-to-Everything Communication",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has transformed intelligent transportation systems through vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, improving road safety and traffic efficiency. However, the dynamic nature of vehicular networks, with high mobility and shared wireless resources, makes them vulnerable to attacks like Denial of Service (DoS). Anomaly detection (AD) has proven effective in detecting such threats. Yet, V2X communication occurs in diverse environments with varying network coverage and vehicle speeds, leading to domain shifts and variations in feature distributions that can hinder the generalization performance of traditional anomaly detection models. To address these challenges, this paper presents V2XFormer, an unsupervised anomaly detection system based on transformer neural networks, designed to identify anomalies in V2X communication. Additionally, we introduce TV2XFormer, which integrates transfer learning to enhance adaptability across diverse network conditions and environmental variations in V2X communication. We assess the performance of the proposed approaches using the VDoS-LRS V2X dataset, employing precision, recall, and$\\mathbf{F 1}$score metrics. A comparison is made with five state-of-the-art unsupervised AD algorithms. Experimental results demonstrate that both V2XFormer and TV2XFormer outperform the competing algorithms, achieving the highest$\\mathbf{F 1}$scores (1.0). Furthermore, TV2XFormer exhibits notable robustness and generalizability to dynamic vehicular environments.",
      "published": "2025-06-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174553",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Harindra S. Mavikumbure",
        "Victor Cobilean",
        "Chathurika S. Wickramasinghe",
        "Devin Drake",
        "Milos Manic"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174553",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174597",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVSOAR: Security Orchestration, Automation and Response via EV Charging Stations",
      "description": "Vehicle cybersecurity has emerged as a critical concern, driven by the innovation in the automotive industry, e.g., automomous, electric, or connnected vehicles. Current efforts to address these challenges are constrained by the limited computational resources of vehicles and the reliance on connected infrastructures. This motivated the foundation of Vehicle Security Operations Centers (VSOCs) that extend IT-based Security Operations Centers (SOCs) to cover the entire automotive ecosystem, both the in-vehicle and off-vehicle scopes. Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) tools are considered key for impelementing an effective cybersecurity solution. However, existing state-of-the-art solutions depend on infrastructure networks such as 4G, 5G, and WiFi, which often face scalability and congestion issues. To address these limitations, we propose a novel SOAR architecture EVSOAR that leverages the EV charging stations for connectivity and computing to enhance vehicle cybersecurity. Our EV-specific SOAR architecture enables real-time analysis and automated responses to cybersecurity threats closer to the EV, reducing the cellular latency, bandwidth, and interference limitations. Our experimental results demonstrate a significant improvement in latency, stability, and scalability through the infrastructure and the capacity to deploy computationally intensive applications, that are otherwise infeasible within the resource constraints of individual vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-03-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174597",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tadeu Freitas",
        "Erick Silva",
        "R. Yasmin",
        "Ali Shoker",
        "M. Correia",
        "Rolando Martins",
        "Paulo Esteves-Verissimo"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE 101st Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2025-Spring)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174597",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174694",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-Domain Adversarial Attacks: Translating Network Intrusion to CAN Bus Evasion in V2X Environments",
      "description": "This research paper presents an attack framework between NIDS and CAN-based intrusion detection that secures vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environments. The connection of vehicles to external networks exposes critical security concerns because public network attacks can penetrate into vehicle systems. Our methodology performs three steps to enable crossdomain attacks through network security domain and automotive security domain integration: (1) ensemble feature selection discovering common vulnerabilities, (2) V2X-Aware calibrated gradient descent that follows protocol constraints, and (3) CAN-Deep PackGen produces valid network-based CAN frames. Our attacks achieve evasion rates of up to 87.9% during experiments on KDDCup99 and UNSW-NB15 for NIDS and CICIoV2024 for CAN IDS. The transfer success rate for timing-related features surpasses 85% due to their vulnerability. The attack success rate receives 24.7% improvement from ensemble feature selection which exhibits strong correlation with feature importance in predicting attack transferability. The diagnostic CAN messages demonstrate the maximum vulnerability to attacks by achieving a $\\text{9 2. 3 \\%}$ evasion rate. These findings highlight critical security implications for connected vehicles and demonstrate the need for cross-domain defensive strategies in automotive cybersecurity, providing a foundation for understanding and mitigating adversarial threats in interconnected transportation.",
      "published": "2025-06-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174694",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehedi Hasan",
        "Rafiqul Islam",
        "Q. Mamun",
        "Md. Zahidul Islam",
        "Junbin Gao"
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE 101st Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2025-Spring)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174694",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4025,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174694 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: strong, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174841",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OLIVE: Adaptive Containerized Architecture for Multi-Factor Authentication in V2X",
      "description": "OLIVE is a containerized Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) architecture designed to adapt to diverse security requirements in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications. By integrating multiple authentication factors, it provides adaptability and scalability to match the required level of security. Beyond the standard three authentication factors, OLIVE supports additional custom factors housed in independent containers. The nature of this modular design and its alignment with current security standards enable efficient resource management while ensuring compatibility with both autonomous and nonautonomous vehicles. OLIVE's adaptability positions it as a versatile solution for various applications, including dynamic Electric Vehicle (EV) charging and zero-trust architectures.",
      "published": "2025-06-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174841",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Chiara Bodei",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174841",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174891",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Robust Voltage-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "As the most widely used in-vehicle network, the controller area network bus lacks effective encryption and authentication mechanisms, exposing it to significant security threats. Voltage-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs), which detect malicious frames and locate attackers by establishing voltage fingerprints, have attracted widespread attention from researchers. However, the voltage signals of frames are vulnerable to temperature variations, leading to false positives and false negatives in voltage-based IDS. To address this, researchers have proposed the scheme that involves frequently updating voltage fingerprints and the temperature compensation-based scheme. Unfortunately, frequent updates to voltage fingerprints have been shown to be vulnerable to poisoning attacks, while the temperature compensation-based approach requires knowledge of the sender node's temperature. To this end, we propose utilizing robust voltage features to develop a robust voltage-based IDS without knowing sender node's temperature. Experiments conducted on both the prototype and real vehicle show that, compared to existing mainstream voltage-based IDS, our system demonstrates superior robustness under temperature variations. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to detect intrusion by collecting voltage signals and extracting their features on resource-constrained device. Our system also includes an alarm module, which can trigger a buzzer to alert the driver when the intrusion is detected.",
      "published": "2025-06-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174891",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhouyan Deng",
        "Yuwei Yang",
        "Xiaohan Zheng",
        "Jiahao Lei",
        "Fei Hui",
        "Jiajia Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtc2025-spring65109.2025.11174891",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288208",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security in Use Cases of Vehicle-to-Everything Communications",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications enable the information exchange between the vehicle and the infrastructure, pedestrian, device, or any other entity that may affect the vehicle. V2X is known as a critical component for the vision of connected and autonomous vehicles in the future, with the goal of improving safety, saving energy, optimizing the traffic, etc. Many stake holders (e.g., 3GPP, IEEE) have announced the draft standards or technical reports that detail new opportunities of V2X-enabled vehicles for the cellular and automotive industries. However, the security issues in V2X communications receive little attention from industry and academia communities. In this paper, we describe how adversaries can exploit the security vulnerabilities to degrade the performance of V2X communications and evaluate the likelihood of V2X specific attacks in undermining the road safety. Our investigation reveals that the existing security mechanisms fall short of addressing the key security threats, and we also discuss countermeasures by adding a security sub-layer for V2X communication protocols to provide V2X users with privacy, authentication, and confidentiality.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288208",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploit",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaigui Bian",
        "Gaoxiang Zhang",
        "Lingyang Song"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288208",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288327",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle CAN Message Authentication: An Evaluation Based on Industrial Criteria",
      "description": "Vehicles have evolved from mostly mechanical machines into devices controlled by an internal computer network consisting of more than 100 interconnected Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Moreover, modern vehicles communicate with external devices to enable new features, but these new communication facilities also expose safety-critical functions to security threats. As the most prevalent automotive bus, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a prime target for attacks. Even though the computer security community has proposed several message authentication solutions to alleviate those threats, such solutions have not yet been widely adopted by the automotive industry. We have identified the most promising CAN message authentication solutions and provide a comprehensive overview of them. In order to investigate the lack of adoption of such solutions, we, together with industry experts, have identified five general requirements they must fulfill in order to be considered viable in industry. Based on those requirements, we analyze and evaluate the identified authentication solutions. We find that none of them meet all the requirements, and that backward compatibility and acceptable overhead are the biggest obstacles.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288327",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nasser Nowdehi",
        "Aljoscha Lautenbach",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288327",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288366",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Joint Subjective and Objective Data Capture and Analytics for Automotive Applications",
      "description": "In this paper we describe a novel technological framework for capture and analysis of both objective measurement data and subjective user experience data for automotive applications. We also investigate how the framework can be extended to address privacy issues by enforcing a rigorous privacy model called differential privacy. The system under development integrates a telematics system with a smartphone app service architecture and a data-driven analytics framework. The hypothesis is that the framework will improve the opportunities of conducting large scale user trials of automotive functions and services, while improving the quality of collected data. To achieve this, a number of challenges are addressed in the paper, including how to design the subjective data capture mechanisms to be both simple to use yet powerful, how to correlate subjective data with objective measurement data, and how to protect the privacy of users.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288366",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mathias Johanson",
        "Jonas Jalminger",
        "Emmanuel Frécon",
        "Boel Nelson",
        "Tomas Olovsson",
        "Mats Gjertz"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcfall.2017.8288366",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcfall.2018.8690781",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automated Reverse Engineering and Attack for CAN Using OBD-II",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) is one of the most popular in-vehicle networks. CAN allows electronic control units (ECUs) to communicate with each other. ECUs control various function of vehicle systems such as engine and transmission control. Therefore, CAN and ECUs are the high priority targets by hackers. If the CAN and the connected components are attacked, the vehicle may cause serious malfunction and fatal accidents. However, it is hard to find out the exact CAN messages to send and control the vehicle as intended by hackers. Likewise, vehicle security researchers have the same problem to find out the exact meaning of CAN messages to detect sophisticated attacks as well as attackers. It is relatively easy to detect the simple pattern of attacks such as denial of service (DoS) attack. However, CAN specification information is private information of car OEMs, to reveal the exact meaning of CAN messages, we need to analyze the messages by reverse engineering techniques, which is time-consuming and laborious tasks. To solve this problem, we developed the Automated CAN Analyzer (ACA). The ACA has automated reverse engineering functions which can help to analyze the relationship between the response data from a diagnostic query of on-board diagnostics II (OBD-II) and the related CAN traffic data. Furthermore, it supports the automated attack function that can inject fake messages into CAN bus based on pre-analyzed CAN message information. Researchers can easily confirm whether the reverse engineering results are correctly working or not through the provided automated attack function. As a result, the ACA could lower the barriers to entry to in-vehicle network research. To evaluate the ACA, we applied our approach to two real vehicles, Hyundai YF Sonata (2010 model) and KIA Soul (2014 model). In this paper, we can find out the meaning of CAN messages on both vehicles with the help of the ACA. Additionally, since modern vehicles are all equipped with OBD-II, our approach can be applied to most vehicle widely.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcfall.2018.8690781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hyundai",
        "in-vehicle",
        "kia",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "hyundai",
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tae Un Kang",
        "Hyun Min Song",
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcfall.2018.8690781",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcfall.2019.8891446",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Neural Network Based Resource Allocation for V2X Communications",
      "description": "This paper focuses on optimal transmit power allocation to maximize the overall system throughput in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication system. We propose two methods for solving the power allocation problem namely the weighted minimum mean square error (WMMSE) algorithm and the deep learning-based method. In the WMMSE algorithm, we solve the problem using block coordinate descent (BCD) method. Then we adopt supervised learning technique for the deep neural network (DNN) based approach considering the power allocation from the WMMSE algorithm as the target output. We exploit an efficient implementation of the mini-batch gradient descent algorithm for training the DNN. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the DNN algorithm can provide very good approximation of the iterative WMMSE algorithm yet reducing the computational overhead significantly.",
      "published": "2019-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcfall.2019.8891446",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Gang Gao",
        "Muhammad R. A. Khandaker",
        "Faisal Tariq",
        "Kai‐Kit Wong",
        "Risala Tasin Khan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcfall.2019.8891446",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2016.7504089",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Intrusion Detection Method Using Deep Neural Network for In-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose a novel intrusion detection technique using a deep neural network (DNN). In the proposed technique, in-vehicle network packets exchanged between electronic control units (ECU) are trained to extract low- dimensional features and used for discriminating normal and hacking packets. The features perform in high efficient and low complexity because they are generated directly from a bitstream over the network. The proposed technique monitors an exchanging packet in the vehicular network while the feature are trained off-line, and provides a real-time response to the attack with a significantly high detection ratio in our experiments.",
      "published": "2016-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2016.7504089",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "ecu",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Minju Kang",
        "Je‐Won Kang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2016.7504089",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 174,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417690",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advanced Analytics for Connected Car Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The vehicular connectivity revolution is fueling the automotive industry's most significant transformation seen in decades. However, as modern vehicles become more connected, they also become much more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In this paper, a fully working machine learning approach is proposed to protect connected vehicles (fleets and individuals) against such attacks. We present a system that monitors different vehicle's interfaces (Network, CAN and OS), extracts relevant information based on configurable rules and sends it to a trained generative model to detect deviations from normal behavior. Using configurable data collector, we provide a higher level of data abstraction as the model is trained based on events instead of raw data, which has a noise-filtering effect and eliminates the need to retrain the model whenever a protocol changes. We present a new approach for detecting anomalies, tailored to the temporal nature of our domain. Adapting the hybrid approach of Gutflaish et al. (2017) to the fully temporal setting, we first train a Hidden Markov Model to learn normal vehicle behavior, and then a regression model to calibrate the likelihood threshold for anomaly. Using this architecture, our method detects sophisticated and realistic anomalies, which are missed by other existing methods monitoring the CAN bus only. We also demonstrate the superiority of adaptive thresholds over static ones. Furthermore, our approach scales efficiently from monitoring individual cars to serving large fleets. We demonstrate the competitive advantage of our model via encouraging empirical results.",
      "published": "2017-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417690",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected car",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Matan Levi",
        "Yair Allouche",
        "Aryeh Kontorovich"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417690",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4091,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417690 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: sends, individuals, nature, normal, large, car, significant, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417808",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic Virtual Resource Allocation in 5G Vehicular Communication Networks with Mixed SCMA/OFDMA",
      "description": "Massive connectivity and safety guarantee are two main challenges in 5G vehicular communication networks. In this paper, we proposed a 5G vehicular communication network which provides active road safety application, traffic efficiency application and infotainment application at the same time. For V2V communications, we exploit SCMA(Sparse Code Multiple Access) and full-duplex to provide massive connectivity, which are also promising to reduce the transmission latency and improve the spectrum efficiency. For V2I communications, OFDMA and half- duplex technologies are adopted for traffic efficiency information transmission and entertainment content transmission. Besides, software-defined networking (SDN) and wireless network virtualization (WNV) are also exploited to slice the network into multiple independent slices, which isolates the road safety application from other applications. Then we proposed virtual resource allocation scheme, in which the absolute priority mechanism is applied to ensure the successful transmission of road safety information. The centralized scheduling and virtual resource allocation problem is formulated, and a Lagrangian dual algorithm is developed, which converges to a stable resource allocation scheme after a limited number of iterations. Simulation results show that the proposed mixed SCMA/OFDMA scheme outperforms the traditional orthogonal multiple access scheme in terms of system throughput.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417808",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "infotainment",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huifang Liu",
        "Gang Liu",
        "Zheng Ma",
        "Youhua Tang",
        "Yuan Guai Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417808",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417879",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANDY: A Social Engineering Attack to Leak Information from Infotainment System",
      "description": "The introduction of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) systems into vehicles make them more prone to cyber-security attacks that may impact of vehicles capability and, consequently, on the safety of drivers, passengers. In this paper, we focus on how to exploit security vulnerabilities affecting user-to-vehicle and intra- vehicle communications to hack the infotainment system to retrieve information about both vehicle and driver. Indeed, we designed and developed CANDY, a set of malicious APP injecting in a genuine Android APP, acting as a Trojan-horse on the Android In-Vehicle infotainment system. It opens a back-door that allows an attacker to remotely access to the infotainment system. We use this back-door to hit the privacy of the driver by recording her voice and collect information circulating on the CAN bus about the vehicle. CANDY is distributed by using social engineering techniques.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417879",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Antonio La Marra",
        "Fabio Martinelli",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2018.8417879",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746399",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proof-of-Benefit: A Blockchain-Enabled EV Charging Scheme",
      "description": "The massive adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) requires the grid system to coordinate with a large number of energy transactions, where the current grid network poses vulnerability against the excessive power loads and attacks. The difficulty of an efficient charging/discharging control mechanism lies on the randomness of future events and scalability of the transaction platform. In this paper, a Proof-of-Benefit consensus mechanism with Online benefit generating (ONPoB) algorithm is proposed on the blockchain platform to handle the EV charging/discharging loads to flatten the overall power load fluctuation. It is demonstrated that all EVs can be charged and achieves a best-known competitive ratio of 2.39. The ONPoB consensus mechanism is approved to better accommodate the EV scenario compared with other mechanisms. And the ONPoB algorithm is able to substantially reduce the Power Fluctuation Level (PFL) in comparison with popular scheduling algorithms.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746399",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chao Liu",
        "Kok Keong Chai",
        "Xiaoshuai Zhang",
        "Yue Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746399",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746516",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Security Architecture for Protecting Connected Vehicles from Malware",
      "description": "Vehicles are becoming increasingly connected to the outside world. We can connect our devices to the vehicle's infotainment system and internet is being added as a functionality. Therefore, security is a major concern as the attack surface has become much larger than before. Consequently, attackers are creating malware that can infect vehicles and perform life-threatening activities. For example, a malware can compromise vehicle ECUs and cause unexpected consequences. Hence, ensuring the security of connected vehicle software and networks is extremely important to gain consumer confidence and foster the growth of this emerging market. In this paper, we propose a characterization of vehicle malware and a security architecture to protect vehicle from these malware. The architecture uses multiple computational platforms and makes use of the virtualization technique to limit the attack surface. There is a real-time operating system to control critical vehicle functionalities and multiple other operating systems for non-critical functionalities (infotainment, telematics, etc.). The security architecture also describes groups of components for the operating systems to prevent malicious activities and perform policing (monitor, detect, and control). We believe this work will help automakers guard their systems against malware and provide a clear guideline for future research.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746516",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "malware",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahrear Iqbal",
        "Anwar Haque",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746516",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746547",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Preliminary Security Assessment of 5G V2X",
      "description": "Research on intelligent transport systems (ITS) for improved traffic safety and efficiency has reached a high level of maturity and first applications will hit the market in 2019. Since 2004, the wireless standard 802.11p has been developed specifically for ITS services. Since then new telecommunication standards have been devised, and the new 5G telecommunication standard is nearing completion. Due to its technological advantages such as higher speeds and reliability, it is being considered to be used for ITS services. The new radio technology \"New Radio (NR)'', which is being developed as part of 5G, can complement or replace 802.11p in V2X applications. While there has been some work to compare 802.11p and 5G New Radio in terms of performance and applicability for safety-critical use cases, little work has been done to investigate the implications for security. In this paper, we provide an overview of the security requirements of known ETSI ITS use cases, and based on those use cases we compare and assess the security implications of replacing 802.11p with cellular V2X. We find that due to the use of millimeter waves, beamforming and massive MIMO, there will be an implicit improvement for confidentiality and privacy, and it may also be possible to shorten authentication procedures in certain cases. When a fully network-assisted C-V2X mode is chosen, it is also possible to outsource several of the ITS security requirements to the cellular network.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746547",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljoscha Lautenbach",
        "Nasser Nowdehi",
        "Tomas Olovsson",
        "Romi Zaragatzky"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746547",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746714",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of Security Access Service in Automotive Diagnostic Communication",
      "description": "Numerous examples of automotive vulnerabilities have been provided, and the diagnostic functions in the on-board electronic control unit (ECU) have been used as an avenue of attack and analysis. Many ECUs are equipped with security access services that protect crucial diagnostic functions. If these security access services contain vulnerabilities, however, the ECU may be falsified or improperly controlled through the controller area network. In this study, we analyze the means of attacking security access services and provide the results of evaluating actual ECUs.",
      "published": "2019-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746714",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ryo Kurachi",
        "Hiroaki Takada",
        "Kentaro Takei",
        "Takaaki Iinuma",
        "Yuki Satoh",
        "Manabu Nakano",
        "Hideki Matsushima",
        "Jun Anzai",
        "Toshihisa Nakano"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/vtcspring.2019.8746714",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/vts56346.2023.10139952",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Thwarting Reverse Engineering Attacks through Keyless Logic Obfuscation",
      "description": "Logic obfuscation protects semiconductor IPs against reverse engineering threats by concealing IP implementation details using a tamper-proof key. With the continuous evolution of key recovery attacks exploiting functional, structural, and physical key exposures, the typical assumption of key secrecy becomes increasingly untenable. This work aims to end the tug of war between key-based defenses and key recovery attacks by delivering reverse engineering resilience through a novel keyless obfuscation approach that demands no external secret. The proposed solution locks the full functionality of a design using internally-generated and constantly-changing secrets that can be only extracted from the FSM transition history. The intrinsic secrets are secure against reverse engineering attempts due to the hardness of identifying valid transition paths to a target state from the obfuscated gate-level netlist. We develop an algorithm to synthesize the obfuscated FSM logic and the dynamic key update logic which jointly activate the design for all valid sequential queries so as to deliver unimpeded functionality for legal users. The algorithm enforces key consistency through equivalence-preserving FSM transformation and constraint-based state encoding to handle complex reconverging transition paths. Experimental results on MCNC benchmarks confirm the practicality and security of the proposed keyless logic obfuscation methodology.",
      "published": "2023-04-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/vts56346.2023.10139952",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "resilience",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Leon Li",
        "Alex Orailoğlu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE VLSI Test Symposium (VTS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/vts56346.2023.10139952",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wacv51458.2022.00288",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluating the Robustness of Semantic Segmentation for Autonomous Driving against Real-World Adversarial Patch Attacks",
      "description": "Deep learning and convolutional neural networks allow achieving impressive performance in computer vision tasks, such as object detection and semantic segmentation (SS). However, recent studies have shown evident weaknesses of such models against adversarial perturbations. In a real-world scenario instead, like autonomous driving, more attention should be devoted to real-world adversarial examples (RWAEs), which are physical objects (e.g., billboards and printable patches) optimized to be adversarial to the entire perception pipeline. This paper presents an in-depth evaluation of the robustness of popular SS models by testing the effects of both digital and real-world adversarial patches. These patches are crafted with powerful attacks enriched with a novel loss function. Firstly, an investigation on the Cityscapes dataset is conducted by extending the Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) paradigm to cope with SS. Then, a novel attack optimization, called scene-specific attack, is proposed. Such an attack leverages the CARLA driving simulator to improve the transferability of the proposed EOT-based attack to a real 3D environment. Finally, a printed physical billboard containing an adversarial patch was tested in an outdoor driving scenario to assess the feasibility of the studied attacks in the real world. Exhaustive experiments revealed that the proposed attack formulations outperform previous work to craft both digital and real-world adversarial patches for SS. At the same time, the experimental results showed how these attacks are notably less effective in the real world, hence questioning the practical relevance of adversarial attacks to SS models for autonomous/assisted driving.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wacv51458.2022.00288",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Federico Nesti",
        "Giulio Rossolini",
        "Saasha Nair",
        "Alessandro Biondi",
        "Giorgio Buttazzo"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Winter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/wacv51458.2022.00288",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 97,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wams64402.2025.11158230",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advanced Secure Ranging in Vehicle Access Using Radio Frequency Techniques",
      "description": "The Passive Entry and Passive Start (PEPS) system, widely used for vehicle access, traditionally relied on Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) as a metric to determine the proximity of a key fob to the vehicle. However, PEPS systems are vulnerable to relay attacks, where attackers relay signals between the vehicle and the key fob using narrowband amplifiers, bypassing encryption and reducing processing time. Traditional Low Frequency (LF, 125 kHz ISM band) and Radio Frequency (RF, $315 / 434 \\text{MHz}$ ISM band) vehicle access systems often lack robust cyber-secure communication mechanisms. Emerging technologies like Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and Ultra-Wideband (UWB) offer enhanced solutions, leveraging proximity-based authentication for automatic locking and unlocking of the vehicle doors. This research proposes a novel approach combining UWB and GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) for secure vehicle access. The system incorporates BLE to establish device authenticity and trigger secure ranging operations. By employing a multilateration technique with UWB and GNSS for distancebased ranging, the proposed solution ensures resistance to relay attacks. The practical implementation, inclusive of PCB assembly for the PEPS ECU, UWB anchors, Telematics Gateway Unit, and BLE key fob, validates the system's design and feasibility. The results underline the effectiveness of this integrated approach in addressing modern vehicular access challenges while setting a benchmark for secure and intelligent access systems.",
      "published": "2025-06-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wams64402.2025.11158230",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "ecu",
        "key fob",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. D.",
        "Prashant V. Joshi",
        "Parag Parandkar",
        "S. M."
      ],
      "venue": "2025 IEEE Wireless Antenna and Microwave Symposium (WAMS)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/wams64402.2025.11158230",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wcicss.2015.7420322",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Frequency-based anomaly detection for the automotive CAN bus",
      "description": "The modern automobile is controlled by networked computers. The security of these networks was historically of little concern, but researchers have in recent years demonstrated their many vulnerabilities to attack. As part of a defence against these attacks, we evaluate an anomaly detector for the automotive controller area network (CAN) bus. The majority of attacks are based on inserting extra packets onto the network. But most normal packets arrive at a strict frequency. This motivates an anomaly detector that compares current and historical packet timing. We present an algorithm that measures inter-packet timing over a sliding window. The average times are compared to historical averages to yield an anomaly signal. We evaluate this approach over a range of insertion frequencies and demonstrate the limits of its effectiveness. We also show how a similar measure of the data contents of packets is not effective for identifying anomalies. Finally we show how a one-class support vector machine can use the same information to detect anomalies with high confidence.",
      "published": "2015-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wcicss.2015.7420322",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adrian Taylor",
        "Nathalie Japkowicz",
        "Sylvain P. Leblanc"
      ],
      "venue": "World Congress on Industrial Control Systems Security (WCICSS)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/wcicss.2015.7420322",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 296,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wcnc49053.2021.9417552",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "WSG-InV: Weighted State Graph Model for Intrusion Detection on In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The paper presents WSG-InV, a novel weighted state graph (WSG) model for lightweight IDS on in-vehicle network. By capitalizing on historical in-vehicle data of timestamps, message identifiers, and data field, WSG-InV constructs offline a weighted state graph G=(V, E) where distinct message identifiers constitute the set V of vertices and the edges in E define the time-varying state transitions of the CAN frames. The iconic constituents of given in-vehicle data are condensed into a collection of ordered triples (the vectorized weight) that are further assigned to the edges in E. In the mean time, several kinds of intrusion data are evoked and the random forest model is deployed to conduct intrusion classification. WSG-InV then segments the online data stream into a slice of sliding windows and extracts a weighted state subgraph S for each of them. Bv consulting G as a benchmarking as well as optimizing a particular 3-variable programming, WSG-InV assesses the subgraph S and thereby recognizes the corresponding traffic as normal or anomaly. Besides, WSG-InV can distinguish which type of attack the anomaly gears toward. Experimental results demonstrate almost optimal performance.",
      "published": "2021-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wcnc49053.2021.9417552",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuan Linghu",
        "Xiangxue Li"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/wcnc49053.2021.9417552",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.405,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/wcnc49053.2021.9417552 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collection, normal, well, where."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wcnc55385.2023.10118852",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrated Sensing and Communication for Joint GPS Spoofing and Jamming Detection in Vehicular V2X Networks",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is expected to be a prominent component of the sixth generation (6G) to accomplish intelligent transportation systems (ITS). Autonomous vehicles relying only on onboard sensors cannot bypass the limitations of safety and reliability. Thus, integrated sensing and communication is proposed as an effective way to achieve high situational- and self-awareness levels, enabling V2X to perceive the physical world and adjust its behaviour to emergencies. Secure navigation through the Global Positioning System (GPS) is essential in ITS for safe operation. Nevertheless, due to the lack of encryption and authentication mechanisms of civil GPS receivers, spoofers can easily replicate satellite signals by launching GPS spoofing attacks to deceive the vehicle and manipulate navigation data. In addition, due to its shared nature, V2X links are prone to jamming attacks which might endanger vehicular safety. This paper proposes a method to jointly detect GPS spoofing and jamming attacks in a V2X network. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method can detect spoofers and jammers with high detection probabilities.",
      "published": "2023-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wcnc55385.2023.10118852",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "jamming",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali Krayani",
        "Gabriele Barabino",
        "Lucio Marcenaro",
        "Carlo S. Regazzoni"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/wcnc55385.2023.10118852",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wcnc57260.2024.10571104",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "NFC-RFAE: Semi-supervised RF Authentication for Mobile NFC Card System",
      "description": "With the increase of the near field communication (NFC) function deployment on smartphones, the mobile NFC card system becomes a solution to inadequacies of conventional physical authentication in accommodating modern Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios involving shared access, like shared family bank cards and household vehicles. While NFC technology brings convenience to these scenarios, it also introduces security vulnerabilities, including relay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Given the multi-user context, these vulnerabilities are further amplified. Therefore, it is urgently needed to design an authentication for securing the mobile NFC card system. However, existing security approaches, such as protocol authen-tication and supervised radio frequency (RF) authentication, face challenges in computational resource allocation and data labeling, making them inadequate for the multi-user mobile NFC card system. To address these issues, this paper proposes NFC-RFAE, a semi-supervised authentication system based on RF signals, demonstrating high accuracy, high recall rate, low latency, and minimal space occupancy in real-life scenarios, including a vehicle keyless system and a mobile bank system.",
      "published": "2024-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wcnc57260.2024.10571104",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuwei Yang",
        "Yijie Xun",
        "Tianhao Lv",
        "Jiajia Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/wcnc57260.2024.10571104",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wcnc57260.2024.10571181",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Feedback Coding of URLLC in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communications and Its Secrecy Analysis",
      "description": "In the literature, channel feedback has already been shown to be an effective way to realize ultra-reliable and low-latency communication (URLLC). In this paper, we aim to extend the point-to-point Schalkwijk-Kailath (SK)-type noisy feedback scheme to Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication scenario. Although enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) and URLLC services are considered as key enablers for V2X communication, here we mainly focus on URLLC service due to the urgency nature of the practical transportation systems. To be specific, based on the SK-type noisy feedback scheme, we propose a finite blocklength feedback coding scheme for URLLC message by mitigating the interference of eMBB message through dirty paper coding. Then, we explore security performance of the proposed scheme by calculating the information leakage to the eavesdropper. Numerical results show that the blocklength of the proposed scheme is significantly short for the desired decoding error probability, and the proposed scheme almost meets the physical layer security requirement for some cases. The study in this paper provides a new method for the secure URLLC in V2X communication.",
      "published": "2024-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wcnc57260.2024.10571181",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jia Wang",
        "Guangfen Xie",
        "Dengfeng Xia",
        "Bin Dai"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/wcnc57260.2024.10571181",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wcnc65185.2026.11555325",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Neural Network Distillation for Real-Time CAN Bus Intrusion Detection in Vehicles",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is widely used for communication between vehicle components but has no built-in encryption or authentication. This makes it easy for attackers to carry out spoofing or denial-of-service attacks. In this paper, we present a lightweight Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that can run on a small Electronic Control Unit (ECU) built with a Raspberry Pi. Our system listens to CAN traffic and classifies frames using machine learning models such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM). The models are trained on labeled datasets stored in HDF format for efficiency. To make the models easier to understand and deploy, they are converted into decision trees using the Trustee framework and run in C++ for real-time use. Tests on a simulated CAN bus with Arduino boards show that the IDS can detect attacks with high accuracy: 93LSTM, and overall more than 99.9using only 0.5Source code is available at:: //github.com/AmirmasoudPourmiri/Resource-Constrained-Machine-Learning-BasedIntrusion-Detection-for-CAN-Communication",
      "published": "2026-04-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wcnc65185.2026.11555325",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amirmasoud Pourmiri",
        "Ali Eslami",
        "Sergio A. Salinas Monroy"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1109/wcnc65185.2026.11555325",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wconf58270.2023.10235022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Security of Lightweight Authentication and Batch Verification in VANETs",
      "description": "Recently, researchers have focused on the authentication and key agreement (AKA) approach to enable a secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interface. Often, these security measures are effective against passive snoopers who tap the links to decipher the conversation. Nevertheless, it has been noted that if the protocol were severely constructed, an active saboteur may mimic legal vehicles or change the broadcast message. In this paper, we cryptanalyze a recently proposed AKA protocol shown as lightweight compared to the state-of-the-art. We employ conventional and cutting-edge techniques to decipher algebraic systems while releasing many forgeries. Using cryptanalysis, we demonstrate that the algorithms and characterizations of this protocol are susceptible to a range of security concerns, such as insufficient anonymity, session-independent key agreement, exposing multiple keys, replay, and vehicle impersonation. In addition, this article provides remarks for developing a secure lightweight V2X authentication system.",
      "published": "2023-07-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wconf58270.2023.10235022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arijit Karati",
        "Li-Chun Chang",
        "Chun‐I Fan",
        "Debasis Das"
      ],
      "venue": "World Conference on Communication & Computing (WCONF)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/wconf58270.2023.10235022",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wf-iot.2016.7845430",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing connected car adoption: Security and over the air update framework",
      "description": "A comprehensive security solution is no longer an option, and needs to be designed bottom-up into the car software. The architecture needs to be scalable and tiered, leveraging the proven technologies, processes and policies from the mature industries. The objective is to detect, defend and recover from any attack before harm comes to passengers, data and instrumentation. No matter how hardened security is there is always a need to patch any security vulnerabilities. This paper presents high level framework for security and over the air (OTA) framework.",
      "published": "2016-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wf-iot.2016.7845430",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M.U. Khurram",
        "Hemanth Kumar",
        "Adi Chandak",
        "Varun Sarwade",
        "Nitu Arora",
        "Tony Quach"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1109/wf-iot.2016.7845430",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wf-iot51360.2021.9595326",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Experimental Results of Detecting Primitive Jamming Attacks using Machine Learning in Vehicle-to-Everything Communication Networks",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything communications (V2X) are being deployed globally. In V2X, messages are used for exchanging critical information between vehicles. However, jamming attacks on the spectrum could deny V2X radios the ability to save lives on the roadway. This work analyzes two types of primitive jamming attacks on commercially available V2X radios. Lab results reveal that V2X networks are easily susceptible to jamming attacks. To avert this threat and promote safety of life on the roadways, we demonstrate a supervised machine learning model that can detect and classify the type of primitive jamming attack with an accuracy of 99.84%.",
      "published": "2021-06-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wf-iot51360.2021.9595326",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "jamming",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Billy Kihei",
        "Hakeem Wilson",
        "Muhamed Fall"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1109/wf-iot51360.2021.9595326",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wf-iot54382.2022.10152219",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Driving Security: A Comprehensive Threat Model of Attacks and Mitigation Strategies",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are envisioned to enhance safety and efficiency on the road, increase productivity, and positively impact the urban transportation system. Due to recent developments in autonomous driving (AD) technology, AVs have started moving on the road. However, this promising technology has many unique security challenges that have the potential to cause traffic accidents. Though some researchers have exploited and addressed specific security issues in AD, there is a lack of a systematic approach to designing security solutions using a comprehensive threat model. A threat model analyzes and identifies potential threats and vulnerabilities. It also identifies the attacker model and proposes mitigation strategies based on known security solutions. As an emerging cyber-physical system, the AD system requires a well-designed threat model to understand the security threats and design solutions. This paper explores security issues in the AD system and analyzes the threat model using the STRIDE threat modeling process. We posit that our threat model-based analysis will help improve AVs' security and guide researchers toward developing secure AVs.",
      "published": "2022-10-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wf-iot54382.2022.10152219",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Aminul Hoque",
        "Ragib Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/wf-iot54382.2022.10152219",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wfcs.2019.8757968",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Model-based simulation and threat analysis of in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "Automotive systems are currently undergoing a rapid evolution through the integration of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Software Defined Networking (SDN) technologies. The main focus of this evolution is to improve the driving experience, including automated controls, intelligent navigation and safety systems. Moreover, the extremely rapid pace that such technologies are brought into the vehicles, necessitates the presence of adequate testing of new features to avoid operational errors. Apart from testing though, IoT and SDN technologies also widen the threat landscape of cyber-security risks due to the amount of connectivity interfaces that are nowadays exposed in vehicles. In this paper we present a new method, based on OMNET++, for testing new in-vehicle features and assessing security risks through network simulation. The method is demonstrated through a case-study on a Toyota Prius, whose network data are analyzed for the detection of anomalies caused from security threats or operational errors.",
      "published": "2019-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wfcs.2019.8757968",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "toyota"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "toyota"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexios Lekidis",
        "Ion Barosan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Workshop on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/wfcs.2019.8757968",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wfpst58552.2024.00025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "How Trustworthy are Over-The-Air (OTA) Updates for Autonomous Vehicles (AV) to Ensure Public Safety?: A Threat Model-based Security Analysis",
      "description": "The rise of autonomous vehicles (AV) has transformed our transportation sectors in recent years. The evolution of technology has made AVs more popular among users. The Over-The-Air (OTA) updates for AVs are widely adopted by the AV industry. These updates are used to deliver improved functionality and security patches to ensure public safety. However, this system is susceptible to security threats since the wireless communication link between the car, the manufacturer, and the cloud-based web server is inherently insecure. While there are studies that explored multiple cybersecurity frameworks and tools for OTA updates, many challenges remain unaddressed. To build a robust trustworthy system, we need to perform a thorough security analysis by creating a threat model. In this study, we use the CIAA and STRIDE threat modeling process to analyze the OTA updates security. Our analysis demonstrates numerous dangers and vulnerabilities. To increase the security of OTA updates, we also suggest several corrective mitigation steps.",
      "published": "2024-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wfpst58552.2024.00025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. M. Istiak Chowdhury",
        "Ragib Hasan"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE World Forum on Public Safety Technology (WF-PST)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/wfpst58552.2024.00025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wi-iat67162.2025.00106",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Vehicle CAN Bus Intrusion Detection Method based on MobileNetV3",
      "description": "With the advancement of intelligent connected vehicles, artificial intelligence has become the core support for in-vehicle network security. Traditional rule-based intrusion detection relies on manually defined features, making it vulnerable to complex attacks. In contrast, deep learning models automatically learn features through data-driven approaches, demonstrating superior detection accuracy and generalization capabilities. However, the CAN bus in vehicles remains vulnerable due to lack of identity authentication, data encryption, and inherent broadcast characteristics. Current research faces three major bottlenecks: low detection rates in Fuzzy-based systems caused by spatiotemporal feature separation[1], model redundancy incompatible with ECU computing power[2], and high inference latency[3]. This paper proposes an improved CAN bus intrusion detection method for MobileNetV3, featuring: 1D-2D hybrid convolution for spatiotemporal feature extraction, a dual-attention architecture to enhance attack region response, and a progressive lightweight compression model. Experimental results show the model achieves 99.85% accuracy with a 1.87MB footprint and 0.72 m s per frame inference time, effectively adapting to in-vehicle environments.",
      "published": "2025-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wi-iat67162.2025.00106",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wang Suyi",
        "Chen Hui",
        "He Peng"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/wi-iat67162.2025.00106",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3848,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/wi-iat67162.2025.00106 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: response, making, intelligence, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wids-psu57071.2023.00030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of CAN Bus Security Vulnerabilities and Potential Solutions",
      "description": "The past decade has seen a significant increase in the automobile industry, which has come with some serious challenges and threats. Modem vehicles are now made up of complex mechanical systems, as well as sophisticated electronic devices and connections to the outside world. Various electronic devices utilize standard communication protocols, including the Controller Area Network (CAN), to establish communication with each other. Unfortunately, CAN lacks some fundamental security features, such as encryption and authentication, which makes it vulnerable to security attacks. This can lead to accidents and financial losses for the users of these vehicles. To address this issue, researchers have proposed a number of security measures, such as cryptography and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). This paper addresses the security vulnerabilities associated with CAN and proposes potential solutions to overcome its limitations.",
      "published": "2023-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wids-psu57071.2023.00030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asma Alfardus",
        "Danda B. Rawat"
      ],
      "venue": "International Women in Data Science Conference at Prince Sultan University (WiDS PSU)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1109/wids-psu57071.2023.00030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wifs.2015.7368559",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Decision tree-based detection of denial of service and command injection attacks on robotic vehicles",
      "description": "Mobile cyber-physical systems, such as automobiles, drones and robotic vehicles, are gradually becoming attractive targets for cyber attacks. This is a challenge because intrusion detection systems built for conventional computer systems tend to be unsuitable. They can be too demanding for resource-restricted cyber-physical systems or too inaccurate due to the lack of real-world data on actual attack behaviours. Here, we focus on the security of a small remote-controlled robotic vehicle. Having observed that certain types of cyber attacks against it exhibit physical impact, we have developed an intrusion detection system that takes into account not only cyber input features, such as network traffic and disk data, but also physical input features, such as speed, physical jittering and power consumption. As the system is resource-restricted, we have opted for a decision tree-based approach for generating simple detection rules, which we evaluate against denial of service and command injection attacks. We observe that the addition of physical input features can markedly reduce the false positive rate and increase the overall accuracy of the detection.",
      "published": "2015-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wifs.2015.7368559",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tuan Phan Vuong",
        "George Loukas",
        "Diane Gan",
        "Anatolij Bezemskij"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1109/wifs.2015.7368559",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 82,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wifs.2017.8267643",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Linking received packet to the transmitter through physical-fingerprinting of controller area network",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as a legacy protocol for in-vehicle data communication. Simplicity, robustness, and suitability for real-time systems are the salient features of the CAN bus protocol. However, it lacks the basic security features such as massage authentication, which makes it vulnerable to the spoofing attacks. In a CAN network, linking CAN packet to the sender node is a challenging task. This paper aims to address this issue by developing a framework to link each CAN packet to its source. Physical signal attributes of the received packet consisting of channel and node (or device) which contains specific unique artifacts are considered to achieve this goal. Material and design imperfections in the physical channel and digital device, which are the main contributing factors behind the device-channel specific unique artifacts, are leveraged to link the received electrical signal to the transmitter. Generally, the inimitable patterns of signals from each ECUs exist over the course of time that can manifest the stability of the proposed method. Uniqueness of the channel-device specific attributes are also investigated for time- and frequency-domain. Feature vector is made up of both time and frequency domain physical attributes and then employed to train a neural network-based classifier. Performance of the proposed fingerprinting method is evaluated by using a dataset collected from 16 different channels and four identical ECUs transmitting same message. Experimental results indicate that the proposed method achieves correct detection rates of 95.2% and 98.3% for channel and ECU classification, respectively.",
      "published": "2017-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wifs.2017.8267643",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omid Avatefipour",
        "Azeem Hafeez",
        "Muhammad Tayyab",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/wifs.2017.8267643",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wimob.2019.8923315",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Anomaly Detector for CAN Bus Networks in Autonomous Cars based on Neural Networks",
      "description": "The domain of securing in-vehicle networks has attracted both academic and industrial researchers due to high danger of attacks on drivers and passengers. While securing wired and wireless interfaces is important to defend against these threats, detecting attacks is still the critical phase to construct a robust secure system. There are only a few results on securing communication inside vehicles using anomaly-detection techniques despite their efficiencies in systems that need real-time detection. Therefore, we propose an intrusion detection system (IDS) based on Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network for Controller Area Networks (CAN) bus. This IDS divides data according to the ID field of CAN packets using K-means clustering algorithm, then it extracts suitable features and uses them to train and construct the neural network. The proposed IDS works for each ID separately and finally it combines their individual decisions to construct the final score and generates alert in the presence of attack. The strength of our intrusion detection method is that it works simultaneously for two types of attacks which will eliminate the use of several separate IDS and thus reduce the complexity and cost of implementation.",
      "published": "2019-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wimob.2019.8923315",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Safa Boumiza",
        "Rafik Braham"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/wimob.2019.8923315",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wincom.2017.8238149",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A secure protocol for session keys establishment between ECUs in the CAN bus",
      "description": "This paper presents a secure protocol for authenticating Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus and establishing session keys between them. These keys are used to introduce message source authentication for the CAN network. Our method is based on the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) which is more suitable for embedded systems where computational power and memory are very reduced. The performance evaluation of the proposed authentication method shows better results in comparison to the existing methods in term of bus load. The security of the proposed mechanism is validated using AVISPA tool which is very efficient for finding potential attacks automatically in cryptographic protocols.",
      "published": "2017-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wincom.2017.8238149",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samir Fassak",
        "Younes El Hajjaji El Idrissi",
        "Noureddine Zahid",
        "Mohamed Jedra"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Wireless Networks and Mobile Communications (WINCOM)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/wincom.2017.8238149",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wincom62286.2024.10656993",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Shielding the Connected Cars: A Dataset-Powered Defense Against DDoS",
      "description": "The connected car is no longer a theoretical concept and is now in the application phase. This puts a burden on the infrastructure of the connected cars since it is at the heart of this technology. The research is now focused on how to protect this infrastructure against the well-known serious attacks, among which is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. The messages exchanged between the cars and the infrastructure are secured by digital certificates, this protects the network from external attacks only. Therefore, there is a need for an extra layer of security that protects the system from insider attacks in the form of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). While researchers have made efforts to simulate such an attack in a near-realistic setup, the work still lacks its true representation. To contribute to this research gap, we present in this paper the generation of a publicly available dataset representing a DDoS attack simulated using Cooperative Awareness Messages in a well-known vehicular traffic simulation to be used to develop an IDS. The data collection is done on the Road Side Unit reflecting real data collection. Also, we propose an ensemble learning-driven approach as a potential framework for creating connected cars Vehicle-to-Everything IDS. Where we delve into the propositions of its deployment and the architecture of it. The obtained results show a Matthews correlation coefficient of 98% by the proposed models countering the attacks.",
      "published": "2024-07-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wincom62286.2024.10656993",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ayoub Wehby",
        "Rida Khatoun",
        "Ahmad Fadlallah"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Wireless Networks and Mobile Communications (WINCOM)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1109/wincom62286.2024.10656993",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wincom65874.2025.11313357",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LRAE: A Low-Rank Autoencoder for Real-Time Efficient CAN Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "This study introduces an innovative Low-Rank Autoencoder (LRAE) for anomaly detection in automotive Controller Area Network (CAN) systems, demonstrating significant advancements over traditional Standard Autoencoders (SAEs). By factorizing weight matrices into compact subspaces (rank $\\leq 16$), the LRAE achieves a 91.3 % reduction in parameters (2,010 vs. 23,198) and a 9 times lower memory footprint (0.01 MB vs. 0.09 MB), enabling efficient deployment on resourceconstrained Electronic Control Units. Training dynamics reveal LRAE converges 50 % faster (5 vs. 10 epochs) with a validation loss stabilizing at 0.35, compared to SAE's at 0.05. Evaluated on the SynCAN dataset, LRAE outperforms SAE with a $1,233 \\%$ higher recall (0.04 vs. 0.003) and $1,440 \\%$ higher F1-score (0.077 vs. 0.005) in continuous attacks, a 148.4 % recall gain (0.226 vs. 0.091) in suppress attacks, and a 48.1 % higher PrecisionRecall Area Under the Curve (PR-AUC) (0.228 vs. 0.154) in plateau scenarios. Despite minor trade-offs in flooding (2.7 % lower PR-AUC, 0.741 vs. 0.761) and playback (22.2 % lower F1score, 0.112 vs. 0.144), LRAE's accelerated convergence and enhanced specificity position it as a pioneering advancement. These results highlight LRAE's potential to revolutionize automotive cybersecurity, blending efficiency with state-of-the-art detection performance.",
      "published": "2025-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wincom65874.2025.11313357",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nadim Ahmed",
        "Md. Ashraful Babu",
        "M. M. Mollah",
        "M. Ahmmed",
        "Md. Mostafizur Rahman",
        "Mufti Mahmud"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Wireless Networks and Mobile Communications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/wincom65874.2025.11313357",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wmnc.2017.8248852",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Preventing single sign-on impersonation attacks with a keyless signature scheme",
      "description": "The mutli-server environment of many Internet services available today such as Google, and the availability of Single Sign-On (SSO) solutions have brought about promising technologies. Many of these and similar applications provide clients with the ability sign on using one set of username and password alleviating the need of multiple identities and multiple password. Although promising, SSO mechanisms need to be extra robust and provide utmost authentication for their users. Due to the unidirectional nature of the authentication channel between the service provider and the client in SSO and the lack of a recent authentication key, researchers have pointed out vulnerabilities in such schemes leading to attacks such as impersonation attacks. In this paper, we present a keyless signature scheme that remedies the aforementioned problem. By utilizing a combination of a Merkle hash tree and a hash calendar, the identity provider in SSO periodically creates an authentication key used by the client and the service provider. Traffic between the latter two is secured by a one-way hash chain to achieve bidirectional authentication. The proposed scheme is evaluated by simulation experiments and communication and computation costs are employed for evaluation. The optimal length of the one-way hash chain between the service providers and the client is validated analytically.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wmnc.2017.8248852",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amerah A. Alabrah",
        "Mostafa A. Bassiouni"
      ],
      "venue": "IFIP Wireless and Mobile Networking Conference (WMNC)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1109/wmnc.2017.8248852",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wocc63563.2025.11082193",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Model for In-vehicle CAN Bus Based on TPE-LightGBM Algorithm",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the most widely used in-vehicle communication protocol, which is susceptible to a variety of cyber-attacks due to its lack of security mechanisms such as message authentication and encryption. In order to effectively improve the security communication guarantee of in-vehicle network, this paper proposes a lightweight CAN bus intrusion detection model based on Bayesian optimization LightGBM algorithm, and combined with the actual hacking dataset, the flooding attack, spoofing attack, replaying attack, and fuzzy attack in the CAN bus network are detected by binary classification and multi-classification of attack messages respectively. The experimental results show that the detection precision in multi-classification experiment is 99.19%.",
      "published": "2025-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wocc63563.2025.11082193",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lewei Liang",
        "Xianfeng Weng",
        "Jianxin Lv",
        "Jingzheng Tan",
        "Chenxu Du",
        "Zhengtao Xiang",
        "Yufeng Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless and Optical Communications Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/wocc63563.2025.11082193",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wowmom.2018.8449768",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IoT and Microservices Based Testbed for Connected Car Services",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) has accelerated the innovations in the connected car domain. Together with Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), the IoT technologies envision unleashing efficient and more sustainable transportation systems. A connected car is already considered as an IoT resource whose capabilities can be exposed through an IoT platform, but few testbeds provide full-stack, cloud-based environment for connected car services experimentation. This paper formulates several research and engineering challenges for developing such testbed. Our proposed testbed exploits the IoT and microservices to provide advanced functionalities such as (i) the integration of heterogeneous sensors and vehicular communication technologies in a complete end-to-end stack and (ii) an Edge Server for vehicular data annotation, local processing with actuation. The testbed exposes the vehicular resources securely through a Cloud based framework and open APIs. They are supported by The Web of Things (WoT) based interoperable descriptions of vehicular devices and interactions among relevant actors. Finally, the Cloud system deploys the connected car services using microservices philosophy. In addition to that, we present a functional IoT architecture of the testbed, describe its operational phases, novel aspects, prototyping and experimentation details.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wowmom.2018.8449768",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "exploits",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soumya Kanti Datta",
        "Mohammad Irfan Khan",
        "Lara Codecà",
        "B. Denis",
        "J. Harri",
        "C. Bonnet"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/wowmom.2018.8449768",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wowmom.2018.8449811",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Security Assurance Framework for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Security assurance is defined as the degree of confidence that the security requirements of an IT system are satisfied. In view of the emerging paradigm of connected vehicles i.e., dynamic Cyber-Physical systems of highly-equipped infrastructure-connected vehicles, specifying the involved assurance becomes highly-critical yet challenging; vehicles increasingly exploit various communication means to exchange rich data of relevance with the infrastructure resulting in a large attack surface. Both the complexity and uncertainty are increased rendering the so-far generic methods for security assurance costly-to-apply. In this position paper we introduce a security assurance framework tailored for connected vehicles, as explored by the EU-funded H2020 SAFERtec project. We put under the microscope two instances of vehicle-to-infrastructure communications and relying on an innovative modeling methodology we identify the involved security and privacy requirements. We then present the way to enhance the processes of the credible yet generic Common Criteria approach to gain evidence that the above requirements are met. The experimental evaluation of the framework is carried-out over a reference implementation of a prototype vehicle connected to road-side units and cloud-based services. The expectations are that our work assists to effectively construct assurance arguments increasing trust in connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wowmom.2018.8449811",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "exploit",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Panagiotis Pantazopoulos",
        "Sammy Haddad",
        "Costas Lambrinoudakis",
        "Christos Kalloniatis",
        "Κωνσταντίνος Μαλιάτσος",
        "Αthanasios G. Kanatas",
        "Andras Varadi",
        "Matthieu Gay",
        "Angelos Amditis"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1109/wowmom.2018.8449811",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4085,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1109/wowmom.2018.8449811 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: credible, confidence, trust, large, privacy, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wowmom54355.2022.00070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Segment Detection Algorithm: CAN bus intrusion detection based on Bit Constraint",
      "description": "With the rapid development of Internet of Vehicles and autonomous driving technologies, car manufacturers provide more comfortable and safe driving experience while gradually exposing their vehicles to the background of cyber-attacks. As the car’s interior communicates through the CAN bus, the intrusion detection for CAN bus becomes crucial. Some studies use bus data characteristics, machine learning algorithms, or information theory algorithms to perform intrusion detection on the CAN bus, but they have problems such as low detection accuracy, high performance requirements, and insufficient detection granularity. This paper innovatively proposes a lightweight detection algorithm—Segment Detection Algorithm (SDA), which calculates the bit flip rate by segment, discovers the variation relationship between bits within each segment, and utilizes multiple inter-message features to achieve the detection of abnormal traffic. Experiments show that compared with existing research, the algorithm has effectively improved the detection accuracy, especially the detection of replay attacks. In addition, the algorithm has extremely low time complexity, can adapt to the limited resources in the vehicle environment, and achieve high-precision real-time detection of abnormal traffic.",
      "published": "2022-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wowmom54355.2022.00070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaixuan Zheng",
        "Shihong Zou",
        "Guosheng Xu",
        "Zixiang Bi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/wowmom54355.2022.00070",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wowmom65615.2025.00053",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LLM-Powered Agentic AI Approach to Securing EV Charging Systems Against Cyber Threats",
      "description": "Electric vehicle (EV) charging systems are increasingly vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks, posing significant risks to grid stability and operational security. Detecting such attacks remains a major challenge due to the complex nature of charging infrastructure and the scarcity of labeled attack data. Traditional machine learning (ML) models have demonstrated promise in intrusion and anomaly detection, however, their effectiveness is often limited by the lack of diverse real-world attack datasets, making them less reliable in detecting stealthy or emerging threats. To address these limitations, we leverage pretrained large language models (LLMs) enhanced with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) for real-time anomaly detection in EV charging networks. The proposed system integrates domain-specific knowledge with live charging session data, enabling accurate classification of malicious activities such as billing fraud, energy theft, and communication tampering. Experimental results demonstrate that LLM-based detection improves classification accuracy while reducing false positives compared to traditional ML approaches. The developed methodology is adaptable across various cybersecurity applications, making it applicable to a wide range of attack scenarios beyond EV infrastructure. By combining AI-driven anomaly detection with real-time contextual analysis, this approach enhances the resilience of EV charging networks against evolving threats, ensuring secure and reliable operations.",
      "published": "2025-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wowmom65615.2025.00053",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ritesh Honnalli",
        "Junaid Farooq"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1109/wowmom65615.2025.00053",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wpmc48795.2019.9096062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "End-to-end security assessment framework for connected vehicles",
      "description": "To increase security and to offer user experiences according to the requirements of a hyper-connected world, modern vehicles are integrating complex electronic systems, being transformed into systems of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). While a great diversity of heterogeneous hardware and software components must work together and control in real-time crucial functionalities, cybersecurity for the automotive sector is still in its infancy. This paper provides an analysis of the most common vulnerabilities and risks of connected vehicles, using a real example based on industrial and market-ready technologies. Several components have been implemented to inject and simulate multiple attacks, which enable security services and mitigation actions to be developed and validated.",
      "published": "2019-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wpmc48795.2019.9096062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Evans",
        "Daniel Calvο",
        "Adrian Arroyo",
        "Alejandro Manilla",
        "David Gomez"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Wireless Personal Multimedia Communications (WPMC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1109/wpmc48795.2019.9096062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1109/wpmc55625.2022.10014951",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Closing the Security Gaps in SOME/IP Through Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System",
      "description": "Scalable service-Oriented MiddlewarE over IP (SOME/IP) is a protocol that provides services over the IP stack, targeted at the automobile industry that strive to implement Ethernet in future vehicles as a replacement of Controller Area Network (CAN). However, switching to Ethernet and SOME/IP changes the entire protocol stack and therefore security needs to be reconsidered. With the assumption that a malicious user has access to the in-vehicle network, four different attacks are identified that can be performed on SOME/IP. Knowing how the network and traffic shall behave in the vehicle, a set of features are used as the basis for an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). These attacks along with the respective defences are implemented and tested on a SOME/IP network. The results from the testbed have demonstrated that the proposed attacks can be performed and therefore, additional security outside the SOME/IP protocol is needed. A host-based IDS is proposed, where the detection is based on arrival time, payload values and packet contradictions. Furthermore, suggestions on how to move towards prevention are given. The purpose of this research is to improve overall SOME/IP security for in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2022-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/wpmc55625.2022.10014951",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Casparsen",
        "Daniel Greth Sorensen",
        "Jeppe Nellemann Andersen",
        "Jonas Ingerslev Christensen",
        "Panagiotis Antoniou",
        "Rolf Kroyer",
        "Tatiana K. Madsen",
        "Karsten Gjoerup"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Wireless Personal Multimedia Communications (WPMC)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1109/wpmc55625.2022.10014951",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1111/rmir.70025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On IoT‐enabled risk prevention and insurance: A systematic literature review",
      "description": "Abstract The insurance market is increasingly adopting connected insurance offerings, such as telematics, wearables, and parametric products, enabled by Internet of Things (IoT) technologies. These innovations generate granular, observable risk data and support the delivery of preventive services. While connected insurance has gained research attention, the role of IoT‐enabled prevention and its impact on insurance, in particular on demand, remain underexplored. To address this gap, we conducted a systematic literature review following the PRISMA guidelines. From 5764 records identified across databases, journals, and industry sources, we analyzed 56 academic and 18 practitioner studies. The results include a comprehensive analysis of how IoT expands risk prevention and insurance mechanisms, as well as the additional benefits and costs introduced to connected insurance solutions, such as discounts, rewards, real‐time services, technology expenses, privacy loss, and cyber risks. This evolution makes the cost–benefit structure broader and more complicated and introduces new drivers of insurance demand, such as technology affinity and the willingness to share data. We argue that existing demand models should be revisited to reflect these dynamics and outline implications for insurers' evolving role, from risk financiers to partners in risk management.",
      "published": "2025-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/rmir.70025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ion Cimbru",
        "Joël Wagner",
        "Angela Zeier Röschmann"
      ],
      "venue": "Risk Management and Insurance Review",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1111/rmir.70025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1115/1.4052823",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Step Algorithm to Detect Cyber-Attack Over the Can-Bus: A Preliminary Case Study in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract Modern vehicles are connected to the network and between each other through smart sensors and smart objects commonly present on board. This situation has allowed manufacturers to send over-the-air updates, receive diagnostic information, and offer various multimedia services. More generally, at present, all this is indicated by the term “Vehicle to Everything” (V2X), which indicates a system of communication between a vehicle and any entity that may influence the vehicle and vice versa. However, it introduces problems regarding the vehicle's IT security. It is possible, for example, by tampering with one of the electronic control units (ECUs) to take partial or total control of the vehicle. In this paper, we introduce a preliminary study case of a probabilistic approach in an intrusion detection system over the CAN-bus to guarantee cybersecurity inside connected vehicles. In particular, through the use of an innovative two-step detection algorithm that exploits both the variation of the status parameters of the various ECUs over time and the Bayesian networks can identify a possible attack. Starting from a domain analysis is possible to find out what are the parameters of interests and how these are related to each other. The first experimental results seem encouraging.",
      "published": "2021-10-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4052823",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco Lombardi",
        "Francesco Pascale",
        "Domenico Santaniello"
      ],
      "venue": "ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems Part B Mechanical Engineering",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1115/1.4052823",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.381,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1115/1.4052823 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: vehicle., case, sensors, information, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.2660280",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive cyber security test method for UN-R 155 regulation",
      "description": "The problem of automotive cyber security is becoming increasingly serious. In 2020, UN / WP 29 released the world's first mandatory regulation on automotive cyber security R155, which involves the entire life cycle of vehicle design and development. As an important means to discover cyber security problems, R155 and its important supporting standard ISO / SAE 21434 have put forward relevant requirements for testing. This paper interprets the requirements of R155 regulation and ISO / SAE 21434 standard on vehicle cyber security test, analyze the testing in the R & D process and the testing in the approval stage, and studies the test process and method that meet the requirements of the regulation.",
      "published": "2022-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2660280",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yanyan Han",
        "Xiong Zhao",
        "Kexun He",
        "Yihong Qin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Testing Technology and Automation Engineering (TTAE)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.2660280",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.2668050",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat analysis and risk assessment for applying cybersecurity engineering",
      "description": "Today automobile industry, many studies on autonomous driving are being conducted, and the distribution of vehicles with autonomous driving functions is increasing. For the era of fully autonomous vehicles, connectivity of vehicles such as intelligent transportation systems, V2V, and V2X is required based on communication technologies such as LTE, 5G, and WiFi. However, this increase in the connectivity of automobiles has become an opportunity to raise the need for vehicle cyber security, and recently, ISO 21434 international standard has been established and announced in relation to cyber security. In this paper, we propose a threat analysis and risk assessment guide for cybersecurity so that we can derive cybersecurity requirements and develop a controller that can be safe against cybersecurity attacks. It also shows that the proposed method conforms to the requirements of the ISO 21434 standard. Through the result of the case study, cybersecurity requirements were derived to a level applicable to controller development, and it was confirmed whether the risk assessment requirements suggested in the ISO 21434 cybersecurity engineering standard were satisfied.",
      "published": "2023-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2668050",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "iso 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Liu",
        "Xuezhu Yang",
        "Muxi Li",
        "Shiying Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronic Information Engineering and Computer Science (EIECS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.2668050",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.2674736",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reverse fast replay attack tunnel lighting system based on CAN bus",
      "description": "Tunnel lighting safety is an important condition to ensure the safe operation of the tunnel traffic, CAN bus with its simple structure, high stability, strong anti-interference ability, better scalability, as well as low cost, can be widely used in the tunnel lighting bus. The CAN protocol, however, lacks an encryption function, making it possible for hackers to launch replay attacks. In this paper, we have comprehensively analyzed the security problems of the CAN bus. We examine the security flaws present in the CAN bus, design an attack method for the CAN bus, and describe how to reverse decrypt the bus packet message with the intention of controlling the lighting system. Through the use of replay attack and reverse analysis, the lighting system's control instructions from the standard data packet were successfully decoded, it has been demonstrated through simulation experiment that the CAN bus can be quickly reverse the ordinary data packet control instruction of the system at low cost.",
      "published": "2023-05-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2674736",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heng Xue",
        "Yun Yang",
        "Jie Liu",
        "Zhiyao Xu",
        "Kabiru Abbati Dankanti"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronic Information Engineering, Big Data and Computer Technology (EIBDCT)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.2674736",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.3032074",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle CAN bus intrusion detection model based on Bayesian network",
      "description": "With the rapid development of in-vehicle network technology, vehicle safety and protection are facing more and more challenges. The vehicle CAN bus is the main network for vehicle internal communication. However, due to its lack of necessary security mechanisms, the vehicle CAN bus is vulnerable to intrusion attacks. Therefore, developing an effective intrusion detection model is crucial to secure vehicle networks. This study proposes a vehicle CAN bus intrusion detection model based on Bayesian network. This model utilizes the probabilistic reasoning of Bayesian networks and the update characteristics of conditional probability, combined with the characteristic attributes of the vehicle CAN bus, to achieve accurate detection of potential intrusion behaviors. By learning historical data, the conditional probability of the Bayesian network can be updated to achieve real-time detection and prediction of intrusion behavior. In order to verify the effectiveness of the model, we used a real vehicle CAN bus data set for experiments. Experimental results show that the intrusion detection model based on Bayesian network has achieved good results in identifying and predicting intrusion behavior of the vehicle CAN bus. Compared with traditional intrusion detection methods, this model can provide higher accuracy and lower false alarm rate, effectively protecting the security of in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2024-06-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3032074",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kangyao Dong"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computer Network Security and Software Engineering (CNSSE)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.3032074",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.3038800",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-based Uptane optimization framework",
      "description": "In recent years, the application of wireless communication technology has been developing from mobile smartphones to the automotive industry. The number of software configured on intelligent connected cars and the number of open network ports are increasing day by day, so they face more network security threats than traditional cars. The automotive software update framework not only needs to have high security and high performance, but also requires the framework to have customizable functions to meet the OTA (Over the Air upgrade) customization needs of car users. In order to improve the security of the framework while reducing the operating overhead of the framework on the vehicle side, and the framework has customizable functions, After analyzing and studying the Uptane framework, an optimization plan based on blockchain technology is proposed. Design a blockchain verification algorithm with low overhead for hierarchical verification and sub-regional verification, Improve the framework’s protection capabilities after key leaks.",
      "published": "2024-07-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3038800",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dongxing Li"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Signal Processing and Communication Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.3038800",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.3039239",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on OTA-based automotive bootloader remote data update technology",
      "description": "To enhance the convenience and efficiency of automotive software upgrades, a method utilizing Over-the-Air (OTA) technology is proposed. In this approach, the Bootloader system establishes a wireless connection to Alibaba Cloud, transmitting firmware packages earmarked for upgrade to the cloud. The cloud then facilitates the download to the gateway board, which, through its Lora module, transmits the firmware to multiple sub-devices, enabling a bulk remote upgrade process. Taking the BCM automotive controller core board as an example, the relay transmission feature of Lora is utilized to extend the transmission range, while the built-in AES encryption algorithm ensures the security of the transmitted firmware packages. Experimental results demonstrate that this remote data update technology significantly accelerates the rate of automotive software updates, reducing the workload and staff requirements in the process. Moreover, this remote data update technology is equally applicable to address status detection issues in body control modules.",
      "published": "2024-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3039239",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "relay",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jigao Niu",
        "Aiguo Wu",
        "Mengmeng Liu",
        "XU Chun-hua"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advanced Manufacturing Technology and Manufacturing Systems (ICAMTMS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.3039239",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.3039461",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and experimental verification OTA system architecture based on ECE-R156",
      "description": "The widespread application of OTA technology has promoted the process of software-defined vehicles. In order to achieve the development of OTA cloud platform and vehicle terminal communication links and meet the authenticity and integrity requirements of foreign ECE-R156 regulations. This paper designs the four-layer hierarchical architecture of the cloud platform and deploys the cloud platform through front-end and back-end offloading. Vehicle-side architecture design, and definition of version detection, software package download, and update installation during the update process. An OTA system security architecture scheme is proposed, the cloud platform signs the uploaded software package, uses HTTPS encrypted channel transmission, and the vehicle terminal verifies and decrypts the software package. Finally, the OTA test environment is built, and the software upgdate test of the automotive VCU is carried out to verify the effectiveness of the OTA system architecture and the system security scheme.",
      "published": "2024-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3039461",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yaxiang Chen",
        "Haiou Wen",
        "Rui Chen",
        "Jingxuan Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electromechanical Control Technology and Transportation (ICECTT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.3039461",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.3049596",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on cybersecurity of CAN bus for ICV",
      "description": "This paper mainly focuses on the information security threats faced by automotive CAN bus, and constructs a framework based on threat analysis and risk assessment, aiming at identifying, assessing and mitigating the impact of these threats on automotive network security. The framework based on threat analysis and risk assessment CAN effectively improve the information security level of automotive CAN bus, which has important theoretical and practical significance for automotive network security management. Through the experiment of attack recognition rate, the research technique achieves 90%, 85% and 95% high recognition rate under replay attack, fuzzy attack and DoS(Denial of service) attack respectively. It CAN be seen from the data conclusion that the framework based on threat analysis and risk assessment has high effectiveness and practicability in CAN bus information security protection.",
      "published": "2024-09-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3049596",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xu Liu",
        "Jing Liu",
        "Haijun Wang",
        "Xingpei Bian",
        "Meng Han",
        "Wenxia Ji"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Intelligent Mechanical and Human-Computer Interaction Technology (IHCIT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.3049596",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.3054402",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on anti-replay attack mechanism of intelligent connected vehicles based on hashing chain and V2X communication",
      "description": "With the increasing complexity of connected vehicle communication, the security of vehicle-to-vehicle communication (V2X) is becoming more and more important. As a common means of network attack, replay attacks seriously threaten the security of intelligent networked vehicles. By combining the unique advantages of hash chain technology and focusing on the common replay attack problem in V2X communication, this paper innovatively proposes an anti-replay attack scheme based on the fusion of hash chain and V2X communication, and constructs a set of secure and efficient communication scheme, which significantly improves the security and reliability of intelligent connected vehicle communication.",
      "published": "2025-01-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3054402",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Quan-Rui Huo",
        "Yu-Qiao Ning",
        "Chenya Bian",
        "Dong-Qing Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "The International Conference Optoelectronic Information and Optical Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.3054402",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1117/12.3123240",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Penetration testing of the CAN bus-based XCP protocol for automotive ECMs",
      "description": "With the development of automotive intelligence and connectivity, the security vulnerabilities of the XCP protocol adopted by in-vehicle ECUs have become increasingly prominent. Conducting targeted penetration testing is crucial for safeguarding in-vehicle security. This paper takes the ECM engine controller as the research object, builds a test environment based on CAN FD-200U hardware and Kali Linux, and uses SocketCAN and CaringCaribou tools. It designs and conducts penetration tests covering three typical XCP attack scenarios: node scanning, information disclosure, and calibration data tampering. A layered test architecture tailored for ECM applications is constructed, security risks of the XCP protocol under unauthenticated and weak-permission scenarios are identified, and engineering-oriented mitigation strategies are proposed. The research results can provide references for security testing, vulnerability mining, and protection system construction of the XCP protocol for in-vehicle ECUs.",
      "published": "2026-09-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3123240",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ruofei Xing",
        "Kexun He",
        "Baizheng Wang",
        "Hao Shan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Signal Processing and Communication Security (ICSPCS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1117/12.3123240",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1136/injuryprev-2016-042156.528",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "528 Will graduated driving licencing have mixed results for reducing road injury? A qualitative study in the UK",
      "description": "Background Graduated Driving Licences (GDL) have the potential to reduce injuries in novice drivers, who are at relatively high risk. However, there are concerns that some risk taking behaviour may be exacerbated by restrictions on, for instance, lift giving. Within the UK, a GDL scheme is planned for Northern Ireland (NI), but not other UK countries. We conducted qualitative research with young adults and parents in NI, England and Wales to identify potential impacts of GDL on injury risk to inform a future evaluation. Methods Group interviews were held with 16 groups of young adults aged 16–21 and 4 groups of parents. A topic guide covered transport mode choices, incentives for learning to drive, experiences of driving/being a passenger, driving outside the system, telematics and potential impact of GDL restrictions. Results In rural areas, cars remain essential for accessing work and study for young adults, and for providing spaces to socialise. Restricting provision of lifts for peers would erode mutual support that was part of informal economies. Risky driving (overcrowding, speeding, driving without a licence) was widely reported, and unlikely to be affected by new restrictions. Drink driving was universally disapproved of. Views on telematics were divided, with some in favour of the likely reduced insurance premiums, but others (particularly in NI) concerned at potential surveillance. Conclusions GDL may have mixed results for reducing road injury in novice drivers, given much risky driving in rural (high risk) areas is ‘outside the system’, and may be increased by further legislation. However, participants were universally disapproving of one risk (drink driving) suggesting that attitudes to other risks may change as a result of GDL implementation. Evaluation of GDL will need to assess impact on population as well as licensed young driver injury rates to take into account possible reductions in access to cars and shifts towards more vulnerable modes.",
      "published": "2016-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1136/injuryprev-2016-042156.528",
      "matched_terms": [
        "surveillance",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "John Green",
        "Rebecca Steinbach",
        "Nicola Christie"
      ],
      "venue": "Injury Prevention",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1136/injuryprev-2016-042156.528",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1142/s0218126621500079",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection for In-vehicle Network by Using Single GAN in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) bus-based connected and even self-driving vehicles suffer severe cybersecurity challenges because connections from outside the vehicle and an existing security vulnerability on CAN expose passengers to privacy and security threats. Generative adversarial nets (GAN)-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for in-vehicle network can eliminate the limit of insufficient types of attack data suffered by the deep learning-based IDSs. The existing GAN-based IDS is a hybrid deep learning model built by DNN and GAN, which is too complex to have a short detection time. The evaluation performance of this model can be further improved. To mitigate this issue, we propose another GAN-based intrusion detection method for in-vehicle network, which is a single improved GAN. The proposed model can have better evaluation metrics, e.g., the testing accuracy rate is up to 99.8% and poor detection performance is addressed when a single GAN is used in intrusion detection for the in-vehicle network. In this paper, we design a new loss function for generator in GAN to enhance an ability to produce fake abnormal data, and utilize a sparse enhancement training method helping discriminator in GAN to correct the arbitration bias for fake attack data every 100 steps. In addition, we utilize fewer convolution and de-convolution layers for constructing GAN model, which can reduce the calculation time theoretically and ultimately shorten the detection time to [Formula: see text][Formula: see text]ms for a data block built by 64 CAN messages. We evaluate this improved GAN-based intrusion detection by test set. The results demonstrate that our method has not only a capacity of five classifications, but also better evaluation performance than the existing method in the area of GAN-based IDSs for the in-vehicle network.",
      "published": "2020-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218126621500079",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuanda Yang",
        "Guoqi Xie",
        "Jilong Wang",
        "Jia Zhou",
        "Ze Xia",
        "Renfa Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Circuits Systems and Computers",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1142/s0218126621500079",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4465,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1142/s0218126621500079 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: expose, five, loss, ability, even, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1142/s0218126623501104",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle CAN Bus Based on Lightweight Neural Network",
      "description": "With the rapid development of automobile intelligent and networking, substantial information is exchanged between in-vehicle network system and the outside world, thereby threatening the automobile security. Intrusion detection is an important technology to realize the security of in-vehicle networks. The existing research on in-vehicle network intrusion detection mainly focuses on the improvement of detection accuracy, but it lacks consideration of timeliness, whereas the in-vehicle network is a time-sensitive system. This study proposes an anomaly detection method for in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) based on lightweight neural network to reduce the operation time while maintaining the detection accuracy. The redundant neuron screening method and model compression algorithm for layer-by-layer neuron pruning are designed. This presented method can delete the neurons with small contribution and obtain lightweight neural network model. The detection performance of model compression and noncompression is compared through experiments. Results show that under the two real in-vehicle datasets, the detection time is accelerated by 47.7 times and 34.2 times at most, and the average accuracy is increased by 14.5% and 15.7%.",
      "published": "2022-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218126623501104",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Defeng Ding",
        "Yehua Wei",
        "Can Cheng",
        "Jing Long"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Circuits Systems and Computers",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1142/s0218126623501104",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4534,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1142/s0218126623501104 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: operation, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2732198.2732204",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Case Study of FMVEA and CHASSIS as Safety and Security Co-Analysis Method for Automotive Cyber-physical Systems",
      "description": "The increasing integration of computational components and physical systems creates cyber-physical system, which provide new capabilities and possibilities for humans to control and interact with physical machines. However, the correlation of events in cyberspace and physical world also poses new safety and security challenges. This calls for holistic approaches to safety and security analysis for the identification of safety failures and security threats and a better understanding of their interplay. This paper presents the application of two promising methods, i.e. Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities and Effects Analysis (FMVEA) and Combined Harm Assessment of Safety and Security for Information Systems (CHASSIS), to a case study of safety and security co-analysis of cyber-physical systems in the automotive domain. We present the comparison, discuss their applicabilities, and identify future research needs.",
      "published": "2015-04-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2732198.2732204",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Zhendong Ma",
        "Erwin Schoitsch",
        "Thomas Gruber"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1145/2732198.2732204",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 83,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2735960.2735984",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sensor attack detection in the presence of transient faults",
      "description": "This paper addresses the problem of detection and identification of sensor attacks in the presence of transient faults. We consider a system with multiple sensors measuring the same physical variable, where some sensors might be under attack and provide malicious values. We consider a setup, in which each sensor provides the controller with an interval of possible values for the true value. While approaches exist for detecting malicious sensor attacks, they are conservative in that they treat attacks and faults in the same way, thus neglecting the fact that sensors may provide faulty measurements at times due to temporary disturbances (e.g., a tunnel for GPS). To address this problem, we propose a transient fault model for each sensor and an algorithm designed to detect and identify attacks in the presence of transient faults. The fault model consists of three aspects: the size of the sensor's interval (1) and an upper bound on the number of errors (2) allowed in a given window size (3). Given such a model for each sensor, the algorithm uses pairwise inconsistencies between sensors to detect and identify attacks. In addition to the algorithm, we provide a framework for selecting a fault model for each sensor based on training data. Finally, we validate the algorithm's performance on real measurement data obtained from an unmanned ground vehicle.",
      "published": "2015-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2735960.2735984",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junkil Park",
        "Radoslav Ivanov",
        "James E. Weimer",
        "Miroslav Pajić",
        "Insup Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1145/2735960.2735984",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2744769.2747942",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and privacy challenges in industrial internet of things",
      "description": "Today, embedded, mobile, and cyberphysical systems are ubiquitous and used in many applications, from industrial control systems, modern vehicles, to critical infrastructure. Current trends and initiatives, such as \"Industrie 4.0\" and Internet of Things (IoT), promise innovative business models and novel user experiences through strong connectivity and effective use of next generation of embedded devices. These systems generate, process, and exchange vast amounts of security-critical and privacy-sensitive data, which makes them attractive targets of attacks. Cyberattacks on IoT systems are very critical since they may cause physical damage and even threaten human lives. The complexity of these systems and the potential impact of cyberattacks bring upon new threats.",
      "published": "2015-06-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2744769.2747942",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad‐Reza Sadeghi",
        "Christian Wachsmann",
        "Michael Waidner"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1145/2744769.2747942",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 959,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2746266.2746267",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Vehicles made within the past years have gradually become more and more complex. As a result, the embedded computer systems that monitor and control these systems have also grown in size and complexity. Unfortunately, the technology that protects them from external attackers has not improved at a similar rate. In this paper we discuss the vulnerabilities of modern in-vehicle networks, focusing on the Controller Area Network (CAN) communications protocol as a primary attack vector. We discuss the vulnerabilities of CAN, the types of attacks that can be used against it, and some of the solutions that have been proposed to overcome these attacks.",
      "published": "2015-04-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2746266.2746267",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Paul Carsten",
        "Todd R. Andel",
        "Mark Yampolskiy",
        "J. Todd McDonald"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference (CISRC)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1145/2746266.2746267",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 82,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2808414.2808423",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "In recent years, several academic teams demonstrated that it is possible to hack vehicles via every available interface (telematics, cellular, Bluetooth, etc.). In this presentation a brief overview of recent results will be presented, and current cybersecurity and privacy threats will be described including attacks on functional safety, attacks for financial purposes, attacks on infrastructure, and considerations around privacy. The differences of automotive cybersecurity to Internet data security will be analyzed, and we will explore why traditional security solutions and even Internet-of-Things security solutions often do not translate well to the automotive world. We will then consider future applications such as vehicle-to-vehicle communication and automated vehicles, and analyze what security risks and challenges these technologies introduce. Research results for implementing automotive cybersecurity will be presented, including connected vehicle security and privacy, secure in-vehicle communication, automotive firewalls and intrusion detection systems, trusted hardware, and formally verified communication interfaces. Finally, an overview of current research initiatives will be provided, and an outlook to future security and research demands will be given.",
      "published": "2015-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2808414.2808423",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "telematics",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "André Weimerskirch"
      ],
      "venue": "Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1145/2808414.2808423",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2899015.2899018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Risk Assessment Framework for Automotive Embedded Systems",
      "description": "The automotive industry is experiencing a paradigm shift towards autonomous and connected vehicles. Coupled with the increasing usage and complexity of electrical and/or electronic systems, this introduces new safety and security risks. Encouragingly, the automotive industry has relatively well-known and standardised safety risk management practices, but security risk management is still in its infancy. In order to facilitate the derivation of security requirements and security measures for automotive embedded systems, we propose a specifically tailored risk assessment framework, and we demonstrate its viability with an industry use-case. Some of the key features are alignment with existing processes for functional safety, and usability for non-security specialists.",
      "published": "2016-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2899015.2899018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mafijul Md. Islam",
        "Aljoscha Lautenbach",
        "Christian Sandberg",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1145/2899015.2899018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2960407",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security in Automotive Networks",
      "description": "With the increasing amount of interconnections between vehicles, the attack surface of internal vehicle networks is rising steeply. Although these networks are shielded against external attacks, they often do not have any internal security to protect against malicious components or adversaries who can breach the network perimeter. To secure the in-vehicle network, all communicating components must be authenticated, and only authorized components should be allowed to send and receive messages. This is achieved through the use of an authentication framework. Cryptography is widely used to authenticate communicating parties and provide secure communication channels (e.g., Internet communication). However, the real-time performance requirements of in-vehicle networks restrict the types of cryptographic algorithms and protocols that may be used. In particular, asymmetric cryptography is computationally infeasible during vehicle operation. In this work, we address the challenges of designing authentication protocols for automotive systems. We present Lightweight Authentication for Secure Automotive Networks (LASAN), a full lifecycle authentication approach. We describe the core LASAN protocols and show how they protect the internal vehicle network while complying with the real-time constraints and low computational resources of this domain. By leveraging the fixed structure of automotive networks, we minimize bandwidth and computation requirements. Unlike previous work, we also explain how this framework can be integrated into all aspects of the automotive product lifecycle, including manufacturing, vehicle maintenance, and software updates. We evaluate LASAN in two different ways: First, we analyze the security properties of the protocols using established protocol verification techniques based on formal methods. Second, we evaluate the timing requirements of LASAN and compare these to other frameworks using a new highly modular discrete event simulator for in-vehicle networks, which we have developed for this evaluation.",
      "published": "2017-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2960407",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Philipp Mundhenk",
        "Andrew Paverd",
        "Artur Mrowca",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst",
        "Martin Lukasiewycz",
        "Suhaib A. Fahmy",
        "Samarjit Chakraborty"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/2960407",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 113,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2976749.2978302",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable",
      "description": "Contemporary vehicles are getting equipped with an increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivities. Although these have enhanced vehicle safety and efficiency, they are accompanied with new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we unveil a new important vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks including Control Area Network (CAN), the de facto standard in-vehicle network protocol. Specifically, we propose a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS), called the bus-off attack, which exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks to disconnect or shut down good/uncompromised ECUs. This is an important attack that must be thwarted, since the attack, once an ECU is compromised, is easy to be mounted on safety-critical ECUs while its prevention is very difficult. In addition to the discovery of this new vulnerability, we analyze its feasibility using actual in-vehicle network traffic, and demonstrate the attack on a CAN bus prototype as well as on two real vehicles. Based on our analysis and experimental results, we also propose and evaluate a mechanism to detect and prevent the bus-off attack.",
      "published": "2016-10-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978302",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyong-Tak Cho",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1145/2976749.2978302",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 249,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2994487.2994489",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Safe and Secure Autonomous and Cooperative Vehicle Ecosystems",
      "description": "Semi-autonomous driver assists are already widely deployed and fully autonomous cars are progressively leaving the realm of laboratories. This evolution coexists with a progressive connectivity and cooperation, creating important safety and security challenges, the latter ranging from casual hackers to highly-skilled attackers, requiring a holistic analysis, under the perspective of fully-fledged ecosystems of autonomous and cooperative vehicles. This position paper attempts at contributing to a better understanding of the global threat plane and the specific threat vectors designers should be attentive to. We survey paradigms and mechanisms that may be used to overcome or at least mitigate the potential risks that may arise through the several threat vectors analyzed.",
      "published": "2016-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2994487.2994489",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antonio Lima",
        "Francisco Rocha",
        "Marcus Völp",
        "Paulo Verı́ssimo"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1145/2994487.2994489",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2994487.2994499",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Assessment for Cooperative Automated Driving",
      "description": "Global investment and recent advancements in vehicle automation are making autonomous and cooperative automated driving (AD) a reality. Not only will automated vehicles incorporate more electronics and connectivity than ever before, but also, notably, they will transfer control and responsibility of monitoring the environment from a human driver to a robotic system. While prior work has assessed and provided security solutions for non-automated vehicles, there is much to understand regarding the security implications of AD. In this work, we begin to address this gap in understanding. This paper reports on a risk assessment framework for autonomous and cooperative AD. We aggregate the state of the art in AD research to define a reference architecture for automated vehicles, describing the new attack surfaces and data flow. Employing existing automotive threat models, we propose a novel application-based threat enumeration and analysis approach that is able to address different AD applications across all levels of automation. We demonstrate this framework with an example application assessment and summarize the results and security insights from analyses of other applications. The results of our risk assessment and future assessments with this framework will inform on the design of security solutions and secure architectures for production AD systems.",
      "published": "2016-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2994487.2994499",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Derrick Dominic",
        "Sumeet Chhawri",
        "Ryan M. Eustice",
        "Di Ma",
        "André Weimerskirch"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1145/2994487.2994499",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/2995289.2995297",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Wireless Attacks on Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on a variety of electronic systems and components. One of those components is the vehicle key. Today, a key typically implements at least three functions: mechanical locking with a key blade, the electronic immobilizer to autorise the start of the engine, and the remote keyless entry (RKE) system that allows to wirelessly (un)lock the doors and disable the alarm system. These main components of a vehicle key are shown in Figure 1. For the mechanical part of the vehicle key, it is well known that the key blade can be easily copied and that the locking cylinder can be bypassed with other means (using so-called \"decoders\" or simply a screwdriver). In contrast, immobilizer and RKE rely on wireless protocols to cryptographically authenticate the vehicle key to the car. Immobilizers employ radio frequency identification (RFID) transponders to carry out a challenge-response protocol over a low-range bidirectional link at a frequency of 125 kHz. In the past, researchers have revealed severe aws in the cryptography and protocols used by immobilizers, leading to the break of the major systems Megamos, Hitag2, and DST40 [7, 6, 1]. In contrast to the immobilizer, the RKE part uses unidirectional communication (the vehicle only receives, the key fob only transmits) over a high-range wireless link with operating distances of tens to one hundred meters. These systems are based on rolling codes, which essentially transmit a counter (that is incremented on each button press) in a cryptographically authenticated manner. Until recently, the security of automotive RKE had been scrutinized to a lesser degree than that of immobilizers, even though vulnerabilities in similar systems have been known since 2008 with the attacks on KeeLoq [3]. Other results reported in the literature include an analytical attack on a single, outdated vehicle [2] and the so-called \"RollJam\" technique [5], which is based on a combination of replay and selective jamming. In 2016, it was shown that severe aws exist in the RKE systems of major automotive manufacturers [4]. On the one hand, the VWgroup (Volkswagen, Seat, Skoda, Audi) based the security of their RKE system on a few global cryptographic keys, potentially affecting hundreds of million vehicles world-wide. By extracting these global keys from the firmware of electronic controls units (ECUs) once, an adversary is able to create a duplicate of the owner's RKE fob by eavesdropping a single rolling code. The second case study in [4] exposes new cryptographic weaknesses in the Hitag2 cipher when used for RKE. Applying a correlation-based attack, an adversary can recover the 48-bit cryptographic key by eavesdropping four to eight rolling codes and performing a one-minute computation on a standard laptop. Again, this attack affects millions of vehicle world-wide. Manufacturers that used Hitag2 in their RKE system include Alfa Romeo, Peugeot, Lancia, Opel, Renault, and Ford among others. In this keynote talk, we will present the results of [4] and put them in into a broader context by revisiting the history of attacks on RKE systems and automotive electronics.",
      "published": "2016-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/2995289.2995297",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "audi",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "immobilizer",
        "jamming",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "renault",
        "volkswagen"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "audi",
        "renault",
        "volkswagen"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Oswald"
      ],
      "venue": "Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1145/2995289.2995297",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3018896.3056791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Protecting an automobile network using distributed firewall system",
      "description": "As the automobile industry continues to incorporate more technology into cars, the security of the \"automobile network\" portion of that technology is in need of tremendous improvement. The communications between the in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems and the essential safety systems (e.g., anti-lock brake systems) should remain secure. However, there are few to no security measures currently implemented in an automobile network. This implies that if an attacker could break into a modern vehicle's IVI system, they could possibly endanger drivers, passengers, and others. Any of the integral mechanisms of the vehicle connected to the IVI system could be open to vulnerabilities. To protect automobile networks from threats, we present a novel Hybrid Security System (HSS). The proposed HSS uses the distributed firewalls to filter malicious content (e.g., data packets) placed at each module and an electronic control unit (ECU). The HSS creates two layers of defense within an automobile network that allows flexibility for manufactures who want extra security for their cars without causing abandonment or redesigning their current security architectures. Our proposed HSS is unique from other existing solutions in that it operates on a universal platform that can reach across all automobile manufacturers.",
      "published": "2017-03-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3018896.3056791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "automobile",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Syed S. Rizvi",
        "Jonathan Willett",
        "Donte Perino",
        "Tyler Vasbinder",
        "Seth Marasco"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Internet of Things, Data and Cloud Computing (ICC)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3018896.3056791",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3055004.3055016",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware module-based message authentication in intra-vehicle networks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a widely used industry-standard intra-vehicle broadcast network that connects the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) which control most car systems. The CAN contains substantial vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers to gain control of the vehicle, due to its lack of security measures. To prevent an attacker from sending malicious messages through the CAN bus to take over a vehicle, we propose the addition of a secure hardware-based module, or Security ECU (SECU), onto the CAN bus. The SECU can perform key distribution and message verification, as well as corrupting malicious messages before they are fully received by an ECU. Only software modification is needed for existing ECUs, without changing the CAN protocol. This provides backward compatibility with existing CAN systems. Furthermore, we collect 6.673 million CAN bus messages from various cars, and find that the CAN messages collectively have low entropy, with an average of 11.915 bits. This finding motivates our proposal for CAN bus message compression, which allows us to significantly reduce message size to fit the message and its message authentication code (MAC) within one CAN frame, enabling fast authentication. Since ECUs only need to generate the MACs (and not verify them), the delay and computation overhead are also reduced compared to traditional authentication mechanisms. Our authentication mechanism is implemented on a realistic testbed using industry standard MCP2551 CAN transceivers and Raspberry Pi embedded systems. Experimental results demonstrate that our mechanism can achieve real-time message authentication on the CAN bus with minimal latency.",
      "published": "2017-04-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3055004.3055016",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eric Wang",
        "William Xu",
        "Suhas Sastry",
        "Songsong Liu",
        "Kai Zeng"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3055004.3055016",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3056506",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LiBrA-CAN",
      "description": "Despite realistic concerns, security is still absent from vehicular buses such as the widely used Controller Area Network (CAN). We design an efficient protocol based on efficient symmetric primitives, taking advantage of two innovative procedures: splitting keys between nodes and mixing authentication tags. This results in a higher security level when compromised nodes are in the minority, a realistic assumption for automotive networks. Experiments are performed on state-of-the-art Infineon TriCore controllers, contrasted with low-end Freescale S12X cores, while simulations are provided for the recently released CAN-FD standard. To gain compatibility with existent networks, we also discuss a solution based on CAN+.",
      "published": "2017-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3056506",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bogdan Groza",
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay",
        "Anthony Van Herrewege",
        "Ingrid M.R. Verbauwhede"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3056506",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3064814.3064816",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modeling inter-signal arrival times for accurate detection of CAN bus signal injection attacks",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on hundreds of on-board electronic control units (ECUs) communicating over in-vehicle networks. As external interfaces to the car control networks (such as the on-board diagnostic (OBD) port, auxiliary media ports, etc.) become common, and vehicle-to-vehicle / vehicle-to-infrastructure technology is in the near future, the attack surface for vehicles grows, exposing control networks to potentially life-critical attacks. This paper addresses the need for securing the controller area network (CAN) bus by detecting anomalous traffic patterns via unusual refresh rates of certain commands. While previous works have identified signal frequency as an important feature for CAN bus intrusion detection, this paper provides the first such algorithm with experiments using three attacks in five (total) scenarios. Our data-driven anomaly detection algorithm requires only five seconds of training time (on normal data) and achieves true positive / false discovery rates of 0.9998/0.00298, respectively (micro-averaged across the five experimental tests).",
      "published": "2017-04-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3064814.3064816",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "obd",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael R. Moore",
        "Robert A. Bridges",
        "Frank L. Combs",
        "Michael S. Starr",
        "Stacy Prowell"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3064814.3064816",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 136,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3090354.3090412",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of communications in connected cars Modeling and safety assessment",
      "description": "In the context of modernization and development of new information and communications technology, ultra-connected world has become a strategic element. Wireless communication technologies have enabled a kaleidoscopic range of applications that are revolutionizing many aspects of business and public services. Connected cars themselves as new born of new technologies, are the next frontiers for the automobile revolution and the key to the evolution towards the next generation of intelligent transport systems that enable information sharing and communication between vehicles and their internal and external environment. Moreover, connected cars are the main use cases of internet of things (IOT), yet they are the least understood in terms of cyber security. And as with all things using the internet infrastructure for the exchange of information, communications of connected cars are sensitive to various security issues and have some great concerns with privacy and data confidentialities.",
      "published": "2017-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3090354.3090412",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "connected cars",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Tbatou",
        "A. Ramrami",
        "Youness Tabii"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Big Data, Cloud and Applications (BDCA)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3090354.3090412",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3098279.3098535",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The connected car",
      "description": "The amount of interactive digital technology in cars is increasing rapidly, and many new cars are shipped with connectivity. As a result, a new platform has emerged that holds potentials to facilitate many new and different interactions, both inside and outside the car. Within the area of HCI for cars, the focus has predominantly been on interactions with in-vehicle systems and applications of technology that is enabled through connectivity. However, we still lack in-depth empirical studies that provide details of the connected car, its use, opinions towards it, and how it integrates into people's everyday lives. We report from a qualitative study of 13 households with connected electric cars. We present our findings in 3 themes of interaction through connectivity, updating and upgrading car software, and security and privacy. We further discuss our findings in 3 themes that might inform and inspire further mobile HCI research with the connected car.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3098279.3098535",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael Kvist Svangren",
        "Mikael B. Skov",
        "Jesper Kjeldskov"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services (MobileHCI)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3098279.3098535",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3098954.3103174",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DoS Attacks on Controller Area Networks by Fault Injections from the Software Layer",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is still the most widely employed bus in the automotive sector. Its lack of security mechanisms led to a high number of attacks and consequently several security countermeasures were proposed, i.e., authentication protocols or intrusion detection mechanisms. We discuss vulnerabilities of the CAN data link layer that can be triggered from the application level with the use of an off the shelf CAN transceiver. Namely, due to the wired-AND design of the CAN bus, dominant bits will always overwrite recessive ones, a functionality normally used to assure priority for frames with low value identifiers. We exploit this characteristic and show Denial of Service attacks both on senders and receivers based on bit injections by using bit banging to maliciously control the CAN transceiver. We demonstrate the effects and limitations of such attacks through experimental analysis and discuss possible countermeasures. In particular, these attacks may have high impact on centralized authentication mechanisms that were frequently proposed in the literature since these attacks can place monitoring nodes in a bus-off state for certain periods of time.",
      "published": "2017-08-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3098954.3103174",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pal-Stefan Murvay",
        "Bogdan Groza"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3098954.3103174",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3098954.3105824",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On Using TLS to Secure In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "A trend in modern in-vehicle networks is the use of network technologies with higher bandwidth such as Automotive Ethernet. As a result, more sophisticated security technologies may be used to secure the communication. In this paper, we investigate whether the Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS) is applicable to secure in-vehicle networks. First, we identify the security and performance requirements as well as the communication scenarios which must be supported by the TLS communication. Next, we discuss how these requirements can be realized with TLS. This also includes the discussion of the certificate management. Finally, we present and discuss our prototypical TLS implementation on a typical automotive platform and show that TLS is able to fulfill most performance requirements of the automotive industry.",
      "published": "2017-08-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3098954.3105824",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel Zelle",
        "Christoph Krauß",
        "Hubert Strauß",
        "Karsten Schmidt"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3098954.3105824",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3123779.3123794",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards defending connected vehicles against attacks",
      "description": "Connected vehicles utilize various communication types that take place between different entities such as vehicle, infrastructure, cloud, and mobile. Connected vehicles have sensors and Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that perform in-vehicle communications, and they communicate with the other entities using cellular, vehicular, and wireless networks. These communications may be compromised through different attacks including Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) and Man-At-The-End (MATE) attacks. Existing security solutions are not suitable for this complex integration between different technologies. In this paper, we provide a taxonomy of connected vehicle attacks that can be classified into four main categories. We identify the relations between these attacks and connected vehicle attributes and security requirements. We also present a trust model that contains various countermeasures to secure connected vehicles against different attacks. This trust model consists of four components: integrity, access control, availability, and privacy. The proposed trust model will ensure the achievement of the security requirements against common MITM and MATE attacks.",
      "published": "2017-08-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3123779.3123794",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eslam G. AbdAllah",
        "Mohammad Zulkernine",
        "Yuan Xiang Gu",
        "Clifford Liem"
      ],
      "venue": "Eastern European Regional Conference on the Engineering of Computer Based Systems (ECBS-EERC)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3123779.3123794",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4646,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3123779.3123794 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: trust, sensors, access, privacy, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3132340.3132346",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection and Avoidance of Wormhole Attacks in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The routing protocol in connected vehicles (CVs) is vulnerable to wormhole attacks where attackers can deceive legitimate nodes and purport them as if they are immediate or close neighbors. The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol is a routing packet protocol designed for mobile nodes. However, AODV may not have been explicitly developed with security issues, specifically wormhole attacks, in mind, thereby requiring a detection algorithm to secure route establishment. This paper introduces the Wormhole-Protocol-Detector ( WPD ), a lightweight protocol for detecting and mitigating wormhole attacks. WPD is designed to work on a highway that is clustered into equal segments and equipped with road side units (RSUs) in predefined locations to monitor each segment. WPD consists of three phases: monitoring and detection of out-of-range packets, estimating the hop count between source and destination nodes, and identification of nodes participating in a wormhole connection. Together, these phases enable legitimate nodes to avoid the wormhole link and obtain secure routing paths between CVs. To validate our approach, we apply WPD to a CVs simulation where different types and lengths of wormhole, including a new wormhole attack method, can be applied to the CV network. Our experimental results suggest that WPD can detect wormhole attacks with a high detection rate and minimum false positives.",
      "published": "2017-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3132340.3132346",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sami Saad Albouq",
        "Erik M. Fredericks"
      ],
      "venue": "Design and Analysis of Intelligent Vehicular Networks and Applications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3132340.3132346",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4056,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3132340.3132346 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: locations, requiring, where, applications, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3152824.3152828",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blackchain: Scalability for Resource-Constrained Accountable Vehicle-to-X Communication",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose a new Blockchain-based message and revocation accountability system called Blackchain. Combining a distributed ledger with existing mechanisms for security in V2X communication systems, we design a distributed event data recorder (EDR) that satisfies traditional accountability requirements by providing a compressed global state. Unlike previous approaches, our distributed ledger solution provides an accountable revocation mechanism without requiring trust in a single misbehavior authority, instead allowing a collaborative and transparent decision making process through Blackchain. This makes Blackchain an attractive alternative to existing solutions for revocation in a Security Credential Management System (SCMS), which suffer from the traditional disadvantages of PKIs, notably including centralized trust. Our proposal becomes scalable through the use of hierarchical consensus: individual vehicles dynamically create clusters, which then provide their consensus decisions as input for road-side units (RSUs), which in turn publish their results to misbehavior authorities. This authority, which is traditionally a single entity in the SCMS, responsible for the integrity of the entire V2X network, is now a set of authorities that transparently perform a revocation, whose result is then published in a global Blackchain state. This state can be used to prevent the issuance of certificates to previously malicious users, and also prevents the authority from misbehaving through the transparency implied by a global system state.",
      "published": "2017-10-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3152824.3152828",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rens Wouter van der Heijden",
        "Felix Engelmann",
        "David Mödinger",
        "Franziska Schönig",
        "Frank Kargl"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3152824.3152828",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3161587.3161593",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of 3GPP Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything Standards",
      "description": "With the growth of mobile data and devices, cellular networks have great potential to support various vehicular communication services for safety and non-safety applications. This paper presents an overview of the 3GPP cellular vehicle-to-everything (V2X) standards. We discuss various aspects of V2X standards, including types of V2X application support in 3GPP, requirements to support eV2X scenarios, different levels of automation, comparison of V2X and IEEE 802.11p, architecture, spectrum usage, and security and privacy for V2X services. Finally, we conclude this article with a review of typical V2X applications",
      "published": "2017-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3161587.3161593",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuyu Wang",
        "Shiwen Mao",
        "Michelle X. Gong"
      ],
      "venue": "GetMobile Mobile Computing and Communications",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1145/3161587.3161593",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 171,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3203217.3203278",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability analysis of Android auto infotainment apps",
      "description": "With over 2 billion active mobile users and a large array of features, Android is the most popular operating system for mobile devices. Android Auto allows such devices to connect with an in-car compatible infotainment system, and it became a popular choice as well. However, as the trend for connecting car dashboard to the Internet or other devices grows, so does the potential for security threats. In this paper, a set of potential security threats are identified, and a static analyzer for the Android Auto infotainment system is presented. All the infotainment apps available in Google Play Store have been checked against that list of possible exposure scenarios. Results show that almost 80% of the apps are potentially vulnerable, out of which 25% poses security threats related to execution of JavaScript.",
      "published": "2018-05-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3203217.3203278",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit Kr Mandal",
        "Agostino Cortesi",
        "Pietro Ferrara",
        "Federica Panarotto",
        "Fausto Spoto"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers (CF)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3203217.3203278",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3205651.3208223",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using a one-class compound classifier to detect in-vehicle network attacks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) in vehicles provides serial communication between electronic control units that manage engine, transmission, steering and braking. Researchers have recently demonstrated the vulnerability of the network to cyber-attacks which can manipulate the operation of the vehicle and compromise its safety. Some proposals for CAN intrusion detection systems, that identify attacks by detecting packet anomalies, have drawn on one-class classification, whereby the system builds a decision surface based on a large number of normal instances. The one-class approach is discussed in this paper, together with initial results and observations from implementing a classifier new to this field. The Compound Classier has been used in image processing and medical analysis, and holds advantages that could be relevant to CAN intrusion detection.",
      "published": "2018-07-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3205651.3208223",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrew Tomlinson",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh"
      ],
      "venue": "Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference Companion (GECCO Companion)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3205651.3208223",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3205977.3205994",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Authorization Framework for Secure Cloud Assisted Connected Cars and Vehicular Internet of Things",
      "description": "Internet of Things has become a predominant phenomenon in every sphere of smart life. Connected Cars and Vehicular Internet of Things, which involves communication and data exchange between vehicles, traffic infrastructure or other entities are pivotal to realize the vision of smart city and intelligent transportation. Vehicular Cloud offers a promising architecture wherein storage and processing capabilities of smart objects are utilized to provide on-the-fly fog platform. Researchers have demonstrated vulnerabilities in this emerging vehicular IoT ecosystem, where data has been stolen from critical sensors and smart vehicles controlled remotely. Security and privacy is important in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) where access to electronic control units, applications and data in connected cars should only be authorized to legitimate users, sensors or vehicles. In this paper, we propose an authorization framework to secure this dynamic system where interactions among entities is not pre-defined. We provide an extended access control oriented (E-ACO) architecture relevant to IoV and discuss the need of vehicular clouds in this time and location sensitive environment. We outline approaches to different access control models which can be enforced at various layers of E-ACO architecture and in the authorization framework. Finally, we discuss use cases to illustrate access control requirements in our vision of cloud assisted connected cars and vehicular IoT, and discuss possible research directions.",
      "published": "2018-06-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3205977.3205994",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maanak Gupta",
        "Ravi S. Sandhu"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3205977.3205994",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4088,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3205977.3205994 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: location, sensitive, sensors, where, applications, access, privacy, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3212480.3212492",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Detection for Collaborative Adaptive Cruise Control in Connected Cars",
      "description": "We study collaborative adaptive cruise control as a representative application for safety services provided by autonomous cars. We provide a detailed analysis of attacks that can be conducted by a motivated attacker targeting the collaborative adaptive cruise control algorithm, by influencing the acceleration reported by another car, or the local LIDAR and RADAR sensors. The attacks have a strong impact on passenger comfort, efficiency and safety, with two of such attacks being able to cause crashes. We also present two detection methods rooted in physical-based constraints and machine learning algorithms. We show the effectiveness of these solutions through simulations and discuss their limitations.",
      "published": "2018-06-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212492",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "connected cars",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Matthew Jagielski",
        "Nicholas Jones",
        "Chung‐Wei Lin",
        "Cristina Nita-Rotaru",
        "Shinichi Shiraishi"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3212480.3212492",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3240765.3243488",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Network and system level security in connected vehicle applications",
      "description": "Connected vehicle applications such as autonomous intersections and intelligent traffic signals have shown great promises in improving transportation safety and efficiency. However, security is a major concern in these systems, as vehicles and surrounding infrastructures communicate through ad-hoc networks. In this paper, we will first review security vulnerabilities in connected vehicle applications. We will then introduce and discuss some of the defense mechanisms at network and system levels, including (1) the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) proposed by the United States Department of Transportation, (2) an intrusion detection system (IDS) that we are developing and its application on collaborative adaptive cruise control, and (3) a partial consensus mechanism and its application on lane merging. These mechanisms can assist to improve the security of connected vehicle applications.",
      "published": "2018-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3240765.3243488",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hengyi Liang",
        "Matthew Jagielski",
        "Bowen Zheng",
        "Chung‐Wei Lin",
        "Eunsuk Kang",
        "Shinichi Shiraishi",
        "Cristina Nita-Rotaru",
        "Qi Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3240765.3243488",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3243734.3243751",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Scission",
      "description": "Increased connectivity increases the attack vector. This also applies to connected vehicles in which vulnerabilities not only threaten digital values but also humans and the environment. Typically, attackers try to exploit the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, which is the most widely used standard for internal vehicle communication. Once an Electronic Control Unit (ECU) connected to the CAN bus is compromised, attackers can manipulate messages at will. The missing sender authentication by design of the CAN bus enables adversarial access to vehicle functions with severe consequences. In order to address this problem, we propose Scission, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which uses fingerprints extracted from CAN frames, enabling the identification of sending ECUs. Scission utilizes physical characteristics from analog values of CAN frames to assess whether it was sent by the legitimate ECU. In addition, to detect comprised ECUs, the proposed system is able to recognize attacks from unmonitored and additional devices. We show that Scission is able to identify the sender with an average probability of 99.85%, during the evaluation on two series production cars and a prototype setup. Due to the robust design of the system, the evaluation shows that all false positives were prevented. Compared to previous approaches, we have significantly reduced hardware costs and increased identification rates, which enables a broad application of this technology.",
      "published": "2018-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243751",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcel Kneib",
        "Christopher Huth"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3243734.3243751",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 166,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3891,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3243734.3243751 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: threaten, costs, functions, digital, physical, access, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3243734.3243752",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Attacks Against Robotic Vehicles",
      "description": "Robotic vehicles (RVs), such as drones and ground rovers, are a type of cyber-physical systems that operate in the physical world under the control of computing components in the cyber world. Despite RVs' robustness against natural disturbances, cyber or physical attacks against RVs may lead to physical malfunction and subsequently disruption or failure of the vehicles' missions. To avoid or mitigate such consequences, it is essential to develop attack detection techniques for RVs. In this paper, we present a novel attack detection framework to identify external, physical attacks against RVs on the fly by deriving and monitoring Control Invariants (CI). More specifically, we propose a method to extract such invariants by jointly modeling a vehicle's physical properties, its control algorithm and the laws of physics. These invariants are represented in a state-space form, which can then be implemented and inserted into the vehicle's control program binary for runtime invariant check. We apply our CI framework to eleven RVs, including quadrotor, hexarotor, and ground rover, and show that the invariant check can detect three common types of physical attacks -- including sensor attack, actuation signal attack, and parameter attack -- with very low runtime overhead.",
      "published": "2018-10-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243752",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hongjun Choi",
        "Wen‐Chuan Lee",
        "Yousra Aafer",
        "Fan Fei",
        "Zhan Tu",
        "Xiangyu Zhang",
        "Dongyan Xu",
        "Xinyan Deng"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3243734.3243752",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 184,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3286606.3286824",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security study on three modes of connection for a connected car",
      "description": "The connected car, is the automobile which detects alone contextual elements and passes on to the driver, to the owner, to the manufacturer or to the third all or part of the information which it collects. Covering the help to the conduct, the comfort and the leisure activities in the passenger compartment, the assistance, the safety of the other users, or the planning of the maintenance, going as far as piloting the return on investment initial, In the intelligent vehicle, the car becomes a platform of great sensor, absorbing the information of the environment, other cars (and of the driver) and feeding him towards other cars and infrastructures for a safe navigation, In this article, we examine briefly the search as regards the modes of connection of the car connected by making a security study on every mode of connection of the car connected, as well as the solutions possible to assure the safety in every mode finally a classification of attacks for every type of connection of the car connected and their effect.",
      "published": "2018-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3286606.3286824",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "connected car",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kawtar Jellid",
        "Tomader Mazri"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Smart City Applications (SCA)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3286606.3286824",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3297280.3297299",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure over-the-air firmware updating for automotive electronic control units",
      "description": "This work presents secure over-the-air firmware updating that brings a homogenized updating process across OEMs, suppliers and sub-tiers, removing at the same time the costs for individual security precautions and cryptographic countermeasures for each individual component or sub-system. The objective is to overcome all attacks to the servers, to the networks and to the diverse electronic control units (ECUs) in modern vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3297280.3297299",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dimitris Mbakoyiannis",
        "Othon Tomoutzoglou",
        "George Kornaros"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3297280.3297299",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3300061.3300132",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Experience: Understanding Long-Term Evolving Patterns of Shared Electric Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Due to the ever-growing concerns on the air pollution and energy security, many cities have started to update their taxi fleets with electric ones. Although environmentally friendly, the rapid promotion of electric taxis raises problems to both taxi drivers and governments, e.g., prolonged waiting/charging time, unbalanced utilization of charging infrastructures and reduced taxi supply due to the long charging time. In this paper, we make the first effort to understand the long-term evolving patterns through a five-year study on one of the largest electric taxi networks in the world, i.e., the Shenzhen electric taxi network in China. In particular, we perform a comprehensive measurement investigation called ePat to explore the evolving mobility and charging patterns of electric vehicles. Our ePat is based on 4.8 TB taxi GPS data, 240 GB taxi transaction data, and metadata from 117 charging stations, during an evolving process from 427 electric taxis in 2013 to 13,178 in 2018. Moreover, ePat also explores the impacts of various contexts and benefits during the evolving process. Our ePat as a comprehensive investigation of the electric taxi network mobility and charging evolving has the potential to advance the understanding of the evolving patterns of electric taxi networks and pave the way for analyzing future shared autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2018-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3300061.3300132",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "charging stations",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guang Wang",
        "Xiuyuan Chen",
        "Fan Zhang",
        "Yang Wang",
        "De-Sheng Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1145/3300061.3300132",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3302509.3313333",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security analysis for cits-soc using sensor data from connected vehicles",
      "description": "Cooperative ITS (CITS) is expected to contribute to a safer and more efficient transportation society by using sensor data shared from connected vehicles. To ensure the safety of such systems, we are working on technology for detecting and responding to cyber attacks via malicious information transmission against CITS. In this demonstration, the following two scenarios are visualized based on the assumption that a service providing the optimum route using sensor-probe information will be implemented in the near future. In the first scenario, using simulations of the Tokyo Metropolitan Expressway traffic flow, we show the potential threats of false-data-injection attacks on transmitted sensor information. In the second scenario, we show that our new detect-and-respond technology can mitigate these threats.",
      "published": "2019-04-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3302509.3313333",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takafumi Harada",
        "Keita Hasegawa",
        "Yuichiro Dan",
        "Tomoaki Washio",
        "Yoshihito Oshima"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3302509.3313333",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3953,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3302509.3313333 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: society, information., following, sensor, service, information, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3309171.3309178",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection Approach Using Adaptive Cumulative Sum Algorithm for Controller Area Network",
      "description": "The modern vehicle has transformed from a purely mechanical system to a system that embeds several electronic devices. These devices communicate through the in-vehicle network for enhanced safety and comfort but are vulnerable to cyber-physical risks and attacks. A well-known technique of detecting these attacks and unusual events is by using intrusion detection systems. Anomalies in the network occur at unknown points and produce abrupt changes in the statistical features of the message stream. In this paper, we propose an anomaly-based intrusion detection approach using the cumulative sum (CUSUM) change-point detection algorithm to detect data injection attacks on the controller area network (CAN) bus. We leverage the parameters required for the change-point algorithm to reduce false alarm rate and detection delay. Using real dataset generated from a car in normal operation, we evaluate our detection approach on three different kinds of attack scenarios.",
      "published": "2019-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3309171.3309178",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Uchenna Ezeobi",
        "Eric Muhati",
        "Gaylon Robinson",
        "Clinton Young",
        "Joseph Zambreno",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3309171.3309178",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3309171.3309179",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Intrusion Detection Based on Constant CAN Message Frequencies Across Vehicle Driving Modes",
      "description": "The modern automobile relies on numerous electronic control units communicating over the de facto standard of the controller area network (CAN) bus. This communication network was not developed with cybersecurity in mind. Many methods based on constant time intervals between messages have been proposed to address this lack of security issue with the CAN bus. However, these existing methods may struggle to handle variable time intervals between messages during transitions of vehicle driving modes. This paper proposes a simple and cost-effective method to ensure the security of the CAN bus that is based on constant message frequencies across vehicle driving modes. This proposed method does not require any modifications on the existing CAN bus and it is designed with the intent for efficient execution in platforms with very limited computational resources. Test results with the proposed method against two different vehicles and a frequency domain analysis are also presented in the paper.",
      "published": "2019-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3309171.3309179",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Clinton Young",
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Gedare Bloom",
        "Joseph Zambreno"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3309171.3309179",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3313831.3376555",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trust versus Privacy: Using Connected Car Data in Peer-to-Peer Carsharing",
      "description": "Trust is the lubricant of the sharing economy. This is true especially in peer-to-peer carsharing, in which one leaves a highly valuable good to a stranger in the hope of getting it back unscathed. Nowadays, ratings of other users are major mechanisms for establishing trust. To foster uptake of peer-to-peer carsharing, connected car technology opens new possibilities to support trust-building, e.g., by adding driving behavior statistics to users' profiles. However, collecting such data intrudes into rentees' privacy. To explore the tension between the need for trust and privacy demands, we conducted three focus group and eight individual interviews. Our results show that connected car technologies can increase trust for car owners and rentees not only before but also during and after rentals. The design of such systems must allow a differentiation between information in terms of type, the context, and the negotiability of information disclosure.",
      "published": "2020-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3313831.3376555",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Paul Bossauer",
        "Thomas Neifer",
        "G. Stevens",
        "Christina Pakusch"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3313831.3376555",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3317549.3323406",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical layer plausibility checks for misbehavior detection in V2X networks",
      "description": "Location spoofing is a proven and powerful attack against Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication systems that can cause traffic congestion and other safety hazards. Recent work also demonstrates practical spoofing attacks that can circumvent application layer sanity checks. In this paper, we propose three novel physical layer plausibility checks that leverage the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) of basic safety messages (BSMs). These plausibility checks have multi-step mechanisms to improve not only the detection rate, but also to decrease false positives. These checks can be run independently by each vehicle and do not rely on the assumption that the majority of vehicles is honest. We comprehensively evaluate the performance of these plausibility checks using the VeReMi dataset (which we enhance along the way) for several types of attacks. We show that the best performing physical layer plausibility check among the three considered achieves an overall detection rate of 83.73% and a precision of 95.91%, far outperforming recently proposed machine learning-based misbehavior detection methods operating at the application layer.",
      "published": "2019-05-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3317549.3323406",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "spoofing",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Steven So",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "David Starobinski A"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3317549.3323406",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 82,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3319535.3339815",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "In Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), one fundamental pillar is perception,which leverages sensors like cameras and LiDARs (Light Detection and Ranging) to understand the driving environment. Due to its direct impact on road safety, multiple prior efforts have been made to study its the security of perception systems. In contrast to prior work that concentrates on camera-based perception, in this work we perform the first security study of LiDAR-based perception in AV settings, which is highly important but unexplored. We consider LiDAR spoofing attacks as the threat model and set the attack goal as spoofing obstacles close to the front of a victim AV. We find that blindly applying LiDAR spoofing is insufficient to achieve this goal due to the machine learning-based object detection process.Thus, we then explore the possibility of strategically controlling the spoofed attack to fool the machine learning model. We formulate this task as an optimization problem and design modeling methods for the input perturbation function and the objective function.We also identify the inherent limitations of directly solving the problem using optimization and design an algorithm that combines optimization and global sampling, which improves the attack success rates to around 75%. As a case study to understand the attack impact at the AV driving decision level, we construct and evaluate two attack scenarios that may damage road safety and mobility.We also discuss defense directions at the AV system, sensor, and machine learning model levels.",
      "published": "2019-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3339815",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yulong Cao",
        "Chaowei Xiao",
        "Benjamin Cyr",
        "Yimeng Zhou",
        "Won Park",
        "Sara Rampazzi",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Kevin E. Fu",
        "Z. Morley Mao"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3319535.3339815",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 580,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3319535.3363190",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LibreCAN",
      "description": "Modern Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are equipped with an increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), many of which produce large amounts of data. Data is exchanged between ECUs via an in-vehicle network, with the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus being the de facto standard in contemporary vehicles. Furthermore, CAVs have not only physical interfaces but also increased data connectivity to the Internet via their Telematic Control Units (TCUs), enabling remote access via mobile devices. It is also possible to tap into, and read/write data from/to the CAN bus, as data transmitted on the CAN bus is not encrypted. This naturally generates concerns about automotive cybersecurity. One commonality among most vehicular security attacks reported to date is that they ultimately require write access to the CAN bus. In order to cause targeted and intentional changes in vehicle behavior, malicious CAN injection attacks require knowledge of the CAN message format. However, since this format is proprietary to OEMs and can differ even among different models of a single make of vehicle, one must manually reverse-engineer the CAN message format of each vehicle they target --- a time-consuming and tedious process that does not scale. To mitigate this difficulty, we develop LibreCAN, which can translate most CAN messages with minimal effort. Our extensive evaluation on multiple vehicles demonstrates LibreCAN's efficiency in terms of accuracy, coverage, required manual effort and scalability to any vehicle.",
      "published": "2019-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363190",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Troy Stacer",
        "C. Andrés Campos",
        "Eric Newberry",
        "Dongyao Chen",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3319535.3363190",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3337791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Modeling of Autonomous Systems",
      "description": "Autonomous systems will soon be integrating into our lives as home assistants, delivery drones, and driverless cars. The implementation of the level of automation in these systems from being manually controlled to fully autonomous would depend upon the autonomy approach chosen to design these systems. This article reviews the historical evolution of autonomy, its approaches, and the current trends in related fields to build robust autonomous systems. Toward such a goal and with the increased number of cyberattacks, the security of these systems needs special attention from the research community. To gauge the extent to which research has been done in this area, we discuss the cybersecurity of these systems. It is essential to model the system from a security perspective, identify the threats and vulnerabilities, and then model the attacks. A survey in this direction explores the theoretical/analytical system and attack models that have been proposed over the years and identifies the research gap that needs to be addressed by the research community.",
      "published": "2019-09-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3337791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cars",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Farha Jahan",
        "Weiqing Sun",
        "Quamar Niyaz",
        "Mansoor Alam"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computing Surveys",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3337791",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3338499.3357360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Controller Area Network Intrusion Prevention System Leveraging Fault Recovery",
      "description": "The ever-increasing demand for safety, comfort, and automation in the automobile has increased their vulnerability to cybersecurity risk and attacks. Automobiles now embed several electronic devices to perform these functions, and the complexity in the design of these systems increases along with the functionalities they offer. These devices communicate through the vehicular network---such as controller area network (CAN) and local interconnect network---which are attractive targets for cyber attackers. In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm to detect and recover from message spoofing attacks aimed at distorting the operation of the CAN bus. Using the predictable run-time behavior of CAN message frames in our recovery process, we leverage the error handling capability (bus-off state) of the CAN bus in a reboot-based recovery process of the compromised network node. We implement this algorithm in tandem with a hardware CAN controller as a detector node, and we evaluate its effectiveness and performance in detecting and recovering a compromised node.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3338499.3357360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Habeeb Olufowobi",
        "Sena G. Hounsinou",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3338499.3357360",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3341105.3373868",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANTransfer",
      "description": "In-vehicle communications, due to simplicity and reliability, a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is widely used as the de facto standard to provide serial communications between Electronic Control Units (ECUs). However, prior research exhibits several network-level attacks can be easily performed and exploited in the CAN bus. Additionally, new types of intrusion attacks are discovered very frequently. However, unless we have a large amount of data about an intrusion, developing an efficient deep neural network-based detection mechanism is not easy. To address this challenge, we propose CANTransfer, an intrusion detection method using Transfer Learning for CAN bus, where a Convolutional LSTM based model is trained using known intrusion to detect new attacks. By applying one-shot learning, the model can be adaptable to detect new intrusions with a limited amount of new datasets. We performed extensive experimentation and achieved a performance gain of 26.60% over the best baseline model for detecting new intrusions.",
      "published": "2020-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3341105.3373868",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahroz Tariq",
        "Sangyup Lee",
        "Simon S. Woo"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3341105.3373868",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 103,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3357613.3357631",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A secure priority vehicle movement based on blockchain technology in connected vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement in internet connectivity, Connected Vehicle network is becoming a promising technology in the current years. However, the increased connectivity most often results in intensifying risk of cyber security threats. In this regard, the network of connected vehicle is also vulnerable to various cyber-attacks. This paper discussed the security issues with connected Priority Vehicle. A priority vehicle must ensure the high level of security otherwise, the results would be devastating and the consequences might be very serious. To ensure the safe and secure movement of connected priority vehicle on the road using blockchain technology. In our proposed system, the priority vehicle movement is controlled by blockchain network, and it only accept messages and signals from blockchain authorized nodes. In particular, the priority vehicle's location, speed and travel time are the important parameters that we secure using blockchain network. This paper also discusses the possible attacks on the priority vehicles and show how our solution can mitigate these attacks. Here it justifies the effectiveness and performance of our security solution using simulation and proves that the blockchain technology shows the potential application towards securing the information in the connected vehicle network.",
      "published": "2019-09-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3357613.3357631",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anil Saini",
        "Shreyansh Sharma",
        "Palash Jain",
        "Vikash Sharma",
        "Arvind Kumar khandelwal"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3357613.3357631",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3359789.3359834",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SIMPLE: single-frame based physical layer identification for intrusion detection and prevention on in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a bus standard commonly used in the automotive industry for connecting Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within a vehicle. The broadcast nature of this protocol, along with the lack of authentication or strong integrity guarantees for frames, allows for arbitrary data injection/modification and impersonation of the ECUs. While mitigation strategies have been proposed to counter these attacks, high implementation costs or violation of backward compatibility hinder their deployment. In this work, we first examine the shortcomings of state-of-the-art CAN intrusion detection and identification systems that rely on multiple frames to detect misbehavior and attribute it to a particular ECU, and show that they are vulnerable to a Hill-Climbing-style attack. Then we propose SIMPLE, a real-time intrusion detection and identification system that exploits physical layer features of ECUs, which would not only allow an attack to be detected using a single frame but also be effectively nullified. SIMPLE has low computational and data acquisition costs, and its efficacy is demonstrated by both in-lab experiments with automotive-grade CAN transceivers as well as in-vehicle experiments, where average equal error rates of close to 0% and 0.8985% are achieved, respectively.",
      "published": "2019-12-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3359789.3359834",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahsa Foruhandeh",
        "Yanmao Man",
        "R. Gerdes",
        "Ming Li",
        "T. Chantem"
      ],
      "venue": "Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3359789.3359834",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 78,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3359999.3360496",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Context-aware Anomaly Detector for Monitoring Cyber Attacks on Automotive CAN Bus",
      "description": "Automotive electronics is rapidly expanding. An average vehicle contains million lines of software codes, running on 100 of electronic control units (ECUs), in supporting number of safety, driver assistance and infotainment functions. These ECUs are networked using a Controller Area Network (CAN). Security of the CAN bus has not historically been a major concern, however, recent research demonstrate that CAN has many vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. This paper presents a contextualised anomaly detector for monitoring cyber attacks on the CAN bus. Proposed algorithm is based on message sequence modelling, using so called N-grams distributions. It utilises only benign data (one class) for training and threshold estimation. Performance of the algorithm was tested against two different attack scenarios, RPM and gear gauge messages spoofing, using data captured from a real vehicle. Experimental outcomes demonstrate that proposed algorithm is capable of detecting both attacks with %100 accuracy, using far smaller time windows (100ms) which is essential for a practically deployable automotive cyber security solution.",
      "published": "2019-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3359999.3360496",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Harsha Kalutarage",
        "Mhd Omar Al-Kadri",
        "Madeline Cheah",
        "Garikayi Madzudzo"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium (CSCS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3359999.3360496",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3360664.3360729",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Approaching the Automation of Cyber Security Testing of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The advancing digitalization of vehicles and automotive systems bears many advantages for creating and enhancing comfort and safety-related systems ranging from drive-by-wire, inclusion of advanced displays, entertainment systems up to sophisticated driving assistance and autonomous driving. It, however, also contains the inherent risk of being used for purposes that are not intended for, raging from small non-authorized customizations to the possibility of full-scale cyberattacks that affect several vehicles to whole fleets and vital systems such as steering and engine control. To prevent such conditions and mitigate cybersecurity risks from affecting the safety of road traffic, testing cybersecurity must be adopted into automotive testing at a large scale. Currently, the manual penetration testing processes cannot uphold the increasing demand due to time and cost to test complex systems. We propose an approach for an architecture that (semi-)automates automotive cybersecurity test, allowing for more economic testing and therefore keeping up to the rising demand induced by new vehicle functions as well as the development towards connected and autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-10-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3360664.3360729",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefan Marksteiner",
        "Zhendong Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference (EICC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3360664.3360729",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4336,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3360664.3360729 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: fleet_scale, vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: purposes, economic, vital, creating, currently, large, functions, well."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3362034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BTMonitor",
      "description": "With the rapid growth of connectivity and autonomy for today’s automobiles, their security vulnerabilities are becoming one of the most urgent concerns in the automotive industry. The lack of message authentication in Controller Area Network (CAN), which is the most popular in-vehicle communication protocol, makes it susceptible to cyber attack. It has been demonstrated that the remote attackers can take over the maneuver of vehicles after getting access to CAN, which poses serious safety threats to the public. To mitigate this issue, we propose a novel intrusion detection system (IDS), called BTMonitor (Bit-time-based CAN Bus Monitor). It utilizes the small but measurable discrepancy of bit time in CAN frames to fingerprint their sender Electronic Control Units (ECUs). To reduce the requirement for high sampling rate, we calculate the bit time of recessive bits and dominant bits, respectively, and extract their statistical features as fingerprint. The generated fingerprint is then used to detect intrusion and pinpoint the attacker. BTMonitor can detect new types of masquerade attack that the state-of-the-art clock-skew-based IDS is unable to identify. We implement a prototype system for BTMonitor using Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA for data collection. We evaluate our method on both a CAN bus prototype and a real vehicle. The results show that BTMonitor can correctly identify the sender with an average probability of 99.76% on the real vehicle.",
      "published": "2019-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3362034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jia Zhou",
        "Prachi Joshi",
        "Haibo Zeng",
        "Renfa Li"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1145/3362034",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3375706.3380554",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Traffic Lights: Replay Attack Detection for Model-based Smart Traffic Controllers",
      "description": "Rapid urbanization calls for smart traffic management solutions that incorporate sensors, distributed traffic controllers and V2X communication technologies to provide fine-grained traffic control to mitigate congestion. As in many other cyber-physical systems, smart traffic management systems typically lack security measures. This allows numerous opportunities for adversarial entities to craft attacks on the sensor networks, wireless data sharing and/or the distributed traffic controllers. We show that such vulnerabilities can be exploited to disrupt mobility in a large urban area and cause unsafe conditions for drivers and the pedestrians on the roads. Specifically, in this paper, we look into vulnerabilities in model-based traffic controllers and show that, even with state-of-the-art attack detectors in place, false-data injection can be used to hamper mobility. We demonstrate a replay attack by modeling an isolated intersection in VISSIM, a popular traffic simulator and also discuss countermeasures to thwart such attacks.",
      "published": "2020-03-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3375706.3380554",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pratham Oza",
        "Mahsa Foruhandeh",
        "R. Gerdes",
        "T. Chantem"
      ],
      "venue": "AutoSec@CODASPY",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3375706.3380554",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3375706.3380558",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ransomware Targeting Automobiles",
      "description": "Ransomware has consistently been the top threat to security in recent years. It seems inevitable that ransomware developers will ultimately target automobiles. As vehicles get smarter and more connected, the threat surface widens and automobiles naturally become more vulnerable to Internet-based threats such as ransomware. In this paper, we identify the constraints on ransomware in the context of automobiles and demonstrate potential ransomware attacks. The demonstrations entail attack vectors targeted at the IVI system and the methodology for implementing a hybrid crypto ransomware on an IVI system. Finally, we clarify the new ransomware strategies that the attackers could leverage in the context of vehicular systems with the intent to promote research to prevent such attacks.",
      "published": "2020-03-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3375706.3380558",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pranshu Bajpai",
        "Richard J. Enbody",
        "Betty H. C. Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3375706.3380558",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3376897.3377861",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Paravirtualized Android for Next Generation Interactive Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Android's APIs, bluetooth support and smartphone integration provide capabilities for user interaction with In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) and vehicle control services. However, Android is not developed to interface with automotive subsystems accessed via CAN bus networks. This work proposes a new automotive system based on our Quest-V partitioning hypervisor, which allows Android to communicate and interact with timing and safety-critical services managed by the Quest real-time OS (RTOS). Quest is used to filter and receive messages from Android applications and to interface with a car's internal CAN bus in a timing predictable manner. Android is then used to host IVI applications and provide a user interface to real-time vehicle services. This system design allows Android to leverage the timing guarantees of Quest, while securely isolating critical hardware components and memory regions. Quest-V hosts a paravirtualized Android 8.1 (Oreo) guest, which required modification of 126 lines of kernel code. Secure shared memory communication mechanisms between Android and a separate Quest guest provide real-time I/O to CAN bus networks.",
      "published": "2020-02-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3376897.3377861",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soham Sinha",
        "Ahmad Golchin",
        "Craig Einstein",
        "Richard West"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3376897.3377861",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3393527.3393543",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Temperature-sensitive Fingerprinting on ECU Clock Offset for CAN Intrusion Detection and Source Identification",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most widely used standard for reliable in-vehicle communications, whereas the lack of security authentication of CAN protocols makes it exposure to targeted attacks. At present, there have been two main streams of security mechanisms, including message authentication and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). The IDS, which uses the physical characteristics of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) as fingerprints to detect the intrusion and identify the attack source, is the most popular one. However, demonstrated by observations, we found the change of temperature will cause the failure of the state-of-the-art IDSs because quartz crystal clock frequency is temperature-sensitive. Inspired by the fact that the clock offset of a specific ECU varies with the temperature, we propose the conception of the temperature-sensitive fingerprints of ECU. In our method, KNN (K-Nearest Neighbor) is used to classify the clock offset of the messages to detect intrusion messages and identify the source ECU. Our approach does not require any additional equipment, which is vital in in-vehicle networks with limited resources. To evaluate the feasibility of the proposed approach, we mount a masquerade attack on a CAN bus prototype and use our method as the IDS. The method is also verified with the data from real vehicles, and the result shows that it works on both the CAN bus prototype and real vehicles. Extensive experiments show that the proposed method has a high detection and identification rate, which is between 98.095% and 100% as the temperature increases from 10 °C to 70 °C.",
      "published": "2020-05-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3393527.3393543",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaoyun Zhou",
        "Ruo-Bing Jiang",
        "Miao-Qing Tian",
        "Hai-Peng Qu",
        "He Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Turing Celebration Conference",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3393527.3393543",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3400302.3415758",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Counteracting adversarial attacks in autonomous driving",
      "description": "This article studies the robust deep stereo vision in autonomous driving systems and counteracting adversarial attacks. The autonomous system operation requires real-time processing of measurement data which often contain significant uncertainties and noise. Adversarial attacks have been widely studied to simulate these perturbations in recent years. To counteract the practical attacks in autonomous systems, novel methods based on simulated attacks are proposed in this article. Univariate and multivariate functions are adopted to represent the relationships between the left and right input images and the deep stereo model. A stereo regularizer is proposed to guide the model to learn the implicit relationship between the images and characterize the loss function’s local smoothness. The attacks are generated by maximizing the regularizer term to break the linearity and smoothness. The model then defends the attacks by minimizing the loss and regularization terms. Two techniques are developed in this article. The first technique,SmoothStereo, explores the basic knowledge from the physical world and smoothness, while the second technique,SmoothStereoV2, improvesSmoothStereothrough leveraging the smooth activation functions during the defense.SmoothStereoV2can learn and utilize the gradient information concerning the attacks. The gradients of the smooth activation functions can handle attacks for improving the model robustness. Numerical experiments on KITTI datasets demonstrate that the proposed methods offer superior performance.",
      "published": "2020-11-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3400302.3415758",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qi Long Sun",
        "Arjun Ashok Rao",
        "Xufeng Yao",
        "Bei Yu",
        "Shiyan Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3400302.3415758",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3407023.3407033",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security assurance cases for road vehicles",
      "description": "Assurance cases are structured arguments that are commonly used to reason about the safety of a product or service. Currently, there is an ongoing push towards using assurance cases also for cybersecurity, especially in safety critical domains, like automotive. While the industry is faced with the challenge of defining a sound methodology to build security assurance cases, the state of the art is rather immature. Therefore, we have conducted a thorough investigation of the (external) constraints and (internal) needs that security assurance cases have to satisfy when used in the automotive industry. This has been done with 28 participants and in the context of two large automotive companies located in Europe: Company A is a passenger car manufacturer, while Company B is a truck manufacturer. An extended version of this paper is available online at https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.14106.",
      "published": "2020-08-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3407023.3407033",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mazen Mohamad",
        "Alexander Åström",
        "Örjan Askerdal",
        "Jörgen Borg",
        "Riccardo Scandariato"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3407023.3407033",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3407023.3409206",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Locality sensitive hashing for tampering detection in automotive systems",
      "description": "In modern auto vehicles we find dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) running several hundred MBs of code, alongside sophisticated dashboards with integrated wireless communications. While this technological advancement has brought upon a wide range of advantages and integrated features, it also exposed the modern vehicle to significant cyber threats, as documented in prior works. Unfortunately, besides traditional cyber attacks, the security and normal operation of the modern vehicle are nowadays exposed to a different kind of threat. This is the tampering, which denotes a procedure that alters the vehicle's behavior in order to gain particular advantages (e.g., financial, operational). A fundamental distinction between tampering and cyber attacks, is that tampering occurs with the owner's consent. This paper presents an approach for detecting tampering within modern vehicles by leveraging the advantages of sensitive hashing, namely the Exact Euclidean Locality Sensitive Hashing (E2LSH) method. Experimental results based on a dataset collected from the On-Board Diagnostics port (OBD) of a Kia SOUL vehicle demonstrate the practical applicability of the developed methodology.",
      "published": "2020-08-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3407023.3409206",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "kia",
        "obd",
        "security",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roland Bolboacă",
        "Teri Lenard",
        "Béla Genge",
        "Piroska Haller"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3407023.3409206",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3407903",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Intersection Management of Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Intersection management of Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) has the potential to improve safety and mobility. CAVs approaching an intersection can exchange information with the infrastructure or each other to schedule their cross times. By avoiding unnecessary stops, scheduling CAVs can increase traffic throughput, reduce energy consumption, and most importantly, minimize the number of accidents that happen in intersection areas due to human errors. We study existing intersection management approaches from following key perspectives: (1) intersection management interface, (2) scheduling policy, (3) existing wireless technologies, (4) existing vehicle models used by researchers and their impact, (5) conflict detection, (6) extension to multi-intersection management, (7) challenges of supporting human-driven vehicles, (8) safety and robustness required for real-life deployment, (9) graceful degradation and recovery for emergency scenarios, (10) security concerns and attack models, and (11) evaluation methods. We then discuss the effectiveness and limitations of each approach with respect to the aforementioned aspects and conclude with a discussion on tradeoffs and further research directions.",
      "published": "2020-08-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3407903",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Khayatian",
        "Mohammadreza Mehrabian",
        "Edward Andert",
        "Rachel Dedinsky",
        "Sarthake Choudhary",
        "Yingyan Lou",
        "Aviral Shirvastava"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3407903",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 111,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3416014.3424581",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "The automotive industry continues to innovate at an exponential rate to provide a safer and more efficient experience for consumers. Autonomous vehicles and Vehicle-to-Everything technologies are at the forefront of defining the future of transportation. Enabling vehicles to connect to various services has exposed critical in-vehicle networks such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) to potential exploitation by adversaries. In its standard form, the CAN bus suffers from multiple vulnerabilities such as limited bandwidth and lack of authentication. Attacks can be initiated through physical and wireless mediums, exploiting diagnostic interfaces, Bluetooth and infotainment systems to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data communication within vehicles. In this paper, a holistic, comprehensive, Machine Learning-Based intrusion detection system for the CAN bus is proposed to secure the critical in-vehicle network. The proposed system is modular, scalable and can be adapted to the ever-changing threat landscape of cyber vehicle attacks. On an unseen testing dataset, our system achieved 100% accuracy in protecting against denial of service and multiple impersonation injection attacks, as well as 95.67% accuracy of fuzzy injection attacks.",
      "published": "2020-11-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3416014.3424581",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "exploitation",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omar Minawi",
        "Jason Whelan",
        "Abdulaziz Almehmadi",
        "Khalil El‐Khatib"
      ],
      "venue": "Design and Analysis of Intelligent Vehicular Networks and Applications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1145/3416014.3424581",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3431233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyberattacks and Countermeasures for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "As connectivity between and within vehicles increases, so does concern about safety and security. Various automotive serial protocols are used inside vehicles such as Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN) and FlexRay. CAN bus is the most used in-vehicle network protocol to support exchange of vehicle parameters between Electronic Control Units (ECUs). This protocol lacks security mechanisms by design and is therefore vulnerable to various attacks. Furthermore, connectivity of vehicles has made the CAN bus not only vulnerable from within the vehicle but also from outside. With the rise of connected cars, more entry points and interfaces have been introduced on board vehicles, thereby also leading to a wider potential attack surface. Existing security mechanisms focus on the use of encryption, authentication and vehicle Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), which operate under various constrains such as low bandwidth, small frame size (e.g. in the CAN protocol), limited availability of computational resources and real-time sensitivity. We survey In-Vehicle Network (IVN) attacks which have been grouped under: direct interfaces-initiated attacks, telematics and infotainment-initiated attacks, and sensor-initiated attacks. We survey and classify current cryptographic and IDS approaches and compare these approaches based on criteria such as real time constrains, types of hardware used, changes in CAN bus behaviour, types of attack mitigation and software/ hardware used to validate these approaches. We conclude with potential mitigation strategies and research challenges for the future.",
      "published": "2020-04-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3431233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected cars",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emad Aliwa",
        "OMER F. RANA",
        "Charith Perera",
        "Pete Burnap"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computing Surveys",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3431233",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 240,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3433210.3437530",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PLI-TDC: Super Fine Delay-Time Based Physical-Layer Identification with Time-to-Digital Converter for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Recently, cyberattacks on Controller Area Network (CAN) which is one of the automotive networks are becoming a severe problem. CAN is a protocol for communicating among Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and it is a de-facto standard of automotive networks. Some security researchers point out several vulnerabilities in CAN such as unable to distinguish spoofing messages due to no authentication and no sender identification. To prevent a malicious message injection, at least we should identify the malicious senders by analyzing live messages. In previous work, a delay-time based method called Divider to identify the sender node has been proposed. However, Divider could not identify ECUs which have similar variations because Divider's measurement clock has coarse time-resolution. In addition, Divider cannot adapt a drift of delay-time caused by the temperature drift at the ambient buses. In this paper, we propose a super fine delay-time based sender identification method with Time-to-Digital Converter (TDC). The proposed method achieves an accuracy rate of 99.67% in the CAN bus prototype and 97.04% in a real-vehicle. Besides, in an environment of drifting temperature, the proposed method can achieve a mean accuracy of over 99%.",
      "published": "2021-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3433210.3437530",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3433210.3437530",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3433210.3453106",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust Roadside Physical Adversarial Attack Against Deep Learning in Lidar Perception Modules",
      "description": "As Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) mature into viable transportation solutions, mitigating potential vehicle control security risks becomes increasingly important. Perception modules in AVs combine multiple sensors to perceive the surrounding environment. As such, they have been the focus of efforts to exploit the aforementioned risks due to their critical role in controlling autonomous driving technology. Despite extensive and thorough research into the vulnerability of camera-based sensors, vulnerabilities originating from Lidar sensors and their corresponding deep learning models in AVs remain comparatively untouched. Being aware that small roadside objects can be occasionally incorrectly identified as vehicles through on-board deep learning models, we propose a novel adversarial attack inspired by this phenomenon in both white-box and black-box scenarios. The adversarial attacks proposed in this paper are launched against deep learning models that perform object detection tasks through raw 3D points collected by a Lidar sensor in an autonomous driving scenario. In comparison to existing works, our attack creates not only adversarial point clouds in simulated environments, but also robust adversarial objects that can cause behavioral reactions in state of the art autonomous driving systems. Defense methods are then proposed and evaluated against this type of adversarial objects.",
      "published": "2021-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3433210.3453106",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaichen Yang",
        "Tzungyu Tsai",
        "Honggang Yu",
        "Max Panoff",
        "Tsung-Yi Ho",
        "Yier Jin"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3433210.3453106",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3447555.3466568",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A review of electric vehicle charging session open data",
      "description": "The need for reliable and accessible electric vehicle (EV) charging data is becoming increasingly important as governments and industries aim to create low-carbon transport systems. Without careful grid management, the security of supply could be compromised. In this work, the results of an open data search are presented with 8 open charging session datasets highlighted and discussed from a practical perspective. These datasets cover a range of charging options (residential, workplace and public) and it is shown that they are all relevant for developing EV load models. To aid with this future modelling work, a distributional analysis of the main influential factors of EV charging load is provided.",
      "published": "2021-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3447555.3466568",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yvenn Amara-Ouali",
        "Pascal Massart",
        "Jean‐Michel Poggi",
        "Yannig Goude",
        "Hui Juan Yan"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems (e-Energy)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3447555.3466568",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3448300.3467817",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SigUnder: a stealthy 5G low power attack and defenses",
      "description": "The 3GPP 5G cellular system is hailed as a major step towards more ubiquitous and pervasive communications infrastructure (including for V2X, Smart Grid, and Healthcare). We disclose and evaluate SigUnder, an attack that enables an adversary to overshadow the Signal Synchronization Block (SSB) with an injected signal at 3.4dB below the legitimate signal (prior work required 3dB above). The attack exploits the polar coding mechanism of 5G and the physical layer OFDM structure. It can be used to make previous DoS and over-shadowing attacks lower-power and stealthy, but also enables new attacks unique to 5G such as setting the cellBarred field in the 5G MIB (and blocking access to a cell). We develop techniques (e.g., phase prediction) to make the attack feasible in a practical setup, and evaluate its performance both in simulations and over the air experiments. We also introduce SICUnder, an extension of Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC) to be able to address the unique challenges that SigUnder poses and demonstrate it effectiveness relatively to standard SIC.",
      "published": "2021-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3448300.3467817",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "exploits",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Norbert Ludant",
        "Guevara Noubir"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Network Security",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3448300.3467817",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3448300.3467831",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security analysis of IEEE 802.15.4z/HRP UWB time-of-flight distance measurement",
      "description": "IEEE 802.15.4z, a standard for Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) secure distance measurement, was adopted in 2020 and the chips that implement this standard are already deployed in mobile phones and in the automotive industry (for Passive Keyless Entry and Start). The standard specifies two different modes---LRP and HRP. Whereas the security of LRP mode has been analyzed, there is no publicly available security analysis of the HRP mode, which is used in different chips like NXP Trimension SR150/SR040, Samsung smartphones, and U1 chip deployed in Apple iPhones. In this work, we perform the first open analysis of the 802.15.4z HRP mode. Our analysis reviews possible attacks on HRP and assesses strategies that an HRP receiver could implement. We show that in realistic deployments, despite countermeasures, HRP is hard to configure to be both performant and secure. If a distance missdetection rate is set to less than 10% (in benign scenarios), the probability of a successful distance shortening attacks ranges from 7% to over 90%.",
      "published": "2021-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3448300.3467831",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mridula Singh",
        "Marc Roeschlin",
        "Ezzat Zalzala",
        "Patrick Leu",
        "Srdjan Čapkun"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Network Security",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3448300.3467831",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3460120.3485377",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Can We Use Arbitrary Objects to Attack LiDAR Perception in Autonomous Driving?",
      "description": "As an effective way to acquire accurate information about the driving environment, LiDAR perception has been widely adopted in autonomous driving. The state-of-the-art LiDAR perception systems mainly rely on deep neural networks (DNNs) to achieve good performance. However, DNNs have been demonstrated vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Although there are a few works that study adversarial attacks against LiDAR perception systems, these attacks have some limitations in feasibility, flexibility, and stealthiness when being performed in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we investigate an easier way to perform effective adversarial attacks with high flexibility and good stealthiness against LiDAR perception in autonomous driving. Specifically, we propose a novel attack framework based on which the attacker can identify a few adversarial locations in the physical space. By placing arbitrary objects with reflective surface around these locations, the attacker can easily fool the LiDAR perception systems. Extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed attack, and the results show that our proposed attack can achieve more than 90% success rate. In addition, our real-world study demonstrates that the proposed attack can be easily performed using only two commercial drones. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first study on the effect of adversarial locations on LiDAR perception models' behaviors, the first investigation on how to attack LiDAR perception systems using arbitrary objects with reflective surface, and the first attack against LiDAR perception systems using commercial drones in physical world. Potential defense strategies are also discussed to mitigate the proposed attacks.",
      "published": "2021-11-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485377",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Zhu",
        "Chenglin Miao",
        "Tianhang Zheng",
        "Foad Hajiaghajani",
        "Lü Su",
        "Chunming Qiao"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3460120.3485377",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3460417.3483374",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-vehicle networking with NDN",
      "description": "In-vehicle networks have been relying on primitive technologies that provide neither security nor high-throughput. As in-vehicle communication becomes more sophisticated, the automotive community is looking for better security and performance. In this work we argue for NDN as a solution for the future of the automotive community.",
      "published": "2021-09-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3460417.3483374",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christos G. Papadopoulos",
        "Susmit Shannigrahi",
        "Alex Afanaseyv"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking (ICN)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3460417.3483374",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3465481.3465750",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2C: A Trust-Based Vehicle to Cloud Anomaly Detection Framework for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Vehicles have become connected in many ways. They communicate with the cloud and will use Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication to exchange warning messages and perform cooperative actions such as platooning. Vehicles have already been attacked and will become even more attractive targets due to their increasing connectivity, the amount of data they produce and their importance to our society. It is therefore crucial to provide cyber security measures to prevent and limit the impact of attacks.",
      "published": "2021-08-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3465481.3465750",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Rosenstatter",
        "Tomas Olovsson",
        "Magnus Almgren"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3465481.3465750",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3472634.3472662",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploiting Temperature-Varied Voltage Fingerprints for In-vehicle CAN Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most commonly used in-vehicle protocol for reliable communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Due to its broadcast nature and absence of message authentication mechanisms, CAN bus is vulnerable to several severe attacks. To combat these defects, many intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that exploit ECU’s inimitable voltage signal have been proposed. However, existing works ignore the impact of temperature changes or only consider a small range of temperature changes. Through experiences, we found that the ECU’s voltage signals will be affected by the temperature, which will cause the state-of-the-art voltage-based IDS to fail. To mitigate this deficiency, we propose a temperature-varied voltage fingerprinting scheme(TVV). TVV collects the voltage signals sent by each ECU at different temperatures, and it constructs a fingerprint database of each ECU. Then TVV performs intrusion detection based on the fingerprint database and the current driving state of the car. We have implemented TVV on both CAN bus prototype and real vehicles at a temperature of 0°C to 80°C, and results show that our scheme is able to detect the masquerade attack.",
      "published": "2021-07-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3472634.3472662",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dong Li",
        "Miaoqing Tian",
        "Ruobing Jiang",
        "Ke Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Turing Celebration Conference - China (ACM TURC)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3472634.3472662",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3473714.3473851",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security design of OTA upgrade for intelligent connected vehicle",
      "description": "With the interlocking of the car network, the intelligent unpleasant exhibition, the car network function has gradually entered the public vision as the standard item of the new car. The public data shows that the vehicle networking configuration accounts for 21% in the new car listed in 2017, which is 16% of the listing of new cars in 2016. With the launch of new models, the car assembly ratio will continue to improve, in accordance with the consistency of the industry, to 2020 OTA will enter a large-scale application state, China's car network users will grow from existing 7 million to 2020 Around 44 million, China's car network market will reach nearly $ 33.8 billion. In this process, the vehicle operation is more convenient, and the use process becomes more intimate. All of this comes from the gradual improvement of vehicle enterprises' functionality. Among them, the real-time networking update of the vehicle electronic control unit (especially entertainment interactive system) is used in real time.",
      "published": "2021-06-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3473714.3473851",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhi Xin Wu",
        "Tianyu Liu",
        "Xianfeng Jia",
        "Chunhui Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Control and Intelligent Robotics (ICCIR)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3473714.3473851",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3473856.3473891",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Consumer Perspective on Privacy Risk Awareness of Connected Car Data Use",
      "description": "New cars are increasingly \"connected\" by default. Since not having a car is not an option for many people, understanding the privacy implications of driving connected cars and using their data-based services is an even more pressing issue than for expendable consumer products. While risk-based approaches to privacy are well established in law, they have only begun to gain traction in HCI. These approaches are understood not only to increase acceptance but also to help consumers make choices that meet their needs. To the best of our knowledge, perceived risks in the context of connected cars have not been studied before. To address this gap, our study reports on the analysis of a survey with 18 open-ended questions distributed to 1,000 households in a medium-sized German city. Our findings provide qualitative insights into existing attitudes and use cases of connected car features and, most importantly, a list of perceived risks themselves. Taking the perspective of consumers, we argue that these can help inform consumers about data use in connected cars in a user-friendly way. Finally, we show how these risks fit into and extend existing risk taxonomies from other contexts with a stronger social perspective on risks of data use.",
      "published": "2021-09-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3473856.3473891",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Timo Jakobi",
        "Fatemeh Alizadeh",
        "Martin Marburger",
        "G. Stevens"
      ],
      "venue": "Message Understanding Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3473856.3473891",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3485730.3485935",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks against LiDAR Semantic Segmentation in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Today, most autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) perception to acquire accurate information about their immediate surroundings. In LiDAR-based perception systems, semantic segmentation plays a critical role as it can divide LiDAR point clouds into meaningful regions according to human perception and provide AVs with semantic understanding of the driving environments. However, an implicit assumption for existing semantic segmentation models is that they are performed in a reliable and secure environment, which may not be true in practice. In this paper, we investigate adversarial attacks against LiDAR semantic segmentation in autonomous driving. Specifically, we propose a novel adversarial attack framework based on which the attacker can easily fool LiDAR semantic segmentation by placing some simple objects (e.g., cardboard and road signs) at some locations in the physical space. We conduct extensive real-world experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed attack framework. The experimental results show that our attack can achieve more than 90% success rate in real-world driving environments. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on physically realizable adversarial attacks against LiDAR point cloud semantic segmentation with real-world evaluations.",
      "published": "2021-11-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3485730.3485935",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Zhu",
        "Chenglin Miao",
        "Foad Hajiaghajani",
        "Mengdi Huai",
        "Lü Su",
        "Chunming Qiao"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3485730.3485935",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 65,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3485832.3485883",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "S2-CAN: Sufficiently Secure Controller Area Network",
      "description": "As automotive security concerns are rising, the Controller Area Network (CAN) — the de facto standard of in-vehicle communication protocol — has come under scrutiny due to its lack of encryption and authentication. Several vulnerabilities, such as eavesdropping, spoofing, and replay attacks, have shown that the current implementation needs to be extended. Both academic and commercial solutions for a Secure CAN (S-CAN) have been proposed, but OEMs have not yet integrated them into their products. The main reasons for this lack of adoption are their heavy use of limited computational resources in the vehicle, increased latency that can lead to missed deadlines for safety-critical messages, as well as insufficient space available in a CAN frame to include a Message Authentication Code (MAC).",
      "published": "2021-12-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485883",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Jay W. Schauer",
        "Junhui Li",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Computer Security Applications Conference",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3485832.3485883",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3488904.3493378",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proposing HEAVENS 2.0 – an automotive risk assessment model",
      "description": "Risk-based security models have seen a steady rise in popularity over the last decades, and several security risk assessment models have been proposed for the automotive industry. The new UN vehicle regulation 155 on cybersecurity provisions for vehicle type approval, as part of the 1958 agreement on vehicle harmonization, mandates the use of risk assessment to mitigate cybersecurity risks and is expected to be adopted into national laws in 54 countries within 1 to 3 years. This new legislation will also apply to autonomous vehicles. The automotive cybersecurity engineering standard ISO/SAE 21434 is seen as a way to fulfill the new UN legislation, so we can expect quick and wide industry adoption. One risk assessment model that has gained some popularity and is in active use in several companies is the HEAVENS model, but since ISO/SAE 21434 introduces additional requirements on the risk assessment process, the original HEAVENS model does not fulfill the standard.",
      "published": "2021-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3488904.3493378",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljoscha Lautenbach",
        "Magnus Almgren",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium (CSCS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1145/3488904.3493378",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3488932.3523263",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ShadowAuth: Backward-Compatible Automatic CAN Authentication for Legacy ECUs",
      "description": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is the de-facto standard in-vehicle network system. Despite its wide adoption by automobile manufacturers, the lack of security design makes it vulnerable to attacks. For instance, broadcasting packets without authentication allows the impersonation of electronic control units (ECUs). Prior mitigations, such as message authentication or intrusion detection systems, fail to address the compatibility requirement with legacy ECUs, stealthy and sporadic malicious messaging, or guaranteed attack detection. We propose a novel authentication system called ShadowAuth that overcomes the aforementioned challenges by offering backwardcompatible packet authentication to ECUs without requiring ECU firmware source code. Specifically, our authentication scheme provides transparent CAN packet authentication without modifying existing CAN packet definitions (e.g., J1939) via automatic ECU firmware instrumentation technique to locate CAN packet transmission code, and instrument authentication code based on the CAN packet behavioral transmission patterns. ShadowAuth enables vehicles to detect state-of-the-art CAN attacks, such as busoff and packet injection, responsively within 60ms without false positives. ShadowAuth provides a sound and deployable solution for real-world ECUs.",
      "published": "2022-05-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3488932.3523263",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sungwoo Kim",
        "Gisu Yeo",
        "Taegyu Kim",
        "J. Rhee",
        "Yuseok Jeon",
        "Antonio Bianchi",
        "Dong-Yan Xu",
        "D. Tian"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3488932.3523263",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3491003.3491024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AutoSec: Secure Automotive Data Transmission Scheme for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Modern vehicles comprise hundreds of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and sensors for enhancing numerous security and comfort-related functionalities. The ECUs perform real-time information exchange, such as automotive instructions over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. However, the CAN bus architecture supports very limited security features. Thus, in-vehicle communications over CAN are vulnerable to critical security threats. Also, as ECUs are resource-constrained in nature, the continuous message transmissions lead to drain out of energy during inter-ECU communication if the authentication scheme is not cost-effective.",
      "published": "2022-01-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3491003.3491024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Trupil Limbasiya",
        "Amrita Ghosal",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3491003.3491024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3498361.3539772",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Battery-enabled anti-theft vehicle immobilizer",
      "description": "Auto thieves often exploit the cyber vulnerabilities of existing key/phone-based vehicle immobilizers. To prevent this exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities for auto thefts, we present Battery Sleuth (Bleuth), a novel \"physical\" vehicle immobilizer which is immune to the common cyber-attack vectors - avoiding the use of wireless communication between key/phone and vehicle as well as in-vehicle networks. Bleuth achieves this by using the common 12V vehicle batteries to authenticate the driver with encrypted power-line communication and then control the battery's output power based on the authentication results, hence (im)mobilizing the vehicle without requiring drivers to carry any additional token. Bleuth is also equipped with four alarms to detect, and respond to, illegitimate operations (i.e., theft attempts), including attempts of unauthorized cranking of the engine, removal/shorting of the authenticator from the battery, abuse of the PLC to drain the car battery, and removal of the dongle from the auxiliary power outlet. Bleuth recharges its power supply automatically to free drivers from the maintenance burden. We have prototyped Bleuth as an add-on module that can be installed on commodity vehicles and evaluated it via field tests on 8 vehicles. We have also demonstrated Bleuth's utility and effectiveness via a survey of 612 car owners.",
      "published": "2022-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3498361.3539772",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "exploit",
        "immobilizer",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liang He",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3498361.3539772",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3503161.3548171",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical Backdoor Attacks to Lane Detection Systems in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Modern autonomous vehicles adopt state-of-the-art DNN models to interpret the sensor data and perceive the environment. However, DNN models are vulnerable to different types of adversarial attacks, which pose significant risks to the security and safety of the vehicles and passengers. One prominent threat is the backdoor attack, where the adversary can compromise the DNN model by poisoning the training samples. Although lots of effort has been devoted to the investigation of the backdoor attack to conventional computer vision tasks, its practicality and applicability to the autonomous driving scenario is rarely explored, especially in the physical world.",
      "published": "2022-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3503161.3548171",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xingshuo Han",
        "Guowen Xu",
        "Yuan Hua Zhou",
        "Xuehuan Yang",
        "Jiwei Li",
        "Tianwei Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM International Conference on Multimedia (ACM MM)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3503161.3548171",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3507657.3528536",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analog Physical-Layer Relay Attacks with Application to Bluetooth and Phase-Based Ranging",
      "description": "Today, we use smartphones as multi-purpose devices that communicate with their environment to implement context-aware services, including asset tracking, indoor localization, contact tracing, or access control. As a de-facto standard, Bluetooth is available in virtually every smartphone to provide short-range wireless communication. Importantly, many Bluetooth-driven applications such as Phone as a Key (PaaK) for vehicles and buildings require proximity of legitimate devices, which must be protected against unauthorized access. In earlier access control systems, attackers were able to violate proximity-verification through relay station attacks. However, the vulnerability of Bluetooth against such attacks was yet unclear as existing relay attack strategies are not applicable or can be defeated through wireless distance measurement.",
      "published": "2022-05-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3507657.3528536",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "relay",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Paul Staat",
        "Kai Jansen",
        "Christian Zenger",
        "Harald Elders-Boll",
        "Christof Paar"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3507657.3528536",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3508398.3511523",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Resiliency of Heavy Vehicles through Compromised Sensor Data Reconstruction",
      "description": "Almost all aspects of modern automobiles are controlled by embedded computers, known as Electronic Control Units (ECUs). ECUs are connected with each other over a Controller Area Network (CAN) network. ECUs communicate with each other and control the automobile's behavior using messages. Heavy vehicles, unlike passenger cars, are constructed using ECUs manufactured by different Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). For reasons of interoperability, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) mandates that all ECUs should communicate using the standardized SAE-J1939 protocol that gives semantics to the signals transmitted on the CAN network. Security concerns have been historically ignored in protocols and standards. Consequently, an ECU having malicious code can spoof other ECUs, e.g., a message can be injected through the OBD-II port or the telematics unit into the internal network to interfere with the behavior of the vehicle. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been proposed and utilized to detect various types of security attacks. However, such systems are only capable of detecting attacks and cannot mitigate them. A compromised ECU may generate invalid data values; even if such invalid values are detected, there is still a need to counter their effects. Almost all prior works focus on detecting attacks. We demonstrate how to make the vehicle resilient to attacks. We analyze the log files of real driving scenarios and show ECUs are significantly dependent on other ECUs to operate. We demonstrate that parameters of a compromised ECU can be reconstructed from those of other non-compromised ECUs to allow the vehicle to continue operation and make it resilient to attacks. We achieve this by modeling the behavior of an ECU using the multivariate Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural network. We then reconstruct compromised ECU values using information obtained from trustworthy ECUs. Despite some levels of errors, our model can reconstruct trustworthy data values that can be substituted for values generated by compromised ECUs. The error between the reconstructed values and the correct ones is less than 6% of the operating range for the compromised ECU, which is significantly low and can be substituted. Our proposed approach makes the vehicle resilient without requiring changes to the internal architecture.",
      "published": "2022-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3508398.3511523",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "obd-ii",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hossein Mozdorani Shirazi",
        "William Pickard",
        "Indrakshi Ray",
        "Haonan Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3508398.3511523",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3526241.3530832",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resiliency in Connected Vehicle Applications: Challenges and Approaches for Security Validation",
      "description": "With the proliferation of connectivity and smart computing in vehicles, a new attack surface has emerged that targets subversion of vehicular applications by compromising sensors and communication. A unique feature of these attacks is that they no longer require intrusion into the hardware and software components of the victim vehicle; rather, it is possible to subvert the application by providing wrong or misleading information. We consider the problem of making vehicular systems resilient against these threats. A promising approach is to adapt resiliency solutions based on anomaly detection through Machine Learning. We discuss challenges in making such an approach viable. In particular, we consider the problem of validating such resiliency architectures, the factors that make the problem challenging, and our approaches to address the challenges.",
      "published": "2022-06-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3526241.3530832",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srivalli Boddupalli",
        "Richard Owoputi",
        "Chengwei Duan",
        "Tashfique Hasnine Choudhury",
        "Sandip Ray"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI (GLSVLSI)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3526241.3530832",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3527317",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Coverage-guided tensor compiler fuzzing with joint IR-pass mutation",
      "description": "In the past decade, Deep Learning (DL) systems have been widely deployed in various application domains to facilitate our daily life, e.g., natural language processing, healthcare, activity recognition, and autonomous driving. Meanwhile, it is extremely challenging to ensure the correctness of DL systems (e.g., due to their intrinsic nondeterminism), and bugs in DL systems can cause serious consequences and may even threaten human lives. In the literature, researchers have explored various techniques to test, analyze, and verify DL models, since their quality directly affects the corresponding system behaviors. Recently, researchers have also proposed novel techniques for testing the underlying operator-level DL libraries (such as TensorFlow and PyTorch), which provide general binary implementations for each high-level DL operator and are the foundation for running DL models on different hardware platforms. However, there is still limited work targeting the reliability of the emerging tensor compilers (also known as DL compilers), which aim to automatically compile high-level tensor computation graphs directly into high-performance binaries for better efficiency, portability, and scalability than traditional operator-level libraries. Therefore, in this paper, we target the important problem of tensor compiler testing, and have proposed Tzer, a practical fuzzing technique for the widely used TVM tensor compiler. Tzer focuses on mutating the low-level Intermediate Representation (IR) for TVM due to the limited mutation space for the high-level IR. More specifically, Tzer leverages both general-purpose and tensor-compiler-specific mutators guided by coverage feedback for diverse and evolutionary IR mutation; furthermore, since tensor compilers provide various passes (i.e., transformations) for IR optimization, Tzer also performs pass mutation in tandem with IR mutation for more effective fuzzing. Our experimental results show that Tzer substantially outperforms existing fuzzing techniques on tensor compiler testing, with 75% higher coverage and 50% more valuable tests than the 2nd-best technique. Also, different components of Tzer have been validated via ablation study. To date, Tzer has detected 49 previously unknown bugs for TVM, with 37 bugs confirmed and 25 bugs fixed (PR merged).",
      "published": "2022-04-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3527317",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiawei Liu",
        "Yuxiang Wei",
        "Sen Yang",
        "Yinlin Deng",
        "Lingming Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3527317",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 53,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3532105.3535027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LARP: A Lightweight Auto-Refreshing Pseudonym Protocol for V2X",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is the key enabler for emerging intelligent transportation systems. Applications built on top of V2X require both authentication and privacy protection for the vehicles. The common approach to meet both requirements is to use pseudonyms which are short-term identities. However, both industrial standards and state-of-the-art research are not designed for resource-constrained environments. In addition, they make a strong assumption about the security of the vehicle's on-board computation units. In this paper, we propose a lightweight auto-refreshing pseudonym protocol (LARP) for V2X. LARP supports efficient operations for resource-constrained devices, and provides security even when parts of the vehicle are compromised. We provide formal security proof showing that the protocol is secure. We conduct experiments on a Raspberry Pi 4. The results demonstrate that LARP is feasible and practical.",
      "published": "2022-06-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3532105.3535027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zheng Yang",
        "Tien Tuan Anh Dinh",
        "Chao Yin",
        "Yingying Yao",
        "Dianshi Yang",
        "Xiaolin Chang",
        "Jianying Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3532105.3535027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3532869",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "User-empowered Privacy-preserving Authentication Protocol for Electric Vehicle Charging Based on Decentralized Identity and Verifiable Credential",
      "description": "The use of Electric Vehicles (EVs) has been gaining traction in recent years due to various reasons. While charging their EVs, users expose their identity and personal details, and an adversary being able to identify and track where users charge their EVs is a potential privacy threat. In this article, we propose a user-empowered privacy-preserving authentication protocol for EV charging based on Decentralized Identifier (DID) and Verifiable Credential (VC) to provide Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)-security. The proposed method gives users full control over their identities and allows them to remain anonymous while charging from any station. Giving control over their identities empowers users. At the same time, by making use of the concept of VC, other parties can verify that a user is legitimate and authenticate the user before providing charging services. Hence, the proposed protocol makes the charging service available in a secure way, while empowering users and preserving their privacy.",
      "published": "2022-05-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3532869",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rohini Poolat Parameswarath",
        "Prosanta Gope",
        "Biplab Sikdar"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3532869",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3538969.3538970",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "STRIPED: A Threat Analysis Method for IoT Systems",
      "description": "Currently, IoT systems display a poor level of security, as 50% of IoT devices are vulnerable to severe attacks, according to research. In an attempt to ameliorate the situation, we propose STRIPED, a threat analysis technique that focuses particularly on threat scenarios involving IoT devices that can be physically accessed by attackers. We evaluate STRIPED in a two-pronged way. First, we assess its performance compared to STRIDE (from which STRIPED is derived) in the context of a case study from the manufacturing industry. Second, we gather the feedback of 8 security experts working in a large, multinational company that specializes in secure IoT products for the domains of automotive, industrial, mobile and smart-home applications. These initial evaluation attempts provide encouraging evidence and suggest our method is a step in the right direction of facilitating security-by-design in IoT systems, especially industrial ones.",
      "published": "2022-08-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3538969.3538970",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kamakshi Srikumar",
        "Komal Kashish",
        "Kolja Eggers",
        "Nicolás E. Díaz Ferreyra",
        "Julian Koch",
        "Thorsten Schüppstuhl",
        "Riccardo Scandariato"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3538969.3538970",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3538969.3543802",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Internet-Wide View of Connected Cars: Discovery of Exposed Automotive Devices",
      "description": "As the number of connected cars increases, cyber-attacks targeting them become significant risks. Especially, On-Board Equipment (OBE) that is directly accessible from the Internet can be an immediate target. However, it is not known what kind of and how many connected automotive devices can be remotely accessed from the Internet and, if compromised, become an entry point for further attacks on in-vehicle networks. In this study, we investigate the prevalence of such exposed vehicular devices. We propose a discovery method that utilizes an Internet-wide scan engine and a regular web search engine to find Internet-facing OBE. Using the proposed method, we discovered 2,532 devices of 12 different OBE products across 27 countries. We also investigated the potential cyber-attack risks against the discovered devices. 11 out of the 12 products have security concerns for remote compromises, such as running Telnet or outdated server programs. Moreover, we found that nine products have the capability to connect to the in-vehicle network. We could confirm from the information displayed in their user interface that at least two of them indeed connected to the in-vehicle network. Additionally, we noticed three products expose privacy-sensitive information such as GPS location. We believe this result provides a lower bound of the security risk of Internet-facing vehicular devices.",
      "published": "2022-08-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3538969.3543802",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takahiro Ueda",
        "Takayuki Sasaki",
        "Katsunari Yoshioka",
        "Tsutomu Matsumoto"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3538969.3543802",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3540198",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN Bus Intrusion Detection Based on Auxiliary Classifier GAN and Out-of-distribution Detection",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a ubiquitous bus protocol present in the Electrical/Electronic (E/E) systems of almost all vehicles. It is vulnerable to a range of attacks once the attacker gains access to the bus through the vehicle’s attack surface. We address the problem of Intrusion Detection on the CAN bus and present a series of methods based on two classifiers trained with Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Network (ACGAN) to detect and assign fine-grained labels to Known Attacks and also detect the Unknown Attack class in a dataset containing a mixture of (Normal + Known Attacks + Unknown Attack) messages. The most effective method is a cascaded two-stage classification architecture, with the multi-class Auxiliary Classifier in the first stage for classification of Normal and Known Attacks, passing Out-of-Distribution (OOD) samples to the binary Real-Fake Classifier in the second stage for detection of the Unknown Attack class. Performance evaluation demonstrates that our method achieves both high classification accuracy and low runtime overhead, making it suitable for deployment in the resource-constrained in-vehicle environment.",
      "published": "2022-06-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3540198",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qingling Zhao",
        "Mingqiang Chen",
        "Zonghua Gu",
        "Siyu Luan",
        "Haibo Zeng",
        "Samarjit Chakrabory"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3540198",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3548606.3560558",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DriveFuzz",
      "description": "Autonomous driving has become real; semi-autonomous driving vehicles in an affordable price range are already on the streets, and major automotive vendors are actively developing full self-driving systems to deploy them in this decade. Before rolling the products out to the end-users, it is critical to test and ensure the safety of the autonomous driving systems, consisting of multiple layers intertwined in a complicated way. However, while safety-critical bugs may exist in any layer and even across layers, relatively little attention has been given to testing the entire driving system across all the layers. Prior work mainly focuses on white-box testing of individual layers and preventing attacks on each layer.",
      "published": "2022-11-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560558",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seulbae Kim",
        "Major Liu",
        "Junghwan Rhee",
        "Yuseok Jeon",
        "Yonghwi Kwon",
        "Chung Hwan Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3548606.3560558",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3548606.3560618",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANflict: Exploiting Peripheral Conflicts for Data-Link Layer Attacks on Automotive Networks",
      "description": "Current research in the automotive domain has proven the limitations of the CAN protocol from a security standpoint. Application-layer attacks, which involve the creation of malicious packets, are deemed feasible from remote but can be easily detected by modern IDS. On the other hand, more recent link-layer attacks are stealthier and possibly more disruptive but require physical access to the bus. In this paper, we present CANflict, a software-only approach that allows reliable manipulation of the CAN bus at the data link layer from an unmodified microcontroller, overcoming the limitations of state-of-the-art works. We demonstrate that it is possible to deploy stealthy CAN link-layer attacks from a remotely compromised ECU, targeting another ECU on the same CAN network. To do this, we exploit the presence of pin conflicts between microcontroller peripherals to craft polyglot frames, which allows an attacker to control the CAN traffic at the bit level and bypass the protocol's rules. We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on high-, mid-, and low-end microcontrollers, and we provide the ground for future research by releasing an extensible tool that can be used to implement our approach on different platforms and to build CAN countermeasures at the data link layer.",
      "published": "2022-09-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560618",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alvise de Faveri Tron",
        "Stefano Longari",
        "Michele Carminati",
        "Mario Polino",
        "Stefano Zanero"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3548606.3560618",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3549036.3562058",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum optimization for fast CAN bus intrusion detection",
      "description": "Modern vehicles, nowadays, come loaded with hundreds of different sensors generating a huge amount of data. This data is shared and processed among different Electronic Control Units (ECUs) through an in-vehicle network, such as the CAN bus, to improve the driver’s experience and safety. However, the implementation of new features increases exposure to cyber-attacks. The CAN bus, which is designed to grant reliable communication, has many security weaknesses that might be exploited by an attacker. The need for highly accurate real-time intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for the automotive industry is limited to classical machine learning techniques, which are usually time-consuming and have hardware limitations. In this work, we analyze an optimized and efficient version of a network-based IDS for CAN bus attack detection based on Quantum Annealing. The models were tested on two different CAN bus datasets. The results show that the Quantum Annealing algorithm outperforms a classical classification algorithm in terms of time performance, which is important in the identification of attacks in the automotive sector, and achieves similar results for detection accuracy.",
      "published": "2022-11-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3549036.3562058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Federica Nitti",
        "Anibrata Pal"
      ],
      "venue": "QP4SE@ESEC/SIGSOFT FSE",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3549036.3562058",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3549036.3562059",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "QAI4ASE: Quantum artificial intelligence for automotive software engineering",
      "description": "Nowadays, the size and complexity of the automotive development life-cycle increase the possibility of cyber-attacks. In this context, team developers play a primary role in managing cyber security, risk assessment, and all phases of software application development (concept phases, product development, cyber security validation, production, operations, and maintenance). Currently, only generic standards exist and they are difficult to put into operation due to the lack of the required skills and knowledge. Therefore, this paper presents a vision model based on Quantum Artificial Intelligence that supports developers' decisions to integrate concrete design methods in the automotive development life-cycle. Organizations need to develop their process for developing vehicle components that comply with the new automotive standards. We suggest the usage of existing data sources (e.g., existing taxonomies) on Quantum Artificial Intelligence algorithms to suggest the best way, or the correct steps, to follow time by time to achieve user solutions.",
      "published": "2022-11-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3549036.3562059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Fabio Cassano",
        "Alessandro Pagano",
        "Antonio Piccinno"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3549036.3562059",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3550356.3561600",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Situational crime prevention for automotive cybersecurity",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-10-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3550356.3561600",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nicholas Polanco",
        "B. Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3550356.3561600",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3558052",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Security and Privacy Issues in V2X Communication Systems",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is receiving growing attention from industry and academia as multiple pilot projects explore its capabilities and feasibility. With about 50% of global road vehicle exports coming from the European Union (EU), and within the context of EU legislation around security and data protection, V2X initiatives must consider security and privacy aspects across the system stack, in addition to road safety. Contrary to this principle, our survey of relevant standards, research outputs, and EU pilot projects indicates otherwise; we identify multiple security- and privacy-related shortcomings and inconsistencies across the standards. We conduct a root cause analysis of the reasons and difficulties associated with these gaps, and categorize the identified security and privacy issues relative to these root causes. As a result, our comprehensive analysis sheds lights on a number of areas that require improvements in the standards, which are not explicitly identified in related work. Our analysis fills gaps left by other related surveys, which are focused on specific technical areas but do not necessarily point out underlying root issues in standard specifications. We bring forward recommendations to address these gaps for the overall improvement of security and safety in vehicular communication.",
      "published": "2022-08-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3558052",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takahito Yoshizawa",
        "Dave Singelée",
        "Jan Tobias Mühlberg",
        "Stéphane Delbruel",
        "Amir Taherkordi",
        "Danny Hughes",
        "Bart Preneel A"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computing Surveys",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3558052",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 160,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3565287.3617977",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Poster: Opinion Dynamics for Enhancing Trust and Security in Connected Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Connected vehicles (CVs) offer enhanced safety features and improved traffic management capabilities but face a critical concern---vulnerability to malicious attacks due to interconnectivity. To address this, trust algorithms have been developed to assess vehicle trustworthiness. However, in majority-malicious conditions, these algorithms may fail. This paper explores an algorithm based on the DeGroot opinion dynamics model to achieve consensus in such scenarios, aiming to distinguish between benevolent and malicious vehicles. The model successfully identified benevolent and malicious vehicles in up to 98% corruption with an average F1 score of 0.96 on three different datasets namely motion model, open source traffic simulator, and real-world dataset.",
      "published": "2023-09-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3565287.3617977",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gianna Voce",
        "Marbella Castillo",
        "Henry Griffith",
        "Heena Rathore"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM International Symposium on Theory, Algorithmic Foundations, and Protocol Design for Mobile Networks and Mobile Computing (MobiHoc)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3565287.3617977",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3569459",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CASCADE: An Asset-driven Approach to Build Security Assurance Cases for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Security Assurance Cases (SAC) are structured arguments and evidence bodies used to reason about the security of a certain system. SACs are gaining focus in the automotive industry, as the needs for security assurance are growing in this domain. However, the state-of-the-arts lack a mature approach able to suit the needs of the automotive industry. In this article, we present CASCADE, an asset-driven approach for creating SAC, which is inspired by the upcoming security standard ISO/SAE-21434 as well as the internal needs of automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). CASCADE also differentiates itself from the state-of-the-art by incorporating a way to reason about the quality of the constructed security assurance case. We created the approach by conducting an iterative design science research study. We illustrate the results using the example case of the road vehicle’s headlamp provided in the ISO standard. We also illustrate how our approach aligns well with the structure and content of the ISO/SAE-21434 standard, hence demonstrating the practical applicability of CASCADE in an industrial context.",
      "published": "2022-11-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3569459",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mazen Mohamad",
        "Rodi Jolak",
        "Örjan Askerdal",
        "Jan-Philipp Steghöfer",
        "Riccardo Scandariato"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3569459",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3570954",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Based Intrusion Detection Systems for In-Vehicle Networks: A Survey",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most widely used in-vehicle communication protocol, which still lacks the implementation of suitable security mechanisms such as message authentication and encryption. This makes the CAN bus vulnerable to numerous cyber attacks. Various Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been developed to detect these attacks. However, the high generalization capabilities of Artificial Intelligence (AI) make AI-based IDS an excellent countermeasure against automotive cyber attacks. This article surveys AI-based in-vehicle IDS from 2016 to 2022 (August) with a novel taxonomy. It reviews the detection techniques, attack types, features, and benchmark datasets. Furthermore, the article discusses the security of AI models, necessary steps to develop AI-based IDSs in the CAN bus, identifies the limitations of existing proposals, and gives recommendations for future research directions.",
      "published": "2022-11-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3570954",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sampath Rajapaksha",
        "Harsha Kalutarage",
        "Mhd Omar Al-Kadri",
        "Andrei Petrovski",
        "Garikayi Madzudzo",
        "Madeline Cheah"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computing Surveys",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3570954",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 259,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3573428.3573618",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey on Security and Privacy in 5G V2X",
      "description": "5G vehicle-to-everything (V2X) improves road safety and reduces communication delays between vehicles. However, due to ubiquitous network connectivity, it also presents serious trust, security and privacy issues toward vehicles, which may impede the performance of 5G V2X. Therefore, a comprehensive survey on security and privacy of 5G V2X communication is analyzed in this paper. Specifically, Firstly, the key issues and research status of 5G V2X security and privacy protection are discussed, and then the challenges in trust, security and privacy protection are expounded. Finally, the future research direction is discussed.",
      "published": "2022-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3573428.3573618",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jianxin Qian",
        "Weilu Wang",
        "Xueming Yang",
        "Huibin Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Electronic Information Technology and Computer Engineering (EITCE)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3573428.3573618",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3576915.3616661",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TileMask: A Passive-Reflection-based Attack against mmWave Radar Object Detection in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "In autonomous driving, millimeter wave (mmWave) radar has been widely adopted for object detection because of its robustness and reliability under various weather and lighting conditions. For radar object detection, deep neural networks (DNNs) are becoming increasingly important because they are more robust and accurate, and can provide rich semantic information about the detected objects, which is critical for autonomous vehicles (AVs) to make decisions. However, recent studies have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Despite the rapid development of DNN-based radar object detection models, there have been no studies on their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. Although some spoofing attack methods are proposed to attack the radar sensor by actively transmitting specific signals using some special devices, these attacks require sub-nanosecond-level synchronization between the devices and the radar and are very costly, which limits their practicability in real world. In addition, these attack methods can not effectively attack DNN-based radar object detection. To address the above problems, in this paper, we investigate the possibility of using a few adversarial objects to attack the DNN-based radar object detection models through passive reflection. These objects can be easily fabricated using 3D printing and metal foils at low cost. By placing these adversarial objects at some specific locations on a target vehicle, we can easily fool the victim AV's radar object detection model. The experimental results demonstrate that the attacker can achieve the attack goal by using only two adversarial objects and conceal them as car signs, which have good stealthiness and flexibility. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the passive-reflection-based attacks against the DNN-based radar object detection models using low-cost, readily-available and easily concealable geometric shaped objects.",
      "published": "2023-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3616661",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Zhu",
        "Chenglin Miao",
        "Hongfei Xue",
        "Zhengxiong Li",
        "Yunnan Yu",
        "Wenyao Xu",
        "Lü Su",
        "Chunming Qiao"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3576915.3616661",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3577923.3583650",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Infotainment System Matters: Understanding the Impact and Implications of In-Vehicle Infotainment System Hacking with Automotive Grade Linux",
      "description": "An in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) system is connected to heterogeneous networks such as Controller Area Network bus, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular, and other vehicle-to-everything communications. An IVI system has control of a connected vehicle and deals with privacy-sensitive information like current geolocation and destination, phonebook, SMS, and driver's voice. Several offensive studies have been conducted on IVI systems of commercialized vehicles to show the feasibility of car hacking. However, to date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the impact and implications of IVI system exploitations. To understand security and privacy concerns, we provide our experience hosting an IVI system hacking competition, Cyber Security Challenge 2021 (CSC2021). We use a feature-flavored infotainment operating system, Automotive Grade Linux (AGL). The participants gathered and submitted 33 reproducible and verified proofs-of-concept exploit codes targeting 11 components of the AGL-based IVI testbed. The participants exploited four vulnerabilities to steal various data, manipulate the IVI system, and cause a denial of service. The data leakage includes privacy, personally identifiable information, and cabin voice. The participants proved lateral movement to electronic control units and smartphones. We conclude with lessons learned with three mitigation strategies to enhance the security of the IVI system.",
      "published": "2023-04-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3577923.3583650",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Minsoo Ryu",
        "Hyunjae Kang",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3577923.3583650",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3579856.3595788",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SPARTA: Signal Propagation-based Attack Recognition and Threat Avoidance for Automotive Networks",
      "description": "With wider availability of wireless interfaces and a rising integration of software, it becomes easier for attackers to access vehicular communication networks and exploit vulnerabilities in Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Once having compromised an ECU, the intruder can control safety-relevant functions without requiring physical access to the vehicle. An essential aspect for the feasibility of such attacks is the lack of security measures in the Controller Area Network (CAN). And although physical-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) gain relevance for CAN security, current voltage and time-based systems have reached a point where crucial improvements can only be achieved at intolerable expense. To assess the potential of novel approaches, we present SPARTA, an advanced Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) which identifies the sending ECU by measuring signal arrival differences on the CAN bus. With a highly reliable detection procedure, SPARTA improves current IDSs and implements an active prevention mechanism to decimate the impact of attacks. In this context, it not only detects violations of the transmission authenticity, but also recognizes the attempt of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. Further, SPARTA was designed to require few resources and to meet real-time constraints of automotive systems. For this reason, the entire approach was realized on a resource-constrained embedded system and evaluated on different CAN and CAN with Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD) setups to demonstrate the efficiency, performance and adaptability to external influences of a dynamic environment.",
      "published": "2023-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595788",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Oleg Schell",
        "Marcel Kneib"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3579856.3595788",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3584318.3584325",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicle Security: Composing Attack, Defense, and Policy Surfaces",
      "description": "An attack surface enumerates resources accessible to an attacker for cyber attacks on a system. These resources are: methods that can be called as part of an attack; channels that an attacker outside the system can use to get to a system’s interface; and untrusted data that an attacker can use in conjunction with the system’s programs and channels. Historically, a system’s attacks surface has provided a metric on the vulnerability of a system, in part to compare two systems’ exposure to attack.",
      "published": "2022-10-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3584318.3584325",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael Clifford",
        "Miriam Heller",
        "Karl Levitt",
        "Matt Bishop"
      ],
      "venue": "New Security Paradigms Workshop",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3584318.3584325",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3584746",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Introduction to the Special Section on Cyber Security in Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "introduction Share on Introduction to the Special Section on Cyber Security in Internet of Vehicles Authors: Ching-Hsien Hsu Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Asia University, Taiwan; Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Wufeng, Taichung, Taiwan Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Asia University, Taiwan; Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Wufeng, Taichung, Taiwan 0000-0002-2440-2771Search about this author , Amir H. Alavi Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 0000-0002-7593-8509Search about this author , Mianxiong Dong Department of Sciences and Informatics, Muroran Institute of Technology, Muroran, Hokkaido, Japan Department of Sciences and Informatics, Muroran Institute of Technology, Muroran, Hokkaido, Japan 0000-0002-2788-3451Search about this author Authors Info & Claims ACM Transactions on Internet TechnologyVolume 22Issue 4November 2022 Article No.: 81pp 1–6https://doi.org/10.1145/3584746Published:15 March 2023Publication History 0citation0DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations0Total Downloads0Last 12 Months0Last 6 weeks0 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my AlertsNew Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Save to BinderSave to BinderCreate a New BinderNameCancelCreateExport CitationPublisher SiteGet Access",
      "published": "2022-11-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3584746",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ching‐Hsien Hsu",
        "Amir H. Alavi",
        "Mianxiong Dong"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Internet Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1145/3584746",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3591335.3591351",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G Communication and Security in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The widespread diffusion of Cyber-Physical Systems and their capability to interact with the physical world depend also on the availability of 5G network. The exponential development of intelligent and interconnected IoT and autonomous systems, combined with the development of 5G networks, presents new challenges from a cyber-security perspective. The paper, without claiming to be exhaustive, offers insights and reflections on the very broad topic that integrates innovative devices, 5G and cybersecurity by illustrating the main European directions indicated by both the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda for Electronic Component and Systems (ECS-SRIA) and the evolution of 5G network standards. Some of the aforementioned issues will be reanalysed through use cases based on Vehicles to X (V2X) scenario, where connectivity, safety and cybersecurity play a key interworking.",
      "published": "2023-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3591335.3591351",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antonio Imbruglia",
        "Daniela Cancila",
        "M. Settembre"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGAda Ada Letters",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3591335.3591351",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3597926.3598072",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BehAVExplor: Behavior Diversity Guided Testing for Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "Testing Autonomous Driving Systems (ADSs) is a critical task for ensuring the reliability and safety of autonomous vehicles. Existing methods mainly focus on searching for safety violations while the diversity of the generated test cases is ignored, which may generate many redundant test cases and failures. Such redundant failures can reduce testing performance and increase failure analysis costs. In this paper, we present a novel behavior-guided fuzzing technique (BehAVExplor) to explore the different behaviors of the ego vehi- cle (i.e., the vehicle controlled by the ADS under test) and detect diverse violations. Specifically, we design an efficient unsupervised model, called BehaviorMiner, to characterize the behavior of the ego vehicle. BehaviorMiner extracts the temporal features from the given scenarios and performs a clustering-based abstraction to group behaviors with similar features into abstract states. A new test case will be added to the seed corpus if it triggers new behav- iors (e.g., cover new abstract states). Due to the potential conflict between the behavior diversity and the general violation feedback, we further propose an energy mechanism to guide the seed selec- tion and the mutation. The energy of a seed quantifies how good it is. We evaluated BehAVExplor on Apollo, an industrial-level ADS, and LGSVL simulation environment. Empirical evaluation results show that BehAVExplor can effectively find more diverse violations than the state-of-the-art.",
      "published": "2023-07-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3597926.3598072",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mingfei Cheng",
        "Yuan Hua Zhou",
        "Xiaofei Xie"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis (ISSTA)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3597926.3598072",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3599957.3606220",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Architectural design on hypervisor-based guest OSs and SafetyRTOS in automotive platform",
      "description": "Automotive platform consists of complex and diverse components, which are Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) and In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI), developed plenty of operating systems by companies, depended on a variety of technologies, and satisfied different requirements in terms of both security and functional safety. The Automotive Hypervisor solution is multi-domain controller that can run multiple operating systems with a single processor. The instrument cluster operates on host OS such as Linux Container (LXC), QNX, and Xen and the IVI center console and ADAS operates on another OS such as Android, WebOS, and Linux. Automotive platforms should improve the integration of various OSs and operate more efficiently and securely. In this paper, we propose hypervisor-based guest OSs architecture that allows improve efficient performance system for automotive platform with safety. We also concept high level SW design architecture of safety real time operating system (SafetyRTOS) to operate functional safety requirements efficiently.",
      "published": "2023-08-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3599957.3606220",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kukhyun Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Research in Adaptive and Convergent Systems (RACS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3599957.3606220",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3600160.3605084",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Systematic Review of Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Methodologies for Connected and Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "With the prevalence of high cyber risks within the Connected Automated Vehicle (CAV)’s environment, the core regulation bodies mandated applying Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) methodologies. Conducting auspicious TARA is essential to ensure acceptable level of risk by analysing potential threats and determining corresponding mitigation strategies. Albeit plethora of standardised TARA versions are available, they are not-ready-to-use methods or they do not encapsulate heterogeneous CAVs properties. By considering the TARA emerging trends and the CAVs’ SAE automation levels, the present work provides a systematic study of salient TARA methodologies in the last ten years. The methodology we applied starts with a systematic review identifying TARA approaches that are relevant to the automotive domain at a large scope. After that, the methods’ applicability to CAVs is evaluated based on their threat analysis avenues and risk metrics. We elevate our appraisal further with a focus on how the automation level is considered, how the privacy impact is assessed by each TARA method, and how subjective the experts were while assessing scores to the risk metrics. Our investigation spotlights how different methods are intertwined and joint to meet the compliance with key standards such as ISO/SAE 21434. We believe that the present study’s findings identify knowledge gaps and help to shape the next generation of TARA methods to keep pace with rapidly evolving automotive technologies and support the readiness of CAV of SAE levels four and five.",
      "published": "2023-08-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3600160.3605084",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "regulation",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meriem Benyahya",
        "Teri Lenard",
        "Anastasija Collen",
        "Niels Alexander Nijdam"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3600160.3605084",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3605098.3636083",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANLP: NLP-Based Intrusion Detection System for CAN",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the most widely used standard for in-vehicle networks. However, the CAN protocol lacks essential security features (e.g., encryption) which makes it vulnerable to exploits by an adversary. In this paper, we develop CANLP, a Natural Language Processing (NLP)-based intrusion detection system to find whether a transmitted message originated from a legitimate ECU or an adversary. CANLP uses the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) to discern complex features associated with CAN data and trains ML models with these features to identify fuzzing, spoofing, and masquerade attacks. When an attack is detected, CANLP identifies the specific ECU on which the attack was mounted on. Through extensive experiments on four public vehicle network datasets, we show that CANLP performs attack classification with high F1-score of 0.9974. We also demonstrate using a testbed that CANLP can be deployed for attack detection on resource-constrained hardware a latency of < 0.05 ms.",
      "published": "2024-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3605098.3636083",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kavya Balasubramanian",
        "Adithya Gowda Baragur",
        "Denis Donadel",
        "Dinuka Sahabandu",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Bhaskar Ramasubramanian",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Radha Poovendran"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3605098.3636083",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3605098.3636102",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OLIVE: Flexible, Portable, and Sustainable V2X Multi-Factor Authentication",
      "description": "Verifying an individual's identity has always been a challenge, especially in virtual environments. In recent years, cybersecurity incidents have highlighted the vulnerability of traditional authentication methods, making Multi-Factor Authentication essential to increase security. Within the automotive domain, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications require robust authentication mechanisms, especially considering the forthcoming coexistence of traditional and autonomous vehicles. In response, we propose OLIVE, an innovative containerized architecture for V2X Authentication with several factors. The flexibility of our solution enables the authentication process to be tailored according to security requirements. Moreover, the architecture of OLIVE is designed to be portable, leveraging the containerization for each authentication factor, and sustainable, trying to manage the energy, environmental, and economic costs associated with cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2024-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3605098.3636102",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Chiara Bodei",
        "Ilaria Matteucci"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3605098.3636102",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3609508",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigating the Security of EV Charging Mobile Applications as an Attack Surface",
      "description": "The adoption rate of EVs has witnessed a significant increase in recent years driven by multiple factors, chief among which is the increased flexibility and ease of access to charging infrastructure. To improve user experience and increase system flexibility, mobile applications have been incorporated into the EV charging ecosystem. EV charging mobile applications allow consumers to remotely trigger actions on charging stations and use functionalities such as start/stop charging sessions, pay for usage, and locate charging stations, to name a few. In this article, we study the security posture of the EV charging ecosystem against a new type of remote that exploits vulnerabilities in the EV charging mobile applications as an attack surface. We leverage a combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques to analyze the security of widely used EV charging mobile applications. Our analysis was performed on 31 of the most widely used mobile applications including their interactions with various components such as cloud management systems. The attack scenarios that exploit these vulnerabilities were verified on a real-time co-simulation test bed. Our discoveries indicate the lack of user/vehicle verification and improper authorization for critical functions, which allow adversaries to remotely hijack charging sessions and launch attacks against the connected critical infrastructure. The attacks were demonstrated using the EVCS mobile applications showing the feasibility and the applicability of our attacks. Indeed, we discuss specific remote attack scenarios and their impact on EV users. More importantly, our analysis results demonstrate the feasibility of leveraging existing vulnerabilities across various EV charging mobile applications to perform wide-scale coordinated remote charging/discharging attacks against the connected critical infrastructure (e.g., power grid), with significant economical and operational implications. Finally, we propose countermeasures to secure the infrastructure and impede adversaries from performing reconnaissance and launching remote attacks using compromised accounts.",
      "published": "2022-11-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3609508",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khaled Sarieddine",
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Sadegh Torabi",
        "Ribal F. Atallah",
        "Chadi M. Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3609508",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 69,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3613904.3642958",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "HIFuzz: Human Interaction Fuzzing for Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles",
      "description": "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) must meet rigorous safety standards when deployed in high-stress emergency response scenarios; however many reported accidents have involved humans in the loop. In this paper, we, therefore, present the HiFuzz testing framework, which uses fuzz testing to identify system vulnerabilities associated with human interactions. HiFuzz includes three distinct levels that progress from a low-cost, limited-fidelity, large-scale, no-hazard environment, using fully simulated Proxy Human Agents, via an intermediate level, where proxy humans are replaced with real humans, to a high-stakes, high-cost, real-world environment. Through applying HiFuzz to an autonomous multi-sUAS system-under-test, we show that each test level serves a unique purpose in revealing vulnerabilities and making the system more robust with respect to human mistakes. While HiFuzz is designed for testing sUAS systems, we further discuss its potential for use in other Cyber-Physical Systems.",
      "published": "2024-05-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3613904.3642958",
      "matched_terms": [
        "fuzzing",
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Theodore P. Chambers",
        "Michael Vierhauser",
        "Ankit Agrawal",
        "Michael N. Murphy",
        "Jason Matthew Brauer",
        "Salil Purandare",
        "Myra B. Cohen",
        "Jane Cleland‐Huang"
      ],
      "venue": "CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3613904.3642958",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3616392.3623424",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: An In-Depth Analysis of Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures",
      "description": "The growth of electric vehicle (EV) adoption is bringing an increased demand for electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) infrastructure. With this growth, however, it is inevitable that vulnerabilities are discovered, which motivates an in-depth analysis of the security posture of EVSE infrastructure and development of a strong cybersecurity program to ensure its security and resiliency. In this research paper, we will analyze and highlight various vulnerabilities in EVSE systems, including weak authentication mechanisms, and end-to-end communications. We will identify as well potential attack scenarios that can create vulnerabilities that have consequences that range from physical damage to major service disruptions, and identify various solutions and countermeasures to mitigate these vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2023-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3616392.3623424",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gerald Vailoces",
        "Alexander Keith",
        "Abdulaziz Almehmadi",
        "Khalil El‐Khatib"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3616392.3623424",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3617184.3630131",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Network Security Test Evaluation Model of Automobile Digital Key",
      "description": "As a product of the development of automobile networking, automotive digital keys not only bring convenience to users, but also bring some network security risks. At present, it is still in the initial stage of mass application of digital keys in automobiles, and the focus of each digital key product is still in the stage of functional realization, and there is a general lack of threat protection and risk assessment in network security. This paper mainly combines the existing network security standards to refine the network security threat scenarios of digital keys, and proposes test methods and evaluation models. According to the network security threats found by a large number of tests on the existing digital key scheme, a targeted test scheme is proposed to evaluate the network security of the digital key system in all aspects, so as to solve the problem of the lack of digital key test evaluation method. This paper proposes a network security test and evaluation model for automotive digital keys, which can support automobile manufacturers to complete the digital key system part of the threat analysis and risk assessment, and carry out functional design, test verification and other work.",
      "published": "2023-09-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3617184.3630131",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Baizheng Wang",
        "Qiang Zhang",
        "Shao Wen",
        "Kexun He",
        "Xiyu Fang",
        "Xuebin Shao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cyber Security and Information Engineering (ICCSIE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3617184.3630131",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3617570.3617866",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Extending Developer Support: Quantum Artificial Intelligence for Automotive Security",
      "description": "With the adoption of advanced technology in the automotive field, managing the risks of attack in modern vehicles becomes essential. Some research works substantially exploit Machine Learning algorithms to identify threats conducted on vehicles, particularly on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Therefore, it is necessary not only to use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to identify attacks but also to help the engineers in the automotive field understand the dangerousness of the attack and help them resolve the vulnerability. With the increasing attention to Quantum Computing (QC), QC-based Artificial Intelligence algorithms have become very popular among many researchers for improving the prediction and the time performance to identify an attack. This paper proposes a methodology, SeQuADE (Secure Quantum Automotive Development and Engineering), to identify CAN attacks and to support developers by proposing associated automotive vulnerabilities and solutions obtained from National Vulnerability Database (NVD).",
      "published": "2023-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3617570.3617866",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Anibrata Pal",
        "Michele Scalera"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3617570.3617866",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4068,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3617570.3617866 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: national, very, intelligence, risks."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3626232.3653249",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Unified Time Series Analytics based Intrusion Detection Framework for CAN BUS Attacks",
      "description": "Modern smart vehicles have a Controller Area Network (CAN) that supports intra-vehicle communication between intelligent Electronic Control Units (ECUs). The CAN is known to be vulnerable to various cyber attacks. In this paper, we propose a unified framework that can detect multiple types of cyber attacks (viz., Denial of Service, Fuzzy, Impersonation) affecting the CAN. Specifically, we construct a feature by observing the timing information of CAN packets exchanged over the CAN bus network over partitioned time windows to construct a low dimensional representation of the entire CAN network as a time series latent space. Then, we apply a two tier anomaly based intrusion detection model that keeps track of short term and long term memory of deviations in the initial time series latent space, to create a 'stateful latent space'. Then, we learn the boundaries of the benign stateful latent space that specify the attack detection criterion. To find hyper-parameters of our proposed model, we formulate a preference based multi-objective optimization problem that optimizes security objectives tailored for a network-wide time series anomaly based intrusion detector by balancing trade-offs between false alarm count, time to detection, and missed detection rate. We use real benign and attack datasets collected from a Kia Soul vehicle to validate our framework and show how our performance outperforms existing works.",
      "published": "2024-06-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3626232.3653249",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "kia"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maisha Maliha",
        "Shameek Bhattacharjee"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3626232.3653249",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3627050.3627059",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "can-logic: Automotive Intrusion Detection via Temporal Logic",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) protocol is all but synonymous with the terms “automotive network\" or “in-vehicle network.\" Nearly all modern vehicles leverage one or more controller area networks to facilitate intra-vehicle communications. Unfortunately, the CAN bus is inherently insecure and severely resource-constrained. As such, researchers, industry experts, and legislators have been hard-pressed to improve the security of the CAN bus. Automotive intrusion detection has been propounded in the literature as a lightweight CAN bus security solution. Automotive intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can solve many of the resource-related challenges of CAN bus security; unfortunately, they still fall short in terms of practicability. An IDS capable of successfully detecting attacks will inevitably raise some false positives. When it comes to in-vehicle networks, even a relatively low false positive rate, e.g., 0.0001, would still produce approximately 100 false positives every 1,000,000 messages—that is, every five to ten minutes. Needless to say, such an IDS would not be practicable.",
      "published": "2023-11-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3627050.3627059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brooke Lampe",
        "Weizhi Meng"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on the Internet of Things (IoT)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3627050.3627059",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3627106.3627127",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of Anomalies in Electric Vehicle Charging Sessions",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle (EV) charging involves a complex system with cyber-physical components, backend systems, and communication protocols. A potential security incident in this system can open up cyber-physical threats and, for instance, lead to EV battery fires or power grid blackouts. In this paper, we propose a hybrid Intrusion Detection System (IDS) method consisting of regression-based charging session forecasting and anomaly detection. The method considers an EV’s detailed charging behavior throughout a session and we discuss and evaluate different design choices. For anomaly detection, we consider both classification- and novelty-based models as well as an ensemble method to combine both models. We perform evaluations based on real-world EV charging session data with simulated attacks. Our results show that regression-based forecasting provides a significant increase in detection performance for attacks affecting individual reports during a charging session. Additionally, the proposed ensemble method, which combines artificial neural network-based classification and local outlier factor-based novelty detection, can maintain a low false alarm rate while offering good detection performance w.r.t. known attacks as well as generalization to previously unseen attacks. We thus argue that the proposed solution can provide a positive contribution to EV charging security, resilience, and trustworthiness.",
      "published": "2023-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3627106.3627127",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dustin Kern",
        "Christoph Krauß",
        "Matthias Hollick"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Computer Security Applications Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3627106.3627127",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3627106.3627135",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure and Lightweight Over-the-Air Software Update Distribution for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicles are increasingly threatened by cyberattacks during their long lifecycle. Therefore, timely Over-the-Air (OTA) update processes are becoming a mandatory mitigation mechanism and their security a critical task. In this paper, we present a novel secure OTA update distribution mechanism for connected vehicles that addresses threats and requirements of recent automotive security regulations and standards. We tailor our security concept to the capabilities of a Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM) that we deploy as hardware trust anchor at the vehicle telematics unit and show its benefits and uniqueness regarding security guarantees and functionality in comparison to related work. In our concept, the TPM acts as trusted update distribution point that securely translates the asymmetric backend cryptography to the symmetric in-vehicle cryptography and as update authorization point that coordinates the update installation, e.g., regarding the vehicle state. These concepts are completely enforced inside the shielded location of the TPM, which then represents our minimal hardened trusted computing base on the telematics unit. The solution does not rely on boot time integrity mechanisms and thus even mitigates against advanced runtime and physical hardware cyberattacks. We evaluate our solution using a prototypical implementation within an automotive evaluation platform.",
      "published": "2023-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3627106.3627135",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Plappert",
        "Andreas Fuchs"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Computer Security Applications Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3627106.3627135",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4136,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3627106.3627135 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: backend_cloud, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: backend, location, trust, even, physical, applications, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3627106.3627202",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure and Lightweight ECU Attestations for Resilient Over-the-Air Updates in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Recent automotive standards and regulations define requirements for over-the-air (OTA) software updates as a mandatory mitigation mechanism to secure the increasingly connected vehicles against future cyberthreats in a timely manner. Targeting these requirements, we design, implement, and evaluate a novel security concept targeted at securing the in-vehicle processes participating in the OTA update process. It is designed as complementary security measure to further harden already in-place secure update distribution mechanisms and is compliant to recent automotive standards and regulations. Its security is bootstrapped from the secure interlocking of two trusted computing technologies: The Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0) as overall hardware trust anchor within the vehicle and the Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE) for securely bootstrapping the resource constrained controllers. Our concept allows the controllers to report their currently running software version to the TPM 2.0 in a secure and lightweight way. Depending on the controllers’ software state, the TPM 2.0 may authorize to transition the vehicle from an update-ready state back to the fully functional drive mode, e.g., after an OTA software update was successfully installed.",
      "published": "2023-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3627106.3627202",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Plappert",
        "Andreas Fuchs"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Computer Security Applications Conference",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3627106.3627202",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3627827",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RollBack: A New Time-Agnostic Replay Attack Against the Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "Automotive Keyless Entry (RKE) systems provide car owners with a degree of convenience, allowing them to lock and unlock their car without using a mechanical key. Today’s RKE systems implement disposable rolling codes, making every key fob button press unique, effectively preventing simple replay attacks. However, a prior attack called RollJam was proven to break all rolling code–based systems in general. By a careful sequence of signal jamming, capturing, and replaying, an attacker can become aware of the subsequent valid unlock signal that has not been used yet. RollJam, however, requires continuous deployment indefinitely until it is exploited. Otherwise, the captured signals become invalid if the key fob is used again without RollJam in place. We introduce RollBack, a new replay-and-resynchronize attack against most of today’s RKE systems. In particular, we show that even though the one-time code becomes invalid in rolling code systems, replaying a few previously captured signals consecutively can trigger a rollback-like mechanism in the RKE system. Put differently, the rolling codes become resynchronized back to a previous code used in the past from where all subsequent yet already used signals work again. Moreover, the victim can still use the key fob without noticing any difference before and after the attack. Unlike RollJam, RollBack does not necessitate jamming at all. In fact, it requires signal capturing only once and can be exploited at any time in the future as many times as desired. This time-agnostic property is particularly attractive to attackers, especially in car-sharing/renting scenarios in which accessing the key fob is straightforward. However, while RollJam defeats virtually any rolling code–based system, vehicles might have additional anti-theft measures against malfunctioning key fobs, hence against RollBack. Our ongoing analysis (with crowd-sourced data) against different vehicle makes and models has revealed that ∼ 50% of the examined vehicles in the Asian region are vulnerable to RollBack, whereas the impact tends to be smaller in other regions, such as Europe and North America.",
      "published": "2022-09-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3627827",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "key fob",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Levente Csikor",
        "Hoon Wei Lim",
        "Jun Wen Wong",
        "Soundarya Ramesh",
        "Rohini Poolat Parameswarath",
        "Mun Choon Chan"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3627827",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3631204.3631859",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Monitoring Automotive Software Security Health through Trustworthiness Score",
      "description": "The automotive industry is drastically moving towards autonomous. This trend constitutes in a fundamental change of going from mechanical and electrical engineering towards software-driven approaches. Modern vehicles can embed more than hundred electronic control units (ECUs). As autonomous vehicles require more intelligence as well as more computing power, high-performance computers (HPCs) bring the data management capabilities for cloud and IoT services to support the transition to a service-oriented vehicle system architecture. With this growing reliance on software in vehicles, software reliability and trustworthiness are increasingly critical to vehicle security. Measuring security trustworthiness in automotive software is even more valuable as cybersecurity is shifting to the left, i.e. in the early phase of development and design process.",
      "published": "2023-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3631204.3631859",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Etienne Sapin",
        "Suraj Menon",
        "Jingquan Ge",
        "Sheikh Mahbub Habib",
        "Maurice Heymann",
        "Yuekang Li",
        "Rene Palige",
        "Gabriel Byman",
        "Yang Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium (CSCS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3631204.3631859",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3832,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3631204.3631859 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: valuable, even, services, intelligence, well, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3631204.3631864",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From TARA to Test: Automated Automotive Cybersecurity Test Generation Out of Threat Modeling",
      "description": "The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) demands the management of cyber security risks in vehicle design and that the effectiveness of these measures is verified by testing. Generally, with rising complexity and openness of systems via software-defined vehicles, verification through testing becomes a very important for security assurance. This mandates the introduction of industrial-grade cybersecurity testing in automotive development processes. Currently, the automotive cybersecurity testing procedures are not specified or automated enough to be able to deliver tests in the amount and thoroughness needed to keep up with that regulation, let alone doing so in a cost-efficient manner. This paper presents a methodology to automatically generate technology-agnostic test scenarios from the results of threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) process. Our approach is to transfer the resulting threat models into attack trees and label their edges using actions from a domain-specific language (DSL) for attack descriptions. This results in a labelled transitions system (LTS), in which every labelled path intrinsically forms a test scenario. In addition, we include the concept of Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CALs) and Targeted Attack Feasibility (TAF) into testing by assigning them as costs to the attack path. This abstract test scenario can be compiled into a concrete test case by augmenting it with implementation details. Therefore, the efficacy of the measures taken because of the TARA can be verified and documented. As TARA is a de-facto mandatory step in the UNECE regulation and the relevant ISO standard, automatic test generation (also mandatory) out of it could mean a significant improvement in efficiency, as two steps could be done at once.",
      "published": "2023-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3631204.3631864",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefan Marksteiner",
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Korbinian Christl",
        "D. Ničković",
        "Mikael Sjodin",
        "Marjan Sirjani"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science in Cars Symposium",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3631204.3631864",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3631204.3631865",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Computing an Automotive Cybersecurity Maturity Level Assessment Programme",
      "description": "Cybersecurity is key for the new and future vehicles that heavily rely on IT systems and depend on data exchange. These vehicles will bring countless new features and are potentially capable of autonomous driving. This paper studies and details a framework that uses the CVSS for evaluating cybersecurity in the automotive world. We present a theoretical model to create a 5-grade rating system based on the CVSS for the sECU of the vehicle. It will enable evaluating the cybersecurity quality of vehicles, so to establish a trustworthy and reliable environment. The model is based on TARA, VARA, and SDL that is already used in the development of car components. Using such a system, will instigate the automotive industry to more heavily address cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2023-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3631204.3631865",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrick Grümer",
        "Pedro Brandão"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science in Cars Symposium",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3631204.3631865",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3631991.3631994",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Software Security Engineering based on the ISO 21434",
      "description": "The increasing use of software and connectivity in modern vehicles has made cybersecurity an important issue in the automotive industry. ISO 21434 is a standard for automotive cybersecurity engineering that provides guidelines for the development and validation of secure automotive systems. For effective implementation and practical use of ISO 21434, it must be incorporated into existing automotive industry development workflows.",
      "published": "2023-09-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3631991.3631994",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Matthias Bergler",
        "Ramin Tavakoli Kolagari"
      ],
      "venue": "World Symposium on Software Engineering (WSSE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3631991.3631994",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3634737.3644999",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Uncovering Covert Attacks on EV Charging Infrastructure: How OCPP Backend Vulnerabilities Could Compromise Your System",
      "description": "The Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure has been rapidly expanding to keep up with the increased demands of EV consumers. This government-backed infrastructure expansion resulted in the rushed integration of a significant number of insecure EV Charging Stations (EVCS), which are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Motivated by the uncovered vulnerabilities in different components of the EV charging infrastructure, in this paper, we study the security of the EVCS Cloud Management System (CMS). Specifically, we focus on the (in)security of the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) backend communication with the EVCS. We verified the prevalence of such security weaknesses by discovering 6 zero-day vulnerabilities in each of the 16 representative live EV charging management systems. Our findings highlight the insecurity of the OCPP backend, which is widely deployed on existing EVCSs in the wild. Indeed, we discuss various attack scenarios that lead to man-in-the-middle, denial of service, firmware theft, and data poisoning, to name a few. We also leverage the developed testbed to demonstrate the feasibility of launching switching attacks against the power grid using compromised EVCSs. Finally, we contribute to the security of the EV charging ecosystem by also recommending countermeasures to mitigate/prevent future cyber-attacks.",
      "published": "2024-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3634737.3644999",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khaled Sarieddine",
        "Mohammad Ali Sayed",
        "Sadegh Torabi",
        "Ribal F. Atallah",
        "Danial Jafarigiv",
        "Chadi M. Assi",
        "Mourad Debbabi"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3634737.3644999",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3636534.3649372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Malicious Attacks against Multi-Sensor Fusion in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Multi-sensor fusion has been widely used by autonomous vehicles (AVs) to integrate the perception results from different sensing modalities including LiDAR, camera and radar. Despite the rapid development of multi-sensor fusion systems in autonomous driving, their vulnerability to malicious attacks have not been well studied. Although some prior works have studied the attacks against the perception systems of AVs, they only consider a single sensing modality or a camera-LiDAR fusion system, which can not attack the sensor fusion system based on LiDAR, camera, and radar. To fill this research gap, in this paper, we present the first study on the vulnerability of multi-sensor fusion systems that employ LiDAR, camera, and radar. Specifically, we propose a novel attack method that can simultaneously attack all three types of sensing modalities using a single type of adversarial object. The adversarial object can be easily fabricated at low cost, and the proposed attack can be easily performed with high stealthiness and flexibility in practice. Extensive experiments based on a real-world AV testbed show that the proposed attack can continuously hide a target vehicle from the perception system of a victim AV using only two small adversarial objects.",
      "published": "2024-05-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3636534.3649372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Zhu",
        "Chenglin Miao",
        "Hongfei Xue",
        "Yunnan Yu",
        "Lü Su",
        "Chunming Qiao"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3636534.3649372",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3643832.3661854",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Invisible Optical Adversarial Stripes on Traffic Sign against Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Camera-based computer vision is essential to autonomous vehicle's perception. This paper presents an attack that uses light-emitting diodes and exploits the camera's rolling shutter effect to create adversarial stripes in the captured images to mislead traffic sign recognition. The attack is stealthy because the stripes on the traffic sign are invisible to human. For the attack to be threatening, the recognition results need to be stable over consecutive image frames. To achieve this, we design and implement GhostStripe, an attack system that controls the timing of the modulated light emission to adapt to camera operations and victim vehicle movements. Evaluated on real testbeds, GhostStripe can stably spoof the traffic sign recognition results for up to 94% of frames to a wrong class when the victim vehicle passes the road section. In reality, such attack effect may fool victim vehicles into life-threatening incidents. We discuss the countermeasures at the levels of camera sensor, perception model, and autonomous driving system.",
      "published": "2024-06-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3643832.3661854",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dongfang Guo",
        "Yuting Wu",
        "Yimin Dai",
        "Pengfei Zhou",
        "Xin Lou",
        "Rui Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3643832.3661854",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3643833.3656114",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Entry: Breaking and Entering eMMC RPMB with EMFI",
      "description": "The Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) in modern storage systems provides a secure area where data integrity is ensured by authentication. This block is used in digital devices to store pivotal information that must be safeguarded against modification by potential attackers. This paper targets the authentication scheme of the RPMB in three different eMMCs from a major manufacturer. A glitch was injected by sending an electromagnetic pulse to the target chip. RPMB authentication was successfully glitched and the information stored in two target eMMCs was overwritten with arbitrary data, without affecting the integrity of other data.",
      "published": "2024-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3643833.3656114",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aya Fukami",
        "Richard Buurke"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3643833.3656114",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3644032.3644457",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PAFOT: A Position-Based Approach for Finding Optimal Tests of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are prone to revolutionise the transportation industry. However, they must be thoroughly tested to avoid safety violations. Simulation testing plays a crucial role in finding safety violations of Automated Driving Systems (ADSs). This paper proposes PAFOT, a position-based approach testing framework, which generates adversarial driving scenarios to expose safety violations of ADSs. We introduce a 9-position grid which is virtually drawn around the Ego Vehicle (EV) and modify the driving behaviours of Non-Playable Characters (NPCs) to move within this grid. PAFOT utilises a single-objective genetic algorithm to search for adversarial test scenarios. We demonstrate PAFOT on a well-known high-fidelity simulator, CARLA. The experimental results show that PAFOT can effectively generate safety-critical scenarios to crash ADSs and is able to find collisions in a short simulation time. Furthermore, it outperforms other search-based testing techniques by finding more safety-critical scenarios under the same driving conditions within less effective simulation time.",
      "published": "2024-04-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3644032.3644457",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Victor Crespo-Rodriguez",
        "Neelofar Neelofar",
        "Aldeida Aleti"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3644032.3644457",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3644075",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Combining Cyber Security Intelligence to Refine Automotive Cyber Threats",
      "description": "Modern vehicles increasingly rely on electronics, software, and communication technologies (cyber space) to perform their driving task. Over-The-Air (OTA) connectivity further extends the cyber space by creating remote access entry points. Accordingly, the vehicle is exposed to security attacks that are able to impact road safety. A profound understanding of security attacks, vulnerabilities, and mitigations is necessary to protect vehicles against cyber threats. While automotive threat descriptions, such as in UN R155, are still abstract, this creates a risk that potential vulnerabilities are overlooked and the vehicle is not secured against them. So far, there is no common understanding of the relationship of automotive attacks, the concrete vulnerabilities they exploit, and security mechanisms that would protect the system against these attacks. In this article, we aim at closing this gap by creating a mapping between UN R155, Microsoft STRIDE classification, Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), and Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). In this way, already existing detailed knowledge of attacks, vulnerabilities, and mitigations is combined and linked to the automotive domain. In practice, this refines the list of UN R155 threats and therefore supports vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, and approval authorities to meet and assess the requirements for vehicle development in terms of cybersecurity. Overall, 204 mappings between UN threats, STRIDE, CAPEC attack patterns, and CWE weaknesses were created. We validated these mappings by applying our Automotive Attack Database (AAD) that consists of 361 real-world attacks on vehicles. Furthermore, 25 additional attack patterns were defined based on automotive-related attacks.",
      "published": "2024-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3644075",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Florian Sommer",
        "Mona Gierl",
        "Reiner Kriesten",
        "Frank Kargl",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3644075",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5554,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3644075 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: suppliers, space, creating, patterns, intelligence, there, impact, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3649329.3658270",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SPFuzz: Stateful Path based Parallel Fuzzing for Protocols in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Protocols in autonomous vehicles are essential for efficient in-vehicle network communication. To ensure their security, many research efforts have been paid to the fuzz testing of their implementations. However, those fuzzing optimizations often struggle to manage the protocols' complex state, resulting in low efficiency in branch covering and vulnerability detection.",
      "published": "2024-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3649329.3658270",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junze Yu",
        "Zhengxiong Luo",
        "Fangshangyuan Xia",
        "Yanyang Zhao",
        "Heyuan Shi",
        "Yu Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3649329.3658270",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3655532.3655574",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fuzzing for Deep Learning Models",
      "description": "Deep learning models have been widely used in security fields such as autonomous vehicles, and the testing of their quality problems has gradually attracted attention. Fuzzing has become an important testing method because of its efficient fault revealing ability. The quality and effectiveness of test cases generated by existing fuzzing methods are not high. In this paper, we propose a fuzzing method for deep learning models that uses heuristic policy mutation inputs to generate test cases. Thus, the quality of test cases is improved, so that the classification error of the model can be tested faster. By testing the image classification model, the experiments show that the generated test cases improve the neuron coverage of the model, and the time to find the model classification error is shorter.",
      "published": "2023-09-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3655532.3655574",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bo Wu",
        "Deng Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Robot Systems and Applications (ICRSA)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3655532.3655574",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3657645",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANdid : A Stealthy Stepping-stone Attack to Bypass Authentication on ECUs",
      "description": "A high-entropy source of randomness is an essential component in any secure protocol, required to ensure that protocol elements, such as cryptographic keys, nonces, or salts, are unpredictable for the attackers. Resource-constrained embedded devices, such as Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles, often utilize weak sources of randomness due to the unavailability of true sources of randomness. In this article, we illustrate the ability of a relatively simple adversary to exploit this weakness within ECUs of vehicles produced by major manufacturers. We demonstrate that the weakness can be exploited by the adversary on a real ECU to breach the protection of Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) Security Access service and access restricted functionality of the UDS protocol. We develop CANdid, a stepping-stone attack strategy where an adversary with access to a non-critical ECU can utilize this weakness to maliciously reprogram an arbitrary critical ECU over the CAN bus.",
      "published": "2024-04-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3657645",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sekar Kulandaivel",
        "Shalabh Jain",
        "Jorge Guajardo",
        "Vyas Sekar"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Journal on Autonomous Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3657645",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3658644.3691551",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CSCS '24 -- Cyber Security in CarS Workshop",
      "description": "The increasing attack surface of modern cars and the new regulatory requirements for cybersecurity (like UNECE R155) made cybersecurity an important part of car design. The \"CSCS'24 Cyber Security in Cars Workshop\" is designed to address current topics in the rapidly evolving automotive cybersecurity domain. The goal is to bring together academia and industry to find novel solutions for cybersecurity problems in the automotive domain. CSCS'24 is the first CSCS workshop co-located with ACM CCS. Nonetheless, it is founded on a series of events known as the \"ACM Cyber Security in Cars Symposium (CSCS symposium)\" that lasted from 2017 until 2023. CSCS'24 welcomes any theoretical or practical contributions to the rich field of automotive cybersecurity, including secure automotive communication, ECU system security, and aspects of Cyber Security Management Systems (CSMS).",
      "published": "2024-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3658644.3691551",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "secure",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mario Fritz",
        "Christoph Krauß",
        "Hans‐Joachim Hof"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3658644.3691551",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3661167.3661278",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum-based Automotive Threat Intelligence and Countermeasures",
      "description": "Due to the increasing amount of software and hardware in connected and autonomous cars, the attack surface is growing, which increases the risk of security attacks. Researchers proposed machine learning or deep learning techniques to identify threats in in-vehicle networks. However, using these techniques is not enough to support the automotive industry since new processes or techniques must be conceptualized to make automotive systems more secure. Therefore, this research work presents a methodology, Quantum-based Automotive Threat Intelligence and Countermeasures (QUANTICAR), that integrates quantum optimization for CAN bus Intrusion Detection and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) to understand the automotive attacks. In the first phase, QUANTICAR identifies the different types of attacks and then, based on the specific attack class, extracts new knowledge using the NVD. This contributes not only to improving attack detection but also to developing an Automotive Knowledge Base that can support developers and security experts in the secure development of automotive components in compliance with ISO/SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2024-06-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3661167.3661278",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Christian Catalano",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Evaluation and Assessment in Software Engineering (EASE)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3661167.3661278",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3661315",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Risk Characterisation of Hardware Threats to Automotive Systems",
      "description": "The increasing dependence of modern automotive systems on electronics and software poses cybersecurity risks previously not factored into design and engineering of such systems. Attacks on hardware components, communication modules and embedded software – many of which are purposefully designed for automotive control and communications – are the key focus of this paper. We adopt a novel approach to characterise such attacks using Gajski-Kuhn Y-charts to represent attack manipulation across behavioural, structural and physical domains. Our selection of attacks is evidence-driven demonstrating threats that have been demonstrated to be feasible in the real-world. We then risk assess impact of such threats using the recently adopted ISO/SAE 21434 standard for automotive cybersecurity risk assessment, including mitigations for potential adoption. Our work serves to provide unique insights into the complex dynamic of hardware vulnerabilities and how the industry may address system-level security and protection of modern automotive platforms.",
      "published": "2024-04-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3661315",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "James Pickford",
        "Rasadhi Attale",
        "Siraj Ahmed Shaikh",
        "Hoang Nga Nguyen",
        "Lee Harrison"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Journal on Autonomous Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3661315",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3664476.3664512",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Analysis and Detection for the Combined Electric Vehicle Charging and Power Grid Domains",
      "description": "With the steady rising Electric Vehicle (EV) adoption world-wide, a consideration of the Electric Vehicle (EV) charging-related load on power grids is becoming critically important. While strategies to manage this load (e.g., to avoid peaks) exist, they assume that Electric Vehicles (EVs) and charging infrastructure are trustworthy. If this assumption is, however, violated (e.g., by an adversary with control over Electric Vehicle (EV) charging systems), the threat of charging load-based attacks on grid stability arises. An adversary may, for example, try to cause overload situations, by means of a simultaneous increase in charging load coordinated over a large number of EVs. In this paper, we propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that combines regression-based charging load prediction with novelty detection-based anomaly identification. The proposed system considers features from both the Electric Vehicle (EV) charging and power grid domains, which is enabled in this paper by a novel co-simulation concept. We evaluate our Intrusion Detection System (IDS) concept with simulated attacks in real Electric Vehicle (EV) charging data. The results show that the combination of support vector regression with isolation forest-based novelty detection generally provides the best results. Additionally, the evaluation shows that our Intrusion Detection System (IDS) concept, combining grid and charging features, is capable of detecting novel/stealthy attack strategies not covered by related work.",
      "published": "2024-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3664476.3664512",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dustin Kern",
        "Christoph Krauß",
        "Matthias Hollick"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3664476.3664512",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3664476.3669917",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Open V2X Management Platform Cyber-Resilience and Data Privacy Mechanisms",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technologies have been recently introduced to provide enhanced connectivity between the different smart grid segments as well as Electric Vehicles (EVs). The EVs draw power to the grid and may be used as an energy flexibility resource for households and buildings. The increased number of interconnections though, is augmenting substantially the cyber-security and data privacy threats that may occur in the V2X ecosystem. In this paper, such threats are categorized into cyber-attack classes which serve as a basis for deriving Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for the V2X ecosystem. Additionally, the sensitive data that are exchanged in charging and discharging scenarios are reviewed. Then, an analysis of the existing cyber-security mechanisms is provided and further mechanisms/tools are proposed for detecting/preventing the categorized threats, which are being developed in an Open V2X Management Platform (O-V2X-MP) within the EV4EU project. These mechanisms will provide security-by-design in O-V2X-MP, as well as ensure protection in the V2X interactions.",
      "published": "2024-07-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3664476.3669917",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cyber-security",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Lekidis",
        "Hugo Morais"
      ],
      "venue": "ARES",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3664476.3669917",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3664476.3670888",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Elevating TARA: A Maturity Model for Automotive Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment",
      "description": "The importance of automotive cybersecurity is increasing in tandem with the evolution of more complex vehicles, fueled by trends like V2X or over-the-air updates. Regulatory bodies are trying to cope with this problem with the introduction of ISO 21434, which standardizes automotive cybersecurity engineering. One piece of the puzzle for compliant cybersecurity engineering is the creation of a TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment) for identifying and managing cybersecurity risks. The more time security experts invest in creating a TARA, the more detailed and mature it becomes. Thus, organizations must balance the benefits of a more mature TARA against the costs and resources required to achieve it. However, there is a lack of guidance on determining the appropriate level of effort. In this paper, we propose a data-driven maturity model as a management utility facilitating the decision on the maturity-cost trade-off for creating TARAs. To evaluate the model, we conducted interviews with seven automotive cybersecurity experts from the industry.",
      "published": "2024-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3664476.3670888",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manfred Vielberth",
        "K. M. RAAB",
        "Magdalena Glas",
        "Patrick Grümer",
        "Günther Pernul"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3664476.3670888",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3664476.3671012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly detection mechanisms for in-vehicle and V2X systems",
      "description": "Modern V2X systems have an increasing number of interfaces that allow remote connectivity but also include the risk of exposure to cyber threats. Hence, the attack surface for such threats is constantly increasing, and combined with privacy issues that may arise through the presence of sensitive user data in the V2X ecosystem, this necessitates the requirement for novel security mechanisms. However, the existing mechanisms to ensure protection against such threats face major hurdles, such as 1) the lack of in-vehicle addressing schemes, 2) the abundance of V2X interfaces, and 3) the manufacturer-specific architecture of each vehicle comprised of various heterogeneous systems. On top of these hurdles, a solution should satisfy the real-time requirements of the resource-constrained in-vehicle architecture by remaining lightweight and highly reliable, as well as by avoiding false positive indications and alarms. This article presents a novel anomaly detection solution for addressing the main challenges of security mechanisms by simultaneously keeping a minimal impact on real-time in-vehicle requirements. The solution is demonstrated through an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging hub testbed that implements anomaly detection schemes to detect proof-of-concept cyber-attacks targeting the EV charging profile and causing cascading effects by zeroing the vehicle speed.",
      "published": "2024-07-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3664476.3671012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Lekidis"
      ],
      "venue": "ARES",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3664476.3671012",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3666025.3699401",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Demo: Invisible Adversarial Stripes against Traffic Sign Recognition in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Camera-based computer vision is crucial for autonomous vehicle perception. We demonstrate GhostStripe [5], an attack system that uses light-emitting diodes and exploits the camera's rolling shutter effect to generate adversarial stripes that are invisible to humans while misleading traffic sign recognition. To maintain stable attack effectiveness, GhostStripe controls the timing of the modulated light emission, adapting to both the camera's framing operation and the movement of the victim vehicle. Evaluated on real testbeds, GhostStripe can stably spoof traffic sign recognition results for up to 97% of frames to a wrong class when the victim vehicle passes the road section.",
      "published": "2024-11-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3666025.3699401",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dongfang Guo",
        "Yuting Wu",
        "Yimin Dai",
        "Pengfei Zhou",
        "Xin Lou",
        "Rui Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3666025.3699401",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3672608.3707797",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SHIELD: Assessing Security-by-Design in Federated Data Spaces Using Attack Graphs",
      "description": "Federated data spaces allow organizations to share and control their own data across various domains, but their exposure to cyber attacks has increased due to a surge in newly discovered vulnerabilities. Existing solutions to secure them focus on messaging protocol protection (e.g., using cryptographic means), but this is not sufficient. Attackers may exploit additional vulnerabilities to cause significant issues (e.g., disrupting the availability of services). To this end, we propose SHIELD, a security-by-design approach for federated data spaces, which leverages attack graphs and trust computation to mitigate the risks of cyber attacks. Mitigation is accomplished by proactively assessing the data spaces' weaknesses and implementing security messaging measures to prevent detrimental attacks. A prototype implementation of SHIELD using publish/subscribe as a messaging mechanism is experimentally evaluated over a real architecture in a V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) scenario.",
      "published": "2025-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3672608.3707797",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alessandro Palma",
        "Nikolaos Papadakis",
        "Georgios Bouloukakis",
        "J. Garcia-alfaro",
        "Mattia Sospetti",
        "K. Magoutis"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3672608.3707797",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3672608.3707802",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection and Mitigation for Electric Vehicle Charging-Based Attacks on the Power Grid",
      "description": "With the increasing adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs), power grids have to deal with the resulting increase in EV charging loads. A generic method of handling EV loads is load balancing, which requires cooperation from the involved systems, i.e., EVs and Charge Points (CPs). However, if we consider the potential of compromised EVs/CPs, existing load balancing methods fail and the threat of EV charging-based attacks on grid stability arises. In this paper, we address this issue by proposing a combined concept for the detection and mitigation of related attacks. Specifically, we propose a two-step Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that first detects attacks with a potential impact on the grid and in a second step identifies the systems involved in an attack. The design of the IDS enables two attack type-dependent mitigation methods that either correct manipulated data or counteract malicious changes in charging load. Our evaluation identifies specific design choices that enable a good attack detection performance. Additionally, our evaluation shows the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation methods and their relation to IDS performance.",
      "published": "2025-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3672608.3707802",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dustin Kern",
        "Christoph Krauß",
        "Matthias Hollick"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3672608.3707802",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3672608.3707823",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving Anomaly Detection for Electric Vehicle Charging with Generative Adversarial Networks",
      "description": "Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are often considered to be an important security mechanism for different use-cases. The Electric Vehicle (EV) charging use-case is one example, with various research articles proposing IDS solutions. One issue in this context, however, is the lack of representative datasets with a variety of realistic attack scenarios, which are vital for evaluating IDSs. Especially concerning the cyber-physical aspects of EV charging, representative datasets are missing and related work usually relies on normal charging data with generating random anomalies or manual attack insertions. This can result in unrealistic or biased attack data. In this paper, we address this issue by proposing a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)-based IDS training method for EV charging. For this, a GAN is used against a pre-trained IDS to generate attack data that avoids detection. Afterwards, the IDS can be re-trained under consideration of the new attack data in order to eliminate persistent gaps or biases in detection. We implement and evaluate the GAN-based training system. Our evaluation shows the ability of the GAN to identify flaws in existing IDSs. Additionally, we show the effectiveness of re-training IDSs with the GAN output.",
      "published": "2025-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3672608.3707823",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Viet Ha The",
        "Dustin Kern",
        "Phat Nguyen Tan",
        "Christoph Krauß"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3672608.3707823",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3676850",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Introduction to Special Issue on Cybersecurity and Resiliency for Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "description": "Introduction to Special Issue on Cybersecurity and Resiliency for Transportation Cyber-Physical SystemsTransportation cyber-physical systems (TCPS) utilize computing and communication power to integrate and optimize the movement of goods and people, with the goal of advancing society.Hardware and software within TCPS enable us to store, transfer, process, analyze, and act on huge amounts of data in real time.The potential benefits of such a system transcend the boundaries of social, economic, and environmental domains, which include reduced traffic congestion, delays, crashes, fuel use, emissions, and lowered monetary costs for transportation infrastructure.However, TCPS open unprecedented opportunities for malicious actors to steal data, invade privacy, demand ransom, and generate misinformation.Ultimately, they could even shut down the transportation systems on which our lives, safety, prosperity, and security depend.These attackers may range from individual hackers to criminal gangs, and their impacts on public safety can be disastrous.Attackers could potentially gain access to the control system of TCPS, causing catastrophic multi-vehicle crashes or even holding the authorities to ransom.Moreover, if these systems are spread across various parts of a city, they could potentially shut down the entire transportation network, causing a ripple effect on non-transportation systems in an Internet of Things (IoT) environment.The number of cyberattacks on smart mobility systems has risen significantly worldwide.However, the full extent of cybersecurity threats and their impacts on TCPS remains largely unknown, and there are no clear solutions to mitigate such attacks.The theme of this Special Issue of the ACM Journal on Autonomous Transportation Systems (JATS) is to address the gap through consolidation of innovative security solutions for evolving TCPS.This special issue acts as a nexus, aiming to converge multidisciplinary researchers and experts to present cutting-edge contributions and chart the trajectory of future advancements pertinent to cybersecurity and resiliency of TCPS.Based on peer reviews, six articles have been accepted.Below is a concise overview of the articles featured in this special issue:The first article, \"Systematic Risk Characterization of Hardware Threats to Automotive Systems,\" presents a unique approach to characterizing attacks on hardware components, communication modules, and embedded software in modern automotive systems.This article employs Gajski-Kuhn Y-charts to depict how attacks manipulate these systems across behavioral, structural, and physical domains.The selection of attacks is based on real-world evidence, showcasing threats that have been proven feasible.The impact of these threats is then assessed using the ISO/SAE 21434 standard for automotive cybersecurity risk assessment, which includes potential mitigations.This article offers unique insights into the intricate dynamics of hardware vulnerabilities and how the industry can address system-level security and protection for modern automotive platforms.",
      "published": "2024-08-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3676850",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "Mhafuzul Islam",
        "Lipika Deka",
        "Mashrur A. Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Journal on Autonomous Transportation Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3676850",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3677525.3678659",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Federated Architecture for Digital Twins in Automotive: An Integrated Solution for Vehicles, Drivers and Road Environments",
      "description": "In the rapidly transforming automotive sector, the adoption of the Digital Twin technology marks a significant evolution, offering real-time interactions within the vehicle ecosystem. This technology not only enhances the personalization of driving experiences but also connects various Digital Twins to augment road safety and traffic management through instantaneous communication. This research introduces novel insights into the synergies between vehicle Digital Twins and driver systems, paving the way for a future of sophisticated, interconnected mobility. The Digital Twin architecture is important in ensuring the security and continuity of public services, rapid emergency management, data security and privacy, and protection from cyber attacks. Particularly in connected vehicle systems, the prominent processes to prevent possible attacks on vehicle control systems are strengthening security protocols and taking continuous monitoring measures.",
      "published": "2024-08-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3677525.3678659",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elisa Calisesi",
        "Özlem Kaya",
        "Andrea Melis",
        "Roberto Girau"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Technology for Social Good (GoodIT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3677525.3678659",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3678890.3678927",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive, Automated Security Analysis of the Uptane Automotive Over-the-Air Update Framework",
      "description": "We present our experience of formally verifying the desired security properties of the Uptane over-the-air (OTA) software update framework against a set of applicable threat models. Uptane is gaining traction in the automobile industry and is widely considered the next de-facto standard for OTA automobile software updates. The security of Uptane is of utmost importance because modern automobiles rely on software for their safety-critical functionalities and, especially, require OTA software updates to add new safety features or patch bugs in existing ones. Design flaws in Uptane can either violate the integrity of the updates to be installed or prevent vehicles from installing new updates, both of which can cause severe safety issues. Previous approaches to protocol verification either fail to capture the necessary features of Uptane or suffer from termination issues due to Uptane’s complexity. A key component of our approach lies in the eager combination of an infinite-state model checker and a cryptographic protocol verifier, where (in contrast to prior lazy approaches) we are able to eliminate a key manual step in the workflow while enabling reasoning over more fine-grained message structures. In addition, our approach utilizes two proven soundness- and completeness-preserving state-space-reduction optimizations for computational tractability, as well as a meta-level analysis technique that makes it feasible to reason over Uptane’s set of optional protocol features. Our approach is able to discover six new vulnerabilities while rediscovering all five known ones. While there have been previous analyses of Uptane’s security properties, they either missed design flaws identified by our approach or suffered from coverage and termination issues. The Uptane standards body has positively acknowledged our findings and has suggested updates to the protocol specification documents to address them.",
      "published": "2024-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3678890.3678927",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Robert Lorch",
        "Daniel Larraz",
        "Cesare Tinelli",
        "Omar Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3678890.3678927",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3686625.3686636",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security of a PUF-based Remote Keyless Entry System using Machine Learning Approach",
      "description": "The Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) system offers users the convenience of remotely locking and unlocking the vehicle, activating the engine through a keychain transmitter. Modern RKE systems are vulnerable to security breaches like the RollJam attack, which exploits signal relaying and interference to activate a vehicle without authorization potentially. This research integrates a “HODOR\" RF profiling technique to detect malicious attacks in a lightweight mutual authentication mechanism using Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). The enhanced protocol withstands device cloning and RollJam attacks. Experimental results show that the concurrent execution of HODOR and PUFs introduces an overhead of 2.01 seconds, and through training with PUF authentication and machine learning, an accuracy of 99.8% was achieved with a training loss of 2.3%. Integrating our approach into the operational RKE system establishes a device-coupled authentication and malicious behavior detection system, effectively safeguarding various vehicular communication applications.",
      "published": "2024-07-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3686625.3686636",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zong Tao Augustine Tang",
        "Ke-Wei Yu",
        "Kii Yuta",
        "Ting-Yu Chen",
        "Arijit Karati"
      ],
      "venue": "International Electronics Communication Conference (IECC)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3686625.3686636",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3689936.3694692",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Revisiting Automotive Threat Analysis by Leveraging the Elements of the Threat Landscape",
      "description": "The automotive industry faces significant challenges due to rapid advancements in areas such as increased connectivity, automated driving, and electrification. These advancements, coupled with an evolving standard and regulatory landscape, place substantial demands on product development, particularly in the realm of cybersecurity. Features that enhance connectivity introduce various external interfaces, leading to numerous attack vectors and potential vulnerabilities in vehicle-connected devices at unprecedented levels. Additionally, the dynamic nature of the threat landscape complicates manufacturers' efforts to maintain adequate security and stay up-to-date. Two major pain points are the extensive resources required and the time-consuming nature of cybersecurity activities. In this paper, we propose a methodology to modularize cybersecurity activities and the corresponding work products related to the threat landscape. These modules are designed to be used as reusable elements in activities mandated by standards such as ISO/SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2023-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3689936.3694692",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexander Åström"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3689936.3694692",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3689936.3694693",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2X Misbehavior in Decentralized Notification Basic Service: Considerations for Standardization",
      "description": "Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV) use sensors and wireless communication to improve road safety and efficiency. However, attackers may target Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. Indeed, an attacker may send authenticated but wrong data to con- vey false location information, alert incorrect events, or report a bogus object, thereby endangering other CAVs' safety. Standardiza- tion Development Organizations (SDOs) are currently working on developing security standards against such attacks. Unfortunately, current standardization efforts do not yet include misbehavior spec- ifications for all V2X services such as Decentralized Environment Notification Basic Service (DENBS also commonly called DENM). The contributions of this work are the first security analysis for DENM (67 threats), the proposal of 103 misbehavior detectors for DENM, and inputs for consideration in existing standards1.",
      "published": "2023-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3689936.3694693",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jean-Philippe Monteuuis",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "Cong Chen",
        "Soumya Das",
        "Mohammad Nekoui",
        "Seung Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3689936.3694693",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3689936.3694695",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "(Un)authenticated Diagnostic Services: A Practical Evaluation of Vulnerabilities in the UDS Authentication Service",
      "description": "Diagnostic communication is an attractive entry point for attackers because of its accessibility and degree of standardization. The prevalent diagnostic protocol used in modern vehicles is Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). To prevent misuse of diagnostic functions, UDS provides the Authentication Service to authenticate diagnostic testers securely. A previous study [16] revealed two vulnerabili- ties in the Authentication Service by theoretically analyzing its specification. By leveraging the identified vulnerabilities, a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacker could theoretically manipulate the communication between a diagnostic tester and an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), with the tester believing that the communication is securely authenticated and encrypted. In this work, we examine the practical applicability of these vulnerabilities and the proposed mitigations. By implementing the MitM attacker against a diagnostic tester and ECU, simulated by a state-of-the-art industrial tool, we show that standard-conform diagnostic clients and servers cannot detect the described attacks and the manipulation can be successfully applied. Based on this practical evaluation, we derive realistic estimates for attack feasibility and impact, which can be used in a Threat and Risk Analysis (TARA) according to ISO/SAE 21434. In addition, we evaluate the performance of the proposed mitigations and show that their overhead is comparable low.",
      "published": "2023-11-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3689936.3694695",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Timm Lauser",
        "Gideon Munoz Molto",
        "Christoph Krauß"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1145/3689936.3694695",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3689936.3694696",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Driven Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) on the ROAD Dataset: A Comparative Analysis for Automotive Controller Area Network (CAN)",
      "description": "The integration of digital devices in modern vehicles has revolutionized automotive technology, enhancing safety and the overall driving experience. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a central system for managing in-vehicle communication between the electronic control units (ECUs). However, the CAN protocol poses security challenges due to inherent vulnerabilities, lacking encryption and authentication, which, combined with an expanding attack surface, necessitates robust security measures. In response to this challenge, numerous Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been developed and deployed. Nonetheless, an open, comprehensive, and realistic dataset to test the effectiveness of such IDSs remains absent in the existing literature. This paper addresses this gap by considering the latest ROAD dataset, containing stealthy and sophisticated injections. The methodology involves dataset labelling and the implementation of both state-of-the-art deep learning models and traditional machine learning models to show the discrepancy in performance between the datasets most commonly used in the literature and the ROAD dataset, a more realistic alternative.",
      "published": "2024-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3689936.3694696",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lorenzo Guerra",
        "Linhan Xu",
        "Paolo Bellavista",
        "Thomas Chapuis",
        "Guillaume Duc",
        "Pavlo Mozharovskyi",
        "Van-Tam Nguyen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3689936.3694696",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3704522.3704534",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Explainable Deep Learning for Cyber Attack Detection in Electric Vehicle Charging Stations",
      "description": "The growing integration of Electric Vehicles (EVs) into smart grids has led to significant cybersecurity challenges, particularly concerning vulnerabilities in Electric Vehicle Charging Systems (EVCS). These systems, which facilitate secure interactions among EVs, EVCS, and management systems through protocols such as ISO 15118 and OCPP, are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to the rise of Internet of Things (IoT) connectivity. Threats such as denial of service, information gathering, man-in-the-middle, and injection attacks pose serious risks to the stability of charging stations and the overall infrastructure. This paper introduces a novel Deep Learning model to cyber attack detection utilizing the CIC EV Charger Attack Dataset 2024 (CICEVSE2024). Although the original study in this dataset reported an accuracy of 78.87%, our proposed deep learning model achieves a remarkable accuracy of 97.15%, with a precision of 97.19%, recall of 97.15%, F1 score of 97. 15% and an area under the curve (AUC) of 97. 14%. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of advanced deep learning techniques in enhancing the security of the EV charging infrastructure. The Shap explainable AI results revealed the significant impact of 12 selected features on detecting benign and attack data using our deep learning model.",
      "published": "2024-12-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3704522.3704534",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Mizanur Rahman",
        "Md Meheraz Hossain Chayan",
        "Khaleda Mehrin",
        "Afrin Sultana",
        "Mosaab M. Hamed"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Network and System Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3704522.3704534",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3705611",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safe Driving Adversarial Trajectory Can Mislead: Toward More Stealthy Adversarial Attack Against Autonomous Driving Prediction Module",
      "description": "The prediction module, powered by deep learning models, constitutes a fundamental component of high-level Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). Given the direct influence of the module’s prediction accuracy on AV driving behavior, ensuring its security is paramount. However, limited studies have explored the adversarial robustness of the prediction modules. Furthermore, existing methods still generate adversarial trajectories that deviate significantly from human driving behavior. These deviations can be easily identified as hazardous by AVs’ anomaly detection models and thus cannot effectively evaluate and reflect the robustness of the prediction modules. To bridge this gap, we propose a stealthy and more effective optimization-based attack method. Specifically, we reformulate the optimization problem using Lagrangian relaxation and design a Frenet-based objective function along with a distinct constraint space. We conduct extensive evaluations on 2 popular prediction models and 2 benchmark datasets. Our results show that our attack is highly effective, with over 87% attack success rates, outperforming all baseline attacks. Moreover, our attack method significantly improves the stealthiness of adversarial trajectories while guaranteeing adherence to physical constraints. Our attack is also found robust to noise from upstream modules, transferable across trajectory prediction models, and high realizability. Lastly, to verify its effectiveness in real-world applications, we conduct further simulation evaluations using a production-grade simulator. These simulations reveal that the adversarial trajectory we created could convincingly induce autonomous vehicles (AVs) to initiate hard braking.",
      "published": "2024-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3705611",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yingkai Dong",
        "Li Wang",
        "Zheng Li",
        "Hao Li",
        "Peng Tang",
        "Chengyu Hu",
        "Shanqing Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3705611",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3708821.3710820",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Three Glitches to Rule One Car: Fault Injection Attacks on a Connected EV",
      "description": "Cars are increasingly integrated with digital technologies. Manufacturers aim to enhance the passenger experience by integrating onboard entertainment while minimizing driving effort. However, these advancements are enabled through more and more complex car computers. Tesla, a leader in this field, has actively promoted security research of their car computer by rewarding vulnerability disclosures and sponsoring security contests. However, they specifically exclude hardware attacks from these programs. This paper formalizes the assets of Tesla’s Car Computer specifically threatened by hardware attacks and outlines the security risks from various often overlooked stakeholders surrounding Connected Cars. All three subsystems of the Car Computer can be fully compromised: two through low-cost voltage glitching attacks and one with a non-invasive, persistent electromagnetic fault injection attack, validating all identified risks. While these attack vectors are well-known in IT security research, our attacks enable important scrutiny of Tesla’s controversial driving assistance systems. Furthermore, the vulnerable components are either advertised for automotive use or even certified by automotive safety standards, making our attacks applicable to other car brands using the same chips. Finally, as effective countermeasures to fault injection attacks can be expected soon, this paper makes an important case for third-party access to Connected Cars’ hardware, firmware, and data.",
      "published": "2025-08-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3708821.3710820",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Niclas Kühnapfel",
        "Christian Werling",
        "H. Jacob",
        "Jean-Pierre Seifert"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3708821.3710820",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3716554.3716593",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development of a Smart Electric Vehicle Charging Station Management System",
      "description": "This paper presents the development of a smart charging station management system (CSMS) for electric vehicle charging stations (CSs), consisting of Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) units, that optimizes the charging of Electric Vehicles (EVs), by calculating charging schedules based on day-ahead (DA) electricity prices aiming at the minimization of energy costs. The basic CSMS operations that have been implemented are user authorization, transaction management, energy tracking, charger monitoring as well as charging optimization. The communication is based on the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) version 2.0.1.",
      "published": "2024-12-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3716554.3716593",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "evse",
        "ocpp",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Konstantinos Papapostolou",
        "Vassilis Kapsalis"
      ],
      "venue": "Pan-Hellenic Conference on Progress in Computing and Informatics (PCI)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3716554.3716593",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3718751.3718915",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modeling and Risk Assessment of Information Security Threats Based on Automotive CAN Bus",
      "description": "This article mainly studies the information security threats faced by the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in automobiles, and constructs a framework based on threat modeling and risk assessment, aiming to identify, evaluate, and mitigate the impact of these threats on automotive network security. In the attack recognition rate experiment, research techniques are applied to replay attacks, blur attacks Under DoS (Denial of Service) attacks, it has high recognition rates of 95%, 90%, and 98%, respectively. In the system performance impact experiment, the introduction of protection technology increased data transmission delay and processing time by 10% and 20%, respectively. In resisting advanced persistent threats, The APT experiment showed that the recognition rate of the protective system increased from the initial 95% to 98%. From the data conclusion, it can be seen that the framework based on threat modeling and risk assessment has high effectiveness and practicality in CAN bus information security protection.",
      "published": "2024-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3718751.3718915",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vivien Kong",
        "Michael Li",
        "Yuli Ye",
        "Xingpei Bian",
        "Xu Liu",
        "Jing Liu",
        "Meng Han"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Risk Management (ICBAR)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3718751.3718915",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3723178.3723200",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Connected Vehicles: An Evaluation Framework for CAN bus-enabled In-vehicle Communications",
      "description": "Modern vehicles heavily depend on the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) for internal communication among Electronic Control Units (ECUs).Various studies assessed the vulnerability of CAN busses, such as manipulating vehicle functions and exploiting invehicle communications.This paper explores the security challenges to counter potential cyber threats within CAN bus-enabled in-vehicle communications to enhance its intrusion detection systems (IDSs).We utilize a CAN bus dataset to analyze the impact of fabricated messages injected into speed and RPM data readings.We explore three scenarios: regular functioning, fabricated speedreading data, and fabricated RPM reading data.With the introduction of these fabrication data, we analyze the CAN bus dataset to explore the characteristics of malicious attacks.We study the effects of fabricated speed messages, with analysis demonstrating the resulting rapid fluctuations in speed readings while RPM measurements remain within expected ranges.To analyze the performance of intrusion detection in the CAN bus, we train state-of-the-art IDS classifiers such as Random Forest, Decision Tree, Gradient Boosting, XGBoost, and AdaBoost while evaluating their effectiveness in handling noisy input data.Our analysis aims to contribute to the development of robust IDSs and enhance the security and reliability of modern vehicles that use CAN bus networks.",
      "published": "2024-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3723178.3723200",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "SK Hafizul Islam",
        "Somesh Kumar",
        "Vemana Joshua Immanuel",
        "Purvansh Sonthalia",
        "Shukla Mondal",
        "Arup Kumar Pal"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computing Advancements (ICCA)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3723178.3723200",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3811,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3723178.3723200 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: remain, functions, studies, impact, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3728914",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Structure-Aware, Diagnosis-Guided ECU Firmware Fuzzing",
      "description": "Electronic Control Units (ECUs), providing a wide range of functions from basic control functions to safetycritical functions, play a critical role in modern vehicles. Fuzzing has emerged as an effective approach to ensure the functional safety and automotive security of ECU firmware. However, existing fuzzing approaches focus on the inputs from other ECUs through external buses (e.g., CAN), but neglect the inputs from internal peripherals through on-board buses (e.g., SPI). Due to the restricted input space exploration, they fail to comprehensively fuzz ECU firmware. Moreover, existing fuzzing approaches often lack visibility into ECU firmware’ internal states but rely on limited feedback (e.g., message timeouts or hardware indicators), hindering their effectiveness. To address these limitations, we propose a structure-aware, diagnosis-guided framework, EcuFuzz, to comprehensively and effectively fuzz ECU firmware. Specifically, EcuFuzz simultaneously considers external buses (i.e., CAN) and on-board buses (i.e., SPI). It leverages the structure of CAN and SPI to effectively mutate CAN messages and SPI sequences, and incorporates a dual-core microcontroller-based peripheral emulator to handle real-time SPI communication. In addition, EcuFuzz implements a new feedback mechanism to guide the fuzzing process. It leverages automotive diagnostic protocols to collect ECUs’ internal states, i.e., error-related variables, trouble codes, and exception contexts. Our compatibility evaluation on ten ECUs from three major Tier 1 automotive suppliers has indicated that our framework is compatible with nine ECUs. Our effectiveness evaluation on three representative ECUs has demonstrated that our framework detects nine previously unknown safety-critical faults, which have been patched by technicians from the suppliers.",
      "published": "2025-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3728914",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qing‐Quan Chen",
        "Kun Hu",
        "Sichen Gong",
        "Bihuan Chen",
        "Zikui Kong",
        "Haowen Jiang",
        "Bingkun Sun",
        "You Jun Lu",
        "Xin Peng"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the ACM on software engineering.",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3728914",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3731569.3764828",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Tock: From Research to Securing 10 Million Computers",
      "description": "Tock began 10 years ago as a research operating system developed by academics to help other academics build urban sensing applications. By leveraging a new language (Rust) and new hardware protection mechanisms, Tock enabled Multiprogramming a 64 kB Computer Safely and Efficiently. Today, it is an open source project with a vibrant community of users and contributors. It is deployed on root of trust hardware in data center servers and on millions of laptops; it is used to develop automotive and space products, wearable electronics, and hardware security tokens--all while remaining a platform for operating systems research. This paper focuses on the impact of Tock's technical design on its adoption, the challenges and unexpected benefits of using a type safe language (Rust)--particularly in security sensitive settings--and the experience of supporting a production open4source operating system from academia.",
      "published": "2026-03-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3731569.3764828",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Leon Schuermann",
        "Brad Campbell",
        "Branden Ghena",
        "Philip Levis",
        "Amit Levy",
        "Pat Pannuto"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3731569.3764828",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3733965.3733966",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AttentionGuard: Transformer-based Misbehavior Detection for Secure Vehicular Platoons",
      "description": "Vehicle platooning, with vehicles traveling in close formation coordinated through Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, offers significant benefits in fuel efficiency and road utilization. However, it is vulnerable to sophisticated falsification attacks by authenticated insiders that can destabilize the formation and potentially cause catastrophic collisions. This paper addresses this challenge: misbehavior detection in vehicle platooning systems. We present AttentionGuard, a transformer-based framework for misbehavior detection that leverages the self-attention mechanism to identify anomalous patterns in mobility data. Our proposal employs a multi-head transformer-encoder to process sequential kinematic information, enabling effective differentiation between normal mobility patterns and falsification attacks across diverse platooning scenarios, including steady-state (no-maneuver) operation, join, and exit maneuvers. Our evaluation uses an extensive simulation dataset featuring various attack vectors (constant, gradual, and combined falsifications) and operational parameters (controller types, vehicle speeds, and attacker positions). Experimental results demonstrate that AttentionGuard achieves up to 0.95 F1-score in attack detection, with robust performance maintained during complex maneuvers. Notably, our system performs effectively with minimal latency (100ms decision intervals), making it suitable for real-time transportation safety applications. Comparative analysis reveals superior detection capabilities and establishes the transformer-encoder as a promising approach for securing Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) against sophisticated insider threats.",
      "published": "2025-05-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3733965.3733966",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hexu Li",
        "Konstantinos Kalogiannis",
        "Ahmed Mohamed Hussain",
        "Panos Papadimitratos"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3733965.3733966",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3735662",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Challenges in the EV Charging Ecosystem",
      "description": "The growing adoption of intelligent Electric Vehicles (EVs) has also created an opportunity for malicious actors to initiate attacks on the EV infrastructure, which can include a number of data exchange protocols across the various entities that are part of the EV charging ecosystem. These protocols possess a range of underlying vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit to disrupt the regular flow of information and energy. While researchers have considered vulnerabilities of particular components within an EV charging ecosystem, there is still a notable gap in vulnerability analysis of charging protocols and the potential threats to these. We investigate threat vectors within the most widely adopted protocols used in EV infrastructure, explore the potential impact of cyberattacks and suggest various mitigation techniques investigated in literature. Potential future research directions are also identified.",
      "published": "2025-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3735662",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amanjot Kaur",
        "Nima Valizadeh",
        "Devki Nandan Jha",
        "Tomasz Szydło",
        "James Ranjith Kumar Rajasekaran",
        "Vijay Kumar",
        "Mutaz Barika",
        "Jun Liang",
        "Rajiv Kumar Ranjan",
        "OMER F. RANA"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computing Surveys",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3735662",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3736130.3762686",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RollCAN – CAN-bus based RollJam-Attack",
      "description": "Modern vehicles increasingly depend on wireless technologies such as Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems for user convenience. However, these systems are susceptible to various security vulnerabilities. The RollJam attack, for example, demonstrated that rolling code mechanisms, intended to prevent unauthorized access, can be circumvented through wireless interception and replay techniques. In addition, attackers have exploited access to the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to carry out a range of in-vehicle attacks. In this paper, we introduce RollCAN, a novel attack that adapts the principles of RollJam from the wireless domain to the CAN bus. RollCAN enables adversaries with physical access to intercept, block, and replay RKE messages over the CAN bus, thereby allowing unauthorized locking and unlocking of vehicle doors. We demonstrate the practicality of the RollCAN attack through two distinct implementations: one using professional automotive-grade equipment and another using a low-cost Raspberry Pi-based setup with a CAN interface. Furthermore, we discuss potential mitigation strategies to counteract the RollCAN attack.",
      "published": "2025-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3736130.3762686",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jannis Hamborg",
        "Timm Lauser",
        "Christoph Krauß"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science in Cars Symposium",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3736130.3762686",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3736130.3762687",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Automotive Cybersecurity Trend Radar",
      "description": "Driven by technological progress and, above all, software, our world is becoming ever faster, more flexible and more complex. Vehicles in particular are complex systems due to the number of components, communication, and millions of lines of code. Recent trends such as autonomous driving and artificial intelligence further accelerate these developments. As a result, the attack surface of vehicles is constantly increasing. To proactively address future security risks, we present the Automotive Cybersecurity Trend Radar (ACTR), an approach that applies the Innovation Radar methodology to identify and temporally classify emerging technologies relevant for the automotive cybersecurity sector. By systematically analyzing technology trends, academic research, and industry reports, this radar provides a structured view of upcoming challenges and opportunities. Our research highlights key topics for the future, including the impact of post-quantum cryptography, AI-driven security mechanisms, and confidential computing technologies. By incorporating these insights into early-stage strategic planning, manufacturers and suppliers can improve their preparedness for emerging cybersecurity-relevant technologies as well as benefit from technology developments, allowing strategic investments. The ACTR thus serves as a tool for industry stakeholders to anticipate, prioritize, and address automotive cybersecurity challenges before they become critical.",
      "published": "2025-10-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3736130.3762687",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gabriel Simmann",
        "Reiner Kriesten",
        "Felix Sebastian Maag",
        "Marta Mager"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science in Cars Symposium",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3736130.3762687",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3736130.3762688",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driving Down Premiums: A Security and Forensic Analysis of the DriveWell Insurance System",
      "description": "Modern car insurance companies can dynamically adjust premiums with mobile sensor units that constantly record, analyze, and grade driving behavior. However, attackers can tamper with these systems to cheat the insurance company and reduce their premiums. We developed an attacker model for this threat in conjunction with a risk assessment using the ISO/SAE 21434 Risk Rating Methodology, a widely accepted standard for evaluating and managing risks in automotive systems. To support and showcase our model, we examined the static IT security of the mobile sensor unit DriveWell and its companion Android application HUK Mein Auto. In particular, we utilized digital forensic tools to analyze the stored data in the sensor’s internal storage and the app’s smartphone storage, with a focus on encryption mechanisms for locally stored data and internet communication. During this analysis, we spotted a critical vulnerability that enables attackers to manipulate their insurance scores and potentially reduce premiums by up to 30%. Our model and real-world analysis provide a solid foundation for reducing the risk of such manipulation of insurance premiums.",
      "published": "2025-10-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3736130.3762688",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Claudius Laves",
        "T. Hutzelmann",
        "Kevin Mayer",
        "Hans-Joachim Hof"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science in Cars Symposium",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3736130.3762688",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3736130.3762689",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Structured Threat Modeling Approach for Generating Executable Attack Scenarios in the EV Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "As the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) accelerates, ensuring the security of the EV charging infrastructure has become a critical challenge in the field of cyber-physical system (CPS) security. The EV charging system represents a complex CPS environment where physical and digital components are intricately coupled with intertwined layered communication protocols. These characteristics necessitate a comprehensive analysis of threat flows rather than merely identifying fragmented vulnerabilities. However, conventional threat modeling techniques often rely on static system analyses, providing threat checklists or security requirement specifications, limiting their ability to capture realistic attack paths and stepwise adversarial behaviors. More dynamic threat modeling approaches that incorporate attacker behavior flows are needed to address this limitation. This paper proposes a threat modeling method that analyzes system operation flows and asset interactions to identify critical attack points. This work constructs an attack tree based on this analysis and applies behavior-based threat classification at the leaf-node level. The resulting threat scenarios are linked to the MITRE adversarial tactics, techniques, and common knowledge framework with flows to generate actionable and executable attack scenarios. The proposed method is applied to a core component of the EV charging infrastructure (i.e., EV supply equipment) to derive scenarios, including remote intrusions, physical access attacks, and supply chain compromises. The scenarios are designed to be directly executable in breach and attack simulation environments, enabling automated and repeatable validation of security controls and facilitating proactive defense planning.",
      "published": "2025-10-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3736130.3762689",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jae-Jun Ha",
        "Dong-Hyuk Shin",
        "Chae-Min Lim",
        "Ieck-Chae Euom"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Science in Cars Symposium",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3736130.3762689",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3737294",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing the Resilience of Automotive Intrusion Detection Systems to Adversarial Manipulation",
      "description": "The security of modern vehicles has become increasingly important, with the controller area network (CAN) bus serving as a critical communication backbone for various electronic control units (ECUs). The absence of robust security measures in CAN, coupled with the increasing connectivity of vehicles, makes them susceptible to cyberattacks. While intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been developed to counter such threats, they are not foolproof. Adversarial attacks, particularly evasion attacks, can manipulate inputs to bypass detection by IDSs. This article extends our previous work by investigating the feasibility and impact of gradient-based adversarial attacks performed with different degrees of knowledge against automotive IDSs. We consider three scenarios: white-box (attacker with full system knowledge), grey-box (partial system knowledge), and—the more realistic—black-box (no knowledge of the IDS’s internal workings or data). We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks against state-of-the-art IDSs on two publicly available datasets. Additionally, we study the effect of the adversarial perturbation on the attack impact and evaluate real-time feasibility by precomputing evasive payloads for timed injection based on bus traffic. Our results demonstrate that, besides attacks being challenging due to the automotive domain constraints, their effectiveness is strongly dependent on the dataset quality, the target IDS, and the attacker’s degree of knowledge.",
      "published": "2025-05-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3737294",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefano Longari",
        "Paolo Cerracchio",
        "Michele Carminati",
        "Stefano Zanero"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3737294",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3743151",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Electric Vehicle Security and Privacy through Decentralized Identity Management",
      "description": "In the next decade, Electric Vehicles (EVs) are expected to contribute to reducing climate change and transforming road mobility significantly. However, the security and privacy of EV charging systems pose considerable challenges that need to be addressed. This article introduces a novel approach by integrating blockchain-based Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) to enhance the security and privacy of EV charging systems. By leveraging the decentralized and immutable nature of blockchain, the proposed SSI framework can ensure secure and private data exchanges between EVs, charging stations, and backend systems. This three-way integration addresses the vulnerabilities identified in existing EV charging methods, such as conductive, inductive, and battery swapping and complies with cybersecurity regulations like UNECE R155. This article provides a comprehensive analysis, practical case study, and evaluation of the security and privacy enhancements achieved through the proposed SSI framework, offering valuable insights for industry professionals and researchers. We have conducted extensive end-to-end testing to evaluate the performance of our blockchain-based SSI framework in the EV charging ecosystem, focusing on identity verification, credential management, and service orchestration. The results show that the system enables fast wallet creation, efficient metadata retrieval, and low-latency service deployment, ensuring seamless identity management and service orchestration.",
      "published": "2025-06-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3743151",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdullah Aydeger",
        "Engin Zeydan",
        "Josep Mangues‐Bafalluy",
        "Şuayb S. Arslan",
        "Yekta Türk"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Threats Research and Practice",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3743151",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3744916.3787828",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DyMA-Fuzz: Dynamic Direct Memory Access Abstraction for Re-hosted Monolithic Firmware Fuzzing",
      "description": "The rise of smart devices in critical domains--including automotive, medical, industrial--demands robust firmware testing. Fuzzing firmware in re-hosted environments is a promising method for automated testing at scale, but remains difficult due to the tight coupling of code with a microcontroller's peripherals. Existing fuzzing frameworks primarily address input challenges in providing inputs for Memory-Mapped I/O or interrupts, but largely overlook Direct Memory Access (DMA), a key high-throughput interface used that bypasses the CPU. We introduce DyMA-Fuzz to extend recent advances in stream-based fuzz input injection to DMA-driven interfaces in re-hosted environments. It tackles key challenges--vendor-specific descriptors, heterogeneous DMA designs, and varying descriptor locations--using runtime analysis techniques to infer DMA memory access patterns and automatically inject fuzzing data into target buffers, without manual configuration or datasheets. Evaluated on 94 firmware samples and 8 DMA-guarded CVE benchmarks, DyMA-Fuzz reveals vulnerabilities and execution paths missed by state-of-the-art tools and achieves up to 122% higher code coverage. These results highlight DyMA-Fuzz as a practical and effective advancement in automated firmware testing and a scalable solution for fuzzing complex embedded systems.",
      "published": "2026-02-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3744916.3787828",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "fuzzing",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guy Farrelly",
        "Michael Chesser",
        "Seyit Camtepe",
        "Damith C. Ranasinghe"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3744916.3787828",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3748522.3779738",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SecureV2X: An Efficient and Privacy-Preserving System for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Applications",
      "description": "Autonomous driving and V2X technologies have developed rapidly in the past decade, leading to improved safety and efficiency in modern transportation. These systems interact with extensive networks of vehicles, roadside infrastructure, and cloud resources to support their machine learning capabilities. However, the widespread use of machine learning in V2X systems raises issues over the privacy of the data involved. This is particularly concerning for smart-transit and driver safety applications which can implicitly reveal user locations or explicitly disclose medical data such as EEG signals. To resolve these issues, we propose SecureV2X, a scalable, multi-agent system for secure neural network inferences deployed between the server and each vehicle. Under this setting, we assume a semi-honest threat model and study two multi-agent V2X applications: secure drowsiness detection, and secure red-light violation detection. Our system achieves strong performance relative to baselines, and scales efficiently to support a large number of secure computation interactions simultaneously. For instance, SecureV2X is 9.4× faster, requires 143× fewer computational rounds, and involves 16.6× less communication on drowsiness detection compared to other secure systems. Moreover, it achieves a runtime nearly 100× faster than state-of-the-art benchmarks in object detection tasks for red light violation detection.1",
      "published": "2025-08-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3748522.3779738",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "threat",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joshua Lee",
        "Ali Arastehfard",
        "Weiran Liu",
        "Xuegang Jeff Ban",
        "Yuan Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Symposium on Applied Computing",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3748522.3779738",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3760787",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Denial of Service Vulnerabilities in Commercial Vehicles: Exploiting Diagnostic Protocol Flaws",
      "description": "Commercial vehicles are a vital component of modern logistics and transportation, forming part of the critical infrastructure and representing safety-critical cyber-physical systems. Contemporary automotive operations are dominated by embedded computing systems that engage through standardized protocols, which constitute the infrastructure of vehicular communication networks. Within the commercial vehicle sector, these systems utilize high-level protocols that operate over the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol for internal exchanges in medium and heavy-duty vehicles. The Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) protocol, as described in International Standards Organization (ISO) 14229 (UDS) and ISO 15765 (Diagnostic Communication over CAN), plays a pivotal role by providing vital diagnostic capabilities. This research introduces four specific scenarios that expose deficiencies in the diagnostic protocol standards and how these can be manipulated to initiate attacks on in-vehicle computers within commercial vehicles, circumventing existing security frameworks. In the first three scenarios, we demonstrate three flaws within the ISO 14229 protocol standards. Following this, the fourth and final scenario elucidates a flaw unique to the ISO 15765 protocol standards. For the purpose of demonstration, test setups incorporating actual Electronic Control Units (ECUs) linked to a CAN bus were employed. Further experiments were performed using a fully equipped cab assembly from a 2018 Freightliner Cascadia truck, set up as a testing environment. The experimental outcomes demonstrate how attacks targeting these specific protocols can undermine the integrity of individual ECUs, leading to denial of service. Additionally, within the Freightliner Cascadia configuration, a network architecture typical of contemporary vehicles was observed, featuring a gateway unit that isolates internal ECUs from diagnostic interfaces. Although this gateway is engineered to prevent conventional message injection and spoofing attacks, it permits all diagnostic communications. This selective permeability inadvertently introduces a susceptibility to diagnostic protocol flaws, highlighting an essential area for security improvements within commercial vehicle networks. These insights are vital for engineers and developers tasked with integrating the diagnostic protocols into their network subsystems, underscoring the urgency for improved security provisions.",
      "published": "2025-08-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3760787",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "spoofing",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carson Green",
        "Rik Chatterjee",
        "Jeremy S. Daily"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3760787",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3769102.3770607",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ARMBench: Benchmarking Adversarial Robustness of Multitask Perception in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Perception models are fundamental to autonomous vehicles, enabling critical tasks such as object detection, drivable area segmentation, and lane line segmentation. Recently, multitask perception models that unify multiple vision tasks into a single architecture have shown their promise in efficiency and improved performance. However, their robustness under adversarial conditions remains underexplored. In this work, we present ARMBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the adversarial robustness of multitask perception models for autonomous driving. ARMBench integrates a suite of representative attack methods as well as multiple defense mechanisms. Through a case study on the YOLOP model using the BDD100K dataset, we investigate the impact of adversarial attacks on individual tasks, compare the robustness of multitask and single-task models, and assess the effectiveness of defense strategies. Our results reveal asymmetric vulnerabilities across tasks and highlight the need for task-aware evaluation and defense. We have open-sourced ARMBench at https://github.com/Yunge6666/YOLOP-adversarial-attack-and-defense to contribute to the research community by providing a reproducible, extensible foundation for advancing robust and trustworthy multitask perception in AV systems.",
      "published": "2025-12-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3769102.3770607",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunge Li",
        "Yuhong Liu",
        "Lanyu Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE Symposium on Edge Computing (SEC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3769102.3770607",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3770743.3803979",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SCIMI: Semantic-Aware Collaborative Intrusion Detection for Multi-domain In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Modern vehicles integrate multiple in-vehicle networks (IVNs), such as Controller Area Network (CAN), Automotive Ethernet, and host systems, to support advanced automation and connectivity. While these networks enable new functionalities, they also expand attack surface across multiple domains. Sophisticated multi-stage attacks exploit these surfaces to propagate covertly, and existing vehicular IDS systems cannot detect them as these attacks only cause minor changes in IVNs. This paper presents SCIMI, a Semantic-aware Collaborative Intrusion detection system for Multi-domain In-vehicle networks, which learns inter-domain causal relationships to identify subtle, coordinated attacks that evade single domain intrusion detection systems. SCIMI aligns asynchronous traffic patterns through a dual window temporal model, extracts semantic features via domain adaptive encoders, and applies cross domain attention to correlate suspicious behaviors. A dataset is also released for collaborative IDS. Experiments show that SCIMI achieves over 99% F1-score with a 17% improvement over state-of-the-art methods, while maintaining low false positive alarms and real time inference efficiency, underscoring its applicability to real time automotive cyber-security.",
      "published": "2026-07-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3770743.3803979",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cyber-security",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chang Zhu",
        "Xiaohang Wang",
        "Abla Smahi",
        "Kaiwei Wu",
        "Yinhe Shen",
        "Yingtao Jiang",
        "Amit Kumar Singh",
        "Kui Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3770743.3803979",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3779208.3785267",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SoK: Security of the Image Processing Pipeline for Camera-based Sensing in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Cameras are crucial sensors for autonomous vehicles. They capture images that are essential for many safety-critical tasks. To process these images, a complex pipeline with multiple layers is used. Security attacks on this pipeline can severely affect passenger safety and system performance. However, many attacks presented in scientific literature overlook the fact that there are different layers and, hence, the feasibility and impact of these attacks can vary. While there has been research to improve the quality and robustness of the image processing pipeline, these efforts are often orthogonal to security research without exploiting potential overlap and synergies. In this work, we aim to bridge this gap by combining security and robustness research for the image processing pipeline in autonomous vehicles. We thoroughly investigated the body of literature on the security and robustness of the image processing pipeline and selected 92 papers for deeper discussion in this SoK. For the security domain, we classify the risk of attacks using the automotive security standard ISO 21434, emphasizing the need to consider all layers for overall system security. With our online tool TARA-CAM, we propose an interactive method to perform threat analysis and risk assessment following the ISO standard. We also demonstrate how existing robustness research can help mitigate the impact of attacks, addressing the current research gap. Finally, we present PICT, an embedded open-source testbed that can influence various parameters across all layers, allowing researchers to analyze the effects of different defense strategies and attack impacts. With this SoK, we contribute a comprehensive discussion and systematic analysis of existing approaches to image processing pipeline security and robustness, together with an open-source tool and testbed that jointly facilitates hardening the image processing pipeline against existing and future security attacks.",
      "published": "2024-09-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3779208.3785267",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael Kühr",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Pedram MohajerAnsari",
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3779208.3785267",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3796731.3796923",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TOF Ranging and CIR Accuracy Analysis and Simulation Implementation in UWB-PEPS System",
      "description": "The Passive Entry and Passive Start (PEPS) system has been widely applied in the field of intelligent vehicles. However, traditional RF-based systems are vulnerable to relay attacks. Ultra-Wideband (UWB) technology, with its high precision ranging capabilities, has become a key technology for building secure PEPS systems. Nevertheless, how to effectively resist relay attacks while maintaining high-precision positioning remains a critical challenge. In this paper, a UWB-PEPS system simulation model is built on the MATLAB platform, using Time-of-Flight (TOF) ranging methods and Channel Impulse Response (CIR) analysis to examine channel characteristics. By employing a CIR consistency verification mechanism, the differences between the normal direct path and relay attack CIRs are compared to detect and filter abnormal signals. The simulation results demonstrate that TOF ranging can maintain centimeter-level accuracy even in multipath environments. The CIR consistency verification can effectively distinguish between normal paths and relay signals, enhancing the system's resistance to relay attacks. The CIR-based discrimination mechanism exhibits high detection rates and low false-positive rates across different channel environments (LOS/NLOS). The proposed CIR consistency verification-based UWB-PEPS simulation framework not only improves the reliability of position estimation but also strengthens the system's ability to resist relay attacks. This method provides a feasible approach for the future secure application of UWB in vehicular PEPS systems.",
      "published": "2025-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3796731.3796923",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "relay",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chuan-Bo Liu",
        "Bohao Yin",
        "Xin Du",
        "Liye Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the 2025 5th International Conference on Computational Modeling, Simulation and Data Analysis",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1145/3796731.3796923",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3797030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Commercial Cyber-Physical System Development Tool Chain Bug Detecting via Diversity-Guided Fuzzing Test",
      "description": "Simulink is MathWorks’ commercial cyber-physical systems development tool, which enables engineers to do rapid prototyping of their systems through simulation and embedded code generation. When a Simulink model meets requirements, engineers can utilize embedded coder to convert it into embedded code (e.g., C source code) and deploy it in safety-critical applications such as automotive, aerospace, and healthcare. However, bugs or incorrect implementations in code generation may lead to unexpected behaviors in target applications, posing security risks. Therefore, it is crucial to eliminate such bugs in embedded code generation. To address this issue, we propose DESCO, a differential testing approach to test embedded code generation in Simulink. DESCO considers the functional correlation between Simulink blocks for partitioning, aiming to generate diverse and complex bug-triggering Simulink models to thoroughly exercise the embedded code generation. DESCO then detects bugs by analyzing the outputs of these Simulink models by differential testing. The experiments demonstrate that DESCO significantly outperforms existing approaches. In three months, DESCO reported 16 issues, including 12 confirmed as bugs by MathWorks Support.",
      "published": "2026-02-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3797030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "fuzzing",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huijiang Liu",
        "Shikai Guo",
        "Jiaxue Liu",
        "Yifan Wang",
        "Hongyi Cheng",
        "Xiaochen Li",
        "He Ling Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3797030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3801968",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicles Security and Privacy: Challenges, Solutions, and Future Needs",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) share common technologies with classic fossil-fueled cars, but they also employ novel technologies and components (e.g., Charging System and Battery Management System) that create an unexplored attack surface for malicious users. Although several contributions in the literature explored cybersecurity aspects of particular components of the EV ecosystem (e.g., charging infrastructure), there is still no contribution to the holistic cybersecurity of EVs and their related technologies from a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) perspective. In this article, we provide the first in-depth study of the Security and Privacy (S&P) threats associated with the EV ecosystem. We analyze the threats associated with both the EV and the different charging solutions. Focusing on the CPS paradigm, we provide a detailed analysis of all the processes that an attacker might exploit to affect the S&P of both drivers and the infrastructure. To address the highlighted threats, we present possible solutions that might be implemented. We also provide an overview of possible future directions to guarantee the S&P of the EV ecosystem. Based on our analysis, we stress the need for EV-specific cybersecurity solutions to help both vehicle owners and infrastructure deployers securing the EV ecosystem.",
      "published": "2026-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3801968",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Denis Donadel",
        "Radha Poovendran",
        "Federico Turrin",
        "Jianjing Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3801968",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3814955",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Contextualizing Security and Privacy of Software-Defined Vehicles: A Literature Review and Industry Perspectives",
      "description": "The growing reliance on software in road vehicles has led to the emergence of Software-Defined Vehicles (SDV). This work analyzes SDV security and privacy through a systematic literature review complemented by an industry questionnaire across the automotive supply chain. The analysis is structured as four research questions and results in a security framework serving as a roadmap for SDV protection. The findings emphasize addressing mixed-criticality architectural challenges, deploying layered security mechanisms, and integrating privacy-preserving techniques. The results highlight the need to harmonize in-vehicle and cloud-based defenses to strengthen cybersecurity and V2X resilience in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).",
      "published": "2024-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3814955",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco De Vincenzi",
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Chiara Bodei",
        "Ilaria Matteucci",
        "Richard R. Brooks",
        "Monowar Hasan",
        "Andrea Saracino",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Computing Surveys, 2026",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1145/3814955",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3822455.3838770",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Metamodel-Based Generation of Security Models from Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence",
      "description": "Modern vehicle systems are increasingly exposed to cybersecurity threats due to growing connectivity, software complexity, and the integration of external services. While standards such as ISO/SAE 21434 provide guidance for threat analysis and risk assessment, constructing security models remains a predominantly manual activity that is difficult to scale and maintain. This challenge limits the systematic incorporation of cybersecurity concerns into model-based engineering processes and hinders early assessment of security risks. This paper explores the idea of automatically generating security models from structured cyber threat intelligence. We present a prototype approach that transforms publicly available attack knowledge from sources such as MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE EMB3D into instances of the Security Abstraction Model (SAM), a domain-specific security metamodel. Our vision is to establish an attack-driven modeling workflow that continuously integrates evolving threat knowledge into model-based engineering environments. As an initial proof of concept, we implemented a generator and applied it to publicly available attack datasets, resulting in the automatic creation of valid security model instances. These early results indicate the feasibility of extensive security model generation and suggest potential benefits for improving the efficiency of cybersecurity analyses. We discuss open challenges, including semantic enrichment, model integration, and outline future research directions toward continuous, data-driven cybersecurity engineering.",
      "published": "2026-10-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3822455.3838770",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexander Fischer",
        "Ramin Tavakoli Kolagari"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM/IEEE International Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3822455.3838770",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4065,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1145/3822455.3838770 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: scale, activity, continuously, extensive, intelligence."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3847353.3847494",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVPot: A High-Interaction Honeypot for Detecting and Analyzing Attacks Against OCPP-Based Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructures",
      "description": "The rapid expansion of Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure has increased the cyber-physical attack surface of the power grid. Central to this ecosystem is the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), whose security in real-world deployments remains insufficiently assessed, particularly due to the lack of analyses examining attackers' tactics, techniques, and procedures. In this paper, we introduce EVPot, high-interaction, OCPP-aware honeypot designed to detect and analyze adversarial behavior targeting OCPP infrastructures. EVPot is built on CRICUS-EV, a custom simulation engine that faithfully reproduces the bidirectional, stateful dynamics of a Central Management System (CSMS) and a fleet of charging stations. EVPot integrates network inspection, log correlation, and an OCPP parsing layer that normalizes traces from heterogeneous implementations for unified analysis. We deployed EVPot in an exposed environment to observe real-world malicious activity. This deployment revealed generic attacks, with no exploitable attempts targeting OCPP, reflecting the protocol's complexity and the expertise required to exploit it. This motivated a controlled experimental analysis, through which we identified eight OCPP protocol specification vulnerabilities, including five previously undocumented design and implementation weaknesses. These findings were responsibly disclosed to the Open Charge Alliance (OCA), which indicated that a security guidance document is currently under development and that the vulnerabilities we reported will be considered in future versions of this guide. EVPot was further validated by detecting attacks against three OCPP implementations and by analyzing logs from a production charging station. Finally, we propose concrete countermeasures to strengthen the security of the OCPP ecosystem.",
      "published": "2026-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3847353.3847494",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elberson Djogap Tef",
        "Pierre-Martin Tardif"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the 2026 8th Joint Workshop on CPS&IoT Security and Privacy",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3847353.3847494",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3847353.3847503",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "D rone F uzz : Detecting Cyber-Physical Peripheral Vulnerabilities via MAVLink Fuzzing",
      "description": "Robotic vehicles, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are deployed in safety-critical applications ranging from package delivery to search and rescue operations. In these cyber-physical systems, software vulnerabilities can cause physical consequences such as collisions and mission failures, giving them direct safety implications. Most existing security research has focused on core control software. However, peripheral subsystems such as proximity sensors, optical flow sensors, and camera gimbals remain under-tested despite directly influencing control decisions, creating opportunities for attackers to manipulate vehicle behavior without immediately triggering software-level alarms.",
      "published": "2026-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3847353.3847503",
      "matched_terms": [
        "fuzzing",
        "vehicle",
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashwin Nambiar",
        "Shafiq-us Saleheen",
        "Antonio Bianchi"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Workshop on CPS&IoT Security and Privacy (CPSIoTSec)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3847353.3847503",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3858340",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Defence on Wheels: A Dual Intrusion Detection System Architecture for Comprehensive In-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": "The combination of increasing connectivity to the outside world and the lack of inbuilt security mechanisms has made legacy intra-vehicular networks extremely vulnerable to cyberattacks. Consequently, significant research has been devoted to analysing the impact of potential attacks, yielding datasets crucial for developing effective mitigation schemes like intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDSs/IPSs). Initial research addressing this problem focused heavily on maximising attack detection accuracy (for both known and unknown attack vectors), often relying on large, full-precision machine learning models. However, embedding IDS into complex vehicular electronic systems adds challenges beyond accuracy, including the need for low detection latency (e.g., 2,000 CAN frames/sec), energy efficiency, and minimal overhead in electronic control unit (ECU) resources like silicon area, memory, and processor use. To address these deployment constraints, recent research has focused on lightweight machine learning models that balance high classification accuracy with these practical limitations. In this work, we propose a dual IDS framework comprising both supervised and unsupervised learning-based solutions, each optimised for real-time, resource-constrained deployment on embedded automotive platforms. We present a quantised LSTM-based IDS (QLSTM-IDS) that achieves over 99.9% detection accuracy across various attack types: DoS/Flooding, Fuzzing, and Spoofing/Malfunction, using a single model and two widely-used datasets. The model is trained using the brevitas quantisation aware training library, transformed into a dataflow accelerator with custom blocks compatible with AMD’s FINN toolchain, and synthesised using Vitis HLS. Complementing this, we introduce an 8-bit quantised convolutional autoencoder-based IDS (QCAE-IDS) for detecting previously unseen anomalies that alter CAN-ID sequence patterns, with >99% accuracy. QCAE-IDS is quantised using AMD’s Vitis-AI toolchain. We detail an integration architecture enabling both IDS models to operate on a single FPGA device, bridging the network interface IP and processor system to minimise software overhead. QLSTM-IDS achieves 0.25ms inference latency and 0.8mJ energy consumption, while QCAE-IDS achieves 0.42ms latency and 1.1mJ energy, supporting real-time, efficient detection of both known and unknown attacks on high-speed CAN buses. Both solutions are deployed and evaluated on the ZCU104 SoC (XCZU7EV FPGA), demonstrating a robust, flexible hardware/software co-design for securing modern vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2026-10-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3858340",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Shanker Shreejith"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3858340",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1145/3859491",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "One-Time PUF and AEAD-Based Remote Keyless Entry Protocol Secure Vehicle Access",
      "description": "Modern vehicles offer significant advancements over older models, particularly in user comfort, due to the integration of Internet of Things (IoT)-based electronics. However, adding these IoT features has introduced new security risks. Security threats fall into two categories: physical, which require direct contact and may render the vehicle inoperable, and remote, which are executed wirelessly through systems such as remote keyless entry (RKE) and other IoT components. In this paper, we analyze various RKE attacks in vehicles and the specific IoT vulnerabilities they exploit. We also propose an authentication method that uses authenticated encryption, hash functions, and one-time physical unclonable functions (PUFs) to improve RKE security. Our security analysis shows that the proposed RKE protocol withstands several well-known attacks, including impersonation, RollJam, and the more recent Rollback method. We validate the authentication process using a formal proof based on BAN logic. Finally, our performance evaluation indicates that the proposed scheme is both more efficient and less costly, supporting its practicality and reliability for real-world deployment.",
      "published": "2026-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3859491",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "exploit",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Tanveer",
        "Muhammad Jawad Akhtar",
        "Abdullah G. Alharbi"
      ],
      "venue": "ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1145/3859491",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2018/1640167",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Cryptographic Techniques for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "A new integration of wireless communication technologies into the automobile industry has instigated a momentous research interest in the field of Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) security. Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are set up, aiming to offer promising applications for efficient and safe communication for future automotive technology. Vehicular networks are unique in terms of characteristics, challenges, architecture, and applications. Consequently, security requirements related to vehicular networks are more complex as compared to mobile networks and conventional wireless networks. This article presents a survey about developments in vehicular networks from the perspective of lightweight cryptographic protocols and privacy preserving algorithms. Unique characteristics of vehicular networks are presented which make the embedded security applications computationally hard as well as memory constrained. The current study also deals with the fundamental security requirements, essential for vehicular communication. Furthermore, awareness of security threats and their cryptographic solutions in terms of future automotive industry are discussed. In addition, asymmetric, symmetric, and lightweight cryptographic solutions are summarized. These strategies can be enhanced or incorporated all in all to meet the security perquisites of future cars security.",
      "published": "2018-06-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/1640167",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmer Khan Jadoon",
        "Licheng Wang",
        "Tong Li",
        "M. A. Zia"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1155/2018/1640167",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2018/1935974",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sound-Proximity: 2-Factor Authentication against Relay Attack on Passive Keyless Entry and Start System",
      "description": "Passive keyless entry and start system has been widely used in modern cars. Car owners can open the door or start the engine merely by having the key in their pocket. PKES was originally designed to establish a communication channel between the car and its key within approximately one meter. However, the channel is vulnerable to relay attacks by which attackers unlock the door even if the key is out of range. Even though relay attacks have been recognized as a potential threat for over ten years, such attacks were thought to be impractical due to highly expensive equipment; however, the required cost is gradually practical. Recently, a relay attack has been demonstrated with equipment being sold only under $100. In this paper, we propose a sound-based proximity-detection method to prevent relay attacks on PKES systems. The sound is eligible to be applied to PKES because audio systems are commonly available in cars. We evaluate our method, considering environments where cars are commonly parked, and present the recording time satisfying both usability and security. In addition, we newly define an advanced attack, called the record-and-playback attack, for sound-based proximity detection, demonstrating that our method is robust to such an attack.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/1935974",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Minhye Seo",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Advanced Transportation",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1155/2018/1935974",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2019/5650245",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced Android App-Repackaging Attack on In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The convergence of automobiles and ICT (information and communication technology) has become a new paradigm for the development of next-generation vehicles. In particular, connected cars represent the most in-demand automobile-ICT convergence technology. With the development of 5G technology, communication between vehicle and external device using autonomous driving and Internet of things (IoT) technology has been remarkably developed. Control of vehicles using smart phones has become a routine feature, and over 200 Android apps are in use. However, Android apps are easy to tamper by repackaging and allowing hackers to attack vehicles with using this vulnerability, which can lead to life-critical accidents. In this study, we analyze the vulnerabilities of connected car environments when connecting with IoT technologies and demonstrate the possibility of cyberattack by performing attack experiments using real cars and repackaging for commercial apps. Furthermore, we propose a realistic security technology as a countermeasure to attain safety against cyberattacks. To evaluate the safety of the proposed method, a security module is developed and a performance evaluation is conducted on an actual vehicle.",
      "published": "2019-02-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/5650245",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yousik Lee",
        "Samuel Woo",
        "Jungho Lee",
        "Yunkeun Song",
        "Heeseok Moon",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1155/2019/5650245",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2020/5129620",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy in Vehicular Ad Hoc Network and Vehicle Cloud Computing: A Survey",
      "description": "Vehicular networks are becoming a prominent research field in the intelligent transportation system (ITS) due to the nature and characteristics of providing high-level road safety and optimized traffic management. Vehicles are equipped with the heavy communication equipment which requires a high power supply, on-board computing device, and data storage devices. Many wireless communication technologies are deployed to maintain and enhance the traffic management system. The ITS is capable of providing services to the traffic authorities and precautionary measures to the drivers and passengers. Several methods have been proposed for discussing the security and privacy issues for the vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) and vehicular cloud computing (VCC). They receive a great deal of attention from researchers around the world since they are new technologies, and they can improve road safety and enhance traffic flow by utilizing the vehicles resources and communication system. Firstly, the VANETs are presented, including the basic overview, characteristics, threats, and attacks. The location privacy methodologies are elaborated, which can protect the confidential information of the vehicle, such as the location detail and driver information. Secondly, the trust management models in the VANETs are comprehensively discussed, followed by the comparison of the cryptography and trust models in terms of different kinds of attacks. Then, the simulation tools and applications of the VANETs are discussed, and the evolution is presented from the VANETs to VCC in the vehicular network. Thirdly, the VCC is discussed from its architecture and the security and privacy issues. Finally, several research challenges on the VANETs and VCC are presented. In sum, this survey comprehensively covers the location privacy and trust management models of the VANETs and discusses the security and privacy issues in the VCC, which fills the gap of existing surveys. Also, it indicates the research challenges in the VANETs and VCC.",
      "published": "2020-01-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/5129620",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Sheikh",
        "Jun Liang",
        "Wen-Song Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1155/2020/5129620",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 121,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2021/1263820",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment for Connected Vehicles: A Survey",
      "description": "With the rapid development of connected vehicles, people can get a better driving experience. However, the interconnection with the external network may bring growing accidents caused by cybersecurity vulnerabilities. As a result, automakers are paying more attention to cybersecurity and spending more cost on developing cybersecurity defense mechanisms. Threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) is an efficient method to ensure the defense effect and greatly save costs in the early stage of vehicle development. It analyzes the threat of vehicle systems and determines the hierarchical defense and corresponding mitigations according to the potential threat to the system. This paper gives an overview of threat analysis and risk assessment in the automotive field. First, a novel classification of different TARA methods has been proposed. The existing methods have been analyzed and compared. Then, we have found some commonly used tools applied to TARA and compared their performance. After that, a concept named attack-defense mapping is proposed to figure out how to map the already found threats and vulnerabilities of the system to the appropriate mitigations. At last, the future development directions of TARA in the automotive domain have been discussed.",
      "published": "2021-09-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/1263820",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Yifan Jiang",
        "Zhaojing Zhang",
        "Yi Ren",
        "Shuo Hou"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1155/2021/1263820",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 63,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2021/2890132",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AVoD: Advanced Verify-on-Demand for Efficient Authentication against DoS Attacks in V2X Communication",
      "description": "Owing to the development of information and communication technology (ICT), autonomous cooperative vehicles are being developed. Autonomous cooperative driving combines vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication technology in existing autonomous driving and provides safe driving by sharing information between communication entities. However, security factors should be considered during communication. Security Credential Management System (SCMS) has been proposed as one of these elements, but it is vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks due to message authentication costs. In congested situations, the number of messages exchanged between vehicles becomes very large. However, the performance of the on-board unit (OBU) is not sufficient to handle huge number of messages, which can lead to a DoS attack. Therefore, a technique to prevent DoS attacks on autonomous cooperative driving vehicles using SCMS has been proposed in this paper. The proposed technique reduces authentication costs by classifying similar messages into multiple categories and authenticating only the first message represented in the group for a unit time. The effectiveness of this technique has been demonstrated by comparing the time it takes to verify huge number of message signatures in each method.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/2890132",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Taehyoung Ko",
        "Cheongmin Ji",
        "Manpyo Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1155/2021/2890132",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2021/8868355",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning Technologies for Secure Vehicular Communication in Internet of Vehicles: Recent Advances and Applications",
      "description": "Recently, interest in Internet of Vehicles’ (IoV) technologies has significantly emerged due to the substantial development in the smart automobile industries. Internet of Vehicles’ technology enables vehicles to communicate with public networks and interact with the surrounding environment. It also allows vehicles to exchange and collect information about other vehicles and roads. IoV is introduced to enhance road users’ experience by reducing road congestion, improving traffic management, and ensuring the road safety. The promised applications of smart vehicles and IoV systems face many challenges, such as big data collection in IoV and distribution to attractive vehicles and humans. Another challenge is achieving fast and efficient communication between many different vehicles and smart devices called Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X). One of the vital questions that the researchers need to address is how to effectively handle the privacy of large groups of data and vehicles in IoV systems. Artificial Intelligence technology offers many smart solutions that may help IoV networks address all these questions and issues. Machine learning (ML) is one of the highest efficient AI tools that have been extensively used to resolve all mentioned problematic issues. For example, ML can be used to avoid road accidents by analyzing the driving behavior and environment by sensing data of the surrounding environment. Machine learning mechanisms are characterized by the time change and are critical to channel modeling in-vehicle network scenarios. This paper aims to provide theoretical foundations for machine learning and the leading models and algorithms to resolve IoV applications’ challenges. This paper has conducted a critical review with analytical modeling for offloading mobile edge-computing decisions based on machine learning and Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) approaches for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). The paper has assumed a Secure IoV edge-computing offloading model with various data processing and traffic flow. The proposed analytical model considers the Markov decision process (MDP) and ML in offloading the decision process of different task flows of the IoV network control cycle. In the paper, we focused on buffer and energy aware in ML-enabled Quality of Experience (QoE) optimization, where many recent related research and methods were analyzed, compared, and discussed. The IoV edge computing and fog-based identity authentication and security mechanism were presented as well. Finally, future directions and potential solutions for secure ML IoV and V2X were highlighted.",
      "published": "2021-03-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/8868355",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elmustafa Sayed Ali",
        "Mohammad Kamrul Hasan",
        "Rosilah Binti Hassan",
        "Rashid Abdelhaleem Saeed",
        "Mona Bakri Hassan",
        "Shayla Islam",
        "Nazmus Shaker Nafi",
        "Savitri Bevinakoppa"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1155/2021/8868355",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 262,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3954,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1155/2021/8868355 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: well., collect, collection, vital, large, intelligence, where, applications."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/4322148",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicular Multilevel Data Arrangement-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle CAN",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are equipped with various types of electrical/electronic (E/E) systems. Electronic control units (ECUs) are used to control various E/E systems in the vehicle. For efficient information exchange between ECUs, most vehicle manufacturers use the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. However, CAN has security vulnerabilities because it does not have an authentication or encryption method. Since attacks on in-vehicle networks affect the safety of drivers, it is essential to develop a technology to prevent attacks. The intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the best ways to enhance network security. Unlike the traditional IDS for network security, IDS for the in-vehicle network requires a lightweight algorithm because of the limitation of the computing power of in-vehicle ECUs. In this paper, we propose a lightweight IDS algorithm for in-vehicle CAN based on the degree of change between successive data frames. In particular, the proposed method minimizes the load on the ECU by using the CAN data frame compression algorithm based on exclusive-OR operations as a tool for calculating the degree of change.",
      "published": "2022-01-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/4322148",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wansoo Kim",
        "Jung‐Ho Lee",
        "Yousik Lee",
        "Yoenjin Kim",
        "Jin-Gyun Chung",
        "Samuel Woo"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/4322148",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/5827056",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A GRU-Based Lightweight System for CAN Intrusion Detection in Real Time",
      "description": "With the rapid development of vehicular networking and intelligence, more interfaces are adopted by cars to interact with the external world. Accordingly, this also brings enormous security risks, which are potentially catastrophic due to communication loopholes. Since the Controller Area Network (CAN) is critical to the transmission of commands among vehicular components, it has become a prime target for hacker research and attack. Considering that the CAN bus is commonly used and its protocol is always flawed, how to efficiently detect the intrusions against it has become an evitable problem. In this paper, we presented an intrusion detection system that can be rapidly deployed inside the vehicle. Aiming at achieving the goal of real-time detection, we devised a feature extraction algorithm with low complexity and thoroughly exploited its advantages via a GRU-based lightweight neural network. The experiment was physically conducted on in-vehicle embedded devices using publicly available datasets. Experiment results illustrated that our intrusion detection system could be rapidly deployed with high classification and real-time performance. Moreover, we also discussed how an intrusion detection system could work with OTA services to improve the intelligence of vehicular operating systems and prevent potential attacks.",
      "published": "2022-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/5827056",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haoyu Ma",
        "Jianqiu Cao",
        "Bo Mi",
        "Darong Huang",
        "Yang Liu",
        "Shaoqian Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/5827056",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/7144516",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Analysis on Blockchain-Powered Mobile APPs Connected with In-Vehicle Networks by Context-Based Reverse Engineering",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) bus for interconnection of electronic control units (ECUs) plays a highly important role in modern intelligent vehicles. To facilitate the CAN Bus accessing to vehicle control or diagnosis, a number of mobile APPs are designed and published by automobile manufacturers to support driving and vehicle-based social network, and some are realized through the in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) middleware. Blockchain technologies are also mature for automobiles to interact service information with the whole industry. Unfortunately, there is a serious threat of command leakage from these mobile APPs, and the reverse engineering (RE) can be exploited by hackers. Previous work has researched this threat by an automatic reverse engineering tool on both automotive android and IOS APPs. However, in such common tool, APP itself-related contexts, including the feature information of CAN Bus commands, vehicle application functions, and control diagnostic protocols, are overlooked, which might be utilized to promote the reverse engineering recall. In this paper, we propose a context-based reverse engineering approach to find deep hidden commands for further revealing security threats for blockchain-powered mobile automotive APPs. For the reverse engineering, we design a context model of four-order tensor to organize multidimensional contexts and establish a continuous updating mechanism. Based on the context model, we further develop two basic analysis algorithms, max-compute (A) and clustering (A), to perform the analysis of CAN Bus commands. Extensive experiments are conducted, and we evaluate it by two metrics, recovered ratio and correctness ratio. Experimental results and the case studied on the familiar APP Carly validate the effectiveness of our approach and reveal the threat of command leakage.",
      "published": "2022-09-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/7144516",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xingyu Wu",
        "Ziyan Qiao",
        "Xingjuan Cai",
        "Qian Wang",
        "Zhiqiang Xie",
        "Rui Sun",
        "Dong Zi",
        "Wenjia Niu",
        "Endong Tong"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/7144516",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/7357820",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain‐Based Trust Verification and Streaming Service Awareness for Big Data‐Driven 5G and Beyond Vehicle‐to‐Everything (V2X) Communication",
      "description": "Vigorous security and transparency with minimum latency and a high data rate are some of the key requirements for 5G and beyond vehicular networks especially in case of big data‐driven vehicle‐to‐everything (V2X) communication applications which plays an important role in enabling advance intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and Internet of Vehicle (IoV) based network. The trace‐ability in blockchain makes it one of the vital options, back‐boned by the decentralized network to ensure independent security and privacy by exploiting the hash of a previous transaction with the time stamp and announcing it publicly for rejection of possible adversary attack. Therefore, in this work, we have opted for blockchains for trusted authentication and service awareness in 5G and beyond vehicle‐to‐everything (V2X) communication‐based vehicular networks to stream blocks by certifying privacy and security. Here, we have considered blockchain as intermediary trusted agent to witness communication between a vehicle node and edge node, where edge node also uploads microservices along with calling figure of microservices to the blockchain. Furthermore, to ensure vehicle privacy with joint verification of vehicular network and server, we have devised a mechanism in which every vehicle nodes anonymously ask for services from the edge server along with signing an individual’s identity. Moreover, based on generated vehicle requests and service awareness, we devised an improved edge cache scheme for the prior compilation of services at each edge. In comparison to the previous state‐of‐art work, the result shows that our proposed work handles the requests more efficiently to achieve a better service request cache hit rate generated by vehicles at the edge server.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/7357820",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iftikhar Rasheed",
        "Muhammad Asif",
        "Wali Ullah Khan",
        "Asim Ihsan",
        "Kalim Ullah",
        "Md. Sadek Ali"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/7357820",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/7632892",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicles and Intelligent Automation: Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities",
      "description": "Intelligent Automation (IA) in automobiles combines robotic process automation and artificial intelligence, allowing digital transformation in autonomous vehicles. IA can completely replace humans with automation with better safety and intelligent movement of vehicles. This work surveys those recent methodologies and their comparative analysis, which use artificial intelligence, machine learning, and IoT in autonomous vehicles. With the shift from manual to automation, there is a need to understand risk mitigation technologies. Thus, this work surveys the safety standards and challenges associated with autonomous vehicles in context of object detection, cybersecurity, and V2X privacy. Additionally, the conceptual autonomous technology risks and benefits are listed to study the consideration of artificial intelligence as an essential factor in handling futuristic vehicles. Researchers and organizations are innovating efficient tools and frameworks for autonomous vehicles. In this survey, in-depth analysis of design techniques of intelligent tools and frameworks for AI and IoT-based autonomous vehicles was conducted. Furthermore, autonomous electric vehicle functionality is also covered with its applications. The real-life applications of autonomous truck, bus, car, shuttle, helicopter, rover, and underground vehicles in various countries and organizations are elaborated. Furthermore, the applications of autonomous vehicles in the supply chain management and manufacturing industry are included in this survey. The advancements in autonomous vehicles technology using machine learning, deep learning, reinforcement learning, statistical techniques, and IoT are presented with comparative analysis. The important future directions are offered in order to indicate areas of potential study that may be carried out in order to enhance autonomous cars in the future.",
      "published": "2022-06-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/7632892",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "supply chain",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gourav Bathla",
        "Kishor Vinayak Bhadane",
        "Rahul Kumar Singh",
        "Rajneesh Kumar",
        "Rajanikanth Aluvalu",
        "Rajalakshmi Krishnamurthi",
        "Adarsh Kumar",
        "R. N. Thakur",
        "Shakila Basheer"
      ],
      "venue": "Mobile Information Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/7632892",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 343,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/9569703",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN Signal Extinction-based DoS Attack on In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "As automobiles become more electrified, more and more Electronic Control Units (ECU) are installed in vehicles. ECUs communicate with each other through dedicated protocols such as a controller area network (CAN), but these protocols do not have their own security measures. Many cyberattacks have exploited this weakness, but an intrusion detection system (IDS) is emerging as an effective countermeasure. In this study, we introduce a new attack method that existing IDS cannot detect. CAN signal extinction-based DoS attack (CEDA) is a new attack method that uses a voltage drop to erase the CAN signal. When the target ECU transmits a signal, adding a resister that lowers the differential voltage to an undefined gray zone causes the other ECU to ignore the signal being sent from the target ECU. In cybersecurity, denial of service (DoS) is defined as restricting an authorized entity from accessing a resource or delaying a time-critical system. This attack is a kind of a DoS attack since the adversary can make the target ECU bus-off through a CEDA. CEDA could be a serious problem as it has not been detected by any known IDS to date. In this study, we use laboratory and vehicle tests to detail the attack methods and introduce appropriate security measures.",
      "published": "2022-09-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/9569703",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yousik Lee",
        "Samuel Woo"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/9569703",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/9751132",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of Security Operational Characteristics of Distribution Network considering Electric Vehicle Load Access Forecast",
      "description": "In recent years, electric vehicles have been widely promoted by virtue of environmental protection and pollution-free advantages. In the future, they are expected to become a mainstream means of transportation. However, as new services and business models become more and more closely related to the distribution network, the traditional AC distribution district has limited ability to respond to the large-scale access of electric vehicles. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important to improve the ability to respond to electric vehicle access, reduce the negative impact of large-scale electric vehicle access on the grid, and predict and calculate the uncertainty caused by electric vehicle load access. Therefore, this paper proposes the concept of flexible distribution district, constructs the security operational boundary model for flexible distribution district, and uses “security margin percentage” as the measurement mechanism to provide dispatchers with an intuitive system operating status. In addition, this paper also proposes an effective uncertainty quantification method for the problem that it is difficult to measure the changes of bus voltage and line current at network nodes when large-scale electric vehicles are connected to the network. Numerical results demonstrate both the extensibility and the practicality of the proposed security operational boundary. In addition, the proposed uncertainty quantification method can reflect the impact of load changes on the characteristics of the power grid, which is helpful to study the improvement significance of adjusting electric vehicle load changes to distribution network optimization.",
      "published": "2022-07-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/9751132",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lei Sun",
        "Yong Ma",
        "Jin Zhu",
        "Xiao-Han Li",
        "Peng Wu",
        "Xiang-Yu Bao"
      ],
      "venue": "Mathematical Problems in Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/9751132",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/2022/9865621",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Hardened and Privacy Preserved Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications have recently gained concentration of researchers for both, academia as well as industry.In the V2X system, the information is communicated from vehicle sensors to other vehicles, infrastructure, pedestrians, and mobile network cloud through high-bandwidth reliable links [1][2][3][4].e technology may greatly improve the driver's awareness of imminent hazards, thereby reducing the severity of accidents, fatalities, or possible collisions with other vehicles.e V2X technology brings efficiency through creating warning alerts for drivers, imparting the information of alternative routes for avoiding possible traffic congestions and pinpointing available parking spaces.Such critical situations might become problematic if the security and privacy of V2X communication system is compromised [5][6][7][8].us, V2X vehicles along with efficiency, reliability, and safety parameters require more secure and robust communication protocols to meet the upcoming security challenges.Moreover, the wireless nature of the system might become challenging in affording secure and ubiquitous connectivity to the V2X network [9][10][11][12][13]. is is crucial to create a fail-safe infrastructure of modern traffic scenario regarding smart cities since security and privacy issues are quite prevalent in our daily lives.is special issue encompasses 13 research articles focusing on security and privacy of vehicular networks.e details of these articles are summarized as follows.e authors in a research article titled \"Implementation of Blockchain Consensus Algorithm on Embedded Architecture\" presented study of the feasibility as well as the gain realized by using an architecture adopted at Ethereum PoW on FPGAs [14].e concept of finding optimized solutions adapted to the specific constraints of blockchain-based applications such as execution time, number of required nodes, and suitable data security algorithms are heavily researched in the literature.e paper also presents the implementation of an embedded-blockchain approach.is system presents a hybrid implementation of ethereum nodes on Raspberry Pi on one side and of PoW consensus on FPGA. is may prove to be a significant proposal for future implementations since it provides the possibility to set up an ASIC to accelerate the POW execution.e authors in a research article titled \"New Efficient and Secured Authentication Protocol for Remote Healthcare Systems in Cloud-IoT\" proposed new authentication scheme for health care systems cloud-IoT [15].Before presenting the proposed work, the authors demonstrate the vulnerabilities and security issues of previous proposed studies including Sharma and Kalra's scheme.e authors discover few weaknesses in the Sharma and Kalra's protocol along with password guessing and smart card stolen attacks.e simulation tests as performed under Scyther tool confirm that the lightweight proposed protocol satisfies up-to-date security requirements.e formal and informal analysis also",
      "published": "2022-04-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/9865621",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Azeem Irshad",
        "Muhammad Shafiq",
        "Shehzad Ashraf Chaudhry",
        "Muhammad Usman"
      ],
      "venue": "Security and Communication Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1155/2022/9865621",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1155/jece/5770202",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the EV Charging Ecosystem: Protocol‐Level Vulnerabilities, Defenses, and a Research Roadmap",
      "description": "Electric mobility offers promising benefits in sustainability and efficiency but also presents significant cybersecurity challenges that threaten the integrity of electric vehicles (EVs), charging infrastructure, and their communication systems. This article reviews the main threats, vulnerabilities, and existing mitigation strategies, identifying critical weaknesses in communication protocols, insufficient protection of charging stations, and limited onboard security. Notably, protocols such as CAN bus, OCPP, and ISO 15118 dominate current implementations; however, many of these protocols lack comprehensive protection mechanisms. Among the most frequent attacks are tampering, denial‐of‐service (DoS), and man‐in‐the‐middle attacks, which often target communication systems and charging points—the most vulnerable elements in the ecosystem. The review also highlights underexplored but critical issues, including the low adoption of protocols such as ISO 26262 and IEC 61850, the security of V2X communications, and the protection of personal data generated by EVs. The article makes a main contribution by proposing a cybersecurity reference architecture and a strategic research roadmap to enhance resilience in electric mobility systems. These tools aim to address current gaps, promote the development of secure and adaptive communication frameworks, and support both academic research and industrial implementation in the transition to intelligent and connected mobility.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1155/jece/5770202",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp",
        "personal data",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miguel Aybar-Mejía",
        "Samil Cuevas",
        "Hipólito Encarnación",
        "Larimar Abel",
        "Jarlen Pichardo",
        "Kasumi Yasuoka",
        "Deyslen Mariano-Hernández",
        "Armando José Taveras Cruz",
        "Giuseppe Sbriz-Zeitun",
        "Fabio Andrade",
        "Jesús C. Hernández"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1155/jece/5770202",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.11591/ijece.v11i4.pp3013-3021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous vehicles: A study of implementation and security",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles have been invented to increase the safety of transportation users. These vehicles can sense their environment and make decisions without any external aid to produce an optimal route to reach a destination. Even though the idea sounds futuristic and if implemented successfully, many current issues related to transportation will be solved, care needs to be taken before implementing the solution. This paper will look at the pros and cons of implementation of autonomous vehicles. The vehicles depend highly on the sensors present on the vehicles and any tampering or manipulation of the data generated and transmitted by these can have disastrous consequences, as human lives are at stake here. Various attacks against the different type of sensors on-board an autonomous vehicle are covered.",
      "published": "2021-04-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.11591/ijece.v11i4.pp3013-3021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Firoz Khan",
        "R. Lakshmana Kumar",
        "Seifedine Kadry",
        "Yunyoung Nam",
        "Maytham N. Meqdad"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Power Electronics and Drive Systems/International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.11591/ijece.v11i4.pp3013-3021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.11591/ijece.v13i5.pp5209-5221",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Ethernet architecture and security: challenges and technologies",
      "description": "Vehicle infrastructure must address the challenges posed by today's advances toward connected and autonomous vehicles. To allow for more flexible architectures, high-bandwidth connections and scalability are needed to connect many sensors and electronic control units (ECUs). At the same time, deterministic and low latency is a critical and significant design requirement to support urgent real-time applications in autonomous vehicles. As a recent solution, the time-sensitive network (TSN) was introduced as Ethernet-based amendments in IEEE 802.1 TSN standards to meet those needs. However, it had hurdle to be overcome before it can be used effectively. This paper discusses the latest studies concerning the automotive Ethernet requirements, including transmission delay studies to improve worst-case end-to-end delay and end-to-end jitter. Also, the paper focuses on the securing Ethernet-based in-vehicle networks (IVNs) by reviewing new encryption and authentication methods and approaches.",
      "published": "2023-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.11591/ijece.v13i5.pp5209-5221",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wael Toghuj",
        "Nidal M. Turab"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Power Electronics and Drive Systems/International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.11591/ijece.v13i5.pp5209-5221",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.11591/ijeecs.v11.i2.pp688-695",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Side-Channel Security on Key Exchange Protocol: Timing and Relay Attacks",
      "description": "The advancing of Key Exchange Protocol (KEP) is compulsory to secure the connected world via Internet of Thing (IoT), cryptocurrency and blockchain, virtual intelligent, smart computing etc. To address the security issues in the Internet based computing systems, this paper explores the side-channel security for KEP, namely timing and relay attacks. Nowadays, various KEP variances are used by internet protocol such as IKEv2/3. The purpose of KEP is to enable a secret key(s) sharing between two or more computing systems on unsecure network. Later, the secret key(s) is used to encrypt all data transmitted for online systems such as internet banking, cryptocurrency transaction, IoT services etc. The timing attack was addressed by an adversary model and security assumptions. The relay attack on KEP was tested by an experiment testbed between a key fob and car using Raspberry Pi and RF module. The experiment result has shown that the propagation delay of KEP on RF communication is increased by 100% for each relay node. If the KEP runtime is increased greater than 50%, the KEP authentication key should be discarded to prevent the attacker from gaining access to the car.",
      "published": "2018-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.11591/ijeecs.v11.i2.pp688-695",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "key fob"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohd Anuar Mat Isa",
        "Habibah Hashim",
        "Syed Farid Syed Adnan",
        "Nur Nabila Mohamed",
        "Yasin Fitri Alias"
      ],
      "venue": "Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.11591/ijeecs.v11.i2.pp688-695",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1163/15730255-bja10157",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Legal Aspects of Telematics for Law Enforcement",
      "description": "Abstract Telematics is a technology that allows vehicle tracking and monitoring. This paper investigates its legal implications in Qatar, where road fatalities are high, but considers the results with international applicability. It reviews the current laws that govern telematics and evaluates their compatibility with constitutional rights or principles, especially privacy. It also examines how telematics can enhance road safety by providing data and feedback on various driving factors. The paper finds that telematics can offer significant benefits for traffic regulation in Qatar, but also poses some legal challenges that need to be addressed.",
      "published": "2024-03-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1163/15730255-bja10157",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "regulation",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jon Truby",
        "Khalid Saleh Al-Shamari",
        "Rafael Dean Brown",
        "Imad Antoine Ibrahim"
      ],
      "venue": "Arab Law Quarterly",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1163/15730255-bja10157",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.11648/j.ijtet.20251103.12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comprehensive Review of Contemporary Challenges and Opportunities in Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The integration of advanced technologies into modern vehicles has significantly transformed the automotive industry, delivering notable improvements in safety, efficiency, and user convenience. However, this technological advancement has also increased vehicles' exposure to cybersecurity threats, raising serious concerns about the integrity, safety, and privacy of automotive systems. This paper seeks to examine the complex and evolving landscape of automotive cybersecurity, addressing both the inherent challenges and the emerging opportunities it presents for researchers, manufacturers, and policymakers. This review also explores ethical, regulatory, and standardization aspects, identifying key directions for future research and the development of resilient vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2025-09-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijtet.20251103.12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Javad Heydari"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Transportation Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.11648/j.ijtet.20251103.12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1177/0361198118799012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Attacks in Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Applications and Their Prevention",
      "description": "A connected vehicle (CV) environment is comprised of diverse computing infrastructure, data communication and dissemination, and data collection systems that are vulnerable to the same cyberattacks as all traditional computing environments. Cyberattacks can jeopardize the expected safety, mobility, energy, and environmental benefits from CV applications. As cyberattacks can lead to severe consequences such as traffic incidents, it has become one of the primary concerns in CV applications. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cyberattacks on the vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) network from a V2I application point of view. Then, we develop a novel V2I cybersecurity architecture, named CVGuard, which can detect and prevent cyberattacks on the V2I applications. In designing CVGuard, key challenges, such as scalability, resiliency and future usability were considered. A case study using a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on a V2I application, “Stop Sign Gap Assist (SSGA)” application, shows that CVGuard was effective in mitigating the adverse safety effects created by a DDoS attack. In our case study, because of the DDoS attack, conflicts between the minor and major road vehicles occurred at an unsignalized intersection, which could have caused crashes. A reduction of conflicts between vehicles occurred because CVGuard was in operation. The reduction of conflicts was compared based on the number of conflicts before and after the implementation and operation of the CVGuard security platform. Analysis revealed that the strategies adopted by CVGuard were successful in reducing the conflicts by 60% where a DDoS attack compromised the SSGA application at an unsignalized intersection.",
      "published": "2018-10-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/0361198118799012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mhafuzul Islam",
        "Mashrur A. Chowdhury",
        "Hongda Li",
        "Hongxin Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "Transportation Research Record Journal of the Transportation Research Board",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1177/0361198118799012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1177/1541931218621032",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Human Factors in Cybersecurity – Perspectives from Industries",
      "description": "Today, cybersecurity is impacting every individual and industry, but the level of effort from the human factors community seems negligible compared to the magnitude of the current security challenge. This panel invites professionals in the healthcare, computer and network, higher education, and automotive industries to share experiences, lessons learned and solutions. The panel characterizes the security landscape in different industries and facilitate discussion on human factors research and applications to address the formidable security challenge.",
      "published": "2018-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/1541931218621032",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nathan Ka Ching Lau",
        "Robert Pastel",
        "Melissa R Chapman",
        "Jennifer Minarik",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "Dave Hale"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1177/1541931218621032",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1177/1548512915604584",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Special Issue: Modeling & Simulation for Cyber Security of Autonomous Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "The transportation and information gathering needs of our world are changing.Transportation systems are becoming more vital for our society and also more congested.Networking holds out the hope for more efficient use of multiple autonomous systems but also opens the door for increased risk exposure to failures and malicious attacks.Developments in internet technologies, online auctions and games, social networks, high-technology engineered systems with multiple dynamic components, and elsewhere motivate new advancements for decision, interaction, and control in cyberphysical systems (CPS) with autonomous dynamical subsystems.Examples of vehicle CPS can be found in areas as diverse as automobiles, air transportation, civil infrastructure, trains, and surface and subsurface water vehicles.Information Assurance must provide authentic, accurate, secure, reliable, and timely information to vehicle decision and control systems in order to achieve information dominance, mission performance, and survivability in risky changing environments.Computing and information processes must be carried out over distributed and heterogeneous networked systems for resilience to minimize single point of failure to malicious attacks.Recent advances in autonomous cyberphysical systems show promise for improved reconnaissance, surveillance, and security in foreign and domestic conflicts.However, CPS also present new and unevaluated sets of attack surfaces in communications and controls.As such, the modeling and simulation of cyber security in autonomous systems is a critical research area that will ultimately dictate the ways these systems should interact with people and each other.Thus, the goal of this Special Issue is collect a comprehensive body of descriptive and prescriptive approaches to modeling and simulating cyber security threats, defense techniques, and overall frameworks in highly dynamic and hostile environments.This special issue is composed of five papers that show the current state of modeling, simulation, decision, and control in some important areas of cyberphysical systems.The paper by Yag ̆dereli, Gemci, and Aktas x presents a study on cyber security of unmanned vehicles, including cars,",
      "published": "2015-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/1548512915604584",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dariusz Mikulski",
        "Gregory R. Hudas",
        "Sajal Kumar Das",
        "Frank L. Lewis"
      ],
      "venue": "The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation Applications Methodology Technology",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1177/1548512915604584",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s12544-025-00732-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Testing autonomous vehicles and AI: perspectives and challenges from cybersecurity, transparency, robustness and fairness",
      "description": "Abstract This study aims to comprehensively explore the complexities of integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) into Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), examining the challenges introduced by AI components and their impact on testing procedures. The research focuses on essential requirements for trustworthy AI, including cybersecurity, transparency, robustness, and fairness. We first analyse the role of AI at the most relevant operational layers of AVs, and discuss the implications of the EU’s AI Act on AVs, highlighting the importance of the concept of a safety component. Using an expert opinion-based methodology, involving an interdisciplinary workshop with 21 academics and a subsequent in-depth analysis by a smaller group of experts, this study provides a state-of-the-art overview of the current landscape of vehicle regulation and standards, including ex-ante, post-hoc, and accident investigation processes, highlighting the need for new testing methodologies for both Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Automated Driving Systems (ADS). The study also provides a detailed analysis of cybersecurity audits, explainability in AI decision-making processes and protocols for assessing the robustness and ethical behaviour of predictive systems in AVs. The analysis highlights significant challenges and suggests future directions for research and development of AI in AV technology, emphasising the need for multidisciplinary expertise. The study’s conclusions have relevant implications for the development of trustworthy AI systems, vehicle regulations, and the safe deployment of AVs.",
      "published": "2025-07-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s12544-025-00732-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Fernández Llorca",
        "Ronan Hamon",
        "H. Junklewitz",
        "Kathrin Grosse",
        "Lars Kunze",
        "Patrick Seiniger",
        "Robert Swaim",
        "Nick Reed",
        "Alexandre Alahi",
        "Emília Gómez",
        "Ignacio Sánchez",
        "Ákos Kriston"
      ],
      "venue": "European Transport Research Review",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1186/s12544-025-00732-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 47,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s13638-019-1484-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection system for automotive Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system: a review",
      "description": "The modern vehicles nowadays are managed by networked controllers. Most of the networks were designed with little concern about security which has recently motivated researchers to demonstrate various kinds of attacks against the system. In this paper, we discussed the vulnerabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) within in-vehicle communication protocol along with some potential attacks that could be exploited against it. Besides, we present some of the security solutions proposed in the current state of research in order to overcome the attacks. However, the main goal of this paper is to highlight a holistic approach known as intrusion detection system (IDS) which has been a significant tool in securing networks and information systems over the past decades. To the best of our knowledge, there is no recorded literature on a comprehensive overview of IDS implementation specifically in the CAN bus network system. Thus, we proposed an in-depth investigation of IDS found in the literature based on the following aspects: detection approaches, deployment strategies, attacking techniques, and finally technical challenges. In addition, we also categorized the anomaly-based IDS according to these methods, e.g., frequency-based, machine learning-based, statistical-based, and hybrid-based as part of our contributions. Correspondingly, this study will help to accelerate other researchers to pursue IDS research in the CAN bus system.",
      "published": "2019-07-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s13638-019-1484-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siti-Farhana Lokman",
        "Abu Talib Othman",
        "Muhammad-Husaini Abu-Bakar"
      ],
      "venue": "EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1186/s13638-019-1484-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 289,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s13638-020-01742-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Authenticated secret key generation in delay-constrained wireless systems",
      "description": "Abstract With the emergence of 5G low-latency applications, such as haptics and V2X, low-complexity and low-latency security mechanisms are needed. Promising lightweight mechanisms include physical unclonable functions (PUF) and secret key generation (SKG) at the physical layer, as considered in this paper. In this framework, we propose (i) a zero round trip time (0-RTT) resumption authentication protocol combining PUF and SKG processes, (ii) a novel authenticated encryption (AE) using SKG, and (iii) pipelining of the AE SKG and the encrypted data transfer in order to reduce latency. Implementing the pipelining at PHY, we investigate a parallel SKG approach for multi-carrier systems, where a subset of the subcarriers are used for SKG and the rest for data transmission. The optimal solution to this PHY resource allocation problem is identified under security, power, and delay constraints, by formulating the subcarrier scheduling as a subset-sum 0−1 knapsack optimization. A heuristic algorithm of linear complexity is proposed and shown to incur negligible loss with respect to the optimal dynamic programming solution. All of the proposed mechanisms have the potential to pave the way for a new breed of latency aware security protocols.",
      "published": "2020-01-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s13638-020-01742-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miroslav Mitev",
        "Arsenia Chorti",
        "Martin J. Reed",
        "Leila Musavian"
      ],
      "venue": "EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1186/s13638-020-01742-0",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s42162-022-00190-y",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An analysis of privacy preservation in electric vehicle charging",
      "description": "Abstract Electric vehicles (EVs) are gaining widespread adoption, which requires expanding the charging infrastructure. This infrastructure is part of a complex ecosystem that consists of multiple entities interacting with each other and exchanging (often personal) user data. Such a heterogeneous system with multiple participants exchanging personal data poses severe privacy risks to users. State-of-the-art literature insufficiently covers privacy aspects of charging ecosystem use cases. In this paper, a profound analysis of this ecosystem with respect to privacy is provided: First, the EV charging ecosystem and its entities are defined. Second, high-level use cases for EV charging identified in literature are analyzed and used for defining data flows within the charging ecosystem. Third, the identified use cases are compared in terms of privacy guarantees and adherence to standards. Fourth, representative implementations of these use cases are evaluated, i.e., all actors and (unintended) data flows are described and potential privacy threats are identified and visualized. It is found that privacy is not sufficiently covered by standards and implementations of EV charging use cases from literature. Furthermore, recommendations and future directions for protecting user privacy in the EV charging ecosystem are derived. In summary, stricter adherence to standards and privacy by design are suggested.",
      "published": "2022-04-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s42162-022-00190-y",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "personal data",
        "privacy",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Unterweger",
        "Fabian Knirsch",
        "Dominik Engel",
        "Daria Musikhina",
        "Ammar Alyousef",
        "Hermann de Meer"
      ],
      "venue": "Energy Informatics",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1186/s42162-022-00190-y",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s42400-022-00132-x",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Valet attack on privacy: a cybersecurity threat in automotive Bluetooth infotainment systems",
      "description": "Abstract Modern automobiles are equipped with connectivity features to enhance the user’s comfort. Bluetooth is one such communication technology that is used to pair a personal device with an automotive infotainment unit. Upon pairing, the user could access the personal information on the phone through the automotive head unit with minimum distraction while driving. However, such connectivity introduces a possibility for privacy attacks. Hence, performing an in-depth analysis of the system with privacy constraints is extremely important to prevent unauthorized access to personal information. In this work, we perform a systematic analysis of the Bluetooth network of an automotive infotainment unit to exploit security and privacy-related vulnerabilities. We model the identified threat with respect to privacy constraints of the system, emphasize the severity of attacks through a standardized rating metric and then provide potential countermeasures to prevent the attack. We perform System Theoretic Process Analysis for Privacy as a part of the systematic analysis and use the Common Vulnerability Scoring System to derive attack severity. The identified vulnerabilities are due to design flaws and assumptions on Bluetooth protocol implementation on automotive infotainment systems. We then elicit the vulnerability by performing a privacy attack on the Automotive system in an actual vehicle. We use Android Open-Source Project to report our findings and propose defense strategies.",
      "published": "2022-10-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s42400-022-00132-x",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vishnu Renganathan",
        "Ekim Yurtsever",
        "Qadeer Ahmed",
        "Aylin Yener"
      ],
      "venue": "Cybersecurity",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1186/s42400-022-00132-x",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s42400-025-00365-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CGTS: graph transformer-based anomaly detection in controller area networks",
      "description": "Abstract Anomaly detection in the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is critical for ensuring the security and reliability of intelligent connected vehicles, which are increasingly prevalent. While existing anomaly detection strategies offer some benefits, they often face challenges such as limited feature extraction and data imbalance, which reduce their effectiveness. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose an unsupervised intrusion detection method based on CAN message graph named CGTS. Specifically, we first construct a message graph based on CAN message sequences. A Graph Transformer is then employed to extract complex structural information, accurately capturing the intrinsic connections between messages. Furthermore, to address the data imbalance problem, we integrate the Support Vector Data Description algorithm after the Graph Transformer model. This algorithm identifies anomalous behaviors efficiently without relying on a priori labels. Experiments conducted on public datasets, including Car-Hacking and CAN-Train-and-Test, demonstrate the efficacy of CGTS. The model achieves an average accuracy exceeding 0.990, precision above 0.995, and an F1-score nearing 0.993. These results highlight CGTS can effectively detect multiple injection attacks and significantly improve the CAN bus intrusion detection performance.",
      "published": "2025-08-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s42400-025-00365-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhou Xue",
        "Guihe Qin",
        "Yanhua Liang",
        "Jiaru Song",
        "Wanning Liu",
        "Qingxin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Cybersecurity",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1186/s42400-025-00365-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.404,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1186/s42400-025-00365-6 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: limited, without, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s43065-020-00008-9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilience modeling concepts in transportation systems: a comprehensive review based on mode, and modeling techniques",
      "description": "Abstract The objective of this comprehensive review study was to compile a state-of-the-art understanding of the resilience of the transportation system due to natural and man-made disasters. This study identified resilience measurement parameters that can be used to formulate resilience quantification and improvement strategies of a transportation system. Reviewed articles were classified and summarized from two perspectives: (i) modeling based on the mode of transportation; and (ii) modeling based on the mathematical technique used to quantify resilience. One of the unique contributions of this review article is that it compiled the key resilience indices that were analyzed to quantify resilience. This review revealed that the majority of the scholarly articles on the topic of transportation system resilience published since 2006, were focused on the resilience of the roadway-based transportation system, and vulnerability was one of the most explored resilience indices in evaluating transportation system resilience. Several future research directions were identified considering the implications of emerging transportation technologies (e.g., connected and automated vehicle technology). The complex interdependency among critical infrastructure systems such as power, transportation, and communication system, as well as the cybersecurity issues in the advanced intelligent transportation system, will be vital in the resilience analysis of future transportation systems.",
      "published": "2020-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s43065-020-00008-9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "resilience",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shofiq Ahmed",
        "Kakan Chandra Dey"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Infrastructure Preservation and Resilience",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1186/s43065-020-00008-9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 93,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s43067-025-00309-7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Composite vulnerability index-based mitigation-aware control law for multiple electric vehicle charging system",
      "description": "Abstract The rapid growth of electric vehicle (EV) adoption demands intelligent, secure, and resilient charging infrastructures capable of operating reliably under cyber-physical uncertainties. This paper designs a Composite Vulnerability Index (CVI)-based mitigation-aware control law for real-time, resilient management of multiple EV charging systems. The CVI quantifies the aggregated risk level of each EV’s charging context by fusing multiple factors such as cyber threats, communication latency, thermal stress, and power quality disturbances. The paper proposes a Digital-Twin enhanced Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework that integrates a Composite Vulnerability Index (CVI) with a mitigation-aware control law for large-scale multi-EV charging networks. A physics-informed EV Charging Digital Twin (DT) continuously predicts system evolution and identifies discrepancies using a learned residual model, enabling real-time characterization of operational uncertainty and cyber-attack impacts. The DT outputs both corrected state estimates and a risk cost that penalizes model uncertainty and elevated vulnerability levels. A Dreamer-V3 world-model-based RL agent uses these DT signals to learn an optimal control policy that adaptively allocates charging power, mitigates risks, and preserves grid safety under DDoS, MITM, spoofing, voltage instability, thermal overload, and communication delays. The proposed CVI integrates cyber, physical, and communication vulnerabilities into a unified state-aware metric, enabling coordinated power redistribution among multiple EV stations through a distributed primal-dual scheme. Simulation results with distributed EV charging stations demonstrate the system’s ability to ensure adaptive charging, equitable energy distribution, and successful convergence to target state-of-charge (SOC) levels while mitigating potential threats. The findings validate the CVI-based strategy as an effective framework for secure, scalable, and risk-aware EV energy management in next-generation smart grids.",
      "published": "2025-12-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s43067-025-00309-7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Desh Deepak Sharma",
        "Rashmi Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Electrical Systems and Information Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1186/s43067-025-00309-7",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1186/s44147-023-00204-w",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Determination of maximum additional load for EV charging station considering practical security limits",
      "description": "Nowadays, the allocation of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS) for the charging of electric vehicles (EVs) is essential, as random allocation may cause significant energy loss for the radial distribution system (RDS). Uncoordinated charging of EVs dominates the load profile of the RDS. Although a single EV has a negligible impact on the system, the combined effect of charging an EV cluster may violate the voltage security constraints of the RDS. Therefore, to avoid such circumstances, the loadability limit of each node of the RDS must be determined. Previously, conventional analytical methods were used to calculate the maximum loadability of the RDS node, where voltage magnitudes become less than the critical voltage limit. However, these approaches are not acceptable for the power industry, as it may push the system towards a blackout. Therefore, the appropriate capacity of the EVCS can only be determined if the voltage security limit of each node of the RDS follows its critical limit. Hence, in this paper, a modified forward-backward sweep (MFBS) algorithm is formulated to find the maximum additional load (MAL) of each node of the RDS considering non-unity power factor during the EV charging process. This algorithm may help the EVCS to determine its capacity or optimal number of charging ports directly during installation at an optimal location of RDS. For validation, the 33-bus and 69-bus RDSs have been used, and it can be seen that the EVCSs have been successfully installed in the optimal location of the test systems mentioned above without violating the voltage security limit of each node of the RDS.",
      "published": "2023-05-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1186/s44147-023-00204-w",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sayak Mondal",
        "P. Acharjee",
        "A. Bhattacharya"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of engineering and applied sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1186/s44147-023-00204-w",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003109952-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart Cars and Over-the-Air Updates",
      "description": "Researchers have been studying ways to create the ultimate smart car. Many smart car systems are built to work in a distributed manner, therefore requiring connection and communication with other systems, over a network that is either wireless or not. Smart cars have started taking over the world and, sooner rather than later, they might become the new normal in the automotive industry. This chapter contains an offer to the automotive industry. On the contrary, it presents a multitude of threats and vulnerabilities that arise via the use of such technology. The chapter is concerned with displaying existing solutions to those problems. As technology evolves, new innovative solutions are presented to counter the threats. The chapter describes the protection mechanisms that have been built and explore some of their possibilities. Lastly, it is dedicated to final conclusions on the matter of smart cars and over-the-air updates with an emphasis on security.",
      "published": "2021-08-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003109952-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Panagiotis Efstathiadis",
        "Anna Karanika",
        "Nestoras Chouliaras",
        "Leandros A. Maglaras",
        "Ioanna Kantzavelou"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003109952-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003264415-13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The authors weave into this research case the market demand driven by the value perception of consumers who own or wish to buy connected vehicles, the vehicle manufacturers’ innovation and viewpoints, and finally the reality of vehicles’ interconnected technology which makes them vulnerable to cyberattacks. The vehicle manufacturers’ willingness to qualitatively address ethical concerns, security risks, legal matters, governance, and emerging technologies is key to companies’ reputation and growth. The research chapter includes an in-depth analysis of these topics and suggests lessons for vehicle manufacturers, connected vehicle consumers, and governments.",
      "published": "2024-04-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003264415-13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sasha Pugh",
        "Juliet Samandari",
        "Hannah Yeo"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003264415-13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4062,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1201/9781003264415-13 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: makes, case, risks, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003559993-12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing the security of firmware over-the-air updates in automotive cyber-physical system",
      "description": "In this era of technological advancements, traditional devices have evolved into intelligent counterparts. Similarly, automobiles are transitioning into “smart cars,” equipped with extensive data capabilities. While this evolution enhances convenience, it also exposes vehicles to cyber threats. To address security risks, regular updates are crucial, replacing conventional security measures. As vehicles increasingly rely on electronic components over mechanical ones, they become sophisticated systems with more than 50 electronic control units (ECUs). Firmware updates are essential for bug fixes and enhanced functionality. While traditional updates required physical access, the emerging trend is firmware over-the-air (FOTA), offering faster updates and improved safety. Malicious firmware installations can mimic physical attacks, compromising safety. As the in-vehicle network becomes vulnerable, vehicle viruses pose serious threats, necessitating robust firmware update verification. Yet verifying firmware integrity faces challenges in untrusted ECU environments, as attackers can manipulate integrity checks stored within the unit. The chapter offers an overview of FOTA update processes, emphasizing their importance in modern systems. It examines the security challenges linked with FOTA updates and analyzes diverse security features to address these risks. Furthermore, it investigates prospective directions and potential avenues for further research in this vital domain.",
      "published": "2024-11-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003559993-12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rachana Y. Patil",
        "Yogesh H. Patil",
        "Asmita Manna",
        "Manjiri Arunrao Ranjanikar"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003559993-12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003590774-2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Role of Additive Manufacturing in Industry 4.0",
      "description": "The convergence of Additive Manufacturing (AM) and the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is reshaping industrial production by combining design flexibility with real-time connectivity and intelligence. AM provides layer-by-layer fabrication that supports rapid prototyping, mass customisation, and material efficiency, while IIoT enables data-driven decision-making through sensors, connectivity, edge/cloud computing, and artificial intelligence. Their integration establishes cyber-physical ecosystems where manufacturing processes are monitored, optimised, and secured in real time. This chapter explores the fundamentals of AM and IIoT, tracing their evolution and current states. Then it examines the synergies between AM and IIoT, highlighting digital twins, adaptive process control, and blockchain-enabled security frameworks. Practical applications across aerospace, healthcare, automotive, and energy sectors are presented, followed by a discussion of reference architecture, interoperability issues, and AI/ML-driven frameworks for intelligent manufacturing. The chapter also identifies challenges and future research opportunities, including scalability, cybersecurity, and sustainable adoption, situating AM-IIoT convergence within the broader vision of Industry 5.0. Leading companies such as GE Additive, Siemens, and HP have showcased the power of AM-IIoT convergence through improved build quality, predictive maintenance, and efficiency gains. These successes demonstrate significant advances in productivity and time-to-market, yet challenges persist in interoperability, cybersecurity, and standardisation. This chapter bridges AM’s hardware agility with IIoT’s digital intelligence, describing the path to smart, adaptive, and sustainable manufacturing.",
      "published": "2026-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003590774-2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Madhukrishna Priyadarsini",
        "Mallikarjuna B",
        "Santosh Kumar Mishra"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003590774-2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003596707-41",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modeling Attack Tree for CAN and ECU Vulnerabilities in Electric Vehicles to Drain its Battery",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) represent a promising advancement in transportation technology, offering numerous benefits such as reduced emissions and lower operating costs. However, as EVs become increasingly integrated with complex digital systems, they are also becoming more susceptible to cyber threats. The presented work delves into the critical examination of vulnerabilities inherent in Electric Vehicles (EVs), specifically focusing on the Controller Area Network (CAN) and Electronic Control Units (ECUs). The primary goal is to develop and analyze an attack tree model to understand potential threats that could lead to the malicious draining of an EV’s battery. Through meticulous analysis of existing literature, vulnerabilities in the CAN network and ECUs are found, encompassing compromise methods such as physical access, remote intrusion, and malware injection. Critical vulnerabilities in communication, software, and battery management systems are revealed, underscoring the multifaceted nature of cyber threats. Additionally, risks associated with overcharging, over-discharging, and battery drain are explored, as these vulnerabilities can be exploited through remote access, physical tampering, and social engineering, posing significant risks. The future scope involves implementing strategies to mitigate identified vulnerabilities, thereby enhancing the security and resilience of EV systems against cyber threats.",
      "published": "2024-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003596707-41",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "malware"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Irfan N. A. Siddavatam",
        "Rahil Zubair Wahedna",
        "Mohammed Haaris Shaikh",
        "Kashmira Sonar"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003596707-41",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003610908-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring CAN Bus Security",
      "description": "The autonomous vehicles use CAN bus, which significantly impacts the data transmission in the autonomous vehicle system. This chapter provides detailed information about the CAN bus protocol and intrusion detection system and describes the method used to mitigate the vulnerabilities in the protocol. This chapter is organised as follows: it begins with controller area network specifications, the severity of the problem, the current solutions implemented for CAN bus, and machine learning and IDS, which contains two techniques known as traditional machine learning and deep learning-based IDS.",
      "published": "2025-03-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003610908-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Alruwaili",
        "Sardar M. N. Islam",
        "Iqbal Gondal"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003610908-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003628569-9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Collaborative Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Diverse Internet of Things (IoT) Devices",
      "description": "Automotive Internet of Things (IoT) presents a myriad of possibilities for addressing challenges within the automobile industry. By facilitating connectivity to the internet, it establishes a network for seamless data exchange, communication, enhanced safety measures, advanced infotainment options, and robust solutions for privacy and security concerns. This interconnected automotive ecosystem opens up new avenues for innovation and efficiency, paving the way for a more interconnected and technologically advanced future in the automotive sector. Automotive IoT, an extension of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) with internet connectivity, leverages components like On-Board Units (OBUs) and Roadside Units (RSUs) to revolutionize the automotive industry. It addresses challenges in connected vehicles, telematics, communication, safety, infotainment, and predictive maintenance, contributing to a more interconnected and technologically advanced automotive ecosystem. It plays a crucial role in addressing and enhancing the following key aspects. The integration of automotive IoT in vehicles brings about several privacy and security challenges which includes but not limited to data privacy, unauthorized hacking, theft identification, vehicle tracking, etc. The privacy often stems from the prevalent practice of centralized data exchange and communication with the cloud in the current architectural setup With Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication the types of data generated varies across devices in the automotive ecosystem. To address these issues the federated learning (FL) allows participants to collaboratively train the local models on local data without revealing their sensitive information to the central cloud server by offloading the training on edge servers.",
      "published": "2026-02-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003628569-9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hacking",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "T. Mamatha",
        "Devi Kannan"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003628569-9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4311,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.1201/9781003628569-9 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage, privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: following, sensitive, unauthorized, limited, like, intelligence, without, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003640790-11",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Protocol Security Assessment",
      "description": "The increasing integration of in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems in modern cars has introduced significant security issues. This chapter presents a new approach for analyzing security vulnerabilities in automotive infotainment systems with a focus on the controller area network (CAN) bus and Wi-Fi communication protocols. Combining randomized, search, and greedy algorithms, the authors introduce a new method for simulating and analyzing potential attack vectors to expand the understanding of system vulnerabilities. The experimental framework implemented Automotive Grade Linux (AGL) in a virtualized environment using tools, including Parrot OS, VMware Workstation, Wireshark, and CAN utilities. Quantitative and statistical methods demonstrate that the system complexity is positively correlated with the number of vulnerabilities, whereby systems classified under low, medium, and high complexity contain 2, 4, and 6 exploitable weaknesses, respectively. The results reveal various forms of vulnerabilities caused by cyber threats, including CAN bus message injection, eavesdropping, denial-of-service attacks, replay attacks, Wi-Fi traffic interception, and unauthorized access through open ports. The proposed countermeasures, including encryption of CAN bus communications, message authentication protocols, and robust Wi-Fi security configurations, are actionable strategies toward mitigation. This chapter contributes to the state-of-the-art with a novel vulnerability assessment framework for automotive and practical insight into improving automotive cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2026-01-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003640790-11",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wareez A. Busari",
        "Abeeb Akorede Bello",
        "Agbotiname Lucky Imoize"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003640790-11",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003646518",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Strategy of Intelligent Transport’s Telematic Systems",
      "description": "This book is a monograph devoted to one of the key challenges of modern transport – the safety strategy for telematics systems being used in the movement of people and cargo. In this sense, the publication aligns with current research trends related to the dynamic development of information and telecommunications technologies which are shaping new operating models for transport and logistics companies. The authors address issues of strategic transport management, focusing on the role of telematics as a tool supporting efficiency, automation, and coordination of operations. Particular emphasis is placed on the issues of risk and safety – which, in an era of growing transport volumes and intensifying competition in the transport market, are becoming a prerequisite for the reliability and sustainable development of the entire industry. The book demonstrates that the safe use of telematics systems is not only a technological requirement, but also a social and environmental one. It is in line with European Union policy, which prioritizes environmental protection, improving social well-being, and reducing road accidents, which constitute one of the greatest threats to civilization. Combining theoretical and practical perspectives, this monograph offers a comprehensive overview of the implementation of secure telematics solutions. It is a valuable resource for transport researchers and students, as well as for logistics company managers and decisionmakers responsible for infrastructure development and transport policy.",
      "published": "2026-04-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003646518",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anna Brzozowska",
        "Wojciech Dyduch",
        "Aleksander Pabian",
        "Barbara Pabian",
        "Magdalena Sobocińska"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003646518",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003654483-85",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Emerging approaches to secure vehicle remote keyless entry",
      "description": "While Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) and Passive Remote Keyless Entry (PKE) systems have greatly improved vehicle security and comfort, vulnerabilities persist in many vehicles owing to things like slow adoption of modern security practices, outdated cryptographic methods, and design flaws. These oversights expose them to attacks such as signal jamming, replay attacks, and rollback attacks. This paper presents our analysis of current emerging solutions designed to address these risks while highlighting loopholes, advantages, and drawbacks of key approaches pertaining to vehicular security. The solutions examined include a mix of protocols, including Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), timestamp-based security protocols, and machine learning (ML)-driven techniques to enhance systems. Blockchain and quantum-resistant authentication systems are also explored. Future emphasis is placed on the need to mitigate challenges such as implementation complexity, compatibility with legacy systems, and the questions arising with the growing wave of mobile app-based entry systems.",
      "published": "2025-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003654483-85",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "jamming",
        "keyless",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A.A. Hingorani",
        "Savita Wadhawan",
        "Umesh Chandra Gupta"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003654483-85",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003725046-25",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Review of Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle Networks: Advances, Challenges, and Insights from the CICIoV2024 Dataset",
      "description": "Modern connected cars raise cybersecurity concerns in In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) and required efficient Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). This study examines recently published CICIoV2024 and can-train-and-test datasets and IDS techniques on them with an emphasis on feature selection, machine learning (ML), deep learning (DL), and metaheuristic optimization. For attack detection optimization methods such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Genetic Algorithms (GA), and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) are analysed. Emerging technologies like Federated Learning and Blockchain-based IDS are examined, along with issues like explainability, adversarial robustness, and real-time deployment. Results indicate that hybrid machine learning techniques improve detection precision and open the door for scalable intrusion detection systems IVNs.",
      "published": "2025-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003725046-25",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rakesh Parmar",
        "Nirav V. Bhatt"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003725046-25",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781003778882-14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) update for Industrial IOT solutions",
      "description": "Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) update for Industrial IOT solutions represents a pivotal advancement in device management and security within the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem. This technology enables remote updates and maintenance of embedded firmware on connected devices, ensuring they remain current with the latest features, patches, and security enhancements without requiring physical access. FOTA operates by facilitating the wireless transmission of firmware updates directly to devices, eliminating the need for manual interventions such as recalls or on-site maintenance. This capability is particularly advantageous in scenarios where devices are deployed in remote or inaccessible locations, such as industrial settings or within critical infrastructure. Despite its advantages, FOTA implementation requires careful consideration of security protocols, bandwidth management, and user consent to ensure seamless and secure operations. A key benefit of FOTA is its ability to address security vulnerabilities by distributing patches and updates efficiently. In sectors like automotive, where connected vehicles are becoming more prevalent, FOTA ensures that cars can receive updates to critical systems like the engine control unit (ECU), infotainment, and safety features. A key benefit of FOTA is its ability to address security vulnerabilities by distributing patches and updates efficiently. In sectors like automotive, where connected vehicles are becoming more prevalent, FOTA ensures that cars can receive updates to critical systems like the engine control unit (ECU), infotainment, and safety features. In conclusion, Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) represents a critical evolution in device management, offering enhanced security, efficiency, and scalability while facilitating continuous innovation in IoT deployments. Its ability to remotely manage firmware updates ensures that devices remain agile, secure, and aligned with evolving technological landscapes.",
      "published": "2026-03-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003778882-14",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "V. Meenambigai",
        "P. Pabitha Muthu",
        "R. Tamilselvi",
        "M. Parisa Beham",
        "S. Nandineeswari",
        "K M Ahamed Sheriff"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781003778882-14",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781032629537-6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Autonomous Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "Advances in autonomous vehicle systems (AVS) have been enabled by the incredible real-world performance achieved by deep neural networks (DNNs), and DNNs are a major component behind the decision-making process of AVS. Despite this success, DNNs have also been shown to be brittle and are known to misbehave in the presence of artificial and natural adversarial noise. Fog, rain, and other natural phenomenon have been shown to affect DNN systems adversarially. Artificial adversarial attacks on DNNs range from imperceptible changes to the input that can produce vastly different output from the DNN to physical patch attacks, where an attacker can put a small patch on a traffic sign to make the AVS treat it as an entirely different signal. Adversarial attacks on DNN are pervasive, and all architectures are affected by it. This lack of consistency in safety-critical applications such as AVS is concerning as minor deviation from the expected behavior can lead to massive implications. Various empirical and certified defense methods have been developed to guard against these adversarial attacks. This chapter will survey various strategies to generate natural and artificial adversarial attacks and techniques to mitigate these attacks.",
      "published": "2023-12-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781032629537-6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sunny Raj"
      ],
      "venue": "River Publishers eBooks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781032629537-6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781315110905-7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Statistical in-depth security analysis for vehicle to everything communication over 5G Network",
      "description": "Many researchers have invested time, effort, and energy analyzing security and vulnerabilities in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X). For communications like V2X, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has been formulating quality standards for these types of the methodological communication system. The Wi-Fi protocol 802.11p cannot offer data security and privacy. However, with the advent of 5G technology developments, many companies and researchers focus their attention on using 5G in V2X communication to provide people with better security and protect them from harmful acts. If the 802.11p can be exchanged with the 5G, it will surely bring advancements to the ETSI security mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is possible to have a counterattack from the new features that have been installed. Rest assured, these attacks can be thwarted with efficiency. Research shows how to perform a statistical in-depth security analysis on V2X communication over the 5G network and how 5G can affect the communication's security. Research also shows that it is possible to make a transit from the 802.11p to 5G New Radio (NR). However, it needs some alteration in the protocol stack. That is why different types of improvements have been proposed, so that the security mechanisms will get stronger and better. Advancements in technology will eradicate the present certificate mechanism, which is needed for authentication. This will be done only because 5G prospects and aspects will provide communication with so many features that authentication will not be needed. In this chapter, we will discuss future recommendations and the positive and negative sides of V2X communication.",
      "published": "2021-12-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315110905-7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rejwan Bin Sulaiman",
        "Ranjana Lakshmi Patel"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781315110905-7",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1201/9781315116174-202",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey on cyber security of connected vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-03-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315116174-202",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liang Bai",
        "Zhen Zhang",
        "Haoyuan Huo",
        "Yueying He"
      ],
      "venue": "CRC Press eBooks",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1201/9781315116174-202",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12694/scpe.v24i4.2345",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Intrusion Detection Method of Vehicle CAN Bus under Computational Resource Constraints",
      "description": "In order to improve the security protection performance of the vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, the research builds an adaptive lightweight intrusion detection algorithm based on the limited computing and storage resources of the on-board ECU environment and the message cycle characteristics to supervise and detect the vehicle CAN bus intrusion. The results showed that the message cycle-based adaptive intrusion detection algorithm had high accuracy and recall rate, and fast computational search efficiency, with a stable detection time of less than 3 seconds. The intrusion detection capability is continuously optimized as the training time increases, and after stabilization, the resource utilization rate reaches over 95% with a throughput of 100Mb/s. The algorithm has strong protection capabilities. The average vehicle CPU usage of the algorithm is only 4.76%, which is 10.17% lower than the intrusion detection algorithm based on support vector machines. It can effectively prevent interference with the normal operation of the vehicle CAN bus. The algorithm has high detection accuracy for interrupt type attacks, and there are no false positives or missed alarms. For injection type attacks, the probability of missed alarms is less than 1%. The intrusion detection of vehicle CAN bus based on the message cycle characteristics provides technical reference for the safety and stability of the vehicle network, and has important practical value for the intelligent and networked development of the automobile industry.",
      "published": "2023-11-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12694/scpe.v24i4.2345",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiancheng Ming",
        "Zhenyu Wang",
        "Bo Rui Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "Scalable Computing Practice and Experience",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.12694/scpe.v24i4.2345",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12700/aph.22.2.2025.2.8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrated Automation for Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment in Automotive Cybersecurity Through Attack Graphs",
      "description": ": Attack graphs contribute to the evaluation of network security vulnerabilities, offering a visualization of possible attack paths. Despite their common use in IT security for analyzing system vulnerabilities, attack graphs are not commonly used in the automotive sector. As smart vehicles increasingly rely on 5G networks for high-bandwidth, low-latency communication – necessary for advanced vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services and sensor data processing – security concerns escalate. The complexity of 5G-enabled vehicles significantly expands a vehicle's attack surface. The ISO/SAE 21434 standard establishes a framework for securing road vehicle systems. The Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process, a vital part of this standard, helps identify and mitigate security risks. However, the current TARA process relies heavily on manual effort to identify potential attack vectors and assess risks. This can be time consuming, resource-intensive, and prone to human error. This paper discusses the concept of an automated attack graph generation tool specifically designed for automotive threat analysis. We propose a new Graph-based Attack Path Prioritization tool (GAPP), tailored for automotive networks. GAPP focuses on generating attack paths, assessing their feasibility, and identifying the most likely attack scenarios. This aims to enhance the efficiency, comprehensiveness, and accuracy of the TARA process in evaluating network security.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12700/aph.22.2.2025.2.8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mera Nizam-Edden Saulaiman",
        "Á. Csilling",
        "Miklós Kozlovszky"
      ],
      "venue": "Acta Polytechnica Hungarica",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.12700/aph.22.2.2025.2.8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12716/1001.12.02.02",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematic Support in Improving Safety of Maritime Transport",
      "description": "Security mechanisms of a telematics system are exceedingly intersecting as they could pretend the ordinary influence of the vehicle and perhaps terminate in accidents. This paper includes a new look at automotive and telematics transportation systems, also refers to methods in modelling, facility location, data processing and assessment of risk in telematics networks.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12716/1001.12.02.02",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tomasz Neumann"
      ],
      "venue": "TransNav the International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.12716/1001.12.02.02",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12716/1001.12.03.22",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Importance of Telematics in the Transport System",
      "description": "Security mechanisms of a telematics system are exceedingly intersecting as they could pretend the ordinary influence of the vehicle and perhaps terminate in accidents. This paper includes a new look at automotive and telematics transportation systems, also refers to methods in modelling, facility location, data processing and assessment of risk in telematics networks.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12716/1001.12.03.22",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tomasz Neumann"
      ],
      "venue": "TransNav the International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.12716/1001.12.03.22",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12716/1001.15.03.05",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The CAN Bus in the Maritime Environment – Technical Overview and Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus standard was developed in the 1980s and is in widespread use in automobile, vehicular, aviation, and other networks. The CAN bus was introduced in the maritime environment with the adoption of the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 2000 standard in the late-1990s. Many papers have been written about the CAN bus protocols and security vulnerabilities but there is sparse literature about use of the CAN bus in the maritime environment. Part I of this paper is a technical overview, describing CAN bus standards and operation, with particular attention to its use with the NMEA 2000 maritime communications standard. Part II of this paper describes security vulnerabilities in terms of loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information (such as eavesdropping, denial-of-service, and spoofing), and mitigations specific to the maritime environment.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12716/1001.15.03.05",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "spoofing",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gary C. Kessler"
      ],
      "venue": "TransNav the International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.12716/1001.15.03.05",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12775/jpm.2019.001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematics systems in road transport",
      "description": "Purpose: The research objective of the article is to assess the level and degree of the use of telematics systems supporting supply chain management based on GPS/GSM/GPRS technology in road transport companies operating in Poland.Methodology: The research methodology was based on the analysis of domestic and foreign subject literature as well as on surveys carried out in road transport companies in Poland for the needs of a National Science Centre grant.Findings: The results of the research performed have shown that despite the large popularity and use of telematics systems, the scope of their use is still very low. The tests carried out on a sample of 500 road transport companies operating in Poland allow for applying the outcome of the research done to the general population.",
      "published": "2020-06-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12775/jpm.2019.001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "supply chain",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wojciech Zalewski"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Positive Management",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.12775/jpm.2019.001",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12783/dtcse/ccnt2018/24750",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical Contactless Attacks on Hitag2-Based Immobilizer and RKE systems",
      "description": "Immobilizer and remote keyless entry (RKE) systems are widely used in the auto industry to improve the security and comfort. However, most of them have vulnerabilities which allow to recover the cryptographic key. In this paper, we present attacks to break the Hitag2-based immobilizer and RKE systems. These attacks require only several minutes of computation on a laptop after obtaining four to eight valid authentication traces, i.e., authentication messages between the immobilizer and the electronic key or rolling codes of the key. The attack on the immobilizer system can fully recover the cryptographic key which allows an adversary to authenticate to the vehicle and start the engine. The attack on the RKE system can determine the state of the last rolling code and predict the next rolling code. This allows an adversary to open the door quickly without leaving any physical traces. A combination of these two attacks provides the ability to open the door and start the engine of a Hitag2-based vehicle in minutes at a very low cost.",
      "published": "2018-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12783/dtcse/ccnt2018/24750",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "immobilizer",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hailong Liu",
        "Jing-shan MA",
        "Shengyu Zhu",
        "Zhao-jun LU",
        "Zhenglin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "DEStech Transactions on Computer Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.12783/dtcse/ccnt2018/24750",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12785/ijcds/090405",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Vehicle-Detection-and-Tracking Technique for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "In this paper, an advanced-and-reliable vehicle detection-and-tracking technique is proposed and implemented. The Real-Time Vehicle Detection-and-Tracking (RT_VDT) technique is well suited for Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS) applications or Self-Driving Cars (SDC).The RT_VDT is mainly a pipeline of reliable computer vision and machine learning algorithms that augment each other and take in raw RGB images to produce the required boundary boxes of the vehicles that appear in the front driving space of the car.The main contribution of this paper is the precise fusion of the employed algorithms where some of them work in parallel to strengthen each other in order to produce a precise and sophisticated real-time output.In addition, the RT_VDT provides fast enough computation to be embedded in CPUs that are currently employed by ADAS systems.Each used algorithm is described in detail, implemented, its performance is evaluated using actual road images, and videos captured by the front-mounted camera of the car.The evaluation of the RT_VDT shows that it reliably detects and tracks vehicle boundaries under various conditions.",
      "published": "2020-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12785/ijcds/090405",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "autonomous driving",
        "self-driving",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wael A. Farag"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computing and Digital Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.12785/ijcds/090405",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12794/metadc2415890",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Communication Security",
      "description": "As new features have been introduced to modern vehicles, the attack surface has increased as well. In the recent years, this gave rise to various practical attack involving control hijacking. For example, it was shown possible to disable brakes or command the steering wheel of a car both by physically connecting to its onboard diagnostic port and by remotely connecting to its WiFi interface. These attacks became possible because modern vehicles have interfaces for accessing the outside networks. At the same time, the in-vehicle network, which is made up of various sensors, electronic control units (ECU), and the infortainment system and which operates on the CAN-Bus protocol, does not use any security mechanisms, such as encryption and authentication. As technology advances, our vehicles will be even more connected to the outside world, and hence even less secure. For this reason, it is imperative to introduce security for the in-vehicle communication. The objective of this work is to demonstrate a prototype of secure in-vehicle communication. We have constructed a testbed of an in-vehicle network using Arduino controllers equipped with CAN-Bus SHIELD v2 adapters, which simulate ECUs communicating on a CAN-Bus network. We tested encrypted communication on this network using AES, ChachaPoly, and Ascon ciphers, measured the timings and confirmed that the network is capable of secure data transmission. Based on this testbed, we developed a lab which can be used to train the workforce in the area of automotive security.",
      "published": "2024-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12794/metadc2415890",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sulav Poudyal"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.12794/metadc2415890",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12948/issn14531305/21.4.2017.03",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy and Security in Connected Vehicles Ecosystems",
      "description": "Modern vehicles could not be figured out without Internet connections in order to provide customers a wide range of services in the vehicle: infotainment platforms, third-party support, onboard and online monitor and maintenance, business analytics for car fleets.Exposure of the vehicles to the Internet turns them into targets for viruses, worms, Trojans, DoS and lot of other threats for connected vehicle security.Beside the classic threats of the Internet exposure, other new threats are introduced by the Internet of Things (IoT) new technologies that are poor regulated or undefined yet from the security point of view.Also, the large variety of the IoT technologies not being standardized yet contribute to security issues in this area of the automotive industry.This paper provides an overview of the connected vehicle environment, considering the main components of such kind of system and the main security challenges to be considered for building reliable secure online systems for connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2017-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12948/issn14531305/21.4.2017.03",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marius Florentin Popa",
        "Cristian Toma",
        "Cătălin Boja",
        "Alin Zamfiroiu"
      ],
      "venue": "Informatica Economica",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.12948/issn14531305/21.4.2017.03",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4043,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.12948/issn14531305/21.4.2017.03 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: onboard, exposure, platforms, large, services, car, without, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.12968/s0047-9624(22)61478-0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security in Connected Cars",
      "description": "Imagination's Marc Canel, Vice President of Security, talks to New Electronics about connected vehicle security",
      "published": "2015-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.12968/s0047-9624(22)61478-0",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marc Canel"
      ],
      "venue": "New Electronics",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.12968/s0047-9624(22)61478-0",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13005/ojcst11.02.06",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Smart Home: An application of Home Security and Automation",
      "description": "The rapid and revolutionary advancement in technology has increased the demand for advanced ubiquitous mobile applications in our daily lives. Home automation system uses collective smart technology to elevate sphere of security and human living standards. Wireless Smart home systems have been prototyped by researchers to realize different applications in vast contexts. In this paper we propose a keyless smart home security system which uses Bluetooth as a communication protocol to automate door locks based on a security code and predefined user credentials. The system combines Android phone as a signal sender to dispatch the input signal from an end users side, Bluetooth communication module as signal receiver, ARDUINO microcontroller as CPU and servo motor and light emitting diodes as an output. The system integrates two modules: one of which is Arduino microcontroller which is responsible for authentication and verification of security code and allows servo motor to process the output according to the received input. The second is android Application which provides an interface to the user to set credentials and security code which is then transmitted to the Arduino microcontroller via Bluetooth technology. Since Arduino and Android are open source, hence implementation rate of the proposed system is inexpensive and feasible.",
      "published": "2018-05-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13005/ojcst11.02.06",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amirita Dewani",
        "Pirah Memon",
        "Veena Kumari",
        "Anum Arain",
        "Ayaz Jiskani",
        "Sania Bhatti"
      ],
      "venue": "Oriental journal of computer science and technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.13005/ojcst11.02.06",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13052/2245-1439.633",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Approach for Building Security Resilience in AUTOSAR Based Safety Critical Systems",
      "description": "AUTOSAR, a worldwide development partnership among automotive parties to establish an open and standardized software architecture for electronic control units (ECUs), has seen great success in recent years by being widely adopted in deeply embedded automotive ECUs.Increasing the security resilience of AUTOSAR based systems is a crucial step in securing safety critical automotive systems.We study AUTOSAR safety mechanisms and demonstrate how they can be used as attack vectors to degrade the vehicle safety.We show the need to harmonize the fail-safe response with the secure state of the system.And we evaluate the overlap in the properties of safety mechanisms with security objectives to highlight methods for hardening automotive systems security.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13052/2245-1439.633",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecus",
        "resilience",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Nasser",
        "Di Ma",
        "Priya Muralidharan",
        "Renesas Electronics America"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.13052/2245-1439.633",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13052/jmm1550-4646.1854",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight and Secure Authentication Model for Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Communication Based on 5G Networks",
      "description": "Integrating the cellular network infrastructure into Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) received attention from the research community and standards groups. This technology allows the invention and development of new applications, as well as the development of new vehicle mobility solutions and the enhancement of driver mobility in terms of safety, reliability, capacity, and quality. Cellular communications networks such as LTE-V2X and 5G NR, integrated into the Vehicle to Everything (V2X) architecture designed to support vehicular communications and deployed on a large scale, appear in particular to be a relevant solution. They could indeed guarantee reliable geographic distribution and acceptable performance (latency, bandwidth, packet loss). In this context, we propose a secure authentication scheme for 5G-based V2X communication. To achieve security requirements, our approach aims to provide a high degree of security in different vehicular communication (V2V, V2I, V2N) by using lightweight cryptographic algorithms in order to safely receive all keys and messages from RSU, vehicles, and the network. To validate our approach, we use the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool to achieve the security goals, also evaluate the performance according to the operational cost which demonstrates that our model has a less computational cost.",
      "published": "2022-04-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13052/jmm1550-4646.1854",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meriem Houmer",
        "Safaa Laqtib",
        "Siham Eddamiri"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Mobile Multimedia",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.13052/jmm1550-4646.1854",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13089/jkiisc.2019.29.3.613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of Security Requirements for Secure Update of IVI(In-Vehicle-Infotainment) Using Threat Modeling and Common Criteria",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13089/jkiisc.2019.29.3.613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soo-Young Kang",
        "Seungjoo Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Information Security and Cryptology",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.13089/jkiisc.2019.29.3.613",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13089/jkiisc.2020.30.6.1115",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient ECU Analysis Technology through Non-Random CAN Fuzzing",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13089/jkiisc.2020.30.6.1115",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ecu",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "KimHyungHoon",
        "Yeonseon Jeong",
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Hyojin Jo"
      ],
      "venue": "Information Security and Cryptology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.13089/jkiisc.2020.30.6.1115",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.14835.45600",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Relay Attack Resistant Passive Keyless Entry: Securing PKE Systems with Immobility Detection",
      "description": "A significant security risk of modern vehicles is their vulnerability to relay attacks, due to challenge-response methods, such as those employed in Passive Keyless Entry (PKE) used by most commercial cars, being inherently exposed. This class of attacks are where communication between a vehicle and its key is relayed by an attacker over long range - thereby bypassing any encryption and unlocking the vehicle without requiring direct access to the key. While a multitude of defenses have been proposed in recent years, many lack either robustness or practicality. Any viable system will likely have to rely on an environmental parameter which is not easily manipulated. Moreover, the system has to be: cost effective; easily implementable; and take user comfort, such as the key’s battery life, into account. This thesis implements and evaluates a PKE system resistant to relay attacks, analyses a multitude of proposed strategies in literature for feasibility, as well as suggests a novel method: Approach Curve Matching. It is concluded that the most promising strategies are: Immobility Detection, Distance Bounding Protocols, and Approach Curve Matching - the first of which is chosen to be implemented in the prototype PKE system. The project develops a PKE system and implements the communication protocol using Bluetooth, as opposed to the conventional RFID. Immobility Detection, using an accelerometer, is then implemented. The final system is then tested and evaluated. It is concluded that while Immobility Detection is not comprehensively effective, it is easily implementable, cost-effective, and can greatly increase the security of PKE systems. Finally, it is proposed that Immobility Detection should be employed promptly by manufacturers while investigating potentially more effective, albeit uncertain, strategies.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.14835.45600",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel Valko"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.13140/rg.2.2.14835.45600",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.22135.79520",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for In-Vehicle Networks: Enhancing CAN Bus Security in Modern Automotive Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.22135.79520",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Betty Janet",
        "Suresh Patel",
        "Shankar Kumar",
        "Phillip Curtois",
        "Farinu Uthman"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.13140/rg.2.2.22135.79520",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.27564.01920",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Rolling Attack Surface: Fleet, personal, rideshare and hire vehicle telematics as unmanaged critical infrastructure risk in Australia’s SOCI, CIRMP, TSRMP and CPS 230 architecture",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-07-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.27564.01920",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tony Ridley"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.13140/rg.2.2.27564.01920",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13154/294-14791",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-divisional cybersecurity risk management in automotive",
      "description": "Modern automotive systems tightly couple vehicle electronics, backend services, and production environments. Regulations such as UN R155 and standards including ISO/SAE 21434, the ISO/IEC 27000 family, and the IEC 62443 series acknowledge this interdependence but provide no operational blueprint for managing cybersecurity risks across divisions. Prior empirical work identified fragmented methods, inconsistent terminology, and weak coordination across Cybersecurity Management Systems (CSMS), Information Security Management Systems (ISMS), and Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security Programs (IACS-SP) as key barriers. This paper addresses the identified gaps by proposing three contributions. First, a target architecture for cross-divisional cybersecurity risk management introduces a claim-based interface concept and a canonical risk meta-model that maps domain-specific schemes—Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) attack feasibility ratings, ISMS likelihood–consequence scores, and IEC 62443 security levels—onto an organizationwide view. Second, a technology-agnostic platform design instantiates this architecture, describing capabilities, integration mechanisms, and role-specific views. Third, a Level 4 truck with cloud-based Control Center illustrates how cross-divisional risks and cybersecurity claims are managed end-to-end. The work follows a design-science methodology; validation relies on analytical requirement coverage against empirically derived needs and preliminary expert feedback.",
      "published": "2026-07-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13154/294-14791",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrick Wagner"
      ],
      "venue": "University Library BOCHUM (Ruhr University Bochum)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.13154/294-14791",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13154/294-14794",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From TARA to CAN firewall rules",
      "description": "Translating cybersecurity risk assessments into concrete and enforceable in-vehicle security controls remains a critical challenge in automotive engineering. Although ISO/SAE 21434 defines a structured Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process, the derivation of implementation-level countermeasures, such as CAN-based firewall policies, is largely left unspecified and is typically performed manually, limiting scalability, consistency, and traceability across modern vehicle network architectures. This work presents a risk-driven methodology and an automated tool for deriving CAN firewall rules directly from TARA artifacts. Threat scenarios and mitigated attack paths are correlated with vehicle network descriptions to generate gateway-enforceable policies such as identifier whitelisting, rate limiting, and payload-aware inspection, with explicit traceability to cybersecurity risks. To address the lack of semantic information in network databases, the approach introduces an LLM-assisted, human-in-the-loop workflow for identifying security-critical signals within protected CAN frames using functional specifications and damage scenarios. A multi-agent architecture is adopted to decompose semantic extraction, threat-driven reasoning, and adversarial validation, improving robustness compared to single-agent configurations while preserving engineering oversight. The proposed solution is evaluated on industrial automotive data through an expert-based assessment involving two independent domain specialists. The results show that deterministic automation, complemented by conservative and human-supervised AI assistance, significantly reduces manual engineering effort while maintaining consistency with expert assessments and alignment with ISO/SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2026-07-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13154/294-14794",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luca Navarra",
        "Anastasia Cornelio",
        "Simon Pietro Romano"
      ],
      "venue": "University Library BOCHUM (Ruhr University Bochum)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.13154/294-14794",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13166/wsge/hr-pl/sfdb6069",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematyka – bezpieczeństwo za cenę prawa do wyboru?",
      "description": "The latest communication and Internet technologies are also present in the auto- motive industry. At the same time, they have a huge impact on road safety. In the latest vehicles, technology helps the driver on the journey, makes the journey pleasant and offers the possibility of diagnosing the vehicle in real time, giving a sense of security and comfort. The progressive trend of equipping vehicles with newer technological achievements is a process that affects the broadly understood market as well as the rights and obligations of its participants. This issue is also beginning to be regulated in detail by legal provisions. This article presents the issues of using telematics systems in vehicles in the legal aspect, as well as the rights and obligations resulting from the pro- visions of vehicle manufacturers, representatives of the service industry and consumers. This article presents the issues of the use of telematics systems in vehicles in the legal aspect, as well as the rights and obligations resulting from the provisions of vehicle manufacturers, representatives of the service industry and consumers. It will also try to assess these regulations and the chances of their full application.",
      "published": "2021-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13166/wsge/hr-pl/sfdb6069",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adam Krupa"
      ],
      "venue": "Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Euroregionalnej im. Alcide De Gasperi w Józefowie eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.13166/wsge/hr-pl/sfdb6069",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2025.08.03.001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Provably secure private-keyless encryption on ideal lattices",
      "description": "Private-keyless encryption (PKLE) addresses the cumbersome challenge of private key management by replacing traditional user private keys with one-time decryption credentials. This approach streamlines complex management processes, such as private key updates and revocations while eliminating the cost and burden of secure key storage for users. Building on this paradigm, this paper introduces the concept, scheme, and security requirements for a PKLE system constructed over ideal lattice. First, we define PKLE and propose a construction method for verifiable credentials. These credentials function as “one-time decryption keys” issued by a trusted third party (the “credential issuance center”) only after the user’s identity is verified. This model simplifies private key management, reduces storage costs, and enables real-time, dynamic decisions on user data access requirements. Second, we introduce a ciphertext-refreshing mechanism that establishes a temporal correspondence between a credential and ciphertext. This mechanism can generate a refreshed ciphertext for any arbitrary time point directly from the initial ciphertext parameters, requiring only partial refreshment of the ciphertext data. This partial-refresh approach significantly reduces the computational overhead of ciphertext refreshing. We also formulate the necessary security requirements for this PKLE scheme—including unforgeability of credentials and refreshed ciphertexts under chosen-time attacks, timeliness security, and semantic security—and elaborate on their interrelationships. A concrete instantiation of this scheme is then constructed over ideal lattices, leveraging the hardness of the ring-small integer solution (R-SIS) and ring-learning with errors (R-LWE) problems. In this construction, the credential is a short preimage vector sampled from a specified dual lattice using the center’s private key and a time-varying parameter. By embedding this parameter into the sampling coset, the credential’s validity is strictly confined to its designated time slot. Concurrently, the ciphertext-refreshing mechanism re-encapsulates the initial ciphertext based on the R-LWE problem. This binds the refreshed ciphertext to the same time-varying parameter, ensuring it can only be decrypted by the corresponding time-bound credential. Finally, we provide security proofs in the standard model, using an R-SIS oracle, demonstrating that our instantiation satisfies all required security properties: unforgeability of credentials and refreshed ciphertexts, timeliness, and semantic security. A complexity and performance analysis confirms that the proposed PKLE scheme eliminates user-side key-storage overhead and simplifies key management by eliminating the need for periodic updates or revocations. Therefore, the proposed scheme is highly suitable for scenarios requiring dynamic access control for sensitive data. Moreover, its support for a partial ciphertext refresh, requiring only a single ring multiplication, significantly reduces the computational cost of ciphertext updates.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2025.08.03.001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hai Lu",
        "Shutong MENG",
        "Yan Zhu",
        "Yong LI"
      ],
      "venue": "DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2025.08.03.001",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1360/ssi-2022-0019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey of Internet of vehicles/vehicle to everything security based on Blockchain",
      "description": "With the acceleration of the intelligent and networking processes of the automobile and transportation industries promoted by the IoV/V2X technology, the security problem of IoV/V2X is becoming increasingly serious. As an integrated application of distributed data storage, peer-to-peer transmission, consensus mechanism, encryption algorithms, and other technologies, Blockchain provides a new IoV/V2X security solution. This paper summarizes the research on Blockchain-based IoV/V2X security. First, it outlines the existing IoV/V2X security threats and protection methods, specifies the research value of Blockchain and IoV/V2X integration, and analyzes the Blockchain-based IoV/V2X security technology. Then, it sorts the existing Blockchain-based IoV/V2X security protection methods and their security architecture from the perspectives of communication security, data security, and application security. Finally, it proposes the development direction and research effort of Blockchain-based IoV/V2X security.",
      "published": "2022-05-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1360/ssi-2022-0019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "媛妮 刘",
        "奕 李",
        "山枝 陈"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientia Sinica Informationis",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1360/ssi-2022-0019",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155781",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection System Using Deep Neural Network for In-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": "A novel intrusion detection system (IDS) using a deep neural network (DNN) is proposed to enhance the security of in-vehicular network. The parameters building the DNN structure are trained with probability-based feature vectors that are extracted from the in-vehicular network packets. For a given packet, the DNN provides the probability of each class discriminating normal and attack packets, and, thus the sensor can identify any malicious attack to the vehicle. As compared to the traditional artificial neural network applied to the IDS, the proposed technique adopts recent advances in deep learning studies such as initializing the parameters through the unsupervised pre-training of deep belief networks (DBN), therefore improving the detection accuracy. It is demonstrated with experimental results that the proposed technique can provide a real-time response to the attack with a significantly improved detection ratio in controller area network (CAN) bus.",
      "published": "2016-06-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0155781",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Min-Joo Kang",
        "Je‐Won Kang"
      ],
      "venue": "PLoS ONE",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1371/journal.pone.0155781",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 684,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0296879",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A comprehensive guide to CAN IDS data and introduction of the ROAD dataset",
      "description": "Although ubiquitous in modern vehicles, Controller Area Networks (CANs) lack basic security properties and are easily exploitable. A rapidly growing field of CAN security research has emerged that seeks to detect intrusions or anomalies on CANs. Producing vehicular CAN data with a variety of intrusions is a difficult task for most researchers as it requires expensive assets and deep expertise. To illuminate this task, we introduce the first comprehensive guide to the existing open CAN intrusion detection system (IDS) datasets. We categorize attacks on CANs including fabrication (adding frames, e.g., flooding or targeting and ID), suspension (removing an ID's frames), and masquerade attacks (spoofed frames sent in lieu of suspended ones). We provide a quality analysis of each dataset; an enumeration of each datasets' attacks, benefits, and drawbacks; categorization as real vs. simulated CAN data and real vs. simulated attacks; whether the data is raw CAN data or signal-translated; number of vehicles/CANs; quantity in terms of time; and finally a suggested use case of each dataset. State-of-the-art public CAN IDS datasets are limited to real fabrication (simple message injection) attacks and simulated attacks often in synthetic data, lacking fidelity. In general, the physical effects of attacks on the vehicle are not verified in the available datasets. Only one dataset provides signal-translated data but is missing a corresponding \"raw\" binary version. This issue pigeon-holes CAN IDS research into testing on limited and often inappropriate data (usually with attacks that are too easily detectable to truly test the method). The scarcity of appropriate data has stymied comparability and reproducibility of results for researchers. As our primary contribution, we present the Real ORNL Automotive Dynamometer (ROAD) CAN IDS dataset, consisting of over 3.5 hours of one vehicle's CAN data. ROAD contains ambient data recorded during a diverse set of activities, and attacks of increasing stealth with multiple variants and instances of real (i.e. non-simulated) fuzzing, fabrication, unique advanced attacks, and simulated masquerade attacks. To facilitate a benchmark for CAN IDS methods that require signal-translated inputs, we also provide the signal time series format for many of the CAN captures. Our contributions aim to facilitate appropriate benchmarking and needed comparability in the CAN IDS research field.",
      "published": "2024-01-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0296879",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "fuzzing",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miki E. Verma",
        "Robert A. Bridges",
        "Michael D. Iannacone",
        "Samuel C. Hollifield",
        "Pablo Moriano",
        "Steven C. Hespeler",
        "Bill Kay",
        "Frank L. Combs"
      ],
      "venue": "PLoS ONE",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1371/journal.pone.0296879",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 112,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0307810",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimizing microgrid performance: Strategic integration of electric vehicle charging with renewable energy and storage systems for total operation cost and emissions minimization",
      "description": "At present, renewable energy sources (RESs) and electric vehicles (EVs) are presented as viable solutions to reduce operation costs and lessen the negative environmental effects of microgrids (μGs). Thus, the rising demand for EV charging and storage systems coupled with the growing penetration of various RESs has generated new obstacles to the efficient operation and administration of these μGs. In this regard, this paper introduces a multi-objective optimization model for minimizing the total operation cost of the μG and its emissions, considering the effect of battery storage system (BSS) and EV charging station load. A day-ahead scheduling model is proposed for optimal energy management (EM) of the μG investigated, which comprises photovoltaics (PVs), fuel cells (FCs), wind turbines (WTs), BSSs, and EV charging stations, with shed light on the viability and benefits of connecting BSS with EV charging stations in the μG. Analyzing three case studies depending on the objective function-Case 1: execute EM to minimize total operation cost and maximize the profits of BSS, Case 2: execute EM to minimize total emission from the μG, and Case 3: execute EM to minimize total operation cost, maximize the profits of BSS, and minimize total emissions from the μG. The main aim of the presented optimization strategy is to achieve the best possible balance between reducing expenses and lessening the environmental impact of greenhouse gas emissions. The krill herd algorithm (KHA) is used to find the optimal solutions while considering various nonlinear constraints. To demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of the proposed solution, the study utilizes the KHA and compares the obtained results with those achieved by other optimization methods. It was demonstrated that such integration significantly enhances the μG's operational efficiency, reduces operating costs, and minimizes environmental impact. The findings underscore the viability of combining EV charging infrastructure with renewable energy to meet the increasing energy demand sustainably. The novelty of this work lies in its multi-objective optimization approach, the integration of EV charging and BSS in μGs, the comparison with other optimization methods, and the emphasis on sustainability and addressing energy demand through the utilization of renewable energy and EVs.",
      "published": "2024-10-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0307810",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Obaid Aldosari",
        "Ziad M. Ali",
        "Shady H. E. Abdel Aleem",
        "Mostafa H. Mostafa"
      ],
      "venue": "PLoS ONE",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1371/journal.pone.0307810",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1387/pceic.19525",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The uses and abuses of \"vulnerability\" in EU asylum and refugee protection: Protecting women or reducing autonomy?",
      "description": "El concepto de vulnerabilidad se ha convertido en el centro de la legislación y la política europeas de asilo y refugio en los últimos años. La adopción de medidas especiales diseñadas para ofrecer una mayor protección a los solicitantes de asilo vulnerables puede considerarse un paso positivo. Ahora bien, la forma en que se ha definido la vulnerabilidad es cuestionable. Con demasiada frecuencia, la vulnerabilidad se reduce a una categorización simplista y esencializada, que también es altamente generizada y racializada. Las mujeres son clasificadas como \"vulnerables\" a priori, sin una consideración real de las causas estructurales y contextuales de esta vulnerabilidad. Si bien ser clasificado como \"vulnerable\" puede aumentar las posibilidades de protección dentro de los sistemas de asilo y refugio de la UE, los impactos en quienes son clasificados como vulnerables pueden ser sentidos como formas de violencia simbólica que reducen la agencia y la autonomía. En base a entrevistas con solicitantes de asilo y refugiados, así como en un análisis de las recientes directivas de asilo de la UE, este artículo propone repensar los usos de la vulnerabilidad en las políticas de asilo de la UE para proporcionar una mejor protección al tiempo que reconozcan la agencia y la autonomía de los solicitantes de asilo y de los refugiados.",
      "published": "2019-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1387/pceic.19525",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "vulnerability",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jane E. Freedman"
      ],
      "venue": "Papeles del CEIC",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.1387/pceic.19525",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 86,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14209/sbrt.2024.1571036313",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical Layer Security Techniques Applied to Vehicle-to-Everything Networks",
      "description": "Physical Layer Security (PLS) is an emerging concept in the field of secrecy for wireless communications that can be used alongside cryptography to prevent unauthorized devices from eavesdropping a legitimate transmission. It offers low computational cost and overhead by injecting an interfering signal in the wiretap channels of potential eavesdroppers. This paper discusses the benefits of the Artificial Noise and Cooperative Jamming techniques in the context of Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, which require secure data exchange with small latency. The simulations indicate that messages can be safely delivered even with devices that have low available power.",
      "published": "2023-01-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14209/sbrt.2024.1571036313",
      "matched_terms": [
        "jamming",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Leonardo Barbosa da Silva",
        "Evelio Martín Garcia Fernández",
        "Ândrei Camponogara"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14209/sbrt.2024.1571036313",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14257/ijsia.2016.10.4.36",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security, Vulnerability and Protection of Vehicular On-board Diagnostics",
      "description": "Recent studies have shown that ''hacktivists'' can mount serious attacks on automobiles.The automotive On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) interface enables an efficient way to access information of the in-vehicle electronic system and leaves way for unauthorized access by an intruder.We discover that remote exploitation is feasible via a broad range of attack points such as mechanic tools, CD players, Bluetooth and Tire Pressure Monitoring System.Wireless communications channels allow long distance vehicle control.Finally, the paper discusses the drawbacks of Seed-Key Mechanism to authenticate and provide an extra layer of authentication to help build a safer automotive ecosystem.",
      "published": "2016-04-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14257/ijsia.2016.10.4.36",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aastha Yadav",
        "Gaurav Bose",
        "Radhika Bhange",
        "Karan Kapoor",
        "N. Ch. S. N. Iyengar",
        "Ronnie D. Caytiles"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Security and Its Applications",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.14257/ijsia.2016.10.4.36",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14293/pr2199.003336.v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Differential Privacy Approaches in Telematics-Based Auto Insurance Systems",
      "description": "The rapid integration of telematics in the automotive insurance industry has enabled Usage-Based Insurance (UBI) models that reward safe driving behavior. However, the high-resolution GPS and accelerometer data collected from vehicles pose significant privacy risks, as they can reveal sensitive information about a policyholder’s lifestyle, home location, and routines. This research explores the application of Differential Privacy (DP) —a mathematical framework for quantifying and limiting privacy loss—within telematics ecosystems. By injecting controlled statistical noise into driving datasets, this study evaluates the trade-off between privacy protection and the actuarial accuracy of risk scoring models. The findings indicate that while DP significantly mitigates reidentification risks, high levels of privacy (low epsilon values) can degrade the predictive power of acceleration-based risk metrics. A hybrid DP approach is proposed to balance these competing interests.",
      "published": "2026-04-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14293/pr2199.003336.v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashley Miller",
        "Linda Garcia",
        "Grace Elvis"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.14293/pr2199.003336.v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14293/s2199-1006.1.sor-.ppvmbgs.v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cryptography used in SecuringVehicles Electronic Control Units",
      "description": "Electronic Control Units(ECUs) are know as the brains of a vehicle. A modern vehicle can have over eighty ECUs. All of these brains are given a particular task and all of them are controlled by a Super Master ECU which knows what the vehicle is doing and how it is behaving. These ECUs are vulnerable to attacks. Attacks to the brains of a vehicle can result in causalities. Hence the concept of cryptography is adopted into the field of automobiles.",
      "published": "2020-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14293/s2199-1006.1.sor-.ppvmbgs.v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Allen Jacob Siby"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.14293/s2199-1006.1.sor-.ppvmbgs.v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14311/ap.2025.65.0296",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced electric vehicle charging topology with integrated fuzzy-based shunt converter",
      "description": "This article presents a novel electric vehicle charging scheme that addresses power quality issues in distribution grids, caused by widespread EV charging. The system uses an interval type-II (IT-II) fuzzy-logic-based shunt converter, with a dual-direction converter enabling power flow from the grid to the EV (G2EV) and from the EV to the grid (EV2G). It incorporates iterative constant current (ICC) regulation for managing Li-ion battery charging and discharging. A fuzzy logic controller (FLC) based on an instantaneous reactive power model is used for the shunt converter, with an enhanced real-coded genetic algorithm (ERGA)-based type-I (IT-I) FLC control. The Performance is evaluated using THD analysis of the source current, and the system response is plotted. Simulations conducted in Matlab demonstrate improved power quality with harmonic distortion within acceptable limits, confirming the effectiveness of the proposed system in optimising EV charging while maintaining grid stability.",
      "published": "2025-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14311/ap.2025.65.0296",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rahul Wilson Kotla",
        "Srinivasa Rao Yarlagadda",
        "Kumudwathi Mannala",
        "Dharani Sreek",
        "Vijaya Madhavi Sivarathri"
      ],
      "venue": "Acta Polytechnica",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.14311/ap.2025.65.0296",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14419/ijet.v7i2.14.11186",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GSM based door open and closing system",
      "description": "GSM based Door Access Security System has principle application in security frameworks and it can be utilized as a part of Industries, Shops, Offices and in our homes. It replaces the customary security frameworks which utilizes key to open entryway. This venture has keyless passage to the entryway. Client needs to send secret key through SMS utilizing his/her portable. In the event that the secret key is right then Microcontroller turns on a DC engine and a Relay. Bell is turned on for wrong secret key. In its most straightforward shape Home security is the capacity to control entryway open or close Family security remotely. The transmitter depends on remote GSM strategy the idea Door bolting and opening System utilizes GPRS to open and close the entryway. Not with standing this security will be given utilizing GSM in the event of any unapproved get to. DC engine will then perform activity on entryway either bolting or opening.",
      "published": "2018-03-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14419/ijet.v7i2.14.11186",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "V. Usha",
        "Nikhila Sundarraj Rajkumar",
        "M. Shyamala Devi",
        "C. Saranya Jothi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Engineering & Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.14419/ijet.v7i2.14.11186",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14419/ijet.v7i2.33.14822",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless signature infrastructure solution for cloud attacks",
      "description": "Keyless Signature Infrastructure (KSI) is a procedure that is used to distribute and verify the signature; only hash function cryptography is being used in this method. KSI uses block chain technology for the signing and verification of the signature. The paper will discuss the solution of different cloud attacks using Keyless Signature Infrastructure.",
      "published": "2018-06-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14419/ijet.v7i2.33.14822",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Remya Chandran",
        "Dr A. Sasi Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Engineering & Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.14419/ijet.v7i2.33.14822",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14529/em230115",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MARKETING ANALYSIS OF KEY TRENDS, BARRIERS AND RISKS OF THE AUTONET MARKET DEVELOPMENT",
      "description": "The article is devoted to the study and analysis of the fundamental trends and directions of devel-opment of the global and Russian Autonet markets, as well as the identification of the main barriers and risks in this area. The authors have identified objective and subjective factors that determine the development of the domestic market segment, as well as analyzed its key segments – telematics transport and information systems, transport and logistics services and intelligent urban mobility. It is proved that the progressive devel-opment of these segments to a large extent can be explained by the introduction of end-to-end high technolo-gies, and in this context, the main advantages and disadvantages of each of them are analyzed. The authors dwelt in detail on the key trend of market development – improving vehicle safety through the introduction of intelligent systems, identified the main directions of using high technologies in product management in this ar-ea and considered the most significant trends influencing the development of the Autonet market. Along with positive trends, the authors characterize the barriers that slow down the growth of the market, as well as identi-fy the risks that can become a deterrent to development. Among them is an insufficiently developed infrastruc-ture for innovative vehicles, a low level of security of transmitted data and a low level of import substitution.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14529/em230115",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Irina Okolnishnikova",
        "Andrey Keller",
        "Ухова Антонина Ивановна"
      ],
      "venue": "Вестник Южно-Уральского государственного университета. Серия: Экономика и менеджмент",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14529/em230115",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14569/ijacsa.2020.0111136",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Conceptual Model for Connected Vehicles Safety and Security using Big Data Analytics",
      "description": "The capability of Connected Vehicles (CVs) connecting to a nearby vehicle, surrounding infrastructure and cyberspace presents a high risk in the aspect of safety and security of the CV and others. Data volume generated from the sensors and infrastructure in CVs environment are enormous. Thus, CVs implementations require a real-time big data processing and analytics to detect any anomaly in the CVs’s environment which are physical layer, network layer and application layer. CVs are exposed to various vulnerabilities associated with exploitations or malfunctions of the components in each layer that could result in various safety and security event such as congestion and collision. The safety and security risks added an extra layer of required protection for the CVs implementation that need to be studied and refined. To address this gap, this research aims to determine the basic components of safety and security for CVs implementation and propose a conceptual model for safety and security in CVs by applying the machine learning and deep learning techniques. The proposed model is highly correlated to safety and security and could be applied in congestion and collision prediction.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14569/ijacsa.2020.0111136",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Noor Afiza Mat Razali",
        "Nuraini Shamsaimon",
        "Muslihah Wook",
        "Khairul Khalil"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.14569/ijacsa.2020.0111136",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14569/ijacsa.2025.0160285",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review of Cybersecurity Challenges and Solutions for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "With the continuously increasing demand for new technologies, many concepts have emerged in recent decades and the Internet of Things is one of the most popular. IoT is revolutionizing several aspects of human life with a large range of applications including the transportation sector. Based on IoT technologies and Artificial Intelligence, new-generation vehicles are being developed with autonomous or self-driving capabilities to handle transportation in future smart cities. Regarding human-based errors such as accidents, traffic congestion, and disruptions, autonomous vehicles are presented as an alternative solution to increase traffic safety, efficiency, and mobility. However, by transferring from a human-based to a computer-based driving style, the transportation area is inheriting existing cyber-security challenges. Due to their connectivity and data-driven decision-making, the security of autonomous vehicles is a high-level concern since it involves human safety in addition to economic losses. In this paper, a comprehensive review is conducted to discuss the security threats and existing solutions for autonomous vehicles. In addition to that, the open security challenges are discussed for further investigations toward trusted and widespread deployment of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14569/ijacsa.2025.0160285",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lasseni Coulibaly",
        "Damien Hanyurwimfura",
        "Evariste Twahirwa",
        "Abubakar Diwani Bakari"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.14569/ijacsa.2025.0160285",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "WeepingCAN: A Stealthy CAN Bus-off Attack",
      "description": "—The controller area network (CAN) is a high-value asset to defend and attack in automobiles. The bus-off attack exploits CAN’s fault confinement to force a victim electronic control unit (ECU) into the bus-off state, which prevents it from using the bus. Although pernicious, the bus-off attack has two distinct phases that are observable on the bus and allow the attack to be detected and prevented. In this paper we present Weeping-CAN, a refinement of the bus-off attack that is stealthy and can escape detection. We evaluate WeepingCAN experimentally using realistic CAN benchmarks and find it succeeds in over 75% of attempts without exhibiting the detectable features of the original attack. We demonstrate WeepingCAN on a real vehicle.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2021.23002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2021.23002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact Evaluation of Falsified Data Attacks on Connected Vehicle Based Traffic Signal Control Systems",
      "description": "Wired communication CV2",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2021.23005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shihong Huang",
        "Yiheng Feng",
        "Wai Hung Wong",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Zhuoqing Morley Mao",
        "Henry X. Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2021.23005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Benchmark",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are complex cyber-physical systems made of hundreds of electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate over controller area networks (CANs). This inherited complexity has expanded the CAN attack surface which is vulnerable to message injection attacks. These injections change the overall timing characteristics of messages on the bus, and thus, to detect these malicious messages, time-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed. However, time-based IDSs are usually trained and tested on low-fidelity datasets with unrealistic, labeled attacks. This makes difficult the task of evaluating, comparing, and validating IDSs. Here we detail and benchmark four time-based IDSs against the newly published ROAD dataset, the first open CAN IDS dataset with real (non-simulated) stealthy attacks with physically verified effects. We found that methods that perform hypothesis testing by explicitly estimating message timing distributions have lower performance than methods that seek anomalies in a distribution-related statistic. In particular, these \"distribution-agnostic\" based methods outperform \"distribution-based\" methods by at least 55% in area under the precision-recall curve (AUC-PR). Our results expand the body of knowledge of CAN time-based IDSs by providing details of these methods and reporting their results when tested on datasets with real advanced attacks. Finally, we develop an after-market plug-in detector using lightweight hardware, which can be used to deploy the best performing IDS method on nearly any vehicle.",
      "published": "2021-01-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2021.23013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Deborah H. Blevins",
        "Pablo Moriano",
        "Robert A. Bridges",
        "Miki E. Verma",
        "Michael D. Iannacone",
        "Samuel C Hollifield"
      ],
      "venue": "Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec) 2021",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2021.23013",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Demo: Security of Camera-based Perception for Autonomous Driving under Adversarial Attack",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2021.23018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christopher DiPalma",
        "Ningfei Wang",
        "Takami Sato",
        "Qi Alfred Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2021.23018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANCloak: Deceiving Two ECUs with One Frame",
      "description": "Modern vehicles have many electronic control units (ECUs) connected to the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, which have few security features in design and are vulnerable to cyber attacks.Researchers have proposed solutions like intrusion detection systems (IDS) to mitigate such threats.We presented a novel attack, CANCloak, which can deceive two ECUs with one CAN data frame, and therefore can bypass IDS detection or cause vehicle malfunction.In this attack, assuming a malicious transmitter is controlled by the adversary, one crafted CAN data frame can be transmitted to a target receiver, while other ECUs shall not receive that frame nor raise any error.We have setup a physical test environment and evaluated the effectiveness of this attack.Evaluation results showed that success rate of CANCloak reaches up to 99.7%, while the performance depends on the attack payload and sample point settings of victim receivers, independent from bus bit rate.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2021.23024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yue Li",
        "Zheming Li",
        "Tingting Yin",
        "Chao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2021.23024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trusted Verification of Over-the-Air (OTA) Secure Software Updates on COTS Embedded Systems",
      "description": "security and protection for said devices [5], [6].OTA frameworks assist in remote diagnosis, and upgrades if required, for any reported security breach in compromised EVSEs and BEVs without having to deal with expensive in-person human attendance to fix the issue(s).While an OTA software update framework facilitates security updates, along with operational upgrades, it can also introduce unwanted security loopholes.For instance, in an autonomous BEV, nearly all driving operations (for e.g., where to turn, when to brake, controlling the speed of the car etc.) are automated, while specific manual cognitive decision-making control is left to the discretion of the driver.Thus, if a corrupt OTA update package which contains functional upgrades for the car is installed, an external agent can easily piggyback on the corrupt package to install malicious programs that will compromise the entire BEV thereby leading to catastrophic consequences.Note that even though we motivate our work with specific examples of BEVs and EVSEs for the rest of the paper, our approach can easily be applied to improve the security specifications of any existing system that utilizes secure OTA update framework running on TEE-compatible COTS embedded system.OTA updates in EVSEs and BEVs, therefore, not only need to be (1) secure to prevent unauthorized access, but also (2) support internal software isolation to ensure functional correctness.Protecting and encrypting the communication channel and checking the authenticity of the new software are longstanding and vital security measures for any BEVs and EVSE devices.However, said security measures are inconsequential if the OTA update verification framework itself is compromised [7], [8].Therefore, there is a need to tackle such a scenario, and design a framework that can detect and protect against such security breaches.Existing approaches to protect the OTA update verification framework include dedicated secure hardware-based solutions (e.g.trusted platform modules (TPMs), secure networking modules, secure grid etc.) [3], [9], [10].They all require expensive, custom-built hardware with long time-to-market or time-to-deployment cycle.A readily available cheaper alternative is the use of trusted execution environment (TEE) [11] on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) embedded processors.Examples of hardware support for TEE include the ARM TrustZone[ 12] which is popular in embedded devices.TEE leverages hardware security extensions to provide platform virtualization to run an application in secure isolation from the rest of the system.TEE can be quickly redeployed if an exploit is found since they are implemented using platform virtualization.Hence, TEE does not require Abstract-Over-the-air (OTA) software updates are an important feature to remotely analyze and upgrade any section of currently running software on battery-operated electric vehicles and its supply equipment.Even though a secure OTA framework can verify and validate updates before installation, the integrity of the framework itself cannot be guaranteed, and can easily introduce system and software vulnerability with potential catastrophic consequences.In this paper, we show how a popular automotive OTA secure update framework (Uptane) can be deployed entirely inside a TEE-enabled commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) embedded device to extend its security considerations and improve its resilience against both internal and external security breaches.We also present a software analysis tool that leverages SAWScript to verify our proposed solution against any functional and logical inconsistency, while validating our approach on a real COTS hardware (Raspberry Pi 3B).",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2021.23028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "evse",
        "exploit",
        "resilience",
        "secure",
        "tpms"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anway Mukherjee",
        "Ryan Gerdes",
        "Thidapat Chantem"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2021.23028",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Car Hacking and Defense Competition on In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "—Cybersecurity competitions can promote the importance of security and discover talented researchers. We hosted the Car Hacking: Attack & Defense Challenge from September 14, 2020 to November 27, 2020, and many security companies and researchers participated. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first competition to contest both attack and detection techniques on an in-vehicle network, specifically Controller Area Network (CAN). The participants developed various injection attacks and high-performance detection algorithms based on the real vehicle environment. Rule-based and ensemble tree-based models dominated the final round. Also, time interval and data byte patterns worked as major features to detect attacks.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2021.23035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyunjae Kang",
        "Byung Il Kwak",
        "Young Hun Lee",
        "Haneol Lee",
        "Hwejae Lee",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2021.23035",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 71,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2022.23023",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GPSKey: GPS based Secret Key Establishment for Intra-Vehicle Environment",
      "description": "In order to overcome such limitations, context-based pairing schemes, where they extract secret key from common observations (e.g., visual channel [29], ambient audio [9], [14], timing of detected events [11], wireless signal strength [12], [33] and wireless channel interference [19], [22]) without requiring human interactions are proposed.However, these schemes present two shortcomings: (1) The surrounding environment may not consistently provide enough randomness for effective key generations.For example, [11] requires a user to generate additional events to reduce pairing time.(2) Some channels may not available in a normal vehicle.For example, audio signals in a vehicle can be easily interfered with by noises and vibrations.Recent research efforts propose context-based pairing schemes for vehicular environments [6], [16].They focus on a fact that devices located in the same vehicle experience highly similar movement, which can be captured by inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensors (e.g., accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer).For example, [16] derives a key from the vertical acceleration (perpendicular to lateral and longitudinal acceleration) of a vehicle, which is affected by vehicle type and road condition.[6] employs three different sensors, where a vehicle's lateral and longitudinal accelerations are captured by an accelerometer, a gyroscope is utilized for measuring the vehicle's turns, and a barometer monitors altitude changes.However, these schemes present two limitations: (1) IMU sensor data can be easily disturbed by device movement, thus may not be robust or provide a consistent performance when the user uses or wear the device during key establishment.(2) IMU sensor data are considered insensitive on modern mobile devices, where any mobile applications can access them without specific privilege [21], [35].In this paper, we utilize a vehicle's movement pattern in GPS data to derive secret keys.The key idea is that two GPSenabled devices in the same vehicle may observe the same vehicle movement with highly similar accuracy.The vehicle movement is determined by a driver's pedal control, which contains randomness from the surrounding traffic environment.Each device extracts secret bits from the observed vehicle velocity when the vehicle is moving.While the devices may get slightly different binary bit sequences due to observation errors, they perform reconciliation to agree on the same key.We implement a prototype of the proposed key establishment scheme and perform real-world experiments to quantify its performance.Extensive experimental results show that the legitimate devices can establish a 128-bit key in a 71-Abstract-With the advent of the in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems (e.g., Android Automotive) and other portable devices (e.g., smartphones) that may be brought into a vehicle, it becomes crucial to establish a secure channel between the vehicle and an in-vehicle device or between two in-vehicle devices.Traditional pairing schemes are tedious, as they require user interaction (e.g., manually typing in a passcode or bringing the two devices close to each other).Modern vehicles, together with smartphones and many emerging Internet-of-things (IoT) devices (e.g., dashcam) are often equipped with built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers.In this paper, we propose a GPS-based Key establishment technique, called GPSKey, by leveraging the inherent randomness of vehicle movement.Specifically, vehicle movement changes with road ground conditions, traffic situations, and pedal operations.It thus may have rich randomness.Meanwhile, two invehicle GPS receivers can observe the same vehicle movement and exploit it for key establishment without requiring user interaction.We implement a prototype of GPSKey on top of off-the-shelf devices.Experimental results show that legitimate devices in the same vehicle require 1.18-minute of driving on average to establish a 128-bit key.Meanwhile, the attacker who follows or leads the victim's vehicle is unable to infer the key.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2022.23023",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Edwin Yang",
        "Song Fang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2022.23023",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/autosec.2022.23047",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical Layer Data Manipulation Attacks on the CAN Bus",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus standard is the most common in-vehicle network that provides communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs).CAN messages lack authentication and data integrity protection mechanisms and hence are vulnerable to attacks, such as impersonation and data injection, at the digital level.The physical layer of the bus allows for a one-way change of a given bit to accommodate prioritization; viz. a recessive bit (1) may be changed to a dominant one (0).In this paper, we propose a physical-layer data manipulation attack wherein multiple compromised ECUs collude to cause 0→1 (i.e., dominant to recessive) bit-flips, allowing for arbitrary bit-flips in transmitted messages.The attack is carried out by inducing transient voltages in the CAN bus that are heightened due to the parasitic reactance of the bus and non-ideal properties of the line drivers.Simulation results indicate that, with more than eight compromised ECUs, an attacker can induce a sufficient voltage drop to cause dominant bits to be flipped to recessive ones.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/autosec.2022.23047",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdullah Zubair Mohammed",
        "Yanmao Man",
        "Ryan Gerdes",
        "Ming Li",
        "Z. Berkay Celik"
      ],
      "venue": "International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security (AutoSec)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.14722/autosec.2022.23047",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/futureg.2026.240099",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adaptive Quantum-Safe Cryptography for 6G Vehicular Networks via Context-Aware Optimization",
      "description": "Powerful quantum computers in the future may be able to break the security used for communication between vehicles and other devices (Vehicle-to-Everything, or V2X). New security methods called post-quantum cryptography can help protect these systems, but they often require more computing power and can slow down communication, posing a challenge for fast 6G vehicle networks. In this paper, we propose an adaptive post-quantum cryptography (PQC) framework that predicts short-term mobility and channel variations and dynamically selects suitable lattice-, code-, or hash-based PQC configurations using a predictive multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (APMOEA) to meet vehicular latency and security constraints.However, frequent cryptographic reconfiguration in dynamic vehicular environments introduces new attack surfaces during algorithm transitions. A secure monotonic-upgrade protocol prevents downgrade, replay, and desynchronization attacks during transitions. Theoretical results show decision stability under bounded prediction error, latency boundedness under mobility drift, and correctness under small forecast noise. These results demonstrate a practical path toward quantum-safe cryptography in future 6G vehicular networks. Through extensive experiments based on realistic mobility (LuST), weather (ERA5), and NR-V2X channel traces, we show that the proposed framework reduces end-to-end latency by up to 27\\%, lowers communication overhead by up to 65\\%, and effectively stabilizes cryptographic switching behavior using reinforcement learning. Moreover, under the evaluated adversarial scenarios, the monotonic-upgrade protocol successfully prevents downgrade, replay, and desynchronization attacks.",
      "published": "2026-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/futureg.2026.240099",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Poushali Sengupta",
        "Mayank Raikwar",
        "Sabita Maharjan",
        "Frank Eliassen",
        "Yan Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "NDSS 2026 - FutureG Workshop",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.14722/futureg.2026.240099",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/fuzzing.2026.23009",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "UAVConfigFuzzer: Detecting Incorrect Configurations in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles via Setpoint Estimation Guided Fuzzing (Registered Report)",
      "description": "Flight control software for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offers numerous configuration parameters.However, their complexity raises the risk of incorrect configurations, leading to mission failures or crashes.Although fuzzing is effective for discovering software vulnerabilities, its application to UAVs configuration is hindered by the need to obtain physical states (e.g., position and altitude) from a time-consuming simulator.Furthermore, machine learning-based acceleration methods often suffer from limited generalizability due to their reliance on flight logs as training data.To address these challenges, we propose UAVConfigFuzzer, a novel fuzzing tool that accelerates configuration testing via setpoint estimation guided fuzzing.In flight control software, setpoints are the calculated target values that guide the UAV's movement based on configurations.UAVCon-figFuzzer leverages the native setpoint generation module to generate setpoints, which serve as the estimated UAV's physical states to rapidly quantify the severity of UAV's anomalies.Guided by this efficient and accurate feedback, UAVConfigFuzzer steers the mutation process toward anomaly-inducing configurations without relying on simulators or extensive flight logs.We evaluate UAVConfigFuzzer on PX4, a widely used open-source UAV flight control software, the results demonstrate that the feedback achieves an average runtime of 27 milliseconds.The estimated states maintain high fidelity, with a mean position error below 6.92 cm and a velocity error below 0.13 m/s.Leveraging this rapid feedback, UAVConfigFuzzer detects 14 incorrect configurations.These issues were validated on real UAV hardware and have been acknowledged by the community maintainers for remediation.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/fuzzing.2026.23009",
      "matched_terms": [
        "fuzzing",
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yingnan Zhou",
        "Yuhao Liu",
        "Hanfeng Zhang",
        "Yan Jia",
        "Sihan Xu",
        "Zhiyuan Jiang",
        "Zheli Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Fuzzing Workshop (FUZZING)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.14722/fuzzing.2026.23009",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/laser.2020.23002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Experimental Analyses of RF Fingerprint Technique for Securing Keyless Entry System in Modern Cars",
      "description": "Aim: To address these cyber security issues, we published research for our RF-fingerprinting method (coined \"HOld the DOoR\", HODOR) to detect attacks on keyless entry systems in the NDSS 2020 as the first attempt to exploit the RFfingerprint technique in the automotive domain.We designed HODOR to operate as a sub-authentication method that supports existing authentication systems of keyless entry systems.HODOR does not require any modification of the main system to perform. Results:Based on a series of real-world experiments, we demonstrated that HODOR competently and reliably detects attacks on keyless entry systems.Furthermore, we evaluated HODOR in different environments to reflect variations in temperature, non-line-of-sight (NLoS) conditions, and battery aging.In addition to the evaluation results in previous work, in this paper, we present deatils of an additional analysis into the difficulty of individual feature impersonation and performance at low sample rates.Conclusions: HODOR is designed as a sub-authentication system to prevent keyless entry system car theft.Specifically, HODOR is an RF fingerprinting method that differentiates between a legitimate unlock request from a malicious attempt and a legitimate request.Through the evaluation results, we show that HODOR is able to effectively detect signal-relay types of attacks that are defined in our attack model, minimizing the number of erroneous detections (i.e., false alarms) at the same time.The only requirement for successful implementation of the HODOR is to add a device to sample UHF band RF signals and analyze them.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/laser.2020.23002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyungho Joo",
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.14722/laser.2020.23002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2018.23222",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exposing Congestion Attack on Emerging Connected Vehicle based Traffic Signal Control",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) technology will soon transform today's transportation systems by connecting vehicles and the transportation infrastructure through wireless communication.Having demonstrated the potential to greatly improve transportation mobility efficiency, such dramatically increased connectivity also opens a new door for cyber attacks.In this work, we perform the first detailed security analysis of the nextgeneration CV-based transportation systems.As a first step, we target the USDOT (U.S.Department of Transportation) sponsored CV-based traffic control system, which has been tested and shown high effectiveness in real road intersections.In the analysis, we target a realistic threat, namely CV data spoofing from one single attack vehicle, with the attack goal of creating traffic congestion.We first analyze the system design and identify data spoofing strategies that can potentially influence the traffic control.Based on the strategies, we perform vulnerability analysis by exhaustively trying all the data spoofing options for these strategies to understand the upper bound of the attack effectiveness.For the highly effective cases, we analyze the causes and find that the current signal control algorithm design and implementation choices are highly vulnerable to data spoofing attacks from even a single attack vehicle.These vulnerabilities can be exploited to completely reverse the benefit of the CV-based signal control system by causing the traffic mobility to be 23.4% worse than that without adopting such system.We then construct practical exploits and evaluate them under real-world intersection settings.The evaluation results are consistent with our vulnerability analysis, and we find that the attacks can even cause a blocking effect to jam an entire approach.In the jamming period, 22% of the vehicles need to spend over 7 minutes for an original halfminute trip, which is 14 times higher.We also discuss defense directions leveraging the insights from our analysis.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2018.23222",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Yucheng Yin",
        "Yiheng Feng",
        "Zhuoqing Morley Mao",
        "Henry X. Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2018.23222",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 102,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2019.23109",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "UWB with Pulse Reordering: Securing Ranging against Relay and Physical Layer Attacks",
      "description": "Physical layer attacks allow attackers to manipulate (spoof) ranging and positioning. These attacks had real world impact and allowed car thefts, executions of unauthorised payments and manipulation of navigation. UWB impulse radio (UWB-IR) has emerged as a prominent technique for precise ranging that allows high operating distances despite power constraints by transmitting multi-pulse symbols. Unfortunately, longer symbols make UWB-IR vulnerable to physical layer attacks. Currently, none of the existing systems is precise, performant and secure at the same time. We present UWB with Pulse Reordering (UWB-PR), the first modulation scheme that secures distance measurement between two mutually trusted devices against all physical-layer attacks without sacrificing performance and irrespective of the environment or attacker. We analyze the security of UWB-PR under the attacker that fully controls the communication channel and show that UWB-PR resists even such a strong attacker. We evaluate UWB-PR within an UWB system building on IEEE 802.15.4f and show that it achieves distances of up to 93m with 10cm precision (LoS).",
      "published": "2018-04-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2019.23109",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "car",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mridula Singh",
        "P. Leu",
        "Srđjan Čapkun"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2019.23109",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 77,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2020.23107",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hold the Door! Fingerprinting Your Car Key to Prevent Keyless Entry Car Theft",
      "description": "Recently, the traditional way to unlock car doors has been replaced with a keyless entry system which proves more convenient for automobile owners. When a driver with a key fob is in the vicinity of the vehicle, doors automatically unlock on user command. However, unfortunately, it has been shown that these keyless entry systems are vulnerable to signal relaying attacks. While it is evident that automobile manufacturers incorporate preventative methods to secure these keyless entry systems, they continue to be vulnerable to a range of attacks. Relayed signals result in valid packets that are verified as legitimate, and this makes it is difficult to distinguish a legitimate door unlock request from a malicious signal. In response to this vulnerability, this paper presents an RF fingerprinting method (coined HOld the DOoR, HODOR) to detect attacks on keyless entry systems the first attempt to exploit the RF fingerprint technique in the automotive domain. HODOR is designed as a sub authentication method that supports existing authentication systems for keyless entry systems and does not require any modification of the main system to perform. Through a series of experiments, the results demonstrate that HODOR competently and reliably detects attacks on keyless entry systems. HODOR achieves both an average false positive rate (FPR) of 0.27 percent with a false negative rate (FNR) of 0 percent for the detection of simulated attacks, corresponding to current research on keyless entry car theft.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.23107",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "key fob",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyungho Joo",
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2020.23107",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 46,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2020.24025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EASI: Edge-Based Sender Identification on Resource-Constrained Platforms for Automotive Networks",
      "description": "In vehicles, internal Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are increasingly prone to adversarial exploitation over wireless connections due to ongoing digitalization.Controlling an ECU allows an adversary to send messages to the internal vehicle bus and thereby to control various vehicle functions.Access to the Controller Area Network (CAN), the most widely used bus technology, is especially severe as it controls brakes and steering.However, state of the art receivers are not able to identify the sender of a frame.Retrofitting frame authenticity, e.g. through Message Authentication Codes (MACs), is only possible to a limited extent due to reduced bandwidth, low payload and limited computational resources.To address this problem, observation in analog differences of the CAN signal was proposed to determine the actual sender.Some of the prior approaches exhibit good identification and detection rates, however require high sampling rates and a high computing effort.With EASI we significantly reduce the required resources and at the same time show increased identification rates of 99.98% by having no false positives in a prototype structure and two series production vehicles.In comparison to the most lightweight approach so far, we have reduced the memory footprint and the computational requirements by a factor of 168 and 142, respectively.In addition, we show the feasibility of EASI and thus demonstrate for the first time that voltage-based sender identification is realizable using comprehensive signal characteristics on resource-constrained platforms.Due to the lightweight design, we achieved a classification in under 100 μs with a training time of 2.61 seconds.We also showed the ability to adapt the system to incremental signal changes during operation.Since cost effectiveness is of utmost importance in the automotive industry due to high production volumes, the achieved improvements are significant and necessary to realize sender identification.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.24025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploitation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcel Kneib",
        "Oleg Schell",
        "Christopher Huth"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2020.24025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2021.23013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evading Voltage-Based Intrusion Detection on Automotive CAN",
      "description": "—The controller area network (CAN) is widely adopted in modern automobiles to enable communications among in-vehicle electronic control units (ECUs). Lacking mainstream network security capabilities due to resource constraints, the CAN is susceptible to the ECU masquerade attack in which a compromised (attacker) ECU impersonates an uncompromised (victim) ECU and spoofs the latter’s CAN messages. A cost-effective state-of-the-art defense against such attacks is the CAN bus voltage-based intrusion detection system (VIDS), which identifies the source of each message using its voltage fingerprint on the bus. Since the voltage fingerprint emanates from an ECU’s hardware characteristics, an attacker ECU by itself cannot controllably modify it. As such, VIDS has been proved effective in detecting masquerade attacks that each involve a single attacker. In this paper, we discover a novel voltage corruption tactic that leverages the capabilities of two compromised ECUs (i.e., an attacker ECU working in tandem with an accomplice ECU) to corrupt the bus voltages recorded by the VIDS. By exploiting this tactic along with the fundamental deficiencies of the CAN protocol, we propose a novel masquerade attack called D UET , which evades all existing VIDS irrespective of the features and classification algorithms employed in them. D UET follows a two-stage attack strategy to first manipulate a victim ECU’s voltage fingerprint during VIDS retraining mode, and then impersonate the manipulated fingerprint during VIDS operation mode. Our evaluation of D UET on real CAN buses (including three in two real cars) demonstrates an impersonation success rate of at least 90% in evading two state-of-the-art VIDS",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2021.23013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rohit Bhatia",
        "Vireshwar Kumar",
        "Khaled Serag",
        "Z. Berkay Celik",
        "Mathias Payer",
        "Dongyan Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2021.23013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2022.23077",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PoF: Proof-of-Following for Vehicle Platoons",
      "description": "Cooperative vehicle platooning significantly improves highway safety, fuel efficiency, and traffic flow. In this model, a set of vehicles move in line formation and coordinate acceleration, braking, and steering using a combination of physical sensing and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) messaging. The authenticity and integrity of the V2V messages are paramount to safety. For this reason, recent V2V and V2X standards support the integration of a PKI. However, a PKI cannot bind a vehicle's digital identity to the vehicle's physical state (location, velocity, etc.). As a result, a vehicle with valid cryptographic credentials can impact platoons from a remote location. In this paper, we seek to provide the missing link between the physical and the digital world in the context of vehicle platooning. We propose a new access control protocol we call Proof-of-Following (PoF) that verifies the following distance between a candidate and a verifier. The main idea is to draw security from the common, but constantly changing environment experienced by the closely traveling vehicles. We use the large-scale fading effect of ambient RF signals as a common source of randomness to construct a {\\em PoF} primitive. The correlation of large-scale fading is an ideal candidate for the mobile outdoor environment because it exponentially decays with distance and time. We evaluate our PoF protocol on an experimental platoon of two vehicles in freeway, highway, and urban driving conditions. We demonstrate that the PoF withstands both the pre-recording and following attacks with overwhelming probability.",
      "published": "2021-07-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2022.23077",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ziqi Xu",
        "Jingcheng Li",
        "Yanjun Pan",
        "Loukas Lazos",
        "Ming Li",
        "Nirnimesh Ghose"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2022.23077",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2023.23084",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ChargePrint: A Framework for Internet-Scale Discovery and Security Analysis of EV Charging Management Systems",
      "description": "—Electric Vehicle Charging Management Systems (EVCMS) are a collection of specialized software that allow users to remotely operate Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS). With the increasing number of deployed EVCS to support the growing global EV fleet, the number of EVCMS are consequently growing, which introduces a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-stage framework, ChargePrint, to discover Internet-connected EVCMS and investigate their security posture. ChargePrint leverages identifiers extracted from a small seed of EVCMS to extend the capabilities of device search engines through iterative fingerprinting and a combination of classification and clustering approaches. Using initial seeds from 1,800 discovered hosts that deployed 9 distinct EVCMS, we identified 27,439 online EVCS instrumented by 44 unique EVCMS. Consequently, our in-depth security analysis highlights the insecurity of the deployed EVCMS by uncovering 120 0-day vulnerabilities, which shed light on the feasibility of cyber attacks against the EVCS, its users, and the connected power grid. Finally, while we recommend countermeasures to mitigate future threats, we contribute to the security of the EVCS ecosystem by conducting a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) effort with system developers/vendors who acknowledged and assigned the discovered vulnerabilities more than 20 CVE-IDs.",
      "published": "2023",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.23084",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tony Nasr",
        "Sadegh Torabi",
        "E. Bou-Harb",
        "Claude Fachkha",
        "C. Assi"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2023.23084",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2023.23251",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Brokenwire: Wireless Disruption of CCS Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "We present a novel attack against the Combined Charging System, one of the most widely used DC rapid charging technologies for electric vehicles (EVs).Our attack, BROKEN-WIRE, interrupts necessary control communication between the vehicle and charger, causing charging sessions to abort.The attack requires only temporary physical proximity and can be conducted wirelessly from a distance, allowing individual vehicles or entire fleets to be disrupted stealthily and simultaneously.In addition, it can be mounted with off-the-shelf radio hardware and minimal technical knowledge.By exploiting CSMA/CA behavior, only a very weak signal needs to be induced into the victim to disrupt communication -exceeding the effectiveness of broadband noise jamming by three orders of magnitude.The exploited behavior is a required part of the HomePlug Green PHY, DIN 70121 & ISO 15118 standards and all known implementations exhibit it.We first study the attack in a controlled testbed and then demonstrate it against eight vehicles and 20 chargers in real deployments.We find the attack to be successful in the real world, at ranges up to 47 m, for a power budget of less than 1 W. We further show that the attack can work between the floors of a building (e.g., multi-story parking), through perimeter fences, and from 'drive-by' attacks.We present a heuristic model to estimate the number of vehicles that can be attacked simultaneously for a given output power.BROKENWIRE has immediate implications for a substantial proportion of the around 12 million battery EVs on the roads worldwide -and profound effects on the new wave of electrification for vehicle fleets, both for private enterprise and crucial public services, as well as electric buses, trucks and small ships.As such, we conducted a disclosure to the industry and discussed a range of mitigation techniques that could be deployed to limit the impact.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.23251",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "jamming"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sebastian Köhler",
        "Richard Baker",
        "Martin Strohmeier",
        "Ivan Martinović"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2023.23251",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 71,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2023.24082",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Access Your Tesla without Your Awareness: Compromising Keyless Entry System of Model 3",
      "description": "Tesla Model 3 has equipped with Phone Keys and Key Cards in addition to traditional key fobs for better driving experiences.These new features allow a driver to enter and start the vehicle without using a mechanical key through a wireless authentication process between the vehicle and the key.Unlike the requirements of swiping against the car for Key Cards, the Tesla mobile app's Phone Key feature can unlock a Model 3 while your smartphone is still in a pocket or bag.In this paper, we performed a detailed security analysis aiming at Tesla keys, especially for Key Cards and Phone Keys.Starting with reverse engineering the mobile application and sniffing the communication data, we reestablished pairing and authentication protocols and analyzed their potential issues.Missing the certificate verification allows an unofficial Key Card to work as an official one.Using these third-party products may lead to serious security problems.Also, the weaknesses of the current protocol lead to a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack through a Bluetooth channel.The MitM attack is an improved relay attack breaking the security of the authentication procedures for Phone Keys.We also developed an App named TESmLA installed on customized Android devices to complete the proof-of-concept.The attackers can break into Tesla Model 3 and drive it away without the awareness of the car owner.Our results bring into question the security of Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES) and Bluetooth implementations in security-critical applications.To mitigate the security problems, we discussed the corresponding countermeasures and feasible secure scheme in the future. I. INTRODUCTIONPassive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES) is an intelligent automotive system allowing drivers to pull the door directly to enter and start the car.The traditional PKES requires a key fob to provide the legitimacy and the vehicle to verify it.New car models of Tesla, Volvo, Mercedes-Benz, and Lincoln enable car owners to use their smartphones to unlock and activate their cars automatically [81], [85].To continuously enrich the driving experiences, Tesla supports three types of keys: Phone Keys, Key Cards and key fobs [52] for Model 3, Model X, Model Y, and Model S. * Both authors contributed equally.Key fobs adopted in classical PKES contain a lowfrequency (LF) radio frequency identification (RFID) tag and ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) transceiver, and the vehicle equips with an LF receiver and UHF RFID tag [48].The LF channel is responsible for detecting whether the key fob is within an allowed region, whereas the UHF channel is for challengeresponse verification.Relay attack is a widely known vulnerability against this technique used in key fobs [1], [2], [27], [47].It allows adversaries to open and start the car by distance fraud.Distance bounding technique is commonly proposed to prevent relay attacks [32], [45], [62], [70].Karani et al. [42] and Lin et al. [49] designed and implemented the PKES based on BLE.This new PKES monitors the BLE received signal strength indicator (RSSI) measurements from the key to estimate users' proximity.Some works insist that considering other techniques or features should be a better solution.They utilize multiple physical features, namely, RSSI, Round-Trip time, Global Position System (GPS) coordinates, and Wi-Fi access point lists, to precisely identify the proximity of a vehicle to its corresponding key fob [20], [63], [83], [84]. A. Ansari et al. [5] transmits the cryptographically secure combined bio-crypto data to enhance the authentication.Focus on the security issues of Tesla key fobs, considering the first version of the Tesla Model S key fob based on DST40, the research [15] proves that it is susceptible to a brute-force attack.Moreover, this first version misses mutual authentication in the challenge-response protocol.It also has no firmware read-out protection and security partitioning [87].Further, Wouters et al. [88] target the second version of the key fob based on DST80.Through reverse engineering immobilizer firmware, they recover the key by downgrade attack leading to a reduction of key entropy.They also describe a Denial-Of-Service attack, which can render the key fob unusable.Also, Tesla warned of theft risk through relay attacks [75].To fix bugs and add features, Tesla introduced over-the-air updates.However, Wouters et al. [78], [86] declared that a hacker could rewrite the firmware of a key fob via Bluetooth connection, lift an unlock code from the fob, and use it to break a Model X just in a few minutes.Key Cards communicate with the vehicle using RFID signals in standard ISO 14443.When you tap the Key Card on the driver's side pillar, doors can be opened.However, it does not support automatic locking and unlocking.Tesla Model 3 vehicles allow attackers to open a door by leveraging access to a legitimate Key Card and using a Near Field Communications (NFC) relay attack [21].When an owner enters the car, he needs to swipe the Key Card on the console right by the cup",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.24082",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "immobilizer",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "mercedes-benz",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "mercedes-benz",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xinyi Xie",
        "Kun Jiang",
        "Rui Dai",
        "Jun Lu",
        "Lihui Wang",
        "Qing Li",
        "Jun Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2023.24082",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2023.24271",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EdgeTDC: On the Security of Time Difference of Arrival Measurements in CAN Bus Systems",
      "description": "A Controller Area Network (CAN bus) is a messagebased protocol for intra-vehicle communication designed mainly with robustness and safety in mind.In real-world deployments, CAN bus does not offer common security features such as message authentication.Due to the fact that automotive suppliers need to guarantee interoperability, most manufacturers rely on a decadeold standard (ISO 11898) and changing the format by introducing MACs is impractical.Research has therefore suggested to address this lack of authentication with CAN bus Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that augment the bus with separate modules.IDSs attribute messages to the respective sender by measuring physicallayer features of the transmitted frame.Those features are based on timings, voltage levels, transients-and, as of recently, Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) measurements.In this work, we show that TDoA-based approaches presented in prior art are vulnerable to novel spoofing and poisoning attacks.We describe how those proposals can be fixed and present our own method called EdgeTDC.Unlike existing methods, EdgeTDC does not rely on Analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) with high sampling rate and high dynamic range to capture the signals at sample level granularity.Our method uses time-to-digital converters (TDCs) to detect the edges and measure their timings.Despite being inexpensive to implement, TDCs offer low latency, high location precision and the ability to measure every single edge (rising and falling) in a frame.Measuring each edge makes analog sampling redundant and allows the calculation of statistics that can even detect tampering with parts of a message.Through extensive experimentation, we show that EdgeTDC can successfully thwart masquerading attacks in the CAN system of modern vehicles.1 At time of writing documentation for those chips is available only under NDA.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.24271",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marc Roeschlin",
        "Giovanni Camurati",
        "Pascal Brunner",
        "Mridula Singh",
        "Srđjan Čapkun"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2023.24271",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2026.231014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ADGFUZZ: Assignment Dependency-Guided Fuzzing for Robotic Vehicles",
      "description": "Robotic vehicles (RVs) play an increasingly vital role in modern society, with widespread applications in both commercial and military contexts.RV control software is the core of RV systems, which maintains proper operation by continuously computing the vehicle's internal state, sensor readings, and external inputs to adjust the system's behavior accordingly.However, the vast combination space of configurable parameters, command inputs, and environment-sensed data in RV software introduces significant security risks to the system.Existing fuzzing techniques face substantial challenges in effectively exploring this vast input space while uncovering deep bugs.To address these challenges, we propose ADGFUZZ, a novel fuzzing framework specifically designed to detect assignment statement bugs in RV control software.ADGFUZZ statically constructs an Assignment Dependency Graph (ADG) to capture inter-variable dependencies within the program.These dependencies are then propagated to the RV input space by leveraging naming similarities, resulting in a targeted set of inputs referred to as the matched input set (MIS).Building upon this, ADGFUZZ performs entropy-aware fuzzing over the MISs, thereby enhancing the overall efficiency of bug discovery.In our evaluation, ADGFUZZ uncovered 87 unique bugs across three RV types, 78 of which were previously unknown.All found bugs were responsibly disclosed to the developers, and 16 have been confirmed for fixing.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2026.231014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuncheng Wang",
        "Yaowen Zheng",
        "Puzhuo Liu",
        "Dongliang Fang",
        "Jiaxing Cheng",
        "Dingyi Shi",
        "Limin Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2026.231014",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/ndss.2026.231408",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automating Function-Level TARA for Automotive Full-Lifecycle Security",
      "description": "Attack trees with detailed attack steps",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2026.231408",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuqiao Yang",
        "Yongzhao Zhang",
        "Wenhao Liu",
        "Jun Li",
        "Pengtao Shi",
        "DingYu Zhong",
        "Jie Yang",
        "Ting Chen",
        "Sheng Quan Cao",
        "Yuntao Ren",
        "Yongyue Wu",
        "Xiaosong Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Network and Distributed System Security Symposium",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.14722/ndss.2026.231408",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced Vehicular Roll-Jam Attack using a Known Noise Source",
      "description": "The traditional vehicular roll-jam attack is an effective means to gain access to the target vehicle by jamming and recording key fob inputs from a victim.However, it requires specific knowledge of the attack surface, and delicate tuning of software-defined radio parameters.We have developed an enhanced version of the roll-jam attack that uses a known noise signal for jamming, in contrast to the additive white Gaussian noise that is typically used in the attack.Using a known noise signal allows for less strict tuning of the software-defined radios used in the attack, and allows for digital noise removal of the recorded input to enhance the replay attack.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "jamming",
        "key fob",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zachary Depp",
        "Halit Bugra Tulay",
        "C. Emre Koksal"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23037",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23071",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VASP: V2X Application Spoofing Platform",
      "description": "—Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is essential to redefining transportation by providing real-time, highly reliable, and actionable information flows to enable safety, mobility and environmental applications. V2X communications and its solutions enable the exchange of information (e.g., Basic Safety Messages) between vehicles, and between vehicle and network infrastructure. To ensure data quality, and hence proper action, V2X data must be authenticated and correct. In this paper, we propose an extensive attack platform, called VASP, which contains 68 BSM attacks. This platform is used to enhance V2X threat assessment, design relevant detectors, guide standardization and prioritization for deployment. The objective is to provide to the security community the tool to help build a more robust V2X system.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23071",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Raashid Ansari",
        "Jonathan Petit",
        "Jean-Philippe Monteuuis",
        "Cong Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23071",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23086",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysing Adversarial Threats to Rule-Based Local-Planning Algorithms for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "The safety and security of navigation and planning algorithms are essential for the adoption of autonomous driving in real-world operational environments.Adversarial threats to local-planning algorithms are a developing field.Attacks have primarily been targeted at trajectory prediction algorithms which are used by the autonomous vehicle to predict the motion of ego vehicles and other environmental objects to calculate a safe planning route.This work extends the attack surface to focus on a rule-based local-planning algorithm, specifically focusing on the planning cost-based function, which is used to estimate the safest and most efficient route.Targeting this algorithm, which is used in a real-world, operational autonomous vehicle program, we devise two attacks; 1) deviation to the lateral and longitudinal pose values, and 2) time-delay of the sensed-data input messages to the local-planning nodes.Using a low-fidelity simulation testing environment, we conduct a sensitivity analysis using multiple deviation range values and time-delay duration.We find that the impact of adversarial attack cases is visible in the rate of failure to complete the mission and in the occurrence of safety violations.The cost-function is sensitive to deviations in lateral and longitudinal pose and higher duration of message delay.The result of the sensitivity analysis suggests minor deviations of the pose (lateral, longitudinal) values as an optimal range for the attackers search space.Options for mitigating such attacks are that the AV should run a concurrent process executing a concurrent planning instance for redundancy.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23086",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrew Roberts",
        "Mohsen Malayjerdi",
        "Mauro Bellone",
        "Olaf Maennel",
        "Ehsan Malayjerdi"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23086",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23088",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving In-vehicle Networks Intrusion Detection Using On-Device Transfer Learning",
      "description": "Modern automobiles are equipped with a large number of electronic control units (ECUs) to provide safe, driver assistance and comfortable service.The controller area network (CAN) provides real-time data transmission between ECUs with adequate reliability for in-vehicle communication.However, the lack of security measures such as authentication and encryption makes the CAN bus vulnerable to cyberattacks, which affect the safety of passengers and the surrounding environment.Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) based on one-class classification have been proposed to detect CAN bus intrusions.However, these IDSs require large amounts of benign data with different driving activities for training, which is challenging given the variety of such activities.This paper presents CAN-ODTL, a novel ondevice transfer learning-based technique to retrain the IDS using streaming CAN data on a resource-constrained Raspberry Pi device to improve the IDS.Optimized data pre-processing and model quantization minimize the CPU and RAM usage of the Raspberry Pi by making CAN-ODTL suitable to deploy in the CAN bus as an additional ECU to detect in-vehicle cyber attacks.Float 16 quantization improves the Tensorflow model with 78% of memory and 83% of detection latency reduction.Evaluation on a real public dataset over a range of seven attacks, including more sophisticated masquerade attacks, shows that CAN-ODTL outperforms the pre-trained and baseline models with over 99% detection rate for realistic attacks.Experiments on Raspberry Pi demonstrate that CAN-ODTL can detect a wide variety of attacks with near real-time detection latency of 125ms.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23088",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sampath Rajapaksha",
        "Harsha Kalutarage",
        "Mhd Omar Al-Kadri",
        "Andrei Petrovski",
        "Garikayi Madzudzo"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2023.23088",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Advantages of Distributed TCAM Firewalls in Automotive Real-Time Switched Zonal Networks",
      "description": "Attackers have found numerous vulnerabilities in the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) of modern vehicles, enabling them to stop the car, control its brakes, and take other potentially disruptive actions.Many of these attacks were possible because the vehicles had insecure In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs), where ECUs could send any message to each other.For example, an attacker who compromised an infotainment ECU might be able to send a braking message to a wheel.In this work, we introduce a scheme based on distributed firewalls to block these unauthorized messages according to a set \"security policy\" defining what transmissions each ECU should be able to send and receive.We leverage the topology of new switched, zonal networks to authenticate messages without cryptography, using Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAMs) to enforce the policy at wire-speed.Crucially, our approach minimizes the security burden on edge ECUs and places control in a set of hardened zonal gateways.Through an OMNeT++ simulation of a zonal IVN, we demonstrate that our scheme has much lower overhead than modern cryptography-based approaches and allows for realtime, low-latency (<0.1 ms) traffic.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Evan Allen",
        "Zeb Bowden",
        "J. Scot Ransbottom"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23015",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Automotive Software Supply Chains",
      "description": "Software supply chain attacks are a major concern and need to be addressed by every organization, including automakers.While there are many effective technologies in both the software delivery and broader software supply chain security space, combining these technologies presents challenges specific to automotive applications.We explore the trust boundaries between the software supply chain and software delivery systems to determine where verification of software supply chain metadata should occur, how to establish a root of trust, and how supply chain policy can be distributed.Using this exploration, we design Scudo, a secure combination of software over the air and software supply chain security technologies.We show that adding full verification of software supply chain metadata on-vehicle is not only inefficient, but is also largely unnecessary for security with multiple points of repository-side verification.In addition, this paper describes a secure instantiation of Scudo, which integrates Uptane, a state of the art software update security solution, and in-toto, a comprehensive supply chain security framework.A practical deployment has shown that Scudo provides robust software supply chain protections.The client side power and processing costs are negligible, with the updated metadata comprising 0.504% of the total update transmission.The client side verification adds 0.21 seconds to the total update flow.This demonstrates that Scudo is easy to deploy in ways that can efficiently and effectively catch software supply chain attacks.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23015",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marina Moore",
        "Aditya Sirish A Yelgundhalli",
        "Justin Cappos"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23015",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23043",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-MIRGU: A Comprehensive CAN Bus Attack Dataset from Moving Vehicles for Intrusion Detection System Evaluation",
      "description": "—The Controller Area Network (CAN Bus) has emerged as the de facto standard for in-vehicle communication. However, the CAN bus lacks security features, such as encryption and authentication, making it vulnerable to cyberattacks. In response, the current literature has prioritized the development of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Nevertheless, the progress of IDS research encounters significant obstacles due to the absence of high-quality, publicly available real CAN data, especially data featuring realistic, verified attacks. This scarcity primarily arises from the substantial cost and associated risks involved in generating real attack data on moving vehicles. Addressing this challenge, this paper introduces a novel CAN bus attack dataset collected from a modern automobile equipped with autonomous driving capabilities, operating under real-world driving conditions. The dataset includes 17 hours of benign data, covering a wide range of scenarios, crucial for training IDSs. Additionally, it comprises 26 physically verified real injection attacks, including Denial-of-Service (DoS), fuzzing, replay, and spoofing, targeting 13 CAN IDs. Furthermore, the dataset encompasses 10 simulated masquerade and suspension attacks, offering 2 hours and 54 minutes of attack data. This comprehensive dataset facilitates rigorous testing and evaluation of various IDSs against a diverse array of realistic attacks, contributing to the enhancement of in-vehicle security.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23043",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sampath Rajapaksha",
        "Harsha Kalutarage",
        "Garikayi Madzudzo",
        "Andrei Petrovski",
        "Mhd Omar Al-Kadri"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23043",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23046",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploiting Diagnostic Protocol Vulnerabilities on Embedded Networks in Commercial Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern automotive operations are governed by embedded computers that communicate over standardized protocols, forming the backbone of vehicular networking.In the domain of commercial vehicles, these systems predominantly rely on the high-level protocols running on top of the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol for internal communication in medium and heavy-duty applications.Critical to this ecosystem is the Unified Diagnostics Services (UDS) protocol, outlined in ISO 14229 (Unified Diagnostic Services -UDS) and ISO 15765 (Diagnostic Communication over CAN), which provides essential diagnostic functionalities.This paper presents three distinct scenarios, demonstrating potential shortcomings of the UDS protocol standards and how they can be exploited to launch attacks on in-vehicle computers in commercial vehicles while bypassing security mechanisms.In the initial two scenarios, we identify and demonstrate two vulnerabilities in the ISO 14229 protocol specifications.Subsequently, in the final scenario, we highlight and demonstrate a vulnerability specific to the ISO 15765 protocol specifications.For demonstration purposes, bench-level test systems equipped with real Electronic Control Units (ECUs) connected to a CAN bus were utilized.Additional testing was conducted on a comprehensively equipped front cab assembly of a 2018 Freightliner Cascadia truck, configured as an advanced test bench.The test results reveal how attacks targeting specific protocols can compromise individual ECUs.Furthermore, in the Freightliner Cascadia truck setup, we found a network architecture typical of modern vehicles, where a gateway unit segregates internal ECUs from diagnostics.This gateway, while designed to block standard message injection and spoofing attacks, specifically allows all UDS-based diagnostic messages.This selective allowance inadvertently creates a vulnerability to UDS protocol attacks, underscoring a critical area for security enhancements in commercial vehicle networks.These findings are crucial for engineers and programmers responsible for implementing the diagnostic protocols in their communication subsystems, emphasizing the need for enhanced security measures.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23046",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "spoofing",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rik Chatterjee",
        "Carson Green",
        "Jeremy S. Daily"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23046",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23069",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OCPPStorm: A Comprehensive Fuzzing Tool for OCPP Implementations",
      "description": "—In the last decade, electric vehicles (EVs) have moved from a niche of the transportation sector to its most innovative, dynamic, and growing sector. The associated EV charging infrastructure is closely following behind. One of the main components of such infrastructure is the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), which defines the messages exchanged between charging stations and central management systems owned by charging companies. This paper presents OCPPStorm, a tool for testing the security of OCPP implementations. OCPPStorm is designed as a black box testing tool, in order to be able to deal with different implementations, independently of their deployment peculiarities, platforms, or languages used. In particular, OCPPStorm applies fuzzing techniques to the OCPP messages to identify errors in the message management and find vulnerabilities among those errors. It’s efficacy is demonstrated through extensive testing on two open-source OCPP systems, revealing its proficiency in uncovering critical security flaws, among which 5 confirmed CVEs and 7 under review. OCPPSTorm’s goal is to bolster the methodological approach to OCPP security testing, thereby reinforcing the reliability and safety of the EV charging ecosystem.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23069",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "fuzzing",
        "ocpp",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gaetano Coppoletta",
        "Rigel Gjomemo",
        "Amanjot Kaur",
        "Nima Valizadeh",
        "OMER F. RANA",
        "Venkat N. Venkatakrishnan"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.23069",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.25004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Demo: CARLA-based Adversarial Attack Assessment on Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles rely on a combination of sensors and sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) systems to perceive their surroundings.The increasing use of AI in autonomous driving technology has brought to our attention the concerns of the implications of AI failure.In this work, we chose an object detector (OD) as an entry point to study the robustness against adversarial attacks like malicious traffic signs.We design and implement CARLA-A3 (CARLA-based Adversarial Attack Assessment), which is a toolkit aimed to streamline the simulation of adversarial conditions and evaluation of OD with several robustness metrics.The toolkit can serve to rapidly and quantitatively evaluate the effects of a malicious sign presented to the OD.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.25004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zirui Lan",
        "Wei Herng Choong",
        "Ching-Yu Kao",
        "Yi Wang",
        "Mathias Dehm",
        "Philip Sperl",
        "Konstantin Böttinger",
        "Michael E. Kasper"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.25004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.25006",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Poster: PLUG&CHECK: Finding Bugs in ISO15118 Implementations with EVFUZZ",
      "description": "The ISO15118 standard defines architecture and protocols for V2G (vehicle-to-grid) communication enabling interaction between vehicle manufacturers, utility providers, and charging station operators.This standard was designed to make the charging process easier and secure.However, the security of its implementations has never been evaluated thoroughly.To address this issue, we design a custom system to interact with the car pretending to be a legitimate charger and fuzz the car to find bugs in the implementation of the standard.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.25006",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aditi Nambiar",
        "Z. Berkay Celik",
        "Ryan Gerdes",
        "Antonio Bianchi"
      ],
      "venue": "Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.14722/vehiclesec.2024.25006",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14738/tmlai.1303.18943",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Security Threats and Trust Management in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks",
      "description": "This paper presents a survey of state-of-the-art trust models for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). Trust management plays an essential role in isolating malicious insider attacks in VANETs which traditional security approaches fail to thwart. To this end, many trust models are presented; some of them only address trust management, while others address security and privacy aspects besides trust management. This paper first reviews, classifies, and summarizes state-of-the-art trust models, and then compares their achievements. From this literature survey, our reader will easily identify two broad classes of trust models that exist in literature, differing primarily in their evaluation point. For example, most trust models follow receiver-side trust evaluation and to the best of our knowledge, there is only one trust model for VANETs which evaluates trust at the sender-side unless a dispute arises. In the presence of a dispute, a Roadside Unit (RSU) rules on the validity of an event. In receiver-side trust models, each receiver becomes busy while computing the trust of a sender and its messages upon the messages' arrival. Conversely, in the sender-side class, receivers are free from any kind of computation as the trust is verified at the time the message is announced. Also, vehicles can quickly act on the information, such as taking a detour to an alternate route, as it supports fast decision-making. We provide a comparison between these two evaluation techniques using a sequence diagram. We then conclude the survey by suggesting future work for sender-side evaluation of trust in VANETs. Additionally, the challenges (real-time constraints and efficiency) are emphasized whilst considering the deployment of a trust model in VANETs",
      "published": "2026-02-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14738/tmlai.1303.18943",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rezvi Shahariar",
        "Chris Phillips"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.14738/tmlai.1303.18943",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.14743/apem2020.1.349",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Awareness and readiness of Industry 4.0: The case of Turkish manufacturing industry",
      "description": "The concept Industry 4.0 (I4.0) represents intelligent production processes combining cyber and physical systems through a set of technologies such as internet of things, big data and cloud computing. Transition to Industry 4.0 is expected to cause formidable structural changes, productivity increments and competitiveness in manufacturing industry in all over the world. This study aimed to investigate the general approach to the concept of Industry 4.0 and levels of adoption of the basic Industry 4.0 technologies in manufacturing firms across Turkey. For this purpose, a survey was conducted with 427 firms with various sizes (micro, small, medium and large) operating in six subsectors (automotive; electronic; machinery; chemical; food; and textile) of Turkish manufacturing. The paper examined nine I4.0 technologies: autonomous robots, big data applications, cloud computing, cyber security, simulation approaches, additive manufacturing, system integration, internet of things, and augmented reality. The results revealed that, there is a significant correlation between the degrees of importance and implementation of the basic Industry 4.0 technologies. Moreover, I4.0 implementation degree increases as the firm size increases. The top three industries in Turkish manufacturing that use the most basic Industry 4.0 technologies are automotive industry, electrical and electronics, and machinery, respectively. The analyses are aimed to achieve a better understanding of the concept Industry 4.0 by comparing different groups of manufacturers.",
      "published": "2020-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.14743/apem2020.1.349",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "T. Sari",
        "Hasan Kürşat Güleş",
        "Büşra Yiğitol"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Production Engineering & Management",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.14743/apem2020.1.349",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1504/ijatm.2018.092187",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity and the auto industry: the growing challenges presented by connected cars",
      "description": "The term 'connected cars' embraces all small passenger vehicles which are connected to the internet in some way. Connected cars are no different from other nodes on the internet of things and face many of the same generic cybersecurity threats. Whilst most modern road vehicles, including buses and trucks, are now complex computer-laden devices, this article concentrates on cars where, arguably, the greatest cybersecurity challenges occur as a consequence of the number of vehicles involved, the potential disincentives to invest in cybersecurity, the range of user threats greater and overall risks the highest. Despite the magnitude and potential impacts of cybersecurity issues, there are relatively few contributions to the debate which focus on the wider social, economic and behavioural aspects rather than the technological. The varied and often competing incentives of different auto industry actors to invest in cybersecurity defences, and knowledge sharing in particular, are identified as a challenge to developing a specific and coherent industry response to the growing threats posed by cybersecurity breaches. This paper identifies threats which are specific to cars and possible strategies the auto industry might pursue to counter them.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1504/ijatm.2018.092187",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Morris",
        "Garikayi Madzudzo",
        "Alexeis García-Pérez"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1504/ijatm.2018.092187",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1504/ijdsss.2018.10023083",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A survey on the cryptographic approaches for CAN bus automotive networks",
      "description": "Electronic control units, so called ECUs are a major part in a today car's architecture. These devises are dedicated to control and monitor different functions in-vehicle. So, a secure communication, between those ECUs, is required. Modern cars can contain from 70-100 of ECUs which are interconnected via several protocols to form an overall internal network controller area network (CAN) bus has become the widely used among these protocol. However, CAN bus does not have enough security prosperities to protect the whole automotive system even to protect its network. Furthermore, today's car is characterised with an important external connectivity through several devices such as of Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and USB. Unfortunately, the increase of connectivity and complexity of modern in-automotive networks have increased the possibility of attacks against vehicle. So, to leave in-vehicle security level, some defence mechanisms, such as cryptographic and intrusion detection systems, are proposed. In this paper, we present, on one hand, a survey on current restrictions of CAN bus to insure a secure communication. On second hand, we give some approaches to solve CAN bus security.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1504/ijdsss.2018.10023083",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hafedh Trabelsi",
        "Mabrouka Gmiden",
        "Mohamed Hedi Gmiden"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Digital Signals and Smart Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1504/ijdsss.2018.10023083",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1504/ijes.2018.089430",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A language-based intrusion detection approach for automotive embedded networks",
      "description": "The increase in connectivity and complexity of modern automotive networks presents new opportunities for potential hackers trying to take over a vehicle. To protect the automotive networks from such attacks, security mechanisms, such as firewalls or secure authentication protocols may be included. However, should an attacker succeed in bypassing such measures and gain access to the internal network, these security mechanisms become unable to report about the attacks ensuing such a breach, occurring from the internal network. To complement these preventive security mechanisms, we present a non-intrusive network-based intrusion detection approach fit for vehicular networks, such as the widely used CAN. Leveraging the high predictability of embedded automotive systems, we use language theory to elaborate a set of attack signatures derived from behavioural models of the automotive calculators in order to detect a malicious sequence of messages transiting through the internal network.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1504/ijes.2018.089430",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ivan Studnia",
        "Éric Alata",
        "Vincent Nicomette",
        "Mohamed Kaâniche",
        "Youssef Laarouchi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Embedded Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1504/ijes.2018.089430",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 85,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1504/ijesdf.2017.085194",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An automobile security protocol: side-channel security against timing and relay attacks",
      "description": "Keyless go, automotive keyless systems (AKS), passive keyless entry and start (PKES) are names given to smart systems that allow a driver to unlock a car without pressing any key, and drive the car without inserting a smart key for starting or stopping the car engine. It is one of the debutant IoT applications in automotive sector. This work presents a 128-bit pairing security protocol (PSP 128 bits) lightweight cryptographic protocol as a security protocol authentication between owner and car. The PSP 128 security analysis in timing and relay attacks by an adversary will be discussed and its resilience proved using a theoretical security reduction method. The theoretical security reduction results are supported by findings from an experimental test bed using RaspberryPi board and radio frequency (RF) communication. Based on the experiment results, the PSP 128 can support up to 56 thousand authentication sessions between owner and car per typical usage. It is estimated that a standard automotive battery running the device can have a lifespan of up to seven years with typical use.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1504/ijesdf.2017.085194",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohd Anuar Mat Isa",
        "Habibah Hashim",
        "Syed Farid Syed Adnan",
        "Norhaflyza binti Marbukhari",
        "Nur Nabila Mohamed"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1504/ijesdf.2017.085194",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1504/ijitst.2018.095978",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat analysis for an in-vehicle telematics control unit",
      "description": "A modern vehicle is a complex computing system consisted of various control units for computing measured data from sensors and controlling the vehicle. Modern vehicles have communication facilities for communicating with a remote system and even other vehicles on the road. All those computing and communication capacities are for making the vehicles smarter and thus improving driving safety and efficiency. However, as the modern vehicles are considered as computing systems, malicious attacks targeting the modern vehicles are increasing and this phenomenon will continue. Security threats on vehicles already become a reality, while the security threats are needed to be articulated. In this paper, we present an initial result of threat analysis especially for a telematics control unit. The identified 25 threats are presented that endanger the TCU in a specific condition.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1504/ijitst.2018.095978",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jong Hyouk Lee",
        "Byoungsoo Koh"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1504/ijitst.2018.095978",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1504/ijssca.2025.10070328",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Scrap reduction using DMAIC in an automotive electronics manufacturers cybersecurity process",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1504/ijssca.2025.10070328",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Todd Lemon",
        "M. Badar",
        "Alister McLeod"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Six Sigma and Competitive Advantage (IJSSCA)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.1504/ijssca.2025.10070328",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1504/ijvas.2026.153565",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine intelligence-based security system to protect smart vehicles from relay attacks",
      "description": "The advancement of technology and the expansion of IoT have reduced the gap between humans and machines in recent years. IoT systems are always vulnerable to attacks from devilish minds on Earth, and these might be sufficient to bring down a whole company in the marketplace. There are incidents of smart car thefts that occur covertly due to a well-known exploit called the relay attack. It's crucial to properly neutralise the relay attack since there are situations where multiple users are operating an automobile at once. By leveraging the current innovation, we aim to mitigate the method that cybercriminals use to easily break into vehicles. The most serious issue is the 'Relay Attack', which could use a latent keyless entry system weakness to start a Passive Keyless Entry System vehicle. An adversarial attacker gains entry to a mechanised vehicle by intercepting radio messages and relaying them back to the vehicle. The effect of this assault and the misfortune is huge. In this work, an amalgamation of network security, the Internet of Things and machine intelligence is considered to formulate a countermeasure for relay attacks. The proposed system ensures the security of vehicles that work on a passive keyless entry system by authenticating multiple drivers through the CART algorithm.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1504/ijvas.2026.153565",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automobile",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anurag R. Simha",
        "Bharat Kumar Naik",
        "C. Rekha",
        "Vinod L. Navhi",
        "K. Vinodha"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Vehicle Autonomous Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.1504/ijvas.2026.153565",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1515/cait-2017-0046",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Key(s) and Keyless Image Encryption Techniques",
      "description": "Abstract As in recent years digital data transmission and image application have been increasing, maintaining secure transmission of image is of high importance. Image Encryption is implemented to achieve security on image applications. This paper exhibits a survey on various existing image encryption techniques. The paper mainly focuses on two types: Image encryption with Key(s) and Image Encryption without Key(s). In addition it also describes several properties of a good image encryption technique. The paper presents a survey of most popular algorithms and research papers that are related with different image encryption techniques.",
      "published": "2017-11-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1515/cait-2017-0046",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ranjan Kumar H S",
        "Safeeriya S. P. Fathimath",
        "Ganesh Aithal",
        "Surendra Shetty"
      ],
      "venue": "Cybernetics and Information Technologies",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.1515/cait-2017-0046",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15167/sohail-muhammad-saad_phd2026-03-06",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk-based Cybersecurity Assessment for Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Communications: A Multi-Tier Experimental Framework",
      "description": "Connected vehicles promise transformative safety improvements through Vehicle to Everything (V2X) wireless communication, yet the broadcast nature of these networks, heterogeneous protocol integration (DSRC, C-V2X, GNSS, CAN), and millisecond latency safety requirements introduce cybersecurity challenges fundamentally different from enterprise IT contexts. Current vulnerability assessment methods fall short in three ways: simulations miss physical layer attack vectors, hardware testbeds cannot scale economically, and conventional IT security frameworks prioritize confidentiality over the availability and integrity critical for preventing collisions. Bridging these gaps demands adapted methodologies validated across multiple experimental paradigms. This central contribution of this research addresses the cybersecurity challenges inherent in heterogeneous Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communication environments, where protocol diversity across DSRC, C-V2X, GNSS, and in-vehicle networks creates complex and exploitable vulnerabilities. To enable realistic and scalable experimentation, a comprehensive multi tier testbed architecture was developed, integrating distinct yet complementary validation layers. The first layer employs Software Defined Radio (SDR) platforms to emulate physical layer attacks that cannot be effectively represented in simulation. The second layer incorporates industrial grade Cohda Wireless equipment to ensure applicability and consistency with commercial V2X deployments, The third layer the CyberVehiCare hardware in the loop testbed, facilitates intermediate scale testing under realistic vehicular operating conditions. The integrated framework revealed multiple cross protocol vulnerabilities that are typically undetected by isolated or single paradigm approaches. To systematically assess their impact, a Safety Impact Scoring (SIS) mechanism was introduced, aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 standards, enabling quantifiable evaluation of the physical consequences of communication breaches. Furthermore, a Graph Neural Network (GNN) based intrusion detection system was developed to operate at the physical layer, thereby supporting real time mitigation. In addition, a hands on cybersecurity training framework strengthening workforce readiness for automotive cybersecurity engineering. Collectively, these contributions span vulnerability discovery, risk quantification, real time detection, and organizational competence development providing holistic V2X cybersecurity solutions bridging academic research and automotive industry deployment needs.",
      "published": "2026-03-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15167/sohail-muhammad-saad_phd2026-03-06",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "MUHAMMAD SAAD SOHAIL"
      ],
      "venue": "CINECA IRIS Institutial Research Information System (University of Genoa)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.15167/sohail-muhammad-saad_phd2026-03-06",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4112,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.15167/sohail-muhammad-saad_phd2026-03-06 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: undetected, scale, commercial, confidentiality, platforms, nature, where, impact."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15439/2022f136",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Heuristic Risk Treatment for ISO/SAE 21434 Development Projects",
      "description": "Due to new technologies for connectivity, automotive systems shift from a closed to an open system approach.Therefore, automotive systems have a rising demand for security, letting security be an upcoming field in research and practice.Also, the newly published process standard ISO/SAE 21434 demands adjustments in the development process to address cybersecurity.The unique characteristics of automotive systems leave many approaches from other system types inapplicable.This work concentrates on the risk treatment step in the cybersecurity development process.Due to the vast amount of differing terminology, we see the need to define a flexible taxonomy adaptable to several system types and used in systems with normative references.We use this taxonomy to develop a heuristic approach for risk treatment based on a distinct terminology for security requirements.The presented method is extendable to include several trade-off points.",
      "published": "2022-09-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15439/2022f136",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christine Jakobs",
        "Matthias Werner",
        "Karsten Schmidt",
        "Gerhard Hansch"
      ],
      "venue": "Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.15439/2022f136",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15439/2023f7757",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "To propose an attack detection model for enhancing the security of 5G-enabled Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication for smart vehicle",
      "description": "The evolution of 5G technology has revolutionized the communication landscape, enabling faster speeds, low latency, and increased capacity.The integration of 5G technology and the emergence of the 5G-enabled V2X communication network are driving the transformation of the automotive industry.Connected cars and the software-defined vehicle concept enable new business models and enhanced safety measures.However, ensuring the security of the 5G-enabled V2X communication network is crucial to mitigate potential attacks and protect the integrity of the ecosystem.To identify this potential attack, we have proposed a novel deep learning-based attack detection model (ADM) for detecting attack in 5G-enabled V2X communication network.In this we have used correlation coefficient as the feature selection method and used the deep learning-based stacked LSTM model for attack detection.The performance metrices are detection rate, accuracy, precision and F1-score.",
      "published": "2023-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15439/2023f7757",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prince Rajak",
        "Pavan Kumar Mishra"
      ],
      "venue": "Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.15439/2023f7757",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15439/2024f5017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering with Modeling Support",
      "description": "Rapid advances of connected and autonomous vehicle technology have led to an increase in cyber-attacks. This in turn has driven the development of the ISO 21434 standard aimed at supporting the management of cybersecurity risks in the automotive industry. There is, however, a disconnect between the standard and the currently applied model-based development approaches that are increasingly applied for systems and software development. In this paper, we present tool support created for model-based automotive cybersecurity engineering. This tool is built upon the existing automotive systems development language, EAST-ADL, with extensions to address security in accordance with the ISO 21434 standard covering modeling support, calculation of security-related metrics such as impact, risk, and attack feasibility, and generation of ISO 21434 compliant security threat reports. Meeting the requirements of cybersecurity engineeering according to ISO 21434 are demonstrated with two examples.",
      "published": "2024-09-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15439/2024f5017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexander Fischer",
        "Juha‐Pekka Tolvanen",
        "Ramin Tavakoli Kolagari"
      ],
      "venue": "Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.15439/2024f5017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15439/2024f8797",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An autonomous vehicle in a connected environment: case study of cyber-resilience",
      "description": "As the advancing autonomy of vehicles requires increasing assistance from the surrounding infrastructure, it becomes clear that the potential for cyberattacks necessitates a sophisticated implementation of resilience, capable of detecting and responding to both internal and external threats.Therefore, threat analysis and risk assessment, including careful modelling of resilience, are essential to prepare against cybersecurity risks.In this context, we extend our method of an automatic discovery of cost-ranked cyberattack scenarios by monitoring/fallback mechanisms.We then demonstrate that this extension allows an analysis of a realistic resilient model of cybersecurity aspects of a level 2 autonomous vehicle in a connected environment.",
      "published": "2024-10-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15439/2024f8797",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guillaume Hutzler",
        "Hanna Klaudel",
        "Witold Klaudel",
        "Franck Pommereau",
        "Artur Rataj"
      ],
      "venue": "Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.15439/2024f8797",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1556/112.2020.00002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Az önvezető autózás kihívásai és biztonsági kérdései a digitális államban",
      "description": "Összefoglalás. A XXI. század első felében a korábban sok évtizeden keresztül lassan változó közlekedés gyorsított ütemben alakul át. Ez alatt a pár év alatt több változás következik be, több kihívást kell leküzdeni, mint a korábbi időszakban. Az elektromos hajtás térnyerése, új járműhasználati módok mellett a járművek autonomizálódása és összekapcsolódása jelenti az új irányokat, amelyek kihívás elé állítják nemcsak az autóipart, hanem a járművek használóit és a szabályzókat, az államot is. Kutatásainkban az önvezető autózás jelentette kihívásokat emeljük ki a többi, röviden bemutatott trend közül, majd pedig vizsgáljuk, milyen kihívásokat támaszt a digitalizálódó állam felé az önvezetés felé elmozduló járműves technológia. Summary. In the first half of the 21st century, transportation that has been slowly changing over many decades has been transforming at an accelerated rate. Over the course of these few years, there will be more changes and more challenges to overcome. For a century it was unquestionable that a vehicle is driven by a driver and its energy comes via diesel or petrol from crude oil. Today vehicles’ autonomy in driving is increasing, and instead of crude oil based fuels first biocomponents and gaseous fuels appeared, and now electricity knocks at the door. The proliferation of the electric driving, the new modes of vehicle use, and the autonomy and connectivity of vehicles represent new directions that challenge not only the automotive industry, but also vehicle users and regulators, and the states. New technologies bring about new security and safety challenges as well. Most of the challenges pop up in the cyber security domain. And its result is that a closer cooperation is necessary between the automotive industry and informatics. As these two leading industrial fields have a different setup, the cooperation is energy demanding task for all participants. Modification and upgrade of the homologation process seems to be one of the potential gateways that could merge the safety requests. Improving traditionally rigid automotive homologation processes needs a lot of extended test opportunities. In our research, we highlight the challenges posed by self-driving cars and show some trends briefly, and then examine the challenges posed by vehicle technology moving towards self-driving, and towards digitizing. The certification process of the automotive industry is highlighted and modifications are proposed. We propose to extend the traditional proving ground based certification processes with special, autonomous vehicles designed processes that are partially made within the virtual reality-proving ground mixtures. A newly designed proving ground not only offers a wide range of vehicle and traffic tests for conventional, connected and automated vehicles, but can also be used to test possible prototype solutions, as well as helps to develop the type-approval process, and useful for educational purposes. Cyber security has special dimensions, newly developed test environment is necessary to validate the vehicles and their elements. A complete vehicle testing and validation center is proposed to establish for automotive cyber security features, focusing not only on known, but also on unknown vulnerabilities. It will help to develop dedicated tests to eliminate unknown vulnerabilities and potential new vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2020-12-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1556/112.2020.00002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Máté Zöldy",
        "Zsolt Szalay",
        "Árpád Török"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientia et Securitas",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.1556/112.2020.00002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15587/1729-4061.2026.351698",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Devising a methodological approach to determining priorities for digital transformation of transport enterprises",
      "description": "The process that improves decision-making for prioritizing the implementation of digital technologies at a transport enterprise under the conditions of uncertainty associated with war and European integration has been investigated in this study. The objective need to improve the efficiency of decisions is predetermined by resource constraints faced by enterprises, especially under conditions of martial law. To solve the problem, it has been proposed using a methodological approach based on the hierarchy analysis method. A system of criteria for assessing the priority of digital technologies for transport enterprises was built, which consists of the following groups: economic, technological, organizational-managerial, social-security, and strategic. It was established that the most significant criteria for evaluating digital technologies for the studied enterprises are operational stability (0.4214), technological reliability (0.2621), physical security of infrastructure (0.2987), management flexibility under risk conditions (0.4237), protection of life and health of employees (0.4593), as well as compliance with the legislation of Ukraine and EU norms (0.2713). The priority of implementing digital technologies for the studied group of transport enterprises was justified based on the construction of a multi-criteria model and the application of the Analytic Hierarchy Process. The following digital technologies were considered to be of the highest priority: transport monitoring and telematics systems, electronic document management, digital contracts and digital interaction platforms. The objectivity and consistency of the results is attributed to the fact that the evaluation was based on substantiated criteria that provided a multidimensional reflection of the impact of digitalization on the activities of enterprises. A feature of the improved methodological approach is its higher universality. It is suitable for practical application in various modes of transport and for a wide continuum of digital technologies",
      "published": "2026-02-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15587/1729-4061.2026.351698",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yevhenii V. Vorobiov",
        "Olena Palyvoda",
        "Iryna V. Tarnovska"
      ],
      "venue": "Eastern-European Journal of Enterprise Technologies",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.15587/1729-4061.2026.351698",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15607/rss.2024.xx.076",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "This paper introduces an attacking mechanism to challenge the resilience of autonomous driving systems.Specifically, we manipulate the decision-making processes of an autonomous vehicle by dynamically displaying adversarial patches on a screen mounted on another moving vehicle.These patches are optimized to deceive the object detection models into misclassifying targeted objects, e.g., traffic signs.Such manipulation has significant implications for critical multi-vehicle interactions such as intersection crossing, which are vital for safe and efficient autonomous driving systems.Particularly, we make four major contributions.First, we introduce a novel adversarial attack approach where the patch is not co-located with its target, enabling more versatile and stealthy attacks.Moreover, our method utilizes dynamic patches displayed on a screen, allowing for adaptive changes and movements, enhancing the flexibility and performance of the attack.To do so, we design a Screen Image Transformation Network (SIT-Net), which simulates environmental effects on the displayed images, narrowing the gap between simulated and real-world scenarios.Further, we integrate a positional loss term into the adversarial training process to increase the success rate of the dynamic attack.Finally, we shift the focus from merely attacking perceptual systems to influencing the decision-making algorithms of selfdriving systems.Our experiments demonstrate the first successful implementation of such dynamic adversarial attacks in real-world autonomous driving scenarios, paving the way for advancements in the field of robust and secure autonomous driving.",
      "published": "2024-07-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15607/rss.2024.xx.076",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amirhosein Chahe",
        "Chenan Wang",
        "Abhishek S. Jeyapratap",
        "Kaidi Xu",
        "Lifeng Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "Robotics: Science and Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.15607/rss.2024.xx.076",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15623/ijret.2015.0405039",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VEHICLE TELEMATICS WITH REAL TIME OPERATING SYSTEM",
      "description": "Vehicle Telematics has Vehicle tracking employs the use of an electronic module or device, regarded as Vehicle Tracking Device, and installed in the vehicle to empower the owner or other person in charge to track the location of vehicle.Global Positioning Systems (GPS) modules are being used by most of the vehicle tracking devices and systems for accurate location of the vehicle.Real Time Operating System (RTOS) on the device ensures determinism among the execution of tasks of data collection and transmission to the server at distant location.Location of the vehicle along with rest of the information can be observed on electronic maps through Internet.Vehicle tracking systems can be used for the purpose of fleet management functions such as routing and dispatch as well as for collection of on-board information, monitoring driver's behavior, vehicle's status and security.",
      "published": "2015-05-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15623/ijret.2015.0405039",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Manish Kumar Chauhan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.15623/ijret.2015.0405039",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15680/ijircce.2024.1202070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reimagining Commercial Insurance with AI: Intelligent Risk Assessment, Dynamic Pricing, and Predictive Claims Management",
      "description": "The commercial insurance industry is at a critical inflection point as traditional underwriting, pricing, and claims management models struggle to keep pace with the complexity, speed, and volatility of modern risk environments. Rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning, cloud computing, and Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are fundamentally reshaping how insurers assess risk, price policies, and manage claims across large-scale commercial portfolios. This paper presents a comprehensive technical exploration of how AI-driven architectures enable intelligent risk assessment, dynamic pricing, and predictive claims management in commercial insurance ecosystems. It examines end-to-end AI pipelines spanning real-time data ingestion, feature engineering, model training, explainable AI (XAI), and regulatory-compliant deployment. The study further integrates real-world industry case studies, including Zurich’s IoT-enabled risk scoring, Progressive’s telematics-driven pricing, and Lemonade’s AI-based claims automation. Regulatory alignment with the NAIC AI Governance Framework, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the EU AI Act is also addressed. The paper demonstrates that AI-powered insurance platforms can significantly enhance underwriting precision, reduce claims settlement time, improve fraud detection, and enable continuous, behavior-driven premium optimization, positioning AI as the foundational engine of next-generation commercial insurance.",
      "published": "2024-02-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15680/ijircce.2024.1202070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Senior Quality Assurance Specialist and Full Stack Developer, FM Global, USA",
        "Sukruthi Reddy Sangannagari"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Innovative Research in Computer and Communication Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.15680/ijircce.2024.1202070",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15849/ijasca.206",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deposit-Escrow EV Charging on Avalanche with zk-SNARK Billing Proofs: Prototype Scope and Security Limits",
      "description": "Electric-vehicle (EV) charging workflows expose billing and session information through centralized services or transparent ledgers. This study integrates deposit escrow, a Groth16 billing-arithmetic proof, and settlement on the Avalanche Fuji testnet. Its contribution is a proof-of-concept workflow linking authorization, payment, refund, and timeout handling, together with an analysis of the boundary between the implemented proof and a proposed station-authenticated protocol. Across five runs per setting, mean deposit and settlement confirmation times are 1.8 s and 2.1 s, respectively; proof generation averages 0.21 s on a desktop PC; and settlement consumes approximately 320,000 gas. These descriptive results apply to a simplified circuit that checks billing arithmetic with a placeholder binding. Station signatures are checked only by the off-chain harness, so station-authenticated billing and resistance to substituted energy witnesses remain unvalidated. Normal settlement provides meter-field omission, not consumption confidentiality: under the exact public linear tariff, energy E is recoverable from public payment C and positive tariff p as E = C/p. The results support feasibility of the escrow-and-arithmetic-proof workflow; authenticated witness binding, complete reproducibility artifacts, and stronger experimental validation remain prerequisites for a secure deployment.",
      "published": "2026-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15849/ijasca.206",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mashael M. Asiri"
      ],
      "venue": "International journal of advances in soft computing and its applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.15849/ijasca.206",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.15866/irea.v9i2.20193",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Future Connected Cars Through the Evolution of Telematics and Infotainment",
      "description": "The world of cars is evolving rapidly, and this evolution is increasingly leading vehicles to be intelligent and interconnected. This paper aims to provide a valuable overview of cars' connectivity concerning trends and technologies. The future automotive market's challenges are now focused on this trend involving large economic investments. This article introduces the primary background concerning problems that the automotive industry must resolve to react satisfactorily to consumers' mobility demands regarding efficient services, comfort, and safety. The widespread employment of digitization in the automotive area will allow a leap forward in creating sustainable and intelligent mobility services. Greater accessibility, small and powerful computers, and the exploitation of wireless networks and cloud services will be required. More in detail, this paper presents a thorough discussion of the leading technologies useful for evolving connected cars. This growth will allow the mixture of computer and network technologies with the Internet of Things (IoT), thus offering communication capabilities at any time, from any place, with anything. This paper also aims to identify salient features of this progress, starting from the onboard diffusion of telematic components and linked to the spread of infotainment, up to some applications, such as car-sharing and smart ticketing. Finally, the main characteristics of connected cars and self-driving cars are examined, trying to trace the future development prospects for these vehicles.",
      "published": "2021-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.15866/irea.v9i2.20193",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "exploitation",
        "infotainment",
        "self-driving",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fabio Arena",
        "Giovanni Pau",
        "Alessandro Gaetano Severino",
        "Salvatore Trubia",
        "Salvatore Curto"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Engineering Applications (IREA)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.15866/irea.v9i2.20193",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1587/comex.2021xbl0175",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Chaotic and Random Neural Network Cipher for In-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": ": With the proliferation of automotive electronic devices, electronic control units are increasingly used to share information within in-vehicle networks. This induces a range of security risks, such as information disclosure, spoofing, and tampering. In this paper, we pro-pose a symmetric-key cipher. The method generates pseudo-random numbers using a chaotic and random neural network, and encrypts and decrypts frame messages of in-vehicle networks based on the symmetric key. We also propose a lightweight ID-based key sharing protocol. We evaluated the key sharing, encryption, and decryption in Controller Area Network.",
      "published": "2021",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1587/comex.2021xbl0175",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhong-Da Liu",
        "Takeshi Murakami",
        "Satoshi Kawamura",
        "H. Yoshida"
      ],
      "venue": "IEICE Communications Express",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.1587/comex.2021xbl0175",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1587/transfun.2022cip0004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study of The Risk Quantification Method of Cyber-Physical Systems focusing on Direct-Access Attacks to In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Cyber-physical systems, in which ICT systems and field devices are interconnected and interlocked, have become widespread. More threats need to be taken into consideration when designing the security of cyber-physical systems. Attackers may cause damage to the physical world by attacks which exploit vulnerabilities of ICT systems, while other attackers may use the weaknesses of physical boundaries to exploit ICT systems. Therefore, it is necessary to assess such risks of attacks properly. A direct-access attack in the field of automobiles is the latter type of attacks where an attacker connects unauthorized equipment to an in-vehicle network directly and attempts unauthorized access. But it has been considered as less realistic and evaluated less risky than other threats via network entry points by conventional risk assessment methods. We focused on reassessing threats via direct access attacks in proposing effective security design procedures for cyber-physical systems based on a guideline for automobiles, JASO TP15002. In this paper, we focus on “fitting to a specific area or viewpoint” of such a cyber-physical system, and devise a new risk quantification method, RSS-CWSS_CPS based on CWSS, which is also a vulnerability evaluation standard for ICT systems. It can quantify the characteristics of the physical boundaries in cyber-physical systems.",
      "published": "2022-11-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.2022cip0004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "automobiles",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yasuyuki Kawanishi",
        "Hideaki NISHIHARA",
        "Hideki Yamamoto",
        "Hirotaka Yoshida",
        "Hiroyuki Inoue"
      ],
      "venue": "IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.1587/transfun.2022cip0004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1587/transfun.e99.a.208",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Network Security Using Secure Element",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.e99.a.208",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Keisuke Takemori",
        "S. Mizoguchi",
        "Hideaki Kawabata",
        "Ayumu Kubota"
      ],
      "venue": "IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.1587/transfun.e99.a.208",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1587/transinf.2017ici0001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Cyber Security for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The demand for and the scope of connected services have rapidly grown and developed in many industries such as electronic appliances, robotics, and industry automation. In the automotive field, including connected vehicles, different types of connected services have become available and they provide convenience and comfort with users while yielding new business opportunities. With the advent of connected vehicles, the threat of cyber attacks has become a serious issue and protection methods against these attacks are urgently needed to provide safe and secure connected services. From 2017, attack methods have become more sophisticated through different attack surfaces attached to navigation systems and telematics modules, and security requirements to circumvent such attacks have begun to be established. Individual threats have been addressed previously; however, there are few reports that provide an overview of cyber security related to connected vehicles. This paper gives our perspective on cyber security for connected vehicles based on a survey of recent studies related to vehicle security. To introduce these studies, the environment surrounding connected vehicles is classified into three categories: inside the vehicle, communications between the back-end systems and vehicles, and the back-end systems. In each category, this paper introduces recent trends in cyber attacks and the protection requirements that should be developed for connected services. We show that the overall security covering the three categories must be considered because the security of the vehicle is jeopardized even if one item in the categories is not covered. We believe that this paper will further contribute to development of all service systems related to connected vehicles including autonomous vehicles and to the investigation into cyber security against these attacks.",
      "published": "2018-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1587/transinf.2017ici0001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junko Takahashi"
      ],
      "venue": "IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.1587/transinf.2017ici0001",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1609/aaaiss.v4i1.31826",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ML-based Anomaly Detection for CAN Bus Network in Agriculture Machinery",
      "description": "The adoption of advanced automation and next-generation technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT) and modern communication networks has revolutionized the food and agriculture sector, boosting the efficiency and precision of farm machinery. However, this increased inter-connectivity has also exposed significant vulnerabilities, particularly in Controller Area Network (CAN) protocols, widely used in advanced agricultural machinery and equipment. Due to its lack of inherent security features, CAN is susceptible to various cyber-attacks, potentially leading to severe consequences if these attacks remain undetected and unmitigated. This paper introduces a supervised machine learning (ML)-based anomaly detection system (CAN-ADS) designed to detect various cyber-attacks on CAN-based agricultural machinery. The system leverages network traffic augmentation and data balancing techniques to train ML algorithms on CAN-specific datasets. Experimental results show that CAN-ADS achieves high accuracy (approx 98%) and true-positive rates with low false-negative rates (approx 1%).",
      "published": "2024-11-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1609/aaaiss.v4i1.31826",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Souradeep Bhattacharya",
        "Ranuka G. Gallolukankanamalage",
        "Brian L. Steward",
        "Manimaran Govindarasu"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.1609/aaaiss.v4i1.31826",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17148/iarjset.2023.101019",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Enabled Unified Diagnostic Services: Ensuring Secure and Efficient OTA Updates Over Ethernet/IP",
      "description": "Ethernet has emerged as a crucial component in modern in-vehicle networks, serving as a bridge to meet the demand for over-the-air updates and ensure efficient automotive software updates.Leveraging its unique characteristics, introducing unified diagnostic services over Ethernet/IP presents a paradigm shift, offering significant advantages over existing solutions based on other time synchronous bridging protocols.This paper unveils an innovative EtherNet/IPcapable Unified Diagnostic Service architecture designed to efficiently address the over-the-air update requirements.The diagnostic process is intelligently offloaded during runtime, ensuring non-interference with the runtime automotive services.This is achieved through well-defined state machines of TCP/IP and FTP, and a task response completed with a finite state machine with bounded buffer complexity, thereby safeguarding the control-CAN network.As the threat landscape evolves, the automotive network is increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks.In response, our architecture incorporates a robust set of preventive and reactive measures.Secure boot, Authentic air updates, and a multi-domain architecture form a formidable first line of defense, enhancing the security of the automotive network.These measures build trust between the CAN FD-enabled Ethernet/IP end devices, ensuring the integrity of the system.The Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) protocol is standardized by ISO(R)-14229, encompassing the entire range of automotive diagnostic tools.Inevitably, this article concentrates on designing and implementing an Ethernet/IP-capable Diagnostic Service Tool that could efficiently meet the OTA need using industry-standard protocols such as an HTTPend server.This ensures that our implemented system is more compatible with existing aftermarkets, that the functionalities are unchanged within our tool, and that it can be used for offline activity with COTS hardware [5].Our implemented system encompasses an industry-grade Ethernet/IP-enabled gigabit physical layer, conformance to joint test specifications of Ethernet/IP specifications by ODVA and Ethernet-based diagnostic services, and a UDS-based diagnostic software tool.In addition, the importance of state machines, states, bounded complexity [1], and formulating attacks so that our system is robust to malicious activity in the compromised environment (Automotive network) are also discussed from the view of proper operation in the runtime, which is a critical barrier for all initial state offloading.Subsequently, testing of the implemented tool under various conditions, such as disabling the interface and downgrading it to 100 Mbps EMAC states, validates the implemented systems' robustness to inaccurate connections and accidental particular states, the evolution of malicious activity, and interoperability between OEM and aftermarket tools.",
      "published": "2024-05-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17148/iarjset.2023.101019",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ravi Aravind",
        "Manogna Dolu Surabhi",
        "Chirag Vinalbhai Shah"
      ],
      "venue": "IARJSET",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.17148/iarjset.2023.101019",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17148/ijarcce.2024.131102",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of Vehicle-To-Everything (V2X) Communication to Enhance Driver Safety and ComplianceAutomation",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is examined in this paper as a revolutionary strategy for improving driver safety and guaranteeing automated adherence to traffic laws.The real-time information exchange between cars infrastructure and pedestrians made possible by V2X technology is essential for preventing collisions and enhancing traffic control.Although traffic flow optimization and accident prevention are two areas where V2X exhibits great promise security flaws inconsistent standards expensive infrastructure and privacy issues are impeding its development.To protect V2X communication the study emphasizes a careful examination of current security protocols and the requirement for strong countermeasures.In order to create universally compatible systems global coordination is necessary to overcome standardization challenges caused by diverse regional protocols such as DSRC and C-V2X.Furthermore, putting V2X infrastructure into place is expensive especially when retrofitting already-existing urban landscapes.The study also looks at potential future directions indicating that adding artificial intelligence could improve V2Xs adaptive and predictive capabilities further supporting driver safety and legal compliance.A thorough grasp of the developments and difficulties in V2X communication is the goal of this paper which also highlights the fact that resolving these issues is crucial to realizing the full potential of the technology.To create a more secure interconnected and effective transportation ecosystem worldwide cooperation between governments businesses and research institutions will be essential.",
      "published": "2024-11-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17148/ijarcce.2024.131102",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "IJARCCE",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.17148/ijarcce.2024.131102",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17148/imrjr.2024.010103",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Future of Automotive Manufacturing: Integrating AI, ML, and Generative AI for Next-Gen Automatic Cars",
      "description": "The automotive industry stands on the brink of a transformative era, driven by advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and generative AI technologies.This paper explores how these cutting-edge technologies are reshaping automotive manufacturing, focusing on their integration into the design, production, and operation of next-generation autonomous vehicles.AI and ML are revolutionizing automotive manufacturing by enabling predictive maintenance, enhancing quality control, and optimizing supply chains through data-driven insights.Generative AI, in particular, is pushing the boundaries of design innovation, allowing for the creation of novel vehicle designs and features that were previously inconceivable.The convergence of these technologies promises not only to streamline manufacturing processes but also to accelerate the development of autonomous vehicles, making them safer, more efficient, and more adaptable to consumer needs.By examining current applications and future potentials, this paper highlights the significant impact of AI and ML on improving operational efficiencies and driving innovation in vehicle design and production.Furthermore, it addresses the challenges and ethical considerations associated with these technologies, including data privacy, cybersecurity, and the potential for job displacement.Through a comprehensive review of emerging trends and case studies, the paper provides a forward-looking perspective on how the integration of AI, ML, and generative AI will shape the future of automotive manufacturing and drive the industry towards a new paradigm of automation and intelligence.",
      "published": "2024-09-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17148/imrjr.2024.010103",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chandrakanth Rao Madhavaram",
        "Janardhana Rao Sunkara",
        "Chandrababu Kuraku",
        "Eswar Prasad Galla",
        "Hemanth Kumar Gollangi"
      ],
      "venue": "IMRJR",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.17148/imrjr.2024.010103",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i24/96027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security Issues in Connected Vehicle of Intelligent Transport System",
      "description": "Background/Objectives: Requirement for security and safety with interest and growth to C-ITS application is increased. It is needed to security threat issue and risk consideration in the connected vehicle environment. Methods/Statistical Analysis: For efficient communication assistance of connected vehicle, the understanding and access of WAVE mode such as CCH, SCH for multi channel and WSMP specification are preferred in control, communication and signal processing for cooperative intelligence transport system. In security risk assessment and debugging, it is applied to reviewing of source code, analysis and evaluating of compliance, fuzzing and conducting of vulnerability. Findings: Main objectives of this article are to see risk issue and cyber threats in connected vehicle of ITS. Understanding for issues of risk assessment such as debugging, fuzzing, real time application, evaluating of compliance, connectivity and computational performance are required. Also for build up security of ITS it should be established guideline of ITS security factors such as PKI, security architecture, cost and interoperable solution. Application/Improvements: The risk assessment and cyber threats are basically emphasized guideline of ITS security and safety in terms of cyber security procedure and security considerations.Keywords: Intelligence Traffic Security, Standard, Traffic, Vehicle Communication",
      "published": "2016-06-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i24/96027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "fuzzing",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin-Keun Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "Indian Journal of Science and Technology",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i24/96027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3812,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i24/96027 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: transport, intelligence, access, safety, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17531/ein/241316",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle ECU On-Board Diagnostic system Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment",
      "description": "This article presents a security assessment of the on-board diagnostic (OBD) system integrated into a vehicle's electronic control unit (ECU), specifically targeting the Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) protocol. The research focuses on a representative Battery Management System (BMS) ECU for electric vehicles within its operational context. The study aims to evaluate security vulnerabilities across all OBD functionalities and propose risk mitigation strategies for software implementation. A Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) was conducted following the ISO/SAE 21434 standard for road vehicle cybersecurity engineering. The authors identified seven primary assets requiring protection and defined 11 damage scenarios. Furthermore, feasibility ratings were calculated for 18 attack paths involving both physical and wireless OBD interfaces. Based on the assessment, the authors recommend specific software enhancements to mitigate the identified cybersecurity threats.",
      "published": "2026-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17531/ein/241316",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "obd",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Piotr Pełechaty",
        "Łukasz Jan KONIECZNY"
      ],
      "venue": "Eksploatacja i Niezawodnosc - Maintenance and Reliability",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.17531/ein/241316",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17559/tv-20200922132555",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Disruptive Technologies in the Operation of Insurance Industry",
      "description": "The aim of this paper is to present and discuss the opportunities and risks related to implementation of new digital disruptive technologies in the operation of insurance companies.We compare theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence of six alternative approaches of digitalization implementation in insurance companies.We review trends and analyse the application of information technologies in risk management, in sales and distribution, Insurtech, big data and predictive analytics, Internet of things (IoT), telematics devices and Blockchain technology in insurance.Regardless of the threats related to digitalization processes and increasing number of \"attackers\" in the insurance sector, insurance companies are slowly and gradually embracing new technologies, adapting their strategies, organizational structures, risk management, employees and culture in order to add value to their companies and to the customers.",
      "published": "2021-08-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17559/tv-20200922132555",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "telematics",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vladimir Njegomir",
        "Jelena Demko-Rihter",
        "Tamara Bojanić"
      ],
      "venue": "Tehnicki vjesnik - Technical Gazette",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.17559/tv-20200922132555",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17577/ijertv10is010075",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modeling and Simulation of Blackhole Attack Detection using Multipath Routing in WSN-based IoV",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a technology that combines the Internet of Things and an intelligent transportation system (ITS), and it is being studied to provide driver convenience and reduce traffic accidents. Autonomous vehicles use advanced driver assistance systems sensors such as cameras, riders, and radar to recognize the road environment. In addition, autonomous vehicles use a high definition map (HDmap) to search a driving route, and use vehicle to everything (V2X) communication technology to acquire external information to drive safely. However, HD-maps and V2X communication have a lot of influence on the external environment. To solve this problem, a scheme for applying a wireless sensor network (WSN) to an ITS has been proposed. WSNs can detect wild animals, so building infrastructure in wild animal haunting areas can prevent road kills caused by autonomous vehicles. However, the sensor node of a WSN is deployed outside and has the disadvantage of being vulnerable to security because it uses wireless communication. If a black hole attack is attempted on the WSN used for the IoV, the message may not be delivered and damage from a car accident may occur. To solve this problem, the IoV must be efficiently authenticated using public keys, and WSN must detect and respond to attacks to deliver accurate information. The proposed scheme prevents accidents by detecting a black hole attack through base station and initializing the damaged node by performing secondary verification through the IoV. The proposed scheme evaluates the performance by simulation using discrete event system specifications. The proposed scheme shows a detection rate of 70% when a black hole attack is attempted with 87.0414% probability through the experimental results. Keywords— Discrete Event System Specification; Internet of Vehicle; Network Security; Wireless Sensor Network",
      "published": "2021-01-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17577/ijertv10is010075",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "driver assistance",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Won-Jin Chung",
        "T. Cho"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Engineering Research",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.17577/ijertv10is010075",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17654/ec016040881",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ANALYSIS ON THE VULNERABILITIES OF CONNECTED CARS AND THE DESIGN OF SECURITY SYSTEMS",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016-12-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17654/ec016040881",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tea-Hyoung Kim",
        "Jong-Wook Jang"
      ],
      "venue": "Far East Journal of Electronics and Communications",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.17654/ec016040881",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17694/bajece.1231384",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Geo-Location Spoofing on E-Scooters; Threat Analysis and Prevention Framework",
      "description": "Geo-location services are widely used by numerous applications and devices. E-scooters have become one of the recent prevalent devices that uses these services. Geo-location services are highly vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Spoofing detection and prevention techniques have been researched for time. Most of the researches have been focused on smart devices such as smartphones, UAVs or other vehicles. Geo-location spoofing also poses significant threats on e-scooters for user security, costs and reliability. In this study, we analyze the location spoofing threats on e-scooter sharing environment and propose a spoofing detection framework. The proposed framework monitors e-scooter’s location and tracks significant changes. The proposed service based framework is able to provide different levels of awareness, and enabled capabilities.",
      "published": "2023-12-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17694/bajece.1231384",
      "matched_terms": [
        "spoofing",
        "threat",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmet Saim Yilmaz",
        "Haydar Çukurtepe",
        "Emin Kugu"
      ],
      "venue": "Balkan Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.17694/bajece.1231384",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17694/bajece.520979",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure Tracking Automobile System for Oil and Gas Distribution using Telematics and Blockchain Techniques",
      "description": "Crude oil is of high significance natural resources to Nigerian economy and is one of the major sources of income to the country development. The distribution of oil and gas products within the country is conveyed through the road networks by engaging tankers and some other type of automobiles. This approach of oil and gas distribution is susceptible to diversion of oil products, vehicles hijacking, goods tampering and many others challenges. In this paper, we present secure-tracking automobile system for remote monitoring of petroleum conveyed products across the country. The system evolves an in-vehicle based telematics tracking system for safeguarding automobile conveyance of petroleum products, geo-location tracking, and monitoring the petroleum volume of the tanker at every instance. The integration of secure-database and telematics-based tracking system was developed to communicates wirelessly, using existing telecommunication technology called General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). The in-vehicle unit makes use of a GPS receiver and ultrasonic sensor to monitor the liquid volume stage of the oil tanker at an interval of time. This database employs the use of blockchain technology for hashing, using SHA-1 algorithm and then link the subsequent records in the database for adequate security and prevent unauthorized alteration of records and unscrupulous parties. This system was tested and evaluated in terms of accuracy and precision of the GPS receiver coordinates with a reported R95 circular error probability radius of 15 meters and precision of 1.24 meters.",
      "published": "2019-07-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17694/bajece.520979",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "tampering",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lukman Adewale Ajao"
      ],
      "venue": "Balkan Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.17694/bajece.520979",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17706/ijcce.2020.9.2.97-104",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Study of In-Vehicle CAN Bus Network Security Based on Tamper Attack Detection Method",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17706/ijcce.2020.9.2.97-104",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shiyi Jin",
        "Shinan Wang",
        "Yujing Wu",
        "Yinan Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer and Communication Engineering",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.17706/ijcce.2020.9.2.97-104",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17721/2519-481x/2023/79-09",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "USING THE ISO 21434 CRITERIA FOR GENERATING SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS IN A-SPICE PROCESSES FOR CARS",
      "description": "With the increasing presence of electronics and autonomous systems in modern automobiles, cybersecurity has become a critical concern. Automotive manufacturers and other stakeholders are actively seeking ways to ensure reliable protection against cyber attacks. One approach involves the utilization of ISO 21434, a standard designed to enhance cybersecurity in the automotive industry. This research article investigates the ISO 21434 standard and its application in the field of automotive production, specifically in software development under the A-SPICE standard. The publication describes the methods and concepts used to enhance cybersecurity in the automotive industry and establishes the role of ISO 21434 within the A-SPICE model. The study's findings are valuable for companies and professionals involved in the development and implementation of cybersecurity measures in the automotive sector. Implementing the ISO 21434 standard can mitigate the risk of cyber attacks and improve the quality and reliability of automobiles, thus making the automotive industry safer and more trustworthy for consumers. The article provides an overview of key cybersecurity standards in the automotive industry. ISO 26262 sets out processes and requirements for functional safety in automotive systems, including cybersecurity considerations. SAE J3061 focuses on cybersecurity management in electronic systems of vehicles and is widely used in the industry. ISO/SAE 21434, introduced in 2020, replaces the previous ISO 26262 standard and specifies cybersecurity requirements in the automotive industry. These standards are closely related as they aim to ensure the safety and security of automotive products. Furthermore, the Automotive SPICE (Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination) framework is widely employed for evaluating and enhancing software development processes in the automotive sector. A-SPICE, a specific variant of Automotive SPICE, provides a framework for improving software development processes in automotive organizations. ISO 21434 guides cybersecurity activities within the A-SPICE framework, emphasizing the importance of a systematic and standardized approach to cybersecurity. To effectively implement cybersecurity in automotive products developed under A-SPICE, compliance with the ISO 21434 standard is crucial. However, mere adherence to the standard may be insufficient for achieving a high level of cybersecurity. Additional tools such as risk analysis methodologies and cybersecurity management can be employed to ensure robust cybersecurity measures. Risk analysis results can help identify vulnerabilities in the security system, enabling the development of effective mitigation measures. Cybersecurity management ensures compliance with the standard throughout the product development lifecycle. ISO 21434 can be applied at various stages of the V-model software development process, including requirements definition, design, and testing. During requirements definition, cybersecurity requirements are identified and incorporated into the system or software specifications. In the design phase, architectures are developed considering the cybersecurity requirements outlined in the standard. The testing phase addresses the fulfillment of cybersecurity requirements and evaluates the effectiveness of cybersecurity measures. In conclusion, the inclusion of ISO 21434 criteria in the development process of automotive software significantly impacts the quality and safety of products. The research demonstrates that applying ISO 21434 criteria allows for a systematic and structured approach to software development, ensuring the reliability, safety, and compliance of software products with regulatory requirements in the automotive industry. The article presents an analysis of standards, methods, and approaches used in the automotive industry and highlights the influence of ISO 21434 on the A-SPICE framework, defining its position within the model. Ultimately, this publication contributes to the advancement of knowledge in automotive cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17721/2519-481x/2023/79-09",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "D.O. Hhumennyi",
        "A.M. Shevchenko",
        "Yu.I. Khlaponin"
      ],
      "venue": "Collection of scientific works of the Military Institute of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.17721/2519-481x/2023/79-09",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijcnis.v15i3.6228",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Internet Technology Innovation and Information Security Challenges in New Vehicle Energy Sector",
      "description": "With the rapid proliferation and advancement of new energy vehicles, Internet technology has garnered significant attention and application in this field. This study focuses on innovations in Internet technology in the domain of new automotive energy and the associated information security challenges. The innovations in Internet technology relevant to new energy vehicles, including Telematics, intelligent driving, and remote control, are initially explored. Subsequently, the information security challenges brought about by these innovations are analyzed, encompassing various aspects such as data privacy breaches, remote attacks, and malware infections. The significance of information security in the development of new energy vehicles is emphasized. Solutions and suggestions, including the strengthening of encryption technology, the establishment of a robust security framework, and the enhancement of user education and awareness, are put forward. In conclusion, the current state of research on Internet technology innovation and information security challenges is summarized, and it is suggested that future research should delve deeper into the trajectory of Internet technology development in the field of new energy vehicles, along with the attendant information security challenges, to provide theoretical and practical support for promoting the healthy development and secure application of the new energy vehicle industry.",
      "published": "2023-12-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijcnis.v15i3.6228",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "malware",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenjie Lu",
        "Ximing Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijcnis.v15i3.6228",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijisae.v10i3s.8001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Emerging Security Risks in Automotive System-on-Chips (SoCs): A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "The transformation of modern vehicles into highly connected and software-driven systems has positioned System-on-Chips (SoCs) as a central element of automotive innovation. Automotive SoCs combine heterogeneous processing cores, accelerators, memory subsystems, and communication interfaces to support safety-critical functionalities such as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), autonomous driving, infotainment, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. While this high level of integration improves performance and cost efficiency, it also gives rise to new and increasingly complex security challenges. This paper presents a comprehensive review of emerging security risks affecting automotive SoCs, encompassing hardware-based attacks, software and firmware vulnerabilities, network-oriented exploits, and systemic risks associated with over-the-air updates and AI-driven workloads. By synthesizing recent academic and industrial research, the paper identifies dominant attack vectors, shortcomings of existing protection mechanisms, and open challenges that remain unresolved. The goal is to provide both researchers and practitioners with a structured perspective on the evolving threat landscape and to outline directions for security-aware SoC design. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v10i3s.8001",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v10i3s.8001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "driver assistance",
        "exploits",
        "infotainment",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "SUJAN HIREGUNDAGAL GOPAL RAO"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijisae.v10i3s.8001",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijisae.v11i10s.8000",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review of Intrusion Detection Methods for In-Vehicle Networks at the Semiconductor Level",
      "description": "The rapid digitalization of modern vehicles has significantly increased their exposure to cyber threats, particularly within in-vehicle networks (IVNs) such as the Controller Area Network (CAN). While numerous intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed at the software level, recent research highlights the growing importance of semiconductor-level intrusion detection to meet stringent real-time, safety, and reliability requirements. This paper presents a comprehensive review of intrusion detection methods for IVNs with a specific focus on hardware-assisted and semiconductor-integrated approaches. A structured literature review of recent studies is provided, followed by a comparative analysis of detection techniques, architectural implementations, and performance characteristics. The paper also discusses key challenges and future research directions toward secure, low-latency automotive semiconductor platforms. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v11i10s.8000",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v11i10s.8000",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "SUJAN HIREGUNDAGAL GOPAL RAO"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijisae.v11i10s.8000",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijisae.v12i1.7998",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review of Cybersecurity Threats in Automotive Semiconductor Control Units",
      "description": "The increasing dependence of modern vehicles on electronic control units (ECUs) has transformed automobiles into complex cyber-physical systems. These ECUs are built on automotive-grade semiconductor platforms that execute safety-critical and connectivity-oriented functions. While advancements in semiconductor integration have improved vehicle performance and functionality, they have simultaneously expanded the cybersecurity attack surface. This paper presents a technical review of cybersecurity threats affecting automotive semiconductor control units, focusing on vulnerabilities at the hardware, firmware, and communication levels. Industry trends, safety–security interdependencies, and mitigation strategies are examined from a semiconductor-centric perspective. The review highlights existing research gaps and identifies future directions for developing secure automotive electronic architectures. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v12i1.7998",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v12i1.7998",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "SUJAN HIREGUNDAGAL GOPAL RAO"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijisae.v12i1.7998",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijisae.v12i4s.7999",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safety and Security Co-Design in Automotive Semiconductor Systems: Challenges and Future Directions",
      "description": "As vehicles grow more connected and automated, semiconductors inside ECUs are the linchpin of both safety and security. Historically treated separately, safety (ISO 26262) and cybersecurity (ISO/SAE 21434) must now be co-designed so that security measures do not inadvertently compromise timing-critical safety behavior and safety mechanisms do not introduce new vulnerabilities. This paper surveys recent work on safety–security co-design at the semiconductor and ECU level, synthesizes practical challenges, and proposes directions for research and industry practice. Three conceptual figures and two summary tables are embedded at contextually appropriate points in the manuscript to aid comprehension. Key recent studies and industry reports are cited to ground recommendations. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v12i4s.7999",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijisae.v12i4s.7999",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "SUJAN HIREGUNDAGAL GOPAL RAO"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijisae.v12i4s.7999",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijritcc.v11i2s.6044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EECLA: A Novel Clustering Model for Improvement of Localization and Energy Efficient Routing Protocols in Vehicle Tracking Using Wireless Sensor Networks",
      "description": "Due to increase of usage of wireless sensor networks (WSN) for various purposes leads to a required technology in the present world. Many applications are running with the concepts of WSN now, among that vehicle tracking is one which became prominent in security purposes. In our previous works we proposed an algorithm called EECAL (Energy Efficient Clustering Algorithm and Localization) to improve accuracy and performed well. But are not focused more on continuous tracking of a vehicle in better aspects. In this paper we proposed and refined the same algorithm as per the requirement. Detection and tracking of a vehicle when they are in larges areas is an issue. We mainly focused on proximity graphs and spatial interpolation techniques for getting exact boundaries. Other aspect of our work is to reduce consumption of energy which increases the life time of the network. Performance of system when in active state is another issue can be fixed by setting of peer nodes in communication. We made an attempt to compare our results with the existed works and felt much better our work. For handling localization, we used genetic algorithm which handled good of residual energy, fitness of the network in various aspects. At end we performed a simulation task that proved proposed algorithms performed well and experimental analysis gave us faith by getting less localization error factor.",
      "published": "2023-01-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijritcc.v11i2s.6044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "tracking",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Annapurna Gummadi",
        "K. R. Rao"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Recent and Innovation Trends in Computing and Communication",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijritcc.v11i2s.6044",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijritcc.v11i8s.7187",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Security",
      "description": "This research paper introduces a novel approach to improve security and access control in smart door lock systems. The proposed system incorporates multi-factor authentication, combining a numerical keypad, mobile app, and RFID sensor. Each authentication method is associated with a specific lock, offering differentiated access control. Notably, the system requires the simultaneous use of the mobile app and RFID sensor to unlock a designated lock, adding an extra layer of security. To assess the system's effectiveness, a comprehensive study was conducted, considering security, usability, and user satisfaction. The study involved simulated attacks, user surveys, and usability tests, with data analysis providing insights into the system's resilience and user acceptance. This research contributes to the field of smart door lock systems by offering an innovative approach to enhance security through multi-factor authentication. The findings provide valuable insights for designing advanced access control mechanisms, empowering users with increased confidence in their security measures while maintaining a user-friendly experience.",
      "published": "2023-08-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijritcc.v11i8s.7187",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaushalya Thopate",
        "Sandip Shinde",
        "Rupali Mahajan",
        "Rajkumar Bhagat",
        "Piyush Joshi",
        "Akshata Kalbhor",
        "Amey Kulkarni",
        "Swayam Jadhav"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Recent and Innovation Trends in Computing and Communication",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijritcc.v11i8s.7187",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/ijritcc.v11i9.9364",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Data Communication with CAN &Security Monitoring: A Review",
      "description": "Automobiles are now being created with more electronic components for efficient functioning such as Anti Lock Braking system, Adaptive Cruise Control, Traction control system, Airbag, Power Steering etc. managed by networked controllers that include hundreds of ECUs (electronic control units) that can coordinate, control, and monitor loads of internal vehicle components. Each component, such as ABS, TCS (Traction control system), tire pressure monitoring system and telematics system, may communicate with nearby components over the CAN (Controller Area Network) bus, establishing an in-vehicle communication network. These modern automobile system networks intended for safety with minimal consideration for security have drawn the attention of researchers for providing security in CAN. The Paper reviews the behavior and vulnerabilities of CAN within an in-vehicle network including various attacks possible in CAN along with the proposed solutions in the literature with extensive survey on a security promising approach named as IDS (Intrusion detection system).",
      "published": "2023-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/ijritcc.v11i9.9364",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Et al. Karuppusamy S"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Recent and Innovation Trends in Computing and Communication",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.17762/ijritcc.v11i9.9364",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.438,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.17762/ijritcc.v11i9.9364 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: extensive, safety, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17762/jidmis.v3.2697",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Structural-Adaptive and Resilience-Driven Hybrid Deep Learning Framework for Intrusion Detection in Autonomous Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Safety-critical choices depend on real-time V2V, V2I, and vehicle communications, therefore autonomous vehicular networks need intrusion detection systems with structural awareness, temporal sensitivity, and adversary drift resistance. Connected ECUs and edge intelligence have extended the cyber-attack surface, but most IDS frameworks are signature-driven, centrally taught, or data-centric. Distribution shift, adversarial perturbations, poor contextual reasoning, and limited scalability plague federated vehicular situations. In dynamic attack intensification sets, present systems prioritize classification accuracy over structural vulnerability propagation and cyber-resilience elasticity. A five-stage analytical approach for validated autonomous car network intrusion detection is described here. First, AVTC-CEGM constructs a structural assault surface topology vector from Temporal Causal Entropy Divergence to characterize communication instability. Spatio-Temporal Adversarial Drift Modeling using Physics-Aware Diffusion Transformers (STADM-PADT) calculates the Vehicular Adversarial Drift Coefficient with vehicular dynamics limitations. Third, HQ-GMNIR attributes contextual anomalies using coherence collapse analysis. Fourth, trust-entropy aggregation and reinforcement-based response control reduce latency and packet loss in FTT-POM. Finally, the HRV-CRBE formalizes multi-dataset stress resilience elasticity. A thorough analysis of vehicle and network intrusion datasets indicates improved detection accuracy (97%+), fewer false positives, faster federated convergence, and resilience to high Intensity attacks. The architecture turns IDS research from anomaly detection to structurally informed, adversarially robust, and system-level cyber-resilient intelligence for next-generation autonomous mobility.",
      "published": "2026-09-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17762/jidmis.v3.2697",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandeep Girijashankar Shukla, Monika Bhatnagar"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Intelligent Decision Making and Information Science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.17762/jidmis.v3.2697",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.17770/etr2025vol2.8580",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND LIMITATIONS FOR ENSURING SAFETY IN TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE",
      "description": "Recently, there has been rapid technological progress in transportation, which is expressed in the field of telematics, the Internet of Things, the Internet of Vehicles, Big Data Analysis, etc. The use of information technology by drivers, including so-called smart devices, technological advances in sensor devices, autonomous vehicles, vessel telematics, cameras, etc., provides new potential for driver/operator behaviour monitoring, vehicle communication, surveillance, and incident detection in all modes of transport. The adoption of these technological advances is widespread, and the emanation of their use is the introduction of A.I. into the decision-making process. All this opens up the important topic of taking responsibility for decisions, detecting and eliminating errors in decisions and actions, and hazardous traffic management and safety processes. This article aims to examine and summarize these problems, especially when using A.I. in transport, from the point of view of ensuring safety. Methodological formulations and a general concept for a limit of admissibility in ensuring the necessary safety in transport are also proposed.",
      "published": "2025-06-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.17770/etr2025vol2.8580",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "surveillance",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dimitar Dimitrov",
        "Todor Balabanov"
      ],
      "venue": "Environment Technology Resources Proceedings of the International Scientific and Practical Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.17770/etr2025vol2.8580",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.1787/5jlwvzdfk640-en",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automated and Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Many cars sold today are already capable of some level of automated operation, and prototype cars capable of driving autonomously have been - and continue to be - tested on public roads in Europe, Japan and the United States. These technologies have arrived rapidly on the market and their future deployment is expected to accelerate. Autonomous driving promises many benefits: improved safety, reduced congestion and lower stress for car occupants, among others. Authorities will have to adapt existing rules and create new ones in order to ensure the full compatibility of these vehicles with the public’s expectations regarding safety, legal responsibility and privacy. This report explores the strategic issues that will have to be considered by authorities as more fully automated and ultimately autonomous vehicles arrive on our streets and roads.",
      "published": "2015-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.1787/5jlwvzdfk640-en",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "International Transport Forum"
      ],
      "venue": "International transport forum policy papers",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.1787/5jlwvzdfk640-en",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18178/jtle.6.1.11-16",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Connected Vehicles Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18178/jtle.6.1.11-16",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Caleb Riggs",
        "Carl-Edwin Rigaud",
        "Robert J Beard",
        "Tanner J. Douglas",
        "Karim O. Elish"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Traffic and Logistics Engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.18178/jtle.6.1.11-16",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18260/1-2--4658",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Construction Equipment Fleet Management Using Telematics Technology: Research And Resultant Educational Perspectives",
      "description": "Construction industry has not kept up pace in the adoption and use of new technologies in general and for fleet-management of construction equipment in particular.As a result, the efficiency, productivity and profitability in relation to construction equipment use has suffered.Fleet management in the U.S., for the most part, still relies on traditional and labor intensive methods of data gathering and evaluation, thus depriving the management from acting on current and reliable data in a timely manner for the benefit of the company.This deficiency remains as an important issue to be addressed in construction curricula.Use of the telematics technology has the capability to enhance constructions equipment fleet management to a whole new level.This paper focuses on a recent collaborative research undertaking to find more about the details of this technology and its impact so far on equipment fleet management.The purpose of the research was to evaluate the use of this technology in construction companies, determine its user acceptance, and to assess the differences it was making in fleet management.The difference made was to be assessed in terms of how this new technology had changed spatial equipment tracking, equipment utilization, equipment maintenance scheduling, operations analysis, job costing, and jobsite/project management related to construction equipment.The paper presents the results in terms of the details of the technology, the methodology of the research, the results of the evaluation, and the conclusions thereof for the purpose of disseminating such information for the benefit of the construction management educators and the construction industry, as well as, elaborating on how this work is finding its way into the classroom for the benefit of the tomorrow's construction managers. The TechnologyThe term telematics combines \"telecommunications\" and \"informatics.\"Literally defined, telematics is the integration of GIS, wireless communications, computational systems, vehicle monitoring systems, and location devices 1,15,24,25,26 .More specifically it is the science of sending, receiving and storing information via telecommunication devices 1,2,3,6,20,21 .The etymology of telematics is from the Greek \"tele\" ('far away') and ~Matos (a derivative of the Greek machinari, or contrivance, usually taken in this context to mean 'of its own accord') which combine in the term \"telematics\" to offer a means of describing the process of long-distance transmission of computer-based information 8 . More recently, telematics have been applied specifically to the use of Global Positioning System technology integrated with computers and mobile communications technology in equipment fleetPage 14.362.2",
      "published": "2020-09-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18260/1-2--4658",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Erdogan Sener",
        "David Thomas Iseley"
      ],
      "venue": "ASEE Annual Conference & Exposition",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.18260/1-2--4658",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18280/ijsse.150604",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Smart Vehicles: A Bilateral TARA Approach for ISO 21434 and ASPICE for CS Compliance",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity in modern vehicles has opened the door to a surge of cyberattacks, posing significant risks to vehicle safety and potentially leading to substantial financial losses.To address this, our paper introduces an optimized approach to risk assessment and threat analysis (TARA), specifically tailored for secure smart vehicles.We've developed a bilateral model that meticulously adheres to the ISO/SAE 21434 automotive cybersecurity standard and the Automotive SPICE for Cybersecurity (ASPICE for CS) base practices.This unique bilateral model considers both standards simultaneously for each model side, incorporating new requirements to ensure practitioners can achieve full compliance.We've also simplified the categorization of requirements, making them more intuitive and industry-driven.Throughout this paper, we detail the analysis, mapping, and development steps of our proposed model.Our observations and lessons learned from applying this model across various projects have significantly improved its maturity, directly reducing the risks associated with recovery costs and financial losses.To further improve the practical application of this model, we have developed a capable cybersecurity TARA tool based on the model to achieve compliance with both standards.This tool could be used by automotive manufacturers and suppliers during the entire vehicle development lifecycle, from initial design to postproduction updates to help identify potential vulnerabilities in electronic control units (ECUs), communication networks, and software, allowing for proactive risk mitigation.The documented and analyzed results from utilizing our model and tool show a remarkable 40% to 60% decrease in operational costs due to the significant reduction in quality and compliance efforts.",
      "published": "2025-06-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18280/ijsse.150604",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso 21434",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Adel Mohamed",
        "Heba Kamal Aslan",
        "Tamer Arafa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Safety and Security Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.18280/ijsse.150604",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18280/jesa.560502",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Design for a Hardware Implementation of the LED Block Cipher",
      "description": "Recently, most modern cars can be controlled with the Remote Keyless System (RKS).A Remote Keyless System consists of a key fob that communicates wirelessly with the car transceiver that is used to control and secure access to the vehicle.The keyless entry systems are based on RFID communication and are equipped with limited computation and power resources.It was proven to be a target for cybercriminals.In this work, we proposed the use of the LED block cipher for data encryption-decryption of the keyless entry systems.The proposed hardware architecture of the LED algorithm was optimized to fit the limited resources of the keyless entry systems.The proposed 8-bit sequential architecture contains 627 LUTs+FFs.To further reduce hardware resources, we proposed a 4-bit architecture for the MixColumns sub-function, which gives good results in occupying hardware resources by reducing it to 597 LUTs+FFs.This leads to a good effect on the area implementation and power consumption of keyless entry systems.Thus, the proposed LED hardware architecture may be applied to lightweight applications that demand a high level of secrecy such as the key fob.In order to adopt the proposed design of the LED block cipher as a security system for keyless entry systems, we examine the security of the proposed LED architecture using five metrics; entropy analysis, histogram analysis, correlation analysis, NPCR, and UACI.As a result, the LED block cipher has a good ability to encrypt any data against any attack.",
      "published": "2023-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18280/jesa.560502",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ayoub Mhaouch",
        "Wajdi Elhamzi",
        "Abdessalem Ben Abdelali",
        "Mohamed Atri"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal Européen des Systèmes Automatisés",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.18280/jesa.560502",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18280/jesa.570505",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Cyber Security in Autonomous Vehicles: A Hybrid XG Boost-Deep Learning Approach for Intrusion Detection in the CAN Bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18280/jesa.570505",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohd Nazeer",
        "Areej Alasiry",
        "Mohammed S. Qayyum",
        "V Madhan",
        "Gouri Patil",
        "Pulipati Srilatha"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal Européen des Systèmes Automatisés",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.18280/jesa.570505",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18280/jesa.590401",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Intrusion Detection and Defence Mechanism for Securing Autonomous Vehicle CAN Bus Using AI-Based Homomorphic Encryption",
      "description": "Rapid technological advancements have transformed the automobile sector, shifting control from mechanical to software systems.Autonomous vehicles use the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol for communication.The complexity of data and traffic makes these networks vulnerable to cyberattacks.Existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) struggle with limited resources, slow response times, and low detection accuracy.Additionally, the growing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) increases security risks within in-vehicle networks.To address this problem, a homomorphic encryption-based machine learning technique can secure and detect attacks on in-vehicle CAN buses.CAN bus datasets are used as input data.The collected data is pre-processed using Batch Normalization (BN) and random drop imputation to improve quality.Potential of Heat-diffusion for Affinity-based Trajectory Embedding (PHATE) is applied for dimensionality reduction.The reduced data are fed into the Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) named as Cheon, Kim, Kim, and Song (CKKS) based conservative physics-informed neural network (cPINN) algorithm to secure the system against cyberattacks in an autonomous vehicle.The modified TrustNet ensures low maintenance and defense against attacks.This classifier reached 97.37% accuracy and 98.02% specificity.Encryption and decryption times were 106.57sec and 47.28sec.This proposed approach is the best choice to secure and detect the IDS on vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2026-04-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18280/jesa.590401",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "K. P. Senthilkumar",
        "E. Anbalagan"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal Européen des Systèmes Automatisés",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.18280/jesa.590401",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18420/in2017_88",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Fingerprinting of Electronic Control Units Using Physical Characteristics in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "More and more connected features, like up-to-date maps or car-to-car communication, are added to our vehicles. Besides comfort and environmental benefits, those connections also enable attackers to cause high damages, as Miller and Valasek had shown with their remote hack of a Jeep Cherokee [MV15]. The exploited vulnerability caused a recall of 1.4 million vehicles. Such attacks are possible since no security mechanisms and no sender information are present in the Controller Area Network. Unfortunately, classical cryptographic algorithms cannot be added easily, due to its small payload size. A promising opportunity to increase security is to exploit physical information included in the received messages by extracting fingerprints. These allow to identify the sender of received messages, what can enhance detection or prevention of attacks. In the following, we impart the needed background and give an overview of the two known approaches to expand the Controller Area Network with sender identification.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18420/in2017_88",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "jeep"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcel Kneib",
        "Christopher Huth"
      ],
      "venue": "Gesellschaft für Informatik (GI)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.18420/in2017_88",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18535/ijecs/v12i09.4760",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in the Age of Big Data: Implementing Robust Strategies for Organizational Protection",
      "description": "In the automotive domain, the trend of ECUs becoming central units facilitating deployment of functionalities sliced up across domains and their interlinking makes MC soberly complex. Some typical functionalities, as examples, are driven control and safety, electrification of the powertrain, and driving assistance. This phenomenon also led to a sharp increase in testing these MCs. Incidents such as those recently seen in highly and fully automated driving automobiles show that rigorous testing of such MCs for readiness to be released to the field is an exponentially increasing challenge. To cope with the MC wiring complexity and its handling efforts, hardware-in-the-loop testing devices are increasingly used to test MC software functionality. Incidentally, many MC customers often first test dumps of the MC software in their software integration labs or they use simulators known as models. The challenges of increasing the number of test cases to pass for the release candidate and the amount of test runs are similar.",
      "published": "2023-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18535/ijecs/v12i09.4760",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hussain Vali Buvvaji",
        "Venkata Rama Reddy Sabbella",
        "Phani Durga Nanda Kishore Kommisetty"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal Of Engineering And Computer Science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.18535/ijecs/v12i09.4760",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18535/ijecs/v13i01.4796",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Innovations in Electronic Control Units: Enhancing Performance and Reliability with AI (Revision-1)",
      "description": "As the automobile industry moves toward greater efficiency, safety, and autonomous operation, the demand for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) - the microprocessors controlling everything from engine functions to infotainment systems - has exploded globally. Currently, there are more than 200 million ECUs in the world, and that number is expected to rise to 700 million by 2030, necessitating enhanced ECU performance, reliability, and safety. However, the growing complexity of ECUs has ironically led to increased false alarms and failures, which in some cases have endangered user safety and privacy, causing heavy penalties for manufacturers. Although artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are showing promise in addressing ECU-related issues, existing methods remain insufficient. Manufacturers need to employ AI-driven, end-to-end, standardized solutions that help design, train, test, and deploy models without deep AI expertise and allow real-time runtime monitoring and retraining of the ECUs.Drawing on decades of experience in the electronics and automotive industries, as well as a track record of successfully deploying AI-based solutions in safety-critical systems like avionics and diesel engine control, a comprehensive method is proposed. It includes an array of novel functionalities that increase transparency, reliability, and safety while keeping development times low. Central to the method is a feature that creates an environment-sensitive digital twin of the ECU by assimilating data from ECUs and the vehicle, thus improving model fidelity and monitoring for unforeseen edge cases. The proposal is based on co-design and training of AI-based perception and prediction models, which can monitor the relevant environmental parameters both on-board and in the cloud. The on-board model is lightweight yet deterministic and can trigger warnings in case of model uncertainty and prediction errors, while the corrective action is taken by the re-licensed cloud-based model. A dataset of more than 33 million kilometers of driving from passenger vehicles in Northern Europe with SaaStronic and Focus models has been provided, using compute-efficient methods for interpretation and simplification of AI-based models.",
      "published": "2024-01-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18535/ijecs/v13i01.4796",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aravind Ravi",
        "Chirag Vinalbhai Shah"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal Of Engineering And Computer Science",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.18535/ijecs/v13i01.4796",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18535/ijsrm/v11i05.ec2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Scalable Python Tools for Managing OTA Updates in Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Over-the-air (OTA) updates have revolutionized the automotive industry by enabling remote updates of software in vehicles, offering improved functionality, security patches, and bug fixes without requiring physical intervention. Python, with its versatility and rich ecosystem, presents a promising framework for developing scalable tools to manage OTA updates efficiently in automotive systems. This paper reviews current literature and explores various Python-based approaches, frameworks, and tools for implementing and managing OTA updates in automotive systems, highlighting their advantages, challenges, and future research directions.",
      "published": "2023-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18535/ijsrm/v11i05.ec2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karthikeyan Palanichamy"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Scientific Research and Management (IJSRM)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.18535/ijsrm/v11i05.ec2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.18535/ijsrm/v12i04.ec04",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Future of Electric Vehicles: Navigating the Intersection of AI, Cloud Technology, and Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The emergence of electric vehicles (EVs) represents a paradigm shift in transportation, offering not only the promise of reduced carbon emissions but also the potential for enhanced sustainability and innovation. However, the full realization of EVs' transformative capabilities extends beyond mere electrification; it encompasses the integration of state-of-the-art technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Cloud Computing. This meticulously crafted research article delves into the profound impact of AI and cloud technologies on the EV landscape within the United States. It meticulously examines how these technological advancements are reshaping EV ecosystems, catalyzing advancements in autonomous driving, optimizing battery management systems, and enriching user experiences. Furthermore, it elucidates the imperative need for robust cybersecurity measures to fortify these sophisticated systems against cyber threats, thereby ensuring the integrity, privacy, and stability of the transportation network. With a diverse audience in mind, including automotive industry professionals, policymakers, cybersecurity experts, environmental advocates, technology enthusiasts, and the broader public, this article serves as a beacon illuminating the future of transportation, sustainability, and digital security within the realm of EVs. Through a blend of rigorous analysis, insightful commentary, and visionary foresight, it aims to provide profound insights into the trajectory of EV technology in the United States and beyond.",
      "published": "2024-04-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.18535/ijsrm/v12i04.ec04",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hassan Rehan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Scientific Research and Management (IJSRM)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.18535/ijsrm/v12i04.ec04",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.19139/soic-2310-5070-3599",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MSDA-GDS: A Dual-Branch Hybrid Federated Explainable Deep Learning Framework for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection in Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus remains critically vulnerable to cyberattacks due to its lack ofauthentication and encryption. Existing intrusion detection systems (IDS) for Internet of Vehicles (IoV) suffer from single-branch architectures that fail to capture multi-scale CAN byte dependencies, centralized training paradigms that compromise vehicular data privacy, and insufficient model interpretability. This paper proposes MSDA-GDS, a dualbranch hybrid federated explainable framework comprising a Multi-Scale Dilated Attention (MSDA) branch with parallel dilated convolutions and channel-spatial attention, and a Gated Depthwise Separable (GDS) branch with learnable gating mechanisms and residual connections, fused via learned attention weighting. The framework integrates Apache Spark-accelerated preprocessing, FedProx federated learning with differential privacy, and multi-method explainability (SHAP, LIME, gradient saliency). Evaluation on CICIoV2024 (1,408,219 CAN frames) and CIC-IDS-2017 (2.83M flows) demonstrates 99.99% and 99.40% accuracy respectively, with the federated variant achieving 99.97% under full privacy protection. Ablation analysis confirms the gating mechanism (∆F1 = −0.21) and engineered features (∆F1 = −0.27) as the most impactful components, while XAI analysis identifies DATA 2, DATA 1, and DATA 3 as the most discriminative byte positions with high cross-method consistency (ρ = 0.978).",
      "published": "2026-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.19139/soic-2310-5070-3599",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moh Shakkah",
        "Belal Al-sellami",
        "Abdulnaser A. Hagar",
        "Mohammed Tawfik"
      ],
      "venue": "Statistics, Optimization & Information Computing",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.19139/soic-2310-5070-3599",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.20381/ruor-20400",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly-Based Detection of Malicious Activity in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Modern automobiles have been proven vulnerable to hacking by security researchers. By exploiting vulnerabilities in the car's external interfaces, attackers can access a car's controller area network (CAN) bus and cause malicious effects. We seek to detect these attacks on the bus as a last line of defence against automotive cyber attacks. The CAN bus standard defines a low-level message structure, upon which manufacturers layer their own proprietary command protocols; attacks must similarly be tailored for their target. This variability makes intrusion detection methods difficult to apply to the automotive CAN bus. Nevertheless, the bus traffic is generated by machines; thus we hypothesize that it can be characterized with machine learning, and that attacks produce anomalous traffic. Our goals are to show that anomaly detection trained without understanding of the message contents can detect attacks, and to create a framework for understanding how the characteristics of a novel attack can be used to predict its detectability. We developed a model that describes attacks based on their effect on bus traffic, informed by a review of published material on car hacking in combination with analysis of CAN traffic from a 2012 Subaru Impreza. The model specifies three high-level categories of effects: attacks that insert foreign packets, attacks that affect packet timing, and attacks that only modify data within packets. Foreign packet attacks are trivially detectable. For timing-based anomalies, we developed features suitable for one-class classification methods. For packet stream data word anomalies, we adapted recurrent neural networks and multivariate Markov model methods to sequence anomaly detection and compared their performance. We conducted experiments to evaluate our detection methods with special attention to the trade-off between precision and recall, given that a practical system requires a very low false alarm rate. The methods were evaluated by synthesizing anomalies within each attack category, parameterized to adjust their covertness. We generalize from the results to enable prediction of detection rates for new attacks using these methods.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-20400",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Taylor, Adrian"
      ],
      "venue": "uO Research (University of Ottawa)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.20381/ruor-20400",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.20381/ruor-31799",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Energy Management of Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment in Multi-Unit Residential Buildings",
      "description": "As EV adoption continues to grow, the demand for charging infrastructure is increasing, particularly in multi-unit residential buildings (MURBs), which account for a substantial share of urban housing. However, most existing MURBs were not designed to support the additional electrical demand introduced by EV charging, resulting in limitations in capacity. While electrical upgrades could address these challenges, they are often prohibitively expensive. A more affordable and scalable alternative is the deployment of Energy Management Systems (EMS) dedicated to Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSEs), which can intelligently allocate power and enhance utilization of existing electrical infrastructure without major physical modifications. To address these challenges across different electrical topologies, a suite of EMS methods is developed for MURBs. For a single-source feeder supplying EVSEs, we develop a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) based EMS that explicitly models the two-phase connections of EVSEs in a three-phase system to ensure balanced operation between connected phases. A Nonlinear Auto-Regressive with Exogenous Input (NARX) forecasting model is employed to predict non-EV load consumption, enabling real-time EMS operation. To manage the uncertainties introduced by non-EV load demand and stochastic EV availability across multiple sub-feeders, a Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) framework with a Wasserstein ambiguity set is developed to determine the optimal charging profiles for the EVSEs under such uncertain conditions. Furthermore, to better capture the hierarchical and multi-tier electrical system of MURBs, a game-theoretic EMS based on the Stackelberg model is developed, where the main panel acts as the leader by setting capacity limits, and each sub-feeder, as a follower, maximizes its own consumption. The proposed EMSs are designed to prioritize non-EV loads and allocate the remaining feeder capacity to active EVSEs while adhering to feeder constraints. Beyond energy allocation, to mitigate excessive curtailment and ensure fairness among EVSEs, a dynamic Round-Robin (d-RR) scheduling mechanism is proposed that can be lightly integrated with the developed EMS methods. By dynamically changing the time quantum, the d-RR approach prevents starvation and equitably distributes charging opportunities across EVs. This scheduler enhances energy utilization and leads to overall customer satisfaction. Simulation results confirm that the proposed EMSs effectively curtail EVSE loads during high consumption of non-EV loads, which facilitates the integration of EVSEs into existing MURB infrastructures. Moreover, the results of the d-RR scheduler demonstrate that EVSE penetration can increase and provide fair access to the limited charging capacity among EVSEs, without requiring major electrical system reinforcements.",
      "published": "2026-03-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.20381/ruor-31799",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Behrad Jamadi"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.20381/ruor-31799",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.20508/qe4gq444",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Digital Transformation Framework for AI-Enabled Electric Vehicle Charging in Smart Cities",
      "description": "As cities move towards electrification and sustainability through the increased use of electric vehicles (EV), these new modes of mobility will continue to change urban transportation. However, deploying the required EV charged infrastructure at scale across large urban centers will introduce operational, technology and energy management complexities. This study offers a comprehensive digital transformation framework for AI-based EV charging systems that increase grid reliability, support user convenience and improve energy efficiency. This comprehensive framework facilitates the integration of AI and IoT connectivity via cloud-based platforms and smart grid technologies, thus creating an intelligent and adaptive system. The research has explored problems associated with dynamic load balancing, integrating renewable energy, predictive maintenance, and estimating demand in real-time. This study used a data-driven approach to optimize the EVs, charging stations, utilities, and city infrastructures with seamless communication through digital technologies. Additionally, further, this study examined the importance of utilizing digital platforms to build scalable infrastructure, increase cyber resilience, and create a user-centric service delivery model. Using simulation-based testing, the study has shown improved EV charging efficiencies and reductions in peak electrical loads and operational costs. This model allows policymakers, city planners, and energy providers to develop resilient, sustainable, and intelligent EV charging systems. Furthermore, this framework reaffirms a larger global vision of carbon-neutral smart cities powered by digitally enabled mobility ecosystems.",
      "published": "2026-09-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.20508/qe4gq444",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. Roopa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Environmental Social and Economic Sustainability",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.20508/qe4gq444",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-10-45-53",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Global Challenges and Formation of a Strategy for Sustainable Development of Automotive Industry in Russia",
      "description": "The purpose of the article is, based on the analysis of global trends in the development of the world automotive industry, to identify the development problems of the Russian automotive industry, to formulate key aspects of improving the strategic management of the industry development. The COVID‐19 pandemic has demonstrated the vulnerability of globalized supply chains, accelerated the digital transformation of the economy, and the development of CASE (Connected, Autonomous, Shared & Services, Electric) technologies in the automotive industry. Russia lags far behind other countries in readiness to use such technologies. It is obvious that the global pandemic will lead to the emergence of different car markets, the Russian market by the world’s leading car manufacturers in the long term will be considered as a market for cars with gasoline and diesel engines. The global challenges caused by the COVID‐19 pandemic, the development of new technologies, the existing imbalance between production capacities and the demand for automotive equipment, a low level of localization of production, and low export potential of the Russian automotive industry actualize the issues of improving the strategic management of the industry development. The analysis of strategies and programs for the development of the automotive industry indicates a weak account of the economic potential and risks of the industry development, weak coordination of hierarchically related state, regional, cluster and corporate strategies and development programs. The paper proposes a hierarchical approach to the process of strategic planning for the development of the automotive industry, based on the principles of consistency and subordination of state programs, sectoral, regional, cluster and corporate strategic development plans, which allows balancing the interests of federal and regional governments and automotive corporations, resources and development projects. Coordination of strategic plans and programs for the development of the automotive industry consists in the coordination of: target indicators of strategies and programs of different hierarchical levels of management; activities and timing of programs; conditions for the provision of funds from the federal and regional budgets to finance programs; mechanisms for the implementation of strategies and programs. Given the global challenges, strategic documents at the national, sectoral and corporate levels should be focused not only on overcoming the consequences of economic crises, but also on ensuring sustainable development in the long term. Thus, it is advisable to talk about the formation of not just a strategy for the development of the automotive industry in Russia, but about strategies for the sustainable development of this industry and corporations within it, developed in accordance with national and international documents.",
      "published": "2021",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-10-45-53",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "L. Zhurova",
        "I. Krakovskaya"
      ],
      "venue": "World Economy and International Relations",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-10-45-53",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.20944/preprints202202.0123.v2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical Autonomous Driving: A Survey of Challenges and Opportunities",
      "description": "Autonomous Driving (AD) has become a prominent research area in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) in recent years. This opens the door wider for self-driving cars to surpass conventional vehicles in the current market share. Despite its apparent simplicity, AD is composed of complex and heterogeneous systems, which are in need of a high level of coordination and alignment to ensure both full automation and safety. Therefore, numerous research studies have been conducted over the last few years to facilitate such coordination and accelerate the capacity of these types of vehicles to be self-managed in complex situations. The paper summarises these approaches that led to building what is known nowadays as the autonomous driving pipeline. Moreover, although skepticism exists regarding the practicality of AD as a viable alternative to traditional vehicles, extensive research suggests the multiple benefits of relying on them for mobility. While challenges remain in implementing AD in the real world, including regulation and technical issues, substantial progress in recent years indicates a growing acceptance of AD in the near future. This paper further explores the advantages and opportunities of the conducted such systems in facilitating the practicality of Autonomous Driving.",
      "published": "2023-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202202.0123.v2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "regulation",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuvodeep De",
        "Debanjan Saha",
        "Karam M. Sallam",
        "Ali Wagdy Mohamed",
        "Ibrahim Radwan"
      ],
      "venue": "Preprints.org",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.20944/preprints202202.0123.v2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.20944/preprints202606.0947.v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "HyCAN: A Hybrid Framework for Performance Comparative Analysis of Machine Learning Techniques for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Electronic Control Units (ECUs) have become important to modern vehicles, enhancing operational control, driving comfort, and safety. These ECUs communicate using the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, which despite its widespread adoption, is vulnerable to various security threats. Therefore making CAN protocol more secure is crucial, intrusion detection systems (IDS) offer a viable path to mitigating cyberattacks on vehicles. This research proposes a Hybrid Framework for performance comparative analysis of Machine Learning-based IDS techniques, employing a range of models, including K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Logistic Regression, Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest, XGBoost, CatBoost, Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), and Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT). Our research used the newly published can-train-test dataset specifically designed for building ML-based IDS. The dataset consists of nine different types of attacks performed on four different vehicles in a real-world environment. This study majorly focused on DoS, Fuzzy, Gear Spoofing, Speed Spoofing and Standstill attacks performed on Chevrolet Impala and Subaru Forester. Notably, proposed framework, which leverages both traditional Machine Learning models and advanced Deep Learning architectures, shows how multiple ML algorithms can be compared at once rather then focusing one at a time. Additionally, our novel approach involves converting CAN bus data into feature strings for classification using BERT, providing a new way of treating CAN numerical data as string. The models used in proposed Hybrid Framework is evaluated using various performance metrics, including Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1-score, and AUC-ROC. The results demonstrate that the proposed Hybrid Framework offers a more effective and efficient solution for testing multiple ML approaches in detecting cyberattacks on vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-06-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202606.0947.v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vikrant Mehla",
        "Lavanya Nagaraju",
        "Ikjot Saini"
      ],
      "venue": "Preprints.org",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.20944/preprints202606.0947.v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-10639604/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adapting AUTOSAR for AI-Enabled Autonomous Driving: An Integrated Functional Safety, SOTIF, Cybersecurity, and Runtime Assurance Framework",
      "description": "Abstract Artificial intelligence and machine-learning technologies have become fundamental enablers of perception, prediction, trajectory planning, decision-making, and motion-control functions in advanced driver-assistance systems and automated driving systems. Nevertheless, the integration of learning-enabled components into safety-critical automotive architectures remains constrained by the limited compatibility between conventional deterministic software-assurance methods and the data-dependent, probabilistic, and context-sensitive behavior of machine-learning models. Although the AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) Adaptive Platform provides a service-oriented execution environment suitable for high-performance computing, sensor fusion, and autonomous-driving applications, AUTOSAR does not independently constitute a complete assurance framework for artificial intelligence. This paper proposes an AUTOSAR-AI Safety Assurance Framework (AASAF) for integrating AI-enabled autonomous-driving functions into automotive safety lifecycles. The framework combines AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform services with ISO 26262 functional safety, ISO 21448 Safety of the Intended Functionality, ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity engineering, ISO 24089 software-update engineering, and AI-specific risk-management and robustness guidance. A complementary AI Assurance Tier model is introduced to determine the required rigor for data governance, model verification, uncertainty estimation, operational-design-domain monitoring, runtime supervision, authority limitation, and deterministic fallback. The proposed tiers do not replace Automotive Safety Integrity Levels and are not interpreted as equivalent safety classifications. Instead, they tailor AI specific evidence and runtime controls according to the safety criticality and operational authority of the learning-enabled component. The framework introduces a safety-supervised AUTOSAR architecture incorporating an AI Assurance Manager, independent runtime monitors, a deterministic Safety Authority Manager, and a verified Minimum Risk Manoeuvre controller. A structured mapping between AI hazards, ASIL-oriented safety goals, AUTOSAR services, and verification evidence is presented. The resulting architecture supports controlled deployment of AI within autonomous-driving systems while maintaining traceability, freedom from interference, cybersecurity protection, safe degradation, and lifecycle assurance.",
      "published": "2026-08-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-10639604/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autosar",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "EMRAH EKREM KARABAG"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Square",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.21203/rs.3.rs-10639604/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-10667680/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Continuous Usage Intention of In-Vehicle Infotainment Systems: An Integrated ECM-TAM Approach",
      "description": "Abstract In-vehicle infotainment systems (IVIS) differ from static information systems due to complexity, safety-critical nature, and over-the-air (OTA) evolution. While initial adoption is well known, the driving forces of continuous intention to use (CITU) are still poorly studied. Integrating the Expectation-Confirmation Model (ECM) and Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), this study explored how intrinsic motivations—perceived security (PS), perceived usefulness (PU), perceived ease of use (PEU), and perceived enjoyment (PE)—interact with external factors, including system & service quality (SSQ), confirmation (CON), and satisfaction (SAT), to influence CITU. 516 Chinese users were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM). Results showed that the framework was powerfully explanatory. PS emerged as the main driving force of CITU, surpassing PU and PE, underscoring the criticality of risk aversion in smart mobility. SSQ and PU are identified as primary antecedents of SAT. Mediation showed that CON affects CITU via multiple paths, and the functional route (CON → PEU → SAT → CITU) is the strongest influenced. These results suggest that while OTA updates change user expectations, long-term engagement depends on security and utility against hedonic experiences.",
      "published": "2026-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-10667680/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xie Chen",
        "Hong Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Square",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.21203/rs.3.rs-10667680/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-11283629/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Challenges in AI-Enabled Car Rental Systems: Protecting Digital Booking, Fleet Management, and Customer Data",
      "description": "Abstract The rapid digitalization of car-rental services has transformed booking, customer verification, demand prediction, fleet monitoring, predictive maintenance, and automated customer support. However, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, cloud platforms, and connected-vehicle technologies has simultaneously expanded the cybersecurity attack surface of car-rental operations (Mohammed, 2026; Suaprae et al., 2026; Potdar & Parikh, 2025). This article examines the cybersecurity challenges associated with AI-enabled car rental systems, focusing on risks to customer identity information, payment data, location records, booking information, telematics, application programming interfaces (APIs), cloud infrastructure, and AI models. A literature-based analytical approach was employed to synthesize evidence from recent research on AI-enabled car rental management, smart tourism, IoT-based fleet management, digital trust, and AI adoption. The analysis identifies interconnected cybersecurity challenges involving data privacy, unauthorized access, API vulnerabilities, connected-vehicle threats, AI-related risks, and weaknesses across digitally integrated enterprise systems. Based on these findings, the article develops a layered protection framework that integrates cybersecurity controls, AI governance, privacy protection, secure system architecture, and human oversight. The analysis indicates that cybersecurity in AI-enabled car rental systems should be addressed as a multidimensional organizational and technological challenge rather than solely as a conventional IT-security concern.",
      "published": "2026-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11283629/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samuel Oluwole"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Square",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.21203/rs.3.rs-11283629/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-2250432/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A3D: Physical Adversarial Attack on Visual Perception Module of Self-driving Cars",
      "description": "Abstract Advancements in machine learning, especially tech­niques such as deep neural networks, are promoting a range of high-stakes applications, including autonomous driving, which often relies on deep learning for perception. While deep learning for perception has been shown to be vulnerable to a host of subtle adversarial manipulations of images, end-to-end demonstrations of successful attacks, which manipulate the physical environment and result in physical consequences, are scarce. We demonstrate the first end-to-end attacks on autonomous driving in simulation, using simple physically realizable attacks: the painting of black lines on the road. These attacks target deep neural network models for end-to-end autonomous driving control. A systematic investigation shows that such attacks are surprisingly easy to engineer, and we describe scenarios (e.g., right turns) in which they are highly effective, and others that are less vulnerable Our result shows how that physical adversarial attack decreased the accuracy of the state of the art network by up to 30%.",
      "published": "2022-11-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2250432/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zain Ul Abideen",
        "Muhammad Atif Bute",
        "Samina Khalid",
        "Iftikhar Ahmad",
        "Rashid Amin"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Square",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.21203/rs.3.rs-2250432/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-3782846/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Risk Assessment Models for Heavy Duty and Medium Duty Vehicles through Customization of the EVITA Framework",
      "description": "Abstract As a cornerstone of cybersecurity, risk assessment facilitates identifying and grading potential threats. Despite several risk assessment methodologies tailored for the automotive industry, such as EVITA and HEAVEN, a substantial knowledge gap persists in the context of heavy-duty (HD) and medium-duty (MD) vehicles. This study seeks to bridge this gap by introducing a customized model derived from EVITA, specifically designed for HD/MD vehicles. This model enhances the existing EVITA framework by integrating updated severity and probability weights that reflect the unique applications of HD/MD vehicles. Additionally, the attack tree initially presented in EVITA, is augmented by incorporating Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) standards. This research presents a comprehensive risk assessment methodology for HD/MD vehicles by building upon the EVITA model. The revised severity and likelihood weighting and the integration of CWE and CVE result in a more precise and effective strategy for assessing and mitigating potential risks. The insights gained from this research contribute to the evolution of risk assessment techniques in the automotive industry, with a particular emphasis on heavy-duty and medium-duty vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3782846/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narges Rahimi",
        "Mitra Mirhassani",
        "Beth‐Anne Schuelke‐Leech"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Square",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.21203/rs.3.rs-3782846/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-3819497/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LIA-V2X: A Lightweight identity mutual and batch authentication protocol for V2X Communication in Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) hold significant importance within the domain of the Internet of Things. However, they face a critical issue concerning security threats. Criminals use open channels to eavesdrop, and tamper with messages to lock and control vehicles, which can lead to safety issues such as car accidents and privacy leaks. Most current approaches fail to adequately address the challenges of low-cost vehicles, anonymity, traceability, and revocation. Hence, we have developed LIA-V2X, a lightweight identity authentication scheme based on SM2 public key cryptography algorithm based on 256-bit ECC. It incorporates ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) key agreement and anonymous authentication techniques, enabling batch processing when multiple vehicles simultaneously enter a specific area, which can enhance communication efficiency. Furthermore, we have conducted both formal security analysis and informal security analysis utilizing the real number or random (RoR) oracle model to validate the security of our scheme in countering various malicious attacks within the IoV environment. Compared to existing identity authentication schemes for IoV, our scheme demonstrates improved performance in function and security features.",
      "published": "2024-01-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3819497/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiaxing liu",
        "Shengwei Xu",
        "Runsheng Liu",
        "Yu Tian",
        "Xiaopeng Zhu",
        "Jianguo Xie"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Square",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.21203/rs.3.rs-3819497/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-87232/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAEV-Surrounding Objects Detection and Tracking for Autonomous Driving Using Lidar and Radar Fusion",
      "description": "Abstract Radar and Lidar are two environmental sensors commonly used in autonomous vehicles,Lidars are accurate in determining objects’ positions but significantly less accurate on measuring their velocities. However, Radars are more accurate on measuring objects velocities but less accurate on determining their positions as they have a lower spatial resolution. In order to compensate for the low detection accuracy, incomplete target attributes and poor environmental adaptability of single sensors such as Radar and LIDAR, we proposed an effective method for high-precision detection and tracking of surrounding targets of autonomous vehicles. By employing the Unscented Kalman Filter, radar and LIDAR information is effectively fused to achieve high-precision detection of the position and speed information of targets around the autonomous vehicle. Finally, we do a variety of driving environment under the real car algorithm verification test. The experimental results show that the proposed sensor fusion method can effectively detect and track the vehicle peripheral targets with high accuracy. Compared with a single sensor, it has obvious advantages and can improve the intelligence level of driverless cars.",
      "published": "2020-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-87232/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ze Liu",
        "Feng Ying Cai"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.21203/rs.3.rs-87232/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21205/deufmd.2024267613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security for IEEE 802.1 Time Sensitive In-Vehicle Networking: Recent Advances and Impact Analysis of DoS Attacks",
      "description": "Dedicated computers control the operation of Cyber Physical Systems such as in-vehicle architectures with the help of sensors and actuators. Securing the real-time communication technologies for in-vehicle platforms attracts the attention of the research community. IEEE 802.1 Time Sensitive Networking (TSN) task group targets the standardization of Ethernet-based deterministic communication technologies due to its high bandwidth and low cost. IEEE P802.1DG working group specifies the profile for secure and real-time automotive embedded systems relying on TSN, which is envisioned to be widely used in future in-vehicle platforms. In this paper, we present an elaborate review of the research work on the security of in-vehicle communication networks with TSN support, and define various Denial of Service (DoS) attack scenarios targeting the real-time traffic in in-vehicle networks. We evaluate the impact of our attack scenarios on the performance of two different realistic in-vehicle communication networks with varying sizes. Experimental results show that DoS attacks can lead to severe consequences disrupting the healthy operation of safety-critical functions in a TSN-compliant in-vehicle network.",
      "published": "2024-01-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21205/deufmd.2024267613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mustafa Topsakal",
        "Selçuk Cevher"
      ],
      "venue": "Deu Muhendislik Fakultesi Fen ve Muhendislik",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.21205/deufmd.2024267613",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21227/9bxm-7b97",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "\"Bus-Off Attack Dataset for CAN Bus\"",
      "description": "\"OpenCAN-Attack (Offline) is an open research dataset of controller area network (CAN) bus traffic and attack traces for studying offline (non-real-time \\/ asynchronous) adversarial behavior in in-vehicle networks. Unlike purely online injection benchmarks that assume continuous bus presence and tight timing, this release emphasizes threat scenarios in which an attacker may act with partial observability, intermittent access, or desynchronized interaction with victim nodes\\u2014conditions that commonly arise in practical assessment of resource-constrained ECUs. The dataset provides labeled normal and attack recordings, structured metadata, and documentation of attack models and evaluation splits to support reproducible research on threat characterization, intrusion detection, and security evaluation for automotive CAN (with optional extension notes for related bus settings). Intended use is limited to defensive security research and education.\"",
      "published": "2026-08-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21227/9bxm-7b97",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heng Sun",
        "Jingxuan Huang"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE DataPort",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.21227/9bxm-7b97",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21227/mkvd-h021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "\"M-CAN Intrusion Detection Dataset\"",
      "description": "\"This dataset contains Controller Area Network (CAN) traffic collected from the M-CAN bus of a Genesis G80 vehicle. M-CAN is a mid-speed bus responsible for communication with navigation systems, multimedia devices, and related in-vehicle modules. Approximately 36 minutes of normal CAN traffic were extracted during real driving, and attack datasets were generated by injecting artificial DoS and Fuzzing messages into the normal traces. Each CAN frame includes timestamps, CAN identifiers, DLC values, payload bytes, and a binary label indicating normal or injected traffic. This dataset enables research on intrusion detection, CAN-bus anomaly behavior, and security analysis of multimedia-related automotive networks.\"",
      "published": "2025-11-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21227/mkvd-h021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hwejae Lee",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE DataPort",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.21227/mkvd-h021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21227/sy7h-9057",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "\"CAN Intrusion Detection Dataset\"",
      "description": "\"This dataset provides raw Controller Area Network (CAN) traffic collected from a real vehicle (KIA Soul) under four states: DoS attack, Fuzzy attack, Impersonation attack, and normal driving conditions. The data were captured via the OBD-II port while performing message-injection attacks following the OTIDS methodology. Each record contains timestamped CAN messages with identifier (ID), DLC, and 8 data bytes. The dataset was originally used for evaluating OTIDS, an intrusion detection system based on analyzing offset ratio and request\\u2013response time intervals between remote frames and their corresponding data frames. Researchers can use this dataset to study CAN-bus anomaly detection, message-injection attacks, impersonation detection, and timing-based IDS mechanisms in in-vehicle networks.\"",
      "published": "2025-11-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21227/sy7h-9057",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "kia",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyunsung Lee",
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE DataPort",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.21227/sy7h-9057",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21227/w09c-2w84",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "\"In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) Hallucination Consequence Index (HCI) Dataset \\u2014 ICVTTS 2026\"",
      "description": "\"This dataset supports the first formal consequence assessment framework for Large Language Model (LLM) hallucinations in In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems. The dataset comprises 478 records across 37 fields, covering real Indian English and Kannada-English code-mixed driver queries synthesised to speech, processed through dual ASR systems (Whisper medium and Sarvam Saaras V3) under three acoustic conditions, responded to by three LLM deployment tiers (T1-Cloud, T2-Hybrid, T3-Edge), and evaluated by an independent GPT-4o Judge. The dataset includes five engineered features \\u2014 Query Safety Tier (QST), ASR Confidence Score (ACS), Vehicle Context (VC), Driver Vulnerability Index (DVI), and Deployment Tier Risk (DTR) \\u2014 used to compute the Hallucination Consequence Index (HCI), a 0\\u2013100 score mapping to six consequence labels from Negligible to Catastrophic. A companion query bank of 120 driver queries across four safety tiers in Indian English and Kanglish is included. The dataset is grounded in real Bangalore locations, Karnataka traffic regulations, and Indian emergency services. Associated paper accepted at the 3rd IEEE International Conference on Vehicular Technology and Transportation Systems (ICVTTS 2026), GITAM University, Bangalore, September 2026.\"",
      "published": "2026-08-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21227/w09c-2w84",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rukmangadha Peddapalli Venkatappa",
        "Rishabh Rukmangadha"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE DataPort",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.21227/w09c-2w84",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21275/sr24302010944",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Firmware Security in Connected Electric Vehicles: Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": "The adoption of autonomous electric vehicles is one of the most significant milestones in the sustainability endeavor that the automotive industry has achieved. These autonomous vehicles are characteristically well - optimized, thus reducing traffic congestion, minimizing accidents, and significantly reducing environmental pollution. The design of an autonomous vehicle entails the mechanical parts, which are the moving and body sections, and the computerized systems consisting of software that performs the processing of the programmed autonomous driving as it receives timely updates from the surroundings using several sensors attached to it. A middle layer called firmware between these systems is used to translate the software instructions into a machine - understandable state, which is the actual action leading to autonomous driving. This firmware is essential; hence, there is a high concern for its security. The firmware could be vulnerable to interceptions when communicating with other remote systems that provide over - the - air updates and sensor communications. Furthermore, it could be compromised by physical manipulation if an attacker gains access. There have been recent attacks on the firmware showing its vulnerabilities and challenges. This paper discusses these cases and explores some strategies that can be used to enhance firmware security, such as defense - in - depth frameworks and security - by - design approaches.",
      "published": "2023-10-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21275/sr24302010944",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omkar Manohar Ghag"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.21275/sr24302010944",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21275/sr24412002613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancements in VANETS and ITS: A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "Roadside accidents have increased significantly as urban and highway traffic has grown.Vehicular communication systems, which include safety features and on -demand infotainment services, were designed to enhance driving safety and enjoyment.The primary role of these vehicular ad hoc networks, or VANETs, is to communicate information (emergency, general, multimedia) between automobiles using unique routing algorithms not available in standard wireless technologies.Many methods, tactics, and plans have been developed to safeguard and secure data.To improve existing security measures and build new ones, principles from machine learning (ML), deep learning (DL), and artificial intelligence (AI) must be integrated.This document covers a wide range of assaults on VANET communications, compromised security targets, and actual attacks in manufacturing hubs.VANETs are vulnerable to attacks because to their complexity, making real -time implementation and security challenging.The paper examines many strategies that leverage machine learning approaches to maintain efficiency while boosting security and reducing false positives.Data security and the verification of vehicle IDs during communication are prioritised.In addition, the paper briefly discusses VCPS implementation.Advanced driver assistance systems and wireless communication rely on data exchange, raising severe concerns about its reliability.Methods such as Unscented Kalman filtering will be critical for data integrity security, vehicle behaviour verification, and 5G V2V localization.Intelligent transportation systems provide credibility and security by assessing gearbox technology, protocols, and networks used to govern vehicle communication.Future developments will address VANET and intelligent transportation concerns, improving driving safety and efficiency through communication and technical advancements.",
      "published": "2024-05-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21275/sr24412002613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "driver assistance",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aayushi Parmar",
        "Ankita Nagmote"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.21275/sr24412002613",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21275/sr25125001736",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Software Defined Vehicles: Transforming the Automotive Industry",
      "description": "Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) represent a paradigm shift in the automotive industry, where the vehicle's functionality and features are increasingly controlled by software rather than hardware. SDVs integrate advanced computing platforms, communication networks, and real-time data processing to enable a range of capabilities such as autonomous driving, over-the-air updates, and personalized user experiences. The evolution of SDVs is driven by the growing importance of software in vehicle design, allowing for greater flexibility, scalability, and efficiency. Key components of SDVs include in-vehicle connectivity, cloud computing, AI algorithms, and cybersecurity measures. As SDVs continue to gain momentum, they promise to redefine transportation ecosystems, improve safety, and unlock new business models, such as mobility-as-a-service. This paper explores the growing importance of software define vehicles architecture and its Challenges and Considerations.",
      "published": "2025-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21275/sr25125001736",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ragothaman Arjunan",
        "Gopinath Murugan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.21275/sr25125001736",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21307/ijssis-2019-011",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrity Assurance of OTA Software Update in Smart Vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract Smart vehicles tend to choose an over-the-air (OTA) software (SW) update service. In an environment with smart vehicles, software malfunctions may have serious consequences such as accidents involving human lives and property loss. Therefore, we must ensure that the software updates in smart vehicles are completed correctly. In this study, we focused on the assurance of both data integrity and service integrity in smart vehicles to improve the OTA SW update service security. To this end, the security features of integrity in smart vehicles were identified and discussed with an emphasis on its potential impact on future vehicular applications.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21307/ijssis-2019-011",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Geunhyoung Kim",
        "Im Young Jung"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Smart Sensing and Intelligent Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.21307/ijssis-2019-011",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.4282045",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Suricata-Based Intrusion Detection for Infotainment Systems in State-of-The-Art Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4282045",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "yeonjae kang",
        "Seong Hoon Jeong",
        "Chanhyeok Jung",
        "Huy Kang Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.4282045",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.4377737",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigating the Attacks and Defensive Mechanisms on Connected Vehicles (CVs)",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4377737",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alireza Ansariyar"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.4377737",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.4502119",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Keyless Entry Systems in Modern Cars from Relay and Replay Attacks Using Two-Way Authentication",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4502119",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alaparthi Vinith",
        "Vempalli Sai Nikhil",
        "Ankit Kumar",
        "Gursharan Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.4502119",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.4696938",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Tech-Driven Innovations: Autonomous Driving to Supply Chain Integration",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4696938",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emmanuel C Mumba"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.4696938",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.4725372",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of Cybersecurity on Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4725372",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohinder Pandey",
        "Arumugam Seetharaman"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.4725372",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.4766986",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Stream Comparator: Defending Against Targeted Spoofing Attacks for In-Vehicle Can Bus Using Selective Redundant Communication",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4766986",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guiqi Zhang",
        "Qi Liu",
        "Jiangtao Li",
        "Wutao Qin",
        "Yufeng Li"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.4766986",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.4917843",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection in In-vehicle Networks using neuro computing",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4917843",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Parag Parandkar",
        "Suresh D",
        "Prashant V. Joshi",
        "K. M. Sudharshan"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.4917843",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.5016705",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection Method Based on Hybridefficientnet",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5016705",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yizhe Wang",
        "Shaoqiang Wang",
        "Jiahui Cheng",
        "Yu Su",
        "Long Chen",
        "Yinfei Dai"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.5016705",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.5060173",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Software-Defined Vehicle Fleet Management System with Integrated Cybersecurity Measures",
      "description": "The significance of cybersecurity in today's globally linked world is paramount. Cybercriminals are finding new and more sophisticated ways to compromise fleet management systems, which regulate and track giant groupings of cars. The potential for cyberattacks is rising exponentially due to the increasing data-driven integration of various systems. Security threats, such as cyber vulnerabilities (CVs), have grown in tandem with the potential uses of extensive data-based communication in multiple sectors, including the autonomous car business. Data transmission between autonomous vehicles and Internet of Things devices may be more susceptible to cyberattacks because of the symmetry of extensive data communication networks employed by these vehicles. Both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms can encrypt the data associated with CVs. Proactive cybersecurity solutions for autonomous vehicles, power-based cyberattacks, and dynamic responses are among the many new concerns and opportunities presented by technological breakthroughs and shifting security threats. A lot of big data research has gone into finding ways to lessen the impact of CVs and big data breaches by implementing security solutions. Big data communication, autonomous vehicular networks (AVNs), and DCAVs will face future security challenges, primarily from CVs in data communication, vulnerabilities in AVMs, and cyber threats to network functioning. For this reason, security algorithms and countermeasure models must be efficient if CVs and data breaches are to be minimized. Integrating CV policies and rules with proxy and DMZ servers strengthened the countermeasure's effectiveness. Here, the energy levels of individual attacks are established to determine the information security measures that are reliant on the increasing degrees of assaults and CVs.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5060173",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Venkata Lakshmi Namburi"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.5060173",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.5111676",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Level Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Networks Using Continuous Wavelet Transform and Discriminative Features",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5111676",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sarah Alsubaie",
        "Abdelwahid Derhab",
        "Mohamed Belaoued"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.5111676",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.5330909",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Grid-V2x: A Scalable and Intelligent Security Architecture for Next-Generation V2x Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5330909",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Imtiaz Ali Soomro",
        "Syed Jawad Hussain",
        "Adeel Iqbal",
        "Mohammad Arif",
        "Adnan Rashid",
        "Arcangela Rago"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.5330909",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.5363378",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicle Cybersecurity: A Deep Learning-Driven IDS for CAN Bus Traffic",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5363378",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lawal G. Anand"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.5363378",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.5634455",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing Security in Software-Defined Vehicles: A Comprehensive Survey and Taxonomy",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5634455",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "khaoula Sghaier",
        "Badis Hammi",
        "Ghada Gharbi",
        "Pierre Merdrignac",
        "Pierre Parrend",
        "Didier Verna"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.5634455",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.6265292",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVSE Cyber-Physical Security: A Perspective and Framework on a Digital-Twin Architecture",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6265292",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Praveen Kumar",
        "Pedro Ribeiro",
        "Wan Li",
        "Burak Ozpineci"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.6265292",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.6278899",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Machine Learning on Automotive Attack Surfaces: Threats, Intrusion Detection, and Zero-Knowledge Defenses",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6278899",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ezekiel Ologunde"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.6278899",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.6721328",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Man-in-the-Middle Exploitation and Grid-LevelImpact Quantification of OCPP TelemetryFalsification in EV Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6721328",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "exploitation",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antonios Ntib",
        "Panagiotis Katrakazas"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.6721328",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2139/ssrn.7664862",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Design for EV Charging, Vehicle-to-Grid, and Connected Devices",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7664862",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Go Charan Kilaru",
        "Willett M. Kempton",
        "Garrett A. Ejzak",
        "Rodney T. McGee",
        "Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos"
      ],
      "venue": "SSRN Electronic Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.2139/ssrn.7664862",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21533/pen.v13.i1.294",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategies to strengthen cybersecurity for business resilience in the digital age",
      "description": "Globalisation has transformed the way people live, work, and interact. In recent decades, businesses of all sizes have been profoundly affected by exponential computer, network, and data storage technology advances. Virtually all industries, from the healthcare to the automotive sector, have integrated digital technologies into their work. This phenomenon is called digitalisation, the drive to connect real-world objects and people virtually and digitally. Digitalisation has unleashed new and exciting opportunities and created particular and unique threats and challenges. One such challenge, which has garnered significant attention, is cybersecurity. This paper should be a primer for business people to understand cybersecurity. Businesses of all sizes and functions will find it necessary to incorporate some digital footprint into their company. The inability to embrace digitalisation will relegate many businesses to obsolescence. However, given the proneness of the digital sector to hacking attacks, and having recognised that 60% of companies that undergo a significant cyberattack go under within 6 months, digitalised entrepreneurs must carefully deliberate the how-to constitution cyber-business strategies and models. Adopting a descriptive analysis method, this paper should be viewed as a primer for business people who need to start thinking about the cyber-security of their company, brand, or business models or for students and researchers intrigued by the subject.",
      "published": "2025-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21533/pen.v13.i1.294",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Сніжана Миколаївна Сукачова",
        "Larysa Gorodianska",
        "Mykola Burmaka",
        "Iryna Yanenkova",
        "Ihor Tkach"
      ],
      "venue": "Periodicals of Engineering and Natural Sciences (PEN)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.21533/pen.v13.i1.294",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/1572920",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure APR",
      "description": "Cybersecurity is essential for interoperable power systems and transportation infrastructure in the US. As the US transitions to transportation electrification, cyber attacks on vehicle charging could impact nearly all US critical infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as more charging stations communicate to a range of entities (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, etc.), as shown in Figure I.1.1.1. The research challenges are extensive and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) cybersecurity is a major risk to electric vehicle (EV) adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks—or public perception of such—ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. For this reason, there is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, prioritizing technology gaps, and developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.",
      "published": "2018-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/1572920",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)",
        "Jay D. Johnson",
        "Office of Sustainable Transportation. Vehicle Technologies Office (VTO) USDOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)",
        "USDOE Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and Administration"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.2172/1572920",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/1706221",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "As the US electrifies the transportation sector, cyber attacks targeting vehicle charging could bring consequences to electrical system infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery and must communicate to a range of entities to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and are complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid communication system cybersecurity could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks - or public perception of such - ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.",
      "published": "2020-11-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/1706221",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)",
        "Jay D. Johnson",
        "USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)"
      ],
      "venue": "OSTI OAI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.2172/1706221",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/1877784",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "As the U.S. electrifies the transportation sector, cyberattacks targeting vehicle charging could impact several critical infrastructure sectors including power systems, manufacturing, medical services, and agriculture. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery capabilities and must communicate to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid operator communication systems could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks — or public perception of such — would ripple across the industry and produce lasting effects. Unfortunately, there is currently no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured inter faces. Comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project provided the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team created a cybersecurity threat model and performed a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets across multiple manufacturers and vendors, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders could better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.",
      "published": "2022-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/1877784",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jay D. Johnson",
        "Benjamin Anderson",
        "Brian Wright",
        "Jimmy Quiroz",
        "Timothy Berg",
        "Russell Graves",
        "Josh Daley",
        "Kandy Phan",
        "Michael Kunz",
        "Rick Pratt",
        "Tom Carroll",
        "Lori Ross O’Neil"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.2172/1877784",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 70,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/2204867",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Inventory of Public Key Cryptography in US Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) and charging infrastructure are networked systems, which employ high-level communications in support of charging and grid service decisions. Public key cryptography (PKC) underlies much of the security and privacy protections of the information exchange. We are entering a new epoch where quantum computing threats must be seriously considered. A sufficiently large quantum computer, so named Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (QRQC), will be able to perform the mathematical operations to efficiently attack the underpinnings of traditional PKC, thus jeopardizing the digital foundations for trust, communications security, and data security. Estimates suggest a QRQC can break public key encryption and digital signatures in the manner of tens to hundreds of hours, compared to traditional computing that would demand more than 10^18 years in a brute force-style attack. A consensus belief of quantum theorists, quantum experimenters, and cryptographers suggest that the quantum threat will be likely realized in the next twenty years. To address the threat, post-quantum cryptography, which is cryptosystems that are designed to be secure against both traditional and quantum computing threats, must be adopted. Migration from traditional PKC to quantum-resilient cryptography is a global undertaking and likely represents the largest transition in computing history. The nascent state of EV public key infrastructure, combined with limited adoption of the vehicle secure charging features, presents an opportunity to establish a preference for quantum-resistant cryptography as a step on the migration path. Delays will stunt the efforts as rapidly accelerating EVs sales and huge infrastructure investments will create large growing bases of long-lived vehicles and infrastructure. Migration preparations can commence while NIST continues the process to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which are quantum-resilient algorithms designed to be secure against traditional and quantum computing threats. The first step in preparing EV charging is to identify the presence of traditional public key cryptography algorithms and applications. With this objective in mind, this report is intended to advise the vehicle manufacturers, charging station manufacturers, charging station operators, charge network providers and other EV charging stakeholders with information on traditional PKC application and the potential risks when PKC becomes insecure. This report, the first in a series of reports discussing the topics existing at the confluence of post-quantum cryptography adoption and EV charging, identifies traditional public key applications employed and identifies potential consequences of leaving EV charging infrastructure vulnerable to quantum computing. The focus remains squarely on the of EV charging and infrastructure with respect to PKC and is believed by the authors to complement the NIST SP 1800-38 Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography. While the report is centered on infrastructure, there are implications to vehicles.",
      "published": "2023-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/2204867",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas E. Carroll",
        "Office of Sustainable Transportation. Vehicle Technologies Office (VTO) USDOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)",
        "Lindsey Redington",
        "Addison Moran-Schmoker",
        "Andrew Duncan Murray"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.2172/2204867",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/2332876",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Motivation and Design of the OCPP Security Service",
      "description": "Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is conducting in-depth research aimed at exploring how zero trust security principles can be effectively applied to electric vehicle charging infrastructure. This investigation seeks to enhance the resilience and reliability of these systems against cyber threats, ensuring secure and uninterrupted access to charging services for electric vehicle users and electric supply. Zero trust is a security concept centered on the belief that system operators should not automatically trust users or systems based on their location, whether inside or outside the organization, but instead must verify everything trying to connect to their systems before granting access. A key aspect of the project is to demonstrate and validate zero trust approaches targeted to electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. It has been observed that both open-source and commercial solutions often overlook the specific protocols employed in managing EV charging stations and proceeded with a general, protocol-agnostic approach. While these strategies effectively block non-authorized routes to the charging infrastructure, they do not tackle the situations where attackers may exploit legitimate access channels, such as the inattentive operator model posited by the Idaho National Laboratory. To address this gap, this paper proposes and discusses a new security service targeted to the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), which is the de facto protocol for the management of charging stations and serves a critical role in the broader adoption of electric vehicles. The design and architecture of the proposed OCPP security service are discussed in detail, outlining how it aims to safeguard charging station management system (CSMS) functions. The service is particularly important in scenarios where the charging station operator (CSO), responsible for the maintenance and operation of charging stations, and the charging network provider (CNP), which manages the charging network's accessibility and billing, are separate entities. This distinction is crucial because CSOs and CNPs often have different priorities, objectives, and operational responsibilities, which may not always align perfectly. For instance, a CSO might prioritize uptime and customer satisfaction, while a CNP might focus on maximizing revenue and network utilization. Such misalignment can create security vulnerabilities, as each entity might implement different policies and standards, potentially leaving gaps in the overall security posture.",
      "published": "2024-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/2332876",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploit",
        "ocpp",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Carroll",
        "USDOE",
        "Brian Edwards",
        "Laurence Chang"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2172/2332876",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/2369573",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recommendations for Minimum Required Error Codes for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "OCPP protocol manages the interaction between the EVSE and its respective back-end communication network. It plays a pivotal role in both error reporting and troubleshooting, carried out primarily through the CSMS. OCPP defines both standard error codes and a flexible framework for creating and communicating custom error codes. The OCPI protocol orchestrates the communication between different backhaul communication networks, incorporating the exchange of error codes. These error codes are instrumental in pinpointing and rectifying issues that can surface prior to, during, or after charging operations, fortifying the reliability and resilience of the EV charging infrastructure. The flexibility offered by the OCPP and OCPI frameworks through the introduction of custom error codes also creates its own set of challenges. While the integration of custom error codes allows for enhanced granularity, it also introduces inconsistencies and fragmentation within the overarching diagnostic reporting system. To address the challenges with custom error codes this report proposes a set of Minimum Required Error Codes (MRECs) for streamlined error reporting, interpretability, and diagnostics. Recommendations in this report are based on independent analysis of custom error codes from multiple stakeholders within the EV charging ecosystem. For better error resolution, this report also assigns one or more entities responsible for the resolution of every mentioned error code. Finally, a functional classification for each mentioned error code is also identified to describe the nature of the error. In summary, the purpose of this document is to simplify the troubleshooting process and increase charging reliability for all EV users. This report serves as a recommendation for industry stakeholders, encouraging a unified methodology to define, transmit, and interpret common error codes.",
      "published": "2023-09-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/2369573",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "ocpp",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mayuresh Savargaonkar",
        "Office of Sustainable Transportation. Joint Office of Energy & Transportation (JOET) USDOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)",
        "Benny Varghese",
        "Kaleb Houck"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.2172/2369573",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/2403003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey and Gap Prioritization of U.S. Electric Vehicle Charge Management Deployments",
      "description": "The goal of this study was to survey and characterize the scope of current technical and programmatic knowledge pertaining to EV charge management technologies and practices in the US and relevant international jurisdictions. This characterization of existing field demonstrations and knowledge derived were used to determine gaps in the SCM demonstration landscape. Addressing these gaps through research and demonstration could increase confidence in the U.S. that load management and EV charge control could achieve overarching societal benefits. A survey of charge management deployments and input from stakeholders was completed to determine the state-of-the-art of smart charge management (SCM) where SCM is defined as controlling the amount of power exchanged between chargers and EVs to meet customers' charging needs while also responding to external power demand or pricing signals to provide load management, resilience, or other benefits to the customer and electric grid. The survey was the basis of the gap analysis in this report and determines which areas are well understood, with high confidence, and which areas need further investigation. Existing examples of EV charge management are characterized here to determine aspects that are ready for widespread deployment and have been demonstrated in the field. These include demonstration studies, pilots, programs, and EV-specific tariffs. In all, 110 examples of charge management were characterized. The data sources were public literature and utility filings as well as targeted interviews. In addition, 43 interviews with stakeholders were conducted with a consistent set of questions used in each interview. This study prioritized gaps in demonstrated SCM capabilities based on 1) Urgency of the particular use-case to offset traditional grid assets, 2) Impact, extensibility, and scaling of results across the entire spectrum of 3000+ utility service territories including projected technical and market potential for a given grid service, and 3) Value of federal funding in addressing the gap, including potential to leverage and/or add scope to existing field demonstrations funded by other non-federal funding mechanisms.",
      "published": "2024-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/2403003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "resilience",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Doug Black",
        "Transportation Office. Vehicle Technologies Office USDOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)",
        "Nadia V. Panossian",
        "Jingjing Liu",
        "Bruce Nordman B",
        "John T. Farrell",
        "Cabell Hodge",
        "Andrew Meintz",
        "Muhammad Abdullah",
        "Mithat C. Kisacikoglu",
        "Jesse Bennett",
        "Rongxin Yin"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2172/2403003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2172/2569916",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle Charging Data Falsification Attacks Utilizing Behavioral Models",
      "description": "A charging station (CS) and its associated electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) and charging electric vehicle (EV) interactions are potential targets for data falsification attacks since CSs are typically unmanned public facilities that are connected to the internet and EVs incorporate the vulnerable CAN bus network, which are both susceptible to remote attacks. The research question being addressed is how is the EV owner and CS negatively affected by CAN bus EV battery current sensor and battery temperature sensor data falsification attacks. Negative effects include economic losses from reduced life span of the battery, battery thermal runaway and fire (and potential loss of surrounding structure), and reduced utilization of the CS due to delayed departure time (longer charging times).",
      "published": "2025-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2172/2569916",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "evse",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "USDOE Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER)",
        "Richard Meyer",
        "Western Michigan Univ., Kalamazoo MI (United States)",
        "Shameek Bhattacharjee"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.2172/2569916",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2174/0122103279346608250109112823",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Firmware Over the Air for Securely Updating ECUs of the Vehicle",
      "description": "Introduction: An automobile is a software-defined machine on top of the wheels including more than 100 electronic control units (ECU) with million lines of code. The integration of ECU in the automobile ensures the customer’s needs by providing safety, security, entertainment, and comfort features. Methods: The firmware integrated into the ECU should be updated to avoid latency in operation and bugs, and to add new features. The traditional update process of ECU holds loopholes like more waiting time, unavailability of service centers, and security threats. To overcome this, over-the-air (OTA) updates are introduced in the vehicle, but security is the major concern while transmitting firmware over the air. Results and Discussion: The proposed system ensures the wireless firmware update with the uptane framework with background Timestamp Update Framework (TUF) ensures the security. The timestamp generated is valid for 86400 seconds to validate the freshness. In addition, security assessment and reverse engineering are performed on the designed system to check for security breaches. Conclusion: The system secures the firmware over arbitrary and replay attacks on the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) server.",
      "published": "2025-01-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2174/0122103279346608250109112823",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bhavesh Raju Mudhivarthi",
        "Prabhat Thakur",
        "Alok Kumar",
        "Sagar Anturkar",
        "Ghanshyam Kumar Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Sensors Wireless Communications and Control",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.2174/0122103279346608250109112823",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2174/9789815079661124010005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Identifying Cyber Threats in IoT based Connected Cars for Enhanced Security",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) has garnered many ideas to create new IoT products as well as enhance their existing products with the help of the internet. Tesla is an example of an IoT device from the automotive industry. The most prominent feature of the vehicle was the over-the-air (OTA) updates. A few vulnerabilities were found in Tesla despite being one of the most secure vehicles in the world. The first vulnerability was in the vehicle's key system, where radio signals from the key fob were intercepted in a relay attack. The next vulnerability was due to the Tesla app, where the hacker obtained the owner's login credentials. Besides, the infotainment system of the vehicle also was compromised and hacked using a web browser bug known as a JIT bug. Lastly, Tesla vehicles also had a vulnerability in their navigation system too. This was demonstrated by a group of researchers who staged a GPS spoof attack on Tesla model 3 while it was in Autopilot mode. Fake satellite coordinates were transmitted by the researchers, who were then received by the GPS receiver. This caused the vehicle to decelerate and made an emergency turn-off at a narrow pit stop. These vulnerabilities can be fixed by following safety measures to counter cyberattacks. More layers of security should be installed on the existing security system to ensure the vehicle does not get exploited easily by hackers.",
      "published": "2024-05-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2174/9789815079661124010005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "infotainment",
        "key fob",
        "relay",
        "secure",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ainkaran Doraisamy",
        "Nor Azlina Abd Rahman",
        "Khalida Shajaratuddur Harun"
      ],
      "venue": "BENTHAM SCIENCE PUBLISHERS eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2174/9789815079661124010005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.21949/1530151",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Assessment Method for Automotive Intrusion Detection System Performance",
      "description": "In response to the increased attack surfaces on modern vehicles due to expanded use of software and the introduction of wireless interfaces, a new market has emerged for intrusion detection systems (IDSs), which can detect some types of attacks and are under development by several companies. NHTSA requested development and demonstration of a method for assessing the in-vehicle performance of anomaly-based IDSs for vehicle data buses, specifically buses using controller area network protocols. IDSs may (1) protect vehicles from direct malicious manipulation of the data bus traffic, or (2) detect symptoms of unfriendly modification of firmware on one of the dozens of electronic control units (ECUs) on a modern vehicle’s network. The methodology used provides a means to assess the performance of automotive IDS products, to provide quantitative and qualitative analysis of performance, and to offer insights on potential IDS options.",
      "published": "2019-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.21949/1530151",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stephen Stachowski",
        "Ron Gaynier",
        "David J. LeBlanc",
        "University of Michigan–Ann Arbor: Transportation Research Institute: Transportation Research Institute"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.21949/1530151",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3855,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.21949/1530151 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: direct, response, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.25.220",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Attacks and Countermeasures on LIN-Bus",
      "description": "This paper presents a security analysis of the Local Interconnect Network (LIN) that is used in assembly units such as seats, steering wheels, and doors in vehicles. Recently, the number of security threats to in-vehicle networks such as the Controller Area Network has increased. In contrast, there have been no reports that evaluate the security of LIN in detail. The security analysis of LIN is important because it is used in units related to seats, steering wheels, etc. and it is at risk for an attack. In this paper, we present the first evaluation on the security of LIN. We present case studies of attacks that use the characteristics of a commonly-used error handling mechanism. In the attacks, the attacker intentionally stops communication using the error handling mechanism and sends a false response in place of a valid one. We experimentally show the feasibility of the attacks using a vehicle microcontroller. Furthermore, we present countermeasures against the attacks. The results of this study show that there is vulnerability to attack when the error handling mechanism is simply designed. We believe that this study will contribute to improvements in security of in-vehicle communications.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.25.220",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junko Takahashi",
        "Yosuke Aragane",
        "Toshiyuki Miyazawa",
        "Hitoshi Fuji",
        "Hirofumi Yamashita",
        "Keita Hayakawa",
        "Shintarou Ukai",
        "Hiroshi Hayakawa"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Processing",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.2197/ipsjjip.25.220",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.26.306",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Supervised and Unsupervised Intrusion Detection Based on CAN Message Frequencies for In-vehicle Network",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and external communication devices. The Controller Area Network (CAN), a widely used communication protocol for ECUs, does not have a security mechanism to detect improper packets; if attackers exploit the vulnerability of an ECU and manage to inject a malicious message, they are able to control other ECUs to cause improper operation of the vehicle. With the increasing popularity of connected cars, it has become an urgent matter to protect in-vehicle networks against security threats. In this paper, we study the applicability of statistical anomaly detection methods for identifying malicious CAN messages in in-vehicle networks. We focus on intrusion attacks of malicious messages. Because the occurrence of an intrusion attack certainly influences the message traffic, we focus on the number of messages observed in a fixed time window to detect intrusion attacks. We formalize features to represent a message sequence that incorporates the number of messages associated with each receiver ID. We collected CAN message data from an actual vehicle and conducted a quantitative analysis of the methods and the features in practical situations. The results of our experiments demonstrated our proposed methods provide fast and accurate detection in various cases.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.26.306",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected cars",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takuya Kuwahara",
        "Yukino Baba",
        "Hisashi Kashima",
        "Takeshi Kishikawa",
        "Junichi Tsurumi",
        "Tomoyuki Haga",
        "Yoshihiro Ujiie",
        "Takamitsu Sasaki",
        "Hideki Matsushima"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Processing",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.2197/ipsjjip.26.306",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.28.611",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Long Short-Term Memory Networks for In-Vehicle Networks Intrusion Detection Using Reverse Engineered Automotive Packets",
      "description": "Nowadays, vehicles are equipped with multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs) each of which communicates with one another using a specification called Controller Area Network (CAN). CAN provides its own share of benefits in modernizing automobiles, but it also brought along a security issue to the automotive industry. CAN bus does not have any mechanism for encrypting or authenticating CAN payloads. As a countermeasure against these drawbacks, we have experimented on identifying intrusions in the CAN bus using Long Short-Term Memory Networks (LSTM). LSTM networks are trained with features extracted from reverse engineered packets. In a specific range of time windows, we have extracted three parameters, the number of packets, the bit flip rate and the average time difference that are used to train LSTM. The trained LSTM is later then used to predict all the three features which will be combined to a single anomaly signal using a root mean squared error. Depending on which side of the threshold appears the anomaly signal value, we managed to identify anomalies in an acceptable performance rate, up to F1 score of 98%. We have tested our methods with a variety of attacks on the CAN bus and demonstrated how effective our detection methods is.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.28.611",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Processing",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.2197/ipsjjip.28.611",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.34.748",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comprehensive Evaluation and Defense against Adversarial Fog Attacks on LiDAR-based Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Recent studies have revealed significant security vulnerabilities in LiDAR-based object detection systems, focusing mainly on attacks against machine learning (ML)-based object detection methods. However, these attacks often overlook the simpler, density-based object detection methods commonly used alongside ML models in autonomous vehicles, which are generally resistant to ML-targeted attacks. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Adversarial Fog Attack (AFA), a novel attack framework that exploits vulnerabilities in both ML- and density-based object detection methods by targeting the point cloud preprocessing stage. AFA leverages artificially generated, strategically configured fog layers to cause objects to become undetectable to LiDAR systems. We develop a theoretical framework modeling LiDAR signal behavior in foggy conditions and analyze point cloud filtering algorithms to determine optimal fog configurations. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of AFA, achieving a 100% success rate using a six-layer fog configuration, with target vehicles colliding with obstacles at an average speed of 37.1km/h with almost no deceleration. Our physical experiments confirm that neither the fog nor the target objects are detectable at a distance of 30m, aligning with our simulation results. We also propose potential countermeasures, including noise removal rate-based detection and thermal camera integration.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.34.748",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuna Tanaka",
        "Kazuki Nomoto",
        "Ryunosuke Kobayashi",
        "Go Tsuruoka",
        "Tatsuya Mori"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Processing",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.2197/ipsjjip.34.748",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22161/ijebm.9.1.11",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Emerging Trends in the Automotive Industry Driven by Sustainable Technological Innovation",
      "description": "Sustainable technological innovation has become increasingly critical to balance profitability, environmental protection, growth and prosperity of the automobile ecosystem. Grid integration of electric vehicles (GIEVs) and renewable energy (RE) integration are vital components towards sustainable innovation. Variability and intermittency of RE and uncertain mobility behavior makes the operational planning challenging. The paper identifies and discusses diverse technologies and trends shaping automotive industry and electric mobility. The leading technologies are: connectivity, electrification, autonomous driving and shared Mobility. Feasibility of these trends is justified from advancements of underlying technologies such as 5G & edge computing, vehicle-to-everything (V2X), Internet of Things (IOT), public clouds, data analytics, artificial intelligence, digitalization, connected car platforms, analytics platforms, cyber security and so on. This paper highlights driving experience enhancement through technologies and glimpse of possible issues of automotive industry.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22161/ijebm.9.1.11",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected car",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suman Sharma",
        "Jitendra Singh",
        "Jinendra Rahul",
        "Bharat Modi",
        "Garvit Gupta",
        "Md. Yusuf Sareef"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Engineering Business and Management",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.22161/ijebm.9.1.11",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22214/ijraset.2022.40598",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Internet of Vehicle (IOV) Security Issues and Their Solutions",
      "description": "Abstract: The \"Internet of Things\" is a new paradigm that includes smart hospitals, smart cities, and home automation, among other services. The \"Internet of Things\" has turned a small-scale Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) into a highly scalable and controlled \"Internet of Vehicle\" that is based on the internet (IoV). The Internet of Automobiles (IoV) is a vehicular network idea that comprises of linked motors, users, and other smart devices. It aims to provide a range of safety and pleasure services. Depending on which directions and other data are sent to each vehicle, the IoV system equips them with various sensors that record various types of data and send it to a computer unit for computation and analysis. We present a model overview of the IoV system in this research. Because every system failure directly affects user safety on the Internet of Things, security becomes crucial. We look at security concerns, various security assaults, and solutions from an IoV perspective. We also provide a system that support for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication in the Internet of Vehicles. Keywords: Internet of vehicles, Vanet, Vehicle to infrastructure, Security challenges.",
      "published": "2022-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2022.40598",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Wani",
        "Jasdeep Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.22214/ijraset.2022.40598",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22214/ijraset.2024.62832",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Facilitate Driving with Geographical Proximity",
      "description": "Abstract: This research paper describes the development of a website based on remote computing with the aim of improving the connection between driving schools and automobile students. The primary purpose of this web application is to provide administrators, parents, and students with actual vehicle information, including clutch usage, speed, braking patterns, and vehicle location. This is achieved through the integration of remote data processing installed in the vehicle and sending the relevant data to web applications. This article discusses the importance of these systems in improving driver training and safety by allowing participants to remotely monitor vehicle operation, driving behavior and actions. We completed the literature review to examine existing telematics systems and their applications in the automotive industry. The work includes the selection and installation of remote data processing equipment, the development of user- friendly web interfaces using modern programming languages and methods, and scrupulous compliance with technical procedures. The main features of the web application include real-time data tracking, GPS tracking, important event alerts and notifications, and reporting and analysis capability. The implementation process is quite detailed, including hardware integration, front-end and back-end development, data storage and security measures.",
      "published": "2024-05-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2024.62832",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jyoti Yadav",
        "Namarta Dixit",
        "Divya Mishra",
        "Khushi Sharma",
        "Dr. Umesh Dwivedi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.22214/ijraset.2024.62832",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22214/ijraset.2025.71008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection in Smart Vehicles",
      "description": "Abstract: The Internet ofVehicles (IoV) istransforming transportation by enabling real-timecommunication betweenvehicles andinfrastructure.AcoreelementofthiscommunicationistheControllerAreaNetwork(CAN)bus,whichinterconnectsElectronicContr olUnits(ECUs)withinvehicles.However,theCANbushassignificant security vulnerabilities, making itsusceptible to cyberattacks that could disruptvehicleoperations. Currentmethodsforintrusiondetectioninvehicles include rule-based systems, signaturedetection, and anomaly detection. Rulebasedsystemsrelyonpredefinedrulestodetectknownattackpatterns,whilesignaturedetection identifies specific attack signaturesinnetworktraffic.Anomalydetection,incontrast,flagsdeviationsfromtypicalbehavioras potentialintrusions. Thesetraditionalmethodsfacelimitations,includingdifficultiesinidentifyingneworevolving attack patterns and a high rate offalsepositives.Toaddressthesechallenges,theiyproposedtheOptimalAttentionDeepLearning-basedInvehicleIntrusionDetectionand Classification algorithm (OADL-IVIDC).Leveragingtheattention mechanism, thissystemfocuses oncriticaldata, enhancingaccuracy indetectingbothknownandunknownthreatswhilereducingFalsepositives. This deeplearningbased approachprovidesamoreadaptiveandreliablesolutionforsecuringCANbuscommunicationin theIoVenvironment.",
      "published": "2025-05-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2025.71008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mrs. D Suganya"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.22214/ijraset.2025.71008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22214/ijraset.2025.73521",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security in Autonomous Vehicles: A Review of Attacks and Defenses",
      "description": "As Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) transition from controlled environments to real-world deployment, ensuring their cybersecurity has become critical. The integration of software, AI-based control systems, sensors, and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication significantly expands the attack surface, exposing AVs to a range of cyber and physical threats. This paper presents a review of AV security, with a particular focus on the classification of attacks across physical, software, communication, and hardware domains. It further analyzes existing defense mechanisms, including both traditional rule-based systems and emerging Machine Learning (ML) approaches, and examines current evaluation and testing strategies for assessing AV resilience. While notable progress has been made, the field still faces challenges related to generalization, real-world robustness, and standardized testing frameworks. This review identifies key gaps and outlines future directions toward building secure and trustworthy autonomous systems.",
      "published": "2025-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2025.73521",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shivani Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.22214/ijraset.2025.73521",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22214/ijraset.2026.82266",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Access System Using UWB and Key Fob",
      "description": "This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of Vehicle Access Systems based on Ultra-Wideband (UWB) technology integrated with secure digital key fobs. With the rapid advancement of intelligent transportation systems and connected vehicles, the demand for highly secure, reliable, and user-friendly vehicle access mechanisms has significantly increased. Conventional Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems, which primarily rely on radio frequency communication, are increasingly susceptible to security threats such as relay attacks, signal interception, and spoofing techniques, thereby compromising vehicle safety and user privacy. To address these limitations, UWB-based vehicle access systems have emerged as an advanced solution capable of providing precise distance estimation and robust authentication between the vehicle and the authorized key fob. By utilizing time-of-flight (ToF) measurements and secure ranging techniques, UWB technology enables accurate localization and ensures that access is granted only when the authenticated user is physically present within a defined proximity. This significantly enhances protection against unauthorized access while simultaneously improving operational convenience for users.",
      "published": "2026-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2026.82266",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sahaj Sisodiya"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.22214/ijraset.2026.82266",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4715,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.22214/ijraset.2026.82266 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: unauthorized, operational, user, digital, access, privacy, safety, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22266/ijies2025.0930.03",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving Can Bus Attack Detection and Prevention System Using Integrated Deep Learning Models",
      "description": "In modern vehicles, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is vulnerable to cyberattacks such as Denial of Service (DoS) and fuzzy and spoofing attacks, which comprise vehicle safety.Traditional methods, including rulebased detection and deep learning models like LSTMs, struggle to capture long-term dependencies and dynamically adapt to evolving threats, leading to high false positives and delayed responses.Therefore, a robust and adaptive security framework is required to enhance detection and real-time attack prevention.This research proposes a novel framework, TGMARL, which integrates a time series transformer for intrusion detection and Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) for intrusion prevention.The transformer model captures complex temporal attack patterns, improving detection accuracy.The GCN represents the CAN bus as a graph to identify attack propagation across ECUs, while MARL dynamically learns optimal countermeasures to mitigate cyber threats in real-time.The TGMARL framework decreases false positives by 65.50% across all attack types and 71.82% over training episodes, improves detection accuracy by 18.25% compared to existing models across all attack types, and improves detection accuracy by 19.52% over training episodes.Then, it reduces the duration of attack impacts by 13.2% across all attack types and 14.2% across all training episodes, and improves prevention efficiency by 12.5% across all attack types and 11% across all training episodes.Thus, the security can be effectively addressed using the proposed TGMARL model, which provides a scalable, intelligent, and real-time solution.The TGMARL offers a scalable and innovative security solution for CAN bus networks, strengthening intrusion detection and realtime response and making automotive communication networks more resilient to cyber threats.",
      "published": "2025-08-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22266/ijies2025.0930.03",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "International journal of intelligent engineering and systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.22266/ijies2025.0930.03",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22266/ijies2026.0131.34",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced CAN Bus Intrusion Detection Using CNN-LSTM-Attention Networks with Time-based Feature Engineering",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocols for critical inter-ECU communication, yet CAN lacks fundamental security features, making vehicles vulnerable to cyber-attacks.This paper presents a deep learning-based intrusion detection system combining Convolutional Neural Networks, Long Short-Term Memory networks, and attention mechanisms to identify CAN bus attacks in real-time.Our approach integrates three innovations: a hybrid CNN-LSTM-Attention architecture capturing spatial and temporal patterns, comprehensive time-based feature engineering extracting six temporal features, and a balanced training strategy addressing severe class imbalance.Evaluated on the Car Hacking Challenge 2020 dataset containing 806,390 messages, our model achieves 97.6% accuracy across five traffic categories (Normal, Flooding, Fuzzing, Replay, Spoofing), outperforming baseline CNN (92.8%) and CNN-LSTM (94.2%) models.With 35ms inference time, the system enables real-time deployment in automotive environments.",
      "published": "2025-12-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22266/ijies2026.0131.34",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "fuzzing",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sabreen Salih Mahdi",
        "Amer Abdulmajeed Abdulrahman"
      ],
      "venue": "International journal of intelligent engineering and systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.22266/ijies2026.0131.34",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22399/ijcesen.4942",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantum Security Risks in Autonomous Vehicles and Smart Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Self-driving cars and intelligent transport networks face unprecedented security challenges from quantum computing capabilities. Quantum algorithms can efficiently solve mathematical problems underlying current cryptographic architectures that protect vehicular communications, authentication, and software integrity. This article analyzes quantum-specific threat vectors including harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks, authentication forgery enabling safety-critical message spoofing, and long-term integrity attacks on over-the-air updates. Technical solutions include post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, hybrid security models, and crypto-agile architectures. The lifecycle threat model addresses temporal aspects of data sensitivity for vehicles with long operational lifetimes. Policy implications encompass national security, economic competitiveness, regulatory frameworks, and international standards coordination. Quantum-resilient transportation security requires urgent, coordinated efforts from industry, government, and standards organizations.",
      "published": "2026-02-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22399/ijcesen.4942",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit K. Awasthi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computational and Experimental Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.22399/ijcesen.4942",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22541/au.165828146.63877046/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Attacks in Celluler-V2X Communicaiton Networks",
      "description": "Vehicles in the current era can communicate with other vehicles, roadside units, and networks. This communication is collaboratively called Vehicle to Everything(V2X) communication. V2X network leverages modern communication technologies such as DSRC, LTE, and 5G communication. Along with the leverages of these technologies, potential security threat has also increased. Cybersecurity attacks are the most common attacks that damage the V2X communication network. In this paper, we will reveal poetnetial cybersecurity attacks in V2X communication",
      "published": "2022-07-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22541/au.165828146.63877046/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Noman Mazher",
        "Mohmmad Alhaddad",
        "Oyunchimeg Shagdar"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.22541/au.165828146.63877046/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22541/au.173991300.08356728/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Building Trust in Driverless Technology: Overcoming Cybersecurity Challenges",
      "description": "Driverless technology is revolutionizing transportation, promising improved safety, efficiency, and accessibility. However, the widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles (AVs) hinges on addressing critical cybersecurity challenges to build public trust. This paper investigates the multifaceted cybersecurity threats faced by driverless systems, including vulnerabilities in communication networks, sensor spoofing, software tampering, and potential breaches in cloud-based data management. These risks not only compromise passenger safety but also erode trust in the technology's reliability and resilience. To overcome these challenges, the paper suggests a comprehensive cybersecurity framework for AVs. This includes robust encryption protocols for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, machine learning-based intrusion detection systems, and blockchainenhanced data integrity solutions. Additionally, regulatory recommendations and industry collaboration are highlighted as essential components in developing standardized cybersecurity measures. The study analyzes real-world incidents and potential attack vectors to provide actionable insights in fortifying the cybersecurity of driverless systems. Ultimately, this paper emphasizes that building trust in the technology of autonomous vehicles requires proactive and transparent approaches to cybersecurity, with the safe and secure integration of AVs into society.",
      "published": "2025-02-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22541/au.173991300.08356728/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anwar Mohammed"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.22541/au.173991300.08356728/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.22667/jisis.2019.05.31.042",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical Methodology for In-Vehicle CAN Security Evaluation",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.22667/jisis.2019.05.31.042",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyun-Bae Park",
        "Yongeun Kim",
        "Jaeseok Jeon",
        "Heeseok Moon",
        "Samuel Woo"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Internet Services and Information Security",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.22667/jisis.2019.05.31.042",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2307/j.ctv176kv1x.6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performing and Experiencing Anger (through Humor)",
      "description": "Turning to one final entertainment genre, Chapter Three studies the rise in popularity of parodic infotainment news shows following the September 11th attacks. Drawing upon humor relief theory, as well as theories concerning affect mimicry and imagined communities, this essay argues that news parodies, such as Comedy Central's The Daily Show, satisfied various emotional needs for viewers during this traumatic time period. While critics often worry that therapeutic laughter diffuses fear and anger and quells rebellious impulses, this essay argues that the humor provided by these programs have the potential to help viewers transform their negative emotions into action.",
      "published": "2020-10-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv176kv1x.6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Melissa R. Ames"
      ],
      "venue": "The University Press of Kentucky eBooks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.2307/j.ctv176kv1x.6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2352/j.imagingsci.technol.2021.65.6.060408",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks on Multi-task Visual Perception for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have accomplished impressive success in various applications, including autonomous driving perception tasks. However, current deep neural networks are easily deceived by adversarial attacks. This vulnerability raises significant concerns, particularly in safety-critical applications. As a result, research into attacking and defending DNNs has gained much coverage. In this work, detailed adversarial attacks are applied on a diverse multi-task visual perception deep network across distance estimation, semantic segmentation, motion detection, and object detection. The experiments consider both white and black box attacks for targeted and un-targeted cases, while attacking a task and inspecting the effect on all others, in addition to inspecting the effect of applying a simple defense method. We conclude this paper by comparing and discussing the experimental results, proposing insights and future work. The visualizations of the attacks are available at https://youtu.be/6AixN90budY.",
      "published": "2021-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2352/j.imagingsci.technol.2021.65.6.060408",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ibrahim Sobh",
        "Ahmed Hamed",
        "Varun Ravi Kumar",
        "Senthil Kumar Yogamani"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Imaging Science and Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.2352/j.imagingsci.technol.2021.65.6.060408",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/acc.2017.7963725",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilient control strategy under Denial of Service in connected vehicles",
      "description": "With the advent of Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication, connected vehicle systems can be a promising tool to realize efficient and intelligent transportation. Essentially, connected vehicles can be viewed as a group of vehicles that can communicate with each other and the infrastructure. However, it also presents some challenges from safety and security point of view. Apart from the malfunction in the communication protocol, wireless communication networks can be subjected to cyber-attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS). Therefore, a vehicular control scheme which is resilient to such cyber-attacks is essential to improve the safety and security. In this paper, we develop a resilient control scheme for a platoon of connected vehicles equipped with Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) to mitigate the DoS attack. We modify the conventional CACC algorithm by adding an estimation algorithm consisting of a set of Luenberger's observer and a delay estimator. The efficacy of the proposes scheme is illustrated via simulation case studies.",
      "published": "2017-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/acc.2017.7963725",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zoliekha Abdollahi Biron",
        "Satadru Dey",
        "Pierluigi Pisu"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the ... American Control Conference/Proceedings of the American Control Conference",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.23919/acc.2017.7963725",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 69,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/acc.2018.8431538",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Replay Attack Detection in a Platoon of Connected Vehicles with Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control",
      "description": "Using emerging wireless communication technologies, vehicles can exchange information among each other with the aim of cooperation to improve safety, efficiency and fuel economy of the transportation system. This advancement in technology highlights challenges in designing control systems that are able to deal with an unreliable and a compromised network while guaranteeing stability, safety and reliability of the vehicles: network failures and cyber-attacks could cause loss in performances, vehicle collisions or loss of lives. In this paper, we focus in detecting replay attack in a connected vehicle system under Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) where one of the vehicle is affected by a malicious agent which wants to compromise the safety and the performance of the platoon. A decentralized diagnosis algorithm based on noisy control signal methodology and cross correlator is proposed to detect the replay attack. The effectiveness of the overall online algorithm scheme is verified via simulation results, which show that the noisy control signal is not affecting significantly the behavior of the vehicle platoon and that the detection algorithm is able to detect the replay attack even though a tuning of some parameter is needed.",
      "published": "2018-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/acc.2018.8431538",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roberto Merco",
        "Zoleikha Abdollahi Biron",
        "Pierluigi Pisu"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the ... American Control Conference/Proceedings of the American Control Conference",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.23919/acc.2018.8431538",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 56,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4109,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.23919/acc.2018.8431538 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: though, stability, loss, even, where, information, safety, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/acc45564.2020.9147977",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Real-time False Data Injection Attack Detection in Connected Vehicle Systems with PDE modeling",
      "description": "Connected vehicles as a promising concept of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), are a potential solution to address some of the existing challenges of emission, traffic congestion as well as fuel consumption. To achieve these goals, connectivity among vehicles through the wireless communication network is essential. However, vehicular communication networks endure from reliability and security issues. Cyber-attacks with purposes of disrupting the performance of the connected vehicles, lead to catastrophic collision and traffic congestion. In this study, we consider a platoon of connected vehicles equipped with Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) which are subjected to a specific type of cyber-attack namely \"False Data Injection\" attack. We developed a novel method to model the attack with ghost vehicles injected into the connected vehicles network to disrupt the performance of the whole system. To aid the analysis, we use a Partial Differential Equation (PDE) model. Furthermore, we present a PDE model-based diagnostics scheme capable of detecting the false data injection attack and isolating the injection point of the attack in the platoon system. The proposed scheme is designed based on a PDE observer with measured velocity and acceleration feedback. Lyapunov stability theory has been utilized to verify the analytically convergence of the observer under no attack scenario. Eventually, the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is evaluated with simulation study.",
      "published": "2020-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/acc45564.2020.9147977",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roghieh A. Biroon",
        "Pierluigi Pisu",
        "Zoleikha Abdollahi"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the ... American Control Conference/Proceedings of the American Control Conference",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.23919/acc45564.2020.9147977",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4466,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.23919/acc45564.2020.9147977 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: disrupting, purposes, stability, well, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/aeit.2017.8240550",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting attacks to internal vehicle networks through Hamming distance",
      "description": "Analysis of in-vehicle networks is an open research area that gained relevance after recent reports of cyber attacks against connected vehicles. After those attacks gained international media attention, many security researchers started to propose different algorithms that are capable to model the normal behaviour of the CAN bus to detect the injection of malicious messages. However, despite the automotive area has different constraint than classical IT security, many security research have been conducted by applying sophisticated algorithm used in IT anomaly detection, thus proposing solutions that are not applicable on current Electronic Control Units (ECUs). This paper proposes a novel intrusion detection algorithm that aims to identify malicious CAN messages injected by attackers in the CAN bus of modern vehicles. Moreover, the proposed algorithm has been designed and implemented with the very strict constraint of low-end ECUs, having low computational complexity and small memory footprints. The proposed algorithm identifies anomalies in the sequence of the payloads of different classes of IDs by computing the Hamming distance between consecutive payloads. Its detection performance are evaluated through experiments carried out using real CAN traffic gathered from an unmodified licensed vehicle.",
      "published": "2017-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/aeit.2017.8240550",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dario Stabili",
        "Mirco Marchetti",
        "Michele Colajanni"
      ],
      "venue": "AEIT International Annual Conference",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.23919/aeit.2017.8240550",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 113,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3803,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.23919/aeit.2017.8240550 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: very, normal, vehicle., control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/aeit67669.2025.11218079",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Challenges in Electric Vehicles Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "The fast diffusion of electric vehicles (EVs) and the required supporting charging infrastructure have introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten reliability, electrical safety, and privacy for users and systems. This paper analyses the multifaceted cybersecurity risks associated with Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), including vulnerabilities in communication protocols, authentication mechanisms, and data integrity. It also analyzes key threat vectors and propose mitigation strategies aimed at enhancing the resilience of EV charging networks, with a focus on cybersecurity strategies within EVSE. The role of datasets and machine learning approaches in detecting and preventing cyber threats is investigated. By leveraging real-world data and advanced algorithms, we highlight how intelligent systems can improve threat detection and response.",
      "published": "2025-09-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/aeit67669.2025.11218079",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefania Conti",
        "Antonino Laudani"
      ],
      "venue": "AEIT International Annual Conference",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.23919/aeit67669.2025.11218079",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/chicc.2017.8028843",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A design method of EV charging security early warning model",
      "description": "In order to improve the electric car battery safety early warning ability and decrease the safe accident of electric vehicle charging, the electric vehicle charging safety factors are analyzed, the security early warning index selection ways and methods are studied, and a security early warning evaluation index system is set, the evaluation method of weight for safety index is discussed. Besides, a kind of electric vehicle charging security early warning model is designed using genetic wavelet neural network training principles with multi-scale multi-resolution characteristics, and five levels of security early warning are classified. Through simulation analysis, early warning system for a charging station safety data is used to verify the proposed electric vehicle charging correctness and feasibility of the early warning model.",
      "published": "2017-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/chicc.2017.8028843",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pengcheng Li",
        "Yuanliang Zhao",
        "Jing Yang",
        "Rui Xu",
        "Zhang Qiu-yan",
        "Li-yun Ying"
      ],
      "venue": "Chinese Control Conference (CCC)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.23919/chicc.2017.8028843",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/comex.2025xbl0066",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PQCMC: Post-Quantum Cryptography McEliece-Chen Implicit Certificate Scheme",
      "description": "In recent years, the elliptic curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificate scheme has found application in security credential management systems (SCMS) and secure vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication to issue pseudonymous certificates. However, the vulnerability of elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) to polynomial-time attacks posed by quantum computing raises concerns. In order to enhance resistance against quantum computing threats, various post-quantum cryptography methods have been adopted as standard (e.g. Dilithium) or candidate standard methods (e.g. McEliece cryptography), but state of the art has proven to be challenging to implement implicit certificates using lattice-based cryptography methods. Therefore, this study proposes a post-quantum cryptography McEliece-Chen (PQCMC) based on an efficient random invertible matrix generation method to issue pseudonymous certificates with less computation time. The study provides mathematical models to validate the key expansion process for implicit certificates. Furthermore, comprehensive security evaluations and discussions are conducted to demonstrate that distinct implicit certificates can be linked to the same end entity. In experiments, a comparison is conducted between the certificate length and computation time to evaluate the performance of the proposed PQCMC. This study demonstrates the viability of the implicit certificate scheme based on PQC as a means of countering quantum computing threats.",
      "published": "2024-01-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/comex.2025xbl0066",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel C. H. Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.23919/comex.2025xbl0066",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/cycon55549.2022.9811048",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keep the Moving Vehicle Secure: Context-Aware Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle CAN Bus Security",
      "description": "The growth of information technologies has driven the development of the transportation sector, including connected and autonomous vehicles. Due to its communication capabilities, the controller area network (CAN) is the most widely used in-vehicle communication protocol. However, CAN lacks suitable security mechanisms such as message authentication and encryption. This makes the CAN bus vulnerable to numerous cyberattacks. Not only are these attacks a threat to information security and privacy, but they can also directly affect the safety of drivers, passengers and the surrounding environment of the moving vehicles. This paper presents CAN-CID, a context-aware intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect cyberattacks on the CAN bus, which would be suitable for deployment in automobiles, including military vehicles, passenger cars and commercial vehicles, and other CAN-based applications such as aerospace, industrial automation and medical equipment. CAN-CID is an ensemble model of a gated recurrent unit (GRU) network and a time-based model. A GRU algorithm works by learning to predict the centre ID of a CAN ID sequence, and ID-based probabilistic thresholds are used to identify anomalous IDs, whereas the time-based model identifies anomalous IDs using time-based thresholds. The number of anomalies compared to the total number of IDs over an observation window is used to classify the window status as anomalous or benign. The proposed model uses only benign data for training and threshold estimation, avoiding the need to collect realistic attack data to train the algorithm. The performance of the CAN-CID model was tested against three datasets over a range of 16 attacks, including fabrication and more sophisticated masquerade attacks. The CAN-CID model achieved an F1-Score of over 99% for 13 of those attacks and outperformed benchmark models from the literature for all attacks, with near real-time detection latency.",
      "published": "2022-05-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/cycon55549.2022.9811048",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sampath Rajapaksha",
        "Harsha Kalutarage",
        "Mhd Omar Al-Kadri",
        "Garikayi Madzudzo",
        "Andrei V. Petrovski"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Cyber Conflict",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.23919/cycon55549.2022.9811048",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/date.2017.7927145",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Self-awareness in autonomous automotive systems",
      "description": "Self-awareness has been used in many research fields in order to add autonomy to computing systems. In automotive systems, we face several system layers that must be enriched with self-awareness to build truly autonomous vehicles. This includes functional aspects like autonomous driving itself, its integration on the hardware/software platform, and among others dependability, real-time, and security aspects. However, self-awareness mechanisms of all layers must be considered in combination in order to build a coherent vehicle self-awareness that does not cause conflicting decisions or even catastrophic effects. In this paper, we summarize current approaches for establishing self-awareness on those layers and elaborate why self-awareness needs to be addressed as a cross-layer problem, which we illustrate by practical examples.",
      "published": "2017-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/date.2017.7927145",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Johannes Schlatow",
        "Mischa Möstl",
        "Rolf Ernst",
        "Marcus Nolte",
        "Inga Jatzkowski",
        "Markus Maurer",
        "Christian Herber",
        "Andreas Herkersdorf"
      ],
      "venue": "Design, Automation, and Test in Europe",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.23919/date.2017.7927145",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 37,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/date.2018.8342198",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digitalization in automotive and industrial systems",
      "description": "Autonomous systems are an important part of todays and future solutions for the automotive and industrial sector. The research and development activities to enable high/full automated driving and industry 4.0 have to deal with a lot of new requirements (e.g. fail operational, cyber security), technologies (connectivity over 5G, neuronal networks, future computing platforms) and topics (data analytics, artificial intelligence). Furthermore processes, methods und tools lack behind and need to speed up to cope with all the consequences in validation and verification. The short paper will give an overview over these challenges and the actual state of research and the development in the field of digital autonomous systems.",
      "published": "2018-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/date.2018.8342198",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Matthias Traub",
        "Hans J. Vogel",
        "Eric Sax",
        "Thilo Streichert",
        "Jérôme Härri"
      ],
      "venue": "Design, Automation, and Test in Europe",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.23919/date.2018.8342198",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/date51398.2021.9474053",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware-assisted Detection of Malware in Automotive-Based Systems",
      "description": "In the age of Internet-of-Things (IoT), automobiles have become heavily integrated and reliant on computerized components for system functionality. Modern vehicles have many Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that control ignition timing, suspension control, and transmission shifting. The Engine Control Module (ECM) is generally recognized as one of the most essential components owing to its functionality of regulating air and fuel input to the engine. Consequently, automotive security is an emerging problem that will only escalate as vehicles integrate more computerized components in conjunction with wireless system connectivity. Attackers that successfully gain access to important vehicular components and compromise existing functionality can induce a plethora of malevolent activities. With the evolution and exponential proliferation of Malware, identifying malicious entities is critical for maintaining proper system performance. Traditional anti-virus software is inadequate against complex Malware, which has engendered a push towards Hardware-assisted Malware Detection (HMDs) using Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs). HPCs are special purpose registers that track low-level micro-architectural events. In this paper, we propose using Machine Learning models trained on HPC data to identify malicious entities in the ECM. Our experimental results determine that the proposed ML-based models can successfully identify malicious actions in an automotive system with a classification accuracy of up to 96.7%.",
      "published": "2021-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/date51398.2021.9474053",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "malware",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yugpratap Singh",
        "Abraham Peedikayil Kuruvila",
        "Kanad Basu"
      ],
      "venue": "Design, Automation, and Test in Europe",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.23919/date51398.2021.9474053",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/date54114.2022.9774542",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attack Data Generation Framework for Autonomous Vehicle Sensors",
      "description": "Driving scenarios of autonomous vehicles combine many data sources with new networking requirements in highly dynamic system setups. To keep security mechanisms applicable to new application fields in the automotive domain, our work introduces a security framework to generate, attack, and validate realistic data sets at rest and in transit. Concerning realistic data sets, our framework leverages autonomous driving simulators as well as static data sets of vehicle sensors. A configurable networking setup enables flexible data encapsulation to perform and validate networking attacks on data in transit. We validate our results with intrusion detection algorithms and simulation environments. Generated data sets and configurations are reproducible, portable, storable, and support iterative security testing of scenarios.",
      "published": "2022-03-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/date54114.2022.9774542",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jan Lauinger",
        "Andreas Finkenzeller",
        "Henrik Lautebach",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst"
      ],
      "venue": "Design, Automation, and Test in Europe",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.23919/date54114.2022.9774542",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/date56975.2023.10137016",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Quantised Neural Network Accelerators for Low-Power IDS in Automotive Networks",
      "description": "In this paper, we explore low-power custom quantised Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for automotive controller area network (CAN). We utilise the FINN framework from AMD/Xilinx to quantise, train and generate hardware IP of our MLP to detect denial of service (DoS) and fuzzying attacks on CAN network, using ZCU104 (XCZU7EV) FPGA as our target ECU architecture with integrated IDS capabilities. Our approach achieves significant improvements in latency (0.12 ms per-message processing latency) and inference energy consumption (0.25 mJ per inference) while achieving similar classification performance as state-of-the-art approaches in the literature.",
      "published": "2024-01-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/date56975.2023.10137016",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashwat Khandelwal",
        "Anneliese Walsh",
        "Shanker Shreejith"
      ],
      "venue": "2023 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.23919/date56975.2023.10137016",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/fruct.2017.8250182",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigation of keyless cryptosystem proposed by dean and Goldsmith",
      "description": "We consider keyless cryptosystem proposed recently by Dean and Goldsmith. We show by simulation that this scheme is secure even so the eavesdropper uses suboptimal decoding (zero-forcing attack) with linear complexity but if the number of legitimate and eavesdropper antennas are equal to one another. But if eavesdropper has even small advantage in number of antennas, the proposed cryptosystem occurs insecure that we prove both theoretically and experimentally. We investigate a modified scheme with inverse precoder and show that it requires untractable values of the legitimate user transmitter power. Thus Dean-Goldsmith cryptosystem seems to be insecure with practical point of view.",
      "published": "2017-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/fruct.2017.8250182",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Коржик Валерий Иванович",
        "Vladimir Starostin",
        "K.A. Akhrameeva"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference of Open Innovations Association (FRUCT)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.23919/fruct.2017.8250182",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/fruct64283.2024.10749940",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication in IoT via 5G",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is growing in market demand as a key technology for the Internet of Things (IoT), intended to enhance road safety, traffic efficiency, and energy savings. This high-speed data transfer, low latency, and wide bandwidth capabilities are crucial to V2X interaction optimization, making it the perfect platform for scaling effectively, and 5G networks give us the right technological environment. The article takes a deep dive into V2X communication applications through 5G technologies which enable the deployment of an inclusive, responsive, real-time transport ecosystem. V2X includes several paradigms such as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), and even a more recent one, Vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P), each of which individually provides unique benefits to road-safety and efficiency.The article evaluates how V2X performs and scales on 5G networks compared to older generations of mobile networks using case studies. Furthermore, the narrative explores challenges in implementing 5G-equipped V2X with fragile infrastructure integration: issues with compatibility, as well as security and privacy of information. It also discusses the possible effects of smart cities, autonomous vehicles, and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Finally, the article offers a glimpse into emerging advancements in V2X technologies such as edge computing, artificial intelligence, and blockchain, potentially revolutionizing vehicle communication systems.This article serves as a comprehensive manual for policymakers, scholars, and researchers in the realm of V2X communications over 5G networks.",
      "published": "2024-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/fruct64283.2024.10749940",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammed Ahmed Shakir",
        "Refat Taleb Hussain",
        "Baydaa Al-Hamadani",
        "Mohammed Mubarak Salih",
        "Hayder Mahmood Salman",
        "Ігор Козубцов",
        "Erahid Aram"
      ],
      "venue": "Conference of Open Innovations Association (FRUCT)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.23919/fruct64283.2024.10749940",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/icact53585.2022.9728968",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Dynamic Voting based Explainable Intrusion Detection System for In-vehicle Network",
      "description": "A modern vehicle contains a large number of electronic components communicating over a large in-vehicle network. While the operation of this network is crucial, some implementations are vulnerable to a number of security attacks while lacking sufficient security measures. Intrusion detection systems have been proposed as a possible solution to this, with those using machine learning receiving much attention. However, such systems may be hard to interpret and understand. In this work, we propose an automotive intrusion detection system that utilizes Random Forest with a dynamic voting technique to provide a robust solution with interpretability through feature and model exploration. The proposed solution is evaluated using two publicly available datasets and demonstrates stable performance when compared to similar solutions.",
      "published": "2022-02-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/icact53585.2022.9728968",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nishat I Mowla",
        "Joakim Rosell",
        "Arash Vahidi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.23919/icact53585.2022.9728968",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/icact63878.2025.10936763",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DataTransfer PDU-based Rollback Mechanism for Securing OCPP 1.6 Against Spoofing Attacks",
      "description": "The Open Charge Point Protocol is a widely adopted communication standard that facilitates interoperability between Charge Points and Central Systems in the electric vehicle charging ecosystem. This paper explores the security implications of OCPP 1.6, with a particular focus on the risks posed by spoofed or unauthorized messages. We propose a rollback mechanism utilizing the DataTransfer PDU to mitigate these risks, allowing the Central System to trigger reversion of unauthorized changes at the CP level. The proposed solution ensures secure, efficient management of configurations and mitigates potential threats such as replay attacks, spoofed requests, and unauthorized modifications. This paper contributes to the growing body of knowledge on securing EV charging infrastructure by highlighting underexplored vulnerabilities in OCPP 1.6 and providing practical solutions to enhance the security and resilience of the protocol.",
      "published": "2025-02-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/icact63878.2025.10936763",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "resilience",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dong Uk Kim",
        "Keon Oh Kim",
        "Sun-Moo Kang",
        "Choong Seon Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Advanced Communications Technology (ICACT)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.23919/icact63878.2025.10936763",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/iconac.2019.8895162",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Network of ECUs Software Update in Future vehicles",
      "description": "Nowadays, the modern vehicles use numerous Electric Control Units (ECUs) which have a complex software architecture. Updating the software in a given ECU is a major challenge since these connected vehicles are prone to security vulnerabilities and cyber-attacks. Another problem is that updating an ECU is a time consuming process and the owners of these vehicles cannot use important features of their cars during this update process. Different software architectures for the ECUs are proposed but none of the existing techniques allow the vehicle driver to use the car during the update. In this paper, we propose an enhanced architecture for the ECUs. The proposed architecture makes use of a delta file which is the actual update in the software. This delta file is placed in the extended RAM and the modules of the software which needs to be updated are run from the delta file. After successful executing of the module from the delta file, the module is updated in the existing software. The proposed ECU architecture allows the owners to use important features of the vehicles during the update process. We run simulation to check the reliability in terms of MTTF due to our non-repairable application of our proposed architecture.",
      "published": "2019-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/iconac.2019.8895162",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Hamza Sarwar",
        "Munam Ali Shah",
        "Muhammad Umair",
        "Syed Hassnain Faraz"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Automation and Computing (ICAC)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.23919/iconac.2019.8895162",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/incit.2018.8584882",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigation mechanism against in-vehicle network intrusion by reconfiguring ECU and disabling attack packet",
      "description": "As the connectivity of vehicles grows and becomes more intelligent, security threats are also increasing. In fact, hacking of vehicles such as Jeep Cherokee (2014), Mitsubishi Outlander (2016) and Tesla model S (2016 and 2017) has been reported. Currently, various intrusion detection solutions are emerging in order to defend the cyber-attacks of vehicles, but up to now, the response to detection has remained at the ex post countermeasure level. In this paper, we propose a mitigation mechanism to cope with an attack on a vehicular internal network. The proposed mechanism reconfigures ECUs and disables attack packets to mitigate damage to network intrusions.",
      "published": "2018-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/incit.2018.8584882",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "jeep",
        "tesla",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "H. Kwon",
        "Sokjoon Lee",
        "Jungyong Choi",
        "Byungho Chung"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.23919/incit.2018.8584882",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/jcc.2021.08.021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "C-V2X equipment identification management and authentication mechanism",
      "description": "Cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) is the most promising V2X communication technology which can greatly improve traffic efficiency and road safety. However, when vehicles are interconnected with the surrounding radio environment, the CV2X system will face various network security risks and threats, significantly impacting on traffic and life safety. This paper proposes a novel unified identification management framework and security authentication mechanism for the C-V2X equipment based on the security problems analyses of the C-V2X system and the existing security protection schemes. This paper also presents the security analysis and evaluation for the united identification management and authentication mechanism. A experiment system is implemented to verify feasibility and effectiveness for the proposed mechanism.",
      "published": "2021-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/jcc.2021.08.021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shanzhi Chen",
        "Qiang Li",
        "Yong Wang",
        "Hui Xu",
        "Xiaoyong Jia"
      ],
      "venue": "China Communications",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.23919/jcc.2021.08.021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/jcn.2022.000012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Parallelized and randomized adversarial imitation learning for safety-critical self-driving vehicles",
      "description": "Self-driving cars and autonomous driving research has been receiving considerable attention as major promising prospects in modern artificial intelligence applications. According to the evolution of advanced driver assistance system (ADAS), the design of self-driving vehicle and autonomous driving systems becomes complicated and safety-critical. In general, the intelligent system simultaneously and efficiently activates ADAS functions. Therefore, it is essential to consider reliable ADAS function coordination to control the driving system, safely. In order to deal with this issue, this paper proposes a randomized adversarial imitation learning (RAIL) algorithm. The RAIL is a novel derivative-free imitation learning method for autonomous driving with various ADAS functions coordination; and thus it imitates the operation of decision maker that controls autonomous driving with various ADAS functions. The proposed method is able to train the decision maker that deals with the LIDAR data and controls the autonomous driving in multi-lane complex highway environments. The simulation-based evaluation verifies that the proposed method achieves desired performance.",
      "published": "2022-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/jcn.2022.000012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "driver assistance",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Won Joon Yun",
        "MyungJae Shin",
        "Soyi Jung",
        "Seok-Chul Kwon",
        "Joongheon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Communications and Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.23919/jcn.2022.000012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/pemwn58813.2023.10304901",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicular Platoons Security: A Review with an Emphasis on Sybil Attacks",
      "description": "Vehicular platoon is a new Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) application that enables automated vehicles to drive close together with short inter-vehicle distances. To effectively manage platoons, efficient beaconing process and platoon formation algorithm are crucial. These later rely on in-vehicle network protocols to regulate the speed of vehicles and control the platoon. Throughout these processes, an efficient and secure communication architecture is vital. However, it is important to note that the used V2V communication protocol is susceptible to several cyberattacks that can lead to potential disruptions or even completely disabling the communication system. This paper reviews the potential threats that can target vehicular platoons with an emphasis on Sybil attacks. We offer detailed explanations of the diverse methods through which Sybil attacks can be perpetrated in platoons. Additionally, we explore recent techniques for detecting and mitigating Sybil attacks, point out their limits, and identify open challenges to stimulate further research in this promising field and improve the overall security of the platoon system.",
      "published": "2023-09-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/pemwn58813.2023.10304901",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yosra Hassine",
        "Haifa Touati"
      ],
      "venue": "IFIP/IEEE International Conference on Performance Evaluation and Modeling in Wired and Wireless Networks (PEMWN)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.23919/pemwn58813.2023.10304901",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/saiee.2015.8531890",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Separation of Shared Caches in AMP-Based Mixed Criticality Systems",
      "description": "The secure separation of functionality is one of the key requirements particularly in mixed criticality systems (MCS). Well-known security models as the multiple independent levels of security (MILS) aim to formalise the isolation of compartments to avoid interference and make them reliable to work in safety critical environments. Especially for in-car multimedia systems, also known as In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems, the composition of compartments onto a system-on-chip (SoC) offers a wide variety of advantages in embedded system development. The development of such systems implies often the combination of pre-qualified hardware- and software components. These components are CPU subsystems and operating systems, for example. However, the required strict separation can suffer due to the pre-qualified and therefore not reconfigurable hardware components. Particularly, this is true for shared cache levels in CPU subsystems. The phenomena of interference in the concurrent usage of shared last-level caches, are exploitable by adversaries. Therefore, this article identifies the attack surface and proposes a mitigation to prevent from the intentional misuse of the fixed cache association. Generally, the solution is based on a suitable mapping scheme in the intermediate address space of an asymmetric multiprocessing environment which implements the MCS. Furthermore, we evaluate the strength of the approach and show how the solution contributes to a separation property conformal system.",
      "published": "2015-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/saiee.2015.8531890",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pierre Schnarz",
        "C. Fischer",
        "Joachim Wietzke",
        "Ingo Stengel"
      ],
      "venue": "SAIEE Africa Research Journal",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.23919/saiee.2015.8531890",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.23919/splitech58164.2023.10193084",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards an automated security-by-design approach in automotive system-of-systems architectures",
      "description": "The development of future autonomous vehicles will become a challenging task, especially concerning the integration into a smart city context. Nowadays, vehicles must communicate with the surrounding environment to provide efficient driving features that prevent crashing and thus save passenger lives. However, the constant information exchange with the vicinity leads to growing attack surfaces of vehicles, which endangers the functional safety of vehicles in particular. Security-by-design seems to be a promising approach to overcoming security challenges and will become essential for the development of automotive architectures in the future. Therefore, the standard ISO-21434 was invented providing guidelines on how to tackle cybersecurity in the automotive context. One proposed method by this standard is the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process used for analyzing cybersecurity threats. Nevertheless, no tools or approaches exist that provide full automation of the TARA process from an ISO-21434 perspective. Therefore, this paper proposes a concept to automate the TARA method by combining the security pattern engineering process with the Automotive Reference Architecture Model (ARAM) to enable a multi-layered security-by-design approach for the development of secure system-of-systems (SoS) architectures in conformity with ISO-21434.",
      "published": "2023-06-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.23919/splitech58164.2023.10193084",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Boris Brankovic",
        "Marco Ebster",
        "Katharina Polanec",
        "Christoph Binder",
        "Christian Neureiter"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Smart and Sustainable Technologies (SpliTech)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.23919/splitech58164.2023.10193084",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.24251/hicss.2021.536",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy Risk Perceptions in the Connected Car Context",
      "description": "Connected car services are rapidly diffusing as they promise to significantly enhance the overall driving experience. Because they rely on the collection and exploitation of car data, however, such services are associated with significant privacy risks. Following guidelines on contextualized theorizing, this paper ex-amines how individuals perceive these risks and how their privacy risk perceptions in turn influence their decision-making, i.e., their willingness to share car data with the car manufacturer or other service providers. We conducted a multi-method study, including interviews and a survey in Germany. We found that individuals’ level of perceived privacy risk is determined by their evaluation of the general likelihood of IS-spe-cific threats and the belief of personal exposure to such threats. Two cognitive factors, need for cognition and institutional trust, are found to moderate the effect that perceived privacy risk has on individuals’ willingness to share car data in exchange for connected car services.",
      "published": "2021",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2021.536",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "exploitation",
        "privacy",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nils Koester",
        "Patrick Cichy",
        "David Antons",
        "T. Salge"
      ],
      "venue": "Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.24251/hicss.2021.536",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.24406/publica-9245",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilience-by-Design: Ontology-Driven differentiation of Resilience from Safety and Cybersecurity in the Context of Automotive Systems Engineering",
      "description": "The increasing complexity, connectivity, and autonomy of modern vehicles are transforming them into highly networked nodes within a comprehensive mobility system. Numerous control units, sensors, and cloud services interact simultaneously inside and outside the vehicle, pushing traditional architectural design to its limits. Complex driving functions, such as Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC), require the interaction of distributed subsystems. Even a single disruption, whether mechanical, logical or cyber-physical, can trigger chain reactions and lead to safety-critical situations. To ensure availability and reliability of the overall system, resilience properties must be integrated into the system architecture as cross-cutting requirements from the early development stages. Resilience describes the ability of a system to maintain its intended functionality and reliability despite disruptive events. In both research and industry, resilience is frequently associated with safety or cybersecurity, giving rise to terms such as \"cyber resilience This work aims to clearly define resilience as an independent system capability during the design phase, to establish a common understanding, and to enable its systematic integration into the automotive development process. We developed a cross-domain ontology that formally models the concepts and relationships of resilience, safety and cybersecurity. The ontology was developed iteratively through literature review, semi-automated term extraction, and expert discussions, and was subsequently validated by industry professionals in the automotive domain.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.24406/publica-9245",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Isaac Mpidi Bita",
        "Dominik Kürpick",
        "Aschot Hovemann",
        "Roman Dumitrescu",
        ":unav"
      ],
      "venue": "Fraunhofer-Publica (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.24406/publica-9245",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2478/acss-2021-0012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks and Defense Technologies on Autonomous Vehicles: A Review",
      "description": "Abstract In recent years, various domains have been influenced by the rapid growth of machine learning. Autonomous driving is an area that has tremendously developed in parallel with the advancement of machine learning. In autonomous vehicles, various machine learning components are used such as traffic lights recognition, traffic sign recognition, limiting speed and pathfinding. For most of these components, computer vision technologies with deep learning such as object detection, semantic segmentation and image classification are used. However, these machine learning models are vulnerable to targeted tensor perturbations called adversarial attacks, which limit the performance of the applications. Therefore, implementing defense models against adversarial attacks has become an increasingly critical research area. The paper aims at summarising the latest adversarial attacks and defense models introduced in the field of autonomous driving with machine learning technologies up until mid-2021.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2478/acss-2021-0012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "K. T. Y. Mahima",
        "Mohamed Ayoob",
        "Guhanathan Poravi"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Computer Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.2478/acss-2021-0012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2478/ias-2024-0001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "State of the Art, Reliable, and Trusted Communication in Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Networks",
      "description": "Abstract Transportation systems are a necessity of modern life. To achieve safe and fast transportation, the intelligent transportation system is being developed. In this system, the main base station facilitates communication between vehicles and all other roadside entities using vehicle to everything networks. Various technologies have been built to support this communication. After receiving the information, vehicles can make their own decisions. This data communication is done in real time. But, if any of these data packets are dropped, the vehicle will make inaccurate decisions, so we need to have reliable data communication. All data communication will be accomplished through a system of neighboring nodes. There may be some malfunctioning nodes that lose packets in between, so a trusted and reliable link is necessary for efficient and secure data communication among the nodes. This paper presents a survey of various algorithms designed for the reliable delivery of data packets, algorithms for secure data transfer, and various types of attacks. After that, various schemes for building trust in parties sending data packets if also presented for survey.",
      "published": "2024-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2478/ias-2024-0001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wajid Ali",
        "Shalini Zanzote Ninoria",
        "Gulista Khan",
        "Kamal Kumar Gola"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information assurance and security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.2478/ias-2024-0001",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2478/ttj-2018-0027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Data and Cyber Security in Autonomous Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Abstract An autonomous vehicle (AV) is a vehicle that operates and performs tasks under its own power. Some features of autonomous vehicle are sensing the environment, collecting information and managing communication with other vehicles. Many autonomous vehicles in development use a combination of cameras, sensors, GPS, radar, LiDAR, and on-board computers. These technologies work together to map the vehicle’s position and its proximity to everything around it. Because of their reliance on these sorts of technologies, which are easily accessible to tampering, a autonomous vehicles are susceptible to cyber attacks if an attacker can discover a weakness in a certain type of vehicle or in a company’s electronic system. This lack of information security can lead to criminal and terrorist acts that eventually cost lives. This paper gives an overview of cyber attack scenarios relating to autonomous vehicles. The cyber security concept proposed here uses biometric data for message authentication and communication, and projects stored and new data based on iris recognition. Iris recognition system can provide other knowledge about drivers as well, such as how tired and sleepy they might be while driving, and they are designed to encrypt the vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-environment communication based on encryption security mechanisms.",
      "published": "2018-11-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2478/ttj-2018-0027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jamal Raiyn"
      ],
      "venue": "Transport and Telecommunication Journal",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.2478/ttj-2018-0027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2478/ttj-2026-0022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Telematics-Enabled Coordination of Mobile Emergency Decontamination Processes in Transport Hubs",
      "description": "Abstract Mass decontamination in transport hubs is a time-critical emergency-response task following accidents involving hazardous goods, where operational effectiveness depends on rapid coordination, reliable control, and traceable execution. This paper proposes a telematics-enabled digital coordination framework for mobile emergency decontamination in transport-hub environments. The framework is formalised as a four-layer cyber-physical architecture integrating operator interaction, application-layer control, equipment-level execution, and persistent audit-oriented data management. Its operational logic is supported by a deterministic lifecycle model, algebraic preset validation, and role-based access control. The proposed approach was evaluated through scenario-based simulation and a transport-hub case study. The results confirmed functional correctness and operational feasibility of the framework, while the case study indicated a 42% reduction in mean response time and a 44% reduction in sustainability-related operational loss compared with conventional manual coordination. The study shows that mobile decontamination can be interpreted as a digitally coordinated safety service within transport hubs and that telematics-enabled orchestration can improve response readiness and operational resilience in disruption-sensitive environments.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2478/ttj-2026-0022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "resilience",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Deniss Bičkovs",
        "Sergejs Borzihs",
        "Veranika Khlud"
      ],
      "venue": "Transport and Telecommunication Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.2478/ttj-2026-0022",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.24912/tesla.v20i1.2985",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Perancangan Sistem Start Engine Mobil Menggunakan Fingerprint",
      "description": "The advancement in automotive technology triggers a lot of innovations. This design which based on fingerprint technology is one of the newest innovations to catch up with the newest technology. This system could verify he auto-mobile owner and authorize people in order to use the automobile. On the other hand, this system has a a higher security mode than others. Our design could be considered as a new innovation from an older system with an additional security system. Our innovation is to modify and join up immobilizer system to start-top engine system and fingerprint system. We innovate by utilizing fingerprint technology and microcontroller. This system uses fingerprint sensor which is connected to microcontroller. Microcontroller is used to save owner’s fingerprint. If the saved data matches to an input, microcontroller will send a signal to activate a relay. The relay is used to start the automobile engine. If the input doesn’t match with the saved data, the system will try for three times before activating an alarm. The alarm will sound for thirty seconds. We hope that automobile owner could have a beneficial from our design. We conclude that our high security design could bring an indifference to other system. Perkembangan teknologi dalam dunia otomotif yang sangat pesat memicu banyak munculnya ide-ide baru yang inovatif. Sistem start engine mobil dengan menggunakan fingerprint ini merupakan inovasi terbaru untuk mengikuti perkembangan dan kemajuan teknologi. Sistem ini dapat mengetahui siapa pemilik mobil dan siapa saja yang dapat menggunakan mobil, di sisi lain sistem ini memiliki sistem keamanan yang sangat tinggi dibandingkan sistem yang sudah ada pada kendaraan. Sistem ini merupakan inovasi dari sistem yang sudah ada pada kendaraan. Sistem yang sudah ada pada kendaraan belum dilengkapi sistem keamanan. Dari kekurangan sistem yang sudah ada muncul ide yang inovatif untuk melengkapi sistem yang sudah ada dengan menambahkan sistem keamanan. Inovasi yang muncul yaitu dengan memodifikasi dan menggabungkan sistem immobilizer dan sistem start-stop engine dengan menggunakan sensor fingerprint. Inovasi untuk memodifikasi sistem tersebut dirancang dengan memanfaatkan teknologi fingerprint dan mikrokontroler. Sistem ini menggunakan sensor sidik jari yang terhubung dengan mikrokontroler. Mikrokontroler digunakan untuk menyimpan data sidik jari pemilik mobil. Bila sidik jari yang dimasukkan sesuai dengan data yang tersimpan maka mikrokontroler akan mengirim sinyal untuk mengaktifkan relay. Relay digunakan untuk menghidupkan mesin mobil. Pada saat sidik jari yang dimasukkan tidak dikenali oleh sensor sidik jari sebanyak tiga kali maka mikrokontroler akan mengirim sinyal untuk mengaktifkan alarm selama tiga puluh detik. Dengan adanya sistem start engine mobil menggunakan fingerprint, pengguna mendapat kemudahan. Selain itu, juga memberikan tingkat keamanan yang lebih dibandingkan sistem yang sudah ada",
      "published": "2019-02-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.24912/tesla.v20i1.2985",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "immobilizer",
        "relay",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dicky Dharmawan",
        "Dali S. Naga",
        "Joni Fat"
      ],
      "venue": "TESLA Jurnal Teknik Elektro",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.24912/tesla.v20i1.2985",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.24963/ijcai.2019/638",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Randomized Adversarial Imitation Learning for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "With the evolution of various advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) platforms, the design of autonomous driving system is becoming more complex and safety-critical. The autonomous driving system simultaneously activates multiple ADAS functions; and thus it is essential to coordinate various ADAS functions. This paper proposes a randomized adversarial imitation learning (RAIL) method that imitates the coordination of autonomous vehicle equipped with advanced sensors. The RAIL policies are trained through derivative-free optimization for the decision maker that coordinates the proper ADAS functions, e.g., smart cruise control and lane keeping system. Especially, the proposed method is also able to deal with the LIDAR data and makes decisions in complex multi-lane highways and multi-agent environments.",
      "published": "2019-07-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/638",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "driver assistance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "MyungJae Shin",
        "Joongheon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.24963/ijcai.2019/638",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.25046/aj030147",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Joint Safety and Security Analysis of message protection for CAN bus protocol",
      "description": "Security by design Security-properties SafetyOne of the prominent challenges of the automotive-transportation system is represented by the integration of security and safety properties within protocols, applications and connectivity mechanisms.A joint safety/security design can sometimes expose to trade-offs, since their requirements may not match perfectly or even be incompatible.This paper analyses an example of security and safety design, by combining integrity with encryption considering the constraints of a typical CAN protocol and real-time traffic.The analysis is presented modelling differently attackers, packet fragmentation issues and the residual probability of error of the combined scheme.",
      "published": "2018-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.25046/aj030147",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luca Dariz",
        "Gianpiero Costantino",
        "Massimiliano Ruggeri",
        "Fabio Martinelli"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Science Technology and Engineering Systems Journal",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.25046/aj030147",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.25046/aj0506132",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G, Vehicle to Everything Communication: Opportunities, Constraints and Future Directions",
      "description": "The 5G, as a new source of telecommunication infrastructure technology, has attracted many stakeholders to promote the progress of its standards and the development of its technology industry.The 5G reinforces new technologies and delivers vehicles for everything services (V2X) to drivers and passengers.It also offers several advantages.On the other hand, due to pervasive network connectivity, there are significant trust, security, and privacy issues for vehicles this affects the overall performance of 5G V2X.This paper provides a comprehensive review; and particularly; an overview of the mobile communication system and introduces the Next Generation (NG).additionally, the paper concentrates on the fifthgeneration structure and its use cases.The 5G-V2X as a new field of communication requires more attention and focus, moreover, it aims to present the problems facing this new technology as well, and some future directions for research have been highlighted.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.25046/aj0506132",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Boughanja Manale",
        "Tomader Mazri"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Science Technology and Engineering Systems Journal",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.25046/aj0506132",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.25236/ajcis.020309",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Vehicle Network Security Technology",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-11-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.25236/ajcis.020309",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ying-Ying Ji",
        "Huaijin Zhao",
        "Zhimin Wu",
        "Chenglei Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.25236/ajcis.020309",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.25236/ajets.2022.051309",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using Digital Twins to Integrate Cyber Security with Physical Security at Smart Airports",
      "description": "Emerging digital twin technology is still at the stage of diverse standards and implementations, and its potential has not been widely validated. Digital twins allow systems to be fully digital from design time, even when combined with today's physical systems and can increase efficiency, validate ideas, and provide additional security. Digital twin technology has already highlighted its potential in industries such as construction, manufacturing, automotive, and agriculture. In this paper, the application of digital twin technology to smart airports is discussed, focusing on the physical and cyber security of airport subsystems. The advantages of adopting digital twin systems are discussed and recommendations are provided by sorting out the current cyber threats to smart airports, and countermeasures.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.25236/ajets.2022.051309",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "<p>Hao Su<sup>1</sup>, Weijun Pan<sup>1</sup>, Keyu Liu<sup>2</sup></p>"
      ],
      "venue": "Academic Journal of Engineering and Technology Science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.25236/ajets.2022.051309",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.25300/misq/2021/14165",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy Concerns and Data Sharing in the Internet of Things: Mixed Methods Evidence from Connected Cars",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) is increasingly transforming the way we work, live, and travel. IoT devices collect, store, analyze, and act upon a continuous stream of data as a by-product of everyday use. However, IoT devices need unrestricted data access to fully function. As such, they invade users’ virtual and physical space and raise far-reaching privacy challenges that are unlike those examined in other contexts. As advanced IoT devices, connected cars offer a unique setting to review and extend established theory and evidence on privacy and data sharing. Employing a sequential mixed methods design, we conducted an interview study (n=120), a survey study (n=333), and a field experiment (n=324) among car drivers to develop and validate a contextualized model of individuals’ data sharing decisions. Our findings from the three studies highlight the interplay between virtual and physical risks in shaping drivers’ privacy concerns and data sharing decisions—with information privacy and data security emerging as discrete yet closely interrelated concepts. Our findings also highlight the importance of psychological ownership, conceptualized as drivers’ feelings of possession toward their driving data, as an important addition to established privacy calculus models of data sharing. This novel perspective explains why individuals are reluctant to share even low-sensitivity data that do not raise privacy concerns. The psychological ownership perspective has implications for designing incentives for data-enabled services in ways that augment drivers’ self-efficacy and psychological ownership and thereby encourage them to share driving data. These insights help reconcile a fundamental tension among IoT users—how to avail the benefits of data-enabled IoT devices while reducing the psychological costs associated with the sharing of personal data.",
      "published": "2021-12-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2021/14165",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "personal data",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Patrick Cichy",
        "Torsten Oliver Salge",
        "Rajiv Kohli"
      ],
      "venue": "MIS Quarterly",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.25300/misq/2021/14165",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 129,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.25394/pgs.32109133",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BRIDGING THE CYBER PHYSICAL GAP: A UNIFIED FUZZING APPROACH FOR PHYSICS-ACCURATE, REHOSTED UNMANNED VEHICLE FIRMWARE",
      "description": "Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) are increasingly integral to diverse application domains, ranging from autonomous delivery to environmental monitoring. Yet, despite their growing utility, persistent safety and security concerns remain a major impediment to their widespread deployment.Current testing methodologies suffer from a fundamental disjoint. Most existing tools require source code or abstract models to work. Unfortunately, these artifacts are rarely available for commercial vehicles. Moreover, they rely on heuristics-based testing, while ignoring the control-theoretic testing techniques, such as falsification.To bridge these gaps, we introduce OptiFuzz, a modular hybrid fuzzing framework that unifies coverage-guided software testing with physics-driven falsification.To eliminate dependency on source code, OptiFuzz leverages Courbet, a novel physics-aware rehosting engine that synchronizes binary firmware execution with high-fidelity physical simulation, enabling concurrent feedback from cyber and physical components of CPS.Our evaluation demonstrates that Courbet is capable of physics-accurate rehosting of eight distinct CPS targets, including drones, rovers, and submarines. achieving a 82x speedup over state-of-the-art rehosting agents. Furthermore, we show that OptiFuzz's modular architecture can easily instantiate parameter-based and stability-based fuzzers, proving its versatility across a wide variety of CPS testing tasks.OptiFuzz demonstrates that integrating physical context into the fuzzing loop is essential for uncovering complex, cross-domain vulnerabilities in autonomous systems, discovering over 300 falsifying inputs leading to dangerous flying outcomes in only thirty-six hours of fuzzing.",
      "published": "2026-05-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.25394/pgs.32109133",
      "matched_terms": [
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael P. Rooney"
      ],
      "venue": "Purdue",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.25394/pgs.32109133",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.26267/unipi_dione/765",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive protocol reverse engineering & car Internal Network Reconnaissance",
      "description": "Automotive industry is undergoing a rapid evolution with road vehicles continuously providing innovative technologies and services such as autonomous driving and interconnection with other vehicles. These technological novelties are constantly increasing the number of embedded electronics in vehicles. However, no equal growth is achieved in the development of modern protocols that will provide essential security measures. Control Area Network (CAN) bus and the underlying bus protocol used for the communication among the different vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECU) on a vehicular CAN network, was designed in an era of very limited security awareness; however, it still is the dominant protocol used in road vehicles. The lack of security features on CAN bus has led to a notable increase in attacks against road vehicles that usually lead to a total compromise. In the present thesis we examine a diagnostic protocol using reverse engineering methodologies and analyze how it works, as well as how it is used to perform various actions on a real car. Furthermore, by utilizing our reverse engineering findings, we show how custom software can be developed, that allows to trigger pre-programmed actions in the car and perform reconnaissance in the internal car network and the Electronic Control Units residing on it.",
      "published": "2021-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.26267/unipi_dione/765",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michail Karamolegkos",
        "Μιχαήλ Καραμολέγκος"
      ],
      "venue": "Dione (University of Piraeus)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.26267/unipi_dione/765",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.26438/ijcse/v6i3.480484",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Image Encryption using Hash Maps",
      "description": "To develop the security, a new image encryption method that uses a keyless approach for image encryption is proposed. Keyless approach increases the ability of the system from various types of attacks as compared to the asymmetric keys that are vulnerable to various types of attacks. For security check of the system hash algorithms (MD5 and SHA128) are applied which checks whether the image transmission over the web is manipulated in between the transfer from sender to the receiver. The image is encrypted in such a way that it is not an easy task for the third party to recognize or create the original image by just seeing the encrypted image. Before the transfer of an image SHA128 and MD5 of the image is calculated. After the decryption of the image if SHA128 and MD5 of the system matches the image is not manipulated otherwise it is manipulated. So the Keyless approach, SHA128 and MD5 together increases the overall security of the system and make the system more secure by protecting it from different types of attacks. The outcome shows that the value of error matrix, PSNR is increased by approximately 8% and the values of MSE is about 31% of the encryption using divergent illumination and asymmetric keys which shows that the result are good in comparison of the encryption using divergent illumination and asymmetric keys.",
      "published": "2018-03-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.26438/ijcse/v6i3.480484",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anchal Monga",
        "Anubhooti Papola"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer Sciences and Engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.26438/ijcse/v6i3.480484",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.26483/ijarcs.v16i6.7384",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBERSECURITY THREATS CHALLENGES AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT IN CONNECTED AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: A REVIEW",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) have become one of the most significant innovations in the current transportation industry, combining artificial intelligence, the latest sensor technologies, and real-time communication platforms to make roads safer, more efficient, and comfortable to drive. These cars are driven by perception, planning, and control systems with the help of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication that supports a smooth interaction with the rest of the vehicles, infrastructure, and the cloud. Nevertheless, with the increasing interconnection of CAVs, they experience increasing cybersecurity threats that compromise their reliability and safety. This paper presents the overall description of CAV systems architecture, major components, and communication technologies, as well as discusses the major threats to security, such as network-based attacks (DoS, spoofing, replay), vehicle-based attacks (ECU tampering, sensor manipulation), and infrastructure vulnerabilities. It also discusses hardware and sensor weaknesses which may undermine autonomous decision-making. The paper highlights the high demand for multi-layered security frameworks that are robust and use AI-driven intrusion detection, blockchain-based data integrity, and hardened cryptographic solutions. Finally, safe, reliable and smart deployment of CAVs takes a set of technological advancements, regulatory standardization and sustained security improvement to create trust in the community and allow the gradual development of autonomous mobility.",
      "published": "2025-12-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.26483/ijarcs.v16i6.7384",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abid Hussain"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.26483/ijarcs.v16i6.7384",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.26552/com.c.2023.017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle-to-Everything Communication",
      "description": "With an increasing number of vehicles, there is a need for reliable and secure communication between subjects participating in the dynamic traffic environment. This kind of communication is called V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything). It can also contribute to higher level of autonomous driving. The V2X model operation is enabled by use of the newest technologies and standards, defined by 3GPP Organization. In this paper, a review of the V2X communication models, available technologies and standards are studied.",
      "published": "2022-12-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.26552/com.c.2023.017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zuzana Špitálová"
      ],
      "venue": "Communications - Scientific letters of the University of Zilina",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.26552/com.c.2023.017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.26599/tst.2020.9010043",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVchain: An Anonymous Blockchain-Based System for Charging-Connected Electric Vehicles",
      "description": "Purchases of electric vehicles have been increasing in recent years. These vehicles differ from traditional fossil-fuel-based vehicles especially in the time consumed to keep them running. Electric-Vehicle-charging Service Providers (EVSPs) must arrange reasonable charging times for users in advance. Most EVSP services are based on third-party platforms, but reliance on third-party platforms creates a lack of security, leaving users vulnerable to attacks and user-privacy leakages. In this paper, we propose an anonymous blockchain-based system for charging-connected electric vehicles that eliminates third-party platforms through blockchain technology and the establishment of a multi-party security system between electric vehicles and EVSPs. In our proposed system, digital certificates are obtained by completing distributed Public Key Infrastructure (distributed-PKI) identity registration, with the user registration kept separate from the verification process, which eliminates dependence on the EVSP for information security. In the verification process, we adopt smart contracts to solve problems associated with centralized verification and opaque services. Furthermore, we utilize zero-knowledge proof and ring-signature superposition to realize completely anonymous verification, which ensures undeniability and unforgeability with no detriment to anonymity. The evaluation results show that the user anonymity, information authenticity, and system security of our system fulfill the necessary requirements.",
      "published": "2021-06-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.26599/tst.2020.9010043",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shiyuan Xu",
        "Xue Chen",
        "Yunhua He"
      ],
      "venue": "Tsinghua Science & Technology",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.26599/tst.2020.9010043",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 113,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.26634/jcom.8.4.18297",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Novel Technique For Secure Keyless Car Authentication Using Block-Chain System",
      "description": "Security of the vehicles are challenging factor. Nowadays, users prefer comfort and a safe environment for their vehicles. System (RKES). This new scenario boosts user's safety and convenience. During the development of this new environment, attackers have also found new ways to hack the RKES. In this paper, a novel technique for secure authentication using blockchain technology has been developed which will provide a more secure way for keyless access. Our model is based on a time comparison of various hash algorithms which are widely used in encrypted and blockchain processes for authentication. Many tests were conducted to check the time complexity of hash algorithms for providing a clear outlook about the security and time complexity.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.26634/jcom.8.4.18297",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rabia Khan"
      ],
      "venue": "i-manager s Journal on Computer Science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.26634/jcom.8.4.18297",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.26636/jtit.2025.fitce2024.1998",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "k-anonymity in Resource Allocation for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Systems",
      "description": "Sixth generation (6G) vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems face numerous security threats, including Sybil and denial-of-service (DoS) cyber-attacks. To provide a secure exchange of data and protect users' identities in 6G V2X communication systems, anonymization techniques - such as k-anonymity - can be used. In this work, we study centralized vs. k-anonymity based resource allocation methods in a vehicular edge computing (VEC) network. Allocation decisions for vehicular networks are classically posed as a centralized optimization task. Therefore, an information flow is transmitted from the vehicles to the communication premises. In addition to a resource allocation decision, vehicle information is not required. We analyze the centralized allocation versus k-anonymous allocation models. To show a potential deterioration introduced by anonymity, we quantify the gap in the optimal goal in two cases: based on resource allocation and with aim at energy reduction. Our numerical results indicate that energy consumption rises by 1% in smaller scenarios and 23% in medium scenarios, whereas it decreases by 14% in larger scenarios.",
      "published": "2025-02-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.26636/jtit.2025.fitce2024.1998",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrés Véjar",
        "Faysal Marzuk",
        "Piotr Chołda"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.26636/jtit.2025.fitce2024.1998",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.28925/2663-4023.2025.28.760",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS AND CYBERSECURITY: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF SECURITY ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES",
      "description": "Modern automotive electronics are a complex system of sensors, electronic control units (ECUs) and actuators connected through various types of automotive networks to control and monitor the condition of the vehicle. In addition, modern vehicles are increasingly connected to the outside world through vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technologies. These create new attack surfaces that increase the cybersecurity risk for modern vehicles. With the advent of intelligent transportation structures, the focus has shifted to the structure of coordinated inter-vehicle systems, symbolized by the integration of infrastructure, people, vehicles, urban areas and the environment. This combination of computer technology and automotive innovation has raised numerous questions about cyberattacks on cars, which play a significant role in the development and use of automotive technology. Advanced wireless technology allows vehicles to exchange and transmit information with each other and around them in real time, which will help reduce accidents, congestion and improve the efficiency of mobile vehicles. Many advanced technologies, such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence, V2X technology, and advanced driver assistance systems, are increasingly being used in cars, making vehicles more intelligent to provide convenient services to people and ensure the safety of drivers and passengers. However, as cars become more connected to the Internet, wireless networks, each other, and other transportation network infrastructure, the risk of cyberattacks is becoming more and more problematic. This review article first analyzes the vulnerabilities of vehicle networks and identifies the main cybersecurity attacks on vehicles. Technologies for improving the cybersecurity of vehicle networks are analyzed in the following technological areas: data encryption, message authentication, network intrusion detection, building a trusted platform, and implementing the Crypto-Engine concept.",
      "published": "2025-06-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.28925/2663-4023.2025.28.760",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecus",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Petro Klimushyn",
        "Vitalii Svitlychnyi",
        "Yurii Gnusov",
        "Yurii Onishchenko"
      ],
      "venue": "Cybersecurity Education Science Technique",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.28925/2663-4023.2025.28.760",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3843,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.28925/2663-4023.2025.28.760 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: following, vehicle., making, services, sensors, intelligence, significant, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.28925/2663-4023.2026.34.1277",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ASSESSMENT OF CYBER RISKS IN VEHICLES BASED ON ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS",
      "description": "The article examines the problem of analyzing cyber threats in modern vehicles, which are increasingly becoming complex cyber-physical systems with a large number of electronic control units, internal networks, wireless interfaces, sensors, diagnostic ports, infotainment modules, and external digital services. It is substantiated that vehicle security cannot be limited solely to the study of the CAN bus, since the actual attack surface includes a much broader set of interaction channels with the environment and the user. Particular attention is paid to the threat modeling approach, which enables the systematic identification of entry points, the determination of input signal receivers, the analysis of trust boundaries between components, and the identification of potential attack propagation paths within the automotive architecture. The paper systematizes the main groups of threats, including threats related to remote communication interfaces, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular communication, keyless entry systems, TPMS, USB ports, OBD-II, infotainment systems, diagnostic mechanisms, and internal vehicle networks. It is shown that the most critical scenarios are those in which an external channel can be used to access the internal systems of a vehicle or to influence electronic control units. The risks of violating confidentiality, integrity, and availability are considered separately, including location tracking, data spoofing, malware installation, blocking vehicle functions, and manipulating messages within the internal network. It is proposed to consider the threat model as a dynamic document that should be updated throughout the entire vehicle life cycle, taking into account changes in software, architecture, and external services. The practical significance of the study lies in the formation of a structured approach to identifying, classifying, and prioritizing risks, which can be used during the auditing, testing, and design of secure automotive systems.",
      "published": "2026-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.28925/2663-4023.2026.34.1277",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "infotainment",
        "keyless",
        "malware",
        "obd-ii",
        "secure",
        "tpms"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Zhuravchak",
        "Danyil Zhuravchak",
        "Y. Zhuravchak"
      ],
      "venue": "Cybersecurity: Education, Science, Technique",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.28925/2663-4023.2026.34.1277",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.28926/ilkomnika.v3i2.294",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Rancang Bangun Pengaman Motor Honda Beat Menggunakan Sistem Arduino Uno",
      "description": "Kemajuan teknologi saat ini sangatlah pesat. Masyarakat luas menggunakan kendaraan sepeda motor untuk memudahkan akses ke berbagai tempat. Namun, maraknya pencurian dan pembegalan yang terjadi pada sepeda motor khususnya Sepeda Motor Merk Honda Beat membuat banyak orang berusaha untuk lebih meningkatkan sistem keamanan sepeda motor tersebut, baik menggunakan alat-alat pengaman, Untuk mengurangi hal-hal yang tidak kita inginkan kunci kontak sepeda motor diganti dengan kartu.yang di atur dan mempunyai kode khusus,yaitu Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). Metode yang digunakan pada penelitian ini adalah metode Riset and Development yang bertujuan menghasilkan produk tertentudan menguji keefektifan produk tersebut. Metode ini diterapkan pada prosedur penelitian dalam 7 tahapan yaitu : (1) mulai, (2) analisa kebutuhan, (3) perencanaan dan perancangan, (4) analisa kebutuhan sistem, (5) pengujian alat, (6) analisa data (7) membuat laporan. Kunci Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) juga menggunakan kartu tag ID sebagai kartu identitas atau pengenal ketika hendak menghidupkan atau mematikan mesin sepeda motor Honda Beat. Kinerja kartu ini juga didukung oleh microcontroller Arduino Uno dan relay. Dalam perancangan alat ini, kami menghubungkan kabel-kabel terdiri dari hardware Arduino Uno, RFID reader, Relay dan saklar O/I dengan sistem kelistrikan sepeda motor Honda Beat. Untuk penggunaan alat ini, dilakukan dengan tiga tahap (scan) untuk menghidupkan dan mematikan mesin sepeda motor. Scan pertama, untuk memposisi ON kan kelistrikan sepeda motor. Scan kedua, untuk menghidupkan mesin sepeda motor. Scan ketiga, untuk mematikan mesin sepeda motor.",
      "published": "2021-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.28926/ilkomnika.v3i2.294",
      "matched_terms": [
        "honda",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [
        "honda"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heri Sunaryatin",
        "Willy Artanika Rikarda",
        "Imam Mualim"
      ],
      "venue": "ILKOMNIKA Journal of Computer Science and Applied Informatics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.28926/ilkomnika.v3i2.294",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.29302/revcad.2024.37.13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Current Trends in Navigation",
      "description": "In this article, I briefly present the perspectives of realizing multimodal intelligent transport in Europe. The main criteria that the European directives in the field of transport have in mind are: ecological and energy efficient transport, traffic decongestion, safety and security of the transport of people and goods, as well as a good interoperability management of the different modes of transport (road, rail, maritime and air). The advantages and positive effects are presented when implementing telematics systems and Intelligent Transport Systems, interconnected for all types of transport, supported by data hubs, based on data standards in a standardized exchange format through standardized interfaces, and some electronic channels for transmitting information.",
      "published": "2024-12-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.29302/revcad.2024.37.13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aurel Aurel"
      ],
      "venue": "RevCAD Journal of Geodesy and Cadastre",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.29302/revcad.2024.37.13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.29303/jppipa.v11i8.11887",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability Assessment of Vehicle Keyless Entry Systems Using the PTES Methodology",
      "description": "The growing adoption of keyless entry systems in motor vehicles introduces new challenges in the security of radio-based communication. This study aims to identify and evaluate the vulnerability level of the keyless entry system on the Honda PCX 150 motorcycle against two types of man-in-the-middle-based attacks: replay attack and relay attack. Using the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) methodology, the study establishes a seven-stage testing procedure, from pre-engagement to reporting. Experiments were conducted using Flipper Zero as the main device, supported by GNU Radio, Software Defined Radio (SDR), and Universal Radio Hacker (URH). Each type of attack was tested 25 times. The results showed a 44% Success rate for the replay attack and 48% for the relay attack. Further analysis revealed that Success occurred not only on repeated frequencies but also on single-occurrence frequencies, with effectiveness rates of 50% and 45%, respectively. These findings indicate the absence of security mechanisms such as rolling code, time or location-based validation, and frequency hopping, allowing intercepted signals to be accepted by the vehicle. The study concludes that the Honda PCX 150's keyless entry system has significant security gaps, potentially exploitable using passive tools. It recommends the implementation of dynamic authentication mechanisms and cryptographic technologies to enhance the security of vehicular radio signal transmissions.",
      "published": "2025-08-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.29303/jppipa.v11i8.11887",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "honda",
        "keyless",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "honda"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ulil Akbar",
        "Muhammad Abdul Aziz",
        "Donna Setiawati",
        "Yusuf Eko Rohmadi"
      ],
      "venue": "Jurnal Penelitian Pendidikan IPA",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.29303/jppipa.v11i8.11887",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2991/978-94-6239-693-7_109",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security of Infotainment Gateways in OTA-Enabled Vehicles",
      "description": "The modern vehicles are becoming highly integrative and connected through the use of digital technologies which have transformed the user experience through the infotainment systems.Nonetheless, with this development has come a variety of cybersecurity risks to vehicular networks.The infotainment gateway is one of the most essential points of vulnerability since it is a key node that oversees the flow of data both between the in-vehicle networks and external cloud services through Over-The-Air (OTA) updates.This study examines the architecture, vulnerabilities, and mitigation measures of the lateral attacks in OTA in automotive architecture.It suggests a composite security structure that complements intrusion detection systems (IDS), secure firmware validation schemes, and behavioural checking on the infotainment gateway level to ensure a diminishing of the spread of attacks on both the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus and Ethernet realms.The paper is based on empirical data of actual OTA system, so Indian automotive cybersecurity practises and new regulation framework have been highlighted.Conclusions indicate that the application of a layered defence model under simulated conditions reduces the success of an attempt of lateral intrusion by 82% and therefore the likely success of an attack by a significant margin.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-693-7_109",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Himanshu Dagar",
        "Poornima Tyagi",
        "Pradeep Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "Atlantis Highlights in Intelligent Systems/Atlantis highlights in intelligent systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.2991/978-94-6239-693-7_109",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2991/978-94-6463-108-1_16",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Criteria for Cybersecurity and Risk Assessment Based on ISO/SAE 21434 for the Application of Autonomous Vehicle",
      "description": ". Recently, as research on autonomous driving technology progresses, the supply of vehicles having various autonomous driving functions is increasing, and autonomous vehicles represented by V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle) and V2X (Vehicle to Everything) are emerging. For the era of autonomous driving, connectivity between vehicles and vehicles, vehicles and the surrounding environment is required based on information and communication technologies such as LTE, 5G, and WiFi. Advances in autonomous driving technology also face new challenges, with security emerging as a top concern as it can become a prime target for cyberattacks as the vehicle's external networks and connections increase. Therefore, it is necessary to derive the defense requirements in software to respond to such malicious attacks, and it is necessary to apply the verified security coding standard during software development. Recently, the ISO/SAE 21434 international standard replacing SAE J3061 has been established and published in relation to cyber security. In this paper, we propose criteria for cybersecurity and risk assessment methods. In addition, a case study confirms the suitability of the risk level determination according to the proposed evaluation factors and criteria.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-108-1_16",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Liu",
        "Xuezhu Yang",
        "Muxi Li",
        "Miao Wu",
        "Chengrui Sun",
        "Shiying Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in computer science research",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.2991/978-94-6463-108-1_16",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.2991/assehr.k.211020.295",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis on Cyber Security Development of Intelligent and Connected Vehicles in China",
      "description": "At present, intelligent networked vehicles have become the key focus and strategic commanding point of the new round of development and reform of emerging industries in the world, and are in the critical stage of rapid technological evolution and accelerated industrial layout.It is extremely urgent to strengthen the network security of intelligent vehicles and promote the safe development of intelligent networked vehicles.The network security problem of intelligent networked vehicles may bring risks in the aspects of environment perception, network transmission, decision execution and driving control.As the software of automotive electronic platform has entered the stage of billions of lines of code, the inevitable security loopholes will cause a lot of risks.In addition, all kinds of data collected by vehicles and the privacy of users involved also need to be fully guaranteed.Therefore, ensuring the safety of automotive network will be one of the key elements of the transformation and upgrading of China's automotive industry towards a new era, and it is also an important measure to maintain cyberspace security, social security and even national security.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211020.295",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hao Zhao",
        "Zhibin Du",
        "Xianglei Zhu",
        "Chao Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research/Advances in social science, education and humanities research",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.2991/assehr.k.211020.295",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4088,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.2991/assehr.k.211020.295 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: strategic, national, even, risks, privacy, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30574/wjaets.2024.13.1.0469",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity and defense in intelligent transportation systems",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) have become increasingly crucial for enhancing transportation networks' efficiency, safety, and security. ITS includes advanced technologies such as electronic sensors, data transmission, and intelligent control technologies, providing better driver and rider services. However, these technologies pose significant security and privacy risks, in which attackers can easily disrupt transportation systems. This paper presents a survey of the challenges with ITS, the engineering requirements, attack challenges, and related work of securing ITS. This survey also discussed the elements of ITS, including advanced traffic management systems, connected and automated vehicles, intelligent infrastructure, and integrated data analytics, as well as the role of government policies, public-private partnerships, and stakeholder engagement. The aim is to look at present security challenges associated with ITS and provide better ways to the system. which is critical for creating smart cities and increasing the importance of individual and public transportation systems.",
      "published": "2024-10-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30574/wjaets.2024.13.1.0469",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sunday Aluko"
      ],
      "venue": "World Journal of Advanced Engineering Technology and Sciences",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.30574/wjaets.2024.13.1.0469",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30574/wjaets.2025.15.2.0530",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Technical innovations transforming the property and casualty insurance landscape",
      "description": "The property and casualty insurance sector is experiencing profound technological transformation driven by digital innovations that fundamentally restructure traditional insurance models. This technical review explores how cloud-native architectures, artificial intelligence, telematics, and regulatory technologies are reshaping core insurance functions. Cloud platforms with microservices architectures enable superior scalability while significantly reducing operational costs across the insurance value chain. AI-driven algorithmic underwriting systems transcend traditional actuarial models through ensemble learning techniques and deep neural networks, delivering enhanced risk assessment accuracy and processing efficiency. Telematics infrastructure with multiple data acquisition mechanisms has revolutionized auto insurance risk assessment, while RegTech solutions have transformed regulatory compliance through automated monitoring systems and blockchain frameworks. Autonomous vehicle insurance requires fundamentally different technical approaches including Bayesian networks and digital twin simulations, while advanced analytics architectures incorporate sophisticated security implementations such as homomorphic encryption and federated learning. Despite implementation challenges related to legacy system integration, data standardization, and model explainability, emerging directions including quantum computing, edge AI deployment, and decentralized insurance platforms promise to further evolve the technological landscape of property and casualty insurance.",
      "published": "2025-05-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30574/wjaets.2025.15.2.0530",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sameer Joshi"
      ],
      "venue": "World Journal of Advanced Engineering Technology and Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.30574/wjaets.2025.15.2.0530",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30574/wjaets.2025.15.3.0899",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Live Over-the-Air update for distributed embedded systems",
      "description": "Distributed embedded systems are increasingly deployed in critical infrastructure, automotive, industrial, and IoT applications. Ensuring these systems stay updated with security patches, feature enhancements, and bug fixes is essential. This article proposes a live over-the-air (OTA) update framework designed specifically for distributed embedded networks. The framework enables non-disruptive, secure, and reliable software updates with minimal downtime and system risk. It implements a hierarchical architecture with centralized orchestration, decentralized execution, and multi-layered security mechanisms. The system employs redundancy management through a clustered topology with N-1 redundancy principles, allowing updates to proceed in parallel across clusters while maintaining operational continuity. The solution addresses key challenges including network instability through resumable downloads and redundant paths, power interruptions via checkpointing mechanisms, security threats with end-to-end encryption and code signing, and version compatibility through pre-update validation. Testing in real-world environments demonstrated exceptional reliability, minimal downtime, and robust recovery from anomalies. The framework significantly enhances the manageability and security posture of distributed embedded systems across multiple application domains.",
      "published": "2025-06-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30574/wjaets.2025.15.3.0899",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kayalvizhi Rajagopal"
      ],
      "venue": "World Journal of Advanced Engineering Technology and Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.30574/wjaets.2025.15.3.0899",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30574/wjarr.2025.26.1.1078",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modern vehicle security: Analyzing software vulnerabilities and protection mechanisms in connected cars",
      "description": "The rapid digitalization of modern vehicles has introduced significant cybersecurity challenges for the automotive industry. As vehicles evolve into sophisticated cyber-physical systems, the integration of multiple electronic control units and communication networks has created extensive attack surfaces requiring robust protection mechanisms. This technical document examines the landscape of automotive cybersecurity, focusing on vulnerabilities in-vehicle networks, emerging attack vectors, and defensive measures implemented by manufacturers. The findings highlight critical areas, including Controller Area Network security, firmware protection, secure over-the-air updates, and intrusion detection systems. Additionally, the document explores emerging technologies such as AI-based anomaly detection, blockchain implementations, and quantum-resistant cryptography, providing recommendations for enhancing automotive security posture through standardized protocols and comprehensive incident response mechanisms.",
      "published": "2025-04-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30574/wjarr.2025.26.1.1078",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mayank Rai"
      ],
      "venue": "World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.30574/wjarr.2025.26.1.1078",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30574/wjarr.2025.26.3.2043",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Technological innovations redefining the insurance landscape: A technical analysis",
      "description": "The insurance industry is undergoing a profound technological transformation, shifting from traditional paper-based processes toward digital innovation. This article explores how cutting-edge technologies—artificial intelligence, machine learning, Internet of Things, blockchain, and cloud computing—are revolutionizing the insurance landscape. Long characterized by manual underwriting and reactive claims handling, the sector now embraces technological solutions that enhance operational efficiency while creating novel customer experiences. These innovations enable real-time risk assessment through telematics and smart home monitoring, automated underwriting through sophisticated algorithms, instant claims processing via computer vision, and parametric insurance through blockchain-based smart contracts. Despite significant implementation challenges including legacy system integration, data security concerns, and talent shortages, forward-thinking insurers recognize that technological adaptation is essential for maintaining competitiveness. As these technologies mature and converge, they enable not merely process enhancement but fundamental business model innovation, shifting the insurance paradigm from reactive claims payment toward proactive risk prevention and creating personalized coverage options for previously underserved populations.",
      "published": "2025-06-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30574/wjarr.2025.26.3.2043",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chandra Prakash Kathroju"
      ],
      "venue": "World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.30574/wjarr.2025.26.3.2043",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30844/wi_2020_r12-renner",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges of Vehicle-to-Everything Communication. Interviews among Industry Experts",
      "description": "By 2025 every new car sold will be connected to the Internet, leading to a disruptive change of road transportation, but also resulting in diverse challenges regarding Vehicle-to-Everything Communication (V2X). Prior research has mostly focused on the technological challenges of V2X and neglects to consider environmental and organizational challenges resulting from a highly interconnected and interdependent market. We conducted 19 semi-structured interviews with experts from multiple market players to achieve a more holistic overview of what challenges implementation and diffusion of V2X are facing. Our findings reveal that V2X is perceived as a critical information infrastructure coming with several challenges that must be tackled, such as security and privacy issues, lacking trust and acceptance, and entangled and unclear responsibilities. By synthesizing major challenges, we provide recommendations for future research avenues to overcome existing challenges and enable widespread diffusion of V2X to unleash its full potential",
      "published": "2020-03-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30844/wi_2020_r12-renner",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maximilian Renner",
        "Niels Münzenberger",
        "Johanna von Hammerstein",
        "Sebastian Lins",
        "Ali Sunyaev"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.30844/wi_2020_r12-renner",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30888/2663-5712.2026-37-01-070",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBERTHREATS FROM EXTERNAL ACCESS POINTS FOR CONNECTING TO VEHICLES",
      "description": "This paper systematizes external entry points into a connected vehicle and proposes a practical approach to constructing an “outside-in” attack surface map. A comparative risk assessment is presented for telematics, infotainment, and wireless interfaces b",
      "published": "2023-05-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30888/2663-5712.2026-37-01-070",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Юрій Онищенко",
        "Андрій Синжерян",
        "Роман Стецик",
        "Владислав Кочин",
        "Денис Куліуш"
      ],
      "venue": "SWorldJournal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.30888/2663-5712.2026-37-01-070",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30939/ijastech..1431379",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "WiFi-based Vehicle Security System for Future Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "With the rapid maturation in automotive industry, intelligent sensing has been emerged as a vital research field for fast paced future intelligent transportation system. After the progressive integration of advanced driver assistance system and the rapid growth in next generation Internet of Vehicles (IoV), diver’s identification constitutes an indispensable aspect for the authorization in next generation internet-connected smart vehicles. Real-time driver identification is crucial in next generation smart vehicles. The presented solution is based on channel state information (CSI) of WiFi signals. In this proposed framework, an innovative WiFi- based low cost driver identification system is proposed which can recognize driver with good accuracy and less computational burden. The core idea is based on analyzing the steering wheel maneuver, exploiting CSI of WiFi signal. In the era of advanced information and communication in intelligent transportation system, this driver identification system may incorporate various intelligent means that are beneficial in many applications including safety, security, fleet management, ride hailing, insurance telematics, and customized vehicles. The proposed framework can recognize the activities with an average accuracy of 92.5% and identification with an average accuracy of 91.8%.",
      "published": "2024-12-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30939/ijastech..1431379",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zain Ul Abiden Akhtar",
        "Hafiz Faiz Rasool"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Automotive Science And Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.30939/ijastech..1431379",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30987/2686-8326-2020-27-32",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Digital Earth: Big Data, Insurance",
      "description": "The article is devoted to the implementation of Big Data technology in the auto industry and insurance. The article substantiates the need to use this technology in the context of rapidly growing volumes of information, describes the role of big data in modern life and predicts its use in the concept of the future development of the Digital Earth. The current level of Big Data usage in the automotive sector in Russia and around the world is considered. The §author describes the main areas of application of Big Data, such as car insurance using telematics devices, navigation, improving the production process of cars in terms of identifying and eliminating system flaws that are detected during operation, as well as about the growing popularity and at the same time causing heated controversy of the technology of unmanned driving. Statistical data on the number of self-driving cars in countries, the level of their introduction into everyday life, and people's readiness for a new stage of transport development are presented. Separately, the author raises the question of the legal regulation of Big Data, which at this stage is in its infancy and requires careful study, identifies current legal problems that arise in the process of implementing this technology. As a solution to the problem, a number of measures are proposed to fill the existing gap and establish compliance with the rule of law and common principles for the use and protection of Big data.",
      "published": "2020-12-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30987/2686-8326-2020-27-32",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "regulation",
        "self-driving",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nikita Nosov"
      ],
      "venue": "Geocontext",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.30987/2686-8326-2020-27-32",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.30998/jpmbio.v1i2.1539",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Pelatihan VSS dan Immobilizer Untuk Meningkatkan Kompetensi Profesional Guru Teknik Otomotif Di SMK Islam 1 Blitar",
      "description": "Seiring dengan kemajuan teknologi, guru teknik otomotif-pun harus memperbaharui dan meningkatkan kemampuannya untuk industri otomotif maju, termasuk kemampuan untuk mendiagnosa vehicle security system (VSS), kunci sentral/kunci pintu, dan immobilizer kendaraan. Penting untuk memperkenalkan dan melatih guru mata pelajaran perawatan dan perbaikan comfort safety dan IT untuk mendiagnosis VSS dan immobilizer menggunakan alat dan mesin yang sama yang ditentukan untuk digunakan di tempat kerja, karena cakupan materi pada kompetensi untuk mendiagnosis VSS dan immobilizer cukup luas dan hanya tersedia waktu yang terbatas. Tim pelaksana pengabdian kepada masyarakat dari program studi S1 Pendidikan Teknik Otomotif UM memberikan pelatihan, khusus bagi guru teknik otomotif di SMK, dengan maksud untuk mentransfer ilmu otomotif mutakhir terkini yaitu VSS dan immobilizers, dalam rangka meningkatkan pengetahuan automotive advanced guru. Metode pelatihan termasuk melakukan survei lokasi, mengembangkan materi pelatihan, membuat jadwal, menyediakan alat dan bahan, dan melatih guru untuk mengevaluasi. Pelatihan VSS dan immobilizer dilakukan secara offline sesuai program, dan hasilnya adalah peningkatan pengetahuan otomotif tingkat lanjut guru, dibuktikan dengan nilai rata-rata posttest (86,00) lebih besar dari nilai rata-rata pretest (69,65), dan perbedaannya adalah signifikan secara statistik (Sig. Selain itu, berdasarkan penjelasan nara sumber, guru memahami cara mengajar siswa tentang VSS dan immobilizer.",
      "published": "2022-01-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.30998/jpmbio.v1i2.1539",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "immobilizer",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prihanto Trihutomo",
        "Marji Marji",
        "Paryono Paryono",
        "Erwin Komara Mindarta"
      ],
      "venue": "Jurnal Pengabdian Masyarakat Biologi dan Sains",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.30998/jpmbio.v1i2.1539",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31219/osf.io/68ugw",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Brief Summary of Cybersecurity attacks in V2X Communication",
      "description": "Vehicles in the current era can communicate with other vehicles, roadside units, and networks. Thiscommunication is collaboratively called Vehicle to Everything(V2X) communication. V2X networkleverages modern communication technologies such as DSRC, LTE, and 5G communication. Along withthe leverages of these technologies, potential security threat has also increased. Cybersecurity attacksare the most common attacks that damage the V2X communication network. In this paper, we willreveal poetnetial cybersecurity attacks in V2X communication",
      "published": "2022-07-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/68ugw",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Noman Mazher",
        "Mohammad Alhadaad",
        "Oyunchimeg Shagdar"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.31219/osf.io/68ugw",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31224/2866",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey on Security Credential Management System and Secure V2X by ChatGPT",
      "description": "Due to the importance of security for Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET), Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Secure Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication are surveyed in this study for SCMS researchers.This study designs sequential prompts that are presented in Section II to supervise ChatGPT for generating the reviews of SCMS and secure V2X.The hot research topics of security and privacy in V2X communications, authentication and access control in V2X networks, key management in V2X networks, and security and privacy in SCMS have been summarized and discussed.Finally, the limitations of SCMS and secure V2X are also surveyed for indicating the future work.",
      "published": "2023-03-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31224/2866",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Robot Sam Chang"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.31224/2866",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31224/6663",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evolving and Securing the CAN Bus for Safer More Comfortable Cars",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the backbone of in-vehicle communications, coordinating electronic control units (ECUs) that affect safety, comfort, and the overall driving experience. Originally introduced to reduce wiring complexity and cost, CAN has evolved with CAN FD and the emerging CAN XL to sustain higher data throughput and larger payloads while preserving real-time behavior and robustness. Yet, classical CAN lacks built-in security and is vulnerable to spoofing, replay, and denial-of-service attacks. This paper reviews the evolution of CAN technologies and practical intrusion detection approaches, highlighting how higher bandwidth and stronger defenses translate into human-centered outcomes: safer driving through reliable advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS), greater comfort via responsive body and infotainment functions, and intuitive ownership supported by diagnostics and software updates. We discuss how CAN XL is positioned to coexist with Automotive Ethernet in zonal architectures and outline how standards and best practices (e.g., ISO/SAE 21434, UNECE WP.29, NHTSA guidance) can be leveraged to mitigate cyber risk. By connecting protocol evolution with human factors, we argue that secure, high-performance CAN-based networks are essential for trustworthy mobility in connected and automated vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31224/6663",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhongheng Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.31224/6663",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31274/cc-20240624-1154",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy: A Growing Risk in the Insurance Industry",
      "description": "With the rapid development of technology-based products and services in recent years, information technology seeps into the pore of people’s daily life by adding value-added services in products. Insurance has seen a rapid increase in technological advancements, which has led to an ever-growing risk of privacy, not just in this industry but across all the technology sector. Given this scenario, more data is collected, which increases the risk of data theft, and cyber risk and existing research shows that most organizations do not have enough resources to prevent data breaches, deal with notification responsibilities, and comply with privacy laws. Talesh, S. A. (2018) shows how insurance companies play a critical yet unrecognized role in assisting organizations in complying with privacy laws and dealing with cyber theft.\\nThe scope of this research is to make insurance companies be on the front foot of the existing and upcoming privacy laws being incorporated and recommending efficient ways to comply with these laws internally and when exposed to an audit. Additionally, another goal of this paper is to identify and suggest ways to increase user adoption within the Telematics segment, which has been a talking point in the automobile segment of the insurance industry where it has been adopted by 20% of the consumer market as of 2016 but has a potential of taking over the entire section as more data is collected as the days pass by. With such changes, the terms and conditions of every privacy policy are becoming something more than just a fine print.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31274/cc-20240624-1154",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit Mahapatra"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.31274/cc-20240624-1154",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31274/cc-20240624-1564",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using messages precedence similarity to detect message injection in in-vehicle network",
      "description": "We developed an intrusion detection technique that detects an attack on CAN Bus network using Long Short-Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network (LSTM RNN). Modern cars contain a number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are responsible for normal car functionality and safety. These ECUs communicate with each other by an in-vehicle bus communication network such as CAN Bus. The CAN Bus lacks encryption and authentication mechanism to ensure secure communication. The safety of the driver relies on the ECUs exchanging messages on the CAN Bus securely. We proposed an intrusion detection system (IDS) that secure in-vehicle communication network. We develop a technique that counts the number of precedence messages, then we use a similarity matrices to detect injection of messages into the CAN Bus. First, We develop message precedences similarity graphs that distinguish between an attack state and no attack state. Then, we constructed an LSTM RNN for anomalous detection. Then, we use similarity matrices graph to training the LSTM RNN at different size and time window. Also, we develop a method to detect changes in PIds centrality due to the injection of messages on CAN Bus. The method was not successful in detecting attacks in-vehicle communication network.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31274/cc-20240624-1564",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mubark Jedh"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.31274/cc-20240624-1564",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31289/jmemme.v9i1.13101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Application of Keyless Security System in Credenza Product Design",
      "description": "A credenza is a type of furniture commonly utilized as a storage unit for various items, typically equipped with conventional physical locks. These locks, often made from iron, metal, or brass, pose a high risk of theft and require more time to unlock. This study proposes an alternative solution for enhancing storage security systems by incorporating Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. The adoption of a keyless security system based on RFID aims to replace conventional physical locks, offering improved security and efficiency. The primary objective of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of RFID technology and its practical application in credenza furniture. Experimental results using Medium Density Fibreboard (MDF) as the material indicate that the maximum functional door thickness is 50 mm, with an authentication time of 1.27 seconds. The production process yielded a credenza featuring an RFID Reader Box installed on the inner side of the door, positioned 100 mm from the top edge, and a locking component located on the inner left wall, 115 mm from its edge.",
      "published": "2025-01-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31289/jmemme.v9i1.13101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Agung Ari Purwanto",
        "Yogi Setiawan"
      ],
      "venue": "JOURNAL OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING MANUFACTURES MATERIALS AND ENERGY",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.31289/jmemme.v9i1.13101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31326/jisa.v8i1.2187",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overview of Vehicle-to-Everything Communication: Technological Advancements, Applications, and Future Prospects in Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is a cornerstone technology in modern Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), enabling real-time data exchange between vehicles, infrastructure, pedestrians, and networks. V2X enhances road safety, traffic management, and driving experience, contributing to the global vision of connected and autonomous transportation. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of V2X communication, detailing its key components, types, and technological standards, including Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC), LTE-V2X, and 5G. We explore current applications of V2X, such as safety enhancements, traffic optimization, infotainment, and environmental sustainability, and discuss significant challenges in deployment, including technical limitations, security and privacy concerns, and infrastructure requirements. Furthermore, this study examines future directions in V2X, emphasizing the role of 5G, edge computing, AI integration, and the implications for electric and autonomous vehicles. Realizing V2X's full potential requires robust policy support, international standardization, and infrastructure investments, particularly in countries with varying levels of technological maturity. This paper provides insights into the evolution of V2X and outlines critical considerations for advancing toward a safer, more efficient, and sustainable global transportation ecosystem",
      "published": "2025-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31326/jisa.v8i1.2187",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ketut Bayu Yogha Bintoro"
      ],
      "venue": "JISA(Jurnal Informatika dan Sains)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.31326/jisa.v8i1.2187",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31436/ijpcc.v11i1.530",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Twin-Based Evaluation of Vehicular Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "The functions and operations of a modern automobile are becoming increasingly computerised, with this transformation made possible by Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate and coordinate with each other on the in-vehicle network. Controller Area Network (CAN) is one of the most popular protocols for the in-vehicle network, supporting low latency and reliable communications. However, the CAN protocol does not have provisions for security, such as encryption, authentication, and authorisation, which makes it vulnerable to cyberattacks, particularly in today’s automotive landscape characterised by extensive connectivity with external devices, vehicles, and infrastructure. While intrusion detection systems (IDS) for CAN have emerged as a key security measure, assessing their performance against realistic attacks remains a challenge since testing with real vehicles poses significant costs and safety risks and testbeds suffer from a lack of fidelity in terms of the CAN frame transmission timings and generated payloads. This work proposes a digital twin (DT)-based framework for CAN IDS evaluation that replicates the functionality of real-world ECUs and CAN bus of a vehicle with real-time flow of data from the physical bus to its virtual representation. The main contribution of this work is a CAN DT that can not only enable the generation of realistic attack traffic for simple and sophisticated attack scenarios but also the generation of diverse combinations of attack and real driving scenarios. This DT can facilitate the evaluation of both the detection capability and performance of CAN IDS. This work presents the methodology for generating the proposed DT and discusses current findings as well as future work",
      "published": "2025-01-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31436/ijpcc.v11i1.530",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaila Sharmin",
        "Hafizah Mansor",
        "Andi Fitriah Abdul Kadir",
        "Amelia Ritahani Ismail"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Perceptive and Cognitive Computing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.31436/ijpcc.v11i1.530",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31649/2413-4503-2020-11-1-55-61",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improvement of technical maintenance and repair of vehicles",
      "description": "The article discusses the use of a planned preventive maintenance system in modern conditions using systems of monitoring of transport , which allows a more reasonable approach to the period of maintenance and create a new approach to calculating runs before technical impacts. Confirmation of the proposed method must be obtained by analyzing the data on failures using the available information and reference system. The analysis of statistical data is necessary to determine the criterion of necessity and sufficiency when performing maintenance. In order to reduce costs when performing maintenance and repair of vehicles, the intervals are set to the maximum possible regulated by the manufacturer, but exceeding the maintenance period is fraught with premature failure of individual systems and mechanisms, the restoration of which can be an order of magnitude greater than the savings in this approach. At the same time, the analysis of statistical data can identify the most vulnerable mechanisms and focus on them when performing technical maintenance. The work carried out to collect and analyze information about the structure of the bus fleet, the distribution of rolling stock by mileage since the beginning of operation, age and average annual mileage suggests that there is a significant influence of mileage and age of buses on the number of requests for repairs, as well as seasonal factors of operation. The analyzed failures and malfunctions of systems and units of bus operating in urban conditions require a balanced approach to determining the timing of maintenance and repair. For a correct description of operating conditions, roads, and road conditions, you can use indicators such as vehicle speed and load. When determining the load, is used parameter of the instantaneous or average fuel consumption, which can be determined using fuel flow and level sensors, as well as using data from the duration of fuel injection by injectors, as well as data from intermediate calculations in the vehicle's CAN data bus. These parameters can be read using the system of transport telematic, which will simplify calculations and obtain greater accuracy. The method of using vehicle parameters has the advantage of taking into account instantaneous data of the autobus operation and, in comparison with the traditional approach, will increase the accuracy of determining the timing of maintenance and remout, since the coefficient K1 depends on the speed and load over time when measuring instantaneous and average fuel consumption over the injection duration.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31649/2413-4503-2020-11-1-55-61",
      "matched_terms": [
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexander Gurski",
        "Viktor Ivashko",
        "Vladimir Makarov"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Mechanical Engineering and Transport",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.31649/2413-4503-2020-11-1-55-61",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31695/ijasre.2018.32849",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Connected Vehicle Security with Block chain",
      "description": "With millions of cars getting connected with OEM / Other vehicles in coming years, there is an increasing demand in ensuring that the consumers are rightly protected from any cyber threats. Vehicle to Vehicle communication such as Smart intersection, Traffic light control and Collision avoidance need the ultra-quick response after handling the security validation. Built-in security and architecture design are required to mitigate any threat. This paper discusses the need for a holistic approach to looking at the deep insight of hackable components in the connected vehicle ecosystem using Blockchain technology. It focuses on security services with Intrusion protection throughout the life cycle of the vehicle. All this ensures a comprehensive and end to end protection. Adhering to the proposed architecture provides proactive measures for any vulnerability thereby building trusted and secure vehicles.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31695/ijasre.2018.32849",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yamunaa Balasubramaniam",
        "Sathyanarayanan PSV"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Advances in Scientific Research and Engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.31695/ijasre.2018.32849",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31764/pdkspj44",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Vigilantism in the Wake of the Collapse of Privacy: Netnographic Evidence from Comments on Indonesian Infotainment YouTube Channels",
      "description": "Abstrak: Studi ini bertujuan menganalisis bagaimana keruntuhan batas privasi dalam video YouTube infotainment memicu terbentuknya vigilantisme digital lunak dalam budaya komentar netizen Indonesia. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif netnografi terhadap 845 komentar pada video “[FULL] Cerita Awal Permasalahan Antara Ruben dan Mantan Istrinya! - BROWNIS (8/6/26)” di kanal TRANS TV Official. Data dikumpulkan melalui crawling Google Colab, dibersihkan menggunakan Microsoft Excel, lalu dianalisis dengan model tematik RIPES yang mencakup refleksivitas, interpretasi, konsistensi prosedural, evaluasi, dan konteks, serta didukung analisis sentimen menggunakan Communalytic.org. Temuan menunjukkan tiga pola utama: pertama, konflik keluarga mengalami keruntuhan koordinasi batas privasi sehingga informasi domestik diperlakukan sebagai milik publik; kedua, simpati parasosial dan religiusisasi penderitaan menjadi dasar legitimasi penghakiman sosial; ketiga, dukungan emosional berkembang menjadi vigilantisme digital lunak melalui pembelaan korban, koreksi publik, pelabelan moral, likes, dan penghukuman simbolik. Signifikansi penelitian ini terletak pada perluasan teori Communication Privacy Management dengan menunjukkan bahwa privacy turbulence tidak hanya lahir dari pelanggaran interpersonal, tetapi juga dari partisipasi massa dalam ekologi platform. Abstract: This study aims to analyse how the breakdown of privacy boundaries in YouTube infotainment videos triggers the emergence of ‘soft’ digital vigilantism within the Indonesian netizen comment culture. The research employs a qualitative netnographic approach to analyse 845 comments on the video “[FULL] The Story Behind the Problems Between Ruben and His Ex-Wife! – BROWNIS (8/6/26)” on the TRANS TV Official channel. Data were collected via Google Colab crawling, cleaned using Microsoft Excel, and then analysed using the RIPES thematic model—which encompasses reflexivity, interpretation, procedural consistency, evaluation and context—and supplemented by sentiment analysis using Communalytic.org. The findings reveal three main patterns: first, family conflicts experience a breakdown in the coordination of privacy boundaries, resulting in domestic information being treated as public property; second, parasocial empathy and the religious framing of suffering form the basis for the legitimisation of social judgement; third, emotional support evolves into soft digital vigilantism through the defence of victims, public correction, moral labelling, ‘likes’, and symbolic punishment. The significance of this research lies in the expansion of the Communication Privacy Management theory by demonstrating that privacy turbulence arises not only from interpersonal violations, but also from mass participation within the platform ecosystem.",
      "published": "2026-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31764/pdkspj44",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lisda Ariani Simabur"
      ],
      "venue": "Al-I'lam",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.31764/pdkspj44",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31838/esa/03.02.04",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware-Assisted Intrusion Detection System for Automotive Embedded ECUs",
      "description": "Modern automotive systems progressively rely on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to take control of vital vehicle functionality and are heavily interlinked on in-vehicle networks, e.g. the Controller Area Network (CAN). With the increased vehicle sophistication into a complex cyber-physical system, the car is more exposed to cyber-related attacks such as message injection, spoofing, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that have the potential to affect safety and performance. Implementations of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) using software, can be not very effective when it comes to real-time detection, because of the computational overhead imposed by them and the shared CPU usage. The paper proposes a new hardware-assisted intrusion detection system (H-IDS) designed to work on the automotive platforms and embedded devices (ECUs) in particular but is focused on the low-latency and real-time nature of the system and its capability to deploy on resource-constrained devices. The described architecture uses a light on-chip co-processor in the ECU as a special security engine to observe CAN traffic and observe abnormal behavior based on temporal and statistical characteristics. The H-IDS performs detection tasks on a separate processor-offloading payload so it does not interfere with other processes or even stop when the vehicle does not perform its tasks. This was implemented on an ECU platform based on the ARM Cortex-R5 in a hardware prototyping system with FPGA and then tested in a range of simulated attack conditions. The input of the experiment shows that there is a significant reduction in the detection latency that the H-IDS displays an average latency of 14 microseconds that is much faster than software-only solutions. Also, the design has less than 2 percent CPU overhead and its power and memory requirements fit squarely within the power and memory budget of most automotive embedded systems. The provided proposed H-IDS is aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 standards of cybersecurity, and it is scalable to be deployed on various heterogeneous ECU systems. Through the increased detection responsiveness and negligible resource consumption, the work is a step towards realistic hardware-enforced security measures, which can be incorporated in the next generation of automotive architectures to guarantee resilient and trustful in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2026-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31838/esa/03.02.04",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vishnupriya.T",
        "Sumit Ramswami Punam"
      ],
      "venue": "SCCTS Journal of Embedded Systems Design and Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.31838/esa/03.02.04",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31838/jivct/02.02.05",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SoC Solutions for Automotive Electronics and Safety Systems for Revolutionizing Vehicle Technology",
      "description": "Today, we are seeing an electronic and safety system driven era of profound change in the automotive industry. The System on Chip (SoC) is really focused on this revolution; it’s a powerful integrated Circuit (IC) that’s able to put several components in a single chip. Yet the latest-generation sophisticated SoCs are transforming how vehicles operate, communicate and protect their vehicle occupants, and more. The movement of cutting edge SoC solutions to automotive applications is reviewed, and evaluated in terms of its influence on vehicle performance, connectivity and safety.But with vehicles becoming more connected and autonomous – electronic systems are needing to be more powerful, efficient and secure. Modern vehicles have a variety of computational requirements that automotive manufacturers and suppliers are attempting to meet in order to achieve robust security, and automotive manufacturers and suppliers are racing to develop innovative SoC solutions that can accommodate these computational requirements. From advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), to infotainment and control, automotive electronics are becoming the basis of such SoCs.As with all the latest trends of automotive SoC design and the challenges a developer has to go through in the market, this is a comprehensive study. Additionally, we will complete further discussion about the importance of cybersecurity for cybersecurity in these complex systems and cyber standards which define the conditions for the formation of these systems. To the world of automotive SoC technology, and how this is evolving to reach for the skies.",
      "published": "2025-03-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31838/jivct/02.02.05",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. A. Papadopoulos",
        "E.A. Konstantinou"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Integrated VLSI, Embedded and Computing Technologies",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.31838/jivct/02.02.05",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31893/multirev.2026350",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-based data integrity and privacy in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication networks: A systematic literature review",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is at the center of autonomous mobility, as it enables vehicles to exchange real-time information with infrastructure, other vehicles on the road, including pedestrians, and the network. V2X has the potential to improve navigation, traffic flow, and safety but also brings with it the associated governance risks of data integrity, privacy, and cybersecurity. These risks are amplified by the interconnected nature of V2X networks, which handle sensitive data like vehicle locations and driver identities, necessitating robust security solutions. This systematic review considers blockchain as a remedy, with its decentralized architecture, cryptographic security protocols, and automation through smart contracts. A review of peer-reviewed literature from 2018 to 2025 highlights blockchain's role in tamper-proof communication, privacy preservation through Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Ring Signatures, and secure transaction automation. For instance, blockchain ensures data immutability by distributing trust across nodes, reducing vulnerabilities like data spoofing, while smart contracts streamline processes like toll payments. Challenges such as scalability, latency, and regulation are addressed with proposals such as 5G, edge computing, and governance frameworks. Hybrid blockchain systems, either public or private are examined in this study to obtain a trade-off between scalability and security in V2X networks. In addition, interoperability is proposed to facilitate the seamless exchange of data between V2X systems. Emerging consensus mechanisms like proof of stake and directed acyclic graphs are proposed to enhance scalability, while federated learning integrations bolster privacy. Pilot projects, such as those in Dubai and Singapore, demonstrate blockchain’s practical efficacy in securing V2X ecosystems. The review positions blockchain as a leading enabler of secure, efficient, and privacy-aware intelligent transport systems. Future research should focus on standardizing governance and addressing latency to ensure global adoption.",
      "published": "2026-01-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2026350",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "regulation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kenneth Baayeh",
        "Prashanth Beleya",
        "Shakeb Akhtar",
        "Diana Airawaty"
      ],
      "venue": "Multidisciplinary Reviews",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.31893/multirev.2026350",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.31979/etd.4t2r-muv7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Defending Vehicles Against Cyberthreats",
      "description": "The lack of concern with security when vehicular network protocols were designed some thirty years ago is about to take its toll as vehicles become more connected and smart. Today as demands for more functionality and connectivity on vehicles continue to grow, a plethora of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that are able to communicate to external networks are added to the automobile networks. The proliferation of ECU and the increasing autonomy level give drivers more control over their vehicles and make driving easier, but at the same time they expand the attack surface, bringing more vulnerabilities to vehicles that might be exploited by hackers. Possible outcomes of a compromised vehicle range from personal information theft to human life loss, raising the importance of automotive cybersecurity to a whole different level. Therefore, network safety has become a necessary and vital consideration of a vehicle. This project is two-fold: the first half will focus on the background of vehicle cybersecurity, characteristics of vehicular networks that could be leveraged during a hacking process, including ECU, Controller Area Network (CAN bus) and On-Board Diagnostics (OBD). It also discusses and evaluates previous hacking experiments conducted by researchers and their proposed countermeasures. The second half is an evaluation of approaches to design an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The aim of this project is to find an effective and suitable solution todefend vehicles against various types of cyber threats.",
      "published": "2021-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.4t2r-muv7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "obd",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qilin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.31979/etd.4t2r-muv7",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3233/atde230577",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Software Security Analysis for Automotive Intelligent Cockpits",
      "description": "With the development of software technology in the automotive industry, open-source components are increasingly penetrating into the automotive systems. Researching the security of open-source software is an important topic in automotive software security. In this paper, the OTA update package of In-Vehicle Infotainment components in intelligent cockpits is analyzed to obtain the internal file system and summarize the general structure of the automotive IVI component file system and the functionality corresponding to common file paths. By analyzing the linking information of executable files in the firmware package, the dynamic linking library information of the executable files is collected to expand the coverage of components and prevent the omission of third-party components. Subsequently, the Software Composition Analysis technique is used to identify the most frequently used third-party components in the sample firmware. The results are validated by comparing the function call relationships between the sample files and the source code of the third-party components through reverse engineering analysis. Static analysis methods and patch comparison techniques are combined to verify the presence of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures vulnerabilities in the identified third-party components. Finally, based on the experimental results, relevant recommendations are provided for the security of intelligent cockpit software.",
      "published": "2023-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3233/atde230577",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Longhai Yu",
        "Xudong Bian",
        "Yuqiao Ning",
        "Zhen Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in transdisciplinary engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3233/atde230577",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3233/atde240515",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Implementation of User Authentication Mechanism for Vehicle-to-Everything Based on FPGA",
      "description": "Aiming at the problem that the current vehicle communication authentication mechanism lacks hardware verification, this paper proposes a new Vehicle-to-Everything(V2X) user authentication mechanism based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), aiming at improving the safety and reliability of vehicle communication. The mechanism adopts One-Time Password (OTP), Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) to realize a highly secure authentication process, and the above algorithms are implemented in FPGA. Compared with the security and resource cost of using a single cryptography mechanism, this paper is effective in authentication, collision resistance, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and identity forgery attack, and completes information encryption processing in microsecond level, which improves the performance and reduces the resource occupation, which proves the security and effectiveness of the proposed method in the case of vehicle-mounted equipment with limited resources.",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3233/atde240515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Changrong Yu",
        "Xuxiu Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in transdisciplinary engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3233/atde240515",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3233/jcm-215889",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Internet of vehicles security situation awareness based on intrusion detection protection systems",
      "description": "With the rise of technologies such as mobile Internet, 5G networks and artificial intelligence, the development of Internet of Vehicle Information Security (ICVS) has become the mainstream and direction for the future development of the automotive industry. ICVS, people, roads, clouds, and APP constitute a complex network of vehicles. As part of the Internet, vehicle networking will inevitably face various complex information security threats and risks. This paper aims to design a kind of security situation awareness of Internet of vehicles based on intrusion detection protection systems (IDPS). By collecting the security data of car, app and private cloud for big data analysis, the whole smart car security situation awareness system is constructed. The system can be used to analyze potential threats, send out warnings, and carry out emergency responses.",
      "published": "2021-12-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3233/jcm-215889",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jian Bai",
        "Zhuo Zhang",
        "Bing-Shen Shen"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computational Methods in Sciences and Engineering",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3233/jcm-215889",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3233/jcs-230027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Benchmarking Frameworks and Comparative Studies of Controller Area Network (CAN) Intrusion Detection Systems: A Review",
      "description": "The development of intrusion detection systems (IDS) for the in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is one of the main efforts being taken to secure the in-vehicle network against various cyberattacks, which have the potential to cause vehicles to malfunction and result in dangerous accidents. These CAN IDS are evaluated in disparate experimental conditions that vary in terms of the workload used, the features used, the metrics reported, etc., which makes direct comparison difficult. Therefore, there have been several benchmarking frameworks and comparative studies designed to evaluate CAN IDS in similar experimental conditions to understand their relative performance and facilitate the selection of the best CAN IDS for implementation in automotive networks. This work provides a comprehensive survey of CAN IDS benchmarking frameworks and comparative studies in the current literature. A CAN IDS evaluation design space is also proposed in this work, which draws from the wider CAN IDS literature. This is not only expected to serve as a guide for designing CAN IDS evaluation experiments but is also used for categorizing current benchmarking efforts. The surveyed works have been discussed on the basis of the five aspects in the design space-namely IDS type, attack model, evaluation type, workload generation, and evaluation metrics-and recommendations for future work have been identified.",
      "published": "2024-02-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-230027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaila Sharmin",
        "Hafizah Mansor",
        "Andi Fitriah Abdul Kadir",
        "Normaziah A. Aziz"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Security, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 477-507, 2024",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3233/jcs-230027",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/cmc.2022.023073",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VANET Jamming and Adversarial Attack Defense for Autonomous Vehicle Safety",
      "description": "The development of Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) technology is helping Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) services to become a reality. Vehicles can use VANETs to communicate safety messages on the road (while driving) and can inform their location and share road condition information in real-time. However, intentional and unintentional (e.g., packet/frame collision) wireless signal jamming can occur, which will degrade the quality of communication over the channel, preventing the reception of safety messages, and thereby posing a safety hazard to the vehicle's passengers. In this paper, VANET jamming detection applying Support Vector Machine (SVM) machine learning technology is used to classify jamming and non-jamming situations. The analysis is based on two cases which include normal traffic and heavy traffic conditions, where the results show that the probability of packet dropping will increase when many vehicles are using the wireless channel simultaneously. When using SVM classification, the most appropriate feature set applied in determining a jamming situation shows an accuracy of 98% or higher. Furthermore, more advanced jamming attacks need to be considered for preparation of more reliable and safer autonomous ITS services. Such research can use vehicular communication transmission and reception data based on selected published datasets. In this paper, an additional adversarial defense algorithm using the Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) method is proposed, which assumes that evolutionary attacks of the jammer will attempt to confuse the trained classifier. The simulation results show that applying DBSCAN can improve the accuracy by elimination of outliers before conducting classification testing.",
      "published": "2021-12-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2022.023073",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haeri Kim",
        "Jong‐Moon Chung"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.32604/cmc.2022.023073",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/cmc.2023.039464",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CNN-Based RF Fingerprinting Method for Securing Passive Keyless Entry and Start System",
      "description": "The rapid growth of modern vehicles with advanced technologies requires strong security to ensure customer safety. One key system that needs protection is the passive key entry system (PKES). To prevent attacks aimed at defeating the PKES, we propose a novel radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting method. Our method extracts the cepstral coefficient feature as a fingerprint of a radio frequency signal. This feature is then analyzed using a convolutional neural network (CNN) for device identification. In evaluation, we conducted experiments to determine the effectiveness of different cepstral coefficient features and the convolutional neural network-based model. Our experimental results revealed that the Gammatone Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (GFCC) was the most compelling feature compared to Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC), Inverse Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (IMFCC), Linear-Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (LFCC), and Bark-Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (BFCC). Additionally, we experimented with evaluating the effectiveness of our method in comparison to existing approaches that are similar to ours.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2023.039464",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyeon Park",
        "SeoYeon Kim",
        "Seok Min Ko",
        "TaeGuen Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.32604/cmc.2023.039464",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/cmc.2023.039583",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Analysis of Datasets for Automotive Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "Recently, automotive intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have emerged as promising defense approaches to counter attacks on in-vehicle networks (IVNs). However, the effectiveness of IDSs relies heavily on the quality of the datasets used for training and evaluation. Despite the availability of several datasets for automotive IDSs, there has been a lack of comprehensive analysis focusing on assessing these datasets. This paper aims to address the need for dataset assessment in the context of automotive IDSs. It proposes qualitative and quantitative metrics that are independent of specific automotive IDSs, to evaluate the quality of datasets. These metrics take into consideration various aspects such as dataset description, collection environment, and attack complexity. This paper evaluates eight commonly used datasets for automotive IDSs using the proposed metrics. The evaluation reveals biases in the datasets, particularly in terms of limited contexts and lack of diversity. Additionally, it highlights that the attacks in the datasets were mostly injected without considering normal behaviors, which poses challenges for training and evaluating machine learning-based IDSs. This paper emphasizes the importance of addressing the identified limitations in existing datasets to improve the performance and adaptability of automotive IDSs. The proposed metrics can serve as valuable guidelines for researchers and practitioners in selecting and constructing high-quality datasets for automotive security applications. Finally, this paper presents the requirements for high-quality datasets, including the need for representativeness, diversity, and balance.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2023.039583",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seyoung Lee",
        "Wonsuk Choi",
        "Insup Kim",
        "Ganggyu Lee",
        "Dong Hoon Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.32604/cmc.2023.039583",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/cmc.2026.077768",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A 3D Object Recovery Framework for Enhancing In-Vehicle Network Resilience to Data Tampering Attack",
      "description": "The integrity of perception data transmitted over in-vehicle networks is important for the safety of autonomous driving. However, legacy protocols like the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus which lacks essential security feat... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on Tech Science Press",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2026.077768",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gangtao Han",
        "Yurui Chen",
        "Song Wang",
        "Enqing Chen",
        "Lingling Li",
        "Gaofeng Pan"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.32604/cmc.2026.077768",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/cmc.2026.082418",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Location Privacy Protection of Data Elements in ICVs: A Key Update Mechanism for Defending Against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks",
      "description": "In intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) system, driving users connect to service providers (SPs) to obtain location-based services (LBS). Users transmit large volumes of encrypted sensitive information related to their itine... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on Tech Science Press",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2026.082418",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lei Wang",
        "Hongji Luo",
        "Yong Heng",
        "Jingnan Tang",
        "Xiaochuan Ju",
        "Jianwei An",
        "Haitao Xu",
        "Xianwei Zhou"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.32604/cmc.2026.082418",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4538,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.32604/cmc.2026.082418 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage, privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: encrypted, providers, location, sensitive, large, services, service, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/cmc.2026.083267",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Orchestration Model for TARA across Vehicle Manufacturers and Suppliers in Software-Defined Vehicles",
      "description": ": Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) increase cybersecurity complexity through the combination of exter-nal connectivity, software-intensive functions, and distributed development across vehicle manufacturers and suppliers. Although United Nations (UN) Regulation No. 155 and ISO/SAE 21434 require Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) throughout the vehicle lifecycle, conventional TARA methodologies remain largely system-focused and often provide limited procedural guidance for coordinating supplier-derived TARA results at the vehicle level. This paper proposes an orchestration model for TARA across vehicle manufacturers and suppliers that structures TARA activities into the concept phase and the product development phases. The model defines interactions between the vehicle and system perspectives throughout the TARA process. In particular, it supports vehicle-perspective re-rating of system-perspective impact ratings, integration of electrical/electronic (E/E)-architecture-based and technical attack paths, signal-level asset refinement, and asset clustering. The feasibility and industrial applicability of the proposed approach are demonstrated through its application to the Driving Control Unit (DCU): Rear in a virtual SDV model using a commercial TARA tool. In addition, an expert-based qualitative evaluation indicates that the model improves the precision, consistency, traceability, and practical applicability of TARA activities in vehicle manufacturer–supplier collaboration. The results suggest that the proposed orchestration model provides a structured and industry-applicable mechanism for lifecycle-aware and vehicle-level TARA.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2026.083267",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunkeun Song",
        "Samuel Woo",
        "Su-Jin Lee",
        "Yousik Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers, Materials & Continua",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.32604/cmc.2026.083267",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/cmc.2026.084915",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated Cybersecurity Testbed as a Service (FCTaaS): A framework to federate cybersecurity testbeds",
      "description": "Rapid technological change is reshaping society through emerging domains such as autonomous vehicles and smart manufacturing, creating new research challenges in system design, operation, security, and training. Researchers often rely on testbeds to reproduce experimental scenarios, collect and analyze data, observe system behavior, and evaluate proposed solutions. However, the fast pace of innovation makes it difficult and costly for individual testbeds to remain representative of state-of-the-art systems, as doing so requires frequent upgrades and new capabilities. Moreover, access to specialized testbeds is often limited to a small group of researchers, leaving valuable infrastructure underutilized during its operational lifetime. This paper presents FCTaaS, a Federated Cybersecurity Testbed as a Service framework that enables heterogeneous cybersecurity testbeds to participate in a single experiment across geographical boundaries. By connecting independently managed testbeds through a Virtual Private Network (VPN), FCTaaS supports remote testbed discovery, experiment design, and coordinated experimentation. We evaluate FCTaaS across three case studies involving denial-of-service scenarios on smart infrastructure and intrusion detection and prevention workflows using a Suricata-based IDS/IPS testbed. The results show that FCTaaS enables effective cross-testbed experimentation while preserving visibility into attack traffic, IDS alerts, and detection-system resource stress. Even under resource-intensive attack scenarios, FCTaaS achieves limiting network utilization of 49%, introduces only 1% overhead, and supports latency ranging from 5.63 ms between local nodes to 147 ms between geographically dispersed nodes.",
      "published": "2026-07-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2026.084915",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Josh Dean",
        "Yu-Zheng Lin",
        "John Paul Martin Encinas",
        "Ibrahim Almazyad",
        "Qinxuan Shi",
        "Zhanglong Yang",
        "Shalaka Satam",
        "Tingjun Lei",
        "Jielun Zhang",
        "Sicong Shao",
        "Salim Hariri",
        "Pratik Satam"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.32604/cmc.2026.084915",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32604/csse.2024.057754",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Revolutionizing Automotive Security: Connected Vehicle Security Blockchain Solutions for Enhancing Physical Flow in the Automotive Supply Chain",
      "description": "The rapid growth of the automotive industry has raised significant concerns about the security of connected vehicles and their integrated supply chains, which are increasingly vulnerable to advanced cyber threats. Traditional... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on Tech Science Press",
      "published": "2024-12-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32604/csse.2024.057754",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "supply chain",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khadija El Fellah",
        "Ikram El Azami",
        "Adil El Makrani",
        "Habiba Bouijij",
        "Oussama El Azzouzy"
      ],
      "venue": "Computer Systems Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.32604/csse.2024.057754",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3911,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.32604/csse.2024.057754 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: physical, significant, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32628/cseit25112362",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Manufacturing Transformation in the Automotive Industry: A Technical Analysis",
      "description": "The automotive manufacturing sector is experiencing a profound transformation driven by Industry 4.0 principles and digital technologies. This comprehensive article examines the evolution of smart manufacturing technologies, their impact on production processes, and the resulting paradigm shift in automotive manufacturing operations. The article explores the implementation of digital twins, advanced manufacturing systems integration, cybersecurity frameworks, and workforce development strategies. The article highlights how these technological advancements have revolutionized production efficiency, quality control, and market responsiveness while addressing the challenges of legacy system integration and cybersecurity. Furthermore, it investigates the future trajectory of automotive manufacturing, focusing on additive manufacturing technologies, artificial intelligence applications, and software-defined vehicle production methodologies.",
      "published": "2025-03-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32628/cseit25112362",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kumar Rajiv Nayan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science Engineering and Information Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.32628/cseit25112362",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32628/cseit25112404",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Evolution of AI-Enhanced Automotive Infotainment: Technical Perspectives",
      "description": "The evolution of automotive infotainment systems through artificial intelligence integration represents a fundamental transformation in human-vehicle interaction. Modern vehicles have transcended their transportation role to become sophisticated technological ecosystems where AI technologies address longstanding challenges in user experience, cognitive load management, and driver safety. This technical perspective explores the multilayered architectural framework underpinning these systems, from dedicated hardware accelerators and virtualized operating systems to sophisticated middleware and continuously learning AI models. The implementation of natural language processing capabilities utilizing far-field microphone arrays and domain-specific language models has dramatically improved voice interaction in challenging acoustic environments. Predictive capabilities leveraging recurrent neural networks and contextual awareness enable personalized experiences while reducing manual interactions. Safety enhancements through driver monitoring systems, dynamic workload management, and multimodal feedback pathways significantly reduce distraction and improve reaction times. Despite substantial resource constraints in computational power, thermal management, and energy efficiency, innovative solutions including model compression, selective activation strategies, and privacy-preserving computation techniques have emerged to address these challenges while maintaining functional safety compliance and robust offline capabilities.",
      "published": "2025-03-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32628/cseit25112404",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ravinder Katla"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science Engineering and Information Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.32628/cseit25112404",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5756,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.32628/cseit25112404 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: occupant_sensor, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: microphone, continuously, user, intelligence, where, privacy, information, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32628/ijsrset2512102",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart EV Charging Station with Automated Payment System",
      "description": "The growing adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates advancements in charging infrastructure to enhance convenience and effeciency. This project focuses on developing a wireless EV charging system integrated with a real-time payment gateway, eliminating the need for physical cables. The system utilizes electromagnetic induction to transfer power wirelessly from a charging pad installed in parking areas to a receiver in the vehicle. This method enhances user convenience by allowing automatic charging when vehicles park in designated spots, reducing reliance on plug-in chargers. The payment system ensures seamless authentication, real-time billing, and transaction security, making EV charging hassle-free and effecient.",
      "published": "2025-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32628/ijsrset2512102",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gangarde Bhagyashri",
        "Khedkar Dipti",
        "M. Nikita",
        "S. Satish",
        "S. Divekar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Scientific Research in Science Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.32628/ijsrset2512102",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32628/ijsrst2411448",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Navigating Trust and Safety in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions",
      "description": "Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is a key framework for building intelligent systems where multiple agents operate within a shared environment, with applications spanning autonomous driving, robotics, and distributed control systems. However, real-world deployment of MARL brings significant trust and safety challenges, as these systems are susceptible to a range of attacks that can compromise their robustness and reliability. This paper provides a comprehensive review of trust and safety attacks in MARL, categorizing various types of attacks and their implications. We explore existing defense mechanisms designed to mitigate these threats, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Additionally, we identify open challenges that remain unaddressed and propose potential future research directions to enhance the robustness and security of MARL systems.",
      "published": "2024-10-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32628/ijsrst2411448",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Divya Challa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Scientific Research in Science and Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.32628/ijsrst2411448",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32657/10220/45957",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security for automotive electrical/electronic (E/E) architectures",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity among vehicles increases their attack surface and challenges their security. This thesis explores approaches to improve analysis and design of security for invehicle networks. Therefore, a design time security analysis, a runtime authentication and authorization framework, and a flexible scheduling scheme, efficiently enabling security on FlexRay are presented. The infotainment system of an electric taxi is introduced as a design experience to demonstrate the necessity of new approaches in automotive security. Vehicles today include a large number of electronics in form of Electronic Control Units (ECUs). These ECUs are interconnected in internal vehicle networks implementing distributed control tasks. With the trend of rising interconnectivity and the Internet of Things (IoT), these in-vehicle networks are increasingly connected to other vehicles and the Internet. While the internal vehicle networks are shielded with gateways and firewalls, these protection mechanisms are not impenetrable. As for these external interfaces the same protection mechanisms as on the Internet are used, the same types of attacks can be applied. Once having access to the vehicle network, an attacker often has as many possibilities for influence as the vehicle owner or an authorized workshop. These internal networks consist of specialized automotive components, are often not sufficiently segmented or secured, and messages are transmitted unencrypted. Combining security and automotive real-time systems is challenging in many ways. The heterogeneity and complexity of automotive communication systems and their interconnections make the quantification of security a difficult task. Lower computational capabilities and network bandwidth, coupled with the real-time behavior in automotive systems makes implementation of computation and bandwidth intensive security challenging. New solutions are required to address security in the automotive domain in context of not only functional, but also real-time requirements. This thesis explores approaches to (1) analyze security of in-vehicle networks at design time, (2) secure network traffic efficiently through authentication and authorization at runtime, and (3) enable security on legacy communication systems. These approaches are motivated in context of the infotainment system of an electric taxi. The interaction of passengers with the infotainment system opens an attack vector on safety-critical in-vehicle systems and requires security to be a priority. The first approach targets the problem of quantifying the security of architectures and forms the basis for evaluation of all other approaches. It is not straightforward to evaluate the security of a network. No method to quantify the security of automotive networks currently exists. In this thesis, the Security Analysis for Automotive Networks (SAAN) is proposed. SAAN uses probabilistic model checking to calculate the security of automotive networks, based on the architecture and expert evaluations of components. Evaluations of SAAN prove its capabilities to detect security flaws and compare automotive architectures in terms of security. SAAN employs an automotive-specific model generation, taking into account the specific security dependencies in the automotive architecture. These dependencies are formulated as rules and form the basis for state-space reduction in the model. By reducing the model size, the performance of the model checking can be improved by two to three orders of magnitude over state of the art model generation. After establishing the ability to analyze networks for security, the second approach is centered around securing in-vehicle network traffic efficiently. To secure traffic, it is required to authenticate communication participants and authorize messages. This is typically ensured by authentication frameworks. Traditional authentication frameworks have high computation and bandwidth requirements, incompatible with automotive networks. This thesis proposes the Lightweight Authentication for Secure Automotive Networks (LASAN). LASAN is specifically tuned to the automotive environment, leveraging on the fixed network structure to reduce evitable flexibility in the protocols and minimize message sizes and thus bandwidth requirements. Splitting asymmetric and symmetric protocol components distributes the computational requirements and thus reduces the delays in time-critical phases of the system. Evaluations show improvements of setup latency of two to three orders of magnitude over the state of the art. Besides improved efficiency, LASAN can be easily integrated with existing automotive processes, such as Over-The-Air (OTA) updates or workshop maintenance and repair. The third approach targets the problem of security in legacy communication systems. Existing time-triggered communication systems, such as FlexRay, are highly limited in their flexibility regarding message lengths and transmission times. This limits the entropy available for security, allowing brute-force attacks on cryptographic keys, effectively rendering employed security mechanisms useless. The policy-based scheduling for FlexRay presented in this thesis enables a higher flexibility for messages on the bus by abstracting the bond between timetriggered slots and messages. Messages are flexibly arranged in a virtual communication layer, before being divided into slots. Thus, messages can be transmitted priority-based and messages longer than one slot lengths can be transmitted. This allows the implementation of authentication frameworks and increases the available entropy per message through enlargement, supporting encryption efficiently. Through the underlying time-triggered system, worst-case response times can be calculated efficiently. Evaluations show improvements in message transmission latencies by close to one order of magnitude over conventional FlexRay scheduling. At the same time, flexibility for message sizes and periods is increased significantly. The security approaches in this thesis are closely linked. Without a flexible message transmission scheme, authentication protocols cannot be implemented. Without an evaluation option for security, quantifying the impact of an authentication framework is highly complicated. Without an authentication framework, secure setup of architectures is not possible. The proposed approaches spans across both the design time and runtime aspects of automotive communication system development. A tight integration is key to security in automotive networks. This thesis lays the groundwork for this.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32657/10220/45957",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Philipp Mundhenk"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.32657/10220/45957",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32657/10356/173908",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security investigation of autonomous driving systems",
      "description": "Autonomous Driving (AD) represents a breakthrough technology with immense potential to make our transportation more intelligent, as many Autonomous Vehicles (AV) are already deployed into real products on public roads. The brain of an AV is the Autonomous Driving System (ADS), which relies on a combination of sensors and various machine learning algorithms to perceive the environment, make decisions, and navigate safely. However, real-world scenarios are complex and dynamic, with numerous factors that can affect the performance of ADS. Adver- sarial attacks, including training-time adversarial attacks (i.e., backdoor attacks) and testing-time adversarial attacks, have emerged as a destructive means of com- promising AV. Nonetheless, current research lacks a comprehensive evaluation of its effectiveness and robustness in physical environments. Furthermore, there is still a huge room for improvement in the current defense methods against physical adversarial attacks against ADS. However, due to the complexity of ADS, conducting a comprehensive evaluation poses significant challenges. To address this challenge, my thesis focuses on the systematic analysis of building secure ADS through evaluation in both simulator and real-world environments. This involves holistic testing and assessment of ADS, using realistic attacks, and actively discovering new security issues. To achieve this goal, my thesis first evaluates the performance of existing physical adversarial attacks in real-world settings, summarizing new insights and identifying new attack surfaces and methods. Specifically, we introduce BatAV, a comprehen- sive platform for benchmarking physical backdoor attacks to ADS perception. To uncover new vulnerabilities of ADS, we develop STFA, a dynamic physical world vulnerability testing platform for the ADS decision-making module. Based on this, we demonstrate that some existing adversarial attacks and vulnerabilities proposed by us could pose significant dangers to AVs. Subsequently, various studies have investigated adversarial attacks on the perception modules in ADS. Therefore, our second focus is on developing novel defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks on ADS. To have a deep understanding of physical adversarial attacks, we comprehensively evaluate 9 state-of-the-art methods in real-world scenarios. Based on that, we introduce two novel defense methods: (1) ADS-Lead, an effective collaborative anomaly detection method to safeguard ADS lane-following mechanisms. (2) VisionGuard, a unified defense framework capable of detecting and mitigating various physical adversarial attacks on ADS perception. Both defense measures utilize positioning and navigation sensors (e.g., GPS, IMU) to defend against attacks on visual sensors (e.g., cameras, LiDAR). In summary, this thesis is committed to evaluating existing adversarial attack methods, finding new vulnerabilities and attack surfaces, and designing novel ADS defense methods to build a secure ADS.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32657/10356/173908",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xingshuo Han"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.32657/10356/173908",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32684/2412-5288-2026-1-28-78-83",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "INTELLECTUALIZATION OF AUTOMOTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS BASED ON SENSOR NETWORK DATA IN THE CONTEXT OF SAFETY",
      "description": "The article examines the intellectualization of automotive control systems based on sensor network data in the context of safety. The rapid development of intelligent transportation systems and autonomous driving technologies significantly increases the complexity of modern automotive cyber-physical systems. Unlike traditional approaches, contemporary vehicles operate at the intersection of hardware components, artificial intelligence algorithms, and network communication environments, forming a multi-layered risk structure that includes technical failures, functional uncertainty, and cyber threats. Existing safety standards, including ISO 26262, ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF), and ISO/SAE 21434, address different risk categories but remain fragmented. In real conditions, these risks are highly interdependent, which complicates isolated analysis and emphasizes the need for an integrated safety framework. The probabilistic nature of machine learning models further limits classical verification and validation methods due to dependence on data quality and environmental variability. The study identifies three main risk categories: hardware and software failures, functional uncertainty of AI-based perception and decision-making systems, and external cyber threats affecting communication and control channels. Sensor networks, including cameras, radars, lidars, ultrasonic, and inertial sensors, form the primary data layer for environmental perception. Their quality directly influences object detection, prediction, and decision-making processes. AUTOSAR architecture plays a key role in system integration by providing modularity, hardware abstraction, and standardized interfaces, enabling coordinated implementation of safety and cybersecurity requirements. Modern automotive systems are therefore considered integrated cyber-physical ecosystems combining data generation, AI processing, communication, and system-level integration. The results confirm the need for a unified safety paradigm addressing functional reliability, algorithmic robustness, and cybersecurity in intelligent automotive systems.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32684/2412-5288-2026-1-28-78-83",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autosar",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Таїсія Іванівна Похлебіна",
        "Юрій Леонідович Лимаренко",
        "Галина Іванівна Оляш",
        "Світлана Василівна Добровольська"
      ],
      "venue": "Key title Zbìrnik naukovih pracʹ Odesʹkoï deržavnoï akademìï tehnìčnogo regulûvannâ ta âkostì",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.32684/2412-5288-2026-1-28-78-83",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32702/2306-6814.2025.3.85",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "АВТОТРАНСПОРТНЕ СТРАХУВАННЯ В УКРАЇНІ В ПЕРІОД ДІЇ ВОЄННОГО СТАНУ",
      "description": "Attention is drawn to the peculiarities of functioning of the motor insurance market under the martial law, which are related to the security situation, changes in the regional distribution of demand for insurance services, insurance terms, the possibility of attracting international insurance and reinsurance funds, and government regulation.The author analyzes the changes in the legislative framework of the compulsory insurance system of civil liability of owners of land vehicles and the ways to improve the mechanisms of compensation to victims. It is determined that the digitalization of insurance services is an important stage in the transformation of the motor insurance market inUkraine.Innovations in insurance in the context of martial law help insurance companies to reduce the risks associated with the security situation, offer customers more flexible, convenient, adapted to modern realities services, and increase efficiency.The author analyzes the main indicators of motor third party liability insurance for owners of land vehicles under internal contracts in Ukraine for 2022-2024, and identifies a constant increase in the number of insurance contracts signed in electronic form.The author outlines the main innovative trends and innovations in the field of motor insurance that are being actively implemented in the world and should be further developed in Ukraine, in particular, such as digitalization of processes, introduction of telematics technology, use of artificial intelligence and automation, innovations in customer service, and use of the Internet of Things.The main advantages of digitalization of motor insurance services during the period of martial law are identified.",
      "published": "2025-02-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32702/2306-6814.2025.3.85",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Вікторія Григорівна Костогриз",
        "Lesia Hariaha"
      ],
      "venue": "Investytsiyi praktyka ta dosvid",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.32702/2306-6814.2025.3.85",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32727/28.2024.3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "RFID Key Fobs in Vehicles: Unmasking Vulnerabilities and Strengthening Security",
      "description": "In modern vehicles, radio frequency identification (RFID) key fobs, a form of remote keyless entry (RKE), play a pivotal role in vehicular security and functionality. The goal of this research is to implement and demonstrate radio-based cyberphysical attacks against identified vulnerabilities associated with RFID key fobs and provide insights on how to fortify security precautions against such attacks. Furthermore, this research reviews and acknowledges pre-existing security features that have been implemented to prevent the recurrence of these vulnerabilities. An additional goal of this research is to discover the security disparity between RFID tags and readers from vehicles manufactured in the early 2000s and vehicles from the mid-2010s or later.",
      "published": "2023-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32727/28.2024.3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devon Magda",
        "Bryson R. Payne"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings on cybersecurity education, research and practice",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.32727/28.2024.3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32840/cpu2219-8741/2021.4(48).5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ТЕЛЕВІЗІЙНА ЕКОЛОГІЧНА ПРОСВІТА ТРЕВЕЛ-ШОУ «ОРЕЛ І РЕШКА. ЧУДО СВІТУ» 2020 Р. – ПЕРШОГО ПІВРІЧЧЯ 2021 Р",
      "description": "Purpose of the study: to contribute to improving the quality of environmental education by television for the formation of an environmental outlook, environmental culture of TV viewers. Methodology. The methodological basis of the research was formed by the types of scientific analysis of the content of the TV programs «Heads and Tails. Wonder of the World» 2020 – the first half of 2021 about foreign national parks, especially: system analysis, content analysis, comparison, synthesis. A descriptive method was used to show the role, functions, and significance of national natural parks in environmental education of the travel show «Heads and Tails. Wonders of the World». Content analysis helped to identify the types of ecotourism and specific methods of television environmental education. The method of comparing statistical data for the three semesters of the research period helped to identify trends in environmental education. Results. Environmental education in the travel show «Heads and Tails. Wonders of the world» is a demonstration of impressive landscapes, unique flora and fauna as a visual environmental education for education and formation of an ecological culture of TV viewers. The issues of the travel show «Heads and Tails. Wonders of the World» covered foreign travels to 5 reserves, 20 national parks of all continents which are protected by UNESCO as outstanding natural values of humanity, where the presenters really and financially contribute to the conservation of animals. Foreign national parks are described as unique nature conservation areas adapted for various types of ecotourism, environmental education, which have special cognitive, scientific, historical, cultural, recreational value, where museums, observation platforms, places for extreme sports and extreme entertainment are located. The novelty of the research is in a new subject of reproduction – environmental education of the travel show «Heads and Tails. Wonders of the World» 2020 – the first half of 2021; new objects of research – national natural parks as protected areas, showing the protection of the environment from clogging, excessive exploitation, the harmful effects of mass tourism, the peculiarities of television infotainment as a combination of ecological and cognitive function, with rehabilitation and entertainment during extreme sports, extreme entertainment on the territory national parks. Key words: environmental education, environmental outlook, environmental culture, travel show «Heads and Tails. Wonders of the World», infotainment, national parks.",
      "published": "2022-02-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32840/cpu2219-8741/2021.4(48).5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploitation",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "E. Kuznetsova"
      ],
      "venue": "State and Regions Series Social Communications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.32840/cpu2219-8741/2021.4(48).5",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32907/ro-119-110113",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ThreatSCOPE: Addressing software vulnerability in embedded systems",
      "description": "mbedded systems controlling complex systems, including medical devices, avionics, automotive and the Internet of Things (IoT), are becoming increasingly sophisticated.The software supporting these systems is growing more and more complex.As this complexity increases, so does the challenge in identifying vulnerabilities within the software, thus exacerbating the likelihood of cyber threats.These embedded systems rely on external data, such as user input and external sensors, and may be connected to public networks.Attackers can exploit the unique interactions that take place between systems and between users and systems in order to find weaknesses that enable them to leak information or take over control of the system.Moreover, it is impossible to test for these complex, data driven interactions.This makes the evaluation of a system's cyber-security attack surface a challenging problem.",
      "published": "2021-01-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32907/ro-119-110113",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "Research outreach",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.32907/ro-119-110113",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.32996/jcsts.2025.7.3.13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Property and Casualty Insurance: Technical Analysis and Market Overview",
      "description": "Property and Casualty (P&C) insurance represents a vital sector of the financial services industry, providing protection against physical damage and liability exposures for both individuals and businesses. This technical article explores the current state of the P&C insurance market, focusing on performance metrics, technical innovation vectors, and emerging challenges across personal and commercial lines. The document explores how technological advancement has transformed underwriting methodologies, claims processing capabilities, and risk assessment frameworks, while also addressing the regulatory structures that govern industry operations. From telematics implementation in personal auto to sophisticated catastrophe modeling for climate risks, the P&C sector continues to evolve through digital transformation initiatives that enhance operational efficiency while enabling more precise risk segmentation. As the industry confronts emerging perils such as cyber exposure and supply chain disruption, continued technical innovation remains essential for maintaining profitability and market relevance amid evolving risk landscapes.",
      "published": "2025-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.32996/jcsts.2025.7.3.13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "supply chain",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sameer Joshi"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Science and Technology Studies",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.32996/jcsts.2025.7.3.13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33012/2019.16999",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GNSS Functional Safety for the Autonomous Vehicle",
      "description": "Emerging autonomous driving applications are setting the pace of the innovation for the on board GNSS receiver. Position accuracy, high availability, robustness of operation and formal integrity of the observables are the priorities, which are giving rise and shaping a new class of automotive receiver components and architectures. Moreover, because the autonomous driving and ADAS are safety critical, on top of previous requirements there is also the requirement for Functional Safety (informally called FuSa) compliancy. The documents codifying Functional Safety for automotive are the ISO26262 part 1 to part 11. The ISO26262 complements the well-known reliability automotive standard AEC-Q100. With respect to FuSa, a system can be defined as functionally safe if it always operates correctly and predictably. More importantly, in the event of failures, the system must remain safe for persons. Lastly also security is becoming a paramount and a new standard for cybersecurity in automotive, the ISO/SAE 21434, is in development where for a GNSS receiver this means robustness versus jamming, spoofing and meaconing attacks. This contribution introduces the functional safety and the security aspects of the new STMicroelectronics TeseoAPP (STA9100) GNSS receiver chipset.",
      "published": "2019-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33012/2019.16999",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "jamming"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fabio Pisoni",
        "Giuseppe Avellone",
        "Domenico Di Grazia",
        "Antonio Silverio",
        "Jerome Durand",
        "J. Molina Garcia",
        "Enrique Domínguez Tijero",
        "Emanuela Falletti"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (Online)/Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (CD-ROM)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.33012/2019.16999",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33012/2020.17687",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analyzing Tesla‘s Level 2 Autonomous Driving System Under Different GNSS Spoofing Scenarios and Implementing Connected Services for Authentication and Reliability of GNSS Data",
      "description": "During a test drive on Tesla Model 3 vehicle, using Tesla’s Navigate on Autopilot feature, a staged attack caused the car to suddenly slow down and unexpectedly veer off the main road. Regulus Cyber initially discovered the Tesla vulnerability during its ongoing study on the threat that easily accessible spoofing technology poses to GNSS (global navigation satellite systems, also known as GPS) receivers. The researchers found that spoofing attacks on the Tesla GNSS (GPS) receiver could easily be carried out wirelessly and remotely, exploiting security vulnerabilities in mission-critical telematics, sensor fusion, time and navigation capabilities. During the extensive research done by Regulus Cyber, the spoofing was generated by a software defined radio and by using both static and dynamic spoofing scenarios, was able to affect various functions including route planning, automatic speed limit, lane changing, and actual turning off the highway. The experiment included various combinations of GNSS attacks, of both spoofing GPS and jamming other constellations in order to check for different methods of multi-constellation mitigation. The attacks also exposed different vectors to identify any check location-shift and check time-shift that were utilized. In addition, different sensor fusion methods were detected including odometer and compass integration with the GPS data. Another experiment included time spoofing, and explored the different aspects of time based spoofing and the collateral affects on GNSS based timing base stations used in telecom industry. The experiment concluded that in certain situations of time offset it is possible to manipulate the timing of a target system, even if it is utilizing its own back atomic clock or oscillator. The talk will explain both experiments, and the type of hardware and software that was used in the process in order to generate the spoofed signals. The research also included measuring and analyzing the effectiveness of a self-developed software library for detection of cybersecurity attacks and authentication and protection of GNSS. The talk will include a functional explanation of the algorithm, and how utilizing software only approach enables real time detection of incoming spoofing signals. The architecture of such spoofing detection solutions, is opening an array of options for multiple industries having to deal with interferences and malicious signals including: mobile, maritime, aviation, infrastructure and timing systems. This is especially vital in the case of small size factor or in the case of retrofitting an existing receiver with an over the air update. The talk will present the research that Regulus has done that highlights the vulnerabilities of both manned and autonomous vehicles and provide best practices for both automotive OEMs and the vehicle GNSS receiver manufacturers. Mr. Zangvil will also cover the different aspects and capabilities of spoofing detection using a software library, and explain the different approaches of both offline and connected solutions to augment GNSS security.",
      "published": "2020-09-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33012/2020.17687",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "telematics",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. Mit",
        "Yoav Zangvil",
        "Dror Katalan"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.33012/2020.17687",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33012/2022.18465",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ISO21434 Compliant Cybersecurity Concept for an Automotive Grade GNSS Receiver",
      "description": "The increase of electronic content for advanced features such as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), and autonomous driving, the use of Over-The-Air (OTA) for updating the related software (SW) combined with the increased number of reported hacking attacks to these systems have highlighted the need of introducing cybersecurity features in automotive products. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) have introduced regulations and standard respectively enforcing cybersecurity for automotive cars and components. This contribution introduces the cybersecurity concept and some security aspects for the evolution of the current STMicroelectronics GNSS receiver STA8100MA TeseoV/STA9100MGA TeseoAPP family, also briefly summarizing the cybersecurity development flow and its link with Functional Safety.",
      "published": "2022-10-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33012/2022.18465",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giuseppe Avellone",
        "Jerome Durand",
        "Fabio Pisoni",
        "Julien Couvrand",
        "Domenico Di Grazia",
        "Priyank Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (Online)/Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (CD-ROM)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.33012/2022.18465",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33093/jetap.2025.7.1.4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comprehensive Review of CAN Bus Security: Vulnerabilities, Cryptographic and IDS Approaches, and Countermeasures",
      "description": "Vehicle connectivity environments and advancements in vehicular technologies offer users both functional convenience and safety features, including remote diagnosis and assistance. To enable these capabilities, modern vehicles utilize various automotive serial protocols such as FlexRay, Local Interconnect Network (LIN), and the popular Controller Area Network (CAN). The CAN bus serves as a key protocol for in-vehicle networks (IVNs), facilitating the exchange of vehicle parameters among Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Despite its merits, the CAN bus has been found to have internal and external vulnerabilities. While numerous countermeasures are currently in place, the continuous advancements in vehicular interfaces have introduced new attack vectors, necessitating the development of additional safeguards. Existing research has primarily focused on CAN attacks initiated through direct interfaces, telematics and infotainment systems, and sensors. In this study, we aim to present an adversarial model for the CAN bus while also evaluating cryptographic and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) approaches considering real-time constraints and other relevant variables. Furthermore, we will classify available countermeasures into relevant categories and discuss their effectiveness. By conducting a comprehensive analysis of published works, our goal is to provide a comprehensive overview of CAN-related studies. This includes exploring potential mitigation techniques and identifying new research opportunities for IVNs. The synthesis of this information will offer valuable insights into the current state of CAN security, the challenges it faces, and the directions for future exploration. In summary, our study aims to address the vulnerabilities of the CAN bus, considering both existing and emerging attack vectors. By examining cryptographic and IDS approaches, we will assess their viability in real-time scenarios. Additionally, we will categorize and discuss the effectiveness of available countermeasures. Through this analysis, we strive to provide a holistic understanding of CAN-related research, paving the way for prospective mitigation techniques and identifying new horizons for IVNs.",
      "published": "2025-03-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33093/jetap.2025.7.1.4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omer Fayyaz Khan",
        "Muhammad Mubashir",
        "Jawaid Iqbal"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Engineering Technology and Applied Physics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.33093/jetap.2025.7.1.4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33093/jiwe.2024.3.3.13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Editorial: Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity in Pervasive Computing",
      "description": "Pervasive computing, or ubiquitous computing, is rapidly increasing in capacity and capabilities. With the Internet of Things (IoT) becoming an integral part of daily life and the growing availability of edge computing resources, automation guided by data is advancing applications in healthcare, manufacturing, automotive, and other areas. It's natural that pervasive computing will intersect with artificial intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity. AI can improve detection, prediction, and anticipative responses to human needs, while cybersecurity addresses topics like misuse prevention, ethics, policies, and governance. This issue features seven articles on these intersections, including four AI articles exploring natural language processing and computer vision, and three cybersecurity articles covering cryptography, medical devices, and maritime security.",
      "published": "2024-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33093/jiwe.2024.3.3.13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ji‐Jian Chin"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Informatics and Web Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.33093/jiwe.2024.3.3.13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33097/jncta.2023.07.12.2058",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-vehicle Network Intrusion Detection Using Supervised and Unsupervised Deep Learning",
      "description": "최근 차량 내부와 외부 네트워크를 연결하는 차량 내 네트워크 기술이 발전함에 따라 CAN(Controller Area Network)을 통해 다양한 정보를 실시간으로 교환할 수 있다. 하지만 CAN 네트워크는 사이버 공격에 취약 하다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 지도 및 비지도 딥러닝 모델 기반 침입 탐지 방법을 제안한다. 실험 데이터로는 CAN ID로 구성된 시계열 데이터를 사용하였다. 지도학습 기반 침입 탐지 방법은 전반적으로 높은 탐지 성능을 보였다. 정상 데이터로만 학습하여 탐지하는 비지도 기반 방식의 경우에도 CAN에 오작동을 일으킬 수 있는 새로운 공격 유형(Spoofing, DoS)에 대한 탐지율이 높았다. 비지도학습을 위해 LSTM(Long Short-Term Memory) 기반 오 토인코더와 IF(Isolation Forest)를 사용하였다. 따라서 제안한 기법은 알려진 공격 외에 새로운 공격을 탐지하는 데도 효과적인 것을 확인하였다.",
      "published": "2023-12-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33097/jncta.2023.07.12.2058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Heeyeon Kim",
        "Kangseok Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "The Journal of Next-generation Convergence Technology Association",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.33097/jncta.2023.07.12.2058",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33564/ijeast.2023.v07i10.024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "REVIEW PAPER: SMART GPS GEOFENCING SYSTEM",
      "description": "Nearly everything around us holds significance, be it data, expensive items, land, people and/or animals. It is essential that we keep all that matters to us safe and secure. To employ the highest form of security, we want to keep track of all the significant things on our own. This gives rise to the need for the meantime tracking of anything which is highly valuable to us. Hence, GPS tracking is employed in this technological solution to keep track. Innovative technology, based on telematics and satellite positioning, is the subject of this study on geofencing. With the use of geofencing technology, users can create virtual boundaries in the context of the actual world. By automatically detecting when monitored mobile items enter or leave geographical areas that are encircled by a virtual fence, it aids in the surveillance of those areas. A geofence is a virtual barrier that is set up around a specific region of interest utilizing several technologies, including Wi-Fi, cellular mobile, RFID, and GPS. A specific radius area on the map can be specified by the user. If any entry or exit is made from that location, they will be updated in real time. This assures the asset's safety and security and provides a system for inspection to deter any unwanted activity.",
      "published": "2023-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33564/ijeast.2023.v07i10.024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "surveillance",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adyasri Sinha",
        "Anmol Singh",
        "Aditya Baghel"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Engineering Applied Sciences and Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.33564/ijeast.2023.v07i10.024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33640/2405-609x.1016",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Features Of Designing The Architecture Of Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "description": "In the global experience, intelligent transport systems (ITS) are recognized as a general transport ideology for integrating the achievements of telematics in all types of transport activities to solve economic and social problems: reducing accidents, improving the efficiency of public transport and cargo transportation, ensuring overall transport security, and improving environmental performance. Considering the design features of the intelligent transport system (ITS), there is a need to develop requirements for the functional and physical architecture as the main part of the ITS development. The creation of functional and physical architecture touches upon issues such as: the scheme of interaction between subjects and objects of ITS proceeding from the requirements and interests of the customer; the definition of the interaction functions of individual elements and subsystems; structure of software, hardware of information and telecommunication technologies; places and methods of installing such systems; interaction and placement of the ITS element base. In this paper, we offer an overview of the main features of ITS design, and the identification of general regularities in the process of their design.",
      "published": "2019-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33640/2405-609x.1016",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaffar Daeibal",
        "Vyacheslav S. Lapshin",
        "Dmitry Elkin",
        "Кучеров Сергей Александрович"
      ],
      "venue": "Karbala International Journal of Modern Science",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.33640/2405-609x.1016",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33744/0365-8171-2023-114.1-034-044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT MODEL for ROAD TRANSPORT SYSTEMS INFORMATION SECURITY",
      "description": "The problem of transportation safety was and will be exist. Transport safety is the target of the functioning of the transport organizational and technical system, that is composed for achieve the situation (set of situations) of the vehicle operating, fixed at a specific point of time, characterized by the accidents absence or the optimization of quantitative safety and environmental performance indicators over a specified period of time. Violation of this equilibrium leads to emergencies. It is necessary to have an operational safety management system in place for transport that works to prevent, preservating accidents and reduce the risk of their occurrence. Promising direction for improvement of monitoring information support of auto transport systems is driver operative informing by telematics ways about system technical condition while driving. In the event of a problem situation, the specialist will play out scenarios for its solution. To make the right and operative decision, the specialist must be an expert, and the path to the expert lasts at least 10 years. There is a necessity to create intelligent expert systems that will determine the actual condition of the vehicle that will based on the obtained parameters, through engineering knowledge, will let to make decisions and to pass it on to the device, that will informing the driver for necessity to execute a specific scenario. While solving most of the tasks related to ensuring the safety of traffic and the organization of passengers and cargo transportation in economic activity process, there is a necessity to ensure the monitoring of motor transport systems through the introduction of informational, telecommunication and satellite technologies of automotive systems and units diagnostic centers. In the presence of sufficient quantity and quality of parametric sensors that record and transmit data on the current technical condition of truck systems and units and the presence of operating diagnostic algorithms in remote informational and analytical centers, sudden failures of truck systems and units that are performing transport work and are located at a considerable distance from their own service stations can be avoided.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33744/0365-8171-2023-114.1-034-044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ігор Павлович Гамеляк",
        "Andij Dmytrychenko",
        "Oleksandr Alieksieienko",
        "Yuliia Artemchuk"
      ],
      "venue": "Automobile Roads and Road Construction",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.33744/0365-8171-2023-114.1-034-044",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33832/ijca.2019.12.5.02",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerabilities of Can Bus & Automobile Security",
      "description": "In an automobile, CAN-bus is the centralized networking system on which Electronic Control Units(ECUs) or nodes broadcast messages or data.Automobile security threats have gone from hypothesis to reality.It is possible for a hacker to remotely control ECUs by means of freeware applications and devices.As a result, the modern automobile presents a broad attack surface and a multitude of potential vulnerabilities to exploit.Security of the CAN-bus can be improved by introducing a monitoring node into the network and using cryptographic techniques.This research highlights the elements of the CAN-bus network, cryptographic methods and suggestions for future development and safety of an automobile.",
      "published": "2019-05-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33832/ijca.2019.12.5.02",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sahid Irfan",
        "R. Udayakumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Control and Automation",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.33832/ijca.2019.12.5.02",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3389/fenrg.2022.928919",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Ontology-Based Dynamic Attack Graph Generation Approach for the Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "With the development of automobile intelligence, the security of the Internet of Vehicles has become a key factor that affects the development of intelligent vehicles. However, existing security risk analysis methods for the IoV either focus only on certain levels, such as the component level, or perform only a static analysis. This paper proposes a dynamic attack graph generation method for the IoV to identify and visually display the security risks caused by the associated vulnerabilities in an IoV system. First, using the actual architecture of the IoV, this paper shows how to model the security elements and their relationships in the IoV system and proposes a network security ontology model for this system. Second, it shows how to construct a reasoning rule base according to the causal relationship between the vulnerabilities using the Semantic Web Rule Language Finally, in view of the rapid change in the network topology of the IoV, a dynamic attack graph generation algorithm based on an ontology reasoning engine is proposed, which can effectively reduce the overhead caused by the changes in the attack graph. The effectiveness of the algorithm is demonstrated through an actual security event scenario and a constructed scenario. The experimental results show that the algorithm can dynamically and accurately display the network attack graph of the IoV. The proposed method is helpful in globally analyzing the threat caused by the combined exploitation of the vulnerabilities in an IoV system and risk management.",
      "published": "2022-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2022.928919",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "exploitation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuning Hou",
        "Xiuzhen Chen",
        "Jin Ma",
        "Zhihong Zhou",
        "Haiyang Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Frontiers in Energy Research",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3389/fenrg.2022.928919",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3389/fenrg.2023.1338807",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bi-level optimal dispatching of distribution network considering friendly interaction with electric vehicle aggregators",
      "description": "The widespread application of electric vehicles (EVs) is a positive force driving green development. However, their widespread penetration also poses significant challenges and threats to the security and stable operation of the power grid. To address this urgent issue, this article constructs a bi-level optimal dispatching model fostering collaboration between electric vehicle aggregators and the distribution network. The upper-level optimization targets the minimization of peak-valley differences in the distribution network via considerably arranging power outputs of gas turbines, while the lower-level one focuses on reducing the charging expense of EV aggregators via efficient charging transfer. Note that the charging expense is not only composed of electric cost but also a dynamic carbon emission factor-based cost, which contributes to the electricity economy and carbon reduction concurrently. A geometric mean optimizer (GMO) is introduced to solve the mode. Its efficiency is evaluated against three typical algorithms, i.e., genetic algorithm, great-wall construction algorithm, and optimization algorithm based on an extended IEEE 33-bus system with different charging behaviors of EVs on both a typical weekday and weekend. Simulation results demonstrate that the GMO outperforms other competitive algorithms in accuracy and stability. The peak-valley difference between the distribution network and the total cost of EV aggregators can be decreased by over 98% and 76%, respectively.",
      "published": "2023-12-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2023.1338807",
      "matched_terms": [
        "penetration",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xin Shen",
        "Jiahao Li",
        "Yu-Jun Yin",
        "Jianlin Tang",
        "X. Lin",
        "Bin Qian"
      ],
      "venue": "Frontiers in Energy Research",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3389/fenrg.2023.1338807",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3389/fenrg.2024.1491332",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing unmanned aerial vehicle and smart grid communication security using a ConvLSTM model for intrusion detection",
      "description": "The emergence of small-drone technology has revolutionized the way we use drones. Small drones leverage the Internet of Things (IoT) to deliver location-based navigation services, making them versatile tools for various applications. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication networks and smart grid communication protocols share several similarities, particularly in terms of their architecture, the nature of the data they handle, and the security challenges they face. To ensure the safe, secure, and reliable operation of both, it is imperative to establish a secure and dependable network infrastructure and to develop and implement robust security and privacy mechanisms tailored to the specific needs of this domain. The research evaluates the performance of deep learning models, including convolutional neural networks (CNN), long short-term memory (LSTM), CNN-LSTM, and convolutional long short-term memory (ConvLSTM), in detecting intrusions within UAV communication networks. The study utilizes five diverse and realistic datasets, namely, KDD Cup-99, NSL-KDD, WSN-DS, CICIDS 2017, and Drone, to simulate real-world intrusion scenarios. Notably, the ConvLSTM model consistently achieves an accuracy of 99.99%, showcasing its potential in securing UAVs from cyber threats. By demonstrating its superior performance, this work highlights the importance of tailored security mechanisms in safeguarding UAV technology against evolving cyber threats. Ultimately, this research contributes to the growing body of knowledge on UAV security, emphasizing the necessity of high-quality datasets and advanced models in ensuring the safe, secure, and reliable operation of UAV systems across various industries.",
      "published": "2024-12-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2024.1491332",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Raed S. Alharthi"
      ],
      "venue": "Frontiers in Energy Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3389/fenrg.2024.1491332",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3389/frcmn.2023.1122231",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Employing automotive security to improve the security of unmanned aerial vehicles",
      "description": "The concern about cyber threats on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) increases as they become more sophisticated and widely used in various areas. Although there have been efforts to improve the security of UAVs, their focus is limited to physical attacks and securing communication, and many areas remain open to issues. Although a more comprehensive approach is required to improve the overall areas of UAVs, it is reasonable to investigate the case study from the perspective of other similar cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Thus, we see the architectural similarity between UAVs and automobiles. Automotive security has seen significant improvement throughout the last decade as vehicles have begun to have connectivity and autonomy. There have been extensive research and development efforts in various aspects, including securing the components, securing communications, securing software updates, and securing the overall management system to provide multi-layered security for the automotive environments, and standardization and regulations are being issued. Due to the similarity, the employment of ideas from the automotive environments in the UAV environments becomes a reasonable approach. In this paper, we show the automotive security trends and discuss how UAV environments are comparable to automotive environments. We then show how security in automotives is adapted in UAVs with a case study.",
      "published": "2023-05-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/frcmn.2023.1122231",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyusuk Han"
      ],
      "venue": "Frontiers in Communications and Networks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3389/frcmn.2023.1122231",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/a16020112",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V-SOC4AS: A Vehicle-SOC for Improving Automotive Security",
      "description": "Integrating embedded systems into next-generation vehicles is proliferating as they increase safety, efficiency, and driving comfort. These functionalities are provided by hundreds of electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate with each other using various protocols that, if not properly designed, may be vulnerable to local or remote attacks. The paper presents a vehicle-security operation center for improving automotive security (V-SOC4AS) to enhance the detection, response, and prevention of cyber-attacks in the automotive context. The goal is to monitor in real-time each subsystem of intra-vehicle communication, that is controller area network (CAN), local interconnect network (LIN), FlexRay, media oriented systems transport (MOST), and Ethernet. Therefore, to achieve this goal, security information and event management (SIEM) was used to monitor and detect malicious attacks in intra-vehicle and inter-vehicle communications: messages transmitted between vehicle ECUs; infotainment and telematics systems, which provide passengers with entertainment capabilities and information about the vehicle system; and vehicular ports, which allow vehicles to connect to diagnostic devices, upload content of various types. As a result, this allows the automation and improvement of threat detection and incident response processes. Furthermore, the V-SOC4AS allows the classification of the received message as malicious and non-malicious and acquisition of additional information about the type of attack. Thus, this reduces the detection time and provides more support for response activities. Experimental evaluation was conducted on two state-of-the-art attacks: denial of service (DoS) and fuzzing. An open-source dataset was used to simulate the vehicles. V-SOC4AS exploits security information and event management to analyze the packets sent by a vehicle using a rule-based mechanism. If the payload contains a CAN frame attack, it is notified to the SOC analysts.",
      "published": "2023-02-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/a16020112",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "flexray",
        "infotainment",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Mirko De Vincentiis",
        "Azzurra Ragone",
        "Michele Scalera",
        "Manuel Serrano"
      ],
      "venue": "Algorithms",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/a16020112",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 32,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/ai5030061",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recent Advances in 3D Object Detection for Self-Driving Vehicles: A Survey",
      "description": "The development of self-driving or autonomous vehicles has led to significant advancements in 3D object detection technologies, which are critical for the safety and efficiency of autonomous driving. Despite recent advances, several challenges remain in sensor integration, handling sparse and noisy data, and ensuring reliable performance across diverse environmental conditions. This paper comprehensively surveys state-of-the-art 3D object detection techniques for autonomous vehicles, emphasizing the importance of multi-sensor fusion techniques and advanced deep learning models. Furthermore, we present key areas for future research, including enhancing sensor fusion algorithms, improving computational efficiency, and addressing ethical, security, and privacy concerns. The integration of these technologies into real-world applications for autonomous driving is presented by highlighting potential benefits and limitations. We also present a side-by-side comparison of different techniques in a tabular form. Through a comprehensive review, this paper aims to provide insights into the future directions of 3D object detection and its impact on the evolution of autonomous driving.",
      "published": "2024-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ai5030061",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Oluwajuwon A. Fawole",
        "Danda B. Rawat"
      ],
      "venue": "AI",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/ai5030061",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app10010217",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure D2D Communication for 5G IoT Network Based on Lightweight Cryptography",
      "description": "Device-to-device (D2D) communication is a direct means of communication between devices without an intermediate node, and it helps to expand cell coverage and to increase radio frequency reuse in a 5G network. Moreover, D2D communication is a core technology of 5G vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, which is an essential technology for autonomous driving. However, typical D2D communication in an 4G network which is typical telecommunication network has various security challenges including impersonation, eavesdropping, privacy sniffing, free-riding attack, etc. Moreover, when IoT technology emerges with 5G networks in massive machine type communication (mMTC) and ultra-reliable low latency communication (URLLC) application scenarios, these security challenges are more crucial and harder to mitigate because of the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices. To solve the security challenges in a 5G IoT environment, we need a lightweight and secure D2D communication system that can provide secure authentication, data confidentiality/integrity and anonymity. In this paper, we survey and analyze existing results about secure D2D communication systems in terms of their security considerations and limitations. Then, we lastly propose a secure D2D communication system to address the aforementioned security challenges and the limitations of the existing results. The proposed secure D2D communication was designed based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and lightweight authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) ciphers to cover resource-constrained IoT devices.",
      "published": "2019-12-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app10010217",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Byoungjin Seok",
        "Jose Costa Sapalo Sicato",
        "Erzhena Tcydenova",
        "Canshou Xuan",
        "Yi Feng Pan",
        "Jong Hyuk Park"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/app10010217",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 91,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app13031675",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cryptographic Protocol with Keyless Sensors Authentication for WBAN in Healthcare Applications",
      "description": "Nowadays, technological advances provide people with more facilities and luxuries in life. Medicine is no exception; for example, different wireless sensors can be used to monitor patients’ state of health. These sensors are used in the so-called Wireless Body Area Networks (WBAN), to improve the efficiency of doctor-patient activities at any time, in any body area, and anywhere. However, health data contains sensitive information that becomes a critical issue requiring special attention when transmitted within a WBAN. In other words, WBAN must be protected from malicious devices that intercept, alter or access without authorization or even deny the health information being transmitted. In this article, we present the design of a new cryptographic protocol that guarantees three security services, authentication, confidentiality, and integrity by securing sensitive information communication through a WBAN. We also consider a keyless sensors authentication method to distinguish whether or not the devices are placed on the same individual’s body. A formal analysis of the protocol is carried out using cryptographic protocol verification tools to guarantee its correct construction and that it provides appropriate security.",
      "published": "2023-01-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app13031675",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kevin Andrae Delgado-Vargas",
        "Gina Gallegos-García",
        "Ponciano Jorge Escamilla-Ambrosio"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/app13031675",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app13031959",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy in Connected Vehicle Cyber Physical System Using Zero Knowledge Succinct Non Interactive Argument of Knowledge over Blockchain",
      "description": "Security has been the most widely researched topic, particularly within IoT, and has been considered as the major hurdle in the adoption of different applications of IoT. When it comes to IoV, security is considered as the most inevitable component to ensure a safe and smooth driving experience. CAV is the new era of transportation, integrating intelligence and self-driving capabilities within vehicles and that requires strong security measures to ensure safety. Security alone is not enough. Instead, a complete package including privacy of the vehicles and passengers needs to be added in addition to secure communication. This is because CAVs are under continuous cyber threats and attacks and the most important among them is the DDoS, where a remote attacker can hijack/launch attacks on vehicles remotely. Single point of failure attacks target the centralized trusted body in order to mislead the connected vehicles for personal gains. In this paper, the authors have proposed a secure communication system for CAVs using blockchain, which also ensures the privacy of the vehicle/people. The paper highlights the major components of the proposed system, and its performance is evaluated to check its efficiency against DDoS and Eclipse attacks. The unlinkability and anonymity of the vehicles have been ensured using the zk-SNAKR protocol over Blockchain.",
      "published": "2023-02-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app13031959",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hijack",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rabia Khan",
        "Amjad Mehmood",
        "Zeeshan Iqbal",
        "Carsten R. Maple",
        "Gregory Epiphaniou"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/app13031959",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 30,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3963,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/app13031959 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: personal, strong, requires, intelligence, where, physical, applications, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app13053014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Aspects of Cyber Security in Autonomous and Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "An automobile is a computer on wheels after the integration of electronics. This handshake of electronics and mechanical systems makes a vehicle smart, and comfortable; driver assistance for achieving this involves data exchange and surroundings sensing. Devices such as sensors, telematics, protocols, etc., are responsible for data exchange and data sensing. This process contains some loopholes that are the preliminary sources for the attacker to attack the vulnerable devices to control the vehicle. This article provides a review of possible attacks and defenses on autonomous and connected vehicles. The attacker’s area of autonomous and connected vehicles is classified into three categories that are safety system attacks, connectivity attacks, and diagnostics attacks, and provided all possible defenses for those attacks. In addition, we provided an analysis of the domain to understand the scenarios in this domain, recommendations, and future scope in this area for further work.",
      "published": "2023-02-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app13053014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "connected vehicles",
        "driver assistance",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bhavesh Raju Mudhivarthi",
        "Prabhat Thakur",
        "Ghanshyam Kumar Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/app13053014",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app13074591",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Mitigating Jellyfish Attacks Based on Honesty Metrics in V2X Autonomous Networks",
      "description": "In vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, security and safety are inherently difficult tasks due to the distinct characteristics of such networks, such as their highly dynamic topology and frequent connectivity disruptions. Jellyfish attacks are a sort of denial of service attack that are challenging to deal with, since they conform to protocol norms while impairing network performance, particularly in terms of communication overhead and reliability. Numerous existing approaches have developed new techniques with which to identify and prevent these attacks; however, no approach has been capable of facing all three types of Jellyfish attacks, which include reordering attacks, delay variance attacks, and periodic drop attacks. In this work, we design a new protocol that analyzes the behavior of every node in a network and selects the trusted routes for data transmission to their intended destination by calculating different Honesty metrics. The OMNET++ simulator was used to evaluate the overall performance of the proposed protocol. Various evaluation metrics, such as the packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, and throughput, are considered and compared with other existing approaches.",
      "published": "2023-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app13074591",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Messaoud Benguenane",
        "A. Korichi",
        "Bouziane Brik",
        "Nadjet Azzaoui"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/app13074591",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app13169374",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Prevention of Controller Area Network (CAN) Attacks on Electric Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The importance of vehicle security has increased in recent years in the automotive field, drawing the attention of both the industry and academia. This is due to the rise in cybersecurity threats caused by (1) the increase in vehicle connectivity schemes, such as the Internet of Things, vehicle-to-x communication, and over-the-air updates, and (2) the increased impact of such threats because of the added functionalities that are controlled by vehicle software. These causes and threats are further amplified in autonomous vehicles, which are generally equipped with more electronic control units (ECUs) that are connected through controller area networks (CANs). Due to the holistic nature of CANs, attacks on the networks can affect the functionality of all vehicle ECUs and the whole system. This can lead to a breach of privacy, denial of services, alteration of vehicle performance, and exposure to safety threats. Although cryptographic encryption and authentication algorithms and intrusion detection systems (IDS) are currently being used to detect and prevent CAN bus attacks, they have certain limitations. Therefore, this study proposed a mitigation scheme that can detect and prevent such attacks at the ECU level, which could address the limitations of existing algorithms. This study proposed the usage of a secure boot scheme to detect and prevent the execution of malicious codes, as the presence of one or more ECUs with a malicious code is the root cause of most CAN bus attacks. Secure boot schemes apply cryptographic data integrity algorithms to ensure that only authentic and untampered software can run on the vehicle’s ECUs. The selection of an appropriate cryptographic algorithm is important because it affects the secure boot schemes’ security level and performance. Therefore, this study also tested and compared the performance of the proposed secure boot scheme with five different data security algorithms implemented using the hardware security module (HSM) of the TC399 32-bit AURIXTM TriCoreTM microcontroller through an electric autonomous vehicle’s control unit. The tests showed that the two most favorable schemes with the selected hardware are the secure boot scheme with the cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC), because it possesses the highest performance with an execution rate of 26.07 (ms/MB), and the secure boot scheme with the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA), because it provides a higher security level with an acceptable compromise in speed. This study also introduced and tested a novel variation of the ECDSA algorithm based on the CMAC algorithm, which was found to have a 19% performance gain over the standard ECDSA-based secure boot scheme.",
      "published": "2023-08-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app13169374",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Salah Adly",
        "Ahmed Moro",
        "Sherif Hammad",
        "Shady Ahmed Maged"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/app13169374",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app13169397",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MT-SOTA: A Merkle-Tree-Based Approach for Secure Software Updates over the Air in Automotive Systems",
      "description": "The automotive industry has seen a dynamic transformation from traditional hardware-defined to software-defined architecture enabling higher levels of autonomy and connectivity, better safety and security features, as well as new in-vehicle experiences and richer functions through software and ongoing updates of both functional and safety-critical features. Service-oriented architecture plays a pivotal role in realizing software-defined vehicles and fostering new business models for OEMs. Such architecture evolution demands new development paradigms to address the increasing complexity of software. This is crucial to guarantee seamless software development, integration, and deployment—all the way from cloud or backend repositories to the vehicle. Additionally, it calls for enhanced collaboration between car manufacturers and suppliers. Simultaneously, it introduces challenges associated with the necessity for ongoing updates and support ensuring vehicles remain safe and up to date. Current approaches to software updates have primarily been implemented for traditional vehicle architectures, which mostly comprise specialized electronic control units (ECUs) designed for specific functions. These ECUs are programmed with a single comprehensive executable that is then flashed onto the ECU all at once. Different approaches should be considered for new software-based vehicle architectures and specifically for ECUs with multiple independent software packages. These packages should be updated independently and selectively for each ECU. Thus, we propose a new scheme for software updates based on a Merkle tree approach to cope with the complexity of the new software architecture while addressing safety and security requirements of real-time and resource-constrained embedded systems in the vehicle. The Merkle-tree-based software updates over the air (MT-SOTA) proposal enables secure updates for individual software clusters. These clusters are developed and integrated by diverse entities with varying release timelines. Our study demonstrates that the MT-SOTA scheme can enhance the speed of software update execution without significantly increasing the process overhead. Additionally, it offers necessary defense against potential cyberthreats. The results of the performed technical analysis and experiments of the MT-SOTA implementation are presented in this paper.",
      "published": "2023-08-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app13169397",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abir Bazzi",
        "Adnan Shaout",
        "Di Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/app13169397",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app14010204",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ICVTest: A Practical Black-Box Penetration Testing Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity of Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) are equipped with extensive electronic control units which offer convenience but also pose significant cybersecurity risks. Penetration testing, recommended in ISO/SAE 21434 “Road vehicles—Cybersecurity engineering”, is an effective approach to identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICVs. However, there is limited research on vehicle penetration testing from a black-box perspective due to the complex architecture of ICVs. Additionally, no penetration testing framework has been proposed to guide security testers on conducting penetration testing for the whole vehicle. The lack of framework guidance results in the inexperienced security testers being uncertain about the processes to follow for conducting penetration testing. Moreover, the inexperienced security testers are unsure about which tests to perform in order to systematically evaluate the vehicle’s cybersecurity. To enhance the penetration testing efficiency of ICVs, this paper presents a black-box penetration testing framework, ICVTest. ICVTest proposes a standardized penetration testing process to facilitate step-by-step completion of the penetration testing, thereby addressing the issue of inexperienced testers lacking guidance on how to initiate work when confronted with ICV. Also, ICVTest includes 10 sets of test cases covering hardware and software security tests. Testers can select appropriate test cases based on the specific cybersecurity threats faced by the target object, thereby reducing the complexity of penetration testing tasks. Furthermore, we have developed a vehicle cybersecurity testing platform for ICVTest that seamlessly integrates various testing tools. The platform enables even novice testers to conduct vehicle black-box penetration testing in accordance with the given guidance which addresses the current industry’s challenge of an overwhelming number of testing tasks coupled with a shortage of skilled professionals. For the first time, we propose a comprehensive black-box penetration testing framework and implement the framework in the form of a cybersecurity testing platform. We apply ICVTest to evaluate an electric vehicle manufactured in 2021 for assessing the framework’s availability. With the aid of ICVTest, even testers with limited experience in automotive penetration can effectively evaluate the security risks of ICVs. In our experiments, numerous cybersecurity vulnerabilities were identified involving in-vehicle sensors, remote vehicle control systems, and in-vehicle controller area network (CAN) bus.",
      "published": "2023-12-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app14010204",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haichun Zhang",
        "Jie Wang",
        "Yijie Wang",
        "Minfeng Li",
        "Jinghan Song",
        "Zhenglin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/app14010204",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.49,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/app14010204 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: extensive, vehicle., limited, even, sensors, there, risks, significant."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app14072805",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Windowed Hamming Distance-Based Intrusion Detection for the CAN Bus",
      "description": "The use of a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in the automotive industry for connecting electronic control units (ECUs) poses security vulnerabilities due to the lack of built-in security features. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have emerged as a practical solution for safeguarding the CAN bus. However, developing an effective IDS for in-vehicle CAN buses encounters challenges in achieving high precision for detecting attacks and meeting real-time requirements with limited computational resources. To address these challenges, we propose a novel method for anomaly detection on CAN data using windowed Hamming distance. Our approach utilizes sliding windows and Hamming distance to extract features from time series data. By creating benchmark windows that span at least one cycle of data, we compare newly generated windows with recorded benchmarks using the Hamming distance to identify abnormal CAN messages. During the experimental phase, we conduct extensive testing on both the public car-hack dataset and a proprietary dataset. The experimental results indicate that our method achieves an impressive accuracy of up to 99.67% in detecting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and an accuracy of 98.66% for fuzzing attacks. In terms of two types of spoofing attacks, our method achieves detection accuracies of 99.48% and 99.61%, respectively, significantly outperforming the methods relying solely on the Hamming distance. Furthermore, in terms of detection time, our method significantly reduces the time consumption by nearly 20-fold compared to the approach using deep convolutional neural networks (DCNN), decreasing it from 6.7 ms to 0.37 ms.",
      "published": "2024-03-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app14072805",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siwei Fang",
        "Guiqi Zhang",
        "Yufeng Li",
        "Jiangtao Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/app14072805",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app14114646",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Transportation System Technologies, Challenges and Security",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) first appeared in 1868 with traffic lights. With developing technology, the need to bring a smart approach to transportation applications within the scope of speed and environmental protection has emerged. Protecting ITS infrastructure against cyber attacks has become a matter of reputation for states. It is essential to provide the necessary technological infrastructure for the integrated operation of the systems used in ITS, especially geographical location, communication, and mapping. These technological developments bring cyber attacks, risks, and many dangers that should be avoided, especially on the systems used. This study examines ITS architecture, applications, communication technologies, and new trend technologies in detail. This study includes contributing to studies in the field of ITS and preventing attacks and incidents that may occur in terms of cyber security. The most important cyber attacks that may occur in ITS applications are included. In addition, the minimum security requirements that can be taken in ITS applications and infrastructures against these attacks are included.",
      "published": "2024-05-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app14114646",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "İsa Avcı",
        "Murat Koca"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/app14114646",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 46,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app14135487",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multiple Intrusion Detection Using Shapley Additive Explanations and a Heterogeneous Ensemble Model in an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’s Controller Area Network",
      "description": "Recently, methods to detect DoS and spoofing attacks that occur on in-vehicle networks using CAN Protocol are being studied through deep learning models such as CNN, RNN, and LSTM. These studies have produced significant results in the field of In-Vehicle Network attack detection using deep learning models. In addition, significant results are being achieved through research on applying time series-based deep learning models such as LSTM to detect DoS attacks and replay attacks occurring in in-drone networks by expanding them to drones using the UAVCAN protocol. In this paper, we conducted an experiment to detect in-drone network attacks through non-time series analysis using machine learning models and deep learning models, and through appropriate learning for each attack type, it can also be analyzed through non-time series analysis. The results showed that it was possible to detect attacks.",
      "published": "2024-06-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app14135487",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Young-Woo Hong",
        "Dong-Young Yoo"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/app14135487",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app14135648",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: A Pairing Approach and Machine Learning Integration",
      "description": "The automotive sector faces escalating security risks due to advances in wireless communication technology. Expanding on our previous research using a sensor pairing technique and machine learning models to evaluate IoT sensor data reliability, this study broadens its scope to address security concerns in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs). The objectives of this research include identifying and mitigating specific security vulnerabilities related to CAVs, thereby establishing a comprehensive understanding of the risks these vehicles face. Additionally, our study introduces two innovative pairing approaches. The first approach focuses on pairing Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within individual vehicles, while the second extends to pairing entire vehicles, termed as vehicle pairing. Rigorous preprocessing of the dataset was carried out to ensure its readiness for subsequent model training. Leveraging Support Vector Machine (SVM) and TinyML methods for data validation and attack detection, we have been able to achieve an impressive accuracy rate of 97.2%. The proposed security approach notably contributes to the security of CAVs against potential cyber threats. The experimental setup demonstrates the practical application and effectiveness of TinyML in embedded systems within CAVs. Importantly, our proposed solution ensures that these security enhancements do not impose additional memory or network loads on the ECUs. This is accomplished by delegating the intensive cross-validation to the central module or Roadside Units (RSUs). This novel approach not only contributes to mitigating various security loopholes, but paves the way for scalable, efficient solutions for resource-constrained automotive systems.",
      "published": "2024-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app14135648",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Usman Ahmad",
        "Mu Han",
        "Shahid Mahmood"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/app14135648",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app15031328",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Image Segmentation Framework for Detecting Adversarial Attacks for Autonomous Driving Cars",
      "description": "The widespread deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs) in critical real-time applications has spurred significant research into their security and robustness. A key vulnerability identified is that DNN decisions can be maliciously altered by introducing carefully crafted noise into the input data, leading to erroneous predictions. This is known as an adversarial attack. In this paper, we propose a novel detection framework leveraging segmentation masks and image segmentation techniques to identify adversarial attacks on DNNs, particularly in the context of autonomous driving systems. Our defense technique considers two levels of adversarial detection. The first level mainly detects adversarial inputs with large perturbations using the U-net model and one-class support vector machine (SVM). The second level of defense proposes a dynamic segmentation algorithm based on the k-means algorithm and a verifier model that controls the final prediction of the input image. To evaluate our approach, we comprehensively compare our method to the state-of-the-art feature squeeze method under a white-box attack, using eleven distinct adversarial attacks across three benchmark and heterogeneous data sets. The experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our framework, achieving overall detection rates exceeding 96% across all adversarial techniques and data sets studied. It is worth mentioning that our method enhances the detection rates of FGSM and BIM attacks, reaching average detection rates of 95.65% as opposed to 62.63% in feature squeezing across the three data sets.",
      "published": "2025-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app15031328",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Fakhr Aldeen Sattout",
        "Ali Chehab",
        "Ammar Mohanna",
        "Razane Tajeddine"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/app15031328",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app15031400",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) Analysis of an Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) System",
      "description": "To ensure security and stable quality, deeper cybersecurity evaluations are essential for the development of safety features and functionalities in vehicles. Among these, the Autonomous emergency braking (AEB) system is the most relevant. This research presents a comprehensive Threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) of the AEB system, emphasizing the identification, validation, and mitigation of major cybersecurity threats and risks. We systematically examine potential attack vectors by utilizing the STRIDE threat model. This approach enables a detailed analysis of each security threat associated with AEB systems, providing insights into how malicious actors could use the attack paths. The assessment aligns with ISO/SAE 21434, which offers a robust framework for risk management in automotive cybersecurity and IT security, ensuring a thorough evaluation of a system’s architecture. By assessing the AEB system’s architecture against these standards, we identify key components and communication pathways that may be particularly prone to cyberattacks. The results of this analysis highlight critical flaws within the AEB framework and propose corrective measures to enhance cybersecurity resilience. This article provides a structured methodology for assessing and mitigating automotive cybersecurity risks in compliance with industry standards, aiming to facilitate the safe implementation of AEB technology and ultimately improve overall vehicle security and safety.",
      "published": "2025-01-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app15031400",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Umberto Della Monica",
        "Kimberly-Annalena Munjal",
        "Mark Paul Tamas",
        "Biagio Boi",
        "Christian Esposito",
        "Rahamatullah Khondoker"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/app15031400",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app15105571",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment of a Driver Monitoring System",
      "description": "The incorporation of Driver Monitoring Systems (DMSs) in vehicles is fundamental to enhancing road safety by continuously assessing driver behavior and identifying signs of fatigue or distraction. However, as these technologies evolve, they also present considerable cybersecurity challenges. This research undertakes an extensive Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of DMSs, adhering to the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, to methodically detect and assess potential security threats. A total of 115 threats were recognized and classified into 95 low-risk, 16 medium-risk, and 4 high-risk scenarios, underscoring key vulnerabilities in data transmission, sensor reliability, and communication frameworks. To mitigate these risks, we suggest a range of countermeasures, including enhanced encryption techniques, stringent authentication protocols, and reinforced access control mechanisms, designed to strengthen the security posture of DMSs in practical applications. This study introduces a structured framework for evaluating and addressing cybersecurity threats in alignment with industry regulations, facilitating the dependable and safeguarded implementation of DMSs in future vehicle architectures while contributing to ongoing progress in automotive cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2025-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app15105571",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco De Santis",
        "Edmund Jochim",
        "Iulia-Cristiana Șodinca",
        "Christian Esposito",
        "Rahamatullah Khondoker"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/app15105571",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app15105572",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of Automotive HMI: New Challenges in Enhancing User Experience, Safety, and Security",
      "description": "Human–Machine Interfaces (HMIs) in traditional automobiles are essential in connecting drivers, passengers, and vehicle systems. In automated vehicles, the HMI has become a critical component. A well-designed HMI facilitates effective human oversight, enhances situational awareness, and mitigates risks associated with system failures or unexpected scenarios. Simultaneously, it serves as a crucial safeguard against cyber threats, preventing unauthorized access and ensuring the integrity of vehicular operations in increasingly connected environments. This narrative review delves into the evolving landscape of automotive HMI design, emphasizing its role in enhancing user experience (UX) and safety. By exploring usability challenges, technological advancements, and the integration of rapidly evolving technologies such as AI (Artificial Intelligence), AR (Augmented Reality), and gesture-based controls, this study highlights how effective HMIs minimize cognitive load while maintaining functionality. Significant attention is given to the new challenges that arise from technological advancements in terms of security and safety.",
      "published": "2025-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app15105572",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iwona Grobelna",
        "David Mailland",
        "Mikołaj Horwat"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/app15105572",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app15126513",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Monitoring Technologies for Truck Drivers: A Systematic Review of Safety and Driving Behavior",
      "description": "Truck drivers are essential to global freight operations but face disproportionate safety risks due to fatigue, distraction, and demanding working conditions, all of which significantly elevate crash likelihood. This systematic review assesses how monitoring technologies have been used to improve safety among professional truck drivers, focusing on the types of technologies deployed, the variables monitored, and reported safety outcomes. Conducted in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) 2020 guidelines, the review includes 40 peer-reviewed articles published in English between 2009 and 2024, identified through systematic searches in PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and IEEE Xplore. Due to methodological heterogeneity, a formal risk of bias assessment was not conducted. Most studies examined wearable devices, in-vehicle cameras, telematics systems, and AI-driven platforms. These technologies monitored variables such as fatigue, stress, distraction, speed, and environmental conditions. While the findings demonstrate considerable potential to enhance safety outcomes, persistent challenges include implementation costs, privacy concerns, and variability in effectiveness. The evidence is also geographically concentrated in high-income regions, limiting broader applicability. This review highlights the urgent need for harmonized evaluation frameworks, robust validation protocols, and context-sensitive strategies to support the effective adoption of monitoring technologies in the trucking sector.",
      "published": "2025-06-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app15126513",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tiago Fonseca",
        "Sara Ferreira"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/app15126513",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app16147233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comprehensive Review of the Architectural Metamorphosis and Techno-Economic Implications of Artificial Intelligence-Integrated Digital Twin Ecosystems",
      "description": "Digital twin (DT) technology has emerged as a cornerstone of Industry 4.0, facilitating real-time synchronization between physical assets and virtual models to drive operational excellence. Unlike prior surveys that address singular industrial domains, presenting qualifications in general terms without paradigm-to-task mapping, this review uniquely synthesizes DT architectural maturation across Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 1 through 9, quantitative performance outcomes from 39 documented industrial implementations spanning 10 sectors, and an explicit algorithmic taxonomy mapping distinct AI paradigms to specific functional DT requirements. By synthesizing empirical data across the aerospace, automotive, and manufacturing sectors, this study evaluates the quantitative impact of DT implementation, highlighting significant gains in predictive maintenance, production efficiency, and design cycle reduction. This research further examines the synergistic role of Machine Learning (ML) paradigms integrated within DT systems, specifically, physics-informed neural networks (PINNS), generative adversarial networks (GANs), deep transfer learning, reinforcement learning, and federated learning, in enhancing diagnostic accuracy and enabling autonomous decision-making. Despite these advancements, this review identifies critical barriers in data interoperability, cybersecurity, and workforce expertise that impede widespread adoption. This paper concludes by outlining future research directions, emphasizing the necessity for standardized data protocols and secure, distributed DT ecosystems to unlock the full potential of cyber-physical integration in a data-driven industrial landscape.",
      "published": "2026-07-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app16147233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adithya Lokesh Hegde",
        "Raviraj Shetty",
        "Vinyas",
        "Gururaj Bolar",
        "Sawan Shetty",
        "Supriya J. P",
        "Arjun Hegde"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/app16147233",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/app9235101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Reference Architecture for Attack Surface Analysis",
      "description": "Connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) will be deployed over the next decade with autonomous functionalities supported by new sensing and communication capabilities. Such functionality exposes CAVs to new attacks that current vehicles will not face. To ensure the safety and security of CAVs, it is important to be able to identify the ways in which the system could be attacked and to build defences against these attacks. One possible approach is to use reference architectures to perform an attack surface analysis. Existing research has developed a variety of reference architectures but none for the specific purpose of attack surface analysis. Existing approaches are either too simple for sufficiently detailed modelling or require too many details to be specified to easily analyse a CAV’s attack surface. Therefore, we propose a reference architecture using a hybrid Functional-Communication viewpoint for attack surface analysis of CAVs, including the Devices, Edge and Cloud systems CAVs interact with. Using two case studies, we demonstrate how attack trees can be used to understand the attack surface of CAV systems.",
      "published": "2019-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/app9235101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carsten R. Maple",
        "Matthew S. Bradbury",
        "Anhtuan Le",
        "Kevin Ghirardello"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/app9235101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/asi8020045",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Designing a Method for Identifying Functional Safety and Cybersecurity Requirements Utilizing Model-Based Systems Engineering",
      "description": "The increasing number and complexity of cyber–physical systems in vehicles necessitate a rigorous approach to identifying functional safety and cybersecurity hazards during the concept phase of product development. This study establishes a systematic method for identifying safety and security requirements for E/E components in the automotive sector, utilizing the SysML language within the CAMEO environment. The method’s activities and work products are grounded in the ISO 26262:2018 and ISO/SAE 21434:2021 standards. Comprehensive requirements were defined for the method’s application environment and activities, including generic methods detailing the creation of work products. The method’s metamodel was developed using the MagicGrid framework and validated through an application example. Synergies between the two foundational standards were identified and integrated into the method. The solution generation was systematically described by detailing activities for result generation and the production of standard-compliant work products. To facilitate practical implementation, a method template in SysML was created, incorporating predefined stereotypes, relationships, and tables to streamline the application and enhance consistency.",
      "published": "2025-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/asi8020045",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bastian Nolte",
        "Armin Stein",
        "Thomas Vietor"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied System Innovation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/asi8020045",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/automation6010005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advanced Data Classification Framework for Enhancing Cyber Security in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have revolutionized the automotive industry by leveraging data to perceive and interact with their environment effectively. Data safety is essential for supporting AV decision-making and ensuring reliability in complex environments. AVs continuously collect data from multiple sources like LiDAR, RADAR, cameras, and ultrasonic sensors to monitor road conditions, traffic signals, and pedestrian movements. An effective data classification framework is crucial for managing vast amounts of information and securing AV systems against cyber threats. This paper proposes a comprehensive framework for AV data classification, categorizing data by sensitivity, usage, and source. By integrating a review of the literature, real-world cases, and practical insights, this study introduces a novel data classification model and explores sensitivity criteria. The findings aim to assist industry stakeholders in creating secure, efficient, and sustainable AV ecosystems.",
      "published": "2025-01-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/automation6010005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shiva Ram Neupane",
        "Weiqing Sun"
      ],
      "venue": "Automation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/automation6010005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/batteries9070382",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Physical Cloud Battery Management Systems: Review of Security Aspects",
      "description": "Battery management systems (BMSs) are critical to ensure the efficiency and safety of high-power battery energy storage systems (BESSs) in vehicular and stationary applications. Recently, the proliferation of battery big data and cloud computing advancements has led to the development of a new generation of BMSs, named Cloud BMS (CBMS), aiming to improve the performance and safety of BESSs. The CBMS is a cyber-physical system with connectivity between the physical BMS and a cloud-based virtual BMS, which is realized through a communication channel such as Internet of Things. Compared to the traditional BMS, the CBMS offers significantly higher computational resources, leveraging the implementation of advanced digital twin models and best-in-class algorithms in the BMS software, which will provide superior performances. However, as for any other CPS, the CBMS creates vulnerabilities against cyberattacks and if not properly secured, could end up damaging the BESS and/or causing dangerous, expensive, and life-threatening situations. Cybersecurity of the CBMSs has thus become a trending topic and several works have been published in this area in recent years. This paper conducts a scoping review to address different topics related to BMS cybersecurity. The CBMS architecture is presented, and the potential cyberattack surfaces are identified. Different possible attack scenarios, including attack points, attack types, and their impact at the component level (BMS and BESS) and system level (vehicle or grid), are discussed. In addition, the paper provides a review of potential countermeasures to protect the CBMS against cyberattacks. The paper also includes a review of the applicable standards and regulations that relate to this trending topic. Finally, based on the reviewed gaps, potential future research domains on BMS cybersecurity topics are identified and presented at the end of the paper.",
      "published": "2023-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/batteries9070382",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Farshid Naseri",
        "Zahra Kazemi",
        "Peter Gorm Larsen",
        "Mohammad Mehdi Arefi",
        "Erik Schaltz"
      ],
      "venue": "Batteries",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/batteries9070382",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/computers12110233",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PUFGuard: Vehicle-to-Everything Authentication Protocol for Secure Multihop Mobile Communication",
      "description": "Vehicle area networks (VANs) encompass a spectrum of communication modes, including point-to-point visible light communication, 5G/6G cellular wireless communication, and Wi-Fi ad hoc multihop communication. The main focus of this paper is the introduction and application of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) as a pivotal element in secure key generation, authentication processes, and trust metric definition for neighboring vehicles. The multifaceted protocols proposed herein encompass comprehensive security considerations, ranging from authentication and anonymity to the imperative aspects of the proof of presence, freshness, and ephemeral session key exchanges. This paper provides a systematic and comprehensive framework for enhancing security in VANs, which is of paramount importance in the context of modern smart transportation systems. The contributions of this work are multifarious and can be summarized as follows: (1) Presenting an innovative and robust approach to secure key generation based on PUFs, ensuring the dynamic nature of the authentication. (2) Defining trust metrics reliant on PUFs to ascertain the authenticity and integrity of proximate vehicles. (3) Using the proposed framework to enable seamless transitions between different communication protocols, such as the migration from 5G/6G to Wi-Fi, by introducing the concept of multimodal authentication, which accommodates a wide spectrum of vehicle capabilities. Furthermore, upholding privacy through the encryption and concealment of PUF responses safeguards the identity of vehicles during communication.",
      "published": "2023-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/computers12110233",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fayez Gebali",
        "Mohamed K. Elhadad"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/computers12110233",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/computers5030016",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Intrusion Detection of Grey Hole and Rushing Attacks in Self-Driving Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) play a vital role in the success of self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles, where they improve safety and comfort. Such vehicles depend heavily on external communication with the surrounding environment via data control and Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) exchanges. VANETs are potentially exposed to a number of attacks, such as grey hole, black hole, wormhole and rushing attacks. This work presents an intelligent Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that relies on anomaly detection to protect the external communication system from grey hole and rushing attacks. These attacks aim to disrupt the transmission between vehicles and roadside units. The IDS uses features obtained from a trace file generated in a network simulator and consists of a feed-forward neural network and a support vector machine. Additionally, the paper studies the use of a novel systematic response, employed to protect the vehicle when it encounters malicious behaviour. Our simulations of the proposed detection system show that the proposed schemes possess outstanding detection rates with a reduction in false alarms. This safe mode response system has been evaluated using four performance metrics, namely, received packets, packet delivery ratio, dropped packets and the average end to end delay, under both normal and abnormal conditions.",
      "published": "2016-07-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/computers5030016",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intrusion",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Khattab M. Ali Alheeti",
        "Anna Gruebler",
        "Klaus Dieter McDonald-Maier"
      ],
      "venue": "Computers",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.3390/computers5030016",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 72,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/drones6120377",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle to Everything (V2X) and Edge Computing: A Secure Lifecycle for UAV-Assisted Vehicle Network and Offloading with Blockchain",
      "description": "Due to globalization and advances in network technology, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) with edge computing has gained increasingly more attention over the last few years. The technology provides a new paradigm to design interconnected distributed nodes in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-assisted vehicle networks for communications between vehicles in smart cities. The process hierarchy of the current UAV-assisted networks is also becoming more multifaceted as more vehicles are connected, requiring accessing and exchanging information, performing tasks, and updating information securely. This poses serious issues and limitations to centralized UAV-assisted vehicle networks, directly affecting computing-intensive tasks and data offloading. This paper bridges these gaps by providing a novel, transparent, and secure lifecycle for UAV-assisted distributed vehicle communication using blockchain hyperledger technology. A modular infrastructure for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) is designed and ‘B-UV2X’, a blockchain hyperledger fabric-enabled distributed permissioned network-based consortium structure, is proposed. The participating nodes of the vehicle are interconnected with others in the chain of smart cities and exchange different information such as movement, etc., preserving operational logs on the blockchain-enabled immutable ledger. This automates IoV transactions over the proposed UAV-assisted vehicle-enabled consortium network with doppler spread. Thus, for this purpose, there are four different chain codes that are designed and deployed for IoV registration, adding new transactions, updating the ledger, monitoring resource management, and customized multi-consensus of proof-of-work. For lightweight IoV authentication, B-UV2X uses a two-way verification method with the defined hyperledger fabric consensus mechanism. Transaction protection from acquisition to deliverance and storage uses the NuCypher threshold proxy re-encryption mechanism. Simulation results for the proposed B-UV2X show a reduction in network consumption by 12.17% compared to a centralized network system, an increase in security features of up to 9.76%, and a reduction of 7.93% in the computational load for computed log storage.",
      "published": "2022-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/drones6120377",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdullah Ayub Khan",
        "Asif Ali Laghari",
        "Muhammad Shafiq",
        "Shafique Ahmed Awan",
        "Zhaoquan Gu"
      ],
      "venue": "Drones",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/drones6120377",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/e22020186",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multiple Rényi Entropy Based Intrusion Detection System for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "In this paper, we propose an intrusion detection system based on the estimation of the Rényi entropy with multiple orders. The Rényi entropy is a generalized notion of entropy that includes the Shannon entropy and the min-entropy as special cases. In 2018, Kim proposed an efficient estimation method for the Rényi entropy with an arbitrary real order α . In this work, we utilize this method to construct a multiple order, Rényi entropy based intrusion detection system (IDS) for vehicular systems with various network connections. The proposed method estimates the Rényi entropies simultaneously with three distinct orders, two, three, and four, based on the controller area network (CAN)-IDs of consecutively generated frames. The collected frames are split into blocks with a fixed number of frames, and the entropies are evaluated based on these blocks. For a more accurate estimation against each type of attack, we also propose a retrospective sliding window method for decision of attacks based on the estimated entropies. For fair comparison, we utilized the CAN-ID attack data set generated by a research team from Korea University. Our results show that the proposed method can show the false negative and positive errors of less than 1% simultaneously.",
      "published": "2020-02-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/e22020186",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ki-soon Yu",
        "Sunghyun Kim",
        "Dae‐Woon Lim",
        "Young-Sik Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Entropy",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/e22020186",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4016,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/e22020186 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/e25071050",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Physics-Informed Generative Car-Following Model for Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "This paper proposes a novel hybrid car-following model: the physics-informed conditional generative adversarial network (PICGAN), designed to enhance multi-step car-following modeling in mixed traffic flow scenarios. This hybrid model leverages the strengths of both physics-based and deep-learning-based models. By taking advantage of the inherent structure of GAN, the PICGAN eliminates the need for an explicit weighting parameter typically used in the combination of traditional physics-based and data-driven models. The effectiveness of the proposed model is substantiated through case studies using the NGSIM I-80 dataset. These studies demonstrate the model’s superior trajectory reproduction, suggesting its potential as a strong contender to replace conventional models in trajectory prediction tasks. Furthermore, the deployment of PICGAN significantly enhances the stability and efficiency in mixed traffic flow environments. Given its reliable and stable results, the PICGAN framework contributes substantially to the development of efficient longitudinal control strategies for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) in real-world mixed traffic conditions.",
      "published": "2023-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/e25071050",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lijing Ma",
        "Shi-Ru Qu",
        "Li-Jun Song",
        "Zhi-Teng Zhang",
        "Jie Ren"
      ],
      "venue": "Entropy",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/e25071050",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electricity3030017",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Power System Impacts of Electric Vehicle Charging Strategies",
      "description": "This article explores the potential impacts of integrating electric vehicles (EVs) and variable renewable energy (VRE) on power system operation. EVs and VRE are integrated in a production cost model with a 5 min time resolution and multiple planning horizons to deduce the effects of variable generation and EV charging on system operating costs, EV charging costs, dispatch stacks, reserves and VRE curtailment. EV penetration scenarios of the light-duty vehicle fleet of 10%, 20%, and 30% are considered in the RTS-GMLC test system, and VRE penetration is 34% of annual energy consumption. The impacts of EVs are investigated during the annual peak in the summer and during the four weeks of the year in which high VRE and low loads lead to overgeneration. Uncoordinated and coordinated EV charging scenarios are considered. In the uncoordinated scenario, charging is undertaken at the convenience of the EV owners, modeled using data from the Idaho National Laboratory’s EV Project. Coordinated charging uses an “aggregator” model, wherein EV charging is scheduled to minimize operating costs while meeting the daily charging requirements subject to EV availability and charging constraints. The results show that at each EV penetration level, the uncoordinated charging costs were higher than the coordinated charging costs. During a high-VRE, low-load week, with uncoordinated EV charging at 30% penetration (3% energy penetration), the peak load increased by as much as 27%. Using coordinated charging, the EV load shifts to hours with low prices, coincident with either low load, high VRE, or both. Furthermore, coordinated charging substantially reduces the curtailment of PV by as much as nine times during the low-load seasons, and the curtailment of wind generation by more than half during the summer peak season, compared to the scenarios with no EVs and uncoordinated EV charging. Using a production cost model with multiple planning cycles, load and VRE forecasts, and a “look ahead” period during scheduling and dispatching units was crucial in creating and utilizing the flexibility of coordinated EV charging.",
      "published": "2022-07-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electricity3030017",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jose David Alvarez Guerrero",
        "Thomas L. Acker",
        "Rafael Castro"
      ],
      "venue": "Electricity",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/electricity3030017",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics10060739",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Continuous Automotive Software Updates through Container Image Layers",
      "description": "The vehicle-embedded system also known as the electronic control unit (ECU) has transformed the humble motorcar, making it more efficient, environmentally friendly, and safer, but has led to a system which is highly dependent on software. As new technologies and features are included with each new vehicle model, the increased reliance on software will no doubt continue. It is an undeniable fact that all software contains bugs, errors, and potential vulnerabilities, which when discovered must be addressed in a timely manner, primarily through patching and updates, to preserve vehicle and occupant safety and integrity. However, current automotive software updating practices are ad hoc at best and often follow the same inefficient fix mechanisms associated with a physical component failure of return or recall. Increasing vehicle connectivity heralds the potential for over the air (OtA) software updates, but rigid ECU hardware design does not often facilitate or enable OtA updating. To address the associated issues regarding automotive ECU-based software updates, a new approach in how automotive software is deployed to the ECU is required. This paper presents how lightweight virtualisation technologies known as containers can promote efficient automotive ECU software updates. ECU functional software can be deployed to a container built from an associated image. Container images promote efficiency in download size and times through layer sharing, similar to ECU difference or delta flashing. Through containers, connectivity and OtA future software updates can be completed without inconveniences to the consumer or incurring expense to the manufacturer.",
      "published": "2021-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10060739",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nick Ayres",
        "Lipika Deka",
        "Daniel Paluszczyszyn"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics10060739",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics10080893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Issues with In-Vehicle Networks, and Enhanced Countermeasures Based on Blockchain",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are no longer simply mechanical devices. Connectivity between the vehicular network and the outside world has widened the security holes that hackers can use to exploit a vehicular network. Controller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay, and automotive Ethernet are popular protocols for in-vehicle networks (IVNs) and will stay in the industry for many more years. However, these protocols were not designed with security in mind. They have several vulnerabilities, such as lack of message authentication, lack of message encryption, and an ID-based arbitration mechanism for contention resolution. Adversaries can use these vulnerabilities to launch sophisticated attacks that may lead to loss of life and damage to property. Thus, the security of the vehicles should be handled carefully. In this paper, we investigate the security vulnerabilities with in-vehicle network protocols such as CAN, automotive Ethernet, and FlexRay. A comprehensive survey on security attacks launched against in-vehicle networks is presented along with countermeasures adopted by various researchers. Various algorithms have been proposed in the past for intrusion detection in IVNs. However, those approaches have several limitations that need special attention from the research community. Blockchain is a good approach to solving the existing security issues in IVNs, and we suggest a way to improve IVN security based on a hybrid blockchain.",
      "published": "2021-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10080893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narayan Khatri",
        "Rakesh Shrestha",
        "Seung Yeob Nam"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics10080893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 59,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics10151765",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Automotive: An Intrusion Detection System in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Today’s modern vehicles are connected to a network and are considered smart objects of IoT, thanks to the capability to send and receive data from the network. One of the greatest challenges in the automotive sector is to make the vehicle secure and reliable. In fact, there are more connected instruments on a vehicle, such as the infotainment system and/or data interchange systems. Indeed, with the advent of new paradigms, such as Smart City and Smart Road, the vision of Internet of Things has evolved substantially. Today, we talk about the V2X systems in which the vehicle is strongly connected with the rest of the world. In this scenario, the main aim of all connected vehicles vendors is to provide a secure system to guarantee the safety of the drive and persons against a possible cyber-attack. So, in this paper, an embedded Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for the automotive sector is introduced. It works by adopting a two-step algorithm that provides detection of a possible cyber-attack. In the first step, the methodology provides a filter of all the messages on the Controller Area Network (CAN-Bus) thanks to the use of a spatial and temporal analysis; if a set of messages are possibly malicious, these are analyzed by a Bayesian network, which gives the probability that a given event can be classified as an attack. To evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of our method, an experimental campaign was conducted to evaluate them, according to the classic evaluation parameters for a test’s accuracy. These results were compared with a common data set on cyber-attacks present in the literature. The first experimental results, obtained in a test scenario, seem to be interesting. The results show that our method has good correspondence in the presence of the most common cyber-attacks (DDoS, Fuzzy, Impersonating), obtaining a good score relative to the classic evaluation parameters for a test’s accuracy. These results have decreased performance when we test the system on a Free State Attack.",
      "published": "2021-07-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10151765",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "infotainment",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Francesco Pascale",
        "Ennio Andrea Adinolfi",
        "Simone Coppola",
        "Emanuele Santonicola"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics10151765",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3967,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/electronics10151765 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: campaign, fact, there, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics10243161",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy-Preserving Tampering Detection in Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Modern auto-vehicles are built upon a vast collection of sensors that provide large amounts of data processed by dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs). These, in turn, monitor and control advanced technological systems providing a large palette of features to the vehicle’s end-users (e.g., automated parking, autonomous vehicles). As modern cars become more and more interconnected with external systems (e.g., cloud-based services), enforcing privacy on data originating from vehicle sensors is becoming a challenging research topic. In contrast, deliberate manipulations of vehicle components, known as tampering, require careful (and remote) monitoring of the vehicle via data transmissions and processing. In this context, this paper documents an efficient methodology for data privacy protection, which can be integrated into modern vehicles. The approach leverages the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) as a core data transformation algorithm, accompanied by filters and additional transformations. The methodology is seconded by a Random Forest-based regression technique enriched with further statistical analysis for tampering detection in the case of anonymized data. Experimental results, conducted on a data set collected from the On-Board Diagnostics (OBD II) port of a 2015 EUR6 Skoda Rapid 1.2 L TSI passenger vehicle, demonstrate that the restored time-domain data preserves the characteristics required by additional processing algorithms (e.g., tampering detection), showing at the same time an adjustable level of privacy. Moreover, tampering detection is shown to be 100% effective in certain scenarios, even in the context of anonymized data.",
      "published": "2021-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10243161",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "obd",
        "privacy",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adrian-Silviu Roman",
        "Béla Genge",
        "Adrian-Vasile Duka",
        "Piroska Haller"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics10243161",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics11142162",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review on Autonomous Vehicles: Progress, Methods and Challenges",
      "description": "Vehicular technology has recently gained increasing popularity, and autonomous driving is a hot topic. To achieve safe and reliable intelligent transportation systems, accurate positioning technologies need to be built to factor in the different types of uncertainties such as pedestrian behavior, random objects, and types of roads and their settings. In this work, we look into the other domains and technologies required to build an autonomous vehicle and conduct a relevant literature analysis. In this work, we look into the current state of research and development in environment detection, pedestrian detection, path planning, motion control, and vehicle cybersecurity for autonomous vehicles. We aim to study the different proposed technologies and compare their approaches. For a car to become fully autonomous, these technologies need to be accurate enough to gain public trust and show immense accuracy in their approach to solving these problems. Public trust and perception of auto vehicles are also explored in this paper. By discussing the opportunities as well as the obstacles of autonomous driving technology, we aim to shed light on future possibilities.",
      "published": "2022-07-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics11142162",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Darsh Parekh",
        "Nishi Poddar",
        "Aakash Rajpurkar",
        "Manisha Chahal",
        "Neeraj Kumar",
        "Gyanendra Prasad Joshi",
        "Woong Cho"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics11142162",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 539,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics11142180",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Using Deep Learning Networks to Identify Cyber Attacks on Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With rapid advancements in in-vehicle network (IVN) technology, the demand for multiple advanced functions and networking in electric vehicles (EVs) has recently increased. To enable various intelligent functions, the electrical system of existing vehicles incorporates a controller area network (CAN) bus system that enables communication among electrical control units (ECUs). In practice, traditional network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) cannot easily identify threats to the CAN bus system. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a new type of NIDS—namely, on-the-move Intrusion Detection System (OMIDS)—to categorise these threats. Accordingly, this paper proposes an intrusion detection model for IVNs, based on the VGG16 classifier deep learning model, to learn attack behaviour characteristics and classify threats. The experimental dataset was provided by the Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab (HCRL) to validate classification performance for denial of service (DoS), fuzzy attacks, spoofing gear, and RPM in vehicle communications. The proposed classifier’s performance was compared with that of the XBoost ensemble learning scheme to identify threats from in-vehicle networks. In particular, the test cases can detect anomalies in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score to ensure detection accuracy and identify false alarm threats. The experimental results show that the classification accuracy of the dataset for HCRL Car-Hacking by the VGG16 and XBoost classifiers (n = 50) reached 97.8241% and 99.9995% for the 5-subcategory classification results on the testing data, respectively.",
      "published": "2022-07-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics11142180",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hsiao-Chung Lin",
        "Ping Wang",
        "Kuo‐Ming Chao",
        "Wen‐Hui Lin",
        "Jiahong Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics11142180",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics11203376",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of Fake Replay Attack Signals on Remote Keyless Controlled Vehicles Using Pre-Trained Deep Neural Network",
      "description": "Keyless systems have replaced the old-fashioned methods of inserting physical keys into keyholes to unlock the door, which are inconvenient and easily exploited by threat actors. Keyless systems use the technology of radio frequency (RF) as an interface to transmit signals from the key fob to the vehicle. However, keyless systems are also susceptible to being compromised by a threat actor who intercepts the transmitted signal and performs a replay attack. In this paper, we propose a transfer learning-based model to identify the replay attacks launched against remote keyless controlled vehicles. Specifically, the system makes use of a pre-trained ResNet50 deep neural network to predict the wireless remote signals used to lock or unlock doors of a remote-controlled vehicle system. The signals are finally classified into three classes: real signal, fake signal high gain, and fake signal low gain. We have trained our model with 100 epochs (3800 iterations) on a KeFRA 2022 dataset, a modern dataset. The model has recorded a final validation accuracy of 99.71% and a final validation loss of 0.29% at a low inferencing time of 50 ms for the model-based SGD solver. The experimental evaluation revealed the supremacy of the proposed model.",
      "published": "2022-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics11203376",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qasem S. Abu Al-Haija",
        "Abdulaziz A. Alsulami"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics11203376",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics11223658",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated AI-Enabled In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection for Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) technology into the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has provided smart services for intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs). However, due to gradually upgrading to ICVs, an increasing number of external communications interfaces exposes the in-vehicle networks (IVNs) to malicious network intrusion. The malicious intruders can take over the compromised ICVs and mediately intrude into the ICVs connected through IoV. Therefore, it is urgent to develop IVN intrusion detection methods for IoV security protection. In this paper, a ConvLSTM-based IVN intrusion detection method is developed by leveraging the periodicity of the network message ID. For training the ConvLSTM model, a federated learning (FL) framework with client selection is proposed. The fundamental FL framework works in the client-server mode. ICVs are the local clients, and mobile edge computing (MEC) servers connected to base stations (BSs) function as the parameter servers. Based on the framework, a proximal policy optimization (PPO)-based federated client selection (FCS) scheme is further developed to optimize the model accuracy and system overhead of federated ConvLSTM model training. Simulations are conducted by the exploitation of real-world IoV scenario settings and IVN datasets. The results indicate that by exploiting the ConvLSTM, the model size and convergence time are dramatically reduced, and the 95%-beyond detection accuracy is maintained. The results also unveil that the PPO-based FCS scheme outperforms the benchmarks on the convergence rate, model accuracy, and system overhead.",
      "published": "2022-11-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics11223658",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "exploitation",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jian-Feng Yang",
        "Jianling Hu",
        "Tianqi Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics11223658",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4046,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/electronics11223658 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: servers, services, intelligence, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics12040888",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Automotive Reference Testbed with Trusted Security Services",
      "description": "While research in the field of automotive systems inclined in the past years towards technologies such as Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) or Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV), the underlying system security still plays a crucial role in assuring trust and system safety. The work at hand tackles the issue of automotive system security by designing a multi-service security system specially tailored for in-vehicle networks. The proposed trusted security services leverage Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to store secrets and manage and exchange cryptographic keys. To showcase how security services can be implemented in a in-vehicle network, a Reference TestBed (RTB) was developed. In the RTB, encryption and authentication keys are periodically exchanged, data is sent authenticated, the network is monitored by a Stateful Firewall and Intrusion Detection System (SF/IDS), and security events are logged and reported. A formal individual and multi-protocol analysis was conducted to demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed services from a theoretical point of view. Two distinct scenarios were considered to present the workflow and interaction between the proposed services. Lastly, performance measurements on the reference hardware are provided.",
      "published": "2023-02-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12040888",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Teri Lenard",
        "Béla Genge",
        "Piroska Haller",
        "Anastasija Collen",
        "Niels Alexander Nijdam"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics12040888",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics12173543",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Anomaly Detection Method Based on Multiple LSTM-Autoencoder Models for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The CAN (Controller Area Network) protocol is widely adopted for in-vehicle networks due to its cost efficiency and reliable transmission. However, despite its popularity, the protocol lacks built-in security mechanisms, making it vulnerable to attacks such as flooding, fuzzing, and DoS. These attacks can exploit vulnerabilities and disrupt the expected behavior of the in-vehicle network. One of the main reasons for these security concerns is that the protocol relies on broadcast frames for communication between ECUs (Electronic Control Units) within the network. To tackle this issue, we present an intrusion detection system that leverages multiple LSTM-Autoencoders. The proposed system utilizes diverse features, including transmission interval and payload value changes, to capture various characteristics of normal network behavior. The system effectively detects anomalies by analyzing different types of features separately using the LSTM-Autoencoder model. In our evaluation, we conducted experiments using real vehicle network traffic, and the results demonstrated the system’s high precision with a 99% detection rate in identifying anomalies.",
      "published": "2023-08-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12173543",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ilsun You",
        "Jiyoon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics12173543",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics12194090",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Cryptography for Connected Vehicles Communication Security on Edge Devices",
      "description": "Recent advances in mobile connection technology have been involved in every aspect of modern life. Even vehicles are becoming more connected, with the ability to communicate without human intervention. The main idea of connected vehicles is to exchange information to avoid a potential collision or to warn the driver about stop signs/lights. To achieve a wide range of connections between vehicles, they must be equipped with connected devices such as Bluetooth, wi-fi, and cellular connectivity. However, communication raises security issues with regard to cybersecurity attacks that attempt to collect confidential information or to take control of the vehicle by forcing unintended braking or steering. In this paper, we proposed a secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication approach by deploying a secure communication protocol based on a key management process and a cryptography system to encrypt exchanged data. The proposed key management process was designed to resist many attacks and eliminate connections to the infrastructure for key generation. Since vehicles are equipped with embedded devices with limited computation resources, a lightweight cryptography algorithm was used. The light encryption device (LED) block cipher was used to encrypt exchanged data. The LED has a low implementation area on hardware and low power consumption. It is considered to be a perfect solution for security issues in connected vehicles. The proposed data encryption algorithm was synthesized with VHDL on the Xilinx Zynq-7020 FPGA using the Vivado HLS tool. The encryption algorithm was implemented only on the logic of the device. The achieved results proved that the proposed algorithm is suitable for implementation in vehicles due to its low implementation requirements and low power consumption in addition to its high security level against cyber-attacks.",
      "published": "2023-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12194090",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sahbi Boubaker",
        "Faisal S. Alsubaei",
        "Yahia Said",
        "Hossam El-din Hussien Ahmed"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics12194090",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3932,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/electronics12194090 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collect, ability, limited, even, without, information, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics13050919",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Effective Ensemble Learning-Based Real-Time Intrusion Detection Scheme for an In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The emergence of connected and autonomous vehicles has led to complex network architectures for electronic control unit (ECU) communication. The controller area network (CAN) enables the transmission of data inside vehicle networks. However, although it has low latency and enjoys data broadcast capability, it is vulnerable to attacks on security. The lack of effectiveness of conventional security mechanisms in addressing these vulnerabilities poses a danger to vehicle safety. This study presents an intrusion detection system (IDS) that accurately detects and classifies CAN bus attacks in real-time using ensemble techniques and the Kappa Architecture. The Kappa Architecture enables real-time attack detection, while ensemble learning combines multiple machine learning classifiers to enhance the accuracy of attack detection. The scheme utilizes ensemble methods with Kappa Architecture’s real-time data analysis to detect common CAN bus attacks. This study entails the development and evaluation of supervised models, which are further enhanced using ensemble techniques. The accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score are used to measure the scheme’s effectiveness. The stacking ensemble technique outperformed individual supervised models and other ensembles with accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 of 0.985, 0.987, and 0.985, respectively.",
      "published": "2024-02-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13050919",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Easa Alalwany",
        "Imad Mahgoub"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics13050919",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics13101962",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Anomaly Detection for Securing In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "In-vehicle networks (IVNs) are networks that allow communication between different electronic components in a vehicle, such as infotainment systems, sensors, and control units. As these networks become more complex and interconnected, they become more vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can compromise safety and privacy. Anomaly detection is an important tool for detecting potential threats and preventing cyber-attacks in IVNs. The proposed machine learning-based anomaly detection technique uses deep learning and feature engineering to identify anomalous behavior in real-time. Feature engineering involves selecting and extracting relevant features from the data that are useful for detecting anomalies. Deep learning involves using neural networks to learn complex patterns and relationships in the data. Our experiments show that the proposed technique have achieved high accuracy in detecting anomalies and outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods. This technique can be used to enhance the security of IVNs and prevent cyber-attacks that can have serious consequences for drivers and passengers.",
      "published": "2024-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13101962",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asma Alfardus",
        "Danda B. Rawat"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics13101962",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics13132654",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Autonomous Vehicles—Are We Ready for the Challenge?",
      "description": "The rapid development and deployment of autonomous vehicles (AVs) present unprecedented opportunities and challenges in the transportation sector. While AVs promise enhanced safety, efficiency, and convenience, they also introduce significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities due to their reliance on advanced electronics, connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). This review examines the current state of cybersecurity in autonomous vehicles, identifying major threats such as remote hacking, sensor manipulation, data breaches, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. It also explores existing countermeasures including intrusion detection systems (IDSs), encryption, over-the-air (OTA) updates, and authentication protocols. Despite these efforts, numerous challenges remain, including the complexity of AV systems, lack of standardization, latency issues, and resource constraints. This review concludes by highlighting future directions in cybersecurity research and development, emphasizing the potential of AI and machine learning, blockchain technology, industry collaboration, and legislative measures to enhance the security of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-07-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13132654",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Irmina Durlik",
        "Tymoteusz I. Miller",
        "Ewelina Kostecka",
        "Zenon Zwierzewicz",
        "Adrianna Łobodzińska"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics13132654",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics13132672",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Reconfigurable CAN Intrusion Detection and Response System",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) remains the de facto standard for intra-vehicular communication. CAN enables reliable communication between various microcontrollers and vehicle devices without a central computer, which is essential for sustainable transportation systems. However, it poses some serious security threats due to the nature of communication. According to caranddriver.com, there were at least 150 automotive cybersecurity incidents in 2019, a 94% year-over-year increase since 2016, according to a report from Upstream Security. To safeguard vehicles from such attacks, securing CAN communication, which is the most relied-on in-vehicle network (IVN), should be configured with modifications. In this paper, we developed a configurable CAN communication protocol to secure CAN with a hardware prototype for rapidly prototyping attacks, intrusion detection systems, and response systems. We used a field programmable gate array (FPGA) to prototype CAN to improve reconfigurability. This project focuses on attack detection and response in the case of bus-off attacks. This paper introduces two main modules: the multiple generic errors module with the introduction of the error state machine (MGEESM) module and the bus-off attack detection (BOAD) module for a frame size of 111 bits (BOAD111), based on the CAN protocol presenting the introduction of form error, CRC error, and bit error. Our results show that, in the scenario with the transmit error counter (TEC) value 127 for switching between the error-passive state and bus-off state, the detection times for form error, CRC error, and bit error introduced in the MGEESM module are 3.610 ms, 3.550 ms, and 3.280 ms, respectively, with the introduction of error in consecutive frames. The detection time for BOAD111 module in the same scenario is 3.247 ms.",
      "published": "2024-07-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13132672",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rachit Saini",
        "Riadul Islam"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics13132672",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics13224444",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessing Satellite-Augmented Connected Vehicle Technology for Security Credentials and Traveler Information Delivery",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology has the capability to enhance road safety by enabling wireless exchange of telematics and spatiotemporal information between connected vehicles (CVs). Effective V2X communication depends on rapid information sharing between Roadside Units (RSUs), in-vehicle On-Board Units (OBUs), and other connected infrastructure. However, there are increasing concerns with RSUs related to installation needs, reliability, and coverage, especially on rural roadways. This study aims to evaluate the benefits of augmenting CV infrastructure with satellite technology in situations where RSU access or coverage is limited while maintaining V2X security protocols and critical information exchange. The study utilizes data from over 400 personal, fleet, and commercial CVs collected during two real-world pilot deployments in the United States, one in an urban environment in Florida and one in a rural environment in Wyoming. The analysis performed shows that the delivery of critical security credential information and traveler information messages (TIMs) to CVs is dependent on a multitude of environmental and operational reliability factors. Overall, information delivery is faster with dense RSU infrastructure as compared to satellites. However, we show that by augmenting RSU infrastructure with satellite technology, the delivery of information is more robust, improving V2X system reliability, security, and overall road safety.",
      "published": "2024-11-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13224444",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sisinnio Concas",
        "Vishal Chandra Kummetha"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics13224444",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics13234640",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security of Automotive OTA Firmware Updates via Decentralized Identifiers and Distributed Ledger Technology",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity and complexity of automotive systems require enhanced mechanisms for firmware updates to ensure security and integrity. Traditional methods are insufficient for modern vehicles that require seamless over-the-air (OTA) updates. Current OTA mechanisms often lack robust security measures, leaving vehicles vulnerable to attacks. This paper proposes an innovative approach based on the use of decentralized identifiers (DIDs) and distributed ledger technology (DLT) for secure OTA firmware updates of on-vehicle software. By utilizing DIDs for unique vehicle identification, as well as verifiable credentials (VCs) and verifiable presentations (VPs) for secure information exchange and verification, the solution ensures the integrity and authenticity of software updates. It also allows for the revocation of specific updates, if necessary, thereby improving overall security. The security analysis applied the STRIDE methodology, which enabled the identification of potential threats, including spoofing, tampering, and privilege escalation. The results showed that our solution effectively mitigates these threats, while a performance evaluation indicated low latency during operations.",
      "published": "2024-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13234640",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ana Kovacevic",
        "Nenad Gligorić"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics13234640",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14030471",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity of Automotive Wired Networking Systems: Evolution, Challenges, and Countermeasures",
      "description": "The evolution of Electrical and Electronic (E/E) architectures in the automotive industry has been a significant factor in the transformation of vehicles from traditional mechanical systems to sophisticated, software-defined machines. With increasing vehicle connectivity and the growing threats from cyberattacks that could compromise safety and violate user privacy, the incorporation of cybersecurity into the automotive development process is becoming imperative. As vehicles evolve into sophisticated interconnected systems, understanding their vulnerabilities becomes essential to improve cybersecurity. This paper also discusses the role of evolving standards and regulations, such as ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434, in ensuring both the safety and cybersecurity of modern vehicles. This paper offers a comprehensive review of the current challenges in automotive cybersecurity, with a focus on the vulnerabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. Additionally, we explore state-of-the-art countermeasures, focusing on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), which are increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques to detect anomalies and prevent attacks in real time. Through an analysis of publicly available CAN datasets, we evaluate the effectiveness of IDS frameworks in mitigating these threats.",
      "published": "2025-01-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14030471",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nicasio Canino",
        "Pierpaolo Dini",
        "Stefano Mazzetti",
        "Daniele Rossi",
        "Sergio Saponara",
        "Ettore Soldaini"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14030471",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4981,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/electronics14030471 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: user, intelligence, significant, privacy, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14030478",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle-to-Everything-Car Edge Cloud Management with Development, Security, and Operations Automation Framework",
      "description": "Modern autonomous driving and intelligent transportation systems face critical challenges in managing real-time data processing, network latency, and security threats across distributed vehicular environments. Conventional cloud-centric architectures typically struggle to meet the low-latency and high-reliability requirements of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) applications, particularly in dynamic and resource-constrained edge environments. To address these challenges, this study introduces the V2X-Car Edge Cloud system, which is a cloud-native architecture driven by DevSecOps principles to ensure secure deployment, dynamic resource orchestration, and real-time monitoring across distributed edge nodes. The proposed system integrates multicluster orchestration with Kubernetes, hybrid communication protocols (C-V2X, 5G, and WAVE), and data-fusion pipelines to enhance transparency in artificial intelligence (AI)-driven decision making. A software-in-the-loop simulation environment was implemented to validate AI models, and the SmartX MultiSec framework was integrated into the proposed system to dynamically monitor network traffic flow and security. Experimental evaluations in a virtual driving environment demonstrate the ability of the proposed system to perform automated security updates, continuous performance monitoring, and dynamic resource allocation without manual intervention.",
      "published": "2025-01-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14030478",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Donghwan Ku",
        "Hannie Zang",
        "Anvarjon Yusupov",
        "Sun Park",
        "JongWon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14030478",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14040683",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Shallow Learning-Based Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Network: ASIC Implementation",
      "description": "This paper presents an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) implementation and Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) verification of a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) designed to enhance the security of an in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) BUS and detect malicious messages. The CNN model employs a lightweight architecture with a single convolution layer using a 2 × 2 kernel and integrates a filter algorithm optimized for Fuzzy and Spoofing attacks to improve the performance. The IDS is implemented on an Electronic Control Unit platform powered by an ARM Cortex-M3 core and uses SRAM to store the parameters utilized by the CNN model and filter algorithm, targeting ASIC implementation with TSMC 180 nm technology. Functional verification was conducted by configuring a simplified CAN bus environment using the Xilinx Nexys Video FPGA and PEAK-System PCAN-USB, which was validated in real-time against DoS, Spoofing, and Fuzzy attack scenarios. The proposed lightweight CNN-based IDS achieved a fast detection speed of 0.0233 ms and an average accuracy of 99.6879%, thereby demonstrating its potential to enhance the security of in-vehicle CAN BUS.",
      "published": "2025-02-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14040683",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Minseok Choi",
        "Myeongjin Lee",
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Joosock Lee",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14040683",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14091710",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ultra-Lightweight and Highly Efficient Pruned Binarised Neural Networks for Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With the rapid evolution toward autonomous vehicles, securing in-vehicle communications is more critical than ever. The widely used Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol lacks built-in security, leaving vehicles vulnerable to cyberattacks. Although machine learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can achieve high detection accuracy, their heavy computational and power demands often limit real-world deployment. In this paper, we present an optimised IDS based on a Binarised Neural Network (BNN) that employs network pruning to eliminate redundant parameters, achieving up to a 91.07% reduction with only a 0.1% accuracy loss. The proposed approach incorporates a two-stage Coarse-to-Fine (C2F) framework, efficiently filtering normal traffic in the initial stage to minimise unnecessary processing. To assess its practical feasibility, we implement and compare the pruned IDS across CPU, GPU, and FPGA platforms. The experimental results indicate that, with the same model structure, the FPGA-based solution outperforms GPU and CPU implementations by up to 3.7× and 2.4× in speed, while achieving up to 7.4× and 3.8× greater energy efficiency, respectively. Among cutting-edge BNN-based IDSs, our ultra-lightweight FPGA-based C2F approach achieves the fastest average inference speed, showing a 3.3× to 12× improvement, while also outperforming them in accuracy and average F1 score, highlighting its potential for low-power, high-performance vehicle security.",
      "published": "2025-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14091710",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Auangkun Rangsikunpum",
        "Sam Amiri",
        "Luciano Copello Ost"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14091710",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14102034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Classification and Vulnerability Analysis on 5G Firmware Over-the-Air Updates for Mobile and Automotive Platforms",
      "description": "The integration of 5G technology with existing LTE architectures has facilitated the widespread adoption of firmware over-the-air (FOTA) updates across Android-based devices, including mobile and automotive infotainment systems. While 5G enhances communication speed and convenience, vulnerabilities related to firmware tampering and Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks still present considerable risks. This study analyzes the security of the FOTA update process for six Android-based mobile manufacturers and one vehicle model, all of which utilize LTE architectures within 5G networks. Through comprehensive security testing, we explore the potential threats of certificate bypass, firmware tampering, and communication interception. Our proposed framework identifies critical security flaws in the FOTA implementation, recommending improvements in encryption protocols and integrity verification mechanisms to secure the firmware update process. Our findings underscore the urgent requirement for enhanced security measures in the deployment of FOTA updates to address vulnerabilities in Android-based IoT devices and automotive systems.",
      "published": "2025-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14102034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Insu Oh",
        "Mahdi Sahlabadi",
        "Kangbin Yim",
        "Sun‐Young Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14102034",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14132572",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Intrusion Detection System for the CAN Bus Based on Locality-Sensitive Hashing",
      "description": "As the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) rapidly gains popularity, the Controller Area Network (CAN) faces increasingly severe security threats. Most of the existing research on protecting the CAN bus has been based on artificial intelligence models, which require complex feature extraction and training processes and are too resource-intensive for deployment in resource-constrained CAN environments. To address these challenges, we propose a lightweight intrusion detection system based on locality-sensitive hashing that achieves efficient security protection without relying on complex machine learning and deep learning frameworks. We employ the Nilsimsa algorithm to compute hash digests of the data, using the similarity scores of these digests as anomaly scores to identify abnormal traffic. Evaluations show that our method achieves an accuracy of 98%, and tests of the system’s overhead confirm its suitability for deployment in resource-limited CAN scenarios.",
      "published": "2025-06-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14132572",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yun Cai",
        "Jinxin Zuo",
        "Mingrui Fan",
        "Chengye Zhao",
        "Yueming Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14132572",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14163274",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Dynamic Advanced Encryption Standard Encryption Based on S-Box Reconfiguration and Real-Time Key Expansion for Secure Over-the-Air Communication",
      "description": "The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric encryption algorithm plays a crucial role in data encryption. To address the limitations of the fixed Substitution-box (S-box) and static key expansion strategy in AES. This paper proposes an improved AES scheme that integrates a dynamic S-box structure with a key expansion mechanism based on dynamic perturbations. The dynamic S-box is generated by selecting affine transformation pairs and irreducible polynomials, and its cryptographic properties are tested in SageMath9.3 to obtain a set of S-boxes superior to the standard AES. In the key expansion process, the perturbation values generated by the hash function will be incorporated into the round key generation process to reduce the correlation between round keys. The improved AES algorithm, when applied to Over-the-Air (OTA) systems, not only achieves significant savings in storage resources of in-vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) but also enhances the security of OTA communications. Furthermore, it consumes only a small amount of ECU computational resources, thereby effectively meeting the lightweight requirements of in-vehicle electronic control units.",
      "published": "2025-08-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14163274",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xin-Lei Hou",
        "Wei Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14163274",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14183645",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Welcome to the Machine (WTTM): A Cybersecurity Framework for the Automotive Sector",
      "description": "Cybersecurity has become a critical concern in the automotive sector, where the increasing connectivity and complexity of modern vehicles—particularly in the context of autonomous driving—have significantly expanded the attack surface. In response to these challenges, this paper presents the Welcome To The Machine (WTTM) framework, developed to support proactive and structured cyber risk management throughout the entire vehicle lifecycle. Specifically tailored to the automotive domain, the framework encompasses four core actions: detection, analysis, response, and remediation. A central element of WTTM is the WTTM Questionnaire, designed to assess the organizational cybersecurity maturity of automotive manufacturers and suppliers. The questionnaire addresses six key areas: Governance, Risk Management, Concept and Design, Security Requirements, Validation and Testing, and Supply Chain. This paper focuses on the development and validation of WTTM-Q. Statistical validation was performed using responses from 43 participants, demonstrating high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.70) and strong construct validity (CFI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.061). A supervised classifier (XGBoost), trained on 115 hypothetical response configurations, was employed to predict a priori risk classes, achieving 78% accuracy and a ROC AUC of 0.84. The WTTM framework, supported by a Vehicle Security Operations Center, provides a scalable, standards-aligned solution for enhancing cybersecurity in the automotive industry.",
      "published": "2025-09-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14183645",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Enrico Picano",
        "Massimo Fontana"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14183645",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14193786",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performance Analysis and Security Preservation of DSRC in V2X Networks",
      "description": "Protecting communications within vehicular networks is of paramount importance, particularly when data are transmitted using wireless ad-hoc technologies such as Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC). Vulnerabilities in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, especially along highways, pose significant risks, such as unauthorized interception or alteration of vehicle data. This study proposes a Software-Defined Radio (SDR)-based tool designed to assess the protection level of V2X communication systems against cyber attacks. The proposed tool can emulate both reception and transmission of IEEE 802.11p packets while testing DSRC implementation and robustness. The results of this investigation offer valuable contributions toward shaping cybersecurity strategies and frameworks designed to protect the integrity of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications.",
      "published": "2025-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14193786",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Saad Sohail",
        "Giancarlo Portomauro",
        "Giovanni Battista Gaggero",
        "Fabio Patrone",
        "Mario Marchese"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14193786",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14214321",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing the Detection of Cyber-Attacks to EV Charging Infrastructures Through AI Technologies",
      "description": "The increasing digitalization of energy infrastructures, particularly electric vehicle (EV) charging systems, has expanded their vulnerability to cyber threats. This paper presents a modular AI-driven platform for detecting attacks on EV charging infrastructures. The platform combines real-time data collection tools (Tshark, Nozomi Guardian, SNMP/Syslog, Elasticsearch Logstash and Kibana (ELK)) with Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Autoencoder-based anomaly detection. Data were gathered from a charging facility at RSE with twelve OCPP-J v1.6 charging stations, including normal and simulated Denial of Service (DoS) scenarios. The model, trained on multivariate time-series traffic data, achieved 97.1% Accuracy and 98.6% Recall, ensuring robust anomaly detection and minimizing false negatives. Although Precision was lower (52%) due to traffic variability, the system effectively detected both cyber-induced and operational anomalies, such as station disconnections. This work demonstrates the value of integrating deep learning with real-time monitoring to enhance the resilience of smart energy systems. Future developments will focus on improving precision, expanding protocol coverage, and addressing advanced threats such as data injection and Man-in-the-Middle attacks.",
      "published": "2025-11-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14214321",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "resilience",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roberta Terruggia",
        "Alberto Maldarella",
        "Giovanna Dondossola",
        "Gabriele Webber"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14214321",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics14224508",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Explainable AI for Federated Learning-Based Intrusion Detection Systems in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles, along with the expanding Internet of Vehicles (IoV), are increasingly exposed to complex and evolving cyberattacks. Consequently, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have become a vital component of modern vehicular cybersecurity. Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple vehicles to collaboratively train detection models while keeping their local data private, providing a decentralized alternative to traditional centralized learning. Despite these advantages, FL-based IDS frameworks remain vulnerable to attacks. To address this vulnerability, we propose an explainable federated intrusion detection framework that enhances both the security and interpretability of IDS in connected vehicles. The framework employs a Deep Neural Network (DNN) within a federated setting and integrates explainability through the Shapley Additive Explanations (SHAP) method. This Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) component identifies the most influential network features contributing to detection decisions and assists in recognizing anomalies arising from malicious or corrupted clients. Experimental validation on the CICEVSE2024 and CICIoV2024 vehicular datasets demonstrates that the proposed system achieves high detection accuracy. Moreover, the XAI module improves transparency and enables analysts to verify and understand the model’s decision-making process. Compared with both centralized IDS models and conventional federated approaches without explainability, the proposed system delivers comparable performance, stronger resilience to attacks, and significantly enhanced interpretability. Overall, this work demonstrates that integrating FL with XAI provides a privacy-preserving and trustworthy approach for intrusion detection in connected vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2025-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14224508",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ramin Taheri",
        "Raheleh Jafari",
        "ALEXANDER E. GEGOV",
        "Farzad Arabikhan",
        "Alexandar Ichtev"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics14224508",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4395,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/electronics14224508 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: vital, remain, intelligence, without, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15020317",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection and Mitigation of Cyber Attacks on UAV Networks",
      "description": "The topic of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) cybersecurity has received significant recent interest from the research community, with many methods proposed in the literature to improve detect and mitigate various types of attacks. This paper provides a comprehensive review of UAV cybersecurity, addressing all aspects of the UAV ecosystem and presenting a thorough review of the various types of UAV attacks, including a survey of recent real-world UAV cybersecurity incidents. UAV cybersecurity threat analysis and risk assessment methodologies are reviewed, discussing how potential attacks translate to UAV system risk. The various threat detection and countermeasure (mitigation) techniques are analyzed. Finally, this paper’s unique contribution is that it provides a survey of existing tools and datasets that are available to UAV cybersecurity researchers. A key identified research gap is the need to conduct real-world experimentation to validate proposed cybersecurity techniques. Many proposed approaches are computationally expensive or require additional redundant hardware onboard the UAV. Future research should focus on the development of lightweight methods that are practical for UAV adoption. Another key research gap is the relative lack of RemoteID cybersecurity research, despite its mandated adoption by UAVs. Lastly, this paper concludes that Global Positioning System (GPS)-related threats pose the greatest continued risk to UAVs.",
      "published": "2026-01-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15020317",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jack L. Burbank",
        "Toro Dama Caleb",
        "Emmanuela Andam",
        "Naima Kaabouch"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15020317",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15040865",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Physical Layer Security for 5G/6G-Enabled Electric Vehicle Charging Network",
      "description": "The rapid deployment of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure, coupled with the integration of 5G/6G and Internet of Vehicles (IoV) technologies, has transformed charging stations into cyber–physical systems that rely on wireless communication for authentication, control, and grid coordination. While existing security standards such as ISO 15118 provide cryptographic protection at upper layers, they are insufficient to address physical-layer threats inherent to wireless connectivity. In particular, wireless active eavesdropping attacks can corrupt channel estimation during the authentication phase, enabling impersonation, unauthorized charging, and disruption of grid operations. This paper proposes a machine learning-based physical layer security (PLS) framework for detecting active eavesdropping attacks in 5G/6G-enabled EV charging systems. By modeling malicious EVs as pilot-spoofing attackers, three discriminative features, namely mean power, power ratio, and angle-based feature, are extracted from received pilot signals at the charging station. Three classifiers are evaluated: single-class support vector machine (SC-SVM), Random Forest (RF), and DNN. Simulation results demonstrate that the SC-SVM maintains a stable accuracy between 94% and 96% across all attacker power levels, while RF and DNN significantly outperform it under stronger attack conditions. Specifically, under strong attacker conditions, RF achieves an accuracy of 99.9%, and DNN reaches 99.8%, both exceeding 99% detection accuracy. By preventing pilot-spoofing-based impersonation during authentication, the proposed framework enhances charging availability, billing integrity, and grid-aware scheduling in intelligent EV charging infrastructure.",
      "published": "2026-02-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15040865",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Livin Shaji",
        "Yang Luo",
        "Cheng Yin",
        "Jie Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15040865",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15051094",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-FD ECU Authentication Using Voltage-Characteristic Hardware Fingerprints",
      "description": "As a next-generation serial communication protocol employed in automotive electronics and industrial control domains, Controller Area Network with Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD) enhances communication efficiency via the introduction of a dual-rate transmission mechanism, yet it still inherits the security vulnerabilities of traditional CAN networks. To enhance the security of node identity authentication in CAN-FD networks—a critical prerequisite for secure communication—we present an electronic control unit (ECU) authentication scheme that utilizes voltage hardware fingerprints (VHFs) as the core identity credential. Specifically, a single frame of data is utilized to integrate the control field’s voltage characteristics and data field’s edges, forming stable and distinguishable hardware fingerprints. We also analyze the VHF offset characteristics under typical spoofing attacks and wire-tapping attacks, and then propose a lightweight vehicle intrusion detection system (VIDS) scheme to identify attack scenarios and locate the compromised ECU in CAN-FD networks. Lastly, we conducted research on and discussed other VHF-influencing factors and put forward detailed specific solutions. Attack tests are conducted under four representative scenarios, namely substitution attack, masquerade attack, injection attack, and wire-tapping attack. The findings reveal that our scheme can not only accurately distinguish between various CAN-FD nodes but also identify specific attack types in real time. In detail, a single-frame node recognition rate exceeding 99% is achieved in approximately 2 ms, and in experiments covering multiple attack scenarios on this six-node prototype system, 100% recognition accuracy for attack types is realized in approximately 500 ms.",
      "published": "2026-03-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15051094",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yang Yang",
        "Rukang Zhou",
        "Jiabao Yu",
        "Yanjun Ding"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15051094",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15061223",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Algorithmic Optimization for Accelerated UDS Fuzzing in Cyber–Physical Automotive Networks: The BB-FAST Approach on LIN-Bus",
      "description": "In modern cyber-physical vehicle networks, the security of component-level Electronic Control Units (ECUs) is essential for overall system reliability. While CAN bus security is well-studied, the Local Interconnect Network (LIN) has received less attention despite its growing role in critical functions and diagnostic services (UDS). The inherent constraints of the LIN protocol, specifically its low bandwidth and Master-Slave architecture, make traditional fuzz testing impractical due to extremely long execution times. This paper proposes BB-FAST, an optimized framework for faster vulnerability detection in LIN-based systems. By integrating batch processing and binary search techniques, BB-FAST overcomes communication bottlenecks and enables efficient error localization. Experiments on a physical automotive ECU show that BB-FAST significantly reduces testing time—by 55.56% and 93.44% depending on the diagnostic session—ensuring high efficiency even under frequent reset conditions. By mitigating these physical limitations through algorithmic optimization, this work enables thorough security verification for LIN-based diagnostic interfaces that was previously constrained by protocol latency, thereby enhancing the integrity of cyber-physical automotive networks.",
      "published": "2026-03-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15061223",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sungsik Im",
        "Yijoon Jung",
        "Junyoung Park"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15061223",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15081652",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Authentication and Key Distribution for SAE J1939 CAN Bus Without Security-Designated ECU",
      "description": "As a higher-layer protocol over a controller area network (CAN) or CAN with a flexible data-rate bus, Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) J1939 has been widely adopted in commercial vehicles. Although it supports advanced diagnostics, complex data transmission, and network management in harsh environments, SAE J1939 lacks native authentication mechanisms. Consequently, in-vehicle communication remains vulnerable to replay, spoofing, and injection attacks. In practice, deploying a Security-designated Electronic Control Unit (SeCU) is often deemed necessary to provide robust authentication, as generating and distributing session keys is essential. However, this introduces a single point of failure and renders the SeCU a high-value target for attackers. To address these issues, we propose J1939-ADBE, an authentication and key-distribution scheme that operates without a centralized SeCU. The scheme is built on Authenticated Distributed Broadcast Encryption (ADBE), a tightly integrated construction that augments distributed broadcast encryption with publicly verifiable sender authentication in a shared bilinear setting. By leveraging ADBE, we eliminate the requirement for a SeCU while achieving the desired security goals. Using the Tamarin Prover, we formally verify in the Dolev–Yao model that J1939-ADBE satisfies injective agreement, session secrecy, known-key security, and forward secrecy. Furthermore, the broadcast nature of ADBE reduces the communication cost of key distribution from O(n) to O(|G|), where n denotes the number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and |G| denotes the number of ECU logical groups. Experimental results show that our proposal is practical for authentication within SAE J1939 networks.",
      "published": "2026-04-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15081652",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Y Z Li",
        "Jiade Xi",
        "Jun Shen",
        "Jiangtao Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15081652",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15112239",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Two-Stage Hybrid Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus Based on Statistical Thresholds and Random Forest Classifiers",
      "description": "This study proposes a two-stage Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Controller Area Networks (CAN) that leverages protocol-specific timing characteristics. Modern vehicular networks are vulnerable to injection attacks due to the CAN protocol’s lack of built-in authentication. Our methodology transforms raw CAN traffic into a structured feature space consisting of CAN IDs, message offsets, and inter-message intervals derived from the CAN Remote Frame request–response mechanism. The first stage applies unsupervised z-score statistical thresholding, requiring no labeled attack data. The second stage employs three independent binary Random Forest (RF) classifiers for precise characterization. Individual classifiers achieve F1-scores of 0.96 (Fuzzy), 0.77 (DoS), and 0.79 (Impersonation). In the integrated end-to-end pipeline, while the system effectively filters 97% of legitimate traffic, a performance stratification is observed: high detection is maintained for timing-disruptive attacks (Fuzzy), whereas timing-preserving attacks (DoS, Impersonation) exhibit lower recall due to the restrictive nature of the timing-only first-stage gating mechanism. Hardware profiling confirmed an inference latency of ∼0.018 ms and footprint of 8.8–19.2 MB, offering a deployable, computationally efficient defense for legacy automotive environments.",
      "published": "2026-05-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15112239",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luis Ferreira",
        "Rafael Abreu",
        "Frederico Branco",
        "Mariana Reis",
        "Carlos Serôdio",
        "António Valente"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15112239",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15112437",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilient Cooperative Localisation for EVs Using V2X Sidelink Measurements Under Hybrid Cyber-Attacks: A Deep Learning-Based Physical-Layer Security Framework",
      "description": "In this work, we explore resilient cooperative localisation for electric vehicles subject to the hybrid attack of gradual global navigation satellite system (GNSS) drag-off spoofing along with received signal strength indicator (RSSI) jamming. In order to mitigate such attacks, a deep learning-based physical-layer security approach is presented. The presented approach includes a long short-term memory (LSTM) detector for attack detection, a regression-based RSSI signal purifier, and a cooperative fusion scheme, which decreases the dependence on the GNSS branch in case of attack detection. The proposed approach is validated via the Berlin Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) dataset with respect to six scenarios, including benign GNSS-only and cooperative localisation, attacked localisation without defence, and attacked localisation with physical-layer security support. According to the experimental evaluation results, the considered hybrid attack significantly impacts the localisation accuracy, leading to an increase in the GNSS-only localisation error to root mean square error (RMSE) = 149.93 m, mean absolute error (MAE) = 129.81 m, and maximum error = 259.62 m. At the same time, the proposed cooperative localisation with physical-layer security decreases the attacked cooperative localisation error to RMSE = 4.00 m, MAE = 3.51 m, and maximum error = 12.01 m.",
      "published": "2026-06-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15112437",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "jamming",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed M. A. A. Elngar",
        "Mohammed J. Abdulaal",
        "M. A. Salem"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15112437",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15112446",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment of the Takeover Request Component in Advanced Driver Assistance Systems for SAE Level 2–3",
      "description": "This paper presents a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of the takeover request (TOR) component in Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) for SAE Level 2–3 automation. A TOR prompts the human driver to retake control when the system approaches its Operational Design Domain limits or when risk increases; late, false, or muted requests directly impact safety. The study models the TOR pipeline (perception, driver monitoring, decision logic, in-vehicle networks, and Human–Machine Interface) as assets and data flows, applies STRIDE-based threat identification using Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool and Ansys Medini Analyze, and rates risks under ISO/SAE 21434 with traceability to ISO 26262, ISO 21448, and UNECE R155/R157. The assessment produces 165 threat rows, with an initial risk distribution of 1 Critical, 113 High, 34 Medium, and 17 Low. Results show that tampering, denial of service, and spoofing dominate the TOR threat landscape, with the central processing unit, sensor-to-CPU links, and HMI channels as primary trust anchors. After applying mitigation measures including secure boot, message authentication, intrusion detection, redundancy checks, and encrypted communication, the residual post-mitigation security levels were reduced to 0 Critical, 0 High, 13 Medium, 101 Low, and 51 Negligible. Unlike other ADAS TARA studies, this TOR-focused analysis shows that cybersecurity risk is shaped by the interaction between cyber compromise, driver-readiness estimation, HMI delivery, fallback execution, and the limited handover time budget. The results support a defence-in-depth mitigation strategy for secure TOR operation in SAE Level 2–3 vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-06-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15112446",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adnan Kujovic",
        "João André Gomes Marques",
        "Mark Paul Tamas",
        "Rahamatullah Khondoker"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15112446",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics15122500",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis of Over-the-Air Updates in Distributed, Domain-Based, and Zonal E/E Architectures",
      "description": "Modern vehicles depend on over-the-air (OTA) updates to maintain security, safety, and functionality, but the attack surface of an update campaign depends on the underlying electrical/electronic architecture and on the controls assumed for update orchestration. This article reports a bounded, model-based TARA study for distributed, domain-based, and zonal vehicle architectures, which is implemented in Medini Analyze and interpreted against ISO/SAE 21434, UNECE Regulations R155 and R156, and ISO 24089 guidance. The comparison unit is not an architecture’s absolute security level. It is the architecture-conditioned instantiation of OTA trust anchors, update paths, STRIDE threat classes, evidence obligations, control-dependency assumptions, and sensitivity of model outputs under a harmonized TARA workflow. The model indicates that distributed architectures expose heterogeneous endpoints and legacy buses, and domain architectures reduce endpoint sprawl while elevating telematics and domain controllers as trust anchors. Moreover, zonal architectures can consolidate orchestration and monitoring under hardening assumptions while concentrating assurance obligations around high-performance computers, backbones, and Zone Controllers. Sensitivity checks show that raw threat counts, High/Critical counts, and severity distributions are model-granularity- and assumption-sensitive; they are therefore reported as diagnostics for traceability and evidence planning, not as real-world security rankings. The contribution is a reproducible interpretation of where OTA threat instances, trust boundaries, and regulatory evidence burdens move as vehicle E/E architectures change.",
      "published": "2026-06-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15122500",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "tara",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tiberius-George Sorescu",
        "Nadzeya Melnik",
        "Rodrigo Rocha del Castillo",
        "Rahamatullah Khondoker"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics15122500",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics4030380",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems: Standards, Threats Analysis and Cryptographic Countermeasures",
      "description": "Due to the growing number of vehicles on the roads worldwide, road traffic accidents are currently recognized as a major public safety problem. In this context, connected vehicles are considered as the key enabling technology to improve road safety and to foster the emergence of next generation cooperative intelligent transport systems (ITS). Through the use of wireless communication technologies, the deployment of ITS will enable vehicles to autonomously communicate with other nearby vehicles and roadside infrastructures and will open the door for a wide range of novel road safety and driver assistive applications. However, connecting wireless-enabled vehicles to external entities can make ITS applications vulnerable to various security threats, thus impacting the safety of drivers. This article reviews the current research challenges and opportunities related to the development of secure and safe ITS applications. It first explores the architecture and main characteristics of ITS systems and surveys the key enabling standards and projects. Then, various ITS security threats are analyzed and classified, along with their corresponding cryptographic countermeasures. Finally, a detailed ITS safety application case study is analyzed and evaluated in light of the European ETSI TC ITS standard. An experimental test-bed is presented, and several elliptic curve digital signature algorithms (ECDSA) are benchmarked for signing and verifying ITS safety messages. To conclude, lessons learned, open research challenges and opportunities are discussed.",
      "published": "2015-07-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics4030380",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elyes Ben Hamida",
        "Hassan Noura",
        "Wassim Znaïdi"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics4030380",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 199,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics8091026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on In-Vehicle Key Management System under Upcoming Vehicle Network Architecture",
      "description": "The intelligentization and connectedness of vehicles make vehicle cybersecurity an important research topic. In-vehicle key management is a critical function in vehicle cybersecurity countermeasures. After describing previous research on vehicle key management and the development trend of vehicle network architecture, a key management scheme for in-vehicle multi-layer electronic control units (ECUs) is proposed. The scheme is based on authenticated key exchange protocol 2 (AKEP2) and on-the-air (OTA) technology. Then, the key storage and trusted key usage based on secure hardware are analyzed and studied. Moreover, the AES Counter with CBC-MAC (AES-CCM) algorithm, which uses fewer keys, is introduced to in-vehicle secure communication. The simulation analysis for the proposed OTA-based key update protocol verifies the protocol’s security. The validity of the hardware-based trusted key usage environment and the feasibility of the AES-CCM algorithm for the CAN FD bus are proven with corresponding experiments.",
      "published": "2019-09-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics8091026",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhi-Hong Wu",
        "Jian-Ning Zhao",
        "Yuan Zhu",
        "Ke Lu",
        "Fenglue Shi"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics8091026",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics9081242",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Risk Analysis Approach for Safety-Critical Systems of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are no longer merely mechanical systems but are monitored and controlled by various electronic systems. Safety-critical systems of connected vehicles become vulnerable to cyberattacks because of increasing interconnection. At present, the security risk analysis of connected vehicles is mainly based on qualitative methods, while these methods are usually subjective and lack consideration for functional safety. In order to solve this problem, we propose in this paper a security risk analysis framework for connected vehicles based on formal methods. Firstly, we introduce the electronic and electrical architecture of the connected vehicle and analyze the attack surfaces of the in-vehicle safety-critical systems from three levels of sensors, in-vehicle networks, and controllers. Secondly, we propose a method to model the target of evaluation (i.e., in-vehicle safety-critical system) as a Markov decision process and use probabilistic computation tree logic to formally describe its security properties. Then, a probabilistic model checker PRISM is used to analyze the security risk of target systems quantitatively according to security properties. Finally, we apply the proposed approach to analyze and compare the security risks of the collision warning system under a distributed and centralized electrical and electronic architecture. In addition, from a practical point of view, we propose a Markov model generation method based on a SysML activity diagram, which can simplify our modeling process. The evaluation results show that we can have a quantitative understanding of the security risks at the system level in the early stage of system design.",
      "published": "2020-08-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics9081242",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Shuo Hou",
        "Xuan Zhang",
        "Zhenyu Yang",
        "Wenwen Pan"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics9081242",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics9081288",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Agent-Based In-Vehicle Infotainment Services in Internet-of-Things Environments",
      "description": "With the growth of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technology and the automobile industry, various In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) services have been developed, in which users can exploit a variety of IVI devices, such as navigation systems, cameras, speakers, headrest displays and heated seats. A typical IVI system is based on the peer-to-peer model, in which the user will directly control each device. This tends to induce a large overhead and inconvenience to the user. To overcome the drawbacks of the peer-to-peer model, the centralized IVI (C-IVI) scheme was recently proposed in which an IVI master is employed to provide IVI services between users and devices. However, the centralized model gives lower performance, as the number of users and devices gets larger. To improve the performance of IVI services, in this paper, we propose an agent-based IVI (A-IVI) scheme. In the proposed A-IVI scheme, a new entity called ‘agent’ is introduced, based on the C-IVI model. Each IVI agent will be used to manage a group of devices and also to perform the communication with the IVI master, on behalf of the concerned devices. The proposed scheme can be used to provide scalability and perform enhancement. The IVI agents are also helpful for supporting a variety of constrained IVI devices, such as speakers or cameras, which may usually have too low power to perform IoT communications. The proposed A-IVI scheme is implemented by using the IoT messaging protocols. For performance comparison with the existing schemes, we performed testbed experimentations. From the results, we see that the proposed A-IVI scheme can provide better performance than the existing IVI systems in terms of transmission delays, throughput and master’s loads. It is expected that the proposed scheme may be used effectively for IVI systems with a large number of users/devices, as seen in public transportation, such as public trains or airplanes.",
      "published": "2020-08-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics9081288",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dong-Kyu Choi",
        "Joong-Hwa Jung",
        "Hye-Been Nam",
        "Seok‐Joo Koh"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics9081288",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/electronics9091338",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evolution of V2X Communication and Integration of Blockchain for Security Enhancements",
      "description": "With the rapid evolution in wireless communications and autonomous vehicles, intelligent and autonomous vehicles will be launched soon. Vehicle to Everything (V2X) communications provides driving safety, traffic efficiency, and road information in real-time in vehicular networks. V2X has evolved by integrating cellular 5G and New Radio (NR) access technology in V2X communications (i.e., 5G NR V2X); it can fulfill the ever-evolving vehicular application, communication, and service demands of connected vehicles, such as ultra-low latency, ultra-high bandwidth, ultra-high reliability, and security. However, with the increasing number of intelligent and autonomous vehicles and their safety requirements, there is a backlash in deployment and management because of scalability, poor security and less flexibility. Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) plays a significant role in bringing cloud services closer to vehicular nodes, which reduces the scalability and flexibility issues. In addition, blockchain has evolved as an effective technology enabler to solve several security, privacy, and networking issues faced by the current 5G-based MEC systems in vehicular networks. Blockchain can be integrated as a strong security mechanism for securing and managing 5G V2X along with MEC. In this survey, we discuss, in detail, state-of-the-art V2X, its evolution based on cellular 5G technology and non-cellular 802.11bd. We investigate the integration of blockchain in 5G-based MEC vehicular networks for security, privacy protection, and content caching. We present the issues and challenges in existing edge computing and 5G V2X and, then, we shed some light on future research directions in these integrated and emerging technologies.",
      "published": "2020-08-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics9091338",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rakesh Shrestha",
        "Seung Yeob Nam",
        "Rojeena Bajracharya",
        "Shiho Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Electronics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/electronics9091338",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 135,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4246,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/electronics9091338 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: backend_cloud, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: strong, services, service, there, significant, access, privacy, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en10091351",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Probabilistic Modeling of Electric Vehicle Charging Pattern Associated with Residential Load for Voltage Unbalance Assessment",
      "description": "It has been recognized that an increased penetration of electric vehicles (EVs) may potentially alter load profile in a distribution network. As EVs are regarded as a diversely distributed load so a deterministic method, to predict EV charging load, may not account for all possible factors that could affect the power system. Thus, a stochastic approach is applied that takes into account various realistic factors such as EV battery capacity, state of charge (SOC), driving habit/need, i.e., involving type and purpose of trip, plug-in time, mileage, recharging frequency per day, charging power rate and dynamic EV charging price under controlled and uncontrolled charging schemes. A probabilistic model of EVs charging pattern associated with residential load profile is developed. The probabilistic model gives an activity based residential load profile and EV charging pattern over a period of 24 h. Then, the model output is used to assess the power quality index such as voltage unbalance factor under different electric vehicle penetration levels at different nodes of the system. An uneven EV charging scenario is identified that could cause the voltage unbalance to exceed its permissible limit.",
      "published": "2017-09-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en10091351",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Azhar Ul-Haq",
        "Marium Azhar",
        "Yousef Mahmoud",
        "Aqib Perwaiz",
        "Essam A. Al‐Ammar"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.3390/en10091351",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 82,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en11051062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicles for Smart and Sustainable Cities: An In-Depth Exploration of Privacy and Cybersecurity Implications",
      "description": "Amidst rapid urban development, sustainable transportation solutions are required to meet the increasing demands for mobility whilst mitigating the potentially negative social, economic, and environmental impacts. This study analyses autonomous vehicles (AVs) as a potential transportation solution for smart and sustainable development. We identified privacy and cybersecurity risks of AVs as crucial to the development of smart and sustainable cities and examined the steps taken by governments around the world to address these risks. We highlight the literature that supports why AVs are essential for smart and sustainable development. We then identify the aspects of privacy and cybersecurity in AVs that are important for smart and sustainable development. Lastly, we review the efforts taken by federal governments in the US, the UK, China, Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Germany, France, and the EU, and by US state governments to address AV-related privacy and cybersecurity risks in-depth. Overall, the actions taken by governments to address privacy risks are mainly in the form of regulations or voluntary guidelines. To address cybersecurity risks, governments have mostly resorted to regulations that are not specific to AVs and are conducting research and fostering research collaborations with the private sector.",
      "published": "2018-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en11051062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hazel Si Min Lim",
        "Araz Taeihagh"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.3390/en11051062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 203,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en12203834",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimal Strategy to Exploit the Flexibility of an Electric Vehicle Charging Station",
      "description": "The increasing use of electric vehicles connected to the power grid gives rise to challenges in the vehicle charging coordination, cost management, and provision of potential services to the grid. Scheduling of the power in an electric vehicle charging station is a quite challenging task, considering time-variant prices, customers with different charging time preferences, and the impact on the grid operations. The latter aspect can be addressed by exploiting the vehicle charging flexibility. In this article, a specific definition of flexibility to be used for an electric vehicle charging station is provided. Two optimal charging strategies are then proposed and evaluated, with the purpose of determining which strategy can offer spinning reserve services to the electrical grid, reducing at the same time the operation costs of the charging station. These strategies are based on a novel formulation of an economic model predictive control algorithm, aimed at minimising the charging station operation cost, and on a novel formulation of the flexibility capacity maximisation, while reducing the operation costs. These formulations incorporate the uncertainty in the arrival time and state of charge of the electric vehicles at their arrival. Both strategies lead to a considerable reduction of the costs with respect to a simple minimum time charging strategy, taken as the benchmark. In particular, the strategy that also accounts for flexibility maximisation emerges as a new tool for maintaining the grid balance giving cost savings to the charging stations.",
      "published": "2019-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en12203834",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cesar Diaz-Londono",
        "Luigi Colangelo",
        "Fredy Ruíz",
        "Diego Alejandro Patino",
        "Carlo Novara",
        "Gianfranco Chicco"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/en12203834",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 55,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en14133734",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modeling Electric Vehicle Charging Demand with the Effect of Increasing EVSEs: A Discrete Event Simulation-Based Model",
      "description": "Electric vehicle (EV) use is growing at a steady rate globally. Many countries are planning to ban internal combustion engines by 2030. One of the key issues needed to be addressed before the full-scale deployment of EVs is ensuring energy security. Various studies have developed models to simulate and study hourly electricity demand from EV charging. In this study, we present an improved model based on discrete event simulation, which allows for modeling characteristics of individual EV users, including the availability of electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) outside homes and the charging threshold of each EV user. The model is illustrated by simulating 1000 random electric vehicles generated using data from an actual survey. The results agree with previous studies that daily charging demands do not significantly vary. However, the results show a significant shift in charging schedule during weekends. Moreover, the simulation demonstrated that the charging peak demand can be reduced by as much as 11% if EVSEs are made more available outside homes. Interestingly, a behavioral solution, such as requiring users to fully utilize their EV’s battery capacity, is more effective in reducing the peak demand (14–17%). Finally, the study concludes by discussing a few potential implications on electric vehicle charging policy.",
      "published": "2021-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en14133734",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Neil Stephen Lopez",
        "Adrian Allana",
        "Jose Bienvenido Manuel Biona"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/en14133734",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en14133816",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proposal for an Integrated Framework for Electronic Control Unit Design in the Automotive Industry",
      "description": "The automotive sector is facing challenges in terms of the requirements for guaranteeing the safety and security of cars. In respect of the engineering process, it is challenging to incorporate functional safety, safety of the intended functionality, and cybersecurity requirements into electrical vehicles. All of these aspects impact not only the vehicles or ECUs produced, but also the structures of the organizations by which the products are created. Based on current standards, drafts of future standards, and an analysis of the performance of a real design process for the ECU of an electrical vehicle, we propose an integrated design framework from the perspective of cybersecurity. Therefore, a stronger emphasis is placed on correct estimations of cybersecurity activity processes. As they affect all areas of development, these estimations cannot be isolated considering the ECU’s design process. More cooperation between various stages of the process is required in order to provide complete products at an early stage of design and development. The challenge is the identification of overlapping activities and the combination of design efforts in order to reduce the time and costs of an engineering project. A dedicated process entity will be proposed to an engineering division to manage cybersecurity processes.",
      "published": "2021-06-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en14133816",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aleksander Buczacki",
        "Piotr Piątek"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/en14133816",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en14134054",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimization and Coordination of Electric Vehicle Charging Process for Long-Distance Trips",
      "description": "Battery electric vehicles offer many advantages in terms of performance and zero-emission pollutants, but their limited range for long-distance trips compromises their large-scale market penetration. The problem of range can be solved with a dense network of fast-charging stations and an increase in embedded battery capacity. Simultaneously, improvements in high-power charging point units offer range gains of hundreds of kilometers in a mere 20 min. One risk remains: The travel time depends on the availability of charging stations, which can drop during rush hours, due to long queues, or power grid constraints. These situations could significantly affect the user experience. In this paper, we presented an approach to coordinate EV charging station choices in the case of long-distance trips. This system relies on vehicle-to-infrastructure communications (V2X). The objective is to enhance the use of the infrastructure by improving the distribution of vehicles between the different charging stations, thus reducing waiting time. Our target is to build an efficient and easily deployable system. The performance of this system is compared to an uncoordinated situation and an offline optimization. We conducted a case study on a 550-km highway with heavy traffic. With this system, the results showed a 10% reduction in time spent in charging stations.",
      "published": "2021-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en14134054",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jean Hassler",
        "Zlatina Dimitrova",
        "Marc Petit",
        "Philippe Dessante"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/en14134054",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en15113931",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review of Electric Vehicle Charger Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, Potential Impacts, and Defenses",
      "description": "Worldwide growth in electric vehicle use is prompting new installations of private and public electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE). EVSE devices support the electrification of the transportation industry but also represent a linchpin for power systems and transportation infrastructures. Cybersecurity researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EVSE devices, communications to electric vehicles (EVs), and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. The potential impact of attacks on these systems stretches from localized, relatively minor effects to long-term national disruptions. Fortunately, there is a strong and expanding collection of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) cybersecurity best practices that may be applied to the EVSE environment to secure this equipment. In this paper, we survey publicly disclosed EVSE vulnerabilities, the impact of EV charger cyberattacks, and proposed security protections for EV charging technologies.",
      "published": "2022-05-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en15113931",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jay D. Johnson",
        "Timothy Berg",
        "Benjamin Anderson",
        "Brian Wright"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/en15113931",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 152,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en15134901",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Electric Vehicle Charging Model in the Urban Residential Sector",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have become increasingly popular because they are highly efficient and sustainable. However, EVs have intensive electric loads. Their penetrations into the power system pose significant challenges to the operation and control of the power distribution system, such as a voltage drop or transformer overloading. Therefore, grid operators need to prepare for high-level EV penetration into the power system. This study proposes data-driven, parameterized, individual, and aggregated EV charging models to predict EV charging loads in the urban residential sector. Actual EV charging profiles in Saskatchewan, Canada, were analyzed to understand the characteristics of EV charging. A location-based algorithm was developed to identify residential EV charging from raw data. The residential EV charging data were then used to tune the EV charging model parameters, including battery capacity, charging power level, start charging time, daily EV charging energy, and the initial state of charge (SOC). These parameters were modeled by random variables using statistic methods, such as the Burr distribution, the uniform distribution, and the inverse transformation methods. The Monte Carlo method was used for EV charging aggregation. The simulation results show that the proposed models are valid, accurate, and robust. The EV charging models can predict the EV charging loads in various future scenarios, such as different EV numbers, initial SOC, charging levels, and EV types (e.g., electric trucks). The EV charging models can be embedded into load flow studies to evaluate the impact of EV penetration on the power distribution systems, e.g., sustained under voltage, line loss, and transformer overloading. Although the proposed EV charging models are based on Saskatchewan’s situation, the model parameters can be tuned using other actual data so that the proposed model can be widely applied in different cities or countries.",
      "published": "2022-07-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en15134901",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamed El-Hendawi",
        "Zhanle Wang",
        "Raman B. Paranjape",
        "Shea Pederson",
        "Darcy Kozoriz",
        "James Fick"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/en15134901",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en16124678",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Applied Control and Artificial Intelligence for Energy Management: An Overview of Trends in EV Charging, Cyber-Physical Security and Predictive Maintenance",
      "description": "On 28 February–2 March 2023, the 2023 States General of Artificial Intelligence (AI) event was held in Italy under the sponsorship of several multinational companies. The purpose of this event was mainly to create a venue for allowing international protagonists of AI to discuss and confront on the recent trends in AI. The aim of this paper is to report on the state of the art of the literature on the most recent control engineering and artificial intelligence methods for managing and controlling energy networks with improved efficiency and effectiveness. More in detail, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the scope of the literature review considered in this paper is specifically limited to recent trends in EV charging, cyber-physical security, and predictive maintenance. These application scenarios were identified in the above-mentioned event as responsible for triggering most of the business needs currently expressed by energy companies. A critical discussion of the most relevant methodological approaches and experimental setups is provided, together with an overview of the future research directions.",
      "published": "2023-06-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en16124678",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lorenzo Ricciardi Celsi",
        "A. Valli"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/en16124678",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en17215394",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EV Smart-Charging Strategy for Power Management in Distribution Grid with High Penetration of Distributed Generation",
      "description": "Accelerated environmental impacts are a growing concern in the modern world. As a result, electric mobility and the transition to a cleaner energy matrix have become increasingly discussed topics. Several countries and entities have already made medium and long-term commitments related to electric mobility. In this context, this work presents a framework for controlling an electric vehicle (EV) charging station, integrated into a microgrid application, as a basis for creating the infrastructure integrated into a smart grid concept. Considering the future perspectives associated with the electrification of the transportation sector and expected impacts, a brief review is conducted on the prospects for the growth of electric vehicle fleets in different countries and how smart charging technologies are identified as solutions for mitigating the negative effects of energy and power consumption associated with EV charging stations. An analysis of the technical characteristics of EV charging is carried out, and the tools that enable the deployment of a fleet charging operator are examined specifically focusing on the communication protocol for EVs, such as the OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) parameterization/configuration. Additionally, a new charging station control method is proposed, aiming to manage the impacts of integrating distributed solar photovoltaic generation and mitigate the effects of the duck curve. Finally, this work also proposes an integration architecture for these elements, resulting in a practical implementation for variable power control throughout the day, considering different strategies to deal with distributed generation impact using EV fleet charging power demand dynamic management. Finally, a proposal for integration via IEC 61850 using low-cost devices for the implementation of a digital communication system is presented.",
      "published": "2024-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en17215394",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Geraldo Leite Maia",
        "Caio César Lins Santos",
        "P.R.M. Nunes",
        "José F. C. Castro",
        "Davidson C. Marques",
        "L. H. A. de Medeiros",
        "Leonardo Rodrigues Limongi",
        "Márcio Evaristo da Cruz Brito",
        "Nicolau K. L. Dantas",
        "Antonio Venancio de Moura Lacerda Filho",
        "A.L. Fernandes",
        "Jiyong Chai"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/en17215394",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en17235832",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Domain-Specific Modeling Language for Security Analysis of EV Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) and their ecosystem have unquestionably made significant technological strides. Indeed, EVs have evolved into sophisticated computer systems with extensive internal and external communication capabilities. This interconnection raises concerns about security, privacy, and the expanding risk of cyber-attacks within the electric vehicle landscape. In particular, the charging infrastructure plays a crucial role in the electric mobility ecosystem. With the proliferation of charging points, new attack vectors are opened up for cybercriminals. The threat landscape targeting charging systems encompasses various types of attacks ranging from physical attacks to data breaches including customer information. In this paper, we aim to leverage the power of model-driven engineering to model and analyze EV charging systems at early stages. We employ domain-specific modeling language (DSML) techniques for the early security modeling and analysis of EV charging infrastructure. We accomplish this by integrating the established EMSA model for electric mobility, which encapsulates all key stakeholders in the ecosystem. To our knowledge, this represents the first instance in the literature of applying DSML within the electric mobility ecosystem, highlighting its innovative nature. Moreover, as our formalization based on DSML is an iterative, continuous, and evolving process, this approach guarantees that our proposed framework adeptly tackles the evolving cyber threats confronting the EV industry. Specifically, we use the Object Constraint Language (OCL) for precise specification and verification of security threats as properties of a modeled system. To validate our framework, we explore a set of representative threats targeting EV charging systems from real-world scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide a comprehensive security modeling framework for the electric mobility ecosystem.",
      "published": "2024-11-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en17235832",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anas Motii",
        "M. El Hamlaoui",
        "Robert B. Basmadjian"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/en17235832",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en18143807",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Grid Impacts of Electric Vehicle Charging: A Review of Challenges and Mitigation Strategies",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) offer a sustainable solution for reducing carbon emissions in the transportation sector. However, their increasing widespread adoption poses significant challenges for local distribution grids, many of which were not designed to accommodate the heightened and irregular power demands of EV charging. Components such as transformers and distribution networks may experience overload, voltage imbalances, and congestion—particularly during peak periods. While upgrading grid infrastructure is a potential solution, it is often costly and complex to implement. The unpredictable nature of EV charging behavior further complicates grid operations, as charging demand fluctuates throughout the day. Therefore, efficient integration into the grid—both for charging and potential discharging—is essential. This paper reviews recent studies on the impacts of high EV penetration on distribution grids and explores various strategies to enhance grid performance during peak demand. It also examines promising optimization methods aimed at mitigating negative effects, such as load shifting and smart charging, and compares their effectiveness across different grid parameters. Additionally, the paper discusses key challenges related to impact analysis and proposes approaches to improve them in order to achieve better overall grid performance.",
      "published": "2025-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en18143807",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asiri Tayri",
        "Xiandong Ma"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/en18143807",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 90,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/en18184847",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Electrified Future: A Systematic Review of Cyber Attacks, Intrusion and Anomaly Detection, and Authentication in Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "The growing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates a robust and secure charging infrastructure. This review article analyzes the current state of cybersecurity challenges within EV charging ecosystems, focusing on vulnerabilities affecting charging stations, communication protocols, and grid integration technologies such as vehicle-to-grid (V2G). Based on a systematic literature review, common cyber threats are categorized, including data manipulation, authentication bypass, infrastructure failures, and attacks on backend systems and the power grid. Furthermore, this paper synthesizes existing and emerging risk mitigation strategies, encompassing intrusion detection systems (IDS), secure communication protocols, authentication frameworks, and anomaly detection techniques utilizing machine learning and blockchain technologies. By analyzing literature published between 2017 and 2024, this study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of cybersecurity issues that are critical to ensuring the resilience and reliability of the evolving EV charging infrastructure. The scope of this review is centered specifically on cyber attacks, intrusion and anomaly detection, and authentication mechanisms within EV charging infrastructures, rather than on the broader cybersecurity domain.",
      "published": "2025-09-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/en18184847",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Łukasz Pawlik",
        "Jacek Łukasz Wilk-Jakubowski",
        "Pawel Tomasz Grabski",
        "Grzegorz Wilk-Jakubowski"
      ],
      "venue": "Energies",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/en18184847",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/engproc2025092015",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simulated Adversarial Attacks on Traffic Sign Recognition of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "With the development and application of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, autonomous driving systems are gradually being applied on the road. However, people still have requirements for the safety and reliability of unmanned vehicles. Autonomous driving systems in today’s unmanned vehicles also have to respond to information security attacks. If they cannot defend against such attacks, traffic accidents might be caused, leaving passengers exposed to risks. Therefore, we investigated adversarial attacks on the traffic sign recognition of autonomous vehicles in this study. We used You Look Only Once (YOLO) to build a machine learning model for traffic sign recognition and simulated attacks on traffic signs. The simulated attacks included LED light strobes, color-light flash, and Gaussian noise. Regarding LED strobes and color-light flash, translucent images were used to overlay the original traffic sign images to simulate corresponding attack scenarios. In the Gaussian noise attack, Python 3.11.10 was used to add noise to the original image. Different attack methods interfered with the original machine learning model to a certain extent, hindering autonomous vehicles from recognizing traffic signs and detecting them accurately.",
      "published": "2025-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/engproc2025092015",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chu‐Hsing Lin",
        "Chao-Ting Yu",
        "Yanling Chen",
        "Yo-Yu Lin",
        "Hsin-Ta Chiao"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Eurasia Conference on IOT, Communication and Engineering (ECICE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/engproc2025092015",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi11100217",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "5G V2X System-Level Architecture of 5GCAR Project",
      "description": "One of the goals of the 5G Communication Automotive Research and innovation (5GCAR) project has been to evaluate and propose system architecture enhancements aiming at supporting the strict requirements of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) use cases. In this paper, we provide an overview of 3GPP 5G system architecture, which is used as a baseline architecture in the project, and we present the main architectural enhancements introduced by 5GCAR. The work of the project focused on the following categories: (i) end-to-end security, also including aspects of privacy; (ii) network orchestration and management; (iii) network procedures; (iv) edge computing enhancements; and (v) multi-connectivity cooperation. The enhancements introduced by 5GCAR to above-listed categories are discussed in this paper, while a more detailed analysis of some selected features is presented.",
      "published": "2019-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi11100217",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Massimo Condoluci",
        "Laurent Gallo",
        "Laurent Mussot",
        "Απόστολος Κουσαρίδας",
        "Panagiotis Spapis",
        "Maliheh Mahlouji",
        "Toktam Mahmoodi"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi11100217",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi12020027",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Security Vulnerability Analysis, Discovery, Detection, and Mitigation on IoT Devices",
      "description": "With the prosperity of the Internet of Things (IoT) industry environment, the variety and quantity of IoT devices have grown rapidly. IoT devices have been widely used in smart homes, smart wear, smart manufacturing, smart cars, smart medical care, and many other life-related fields. With it, security vulnerabilities of IoT devices are emerging endlessly. The proliferation of security vulnerabilities will bring severe risks to users’ privacy and property. This paper first describes the research background, including IoT architecture, device components, and attack surfaces. We review state-of-the-art research on IoT device vulnerability discovery, detection, mitigation, and other related works. Then, we point out the current challenges and opportunities by evaluation. Finally, we forecast and discuss the research directions on vulnerability analysis techniques of IoT devices.",
      "published": "2020-02-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi12020027",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cars",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Miao Yu",
        "Jianwei Zhuge",
        "Ming Cao",
        "Zhiwei Shi",
        "Lin Cheng Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi12020027",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 100,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi12070119",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection for in-Vehicle Communication Networks: An Unsupervised Kohonen SOM Approach",
      "description": "The diffusion of embedded and portable communication devices on modern vehicles entails new security risks since in-vehicle communication protocols are still insecure and vulnerable to attacks. Increasing interest is being given to the implementation of automotive cybersecurity systems. In this work we propose an efficient and high-performing intrusion detection system based on an unsupervised Kohonen Self-Organizing Map (SOM) network, to identify attack messages sent on a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. The SOM network found a wide range of applications in intrusion detection because of its features of high detection rate, short training time, and high versatility. We propose to extend the SOM network to intrusion detection on in-vehicle CAN buses. Many hybrid approaches were proposed to combine the SOM network with other clustering methods, such as the k-means algorithm, in order to improve the accuracy of the model. We introduced a novel distance-based procedure to integrate the SOM network with the K-means algorithm and compared it with the traditional procedure. The models were tested on a car hacking dataset concerning traffic data messages sent on a CAN bus, characterized by a large volume of traffic with a low number of features and highly imbalanced data distribution. The experimentation showed that the proposed method greatly improved detection accuracy over the traditional approach.",
      "published": "2020-07-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi12070119",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vita Santa Barletta",
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Antonella Nannavecchia",
        "Michele Scalera"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi12070119",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 73,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi12110198",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Modeling of Automotive Security: A Survey of Methods and Perspectives",
      "description": "As the intelligent car-networking represents the new direction of the future vehicular development, automotive security plays an increasingly important role in the whole car industry chain. On condition that the accompanying problems of security are proofed, vehicles will provide more convenience while ensuring safety. Security models can be utilized as tools to rationalize the security of the automotive system and represent it in a structured manner. It is essential to improve the knowledge about security models by comparing them besides proposing new methods. This paper aims to give a comprehensive introduction to the topic of security models for the Intelligent Transport System (ITS). A survey of the current methodologies for security modeling is conducted and a classification scheme is subsequently proposed. Furthermore, the existing framework and methods to build automotive security models are broadly examined according to the features of automotive electronic system. A number of fundamental aspects are defined to compare the presented methods in order to comprehend the automotive security modeling in depth.",
      "published": "2020-11-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi12110198",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jingjing Hao",
        "Guangsheng Han"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi12110198",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi15050157",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threshold Cryptography-Based Secure Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication in 5G-Enabled Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "Implementing 5G-enabled Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) intelligent transportation systems presents a promising opportunity to enhance road safety and traffic flow while facilitating the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) based solutions. Yet, security and privacy concerns pose significant challenges that must be addressed. Therefore, researchers have focused on improving the security and integrity of vehicle data sharing, with a particular emphasis on V2X application layer security and privacy requirements. This is crucial given that V2X networks can consist of vehicles manufactured by different companies and registered in various jurisdictions, which may only be within communication range for a few seconds. Thus, it is necessary to establish a trusting relationship between vehicles quickly. The article proposes a threshold cryptography-based key exchange protocol that meets the key requirements for V2X data sharing and privacy, including the rapid establishment of trust, the maintenance of vehicle anonymity, and the provision of secure messages. To evaluate the feasibility and performance of the proposed protocol, a tailored testbed that leverages the NS-3 network simulator, a commercial 5G network, and public cloud infrastructure is used. Overall, the proposed protocol provides a potential solution for addressing security and privacy concerns in V2X networks, which is essential for successfully implementing and adopting this technology.",
      "published": "2023-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15050157",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nuwan Weerasinghe",
        "Muhammad Arslan Usman",
        "Chaminda T. E. R. Hewage",
        "Eckhard Pflüegel",
        "Christos Politis"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi15050157",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3974,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/fi15050157 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: commercial, trust, intelligence, significant, privacy, safety, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi16010010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Application Based on CARDIAN",
      "description": "Nowadays, a vehicle can contain from 20 to 100 ECUs, which are responsible for ordering, controlling and monitoring all the components of the vehicle itself. Each of these units can also send and receive information to other units on the network or externally. For most vehicles, the controller area network (CAN) is the main communication protocol and system used to build their internal network. Technological development, the growing integration of devices and the numerous advances in the field of connectivity have allowed the vehicle to become connected, and the flow of information exchanged between the various ECUs (electronic control units) becomes increasingly important and varied. Furthermore, the vehicle itself is capable of exchanging information with other vehicles, with the surrounding environment and with the Internet. As shown by the CARDIAN project, this type of innovation allows the user an increasingly safe and varied driving experience, but at the same time, it introduces a series of vulnerabilities and dangers due to the connection itself. The job of making the vehicle safe therefore becomes critical. In recent years, it has been demonstrated in multiple ways how easy it is to compromise the safety of a vehicle and its passengers by injecting malicious messages into the CAN network present inside the vehicle itself. The purpose of this article is the construction of a system that, integrated within the vehicle network, is able to effectively recognize any type of intrusion and tampering.",
      "published": "2023-12-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16010010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emanuele Santonicola",
        "Ennio Andrea Adinolfi",
        "Simone Coppola",
        "Francesco Pascale"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi16010010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi16110395",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Maintenance in the Automotive Industry Challenges and Solutions: A Technology Adoption Approach",
      "description": "Numerous attempts have been made to create a secure system that meets the criteria and requirements of the automotive vehicle development life cycle. However, a critical gap exists in the secure development lifecycle, particularly concerning the development and maintenance of software after the vehicle has been sold by the manufacturer. This step is often overlooked by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), especially after the expiration of the vehicle warranty period, given the cost that it will require to update and test the software in their vehicles. This paper addresses the issues that affect current and future vehicle cybersecurity, during the maintenance of cybersecurity, and how the neglect of it could end up creating hazards for the vehicle owner or other road users. To accomplish this, we will employ the technology adoption model (TAM) as a theoretical framework, which is used to understand and predict how organizations adopt technology. Thus, through qualitative and quantitative research, including text mining, we identify the challenges in the adoption and diffusion of cybersecurity maintenance in the automotive sector and its supply chain. In addition, we propose possible solutions on how to maintain a level of security that will benefit road users, OEMs and regulators, covering the cybersecurity needs for the vehicle’s usable life, taking into account the vehicle’s heterogeneity of components and technology, connectivity, environmental impact and cost of production and maintenance of a vehicle.",
      "published": "2024-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16110395",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ignacio Fernandez De Arroyabe",
        "Tim Watson",
        "Iain W. Phillips"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi16110395",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi16120451",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hierarchical Federated Learning-Based Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are crucial for identifying cyberattacks on in-vehicle networks. To enhance IDS robustness and preserve user data privacy, researchers are increasingly adopting federated learning (FL). However, traditional FL-based IDSs depend on a single central aggregator, creating performance bottlenecks and introducing a single point of failure, thereby compromising robustness and scalability. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a Hierarchical Federated Learning (H-FL) framework to deploy and evaluate the performance of the IDS. The H-FL framework incorporates multiple edge aggregators alongside the central aggregator, mitigating single-point failure risks, improving scalability, and efficiently distributing computational load. We evaluate the proposed IDS using the H-FL framework on two car hacking datasets under realistic non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID) data scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that deploying the IDS within an H-FL framework can enhance the F1-score by up to 10.63%, addressing the limitations of edge-FL in dataset diversity and attack coverage. Notably, H-FL improved the F1-score in 16 out of 24 evaluated scenarios. By enabling the IDS to learn from diverse data, driving conditions, and evolving threats, this approach substantially strengthens cybersecurity in modern vehicular systems.",
      "published": "2024-12-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16120451",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muzun Althunayyan",
        "Amir Javed",
        "OMER F. RANA",
        "Theodoros Spyridopoulos"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi16120451",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi17020079",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligence-Based Strategies with Vehicle-to-Everything Network: A Review",
      "description": "Advancements in intelligent vehicular networks and computing systems have created new possibilities for innovative approaches that enhance traffic safety, comfort, and transportation performance. Machine Learning (ML) has become widely employed for boosting conventional data-driven methodologies in various scientific study domains. The integration of a Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) system with ML enables the acquisition of knowledge from multiple places, enhances the operator’s awareness, and predicts future crashes to prevent them. The information serves multiple functions, such as determining the most efficient route, increasing the driver’s knowledge, forecasting movement strategy to avoid risky circumstances, and eventually improving user convenience, security, and overall highway experiences. This article thoroughly examines Artificial Intelligence (AI) and ML methods that are now investigated through different study endeavors in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Furthermore, it examines the benefits and drawbacks accompanying such intelligent methods in the context of the VANETs system and simulation tools. Ultimately, this study pinpoints prospective domains for vehicular network development that can utilize the capabilities of AI and ML.",
      "published": "2025-02-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi17020079",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Navdeep Bohra",
        "Ashish Kumari",
        "Vikash Kumar Mishra",
        "Pramod Kumar Soni",
        "Vipin Balyan"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi17020079",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi18010042",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection for Internet of Vehicles CAN Bus Communications Using Machine Learning: An Empirical Study on the CICIoV2024 Dataset",
      "description": "The rapid integration of connectivity and automation in modern vehicles has significantly expanded the attack surface of in-vehicle networks, particularly the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, which lacks native security mechanisms. This study investigates machine learning-based intrusion detection for Internet of Vehicles (IoV) environments using the CICIoV2024 dataset. Unlike prior studies that rely on highly redundant traffic traces, this work applies strict de-duplication to eliminate repetitive CAN frames, resulting in a dataset of unique attack signatures. To ensure statistical robustness despite the reduced data size, Stratified K-Fold Cross-Validation was employed. Experimental results reveal that while traditional models like Random Forest (optimized with ANOVA feature selection) maintain stability (F1-Macro ≈ 0.64), Deep Learning models fail to generalize (F1-Macro < 0.55) when denied the massive redundancy they typically require. These findings challenge the “near-perfect” detection rates reported in the literature, suggesting that previous benchmarks may reflect data leakage rather than true anomaly detection capabilities. The study concludes that lightweight models offer superior resilience for resource-constrained vehicular environments when evaluated on realistic, non-redundant data.",
      "published": "2026-01-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi18010042",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "resilience",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hop Le",
        "Izzat Mahmoud Alsmadi"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi18010042",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi18010051",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Resilience-by-Design: Extracting Resilience Requirements Using the Resilience Graph in the Automotive Concept Phase",
      "description": "The complexity and interconnectivity of modern automotive systems are rapidly increasing, particularly with the rise of distributed and cooperative driving functions. These developments increase exposure to a range of disruptions, from technical failures to cyberattacks, and demand a shift towards resilience-by-design. This study addresses the early integration of resilience into the automotive design process by proposing a structured method for identifying gaps and eliciting resilience requirements. Building upon the concept of resilience scenarios, the approach extends traditional hazard and threat analyses as defined in ISO 26262, ISO 21448 and ISO/SAE 21434. Using a structured, graph-based modeling method, these scenarios enable the anticipation of functional degradation and its impact on driving scenarios. The methodology helps developers to specify resilience requirements at an early stage, enabling the integration of resilience properties throughout the system lifecycle. Its practical applicability is demonstrated through an example in the field of automotive cybersecurity. This study advances the field of resilience engineering by providing a concrete approach for operationalizing resilience within automotive systems engineering.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi18010051",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "resilience",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Isaac Mpidi Bita",
        "Elif Ugur",
        "Aschot Hovemann",
        "Roman Dumitrescu",
        ":unav"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi18010051",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi18010060",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unsupervised Detection of SOC Spoofing in OCPP 2.0.1 EV Charging Communication Protocol Using One-Class SVM",
      "description": "The electric vehicles (EVs) market keeps growing globally; thus, it is critical to secure the EV charging communication protocols in order to guarantee reliable and fair charging operations among the customers. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 2.0.1 supports the communication between the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) and Charging Station Management Systems (CSMSs); therefore, it becomes vulnerable to several types of attacks, which aim to jeopardize smart charging, billing, and energy management. Specifically, OCPP 2.0.1 allows the self-reporting of the State of Charge (SOC) values, which makes it vulnerable to spoofing-based cyberattacks, which target manipulating the scheduling priorities, distorting the load forecasts, and extending the charging sessions in an unfair manner. In this paper, we try to address this type of attack by providing a comprehensive analysis of the SOC spoofing attacks and introducing a novel unsupervised detection framework based on the One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) algorithm. Specifically, two types of attack scenarios are analyzed (i.e., priority manipulation and session extension) by deriving engineered features that capture the nonlinear relationships under normal charging behavior. Detailed simulation-based results are derived by utilizing the DESL-EPFL Level 3 EV charging dataset. Our results demonstrate high F1-score and recall in identifying spoofed SOC values and that the proposed OCSVM model demonstrates superior performance compared to alternative clustering and deep-learning based detectors.",
      "published": "2026-01-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi18010060",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "ocpp",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aisha B Rahman",
        "Md Sadman Siraj",
        "Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou",
        "Georgios Fragkos",
        "Ryan Sullivant",
        "Yung Ryn Choe",
        "Jhaell Jimenez",
        "Junghwan Rhee",
        "Kyu Hyung Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi18010060",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi18040202",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EGGA: An Error-Guided Generative Augmentation and Optimized ML-Based IDS for EV Charging Network Security",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle Charging Systems (EVCSs) are increasingly connected with the Internet of Things (IoT) and smart grid infrastructure, yet they face growing cyber risks due to expanded attack interfaces. These systems are vulnerable to various attacks that potentially impact both charging operations and user privacy. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are essential for identifying suspicious activities and mitigating risks to protect EVCS networks, but conventional ML-based IDSs are often unable to achieve optimal performance due to imbalanced datasets, complex traffic distributions, and human design limitations. In practice, EVCS traffic is typically multi-class, imbalanced, and safety-critical, where both missed attacks and false alarms can lead to denial of charging, service interruption, unnecessary incident escalation, financial loss, and reduced user trust. Automated ML (AutoML) and Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) have emerged as promising solutions in cybersecurity. Existing GAI and augmentation methods are mostly class-frequency-driven, but this does not necessarily improve the error-prone regions where IDSs actually fail. In this paper, we propose a GAI and an AutoML-based IDS that incorporates a Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (cGAN) with the optimized XGBoost model to improve the effectiveness of intrusion detection in EVCS networks and IoT systems. The proposed framework involves two techniques: (1) a novel cGAN-based error-guided generative augmentation (EGGA) method that extracts misclassified samples and generates a more robust training set for IDS development, and (2) an optimized IDS model that automatically constructs an optimized XGBoost model based on Bayesian Optimization with Tree-structured Parzen Estimator (BO-TPE). The main algorithmic novelty lies in EGGA, which uses model errors to guide generative augmentation toward difficult decision regions, while the overall pipeline represents a practical system-level integration of EGGA, XGBoost, and BO-TPE. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that combines GAI and AutoML to specifically improve detection on hard samples, enabling more autonomous and reliable identification of diverse cyber attacks in EV charging networks and IoT systems. Experiments are conducted on two benchmark EVCS and cybersecurity datasets, CICEVSE2024 and CICIDS2017, demonstrating consistent and statistically meaningful improvements over state-of-the-art IDS models. This research highlights the importance of combining automation, generative balancing, and optimized learning to strengthen cybersecurity solutions for EV charging networks and IoT systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi18040202",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Yang",
        "G. Kirubavathi"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi18040202",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/fi7030257",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicular Internet: Security & Privacy Challenges and Opportunities",
      "description": "The vehicular internet will drive the future of vehicular technology and intelligent transportation systems (ITS). Whether it is road safety, infotainment, or driver-less cars, the vehicular internet will lay the foundation for the future of road travel. Governments and companies are pursuing driver-less vehicles as they are considered to be more reliable than humans and, therefore, safer. The vehicles today are not just a means of transportation but are also equipped with a wide range of sensors that provide valuable data. If vehicles are enabled to share data that they collect with other vehicles or authorities for decision-making and safer driving, they thereby form a vehicular network. However, there is a lot at stake in vehicular networks if they are compromised. With the stakes so high, it is imperative that the vehicular networks are secured and made resilient to any attack or attempt that may have serious consequences. The vehicular internet can also be the target of a cyber attack, which can be devastating. In this paper, the opportunities that the vehicular internet offers are presented and then various security and privacy aspects are discussed and some solutions are presented.",
      "published": "2015-07-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/fi7030257",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kamran Zaidi",
        "Muttukrishnan Rajarajan"
      ],
      "venue": "Future Internet",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.3390/fi7030257",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info10040148",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey and Classification of Automotive Security Attacks",
      "description": "Due to current development trends in the automotive industry towards stronger connected and autonomous driving, the attack surface of vehicles is growing which increases the risk of security attacks. This has been confirmed by several research projects in which vehicles were attacked in order to trigger various functions. In some cases these functions were critical to operational safety. To make automotive systems more secure, concepts must be developed that take existing attacks into account. Several taxonomies were proposed to analyze and classify security attacks. However, in this paper we show that the existing taxonomies were not designed for application in the automotive development process and therefore do not provide enough degree of detail for supporting development phases such as threat analysis or security testing. In order to be able to use the information that security attacks can provide for the development of security concepts and for testing automotive systems, we propose a comprehensive taxonomy with degrees of detail which addresses these tasks. In particular, our proposed taxonomy is designed in such a wa, that each step in the vehicle development process can leverage it.",
      "published": "2019-04-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info10040148",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Florian Sommer",
        "Jürgen Dürrwang",
        "Reiner Kriesten"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/info10040148",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 114,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info13050242",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Finding Optimal Moving Target Defense Strategies: A Resilience Booster for Connected Cars",
      "description": "During their life-cycle, modern connected cars will have to face various and changing security threats. As for any critical embedded system, security fixes in the form of software updates need to be thoroughly verified and cannot be deployed on a daily basis. The system needs to commit to a defense strategy, while attackers can examine vulnerabilities and prepare possible exploits before attacking. In order to break this asymmetry, it can be advantageous to use proactive defenses, such as reconfiguring parts of the system configuration. However, resource constraints and losses in quality of service need to be taken into account for such Moving Target Defenses (MTDs). In this article, we present a game-theoretic model that can be used to compute an optimal MTD defense for a critical embedded system that is facing several attackers with different objectives. The game is resolved using off-the-shelf MILP solvers. We validated the method with an automotive use case and conducted extensive experiments to evaluate its scalability and stability.",
      "published": "2022-05-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info13050242",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "exploits",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maxime Ayrault",
        "Ulrich Kühne",
        "Étienne Borde"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/info13050242",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info13110518",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Comparison of Brain-Based Automotive Electrical and Electronic Architectures",
      "description": "Modern autonomous vehicles with an electric/electronic (E/E) architecture represent the next big step in the automation and evolution of smart and self-driving vehicles. This technology is of significant interest nowadays and humans are currently witnessing the development of the different levels of automation for their vehicles. According to recent demand, the components of smart vehicles are centrally or zonally connected, as well as connected to clouds to ensure the seamless automation of driving functions. This necessity has a downside, as it makes the system vulnerable to malicious attacks from hackers with unethical motives. To ensure the control, safety, and security of smart vehicles, attaining and upholding automotive cybersecurity standards is inevitable. The ISO/SAE 21434 Road vehicle—Cybersecurity engineering standard document was published in 2021 and can be considered the Bible of automotive cybersecurity. In this paper, a comparison between four different E/E architectures was made based on the aforementioned standard. One of them is the traditional distributed architecture with many electronic control units (ECUs). The other three architectures consist of centralized or zonally distributed high-performance computers (HPCs). As the complexity of autonomous E/E systems are on the rise, the traditional distributive method is compared against the HPC (brain)-based architectures to visualize a comparative scenario between the architectures. The authors of this paper analyzed the threats and damage scenarios of the architectures using the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, “Microsoft Threat Analysis Tool - STRIDE”, TARA, and “Ansys Medini Analyze”. Security controls are recommended to mitigate the threats and risks in all of these studied architectures. This work attempted to mitigate the gap in the scholarly literature by creating a comparative image of the E/E architectures on a generalized level. The exploratory method of this research provides the reader with knowledge on four different architecture types, their fundamental properties, advantages, and disadvantages along with a general overview of the threats and vulnerabilities associated with each in light of the ISO/SAE 21434 standard. The improvement possibilities of the studied architectures are provided and their advantages and disadvantages are highlighted herein.",
      "published": "2022-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info13110518",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nadera Sultana Tany",
        "Sunish Suresh",
        "Durgesh Nandan Sinha",
        "Chinmay Shinde",
        "Cristina Stolojescu-Crișan",
        "Rahamatullah Khondoker"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/info13110518",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info14010014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "THREATGET: Towards Automated Attack Tree Analysis for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The automotive domain is moving away from simple isolated vehicles to interconnected networks of heterogeneous systems forming a complex transportation infrastructure. The additional means of communication result in increased attack surfaces which can be exploited by physical as well as remote attackers if not secured thoroughly. Thus, the automotive sector is exposed to new cyber risk factors. Consequently, joint approaches targeting securing vehicles and infrastructure by identifying and mitigating potential threats for the automotive domain have been developed in several research projects. This paper builds on developments originating from these projects and correlated standards and regulations. Moreover, the extension of an existing threat modeling tool—THREATGET—with a novel automated approach toward attack propagation will be introduced. Therefore, we will conduct an analysis of a real-world example from the automotive domain. Furthermore, we will identify and analyze potential threats and discuss their accumulation to automatically generate an attack tree.",
      "published": "2022-12-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info14010014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sebastian Chlup",
        "Korbinian Christl",
        "Christoph Schmittner",
        "Abdelkader Magdy Shaaban",
        "Stefan Schauer",
        "Martin Latzenhofer"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/info14010014",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info14120639",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrated Attack Tree in Residual Risk Management Framework",
      "description": "Safety-critical cyber-physical systems (CPSs), such as high-tech cars having cyber capabilities, are highly interconnected. Automotive manufacturers are concerned about cyber attacks on vehicles that can lead to catastrophic consequences. There is a need for a new risk management approach to address and investigate cybersecurity risks. Risk management in the automotive domain is challenging due to technological improvements and advances every year. The current standard for automotive security is ISO/SAE 21434, which discusses a framework that includes threats, associated risks, and risk treatment options such as risk reduction by applying appropriate defences. This paper presents a residual cybersecurity risk management framework aligned with the framework presented in ISO/SAE 21434. A methodology is proposed to develop an integrated attack tree that considers multiple sub-systems within the CPS. Integrating attack trees in this way will help the analyst to take a broad perspective of system security. Our previous approach utilises a flow graph to calculate the residual risk to a system before and after applying defences. This paper is an extension of our initial work. It defines the steps for applying the proposed framework and using adaptive cruise control (ACC) and adaptive light control (ALC) to illustrate the applicability of our work. This work is evaluated by comparing it with the requirements of the risk management framework discussed in the literature. Currently, our methodology satisfies more than 75% of their requirements.",
      "published": "2023-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info14120639",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Nawaz Khan",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Giedre Sabaliauskaite",
        "Hesamaldin Jadidbonab"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/info14120639",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info14120666",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Formal Methods and Validation Techniques for Ensuring Automotive Systems Security",
      "description": "The increasing complexity and connectivity of automotive systems have raised concerns about their vulnerability to security breaches. As a result, the integration of formal methods and validation techniques has become crucial in ensuring the security of automotive systems. This survey research paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state-of-the-art formal methods and validation techniques employed in the automotive industry for system security. The paper begins by discussing the challenges associated with automotive system security and the potential consequences of security breaches. Then, it explores various formal methods, such as model checking, theorem proving, and abstract interpretation, which have been widely used to analyze and verify the security properties of automotive systems. Additionally, the survey highlights the validation techniques employed to ensure the effectiveness of security measures, including penetration testing, fault injection, and fuzz testing. Furthermore, the paper examines the integration of formal methods and validation techniques within the automotive development lifecycle, including requirements engineering, design, implementation, and testing phases. It discusses the benefits and limitations of these approaches, considering factors such as scalability, efficiency, and applicability to real-world automotive systems. Through an extensive review of relevant literature and case studies, this survey provides insights into the current research trends, challenges, and open research questions in the field of formal methods and validation techniques for automotive system security. The findings of this survey can serve as a valuable resource for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers involved in the design, development, and evaluation of secure automotive systems.",
      "published": "2023-12-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info14120666",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "penetration",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moez Krichen"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/info14120666",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info15100583",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart Collaborative Intrusion Detection System for Securing Vehicular Networks Using Ensemble Machine Learning Model",
      "description": "The advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution has positioned the Internet of Things as a pivotal force in intelligent vehicles. With the source of vehicle-to-everything (V2X), Internet of Things (IoT) networks, and inter-vehicle communication, intelligent connected vehicles are at the forefront of this transformation, leading to complex vehicular networks that are crucial yet susceptible to cyber threats. The complexity and openness of these networks expose them to a plethora of cyber-attacks, from passive eavesdropping to active disruptions like Denial of Service and Sybil attacks. These not only compromise the safety and efficiency of vehicular networks but also pose a significant risk to the stability and resilience of the Internet of Vehicles. Addressing these vulnerabilities, this paper proposes a Dynamic Forest-Structured Ensemble Network (DFSENet) specifically tailored for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). By leveraging data-balancing techniques and dimensionality reduction, the DFSENet model is designed to detect a wide range of cyber threats effectively. The proposed model demonstrates high efficacy, with an accuracy of 99.2% on the CICIDS dataset and 98% on the car-hacking dataset. The precision, recall, and f-measure metrics stand at 95.6%, 98.8%, and 96.9%, respectively, establishing the DFSENet model as a robust solution for securing the IoV against cyber-attacks.",
      "published": "2024-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info15100583",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hacking",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. M. El-Gayar",
        "Faheed A. F. Alrslani",
        "Shaker El–Sappagh"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/info15100583",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4606,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/info15100583 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: expose, stability, like, service, significant, information, safety, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info16060449",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Graph-Based Automation of Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment for Automotive Security",
      "description": "The proliferation of cyber–physical systems in modern vehicles, characterized by densely interconnected Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and heterogeneous communication networks, has significantly expanded the automotive attack surface. Traditional Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) methodologies remain predominantly manual processes that exhibit limitations in scalability, and comprehensive threat identification. This research addresses these limitations by developing a formalized framework for automating attack path analysis within the automotive architecture. While attack graph methodologies have demonstrated efficacy in conventional information technology domains, their application within automotive cybersecurity contexts presents unique challenges stemming from domain-specific architectural constraints. We propose a novel Graph-based Attack Path Prioritization (GAPP) methodology that integrates Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) modeling. Our implementation employs the Neo4j property graph database architecture to establish the mappings between architectural components, security states, and exploitation vectors. This research contributes a systematic approach to automotive security assessment, enhancing vulnerability identification capabilities while reducing analytical complexity.",
      "published": "2025-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info16060449",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "exploitation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mera Nizam-Edden Saulaiman",
        "Miklós Kozlovszky",
        "Á. Csilling"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/info16060449",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info7030036",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Standard Compliant Hazard and Threat Analysis for the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "The automotive industry has successfully collaborated to release the ISO 26262 standard for developing safe software for cars. The standard describes in detail how to conduct hazard analysis and risk assessments to determine the necessary safety measures for each feature. However, the standard does not concern threat analysis for malicious attackers or how to select appropriate security countermeasures. We propose the application of ISO 27001 for this purpose and show how it can be applied together with ISO 26262. We show how ISO 26262 documentation can be re-used and enhanced to satisfy the analysis and documentation demands of the ISO 27001 standard. We illustrate our approach based on an electronic steering column lock system.",
      "published": "2016-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info7030036",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kristian Beckers",
        "Jürgen Dürrwang",
        "Dominik Holling"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.3390/info7030036",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/info9110264",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Challenges and Opportunities of Named Data Networking in Vehicle-To-Everything Communication: A Review",
      "description": "Many car manufacturers have recently proposed to release autonomous self-driving cars within the next few years. Information gathered by sensors (e.g., cameras, GPS, lidar, radar, ultrasonic) enable cars to drive autonomously on roads. However, in urban or high-speed traffic scenarios the information gathered by mounted sensors may not be sufficient to guarantee a smooth and safe traffic flow. Thus, information received from infrastructure and other cars or vehicles on the road is vital. Key aspects in Vehicle-To-Everything (V2X) communication are security, authenticity, and integrity which are inherently provided by Information Centric Networking (ICN). In this paper, we identify advantages and drawbacks of ICN for V2X communication. We specifically review forwarding, caching, as well as simulation aspects for V2X communication with a focus on ICN. Furthermore, we investigate existing solutions for V2X and discuss their applicability. Based on these investigations, we suggest directions for further work in context of ICN (in particular Named Data Networking) to enable V2X communication providing a secure and efficient transport platform.",
      "published": "2018-10-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/info9110264",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Benjamin Rainer",
        "Stefan Petscharnig"
      ],
      "venue": "Information",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.3390/info9110264",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/j2030021",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Crypto Hash Algorithm-Based Blockchain Technology for Managing Decentralized Ledger Database in Oil and Gas Industry",
      "description": "This research work proposes a method for the securing and monitoring of petroleum product distribution records in a decentralized ledger database using blockchain technology. The aim of using this technique is to secure the transaction of distributed ledgers in a database and to protect records from tampering, fraudulent activity, and corruption by the chain participants. The blockchain technology approach offers an efficient security measure and novel advantages, such as in the transaction existence and distribution ledger management between the depot, transporter, and retailing filling station. Others advantages are transparency, immunity to fraud, insusceptibility to tampering, and maintaining record order. The technique adopted for this secure distributed ledger database is crypto hash algorithm-1 (SHA-1)-based public permissioned blockchain and telematics, while this telematics approach is an embedded system integrated into an in-vehicle model for remote tracking of geolocation (using Global Positioning System (GPS)), monitoring, and far-off data acquisition in a real-time. The scope of the data in the secure distributed ledger database (using blockchain) developed are identification (ID) of the tanker operator, Depot name, Source station ID, Destination station ID, Petroleum product volume, Transporter ID, and Geographic automobiles location. This system proved to be efficient, secure, and easy to maintain as it does not permit any individual for records tampering, but supports agreement of ~75% of participants in the chain to make changes.",
      "published": "2019-08-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/j2030021",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "tampering",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lukman Adewale Ajao",
        "James Agajo",
        "Emmanuel Adewale Adedokun",
        "Loveth Karngong"
      ],
      "venue": "J — Multidisciplinary Scientific Journal",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/j2030021",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 94,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/jcp3030025",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicles: Sophisticated Attacks, Safety Issues, Challenges, Open Topics, Blockchain, and Future Directions",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs), defined as vehicles capable of navigation and decision-making independent of human intervention, represent a revolutionary advancement in transportation technology. These vehicles operate by synthesizing an array of sophisticated technologies, including sensors, cameras, GPS, radar, light imaging detection and ranging (LiDAR), and advanced computing systems. These components work in concert to accurately perceive the vehicle’s environment, ensuring the capacity to make optimal decisions in real-time. At the heart of AV functionality lies the ability to facilitate intercommunication between vehicles and with critical road infrastructure—a characteristic that, while central to their efficacy, also renders them susceptible to cyber threats. The potential infiltration of these communication channels poses a severe threat, enabling the possibility of personal information theft or the introduction of malicious software that could compromise vehicle safety. This paper offers a comprehensive exploration of the current state of AV technology, particularly examining the intersection of autonomous vehicles and emotional intelligence. We delve into an extensive analysis of recent research on safety lapses and security vulnerabilities in autonomous vehicles, placing specific emphasis on the different types of cyber attacks to which they are susceptible. We further explore the various security solutions that have been proposed and implemented to address these threats. The discussion not only provides an overview of the existing challenges but also presents a pathway toward future research directions. This includes potential advancements in the AV field, the continued refinement of safety measures, and the development of more robust, resilient security mechanisms. Ultimately, this paper seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the safety and security landscape of autonomous vehicles, fostering discourse on the intricate balance between technological advancement and security in this rapidly evolving field.",
      "published": "2023-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp3030025",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Αναστάσιος Γιάνναρος",
        "Aristeidis Karras",
        "Leonidas Theodorakopoulos",
        "Christos Karras",
        "Panagiotis Kranias",
        "Nikolaos Schizas",
        "Gerasimos Kalogeratos",
        "Dimitrios K. Tsolis"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/jcp3030025",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 235,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/joitmc5020024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Disruptive Impacts of Automated Driving Systems on the Built Environment and Land Use: An Urban Planner’s Perspective",
      "description": "Cities have started to restructure themselves into 'smart cities' to address the challenges of the 21st Century-such as climate change, sustainable development, and digital disruption.One of the major obstacles to success for a smart city is to tackle the mobility and accessibility issues via 'smart mobility' solutions.At the verge of the age of smart urbanism, autonomous vehicle technology is seen as an opportunity to realize the smart mobility vision of cities.However, this innovative technological advancement is also speculated to bring a major disruption in urban transport, land use, employment, parking, car ownership, infrastructure design, capital investment decisions, sustainability, mobility, and traffic safety.Despite the potential threats, urban planners and managers are not yet prepared to develop autonomous vehicle strategies for cities to deal with these threats.This is mainly due to a lack of knowledge on the social implications of autonomous capabilities and how exactly they will disrupt our cities.This viewpoint provides a snapshot of the current status of vehicle automation, the direction in which the field is moving forward, the potential impacts of systematic adoption of autonomous vehicles, and how urban planners can mitigate the built environment and land use disruption of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/joitmc5020024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tan Yiğitcanlar",
        "Mark I. Wilson",
        "Md. Kamruzzaman"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Open Innovation Technology Market and Complexity",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/joitmc5020024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 129,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/jsan11010006",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Lightweight Intrusion Detection Framework for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With the emergence of networked devices, from the Internet of Things (IoT) nodes and cellular phones to vehicles connected to the Internet, there has been an ever-growing expansion of attack surfaces in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). In the past decade, there has been a rapid growth in the automotive industry as network-enabled and electronic devices are now integral parts of vehicular ecosystems. These include the development of automobile technologies, namely, Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) and electric vehicles. Attacks on IoV may lead to malfunctioning of Electronic Control Unit (ECU), brakes, control steering issues, and door lock issues that can be fatal in CAV. To mitigate these risks, there is need for a lightweight model to identify attacks on vehicular systems. In this article, an efficient model of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is developed to detect anomalies in the vehicular system. The dataset used in this study is an In-Vehicle Network (IVN) communication protocol, i.e., Control Area Network (CAN) dataset generated in a real-time environment. The model classifies different types of attacks on vehicles into reconnaissance, Denial of Service (DoS), and fuzzing attacks. Experimentation with performance metrics of accuracy, precision, recall, and F-1 score are compared across a variety of classification models. The results demonstrate that the proposed model outperforms other classification models.",
      "published": "2022-01-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan11010006",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dheeraj Basavaraj",
        "Shahab Tayeb"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/jsan11010006",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/jsan4010002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Car: Quantified Self becomes Quantified Car",
      "description": "The automotive industry could be facing a situation of profound change and opportunity in the coming decades. There are a number of influencing factors such as increasing urban and aging populations, self-driving cars, 3D parts printing, energy innovation, and new models of transportation service delivery (Zipcar, Uber). The connected car means that vehicles are now part of the connected world, continuously Internet-connected, generating and transmitting data, which on the one hand can be helpfully integrated into applications, like real-time traffic alerts broadcast to smartwatches, but also raises security and privacy concerns. This paper explores the automotive connected world, and describes five killer QS (Quantified Self)-auto sensor applications that link quantified-self sensors (sensors that measure the personal biometrics of individuals like heart rate) and automotive sensors (sensors that measure driver and passenger biometrics or quantitative automotive performance metrics like speed and braking activity). The applications are fatigue detection, real-time assistance for parking and accidents, anger management and stress reduction, keyless authentication and digital identity verification, and DIY diagnostics. These kinds of applications help to demonstrate the benefit of connected world data streams in the automotive industry and beyond where, more fundamentally for human progress, the automation of both physical and now cognitive tasks is underway.",
      "published": "2015-02-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan4010002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "keyless",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Melanie Swan"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.3390/jsan4010002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 78,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/jsan5010003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Social Internet of Vehicles for Smart Cities",
      "description": "Digital devices are becoming increasingly ubiquitous and interconnected. Their evolution to intelligent parts of a digital ecosystem creates novel applications with so far unresolved security issues. A particular example is a vehicle. As vehicles evolve from simple means of transportation to smart entities with new sensing and communication capabilities, they become active members of a smart city. The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) consists of vehicles that communicate with each other and with public networks through V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle), V2I (vehicle-to-infrastructure) and V2P (vehicle-to-pedestrian) interactions, which enables both the collection and the real-time sharing of critical information about the condition on the road network. The Social Internet of Things (SIoT) introduces social relationships among objects, creating a social network where the participants are not humans, but intelligent objects. In this article, we explore the concept of the Social Internet of Vehicles (SIoV), a network that enables social interactions both among vehicles and among drivers. We discuss technologies and components of the SIoV, possible applications and issues of security, privacy and trust that are likely to arise.",
      "published": "2016-02-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan5010003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Leandros A. Maglaras",
        "Ali Hilal Al-Bayatti",
        "Ying He",
        "Isabel Wagner",
        "Helge Janicke"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.3390/jsan5010003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 165,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/jsan9040057",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "End-to-End Performance Evaluation of MEC Deployments in 5G Scenarios",
      "description": "Multi-access edge computing (MEC) promises to deliver localized computing power and storage. Coupled with low-latency 5G radio access, this enables the creation of high added-value services for mobile users, such as in-vehicle infotainment or remote driving. The performance of these services as well as their scalability will however depend on how MEC will be deployed in 5G systems. This paper evaluates different MEC deployment options, coherent with the respective 5G migration phases, using an accurate and comprehensive end-to-end (E2E) system simulation model (exploiting Simu5G for radio access and Intel CoFluent for core network and MEC), taking into account user-related metrics, such as response time or MEC latency. Our results show that 4G radio access is going to be a bottleneck, preventing MEC services from scaling up. On the other hand, the introduction of 5G will allow a considerable higher penetration of MEC services.",
      "published": "2020-12-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan9040057",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Antonio Virdis",
        "Giovanni Nardini",
        "Giovanni Stea",
        "Dario Sabella"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/jsan9040057",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/knowledge3020013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Managing the Knowledge Deficit in the German Automotive Industry",
      "description": "The combined effects of decarbonization and digitalization have had a significant impact on the German automotive industry, with different business models emerging that often involve new business alliances with other automotive companies and technology companies. This rapid and dramatic change momentum has resulted in a “knowledge deficit” in the industry, as regards the skills and know-how required to operate successfully in the digital economy. Using an inductive, qualitative research methodology, based on in-depth interviews with industry experts and practitioners, this article identifies the main areas in which skills, knowledge and competencies are lacking, and assesses the main ways in which the industry is trying to address the problem. A number of emergent issues are also discussed. The article finds that many years of technology outsourcing have left the industry deficient in core technology skills for software development, data management and architecture design, and that new competencies in cybersecurity, platforms and ecosystems, and sourcing management are also urgently needed. The industry is addressing this challenge through a combination of strategies, including major partnership arrangements with the big tech companies. The article concludes that entrepreneurial innovation and radical digital leadership will be required to adequately address the knowledge deficit in the digital era.",
      "published": "2023-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/knowledge3020013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kerstin Felser",
        "Martin George Wynn"
      ],
      "venue": "Knowledge",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/knowledge3020013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/math12193150",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analyzing the Influence of Telematics-Based Pricing Strategies on Traditional Rating Factors in Auto Insurance Rate Regulation",
      "description": "This study examines how telematics variables such as annual percentage driven, total miles driven, and driving patterns influence the distributional behaviour of conventional rating factors when incorporated into predictive models for capturing auto insurance risk in rate regulation. To effectively manage the complexity inherent in telematics data, we advocate for the adoption of non-negative sparse principal component analysis (NSPCA) as a structured approach for data dimensionality reduction. By emphasizing sparsity and non-negativity constraints, NSPCA enhances the interpretability and predictive power of models concerning both loss severity and claim counts. This methodological innovation aims to advance statistical analyses within insurance pricing frameworks, ensuring the robustness of predictive models and providing insights crucial for rate regulation strategies specific to the auto insurance sector. Results show that, to enhance auto insurance risk pricing models, it is essential to address data dimension reduction challenges when integrating telematics data variables. Our findings underscore that integrating telematics variables into predictive models maintains the integrity of risk relativity estimates associated with traditional policy variables.",
      "published": "2024-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/math12193150",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shengkun Xie"
      ],
      "venue": "Mathematics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/math12193150",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/math8081311",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Detection for Cyber Security Attacks on Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV)-related initiatives have become some of the fastest expanding in recent years, and have started to affect the daily lives of people. More and more companies and research organizations have announced their initiatives, and some have started CAV road trials. Governments around the world have also introduced policies to support and accelerate the deployments of CAVs. Along these, issues such as CAV cyber security have become predominant, forming an essential part of the complications of CAV deployment. There is, however, no universally agreed upon or recognized framework for CAV cyber security. In this paper, following the UK CAV cyber security principles, we propose a UML (Unified Modeling Language)-based CAV cyber security framework, and based on which we classify the potential vulnerabilities of CAV systems. With this framework, a new CAV communication cyber-attack data set (named CAV-KDD) is generated based on the widely tested benchmark data set KDD99. This data set focuses on the communication-based CAV cyber-attacks. Two classification models are developed, using two machine learning algorithms, namely Decision Tree and Naive Bayes, based on the CAV-KDD training data set. The accuracy, precision and runtime of these two models when identifying each type of communication-based attacks are compared and analysed. It is found that the Decision Tree model requires a shorter runtime, and is more appropriate for CAV communication attack detection.",
      "published": "2020-08-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/math8081311",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qiyi He",
        "Xiaolin Meng",
        "Rong Qu",
        "Ruijie Xi"
      ],
      "venue": "Mathematics",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/math8081311",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 93,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/network5040043",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimized Hybrid Ensemble Intrusion Detection for VANET-Based Autonomous Vehicle Security",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles are promising for advancing traffic safety and efficiency. However, the increased connectivity makes these vehicles vulnerable to a broad array of cyber threats. This paper presents a novel hybrid approach for intrusion detection in in-vehicle networks, specifically focusing on the Controller Area Network bus. Ensemble learning techniques are combined with sophisticated optimization techniques and dynamic adaptation mechanisms to develop a robust, accurate, and computationally efficient intrusion detection system. The proposed system is evaluated on real-world automotive network datasets that include various attack types (e.g., Denial of Service, fuzzy, and spoofing attacks). With these results, the proposed hybrid adaptive system achieves an unprecedented accuracy of 99.995% with a 0.00001% false positive rate, which is significantly more accurate than traditional methods. In addition, the system is very robust to novel attack patterns and is tolerant to varying computational constraints and is suitable for deployment on a real-time basis in various automotive platforms. As this research represents a significant advancement in automotive cybersecurity, a scalable and proactive defense mechanism is necessary to safely operate next-generation vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-10-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/network5040043",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad A. Aloqaily",
        "Emad E. Abdallah",
        "Aladdin Hussein Baarah",
        "Mohammad M. Alnabhan",
        "Esra’a Alshdaifat",
        "Hind Milhem"
      ],
      "venue": "Network",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/network5040043",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s19020334",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Vehicle to Everything (V2X) Testing",
      "description": "Vehicle to everything (V2X) is a new generation of information and communication technologies that connect vehicles to everything. It not only creates a more comfortable and safer transportation environment, but also has much significance for improving traffic efficiency, and reducing pollution and accident rates. At present, the technology is still in the exploratory stage, and the problems of traffic safety and information security brought about by V2X applications have not yet been fully evaluated. Prior to marketization, we must ensure the reliability and maturity of the technology, which must be rigorously tested and verified. Therefore, testing is an important part of V2X technology. This article focuses on the V2X application requirements and its challenges, the need of testing. Then we also investigate and summarize the testing methods for V2X in the communication process and describe them in detail from the architectural perspective. In addition, we have proposed an end-to-end testing system combining virtual and real environments which can undertake the test task of the full protocol stack.",
      "published": "2019-01-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s19020334",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jian Wang",
        "Yameng Shao",
        "Yuming Ge",
        "Rundong Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/s19020334",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 317,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s19092059",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicle as a Mobile Sensor for Real Time Queue Length at Signalized Intersections",
      "description": "With the development of intelligent transportation system (ITS) and vehicle to X (V2X), the connected vehicle is capable of sensing a great deal of useful traffic information, such as queue length at intersections. Aiming to solve the problem of existing models' complexity and information redundancy, this paper proposes a queue length sensing model based on V2X technology, which consists of two sub-models based on shockwave sensing and back propagation (BP) neural network sensing. First, the model obtains state information of the connected vehicles and analyzes the formation process of the queue, and then it calculates the velocity of the shockwave to predict the queue length of the subsequent unconnected vehicles. Then, the neural network is trained with historical connected vehicle data, and a sub-model based on the BP neural network is established to predict the real-time queue length. Finally, the final queue length at the intersection is determined by combining the sub-models by variable weight. Simulation results show that the sensing accuracy of the combined model is proportional to the penetration rate of connected vehicles, and sensing of queue length can be achieved even in low penetration rate environments. In mixed traffic environments of connected vehicles and unconnected vehicles, the queuing length sensing model proposed in this paper has higher performance than the probability distribution (PD) model when the penetration rate is low, and it has an almost equivalent performance with higher penetration rate while the penetration rate is not needed. The proposed sensing model is more applicable for mixed traffic scenarios with much looser conditions.",
      "published": "2019-05-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s19092059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "penetration",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kai Gao",
        "Farong Han",
        "Pingping Dong",
        "Naixue N. Xiong",
        "Ronghua Du"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/s19092059",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 120,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s19102394",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards an Autonomous Industry 4.0 Warehouse: A UAV and Blockchain-Based System for Inventory and Traceability Applications in Big Data-Driven Supply Chain Management",
      "description": "Industry 4.0 has paved the way for a world where smart factories will automate and upgrade many processes through the use of some of the latest emerging technologies. One of such technologies is Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which have evolved a great deal in the last years in terms of technology (e.g., control units, sensors, UAV frames) and have significantlyr educed their cost. UAVs can help industry in automatable and tedious tasks, like the ones performed on a regular basis for determining the inventory and for preserving item traceability. In such tasks, especially when it comes from untrusted third parties, it is essential to determine whether the collected information is valid or true. Likewise, ensuring data trustworthiness is a key issue in order to leverage Big Data analytics to supply chain efficiency and effectiveness. In such a case, blockchain, another Industry 4.0 technology that has become very popular in other fields like finance, has the potential to provide a higher level of transparency, security, trust and efficiency in the supply chain and enable the use of smart contracts. Thus, in this paper, we present the design and evaluation of a UAV-based system aimed at automating inventory tasks and keeping the traceability of industrial items attached to Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags. To confront current shortcomings, such a system is developed under a versatile, modular and scalable architecture aimed to reinforce cyber security and decentralization while fostering external audits and big data analytics. Therefore, the system uses a blockchain and a distributed ledger to store certain inventory data collected by UAVs, validate them, ensure their trustworthiness and make them available to the interested parties. In order to show the performance of the proposed system, different tests were performed in a real industrial warehouse, concluding that the system is able to obtain the inventory data really fast in comparison to traditional manual tasks, while being also able to estimate the position of the items when hovering over them thanks to their tag's signal strength. In addition, the performance of the proposed blockchain-based architecture was evaluated in different scenarios.",
      "published": "2019-05-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s19102394",
      "matched_terms": [
        "supply chain",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tiago M. Fernández‐Caramés",
        "Óscar Blanco-Novoa",
        "Iván Froiz-Míguez",
        "Paula Fraga‐Lamas"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/s19102394",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 346,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s19112563",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Wildcard Fields-Based Partitioning for Fast and Scalable Packet Classification in Vehicle-to-Everything",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) requires high-speed communication and high-level security. However, as the number of connected devices increases exponentially, communication networks are suffering from huge traffic and various security issues. It is well known that performance and security of network equipment significantly depends on the packet classification algorithm because it is one of the most fundamental packet processing functions. Thus, the algorithm should run fast even with the huge set of packet processing rules. Unfortunately, previous packet classification algorithms have focused on the processing speed only, failing to be scalable with the rule-set size. In this paper, we propose a new packet classification approach balancing classification speed and scalability. It can be applied to most decision tree-based packet classification algorithms such as HyperCuts and EffiCuts. It determines partitioning fields considering the rule duplication explicitly, which makes the algorithm memory-effective. In addition, the proposed approach reduces the decision tree size substantially with the minimal sacrifice of classification performance. As a result, we can attain high-speed packet classification and scalability simultaneously, which is very essential for latest services such as V2X and Internet-of-Things (IoT).",
      "published": "2019-06-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s19112563",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jaehyung Wee",
        "Jin‐Ghoo Choi",
        "Wooguil Pak"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/s19112563",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s19133028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure Charging System for Electric Vehicles Based on Blockchain",
      "description": "Smart grids incorporating internet-of-things are emerging solutions to provide a reliable, sustainable and efficient electricity supply, and electric vehicle drivers can access efficient charging services in the smart grid. However, traditional electric vehicle charging systems are vulnerable to distributed denial of service and privileged insider attacks when the central charging server is attacked. The blockchain-based charging systems have been proposed to resolve these problems. In 2018, Huang et al. proposed the electric vehicle charging system using lightning network and smart contract. However, their system has an inefficient charging mechanism and does not guarantee security of key. We propose a secure charging system for electric vehicles based on blockchain to resolve these security flaws. Our charging system ensures the security of key, secure mutual authentication, anonymity, and perfect forward secrecy, and also provides efficient charging. We demonstrate that our proposed system provides secure mutual authentication using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic and prevents replay and man-in-the-middle attacks using automated validation of internet security protocols and applications simulation tool. Furthermore, we compare computation and communication costs with previous schemes. Therefore, the proposed charging system efficiently applies to practical charging systems for electric vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s19133028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Myeonghyun Kim",
        "Kisung Park",
        "Sungjin Yu",
        "Joonyoung Lee",
        "Youngho Park",
        "Sang‐Woo Lee",
        "Boheung Chung"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.3390/s19133028",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 90,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20030641",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of a FlexRay/Ethernet Gateway and Security Mechanism for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Due to the development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS), the Ethernet has become one of the most important communication protocols for the future of automotive networks. This is because the existing communication protocols (such as FlexRay) do not provide sufficiently high bandwidth requirements. The main challenge for the automotive industry will be to transfer and extend standard IP and Ethernet into vehicles and still fulfill the automotive requirements. The automotive gateway not only links two or more protocols and exchanges the data using each, but also monitors and ensures functional safety. This paper proposes a FlexRay/Ethernet gateway by considering the development conditions of embedded systems and the security in the field of vehicle networking. The proposed method is implemented on the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) system to evaluate running time and to analyze the overhead of the security mechanism. For one-to-one mapping logic, the execution times of FlexRay to the Ethernet path and Ethernet to FlexRay path are constant, at 4.67 μs and 6.71 μs, respectively. In particular, cybersecurity can be integrated as an extension of the gateway with low latency and power consumption.",
      "published": "2020-01-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20030641",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Trong‐Yen Lee",
        "I-An Lin",
        "Ren-Hong Liao"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20030641",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20082364",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of CAN Bus Security Challenges",
      "description": "The automobile industry no longer relies on pure mechanical systems; instead, it benefits from many smart features based on advanced embedded electronics. Although the rise in electronics and connectivity has improved comfort, functionality, and safe driving, it has also created new attack surfaces to penetrate the in-vehicle communication network, which was initially designed as a close loop system. For such applications, the Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most-widely used communication protocol, which still suffers from various security issues because of the lack of encryption and authentication. As a result, any malicious/hijacked node can cause catastrophic accidents and financial loss. This paper analyses the CAN bus comprehensively to provide an outlook on security concerns. It also presents the security vulnerabilities of the CAN and a state-of-the-art attack surface with cases of implemented attack scenarios and goes through different solutions that assist in attack prevention, mainly based on an intrusion detection system (IDS).",
      "published": "2020-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20082364",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mehmet Bozdal",
        "Mohammad Samie",
        "Sohaib Aslam",
        "Ian K Jennions"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20082364",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 239,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20113141",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Based Data Sharing and Trading Model for the Connected Car",
      "description": "Currently, “connected cars” are being actively designed over smart cars and autonomous cars, to establish a two-way communication network between the vehicle and all infrastructure. Additionally, because vehicle black boxes are becoming more common, specific processes for secure and efficient data sharing and transaction via vehicle networks must be developed. In this paper, we propose a Blockchain-based vehicle data marketplace platform model, along with a data sharing scheme, using Blockchain-based data-owner-based attribute-based encryption (DO-ABE). The proposed model achieves the basic requirements such as data confidentiality, integrity, and privacy. The proposed system securely and effectively handles large-capacity and privacy-sensitive black box video data by storing the metadata on Blockchain (on-chain) and encrypted raw data on off-chain (external) storage, and adopting consortium Blockchain. Furthermore, the data owners of the proposed model can control their own data by applying the Blockchain-based DO-ABE and owner-defined access control lists.",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113141",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Byeong-Gyu Jeong",
        "Taek-Young Youn",
        "Namsu Jho",
        "Sanguk Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20113141",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5339,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/s20113141 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: encrypted, national, confidentiality, currently, sensors, car, access, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20143928",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain for the Internet of Vehicles: A Decentralized IoT Solution for Vehicles Communication Using Ethereum",
      "description": "The concept of smart cities has become prominent in modern metropolises due to the emergence of embedded and connected smart devices, systems, and technologies. They have enabled the connection of every \"thing\" to the Internet. Therefore, in the upcoming era of the Internet of Things, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) will play a crucial role in newly developed smart cities. The IoV has the potential to solve various traffic and road safety problems effectively in order to prevent fatal crashes. However, a particular challenge in the IoV, especially in Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications, is to ensure fast, secure transmission and accurate recording of the data. In order to overcome these challenges, this work is adapting Blockchain technology for real time application (RTA) to solve Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications problems. Therefore, the main novelty of this paper is to develop a Blockchain-based IoT system in order to establish secure communication and create an entirely decentralized cloud computing platform. Moreover, the authors qualitatively tested the performance and resilience of the proposed system against common security attacks. Computational tests showed that the proposed solution solved the main challenges of Vehicle-to-X (V2X) communications such as security, centralization, and lack of privacy. In addition, it guaranteed an easy data exchange between different actors of intelligent transportation systems.",
      "published": "2020-07-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20143928",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rateb Jabbar",
        "Mohamed Bin Mokhtar Kharbeche",
        "Khalifa N. Al‐Khalifa",
        "Moez Krichen",
        "Kamel Barkaoui"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20143928",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 121,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20143934",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hierarchical Anomaly Detection Model for In-Vehicle Networks Using Machine Learning Algorithms",
      "description": "The communication and connectivity functions of vehicles increase their vulnerability to hackers. The unintended failure and malfunction of in-vehicle systems caused by external factors threaten the security and safety of passengers. As the controller area network alone cannot protect vehicles from external attacks, techniques to analyze and detect external attacks are required. Therefore, we propose a multi-labeled hierarchical classification (MLHC) intrusion detection model that analyzes and detects external attacks caused by message injection. This model quickly determines the occurrence of attacks and classifies the attack using only existing classified attack data. We evaluated the performance of the model by analyzing its learning space. We further verified the model by comparing its accuracy, F1 score and data learning and evaluation times with the two layers multi-class detection (TLMD) and single-layer multi-class classification (SLMC) models. The simulation results show that the MLHC model has the highest F1 score of 0.9995 and is 87.30% and 99.92% faster than the SLMC and TLMD models in terms of detection time, respectively. Consequently, the proposed model can classify both the type and existence or absence of attacks with high accuracy and can be used in interior communication environments of high-speed vehicles with a high throughput.",
      "published": "2020-07-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20143934",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seunghyun Park",
        "Jin‐Young Choi"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20143934",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20164446",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "User Context Detection for Relay Attack Resistance in Passive Keyless Entry and Start System",
      "description": "In modern cars, the Passive Keyless Entry and Start system (PKES) has been extensively installed. The PKES enables drivers to unlock and start their cars without user interaction. However, it is vulnerable to relay attacks. In this paper, we propose a secure smartphone-type PKES system model based on user context detection. The proposed system uses the barometer and accelerometer embedded in smartphones to detect user context, including human activity and door closing event. These two types of events detection can be used by the PKES to determine the car owner's position when the car receives an unlocking or a start command. We evaluated the performance of the proposed method using a dataset collected from user activity and 1526 door closing events. The results reveal that the proposed method can accurately and effectively detect user activities and door closing events. Therefore, smartphone-type PKES can prevent relay attacks. Furthermore, we tested the detection of door closing event under multiple environmental settings to demonstrate the robustness of the proposed method.",
      "published": "2020-08-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20164446",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jing Li",
        "Yabo Dong",
        "Shengkai Fang",
        "Haowen Zhang",
        "Duanqing Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20164446",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20174900",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANsec: A Practical in-Vehicle Controller Area Network Security Evaluation Tool",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) is an industry-recognized next intelligent life solution that increases the level of comfort, efficiency, and automation for citizens through numerous sensors, smart devices, and cloud stations connected physically. As an important application scenario of IoT, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) plays an extremely critical role in the intelligent transportation field. In fact, the In-Vehicle Network of smart vehicles that are recognized as the core roles in intelligent transportation is currently the Controller Area Network (CAN). However, the In-Vehicle CAN bus protocol has several vulnerabilities without any encryption, authentication, or integrity checking, which severely threatens the safety of drivers and passengers. Once malicious attackers hack the vehicular gateway and obtain the access right of the CAN, they may control the vehicle based on the vulnerabilities of the CAN bus protocol. Given the severe security risk of CAN, we proposed the CANsec, a practical In-Vehicle CAN security evaluation tool that simulates malicious attacks according to major attack models to evaluate the security risk of the In-Vehicle CAN. We also show a usage case of the CANsec without knowing any information from the vehicle manufacturer.",
      "published": "2020-08-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20174900",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haichun Zhang",
        "Xu Meng",
        "Xiong Zhang",
        "Zhenglin Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20174900",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s20195719",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comparative Experiments of V2X Security Protocol Based on Hash Chain Cryptography",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) is the communication technology designed to support road safety for drivers and autonomous driving. The light-weight security solution is crucial to meet the real-time needs of on-board V2X applications. However, most of the recently proposed V2X security protocols-based on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)-are not efficient enough to support fast processing and reduce the communication overhead between vehicles. ECDSA provides a high-security level at the cost of excessive communication and computation overhead, which motivates us to propose a light-weight message authentication and privacy preservation protocol for V2X communications. The proposed protocol achieves highly secure message authentication at a substantially lower cost by introducing a hash chain of secret keys for a Message Authentication Code (MAC). We implemented the proposed protocol using commercial V2X devices to prove its performance advantages over the standard and non-standard protocols. We constructed real V2X networks using commercial V2X devices that run our implemented protocol. Our extensive experiments with real networks demonstrate that the proposed protocol reduces the communication overhead by 6 times and computation overhead by more than 100 times compared with the IEEE1609.2 standard. Moreover, the proposed protocol reduces the communication overhead by 4 times and the computation overhead by up to 100 times compared with a non-standard security protocol, TESLA. The proposed protocol substantially reduces the average end-to-end delay to 2.5 ms, which is a 24- and 28-fold reduction, respectively, compared with the IEEE1609 and TESLA protocols.",
      "published": "2020-10-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s20195719",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "autonomous driving",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "tesla",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shimaa Abdelnaby AbdelHakeem",
        "Mohamed A. Abd El-Gawad",
        "HyungWon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/s20195719",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s21020515",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performance Evaluation of Attribute-Based Encryption in Automotive Embedded Platform for Secure Software Over-The-Air Update",
      "description": "This paper aims to show that it is possible to improve security for over the air update functionalities in an automotive scenario through the use of a cryptographic scheme, called \"Attribute-Based-Encryption\" (ABE), which grants confidentiality to the software/firmware update done Over The Air (OTA). We demonstrate that ABE is seamlessly integrable into the state of the art solutions regarding the OTA update by showing that the overhead of the ABE integration in terms of computation time and its storage is negligible w.r.t. the other overheads that are introduced by the OTA process, also proving that security can be enhanced with a minimum cost. In order to support our claim, we report the experimental results of an implementation of the proposed ABE OTA technique on a Xilinx ZCU102 evaluation board, which is an automotive-oriented HW/SW platform that is equipped with a Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC chip that is representative of the computing capability of real automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs).",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s21020515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michele La Manna",
        "Luigi Treccozzi",
        "Pericle Perazzo",
        "Sergio Saponara",
        "Gianluca Dini"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/s21020515",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 44,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s21030706",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of Autonomous Vehicles: Enabling Communication Technologies and Challenges",
      "description": "The Department of Transport in the United Kingdom recorded 25,080 motor vehicle fatalities in 2019. This situation stresses the need for an intelligent transport system (ITS) that improves road safety and security by avoiding human errors with the use of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Therefore, this survey discusses the current development of two main components of an ITS: (1) gathering of AVs surrounding data using sensors; and (2) enabling vehicular communication technologies. First, the paper discusses various sensors and their role in AVs. Then, various communication technologies for AVs to facilitate vehicle to everything (V2X) communication are discussed. Based on the transmission range, these technologies are grouped into three main categories: long-range, medium-range and short-range. The short-range group presents the development of Bluetooth, ZigBee and ultra-wide band communication for AVs. The medium-range examines the properties of dedicated short-range communications (DSRC). Finally, the long-range group presents the cellular-vehicle to everything (C-V2X) and 5G-new radio (5G-NR). An important characteristic which differentiates each category and its suitable application is latency. This research presents a comprehensive study of AV technologies and identifies the main advantages, disadvantages, and challenges.",
      "published": "2021-01-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s21030706",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Nadeem Ahangar",
        "Qasim Zeeshan Ahmed",
        "Fahd Ahmed Khan",
        "Maryam Hafeez"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/s21030706",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 382,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s21144736",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep Transfer Learning Based Intrusion Detection System for Electric Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus works as an important protocol in the real-time In-Vehicle Network (IVN) systems for its simple, suitable, and robust architecture. The risk of IVN devices has still been insecure and vulnerable due to the complex data-intensive architectures which greatly increase the accessibility to unauthorized networks and the possibility of various types of cyberattacks. Therefore, the detection of cyberattacks in IVN devices has become a growing interest. With the rapid development of IVNs and evolving threat types, the traditional machine learning-based IDS has to update to cope with the security requirements of the current environment. Nowadays, the progression of deep learning, deep transfer learning, and its impactful outcome in several areas has guided as an effective solution for network intrusion detection. This manuscript proposes a deep transfer learning-based IDS model for IVN along with improved performance in comparison to several other existing models. The unique contributions include effective attribute selection which is best suited to identify malicious CAN messages and accurately detect the normal and abnormal activities, designing a deep transfer learning-based LeNet model, and evaluating considering real-world data. To this end, an extensive experimental performance evaluation has been conducted. The architecture along with empirical analyses shows that the proposed IDS greatly improves the detection accuracy over the mainstream machine learning, deep learning, and benchmark deep transfer learning models and has demonstrated better performance for real-time IVN security.",
      "published": "2021-07-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s21144736",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sk. Tanzir Mehedi",
        "Adnan Anwar",
        "Ziaur Rahman",
        "Kawsar Ahmed"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/s21144736",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 153,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s21217069",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A CAN-Bus Lightweight Authentication Scheme",
      "description": "The design of the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) did not account for security issues and, consequently, attacks often use external mobile communication interfaces to conduct eavesdropping, replay, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks on a CAN bus, posing a risk to driving safety. Numerous studies have proposed CAN bus safety improvement techniques that emphasize modifying the original CAN bus method of transmitting frames. These changes place additional computational burdens on electronic control units cause the CAN bus to lose the delay guarantee feature. Consequently, we proposed a method that solves these compatibility and security issues. Simple and efficient frame authentication algorithms were used to prevent spoofing and replay attacks. This method is compatible with both CAN bus and CAN-FD protocols and has a lower operand when compared with other methods.",
      "published": "2021-10-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s21217069",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jia-Ning Luo",
        "Chang-Ming Wu",
        "Ming‐Hour Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/s21217069",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s21227712",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicles: Technology Review, State of the Art, Challenges and Opportunities",
      "description": "In an effort to reach accident-free milestones or drastically reduce/eliminate road fatalities rates and traffic congestion and to create disruptive, transformational mobility systems and services, different parties (e.g., automakers, universities, governments, and road traffic regulators) have collaborated to research, develop, and test connected vehicle (CV) technologies. CVs create new data-rich environments and are considered key enablers for many applications and services that will make our roads safer, less congested, and more eco-friendly. A deeper understanding of the CV technologies will pave the way to avoid setbacks and will help in developing more innovative applications and breakthroughs. In the CV paradigm, vehicles become smarter by communicating with nearby vehicles, connected infrastructure, and the surroundings. This connectivity will be substantial to support different features and systems, such as adaptive routing, real-time navigation, and slow and near real-time infrastructure. Further examples include environmental sensing, advanced driver-assistance systems, automated driving systems, mobility on demand, and mobility as a service. This article provides a comprehensive review on CV technologies including fundamental challenges, state-of-the-art enabling technologies, innovative applications, and potential opportunities that can benefit automakers, customers, and businesses. The current standardization efforts of the forefront enabling technologies, such as Wi-Fi 6 and 5G-cellular technologies are also reviewed. Different challenges in terms of cooperative computation, privacy/security, and over-the-air updates are discussed. Safety and non-safety applications are described and possible future opportunities that CV technology brings to our life are also highlighted.",
      "published": "2021-11-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s21227712",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ghadeer Abdelkader",
        "Khalid Elgazzar",
        "Alaa M. Khamis"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/s21227712",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 170,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3845,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/s21227712 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: services, sensors, applications, privacy, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s21237917",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of a CANFD to SOME/IP Gateway Considering Security for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "In recent years, Ethernet has been introduced into vehicular networks to cope with the increasing demand for bandwidth and complexity in communication networks. To exchange data between controller area network (CAN) and Ethernet, a gateway system is required to provide a communication interface. Additionally, the existence of networked devices exposes automobiles to cyber security threats. Against this background, a gateway for CAN/CAN with flexible data-rate (CANFD) to scalable service-oriented middleware over IP (SOME/IP) protocol conversion is designed, and security schemes are implemented in the routing process to provide integrity and confidentiality protections. Based on NXP-S32G, the designed gateway is implemented and evaluated. Under most operating conditions, the CPU and the RAM usage are less than 5% and 20 MB, respectively. Devices running a Linux operating system can easily bear such a system resource overhead. The latency caused by the security scheme accounts for about 25% of the entire protocol conversion latency. Considering the security protection provided by the security scheme, this overhead is worthwhile. The results show that the designed gateway can ensure a CAN/CANFD to SOME/IP protocol conversion with a low system resource overhead and a low latency while effectively resisting hacker attacks such as frame forgery, tampering, and sniffing.",
      "published": "2021-11-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s21237917",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "tampering",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zheng Zuo",
        "Shichun Yang",
        "Bin Ma",
        "Bosong Zou",
        "Yaoguang Cao",
        "Qiangwei Li",
        "Sida Zhou",
        "Jichong Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/s21237917",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22010360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attacks to Automatous Vehicles: A Deep Learning Algorithm for Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Rapid technological development has changed drastically the automotive industry. Network communication has improved, helping the vehicles transition from completely machine- to software-controlled technologies. The autonomous vehicle network is controlled by the controller area network (CAN) bus protocol. Nevertheless, the autonomous vehicle network still has issues and weaknesses concerning cybersecurity due to the complexity of data and traffic behaviors that benefit the unauthorized intrusion to a CAN bus and several types of attacks. Therefore, developing systems to rapidly detect message attacks in CAN is one of the biggest challenges. This study presents a high-performance system with an artificial intelligence approach that protects the vehicle network from cyber threats. The system secures the autonomous vehicle from intrusions by using deep learning approaches. The proposed security system was verified by using a real automatic vehicle network dataset, including spoofing, flood, replaying attacks, and benign packets. Preprocessing was applied to convert the categorical data into numerical. This dataset was processed by using the convolution neural network (CNN) and a hybrid network combining CNN and long short-term memory (CNN-LSTM) models to identify attack messages. The results revealed that the model achieved high performance, as evaluated by the metrics of precision, recall, F1 score, and accuracy. The proposed system achieved high accuracy (97.30%). Along with the empirical demonstration, the proposed system enhanced the detection and classification accuracy compared with the existing systems and was proven to have superior performance for real-time CAN bus security.",
      "published": "2022-01-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22010360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Theyazn H. H. Aldhyani",
        "Hasan Shojaa Alkahtani"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22010360",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 134,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22020647",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Authentication and Secure Communication Scheme for In-Vehicle Networks Based on SOME/IP",
      "description": "The rapid development of intelligent networked vehicles (ICVs) has brought many positive effects. Unfortunately, connecting to the outside exposes ICVs to security threats. Using secure protocols is an important approach to protect ICVs from hacker attacks and has become a hot research area for vehicle security. However, most of the previous studies were carried out on V2X networks, while those on in-vehicle networks (IVNs) did not involve Ethernet. To this end, oriented to the new IVNs based on Ethernet, we designed an efficient secure scheme, including an authentication scheme using the Scalable Service-Oriented Middleware over IP (SOME/IP) protocol and a secure communication scheme modifying the payload field of the original SOME/IP data frame. The security analysis shows that the designed authentication scheme can provide mutual identity authentication for communicating parties and ensure the confidentiality of the issued temporary session key; the designed authentication and secure communication scheme can resist the common malicious attacks conjointly. The performance experiments based on embedded devices show that the additional overhead introduced by the secure scheme is very limited. The secure scheme proposed in this article can promote the popularization of the SOME/IP protocol in IVNs and contribute to the secure communication of IVNs.",
      "published": "2022-01-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22020647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bin Ma",
        "Shichun Yang",
        "Zheng Zuo",
        "Bosong Zou",
        "Yaoguang Cao",
        "Xiaoyu Yan",
        "Sida Zhou",
        "Jichong Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22020647",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22030981",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bit-Level Automotive Controller Area Network Message Reverse Framework Based on Linear Regression",
      "description": "Modern intelligent and networked vehicles are increasingly equipped with electronic control units (ECUs) with increased computing power. These electronic devices form an in-vehicle network via the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, the de facto standard for modern vehicles. Although many ECUs provide convenience to drivers and passengers, they also increase the potential for cyber security threats in motor vehicles. Numerous attacks on vehicles have been reported, and the commonality among these attacks is that they inject malicious messages into the CAN network. To close the security holes of CAN, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) keep the Database CAN (DBC) file describing the content of CAN messages, confidential. This policy is ineffective against cyberattacks but limits in-depth investigation of CAN messages and hinders the development of in-vehicle intrusion detection systems (IDS) and CAN fuzz testing. Current research reverses CAN messages through tokenization, machine learning, and diagnostic information matching to obtain details of CAN messages. However, the results of these algorithms yield only a fraction of the information specified in the DBC file regarding CAN messages, such as field boundaries and message IDs associated with specific functions. In this study, we propose multiple linear regression-based frameworks for bit-level inversion of CAN messages that can approximate the inversion of DBC files. The framework builds a multiple linear regression model for vehicle behavior and CAN traffic, filters the candidate messages based on the decision coefficients, and finally locates the bits describing the vehicle behavior to obtain the data length and alignment based on the model parameters. Moreover, this work shows that the system has high reversion accuracy and outperforms existing systems in boundary delineation and filtering relevant messages in actual vehicles.",
      "published": "2022-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22030981",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zixiang Bi",
        "Guoai Xu",
        "Guosheng Xu",
        "Chenyu Wang",
        "Sutao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22030981",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22072636",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANon: Lightweight and Practical Cyber-Attack Detection for Automotive Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Automotive cyber-physical systems are in transition from the closed-systems to open-networking systems. As a result, in-vehicle networks such as the controller area network (CAN) have become essential to connect to inter-vehicle networks through the various rich interfaces. Newly exposed security concerns derived from this requirement may cause in-vehicle networks to pose threats to automotive security and driver's safety. In this paper, to ensure a high level of security of the in-vehicle network for automotive CPS, we propose a novel lightweight and practical cyber defense platform, referred to as CANon (CAN with origin authentication and non-repudiation), to be enabled to detect cyber-attacks in real-time. CANon is designed based on the hierarchical approach of centralized-session management and distributed-origin authentication. In the former, a gateway node manages each initialization vector and session of origin-centric groups consisting of two more sending and receiving nodes. In the latter, the receiving nodes belonging to the given origin-centric group individually perform the symmetric key-based detection against cyber-attacks by verifying each message received from the sending node, namely origin authentication, in real-time. To improve the control security, CANon employs a one-time local key selected from a sequential hash chain (SHC) for authentication of an origin node in a distributed mode and exploits the iterative hash operations with randomness. Since the SHC can constantly generate and consume hash values regardless of their memory capacities, it is very effective for resource-limited nodes for in-vehicle networks. In addition, through implicit key synchronization within a given group, CANon addresses the challenges of a key exposure problem and a complex key distribution mechanism when performing symmetric key-based authentication. To achieve lightweight cyber-attack detection without imposing an additive load on CAN, CANon uses a keyed-message authentication code (KMAC) activated within a given group. The detection performance of CANon is evaluated under an actual node of Freescale S12XF and virtual nodes operating on the well-known CANoe tool. It is seen that the detection rate of CANon against brute-force and replay attacks reaches 100% when the length of KMAC is over 16 bits. It demonstrates that CANon ensures high security and is sufficient to operate in real-time even on low-performance ECUs. Moreover, CANon based on several software modules operates without an additive hardware security module at an upper layer of the CAN protocol and can be directly ported to CAN-FD (CAN with Flexible Data rate) so that it achieves the practical cyber defense platform.",
      "published": "2022-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22072636",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Youngmi Baek",
        "Seongjoo Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22072636",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22124360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Cabin Monitoring System for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "In this paper, we have demonstrated a robust in-cabin monitoring system (IMS) for safety, security, surveillance, and monitoring, including privacy concerns for personal and shared autonomous vehicles (AVs). It consists of a set of monitoring cameras and an onboard device (OBD) equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Hereafter, this combination of a camera and an OBD is referred to as the AI camera. We have investigated the issues for mobility services in higher levels of autonomous driving, what needs to be monitored, how to monitor, etc. Our proposed IMS is an on-device AI system that indigenously has improved the privacy of the users. Furthermore, we have enlisted the essential actions to be considered in an IMS and developed an appropriate database (DB). Our DB consists of multifaced scenarios important for monitoring the in-cabin of the higher-level AVs. Moreover, we have compared popular AI models applied for object and occupant recognition. In addition, our DB is available on request to support the research on the development of seamless monitoring of the in-cabin higher levels of autonomous driving for the assurance of safety and security.",
      "published": "2022-06-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22124360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "obd",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashutosh Mishra",
        "Sang-Ho Lee",
        "Dohyun Kim",
        "Shiho Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22124360",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22176493",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enabling Blockchain Services for IoE with Zk-Rollups",
      "description": "The Internet of Things includes all connected objects from small embedded systems with low computational power and storage capacities to efficient ones, as well as moving objects like drones and autonomous vehicles. The concept of Internet of Everything expands upon this idea by adding people, data and processing. The adoption of such systems is exploding and becoming ever more significant, bringing with it questions related to the security and the privacy of these objects. A natural solution to data integrity, confidentiality and single point of failure vulnerability is the use of blockchains. Blockchains can be used as an immutable data layer for storing information, avoiding single point of failure vulnerability via decentralization and providing strong security and cryptographic tools for IoE. However, the adoption of blockchain technology in such heterogeneous systems containing light devices presents several challenges and practical issues that need to be overcome. Indeed, most of the solutions proposed to adapt blockchains to devices with low resources confront difficulty in maintaining decentralization or security. The most interesting are probably the Layer 2 solutions, which build offchain systems strongly connected to the blockchain. Among these, zk-rollup is a promising new generation of Layer 2/off-chain schemes that can remove the last obstacles to blockchain adoption in IoT, or more generally, in IoE. By increasing the scalability and enabling rule customization while preserving the same security as the Layer 1 blockchain, zk-rollups overcome restrictions on the use of blockchains for IoE. Despite their promises illustrated by recent systems proposed by startups and private companies, very few scientific publications explaining or applying this barely-known technology have been published, especially for non-financial systems. In this context, the objective of our paper is to fill this gap for IoE systems in two steps. We first propose a synthetic review of recent proposals to improve scalability including onchain (consensus, blockchain organization, ...) and offchain (sidechain, rollups) solutions and we demonstrate that zk-rollups are the most promising ones. In a second step, we focus on IoE by describing several interesting features (scalability, dynamicity, data management, ...) that are illustrated with various general IoE use cases.",
      "published": "2022-08-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22176493",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Lavaur",
        "J. Lacan",
        "Caroline Ponzoni Carvalho Chanel"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22176493",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22176679",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Communication Cyber Security: Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": "In-vehicle communication has become an integral part of today’s driving environment considering the growing add-ons of sensor-centric communication and computing devices inside a vehicle for a range of purposes including vehicle monitoring, physical wiring reduction, and driving efficiency. However, related literature on cyber security for in-vehicle communication systems is still lacking potential dedicated solutions for in-vehicle cyber risks. Existing solutions are mainly relying on protocol-specific security techniques and lacking an overall security framework for in-vehicle communication. In this context, this paper critically explores the literature on cyber security for in-vehicle communication focusing on technical architecture, methodologies, challenges, and possible solutions. In-vehicle communication network architecture is presented considering key components, interfaces, and related technologies. The protocols for in-vehicle communication have been classified based on their characteristics, and usage type. Security solutions for in-vehicle communication have been critically reviewed considering machine learning, cryptography, and port-centric techniques. A multi-layer secure framework is also developed as a protocol and use case-independent in-vehicle communication solution. Finally, open challenges and future dimensions of research for in-vehicle communication cyber security are highlighted as observations and recommendations.",
      "published": "2022-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22176679",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rajkumar Singh Rathore",
        "C. Hewage",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya",
        "Jaime Lloret"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22176679",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 129,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s22239211",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Testing for Automotive Domain: A Survey",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are more complex and interconnected than ever before, which also means that attack surfaces for vehicles have increased significantly. Malicious cyberattacks will not only exploit personal privacy and property, but also affect the functional safety of electrical/electronic (E/E) safety-critical systems by controlling the driving functionality, which is life-threatening. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct cybersecurity testing on vehicles to reveal and address relevant security threats and vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity standards and regulations issued in recent years, such as ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE WP.29 regulations (R155 and R156), also emphasize the indispensability of cybersecurity verification and validation in the development lifecycle but lack specific technical details. Thus, this paper conducts a systematic and comprehensive review of the research and practice in the field of automotive cybersecurity testing, which can provide reference and advice for automotive security researchers and testers. We classify and discuss the security testing methods and testbeds in automotive engineering. Furthermore, we identify gaps and limitations in existing research and point out future challenges.",
      "published": "2022-11-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s22239211",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "exploit",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Xuan Zhang",
        "Zhenyu Yang",
        "Yifan Jiang",
        "Jiajia Wang",
        "Mingzhi Wu",
        "Wanqiang Feng"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/s22239211",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23031421",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simulation-Based Cybersecurity Testing and Evaluation Method for Connected Car V2X Application Using Virtual Machine",
      "description": "In a connected car, the vehicle's internal network is connected to the outside through communication technology. However, this can cause new security vulnerabilities. In particular, V2X communication, to provide the safety of connected cars, can directly threaten the lives of passengers if a security attack occurs. For V2X communication security, standards such as IEEE 1609.2 define the technical functions that digital signature and encryption to provide security of V2X messages. However, it is difficult to verify the security technology by applying it to the environment with real roads because it can be made up of other safety accidents. In addition, vehicle simulation R&D is steadily being carried out, but there is no simulation that evaluates security for the V2X application level. Therefore, in this paper, a virtual machine was used to implement a V2X communication simulation environment that satisfies the requirements for the security evaluation of connected cars. Then, we proposed scenarios for cybersecurity testing and evaluation, implemented and verified through CANoe Option.Car2X. Through this, it is possible to perform sufficient preliminary verification to minimize the variables before verifying security technology in a real road environment.",
      "published": "2023-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23031421",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dae-Hwi Lee",
        "Chan-Min Kim",
        "Hyun-Seok Song",
        "Yong-Hee Lee",
        "Won-Sun Chung"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23031421",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23042330",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BackProx: Secure Backscatter-Assisted Proximity Detection for Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems",
      "description": "A passive keyless entry and start (PKES) system is an electronic lock for an automobile that provides the great convenience of opening the door when the user is in proximity. However, the system suffers from relay attacks. Recent studies revealed that relayed signals result in valid packets that are sufficient to unlock doors. In particular, the adversary causes proximity errors by injecting a certain time delay before relaying to manipulate the phase rotation in the response signal. To this end, we present a novel relay-resilient proximity detection solution, BackProx, which uses pseudo-random frequency hopping with the assistance of a reference backscattering device. Since the relay adversary transmits the relayed signals from the key fob at long distances, the signals should propagate over longer distances, resulting in inevitable significant phase rotation with different frequencies. Inspired by this finding, BackProx uses an additional backscattering device to ensure the proximity of the key fob using the invariant characteristics of radio frequency signals in the physical layer (i.e., phase rotation). Our evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of BackProx in resisting three types of relay attacks. The results show that it achieved a 98% true positive rate at close range and a 0.3% false positive rate at long range.",
      "published": "2023-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23042330",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hoorin Park",
        "Jeongkyu Hong"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23042330",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23073554",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection System CAN-Bus In-Vehicle Networks Based on the Statistical Characteristics of Attacks",
      "description": "For in-vehicle network communication, the controller area network (CAN) broadcasts to all connected nodes without address validation. Therefore, it is highly vulnerable to all sorts of attack scenarios. This research proposes a novel intrusion detection system (IDS) for CAN to identify in-vehicle network anomalies. The statistical characteristics of attacks provide valuable information about the inherent intrusion patterns and behaviors. We employed two real-world attack scenarios from publicly available datasets to record a real-time response against intrusions with increased precision for in-vehicle network environments. Our proposed IDS can exploit malicious patterns by calculating thresholds and using the statistical properties of attacks, making attack detection more efficient. The optimized threshold value is calculated using brute-force optimization for various window sizes to minimize the total error. The reference values of normality require a few legitimate data frames for effective intrusion detection. The experimental findings validate that our suggested method can efficiently detect fuzzy, merge, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks with low false-positive rates. It is also demonstrated that the total error decreases with an increasing attack rate for varying window sizes. The results indicate that our proposed IDS minimizes the misclassification rate and is hence better suited for in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2023-03-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23073554",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junaid Ahmad Khan",
        "Dae‐Woon Lim",
        "Young-Sik Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23073554",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 64,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23073610",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection in Vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus Using Machine Learning: A Comparative Performance Study",
      "description": "Electronic Control Units (ECUs) have been increasingly used in modern vehicles to control the operations of the vehicle, improve driving comfort, and safety. For the operation of the vehicle, these ECUs communicate using a Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol that has many security vulnerabilities. According to the report of Upstream 2022, more than 900 automotive cybersecurity incidents were reported in 2021 only. In addition to developing a more secure CAN protocol, intrusion detection can provide a path to mitigate cyberattacks on the vehicle. This paper proposes a machine learning-based intrusion detection system (IDS) using a Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT), and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and investigates the effectiveness of the IDS using multiple real-world datasets. The novelty of our developed IDS is that it has been trained and tested on multiple vehicular datasets (Kia Soul and a Chevrolet Spark) to detect and classify intrusion. Our IDS has achieved accuracy up to 99.9% with a high true positive and a low false negative rate. Finally, the comparison of our performance evaluation outcomes demonstrates that the proposed IDS outperforms the existing works in terms of its liability and efficiency to detect cyber-attacks with a minimal error rate.",
      "published": "2023-03-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23073610",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "kia",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bifta Sama Bari",
        "Kumar Yelamarthi",
        "Sheikh Ghafoor"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23073610",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 84,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23084086",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Attack Detection for Self-Driving Vehicle Networks Using Deep Autoencoder Algorithms",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) present exciting opportunities for the improvement of both the mobility of people and the efficiency of transportation systems. The small computers in autonomous vehicles (CAVs) are referred to as electronic control units (ECUs) and are often perceived as being a component of a broader cyber–physical system. Subsystems of ECUs are often networked together via a variety of in-vehicle networks (IVNs) so that data may be exchanged, and the vehicle can operate more efficiently. The purpose of this work is to explore the use of machine learning and deep learning methods in defence against cyber threats to autonomous cars. Our primary emphasis is on identifying erroneous information implanted in the data buses of various automobiles. In order to categorise this type of erroneous data, the gradient boosting method is used, providing a productive illustration of machine learning. To examine the performance of the proposed model, two real datasets, namely the Car-Hacking and UNSE-NB15 datasets, were used. Real automated vehicle network datasets were used in the verification process of the proposed security solution. These datasets included spoofing, flooding and replay attacks, as well as benign packets. The categorical data were transformed into numerical form via pre-processing. Machine learning and deep learning algorithms, namely k-nearest neighbour (KNN) and decision trees, long short-term memory (LSTM), and deep autoencoders, were employed to detect CAN attacks. According to the findings of the experiments, using the decision tree and KNN algorithms as machine learning approaches resulted in accuracy levels of 98.80% and 99%, respectively. On the other hand, the use of LSTM and deep autoencoder algorithms as deep learning approaches resulted in accuracy levels of 96% and 99.98%, respectively. The maximum accuracy was achieved when using the decision tree and deep autoencoder algorithms. Statistical analysis methods were used to analyse the results of the classification algorithms, and the determination coefficient measurement for the deep autoencoder was found to reach a value of R2 = 95%. The performance of all of the models that were built in this way surpassed that of those already in use, with almost perfect levels of accuracy being achieved. The system developed is able to overcome security issues in IVNs.",
      "published": "2023-04-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23084086",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fawaz Waselallah Alsaade",
        "Mosleh Hmoud Al-Adhaileh"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23084086",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23094376",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multi-Layer Intrusion Detection System for SOME/IP-Based In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "The automotive Ethernet is gradually replacing the traditional controller area network (CAN) as the backbone network of the vehicle. As an essential protocol to solve service-based communication, Scalable service-Oriented MiddlewarE over IP (SOME/IP) is expected to be applied to an in-vehicle network (IVN). The increasing number of external attack interfaces and the protocol's vulnerability makes SOME/IP in-vehicle networks vulnerable to intrusion. This paper proposes a multi-layer intrusion detection system (IDS) architecture, including rule-based and artificial intelligence (AI)-based modules. The rule-based module is used to detect the SOME/IP header, SOME/IP-SD message, message interval, and communication process. The AI-based module acts on the payload. We propose a SOME/IP dataset establishment method to evaluate the performance of the proposed multi-layer IDS. Experiments are carried out on a Jetson Xavier NX, showing that the accuracy of AI-based detection reached 99.7761% and that of rule-based detection was 100%. The average detection time per packet is 0.3958 ms with graphics processing unit (GPU) acceleration and 0.6669 ms with only a central processing unit (CPU). After vehicle-level real-time analyses, the proposed IDS can be deployed for distributed or select critical advanced driving assistance system (ADAS) traffic for detection in a centralized layout.",
      "published": "2023-04-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23094376",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Zhenyu Yang",
        "Zhaojing Zhang",
        "Zitong Wang",
        "Bowen Wang",
        "Mingzhi Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23094376",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 25,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23104979",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Framework for Cybersecurity Requirements Management in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "The rapid development of intelligent connected vehicles has increased the attack surface of vehicles and made the complexity of vehicle systems unprecedented. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) need to accurately represent and identify threats and match corresponding security requirements. Meanwhile, the fast iteration cycle of modern vehicles requires development engineers to quickly obtain cybersecurity requirements for new features in their developed systems in order to develop system code that meets cybersecurity requirements. However, existing threat identification and cybersecurity requirement methods in the automotive domain cannot accurately describe and identify threats for a new feature while also quickly matching appropriate cybersecurity requirements. This article proposes a cybersecurity requirements management system (CRMS) framework to assist OEM security experts in conducting comprehensive automated threat analysis and risk assessment and to help development engineers identify security requirements prior to software development. The proposed CRMS framework enables development engineers to quickly model their systems using the UML-based (i.e., capable of describing systems using UML) Eclipse Modeling Framework and security experts to integrate their security experience into a threat library and security requirement library expressed in Alloy formal language. In order to ensure accurate matching between the two, a middleware communication framework called the component channel messaging and interface (CCMI) framework, specifically designed for the automotive domain, is proposed. The CCMI communication framework enables the fast model of development engineers to match with the formal model of security experts for threat and security requirement matching, achieving accurate and automated threat and risk identification and security requirement matching. To validate our work, we conducted experiments on the proposed framework and compared the results with the HEAVENS approach. The results showed that the proposed framework is superior in terms of threat detection rates and coverage rates of security requirements. Moreover, it also saves analysis time for large and complex systems, and the cost-saving effect becomes more pronounced with increasing system complexity.",
      "published": "2023-05-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23104979",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Yifan Jiang",
        "Jiajia Wang",
        "Zhihao Li",
        "Xiaoxian Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23104979",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4044,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/s23104979 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: requires, large, sensors, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23187941",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Cyber Attacks In-Vehicle Diagnostics Using an Intelligent Multistage Framework",
      "description": "The advanced technology of vehicles makes them vulnerable to external exploitation. The current trend of research is to impose security measures to protect vehicles from different aspects. One of the main problems that counter Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) is the necessity to have a low false acceptance rate (FA) with high detection accuracy without major changes in the vehicle network infrastructure. Furthermore, the location of IDSs can be controversial due to the limitations and concerns of Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Thus, we propose a novel framework of multistage to detect abnormality in vehicle diagnostic data based on specifications of diagnostics and stacking ensemble for various machine learning models. The proposed framework is verified against the KIA SOUL and Seat Leon 2018 datasets. Our IDS is evaluated against point anomaly attacks and period anomaly attacks that have not been used in its training. The results show the superiority of the framework and its robustness with high accuracy of 99.21%, a low false acceptance rate of 0.003%, and a good detection rate (DR) of 99.63% for Seat Leon 2018, and an accuracy of 99.22%, a low false acceptance rate of 0.005%, and good detection rate of 98.59% for KIA SOUL.",
      "published": "2023-09-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23187941",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "exploitation",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "kia"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tasneem A. Awaad",
        "Mohamed Watheq El-Kharashi",
        "Mohamed Taher",
        "Ayman Tawfik"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23187941",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23198107",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Internet of Medical Vehicles: State-of-the-Art Analysis, Research Challenges and Future Perspectives",
      "description": "The \"Internet-of-Medical-Vehicles (IOMV)\" is one of the special applications of the Internet of Things resulting from combining connected healthcare and connected vehicles. As the IOMV communicates with a variety of networks along its travel path, it incurs various security risks due to sophisticated cyber-attacks. This can endanger the onboard patient's life. So, it is critical to understand subjects related to \"cybersecurity\" in the IOMV to develop robust cybersecurity measures. In this paper, the goal is to evaluate recent trends and state-of-the-art publications, gaps, and future outlooks related to this research area. With this aim, a variety of publications between 2016 and 2023 from \"Web-of-Science\" and \"Scopus\" databases were analysed. Our analysis revealed that the IOMV is a niche and unexplored research area with few defined standards and frameworks, and there is a great need to implement robust cybersecurity measures. This paper will help researchers to gain a comprehensive idea of this niche research topic, as it presents an analysis of top journals and highly cited papers, their challenges and limitations, the system model and architecture of the IOMV, related applicable standards, potential cyber-attacks, factors causing cybersecurity risks, various artificial intelligence techniques for developing potential countermeasures, the assessment and parameterisation of cybersecurity risks, constraints and challenges, and future outlooks for implementing cybersecurity measures in the IOMV.",
      "published": "2023-09-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23198107",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chidambar Rao Bhukya",
        "Prabhat Thakur",
        "Bhavesh Raju Mudhivarthi",
        "Ghanshyam Kumar Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23198107",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 22,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23198223",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANAttack: Assessing Vulnerabilities within Controller Area Network",
      "description": "Current vehicles include electronic features that provide ease and convenience to drivers. These electronic features or nodes rely on in-vehicle communication protocols to ensure functionality. One of the most-widely adopted in-vehicle protocols on the market today is the Controller Area Network, popularly referred to as the CAN bus. The CAN bus is utilized in various modern, sophisticated vehicles. However, as the sophistication levels of vehicles continue to increase, we now see a high rise in attacks against them. These attacks range from simple to more-complex variants, which could have detrimental effects when carried out successfully. Therefore, there is a need to carry out an assessment of the security vulnerabilities that could be exploited within the CAN bus. In this research, we conducted a security vulnerability analysis on the CAN bus protocol by proposing an attack scenario on a CAN bus simulation that exploits the arbitration feature extensively. This feature determines which message is sent via the bus in the event that two or more nodes attempt to send a message at the same time. It achieves this by prioritizing messages with lower identifiers. Our analysis revealed that an attacker can spoof a message ID to gain high priority, continuously injecting messages with the spoofed ID. As a result, this prevents the transmission of legitimate messages, impacting the vehicle's operations. We identified significant risks in the CAN protocol, including spoofing, injection, and Denial of Service. Furthermore, we examined the latency of the CAN-enabled system under attack, finding that the compromised node (the attacker's device) consistently achieved the lowest latency due to message arbitration. This demonstrates the potential for an attacker to take control of the bus, injecting messages without contention, thereby disrupting the normal operations of the vehicle, which could potentially compromise safety.",
      "published": "2023-10-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23198223",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Damilola Oladimeji",
        "Amar A. Rasheed",
        "Cihan Varol",
        "Mohamed Baza",
        "Hani Mohammed Alshahrani",
        "Abdullah Baz"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23198223",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23218788",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Classification and Tree-Based Ensemble Network for the Intrusion Detection System in the Internet of Vehicles",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles(IoV) employs vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology to establish intricate interconnections among the Internet, the IoT network, and the Vehicle Networks (IVNs), forming a complex vehicle communication network. However, the vehicle communication network is very vulnerable to attacks. The implementation of an intrusion detection system (IDS) emerges as an essential requisite to ensure the security of in-vehicle/inter-vehicle communication in IoV. Within this context, the imbalanced nature of network traffic data and the diversity of network attacks stand as pivotal factors in IDS performance. On the one hand, network traffic data often heavily suffer from data imbalance, which impairs the detection performance. To address this issue, this paper employs a hybrid approach combining the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE) and RandomUnderSampler to achieve a balanced class distribution. On the other hand, the diversity of network attacks constitutes another significant factor contributing to poor intrusion detection model performance. Most current machine learning-based IDSs mainly perform binary classification, while poorly dealing with multiclass classification. This paper proposes an adaptive tree-based ensemble network as the intrusion detection engine for the IDS in IoV. This engine employs a deep-layer structure, wherein diverse ML models are stacked as layers and are interconnected in a cascading manner, which enables accurate and efficient multiclass classification, facilitating the precise identification of diverse network attacks. Moreover, a machine learning-based approach is used for feature selection to reduce feature dimensionality, substantially alleviating the computational overhead. Finally, we evaluate the proposed IDS performance on various cyber-attacks from the in-vehicle and external networks in IoV by using the network intrusion detection dataset CICIDS2017 and the vehicle security dataset Car-Hacking. The experimental results demonstrate remarkable performance, with an F1-score of 0.965 on the CICIDS2017 dataset and an F1-score of 0.9999 on the Car-Hacking dataset. These scores demonstrate that our IDS can achieve efficient and precise multiclass classification. This research provides a valuable reference for ensuring the cybersecurity of IoV.",
      "published": "2023-10-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23218788",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wanting Gou",
        "Haodi Zhang",
        "Ronghui Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23218788",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 54,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23229231",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and Experimental Assessment of Real-Time Anomaly Detection Techniques for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "In recent decades, an exponential surge in technological advancements has significantly transformed various aspects of daily life. The proliferation of indispensable objects such as smartphones and computers underscores the pervasive influence of technology. This trend extends to the domains of the healthcare, automotive, and industrial sectors, with the emergence of remote-operating capabilities and self-learning models. Notably, the automotive industry has integrated numerous remote access points like Wi-Fi, USB, Bluetooth, 4G/5G, and OBD-II interfaces into vehicles, amplifying the exposure of the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to external threats. With a recognition of the susceptibility of the CAN bus to external attacks, there is an urgent need to develop robust security systems that are capable of detecting potential intrusions and malfunctions. This study aims to leverage fingerprinting techniques and neural networks on cost-effective embedded systems to construct an anomaly detection system for identifying abnormal behavior in the CAN bus. The research is structured into three parts, encompassing the application of fingerprinting techniques for data acquisition and neural network training, the design of an anomaly detection algorithm based on neural network results, and the simulation of typical CAN attack scenarios. Additionally, a thermal test was conducted to evaluate the algorithm’s resilience under varying temperatures.",
      "published": "2023-11-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23229231",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pierpaolo Dini",
        "Sergio Saponara"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23229231",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 19,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s23239579",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring Adversarial Robustness of LiDAR Semantic Segmentation in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Deep learning networks have demonstrated outstanding performance in 2D and 3D vision tasks. However, recent research demonstrated that these networks result in failures when imperceptible perturbations are added to the input known as adversarial attacks. This phenomenon has recently received increased interest in the field of autonomous vehicles and has been extensively researched on 2D image-based perception tasks and 3D object detection. However, the adversarial robustness of 3D LiDAR semantic segmentation in autonomous vehicles is a relatively unexplored topic. This study expands the adversarial examples to LiDAR-based 3D semantic segmentation. We developed and analyzed three LiDAR point-based adversarial attack methods on different networks developed on the SemanticKITTI dataset. The findings illustrate that the Cylinder3D network has the highest adversarial susceptibility to the analyzed attacks. We investigated how the class-wise point distribution influences the adversarial robustness of each class in the SemanticKITTI dataset and discovered that ground-level points are extremely vulnerable to point perturbation attacks. Further, the transferability of each attack strategy was assessed, and we found that networks relying on point data representation demonstrate a notable level of resistance. Our findings will enable future research in developing more complex and specific adversarial attacks against LiDAR segmentation and countermeasures against adversarial attacks.",
      "published": "2023-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s23239579",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "K. T. Y. Mahima",
        "Asanka G. Perera",
        "Sreenatha Gopalarao Anavatti",
        "Matthew Garratt"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s23239579",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24010241",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Cloud-Assisted Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: An In-Depth Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment",
      "description": "As threat vectors and adversarial capabilities evolve, Cloud-Assisted Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CCAVs) are becoming more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Several established threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) methodologies are publicly available to address the evolving threat landscape. However, these methodologies inadequately capture the threat data of CCAVs, resulting in poorly defined threat boundaries or the reduced efficacy of the TARA. This is due to multiple factors, including complex hardware-software interactions, rapid technological advancements, outdated security frameworks, heterogeneous standards and protocols, and human errors in CCAV systems. To address these factors, this study begins by systematically evaluating TARA methods and applying the Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privileges (STRIDE) threat model and Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, and Discoverability (DREAD) risk assessment to target system architectures. This study identifies vulnerabilities, quantifies risks, and methodically examines defined data processing components. In addition, this study offers an attack tree to delineate attack vectors and provides a novel defense taxonomy against identified risks. This article demonstrates the efficacy of the TARA in systematically capturing compromised security requirements, threats, limits, and associated risks with greater precision. By doing so, we further discuss the challenges in protecting hardware-software assets against multi-staged attacks due to emerging vulnerabilities. As a result, this research informs advanced threat analyses and risk management strategies for enhanced security engineering of cyberphysical CCAV systems.",
      "published": "2023-12-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24010241",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Al Tariq Sheik",
        "Carsten R. Maple",
        "Gregory Epiphaniou",
        "Mehrdad Dianati"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24010241",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24051447",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MQTree: Secure OTA Protocol Using MQTT and MerkleTree",
      "description": "The escalating advancement in Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) necessitates a formidable strategy for firmware updates, where traditional methods often fall short of guaranteeing absolute integrity. Although decentralization has been explored in studies for firmware integrity verification using blockchain technology, it lacks comprehensive validation in the context of automotive over-the-air (OTA) updates. By recognizing the limitations of current practices and the partial validation of decentralized approaches, such as blockchain, in the automotive sector, our study introduces a novel mechanism for firmware over-the-air (FOTA) updates. This mechanism is grounded in the widely adopted message queuing telemetry transport (MQTT) protocol, integral to the Internet of Things (IoT) domain, and leverages Merkle tree-based blockchain verification to fortify the fidelity and efficiency of firmware updates. Our proposed solution not only prioritizes the stability crucial to automotive OTA updates but also ensures that performance is not compromised. This dual focus on reliability and efficiency represents a significant stride forward in the development of secure, scalable SDV firmware update protocols.",
      "published": "2024-02-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24051447",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yunje Shin",
        "Sanghoon Jeon"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24051447",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24051515",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "B-SAFE: Blockchain-Enabled Security Architecture for Connected Vehicle Fog Environment",
      "description": "Vehicles are no longer stand-alone mechanical entities due to the advancements in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication-centric Internet of Connected Vehicles (IoV) frameworks. However, the advancement in connected vehicles leads to another serious security threat, online vehicle hijacking, where the steering control of vehicles can be hacked online. The feasibility of traditional security solutions in IoV environments is very limited, considering the intermittent network connectivity to cloud servers and vehicle-centric computing capability constraints. In this context, this paper presents a Blockchain-enabled Security Architecture for a connected vehicular Fog networking Environment (B-SAFE). Firstly, blockchain security and vehicular fog networking are introduced as preliminaries of the framework. Secondly, a three-layer architecture of B-SAFE is presented, focusing on vehicular communication, blockchain at fog nodes, and the cloud as trust and reward management for vehicles. Thirdly, details of the blockchain implementation at fog nodes is presented, along with a flowchart and algorithm. The performance of the evaluation of the proposed framework B-SAFE attests to the benefits in terms of trust, reward points, and threshold calculation.",
      "published": "2024-02-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24051515",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Priyanka Gaba",
        "Ram Shringar Raw",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya",
        "Mohammad Aljaidi"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24051515",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 21,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4136,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/s24051515 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: servers, points, serious, very, trust, limited, sensors, where."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24061848",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Complying with ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434: A Safety and Security Co-Analysis Method for Intelligent Connected Vehicle",
      "description": "A cyber-physical system (CPS) integrates communication and automation technologies into the operational processes of physical systems. Nowadays, as a complex CPS, an intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) may be exposed to accidental functional failures and malicious attacks. Therefore, ensuring the ICV's safety and security is crucial. Traditional safety/security analysis methods, such as failure mode and effect analysis and attack tree analysis, cannot provide a comprehensive analysis for the interactions between the system components of the ICV. In this work, we merge system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) with the concept phase of ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434. We focus on the interactions between components while analyzing the safety and security of ICVs to reduce redundant efforts and inconsistencies in determining safety and security requirements. To conquer STPA's abstraction in describing causal scenarios, we improved the physical component diagram of STPA-SafeSec by adding interface elements. In addition, we proposed the loss scenario tree to describe specific scenarios that lead to unsafe/unsecure control actions. After hazard/threat analysis, a unified risk assessment process is proposed to ensure consistency in assessment criteria and to streamline the process. A case study is implemented on the autonomous emergency braking system to demonstrate the validation of the proposed method.",
      "published": "2024-03-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24061848",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yufeng Li",
        "Wenqi Liu",
        "Qi Liu",
        "Xiangyu Zheng",
        "Ke Sun",
        "Chengjian Huang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24061848",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 39,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24092807",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Architecture for an Intrusion Detection System Utilizing Cross-Check Filters for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN), widely used for vehicular communication, is vulnerable to multiple types of cyber-threats. Attackers can inject malicious messages into the CAN bus through various channels, including wireless methods, entertainment systems, and on-board diagnostic ports. Therefore, it is crucial to develop a reliable intrusion detection system (IDS) capable of effectively distinguishing between legitimate and malicious CAN messages. In this paper, we propose a novel IDS architecture aimed at enhancing the cybersecurity of CAN bus systems in vehicles. Various machine learning (ML) models have been widely used to address similar problems; however, although existing ML-based IDS are computationally efficient, they suffer from suboptimal detection performance. To mitigate this shortcoming, our architecture incorporates specially designed rule-based filters that cross-check outputs from the traditional ML-based IDS. These filters scrutinize message ID and payload data to precisely capture the unique characteristics of three distinct types of cyberattacks: DoS attacks, spoofing attacks, and fuzzy attacks. Experimental evidence demonstrates that the proposed architecture leads to a significant improvement in detection performance across all utilized ML models. Specifically, all ML-based IDS achieved an accuracy exceeding 99% for every type of attack. This achievement highlights the robustness and effectiveness of our proposed solution in detecting potential threats.",
      "published": "2024-04-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24092807",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Donghyeon Lee",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24092807",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24113461",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Attack Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle CAN-FD Messages",
      "description": "As an enhanced version of standard CAN, the Controller Area Network with Flexible Data (CAN-FD) rate is vulnerable to attacks due to its lack of information security measures. However, although anomaly detection is an effective method to prevent attacks, the accuracy of detection needs further improvement. In this paper, we propose a novel intrusion detection model for the CAN-FD bus, comprising two sub-models: Anomaly Data Detection Model (ADDM) for spotting anomalies and Anomaly Classification Detection Model (ACDM) for identifying and classifying anomaly types. ADDM employs Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) layers to capture the long-range dependencies and temporal patterns within CAN-FD frame data, thus identifying frames that deviate from established norms. ACDM is enhanced with the attention mechanism that weights LSTM outputs, further improving the identification of sequence-based relationships and facilitating multi-attack classification. The method is evaluated on two datasets: a real-vehicle dataset including frames designed by us based on known attack patterns, and the CAN-FD Intrusion Dataset, developed by the Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab. Our method offers broader applicability and more refined classification in anomaly detection. Compared with existing advanced LSTM-based and CNN-LSTM-based methods, our method exhibits superior performance in detection, achieving an improvement in accuracy of 1.44% and 1.01%, respectively.",
      "published": "2024-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24113461",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fei Gao",
        "Jinshuo Liu",
        "Yingqi Liu",
        "Zhenhai Gao",
        "Rui Zhao"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24113461",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4295,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/s24113461 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: patterns, sensors, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24123848",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks on Intrusion Detection Systems in In-Vehicle Networks of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Rapid advancements in connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) are fueled by breakthroughs in machine learning, yet they encounter significant risks from adversarial attacks. This study explores the vulnerabilities of machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) within in-vehicle networks (IVNs) to adversarial attacks, shifting focus from the common research on manipulating CAV perception models. Considering the relatively simple nature of IVN data, we assess the susceptibility of IVN-based IDSs to manipulation-a crucial examination, as adversarial attacks typically exploit complexity. We propose an adversarial attack method using a substitute IDS trained with data from the onboard diagnostic port. In conducting these attacks under black-box conditions while adhering to realistic IVN traffic constraints, our method seeks to deceive the IDS into misclassifying both normal-to-malicious and malicious-to-normal cases. Evaluations on two IDS models-a baseline IDS and a state-of-the-art model, MTH-IDS-demonstrated substantial vulnerability, decreasing the F1 scores from 95% to 38% and from 97% to 79%, respectively. Notably, inducing false alarms proved particularly effective as an adversarial strategy, undermining user trust in the defense mechanism. Despite the simplicity of IVN-based IDSs, our findings reveal critical vulnerabilities that could threaten vehicle safety and necessitate careful consideration in the development of IVN-based IDSs and in formulating responses to the IDSs' alarms.",
      "published": "2024-06-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24123848",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fatimah Aloraini",
        "Amir Javed",
        "OMER F. RANA"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24123848",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s24186139",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity: A Survey on Frameworks, Standards, and Testing and Monitoring Technologies",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are increasingly interconnected through various communication channels, which requires secure access for authorized users, the protection of driver assistance and autonomous driving system data, and the assurance of data integrity against misuse or manipulation. While these advancements offer numerous benefits, recent years have exposed many intrusion incidents, revealing vulnerabilities and weaknesses in current systems. To sustain and enhance the performance, quality, and reliability of vehicle systems, software engineers face significant challenges, including in diverse communication channels, software integration, complex testing, compatibility, core reusability, safety and reliability assurance, data privacy, and software security. Addressing cybersecurity risks presents a substantial challenge in finding practical solutions to these issues. This study aims to analyze the current state of research regarding automotive cybersecurity, with a particular focus on four main themes: frameworks and technologies, standards and regulations, monitoring and vulnerability management, and testing and validation. This paper highlights key findings, identifies existing research gaps, and proposes directions for future research that will be useful for both researchers and practitioners.",
      "published": "2024-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s24186139",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Claudiu Vasile Kifor",
        "Aurelian Popescu"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/s24186139",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s25134174",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adaptive Autoencoder-Based Intrusion Detection System with Single Threshold for CAN Networks",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) protocol, widely used for in-vehicle communication, lacks built-in security features and is inherently vulnerable to various attacks. Numerous attack techniques against CAN have been reported, leading to intrusion detection systems (IDSs) tailored for in-vehicle networks. In this study, we propose a novel lightweight unsupervised IDS for CAN networks, designed for real-time, on-device implementation. The proposed autoencoder model was trained exclusively on normal data. A portion of the attack data was utilized to determine the optimal detection threshold using a Gaussian kernel density estimation function, while the frame count was selected based on error rate analysis. Subsequently, the model was evaluated using four types of attack data that were not seen during training. Notably, the model employs a single threshold across all attack types, enabling detection using a single model. Furthermore, the designed software model was optimized for hardware implementation and validated on an FPGA under a real-time CAN communication environment. When evaluated, the proposed system achieved an average accuracy of 99.2%, precision of 99.2%, recall of 99.1%, and F1-score of 99.2%. Furthermore, compared to existing FPGA-based IDS models, our model reduced the usage of LUTs, flip-flops, and power by average factors of 1/5, 1/6, and 1/11.",
      "published": "2025-07-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s25134174",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Donghyeon Kim",
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/s25134174",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s25154793",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning-Based Blockchain Technology for Secure V2X Communication: Open Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is a fundamental technology in the development of intelligent transportation systems, encompassing vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), infrastructure (V2I), and pedestrian (V2P) communications. This technology enables connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) to interact with their surroundings, significantly enhancing road safety, traffic efficiency, and driving comfort. However, as V2X communication becomes more widespread, it becomes a prime target for adversarial and persistent cyberattacks, posing significant threats to the security and privacy of CAVs. These challenges are compounded by the dynamic nature of vehicular networks and the stringent requirements for real-time data processing and decision-making. Much research is on using novel technologies such as machine learning, blockchain, and cryptography to secure V2X communications. Our survey highlights the security challenges faced by V2X communications and assesses current ML and blockchain-based solutions, revealing significant gaps and opportunities for improvement. Specifically, our survey focuses on studies integrating ML, blockchain, and multi-access edge computing (MEC) for low latency, robust, and dynamic security in V2X networks. Based on our findings, we outline a conceptual framework that synergizes ML, blockchain, and MEC to address some of the identified security challenges. This integrated framework demonstrates the potential for real-time anomaly detection, decentralized data sharing, and enhanced system scalability. The survey concludes by identifying future research directions and outlining the remaining challenges for securing V2X communications in the face of evolving threats.",
      "published": "2025-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s25154793",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yonas Teweldemedhin Gebrezgiher",
        "Sekione Reward Jeremiah",
        "Xianjun Deng",
        "Jong Hyuk Park"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/s25154793",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s25206428",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Authentication Scheme for Vehicle-to-Everything Computing Task Offloading Environments",
      "description": "Computational task offloading is a key technology in the field of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, where security issues represent a core challenge throughout the offloading process. We must ensure the legitimacy of both the offloading entity (requesting vehicle) and the offloader (edge server or assisting vehicle), as well as the confidentiality and integrity of task data during transmission and processing. To this end, we propose a security authentication scheme for the V2X computational task offloading environment. We conducted rigorous formal and informal analyses of the scheme, supplemented by verification using the formal security verification tool AVISPA. This demonstrates that the proposed scheme possesses fundamental security properties in the V2X environment, capable of resisting various threats and attacks. Furthermore, compared to other related authentication schemes, our proposed solution exhibits favorable performance in terms of computational and communication overhead. Finally, we conducted network simulations using NS-3 to evaluate the scheme's performance at the network layer. Overall, the proposed scheme provides reliable and scalable security guarantees tailored to the requirements of computing task offloading in V2X environments.",
      "published": "2025-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s25206428",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yubao Liu",
        "Chenhao Li",
        "Quanchao Sun",
        "Haiyue Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sensors",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/s25206428",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s26102964",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Relational Modelling for Automotive Cybersecurity: Structural Transition and Graph-Topology-Based CAN Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "A central open question in automotive intrusion detection is not merely whether relational representations of Controller Area Network (CAN) traffic improve performance, but which aspects of CAN traffic structure transfer robustly across attacks and which do not transfer across vehicle platforms, and why. To investigate this question systematically, we develop a lightweight intrusion-detection framework combining statistical traffic descriptors, structural identifier transition features, and graph topology representations extracted from sliding windows of CAN frames. Because CAN is a broadcast-only bus with no request–response mechanism, each ECU independently transmits its identifiers at fixed periodic rates; accordingly, the structural and graph-based features capture the temporal scheduling regularity of identifier broadcasts, not directed inter-ECU communication dependencies. Stress-testing the framework under cross-attack and cross-dataset transfer reveals a clear four-level hierarchy: (1) statistical features collapse under cross-attack transfer (ROC-AUC as low as 0.009), failing to generalise beyond the attack type seen during training; (2) structural transition features are the most robust form of representation, maintaining high cross-attack performance (ROC-AUC > 0.999) across all evaluated scenarios within the same vehicle platform; (3) graph topology features are scenario-dependent, achieving high robustness in DoS-trained scenarios but producing sub-random results in Fuzzy-trained scenarios, exposing a sensitivity to injection density profiles; and (4) the hybrid combination provides the strongest overall operational package, consistently across four classifiers. Cross-dataset transfer to the ROAD dataset reveals the precise boundary conditions of transferability: structural representations transfer only when an attack perturbs identifier transition regularity (correlated signal attacks, ROC-AUC = 0.81–0.83), while attacks that affect only payload semantics (speedometer) or exploit identifier–space novelty (fuzzing) lie outside the detection scope of transition-based features, regardless of the vehicle platform. A vehicle-specific calibration experiment further shows that the correlated-attack generalization gap can be closed with as little as 10% of target-vehicle normal traffic, whereas speedometer attacks remain structurally invisible by design. A key contribution of this work is therefore a transparent approach for identifying when relational CAN representations transfer and when they do not—a finding that is more scientifically valuable than a uniformly optimistic performance claim and which provides concrete guidance for practitioners designing cross-platform automotive IDS.",
      "published": "2026-05-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s26102964",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Khalaf Mohammad Khreasat",
        "G. V. González"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/s26102964",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s26123886",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Survey on Online AutoML and Adversarial Robustness for IoT and EV Charging Network Security",
      "description": "The increasing deployment of IoT-enabled electric-vehicle charging networks has created a rapidly evolving cyber–physical environment in which security mechanisms must operate amid ever-changing data patterns and resource constraints. In these environments, static Machine Learning (ML) pipelines are often insufficient because they struggle to adapt to concept drift issues, emerging attacks, and real-time operational requirements. We analyzed cybersecurity vulnerabilities, challenges of conventional ML approaches, and the possibilities of AI-powered, adaptive security measures. This paper examines Online AutoML and its advantages, including automated adaptation to streaming data, reduced human intervention, and privacy-preserving, resource-aware learning. Furthermore, this paper discusses adversarial attacks and defences in Online AutoML systems, highlighting the need for frameworks that jointly address concept drift, scalability, privacy, and adversarial threats. Finally, this study emphasizes the importance of establishing comprehensive public benchmarks for Online AutoML research.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s26123886",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wajiha Zaheer",
        "C. Nwokoye",
        "S. N. Afrasiabi",
        "Khalil El-Khatib",
        "Li Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/s26123886",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s26123964",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Semi-Supervised Adversarial Learning Framework for Controller Area Network Bus Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "Modern connected vehicles rely on the controller area network (CAN) to disseminate safety-critical in-vehicle information, including sensor-related and vehicle-state signals such as engine revolutions per minute (RPM) and gear state, among electronic control units (ECUs). Because CANs lack built-in authentication and encryption, malicious message injection and spoofing can compromise the integrity and availability of vehicular sensing and control functions. Existing deep-learning-based intrusion-detection systems (IDSs) show a clear trade-off: supervised methods perform well on known attacks but rely on costly labels, whereas unsupervised methods can identify unseen attacks but often suffer from high false-positive rates. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a semi-supervised generative adversarial network (SGAN) framework for CAN bus intrusion detection that combines image-based CAN representation with adversarial learning. Consecutive CAN messages are converted into 64×9 grayscale images, and the proposed framework is trained in three phases. First, the discriminator establishes an initial decision boundary using a small labeled subset. It then refines this boundary through distribution-level likelihood objectives and generated samples. Finally, the generator is trained to produce realistic samples capable of deceiving the discriminator. The proposed method was evaluated on the Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab (HCRL) car-hacking dataset using leave-one-class-out experiments to simulate unknown attacks and achieved an average accuracy of 99.73% and an average F1-score of 99.63% on unknown attacks. Moreover, with only 0.21 M parameters and 3.25 M floating-point operations (FLOPs), the model is well suited for resource-constrained in-vehicle platforms. These results indicate that the proposed framework can serve as a practical cybersecurity component for protecting CAN-carried data in vehicular sensing applications.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s26123964",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jonggwon Kim",
        "Hyungchul Im",
        "Semin Kim",
        "Seongsoo Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/s26123964",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3807,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/s26123964 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serve, national, unknown, sensors, well, information, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/s26185840",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Enabled Hardware-in-the-Loop Validation for Automotive Cybersecurity: A Review of Cyber Threats, Testbeds, and Intelligent Detection",
      "description": "Cybersecurity has become one of the most critical challenges in the intelligent and connected vehicle ecosystem of today. As modern vehicles become increasingly connected and intelligent, the frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks targeting automotive systems continue to grow at an alarming rate. Ensuring robust detection and prevention mechanisms has therefore become essential to safeguard driver safety and vehicle integrity. Rapid and accurate identification of cyberthreats is critical, as such attacks can disrupt vital Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and compromise functions such as braking, steering, or communication networks. This review provides a comprehensive analysis of the major categories of cyberattacks targeting modern vehicles, including physical, remote, in-network, firmware- and software-based, cloud- and connectivity-related, and sensor-level perception attacks. Contemporary vehicle architectures, connected-vehicle technologies, software-update mechanisms, and current automotive cybersecurity standards and regulations are also considered. Although traditional cybersecurity testing approaches offer valuable insight into software vulnerabilities, they fail to capture the full cyber–physical interactions that govern vehicle behavior under malicious conditions. In this review, we highlight the essential role of Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) and Vehicle-in-the-Loop (VIL) platforms as realistic and safe environments for evaluating the impact of cyberattacks on automotive control systems and for generating synchronized cyber–physical data under controlled attack scenarios. We further examine how artificial intelligence (AI) techniques contribute to detecting, mitigating, and countering these cyberthreats, including supervised and unsupervised intrusion detection, deep-learning-based temporal modeling, cyber–physical anomaly detection, and the emerging challenge of adversarial attacks against AI-based detectors. By synthesizing insights from automotive cybersecurity, HIL-/VIL-based validation, automotive cybersecurity datasets, and AI-driven intrusion detection, this paper establishes a foundation for developing and evaluating more resilient and secure connected and software-defined vehicle architectures.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/s26185840",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Farshideh Kordi",
        "Paul Fortier",
        "A. Miled"
      ],
      "venue": "Italian National Conference on Sensors",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/s26185840",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4646,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/s26185840 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: valuable, national, vital, platforms, functions, sensors, intelligence, impact."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/safety10020041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Risk Assessment Framework Based on Fuzzy Logic for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Recent advancements in the automotive field have significantly increased the level of complexity and connectivity of modern vehicles. In this context, the topic of cybersecurity becomes extremely relevant, as a successful attack can have an impact in terms of safety on the car navigation, potentially leading to harmful behavior. Risk assessment is typically performed using discrete input and output scales, which can often lead to an identical output in terms of risk evaluation despite the inputs presenting non-negligible differences. This work presents a novel fuzzy-logic-based methodology to assess cybersecurity risks which takes attack feasibility and safety impact as input factors. This technique allows us explicitly model the uncertainty and ambiguousness of input data, which is typical of the risk assessment process, providing an output on a more detailed scale. The fuzzy inference engine is based on a set of control rules expressed in natural language, which is crucial to maintaining the interpretability and traceability of the risk calculation. The proposed framework was applied to a case study extracted from ISO/SAE 21434. The obtained results are in line with the traditional methodology, with the added benefit of also providing the scatter around the calculated value, indicating the risk trend. The proposed method is general and can be applied in the industry independently from the specific case study.",
      "published": "2024-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/safety10020041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Francesco Merola",
        "Cinzia Bernardeschi",
        "Giuseppe Lami"
      ],
      "venue": "Safety",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/safety10020041",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/sci7030112",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Potential Vulnerabilities of Cryptographic Primitives in Modern Blockchain Platforms",
      "description": "Today, blockchain technologies are a separate, rapidly developing area. With rapid development, they open up a number of scientific problems. One of these problems is the problem of reliability, which is primarily associated with the use of cryptographic primitives. The threat of the emergence of quantum computers is now widely discussed, in connection with which the direction of post-quantum cryptography is actively developing. Nevertheless, the most popular blockchain platforms (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum) use asymmetric cryptography based on elliptic curves. Here, cryptographic primitives for blockchain systems are divided into four groups according to their functionality: keyless, single-key, dual-key, and hybrid. The main attention in the work is paid to the most significant cryptographic primitives for blockchain systems: keyless and single-key. This manuscript discusses possible scenarios in which, during practical implementation, the mathematical foundations embedded in the algorithms for generating a digital signature and encrypting data using algorithms based on elliptic curves are violated. In this case, vulnerabilities arise that can lead to the compromise of a private key or a substitution of a digital signature. We consider cases of vulnerabilities in a blockchain system due to incorrect use of a cryptographic primitive, describe the problem, formulate the problem statement, and assess its complexity for each case. For each case, strict calculations of the maximum computational costs are given when the conditions of the case under consideration are met. Among other things, we present a new version of the encryption algorithm for data stored in blockchain systems or transmitted between blockchain systems using elliptic curves. This algorithm is not the main blockchain algorithm and is not included in the core of modern blockchain systems. This algorithm allows the use of the same keys that system users have in order to store sensitive user data in an open blockchain database in encrypted form. At the same time, possible vulnerabilities that may arise from incorrect implementation of this algorithm are considered. The scenarios formulated in the article can be used to test the reliability of both newly created blockchain platforms and to study long-existing ones.",
      "published": "2025-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/sci7030112",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "threat",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Evgeniya Ishchukova",
        "Sergei Petrenko",
        "Alexey Petrenko",
        "Konstantin Olegovich Gnidko",
        "Alexey Nekrasov"
      ],
      "venue": "Sci",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/sci7030112",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/smartcities3010002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Identify a Spoofing Attack on an In-Vehicle CAN Bus Based on the Deep Features of an ECU Fingerprint Signal",
      "description": "An in-vehicle controller area network (CAN) bus is vulnerable because of increased sharing among modern autonomous vehicles and the weak protocol design principle. Spoofing attacks on a CAN bus can be difficult to detect and have the potential to enable devastating attacks. To effectively identify spoofing attacks, we propose the authentication of sender identities using a recurrent neural network with long short-term memory units (RNN-LSTM) based on the features of a fingerprint signal. We also present a way to generate the analog fingerprint signals of electronic control units (ECUs) to train the proposed RNN-LSTM classifier. The proposed RNN-LSTM model is accelerated on embedded Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) to allow for real-time detection despite high computational complexity. A comparison of experimental results with the latest studies demonstrates the capability of the proposed RNN-LSTM model and its potential as a solution to in-vehicle CAN bus security.",
      "published": "2020-01-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities3010002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yun Yang",
        "Zongtao Duan",
        "Mark Mohammad Tehranipoor"
      ],
      "venue": "Smart Cities",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/smartcities3010002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 52,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/smartcities8050142",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Modeling and Attacks on Digital Twins of Vehicles: A Systematic Literature Review",
      "description": "This systematic literature review pioneers the synthesis of cybersecurity challenges for automotive digital twins (DTs), a critical yet underexplored frontier in connected vehicle security. The notion of digital twins, which act as simulated counterparts to real-world systems, is revolutionizing secure system design within the automotive sector. As contemporary vehicles become more dependent on interconnected electronic systems, the likelihood of cyber threats is escalating. This comprehensive literature review seeks to analyze existing research on threat modeling and security testing in automotive digital twins, aiming to pinpoint emerging patterns, evaluate current approaches, and identify future research avenues. Guided by the PRISMA framework, we rigorously analyze 23 studies from 882 publications to address three research questions: (1) How are threats to automotive DTs identified and assessed? (2) What methodologies drive threat modeling? Lastly, (3) what techniques validate threat models and simulate attacks? The novelty of this study lies in its structured classification of digital twin types (physics based, data driven, hybrid), its inclusion of a groundbreaking threat taxonomy across architectural layers (e.g., ECU tampering, CAN-Bus spoofing), the integration of the 5C taxonomy with layered architectures for DT security testing, and its analysis of domain-specific tools such as VehicleLang and embedded intrusion detection systems. The findings expose significant deficiencies in the strength and validation of threat models, highlighting the necessity for more adaptable and comprehensive testing methods. By exposing gaps in scalability, trust, and safety, and proposing actionable solutions aligned with UNECE R155, this SLR delivers a robust framework to advance secure DT development, empowering researchers and industry to fortify vehicle resilience against evolving cyber threats.",
      "published": "2025-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities8050142",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "intrusion",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Uzair Muzamil Shah",
        "Daud Mustafa Minhas",
        "Kashif Kifayat",
        "Khizar Ali Shah",
        "Georg Frey"
      ],
      "venue": "Smart Cities",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/smartcities8050142",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/su122410331",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Acceptance Approach for Novel Technologies in Car Insurance",
      "description": "Background: Unlike other financial services, technology-driven changes in the insurance industry have not been a vastly explored topic in scholarly literature. Incumbent insurance companies have hitherto been holding their positions using the complexity of the product, heavy regulation, and gigantic balance sheets as paramount factors for a relatively slow digitalization and technological transformation. However, new technologies such as car telematic devices have been creating a new insurance ecosystem. The aim of this study is to assess the telematics technology acceptance for insurance purposes. Methods: The study is based on the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT). By interviewing 502 new car buyers, we tested the factors that affect the potential usage of telematic devices for insurance purposes. Results: The results indicate that facilitating conditions are the main predictor of telematics use. Moreover, privacy concerns related to the potential abuse of driving behavior data play an important role in technology acceptance. Conclusions: Although novel insurance technologies are mainly presented as user-driven, users (drivers and insurance buyers) are often neglected as an active party in the development of such technologies.",
      "published": "2020-12-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su122410331",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "regulation",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nemanja Milanović",
        "Miloš Milosavljević",
        "Slađana Benković",
        "Dušan Starčević",
        "Željko Spasenić"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainability",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3390/su122410331",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/su14095211",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Vehicular Cybersecurity for Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Cybersecurity is one of the most important challenges in the intelligent connected vehicle system. Interconnected vehicles are vulnerable to different network security attacks, which endanger the safety of passengers. This review paper firstly analyses the reasons why the current vehicle network is vulnerable to network attack and summarizes the three implementation methods of network security threats. The necessity of vehicle network security research and deployment is also analyzed. After giving a short introduction to the vehicular network security, this review paper identifies major security attacks on intelligent connected vehicles. Then the security enhancement technology of vehicle networks from three aspects are introduced, including vehicle network data encryption technology, vehicle network message authentication technology, and vehicle network anomaly intrusion detection technology. Then we analyze three common methods of abnormal intrusion detection in vehicle networks and explore the future research for preventing attacks on the network security of intelligent vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2022-04-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095211",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tian Guan",
        "Yi Hong Han",
        "Nan Kang",
        "Ningye Tang",
        "Xu Chen",
        "Shu Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainability",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/su14095211",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.403,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/su14095211 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/su141912409",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Issues and Solutions for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in a Sustainable City: A Survey",
      "description": "Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) combine technologies of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and connected vehicles (CVs) to develop quicker, more reliable, and safer traffic. Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based CAV solutions play significant roles in sustainable cities. The convergence imposes stringent security requirements for CAV safety and reliability. In practice, vehicles are developed with increased automation and connectivity. Increased automation increases the reliance on the sensor-based technologies and decreases the reliance on the driver; increased connectivity increases the exposures of vehicles’ vulnerability and increases the risk for an adversary to implement a cyber-attack. Much work has been dedicated to identifying the security vulnerabilities and recommending mitigation techniques associated with different sensors, controllers, and connection mechanisms, respectively. However, there is an absence of comprehensive and in-depth studies to identify how the cyber-attacks exploit the vehicles’ vulnerabilities to negatively impact the performance and operations of CAVs. In this survey, we set out to thoroughly review the security issues introduced by AV and CV technologies, analyze how the cyber-attacks impact the performance of CAVs, and summarize the solutions correspondingly. The impact of cyber-attacks on the performance of CAVs is elaborated from both viewpoints of intra-vehicle systems and inter-vehicle systems. We pointed out that securing the perception and operations of CAVs would be the top requirement to enable CAVs to be applied safely and reliably in practice. Additionally, we suggested to utilize cloud and new AI methods to defend against smart cyber-attacks on CAVs.",
      "published": "2022-09-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su141912409",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "exploit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhendong Wang",
        "Haoran Wei",
        "Jianda Wang",
        "Xiaoming Zeng",
        "Yuchao Chang"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainability",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/su141912409",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 58,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/su16062487",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart and Sustainable Wireless Electric Vehicle Charging Strategy with Renewable Energy and Internet of Things Integration",
      "description": "This study addresses the challenges associated with electric vehicle (EV) charging in office environments. These challenges include (1) reliance on manual cable connections, (2) constrained charging options, (3) safety concerns with cable management, and (4) the lack of dynamic charging capabilities. This research focuses on an innovative wireless power transfer (WPT) system specifically designed for use in office parking areas. This system incorporates renewable energy resources (RERs) and uses the transformative power of the Internet of Things (IoT). It employs a mix of solar energy systems and battery storage solutions to facilitate a sustainable and efficient energy supply to EVs. The integration of IoT technology allows for the automatic initiation of charging as soon as an EV is parked. Additionally, the implementation of the Blynk application offers users real-time access to information regarding the operational status of the photovoltaic system and the battery levels of their EVs. The system is further enhanced with IoT and RFID technologies to provide dynamic updates on the availability of charging slots and to implement strict security protocols for user authentication and protection. The research also includes a case study focusing on the application of this charging system in office settings. The case study achieves a 95.9% IRR, lower NPC of USD 1.52 million, and 56.7% power contribution by RERs, and it reduces annual carbon emissions to 173,956 kg CO2.",
      "published": "2024-03-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su16062487",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sheeraz Iqbal",
        "Nahar Fehaid Alshammari",
        "Mokhtar Shouran",
        "Jabir Massoud"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainability",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/su16062487",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 67,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/su18136677",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sustainable Campus EV Charging via a PV–Storage Microgrid: An OCPP-Compliant Proof-of-Concept Field Deployment",
      "description": "Sustainable EV charging infrastructure is fragmented by proprietary applications, vendor lock-in, and weakly time-differentiated pricing, blunting its contribution to urban-mobility decarbonisation. This paper asks whether an open-protocol, super-app-mediated photovoltaic–storage charging architecture can jointly resolve these three fragmentations under deployed field conditions and what its sustainability profile then looks like. We report a campus photovoltaic–storage microgrid integrating heterogeneous EV chargers under an open, vendor-neutral charging-control protocol with super-app authentication and payment replacing dedicated charging applications and a time-differentiated tariff aligned at the meter-interval level with the underlying utility wholesale rate; the deployment is exercised through a researcher-scheduled commissioning campaign of 13 sessions designed to establish functional correctness across the operating envelope rather than to measure user behaviour. Three results emerge across cross-vendor compatibility, onboarding friction, and grid alignment. First, basic message-level OCPP compatibility is sustained across two charger vendors under a single cloud management system—in sequential single-vendor sessions—including the full charging profile up to near-rated DC peak power. Second, the super-app-mediated workflow, which requires no charging-specific application installation and no new charger-operator account, structurally eliminates the dedicated application installation and the email/SMS/credit-card verification round-trips of conventional onboarding, compressing measured first-use end-to-end interaction to 31 s; relative to reconstructed commercial-operator baselines, this is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, an order-of-magnitude reduction rather than a controlled benchmark. Third, mid-day energy delivery aligns incidentally with the utility off-peak window, not user-driven demand shifting, while PV-displacement and BESS-discharge contributions to charging are bracketed by scenario rather than being separately metered. The paper’s contribution is therefore a replicable, policy-embedded sustainable charging architecture validated at field scale within the New Taipei Net-Zero Carbon Demonstration Site Programme, with no claim of global novelty; the same architecture is structurally positioned to convert the observed incidental grid-friendliness into a deliberate, user-facing benefit via a hardware-free mid-day-discount redesign.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su18136677",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ching-Chuan Luo",
        "Cheng-En You",
        "Ming-Feng Yeh"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainability",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/su18136677",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/su182110783",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sustainable Growth of Cybersecurity for Smart Autonomous Vehicle Networks: The TARA Methodology",
      "description": "In the context of population growth, pressure on finite resources, and the limits of the current urban transport model, sustainable mobility in smart cities has become a strategic priority. Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) and intelligent networks (V2X, IoV) promise reductions in consumption, emissions, and congestion, yet they introduce an unprecedented cyber-attack surface, with impacts on safety, privacy, and operational continuity. The ISO/SAE 21434 standard and UNECE R155 regulations mandate systematic Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) throughout the system lifecycle. This article proposes a sustainability-oriented approach to cybersecurity, in which TARA is treated not only as a compliance instrument but as an iterative, adaptive, and resource-efficient methodology capable of supporting intelligent autonomous vehicle networks over the long term without eroding the gains of sustainable mobility. The TARA steps according to ISO/SAE 21434 are detailed, the specificities of application to autonomous vehicle networks (SAE levels L3–L5) in smart cities are analyzed, elements of TARA 2.0 are introduced, and integration with sustainability principles is discussed, considering the limits to growth and consumption constraints. The article includes a complete case study on an SAE Level 4 autonomous driving system (Urban Shuttle L4), comparative tables of TARA 1.0 vs. TARA 2.0, numerical examples of risk calculation, risk matrices, detailed asset and threat lists, and a proposal for cybersecurity sustainability metrics.",
      "published": "2026-10-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su182110783",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "unece r155",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ionut Dancau",
        "Catalin Marian Dumitrescu"
      ],
      "venue": "Sustainability",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/su182110783",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/sym14020310",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TCAN-IDS: Intrusion Detection System for Internet of Vehicle Using Temporal Convolutional Attention Network",
      "description": "Intrusion detection systems based on recurrent neural network (RNN) have been considered as one of the effective methods to detect time-series data of in-vehicle networks. However, building a model for each arbitration bit is not only complex in structure but also has high computational overhead. Convolutional neural network (CNN) has always performed excellently in processing images, but they have recently shown great performance in learning features of normal and attack traffic by constructing message matrices in such a manner as to achieve real-time monitoring but suffer from the problem of temporal relationships in context and inadequate feature representation in key regions. Therefore, this paper proposes a temporal convolutional network with global attention to construct an in-vehicle network intrusion detection model, called TCAN-IDS. Specifically, the TCAN-IDS model continuously encodes 19-bit features consisting of an arbitration bit and data field of the original message into a message matrix, which is symmetric to messages recalling a historical moment. Thereafter, the feature extraction model extracts its spatial-temporal detail features. Notably, global attention enables global critical region attention based on channel and spatial feature coefficients, thus ignoring unimportant byte changes. Finally, anomalous traffic is monitored by a two-class classification component. Experiments show that TCAN-IDS demonstrates high detection performance on publicly known attack datasets and is able to accomplish real-time monitoring. In particular, it is anticipated to provide a high level of symmetry between information security and illegal intrusion.",
      "published": "2022-02-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/sym14020310",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pengzhou Cheng",
        "Kai Xu",
        "Simin Li",
        "Mu Han"
      ],
      "venue": "Symmetry",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/sym14020310",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 64,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/sym14081532",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Illegal Intrusion Detection for In-Vehicle CAN Bus Based on Immunology Principle",
      "description": "The controller area network (CAN) bus has become one of the most commonly used protocols in automotive networks. Some potential attackers inject malicious data packets into the CAN bus through external interfaces for implementing illegal operations (intrusion). Anomaly detection is a technique for network intrusion detection which can detect malicious data packs by comparing the normal data packets with incoming data packets obtained from the network traffic. The data of a normal network is in a symmetric and stable state, which will become asymmetric when compromised. Considering the in-vehicle network, the CAN bus is symmetrically similar to the immune system in terms of internal network structure and external invasion threats. In this work, we use an intrusion detection method based on the dendritic cell algorithm (DCA). However, existing studies suggest the use of optimization methods to improve the accuracy of classification algorithms, and the current optimization of the parameters of the detection method mostly relies on the manual tuning of the parameters, which is a large workload. In view of the above challenges, this paper proposes a new detection algorithm based on the particle swarm optimization algorithm (PSO) and gravitational search algorithm (GSA) to improve the dendritic cell algorithm (PSO-GSA-DCA). PSO-GSA-DCA achieves adaptive parameter tuning and improves detection accuracy by mixing optimization algorithms and using them to optimize the dendritic cell algorithm classifier. Additionally, DCA-based CAN message attribute matching rules (measured by information gain and standard deviation of CAN data) are proposed for matching the three input signals (PAMP, DS, SS) of the DCA. The experimental results show that our proposed scheme has a significant improvement in accuracy, which can reach 91.64%, and lower time loss compared with other correlation anomaly detection schemes. Our proposed method also enables adaptive tuning, which solves the problem that most models now rely on manual tuning.",
      "published": "2022-07-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/sym14081532",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiaowei Li",
        "Feng Liu",
        "Defei Li",
        "Tianchi Hu",
        "Mu Han"
      ],
      "venue": "Symmetry",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/sym14081532",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/systems10050162",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Perceived Risks toward In-Vehicle Infotainment Data Services on Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "With the evolution of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and intelligent transportation systems, intelligent connected vehicles (ICV) are becoming the trend in automobile industry worldwide. Assisted by road-side infrastructure and vehicle-mounted sensors, in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) data services are gradually growing more popular with drivers and passengers. In particular, IVI data services are not only restricted to internal cabin, but also are being extended to the external environment (e.g., workplace and home). These data categories include personal demographics/bioinformatics, usage habits, travel patterns, real-time location, audio, video, etc., which in turn induce perceived risk concerns around the data privacy and security of occupants. In this paper, we collect answers from 500 valid respondents and then construct a structural equation model to investigate key factors influencing users’ attitudes and behavioral intention (BI) towards IVI data services. Therein, trust is considered to play a vital role in attitude, and is assumed to be affected by perceived security risk (PSR), perceived privacy risk (PPR), and perceived performance risk (PFR). The results show that PSR and PPR have negative effects on user trust. The data breache anxiety positively influences PPR, which explain 75% of variance. In addition, trust can directly affect attitude and BI, which explain 28.6% of variance in attitudes towards IVI data services. Respondents score higher on average for attitude (Mean = 5.762, SD = 0.89) even where perceived risks exist. BI is influenced by the factors of PSR, PFR, trust, and attitude. Through this study, we intend to reveal the relationships among the factors of perceived risk, trust, attitude, and BI towards IVI data services, then provide guidelines for vehicular data governance in order to consolidate user trust for a safer mobility ecosystem.",
      "published": "2022-09-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10050162",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhiyuan Yu",
        "Kexin Cai"
      ],
      "venue": "Systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3390/systems10050162",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4619,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/systems10050162 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collect, personal, vital, location, patterns, trust, even, user."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/technologies11050117",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected and Automated Vehicles: Infrastructure, Applications, Security, Critical Challenges, and Future Aspects",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AV) are game-changing innovations that promise a safer, more convenient, and environmentally friendly mode of transportation than traditional vehicles. Therefore, understanding AV technologies and their impact on society is critical as we continue this revolutionary journey. Generally, there needs to be a detailed study available to assist a researcher in understanding AV and its challenges. This research presents a comprehensive survey encompassing various aspects of AVs, such as public adoption, driverless city planning, traffic management, environmental impact, public health, social implications, international standards, safety, and security. Furthermore, it presents emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), integration of cloud computing, and solar power usage in automated vehicles. It also presents forensics approaches, tools used, standards involved, and challenges associated with conducting digital forensics in the context of autonomous vehicles. Moreover, this research provides an overview of cyber attacks affecting autonomous vehicles, attack management, traditional security devices, threat modeling, authentication schemes, over-the-air updates, zero-trust architectures, data privacy, and the corresponding defensive strategies to mitigate such risks. It also presents international standards, guidelines, and best practices for AVs. Finally, it outlines the future directions of AVs and the challenges that must be addressed to achieve widespread adoption.",
      "published": "2023-09-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies11050117",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Memoona Sadaf",
        "Zafar Iqbal",
        "Abdul Rehman Javed",
        "Irum Saba",
        "Moez Krichen",
        "Sajid Majeed",
        "Arooj Raza"
      ],
      "venue": "Technologies",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/technologies11050117",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 223,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/technologies14060375",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN-TEMPO: Unsupervised CAN Bus Intrusion Detection via Temporal Multi-Period Oscillation Encoding",
      "description": "The security of Controller Area Network (CAN) systems is critical for modern automotive safety, as their lack of built-in security mechanisms makes them vulnerable to cyberattacks. In this work, we propose CAN-TEMPO, an unsupervised anomaly detection framework that explicitly models the multi-periodic structure of CAN traffic. The proposed approach leverages a Temporal Multi-Periodic Oscillation (TEMPO) block, which uses frequency-domain analysis to transform one-dimensional CAN sequences into multi-scale two-dimensional representations. This design enables the model to capture both intra-period correlations and inter-period temporal variations. We evaluate CAN-TEMPO on multiple public CAN intrusion detection benchmarks under diverse attack scenarios and generalization settings. Experimental results show that CAN-TEMPO consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods in terms of AUC-ROC and F1-score, while maintaining lower false positive rates and improved robustness across different vehicles and attack types. These findings demonstrate that explicitly modeling periodic structures enables more reliable and generalizable anomaly detection in automotive networks.",
      "published": "2026-06-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies14060375",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soufiane Oualil",
        "Issam Ait Yahia",
        "Mohamed El Kamili",
        "Khalid Fardousse",
        "Ismaïl Berrada"
      ],
      "venue": "Technologies",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.3390/technologies14060375",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/telecom4010012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Symbiotic Analysis of Security Assessment and Penetration Tests Guiding Real L4 Automated City Shuttles",
      "description": "The Connected Automated Vehicle (CAV)’s deployment is proof of the wide evolution of autonomous driving technologies enabling vehicles to gradually dispose of their drivers. Within the scope of smart cities, such innovation has given rise to a new type of CAV: the Automated City Shuttle (ACS). Foreseen as the new paradigm aiming to shape the public transport model, the ACS elicits a plurality of new applications, such as the on-demand service in which a driverless shuttle offers the desired ride without human intervention. However, such a model raises cybersecurity concerns through the numerous attack surfaces and vehicle hyperconnection. This phenomenon was highlighted in several studies on CAVs, but very few research works tackled the specific case of ACSs, whose challenges and risks far exceed those of personal vehicles. The present work offers a comprehensive investigation of cybersecurity attacks, demonstrates a performed risk assessment based on the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, and showcases a penetration test over a real ACS of automation level four (L4) according to the Society of Automotive Engineering (SAE)’s ranking. Based on our experiments, we leverage fundamental cybersecurity recommendations with a focus on the ACS’s physical security.",
      "published": "2023-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/telecom4010012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meriem Benyahya",
        "Pierre Bergerat",
        "Anastasija Collen",
        "Niels Alexander Nijdam"
      ],
      "venue": "Telecom",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/telecom4010012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/urbansci9090363",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Federated AI-OCPP Framework for Secure and Scalable EV Charging in Smart Cities",
      "description": "The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has intensified the demand for intelligent, scalable, and interoperable charging infrastructure. Traditional EV charging networks based on the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) face challenges related to dynamic load management, cybersecurity, and efficient integration with renewable energy sources. This paper presents a novel AI-driven framework that integrates federated learning, predictive analytics, and real-time control within OCPP-compliant networks to enhance performance and sustainability. The proposed system utilizes edge AI modules at charging stations, supported by a central aggregator that employs federated learning to preserve data privacy while enabling network-wide optimization. A case study involving simulated smart charging stations demonstrates significant improvements, including an 18% reduction in peak load demand, a 29% increase in forecasting accuracy (MAPE of 8.5%), a 10% decrease in average charging wait times, and a 12% increase in on-site solar energy utilization. The framework’s compatibility with OCPP and related standards (e.g., IEC 61851, ISO 15118) ensures ease of deployment on existing infrastructure. These results indicate that the proposed AI-OCPP integration provides a scalable and intelligent foundation for next-generation EV charging networks that align with the goals of sustainable transportation and smart grid evolution.",
      "published": "2025-09-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/urbansci9090363",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Sabbir Hossen",
        "M. Sarker",
        "Md Serajun Nabi",
        "Hasanul Bannah",
        "Gobbi Ramasamy",
        "Ngu Eng Eng"
      ],
      "venue": "Urban Science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/urbansci9090363",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/vehicles5040096",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strengthening Automotive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Analysis of ISO/SAE 21434-Compliant Automatic Collision Notification (ACN) Systems",
      "description": "The increasing usage of autonomous and automatic systems within the automotive industry is steering us towards a more interconnected world. This enhanced interconnectivity fosters a more streamlined driving experience, reduces costs, and provides timely driver assistance. The electric/electronic (EE) architectures of modern vehicles are inherently complex due to the multitude of components they encompass. Contemporary architectures reveal that these components converge at an electronic control unit (ECU) called the central gateway, which could potentially represent a single point of failure. While this central unit is typically adequately safeguarded, the same cannot be said for the connected components, which often remain vulnerable to cyber threats. The ISO/SAE 21434 standard paved the way for automotive cybersecurity and could be used in parallel with other standards such as ISO 26262 and ISO PAS 21488. Automatic collision notification (ACN) is one of the most typical systems in a vehicle, and limited effort has been dedicated to identifying the most suitable architecture for this feature. This paper addresses the existing security and privacy gap of this feature by conducting a comparative analysis of security threats in two distinct ACN architectures. Notably, despite ACN architectures exhibiting inherent similarities, the primary distinction between the two architectures lies in their strategies for crash estimation and detection, followed by subsequent communication with emergency response teams. A rigorous security assessment was conducted using the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, employing the TARA and STRIDE methodologies through the Ansys medini analyze software. This analysis identified an average of 310 threats per architecture, including a significant number of high-level threats (11.8% and 15%, respectively), highlighting the importance of a comprehensive evaluation.",
      "published": "2023-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/vehicles5040096",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Biagio Boi",
        "Tarush Gupta",
        "Marcelo Rinhel",
        "Iuliana Jubea",
        "Rahamatullah Khondoker",
        "Christian Esposito",
        "Bruno Sousa"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicles",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/vehicles5040096",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/vehicles6030054",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "STRIDE-Based Cybersecurity Threat Modeling, Risk Assessment and Treatment of an In-Vehicle Infotainment System",
      "description": "In modern automobiles, the infotainment system is crucial for enhancing driver and passenger capabilities, offering advanced features such as music, navigation, communication, and entertainment. Leveraging Wi-Fi, cellular networks, NFC, and Bluetooth, the system ensures continuous internet connectivity, providing seamless access to information. However, the increasing complexity of IT connectivity in vehicles raises significant cybersecurity concerns, including potential data breaches and exposure of sensitive information. To enhance security in infotainment systems, this study applied component-level threat modeling to a proposed infotainment system using the Microsoft STRIDE model. This approach illustrates potential component-level security issues impacting privacy and security concerns. The study also assessed these impacts using SAHARA and DREAD risk assessment methodologies. The threat modeling process identified 34 potential security threats, each accompanied by detailed information. Moreover, a comparative analysis is performed to compute risk values for prioritizing treatment, followed by recommending mitigation strategies for each identified threat. These identified threats and associated risks require careful consideration to prevent potential cyberattacks before deploying the infotainment system in automotive vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-06-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/vehicles6030054",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Popy Das",
        "Md. Rashid Al Asif",
        "Sohely Jahan",
        "Kawsar Ahmed",
        "K. S. Ahmed",
        "Francis M. Bui"
      ],
      "venue": "Vehicles",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/vehicles6030054",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj12030092",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review of Communication Technologies for Electric Vehicle Charging Management and Coordination",
      "description": "Recently, electric vehicles (EVs) have been introduced as an alternative method of transportation to help mitigate environmental issues, such as carbon emissions and fuel consumption, caused by conventional transportation systems. The implementation of effective EV charging systems is essential to motivate mass adoption of EVs. Accordingly, fast and reliable communications between the charging systems and the EVs are vital for efficient management of the charging process. Different radio access technologies (RATs) are discussed in the literature to enable communication between the highly mobile EVs and the charging subsystems, to collect and exchange information such as state of charge (SoC), users’ locations, and charging decisions between the different network entities. This information can be used to coordinate charging plans and select the optimal routes for moving vehicles. This paper presents a survey of existing literature on vehicular communications for EV charging coordination and management. The communication requirements and feasible communication technologies for vehicular communication are first discussed in details. A review of the physical layer security strategies is then presented and the role of the different RATs in EV charging coordination and management is described and studied.",
      "published": "2021-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj12030092",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eiman A. Elghanam",
        "Mohamed S. Hassan",
        "Ahmed H. Osman",
        "Ibtihal Ahmed"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj12030092",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 79,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj14020041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Object Classification Approach for Autonomous Vehicles Using Machine Learning Techniques",
      "description": "An intelligent, accurate, and powerful object detection system is required for automated driving systems to keep these vehicles aware of their surrounding objects. Thus, vehicles adapt their speed and operations to avoid crashing with the existing objects and follow the driving rules around the existence of emergency vehicles and installed traffic signs. The objects considered in this work are summarized by regular vehicles, big trucks, emergency vehicles, pedestrians, bicycles, traffic lights, and traffic signs on the roadside. Autonomous vehicles are equipped with high-quality sensors and cameras, LiDAR, radars, and GPS tracking systems that help to detect existing objects, identify them, and determine their exact locations. However, these tools are costly and require regular maintenance. This work aims to develop an intelligent object classification mechanism for autonomous vehicles. The proposed mechanism uses machine learning technology to predict the existence of investigated objects over the road network early. We use different datasets to evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism. Accuracy, Precision, F1-Score, G-Mean, and Recall are the measures considered in the experiments. Moreover, the proposed object classification mechanism is compared to other selected previous techniques in this field. The results show that grouping the dataset based on their mobility nature before applying the classification task improved the results for most of the algorithms, especially for vehicle detection.",
      "published": "2023-02-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj14020041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Majd Alqarqaz",
        "Maram Bani Younes",
        "Raneem Qaddoura"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj14020041",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj14040095",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Energy Management and Optimization of Large-Scale Electric Vehicle Charging on the Grid",
      "description": "The sustainability of a clean energy transition for electric vehicle transportation is clearly affected by increased energy consumption cost, which is associated with large-scale electric vehicles (EVs) charging on a fossil-fuel dependent electricity grid. This places a potential threat on the safe operations and stability of the grid and increases the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the power stations that generate the electricity. Furthermore, the uncontrolled large-scale integration of EVs charging on the grid will increase exponentially in the coming years. Because of this, new peaks on the grid will be generated due to the EV charging load variance, and a significant impact on the transformer limit and substation capacity violation will occur. To mitigate the significant impact of the high cost of energy consumption by large-scale EVs charging on the grid, and to reduce the emissions of GHGs, there is a need to provide a multi-level optimization approach that is robust and dynamic to solve the uncontrolled charging problem of large-scale integration of EVs to the grid. This paper investigates the grid energy consumption by EVs and reviews recent applications of EV charging controls and optimization approaches used for the energy management of large-scale EVs charging on the grid. Energy management in this context is not trivial. It implies that the objectives such as load shifting, peak shaving, and minimizing the high cost of electricity consumption with a stable grid operation can be achieved. In the context of this study, EVs charging on the grid includes both battery electric vehicles (BEVs), which have larger battery banks with a longer charging duration and higher energy consumption capacity, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) which have smaller battery capacities.",
      "published": "2023-04-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj14040095",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Raymond O. Kene",
        "Thomas Otieno Olwal"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj14040095",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj15080356",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Intelligent Attack Detection Framework for the Internet of Autonomous Vehicles with Imbalanced Car Hacking Data",
      "description": "The modern Internet of Autonomous Vehicles (IoVs) has enabled the development of autonomous vehicles that can interact with each other and their surroundings, facilitating real-time data exchange and communication between vehicles, infrastructure, and the external environment. The lack of security procedures in vehicular networks and Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol leaves vehicles exposed to intrusions. One common attack type is the message injection attack, which inserts fake messages into original Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to trick them or create failures. Therefore, this paper tackles the pressing issue of cyber-attack detection in modern IoV systems, where the increasing connectivity of vehicles to the external world and each other creates a vast attack surface. The vulnerability of in-vehicle networks, particularly the CAN protocol, makes them susceptible to attacks such as message injection, which can have severe consequences. To address this, we propose an intelligent Intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect a wide range of threats utilizing machine learning techniques. However, a significant challenge lies in the inherent imbalance of car-hacking datasets, which can lead to misclassification of attack types. To overcome this, we employ various imbalanced pre-processing techniques, including NearMiss, Random over-sampling (ROS), and TomLinks, to pre-process and handle imbalanced data. Then, various Machine Learning (ML) techniques, including Logistic Regression (LR), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Naive Bayes (NB), and K-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), are employed in detecting and predicting attack types on balanced data. We evaluate the performance and efficacy of these techniques using a comprehensive set of evaluation metrics, including accuracy, precision, F1_Score, and recall. This demonstrates how well the suggested IDS detects cyberattacks in external and intra-vehicle vehicular networks using unbalanced data on vehicle hacking. Using k-NN with various resampling techniques, the results show that the proposed system achieves 100% detection rates in testing on the Car-Hacking dataset in comparison with existing work, demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach in protecting modern vehicle systems from advanced threats.",
      "published": "2024-08-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj15080356",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samah Ibrahim AlShathri",
        "Amged Sayed",
        "Ezz El‐Din Hemdan"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj15080356",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj15080361",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Experimental Investigation of a Distributed Architecture for EV Chargers Performing Frequency Control",
      "description": "The demand for electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) is increasing because of the rapid shift toward electric transport. Introducing EVSE on a large scale into the power grid can increase power demand volatility, negatively affecting frequency stability. A viable solution to this challenge is the development of smart charging technologies capable of performing frequency regulation. This paper presents an experimental proof of concept for a new frequency regulation method for EVSE utilizing a distributed control architecture. The architecture dynamically adjusts the contribution of electric vehicles (EVs) to frequency regulation response based on the charging urgency assigned by the EV users. The method is demonstrated with two Renault ZOEs responding to frequency fluctuation with a combined power range of 6 kW in the frequency range of 50.1 to 49.9 Hz. The results confirm consistent power sharing and effective frequency regulation, with the system controlling the engagement of the EVs in frequency regulation based on priority. The delay and accuracy analyses reveal a fast and accurate response, with the cross-correlation indicating an 8.48 s delay and an average undershoot of 0.17 kW. In the conclusions, the paper discusses prospective improvements and outlines future research directions for integrating EVs as service providers.",
      "published": "2024-08-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj15080361",
      "matched_terms": [
        "evse",
        "regulation",
        "renault"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "renault"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simone Striani",
        "Kristoffer Laust Pedersen",
        "Jan Engelhardt",
        "Mattia Marinelli"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj15080361",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj15090392",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Novel Charging Management and Security Framework for the Electric Vehicle (EV) Ecosystem",
      "description": "The EV charging network has witnessed significant growth in the UK in the last few years due to the net zero emission target of the government by 2030. The related literature in EV charging management mainly focuses on road-traffic-parameter-based optimization and lacks detail in terms of charging statistics and cyber–security-enabled charging management frameworks. In this context, this paper proposes a novel EV Charging Management and Security (EVCMS) framework using real-time charging statistics and an Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP). Specifically, a system model for EVCMS is presented considering charging data management and security protocols. An EVCMS framework design is detailed, focusing on charging pricing, optimization, and charging security. The experimental implementation is described in terms of client–server and charge-box-based simulation. The performance of the proposed EVCMS framework is evaluated by considering different charging scenarios and a range of charging-related metrics. An analysis of results and comparative study attest to the benefits of the proposed EVCMS framework for enabling the EV charging ecosystem.",
      "published": "2024-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj15090392",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Safa Hamdare",
        "David Joseph Brown",
        "Yue Cao",
        "Mohammad Aljaidi",
        "Sushil Kumar",
        "Rakan Khalid Marzouq Alanazi",
        "Manish Jugran",
        "Pratik Vyas",
        "Omprakash Kaiwartya"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj15090392",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj16010024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Intelligent Transport Systems Through Decentralized Security Frameworks in Vehicle-to-Everything Networks",
      "description": "Vehicle Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) play an essential role in intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) by improving road safety and traffic management through robust decentralized communication between vehicles and infrastructure. Yet, decentralization introduces security vulnerabilities, including spoofing, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks, which can compromise the reliability and safety of vehicular communications. Traditional centralized security mechanisms are often inadequate in providing the real-time response and scalability required by such dispersed networks. This research promotes a shift toward distributed and real-time technologies, including blockchain and secure multi-party computation, to enhance communication integrity and privacy, ultimately strengthening system resilience by eliminating single points of failure. A core aspect of this study is the novel D-CASBR framework, which integrates three essential components. First, it employs hybrid machine learning methods, such as ElasticNet and Gradient Boosting, to facilitate real-time anomaly detection, identifying unusual activities as they occur. Second, it utilizes a consortium blockchain to provide secure and transparent information exchange among authorized participants. Third, it implements a fog-enabled reputation system that uses distributed fog computing to effectively manage trust within the network. This comprehensive approach addresses latency issues found in conventional systems while significantly improving the reliability and efficacy of threat detection, achieving 95 percent anomaly detection accuracy with minimal false positives. The result is a substantial advancement in securing vehicular networks.",
      "published": "2025-01-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj16010024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Usman Tariq",
        "Tariq Ahamed Ahanger"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj16010024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj16060324",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Vehicles Security: A Lightweight Machine Learning Model to Detect VANET Attacks",
      "description": "Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) aim to manage traffic, prevent accidents, and regulate various parts of traffic. However, owing to their nature, the security of VANETs remains a significant concern. This study provides insightful information regarding VANET vulnerabilities and attacks. It investigates a number of security models that have recently been introduced to counter VANET security attacks with a focus on machine learning detection methods. This confirms that several challenges remain unsolved. Accordingly, this study introduces a lightweight machine learning model with a gain information feature selection method to detect VANET attacks. A balanced version of the well-known and recent dataset CISDS2017 was developed by applying a random oversampling technique. The developed dataset was used to train, test, and evaluate the proposed model. In other words, two layers of enhancements were applied—using a suitable feature selection technique and fixing the dataset imbalance problem. The results show that the proposed model, which is based on the Random Forest (RF) classifier, achieved excellent performance in terms of classification accuracy, computational cost, and classification error. It achieved an accuracy rate of 99.8%, outperforming all benchmark classifiers, including AdaBoost, decision tree (DT), K-nearest neighbors (KNNs), and multi-layer perceptron (MLP). To the best of our knowledge, this model outperforms all the existing classification techniques. In terms of processing cost, it consumes the least processing time, requiring only 69%, 59%, 35%, and 1.4% of the AdaBoost, DT, KNN, and MLP processing times, respectively. It causes negligible classification errors.",
      "published": "2025-06-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj16060324",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muawia Abdelmagid Elsadig",
        "Abdelrahman Altigani",
        "Yasir Abdelgadir Mohamed",
        "Abdul Hakim H. M. Mohamed",
        "Akbar Khanan",
        "Mohamed Bashir",
        "Mousab A. E. Adiel"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj16060324",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4056,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.3390/wevj16060324 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: requiring, remain, nature, significant, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj16080468",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy-Preserving EV Charging Authorization and Billing via Blockchain and Homomorphic Encryption",
      "description": "Electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructures raise significant concerns about data security and user privacy because traditional centralized authorization and billing frameworks expose sensitive information to breaches and profiling. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose a novel decentralized framework that couples a permissioned blockchain with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Unlike prior blockchain-only or blockchain-and-machine-learning solutions, our architecture performs all authorization and billing computations on encrypted data and records transactions immutably via smart contracts. We implemented the system on Hyperledger Fabric using the CKKS-based TenSEAL library, chosen for its efficient arithmetic on real-valued vectors, and show that homomorphic operations are executed off-chain within a secure computation layer while smart contracts handle only encrypted records. In a simulation involving 20 charging stations and up to 100 concurrent users, the proposed system achieved an average authorization latency of 610 ms, a billing computation latency of 310 ms, and transaction throughput of 102 Tx min while maintaining energy overhead below 0.14 kWh day per station. When compared to state-of-the-art blockchain-only approaches, our method reduces data exposure by 100%, increases privacy from “moderate” to “very high,” and achieves similar throughput with acceptable computational overhead. These results demonstrate that privacy-preserving EV charging is practical using present-day cryptography, paving the way for secure, scalable EV charging and billing services.",
      "published": "2025-08-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj16080468",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Aldweesh",
        "Someah Alangari"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj16080468",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3390/wevj7040670",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Innovative practice of EV-carsharing in China for urban E-mobility",
      "description": "EV-Carsharing (called as ‘EV-Timesharing’ in China) has been rapidly developing with the 2nd round National EV promotion and application project in 88 Chinese EV pilot cities authorized by Central Governments from 2013. While EV-Carsharing has been launching in more than 10 cities by end of 2014, Central Governments will select 4 as demonstration cities from 2015 and give special support to help them integrate EV-Carsharing into urban E-mobility more successfully. Recognizing importance and benefit for energy conservation, emission and traffic congestion reduction from EV-Carsharing, encouraged by Central Governments and pilot cities, more and more cities are preparing for EV-Carsharing to develop local EV industry and expand usage for urban E-mobility.This report is based on deep understanding of Chinese EV Pilot City as the biggest background for EV-Carsharing’s boom in China in past 2 years. Through conducting comparative studies, field investigation, survey, expert interview, data collection and analysis, this report comprehensively summarizes latest status of EV-Carsharing in China and some typical practice in different cities and highlights successful experience as well as barriers on key dimensions for EV-Carsharing, including application of telematics on EVs, Governments’ policy and administration, business and operating models, safety and security system and consumers’ education. Suggestions and guidelines will also be provided with recommendations on operating successful EV-Carsharing for urban E-mobility and better low carbon society for both China and other areas.",
      "published": "2015-12-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/wevj7040670",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xiao‐Yuan Wu",
        "Xuying Yang",
        "Huan Shi"
      ],
      "venue": "World Electric Vehicle Journal",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.3390/wevj7040670",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33915/etd.12709",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning Based Intrusion Detection Framework for CAN Bus Vulnerabilities in Modern Vehicles",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a crucial communication backbone in modern vehicles, connecting various Electronic Control Units (ECUs). However, inherent design weaknesses such as the lack of encryption and authentication make CAN networks vulnerable to cyber-attacks, including spoofing, Denial of Service (DoS), and fuzzing attacks. This thesis thoroughly evaluates these vulnerabilities and the limitations of existing security frameworks like Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and encryption, advocating for the adoption of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) as a more practical solution for CAN bus security. The proposed IDS leverages advanced machine learning techniques to accurately detect intrusions, even under complex attack configurations. In the first phase of this research, a One-Dimensional Convolutional Neural Network (1D-CNN) IDS model was developed and evaluated on both the robust ORNL ROAD and the HCRL dataset. While existing models achieve near-perfect accuracy on straightforward attack datasets like HCRL, this thesis demonstrates the limitations of these datasets in representing real-world threats. Testing on ROAD, which includes stealthier and more diverse attack scenarios, the 1D-CNN model struggled with detecting attacks with intricate patterns, hence the need for more robust IDS architecture. To address this, a hybrid model combining 1D-CNN with Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) was designed to capture both spatial and temporal features in CAN traffic. This hybrid approach significantly improved detection accuracy and reduced the false positive rate, particularly for stealthy attacks such as targeted ID manipulations. Key enhancements include class weighting to handle imbalanced data, systematic hyperparameter tuning, and dropout regularization to prevent overfitting. Extensive testing on the ROAD dataset resulted in a model accuracy of 99.64%, demonstrating the hybrid IDS’s capacity to detect even the most sophisticated CAN bus attacks efficiently. This thesis contributes to vehicular network security by establishing a benchmark for IDS performance on high-fidelity CAN datasets. The findings emphasize the importance of hybrid architectures in enhancing IDS capabilities and underscore the necessity for realistic datasets in assessing IDS robustness in real-world applications.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33915/etd.12709",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Obinna Agbo"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.33915/etd.12709",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33969/j-nana.2025.050101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Prevention System Against Spoofed Data Frames at the Electronic Control Unit Level",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) serves as the backbone of modern vehicle networks, connecting multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and providing an efficient data transmission environment for the entire vehicle control system. With the advancement of automotive intelligence, the methods for intruding upon in-vehicle CAN networks are becoming increasingly diverse, posing significant threats to driving safety. However, existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) often require considerable time to detect anomalies, potentially allowing malicious data frames to escape under current security mechanisms. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an efficient anomaly detection and defense mechanism to enhance the security of CAN networks. This paper proposes an ECU-level Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) based on statistical methods that does not require modifications to the existing ECU architecture. By analyzing matrix area features generated from CAN data frame payloads, the system can determine normal ranges for these feature parameters in an unsupervised manner. When detected data frame characteristics exceed predefined thresholds, the system identifies them as anomalies, thereby achieving effective detection and defense against potential attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that, under real attack scenarios and tampering attack scenarios, the system achieves detection rates of 99.76% and 96.5%, respectively, while maintaining a false positive rate of 0%. Additionally, the system is deployed on a low-cost STM32F407MINI development board simulating ECU functionality, with a detection process lasting only 64 μs.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33969/j-nana.2025.050101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhengyuan Liu",
        "Weidong Yang",
        "Shuguang Wang",
        "Hongwei Fan"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Networking and Network Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.33969/j-nana.2025.050101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4382,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.33969/j-nana.2025.050101 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: normal, intelligence, there, applications, significant, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.33995/wu2025.2.6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Transformation and Innovation in the Insurance Sector: Processes, Technologies, and Challenges",
      "description": "The digital transformation of the insurance sector improves risk assessment, pricing, distribution, and claims management. Key technologies driving these changes include artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), big data analytics, and automation. These advancements primarily drive process innovation, aligning with Barras’s reverse innovation cycle rather than traditional product innovation. The authors show that key technologies such as telematics, the Internet ofThings, predictive analytics, and robotic process automation streamline operations and improve customer experience. However, challenges remain in ensuring AI transparency and interpretability. While digital transformation is still in its early stages, its continued development will shape the industry’s efficiency, competitiveness, and regulatory landscape. Keywords",
      "published": "2025-07-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.33995/wu2025.2.6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adam Śliwiński",
        "Łukasz Kuryłowicz",
        "Renata Pajewska-Kwaśny"
      ],
      "venue": "Wiadomości Ubezpieczeniowe",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.33995/wu2025.2.6",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34190/eccws.25.1.4704",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ECUInjector: An Automotive ECU Security Analysis Tool",
      "description": "Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are responsible for a significant number of systems in modern day vehicles. If these systems are compromised, the resulting attacks will result in road accidents. Therefore, increased adoption of these systems has significantly widened vehicle attack surfaces. As a result, it is important to devise methods of identifying and investigating vulnerabilities within automotive control systems, allowing them to be patched before they are exploited by an attacker. To this end, we present ECUInjector, an open-source application designed to assist in the discovery of vulnerabilities within diagnostic interfaces and ECU communications. The software is designed in a modular way allowing it to be universal across ECU vendors and provides the ability to communicate via vehicle diagnostics buses and build vulnerability detection tools that can assist in locating potential weaknesses. We also provide some of our applications of using the software to communicate with and analyse various ECUs.",
      "published": "2026-06-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34190/eccws.25.1.4704",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J. Todd",
        "Aidan Grant",
        "Tim Muller",
        "Xavier Carpent"
      ],
      "venue": "European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.34190/eccws.25.1.4704",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34218/ijdard_01_02_004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MODERNIZING CONNECTED VEHICLE SOFTWARE VALIDATION THROUGH AUTOMATED OVER-THE-AIR TESTING FRAMEWORKS",
      "description": "Connected and software-defined vehicles are transforming automotive systems by shifting a significant portion of vehicle functionality from fixed hardware implementations toward continuously evolving software platforms.Features such as advanced driver assistance, infotainment, connectivity, cybersecurity, diagnostics, and vehicle control increasingly depend on software that may be updated throughout the vehicle lifecycle.Over-the-air (OTA) software delivery provides an efficient mechanism for deploying these updates without requiring vehicles to visit service centers; however, it also introduces new challenges for software validation.Traditional validation approaches, which largely depend on laboratory testing, physical vehicles, and predefined regression cycles, are often insufficient for evaluating frequent, distributed, and configuration-dependent OTA releases.This article presents a generalized framework for modernizing connected vehicle software validation through automated OTA testing.The proposed approach integrates",
      "published": "2022-08-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34218/ijdard_01_02_004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Praveen Kumar Bandaru"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.34218/ijdard_01_02_004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34218/ijecet_15_03_003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A ZERO TRUST-BASED AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE ECU COMMUNICATION IN INTELLIGENT VEHICLE NETWORKS",
      "description": "As the automotive industry transitions into an era of intelligent and connected vehicle networks, the need for robust and adaptive cybersecurity measures has become paramount.Electronic Control Units (ECUs), which govern vehicular functions, are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats, necessitating a secure and scalable authentication framework.This paper proposes a comprehensive Zero Trust-based framework for ECU authentication, emphasizing the \"never trust, always verify\" principle.The framework ensures continuous verification of every communication and interaction within the network, leveraging lightweight cryptographic algorithms and dynamic policy enforcement.By integrating seamlessly with existing protocols such as CAN, FlexRay, and Automotive Ethernet, the framework offers a scalable and backward-compatible solution.Performance evaluations demonstrate significant improvements in latency, scalability, and resistance to sophisticated attacks, making this framework a future-ready approach for securing intelligent vehicle networks. A Zero Trust-Based Authentication Framework for Secure ECU Communication in Intelligent VehicleNetworks",
      "published": "2024-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34218/ijecet_15_03_003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siranjeevi Srinivasa Raghavan"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRONICS & COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.34218/ijecet_15_03_003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34218/ijm.11.12.2020.210",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AN EVALUATION OF SECURE VANET ENVIRONMENT USING FUZZY APPROACH",
      "description": "Purpose: Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) has generally picked up the consideration of the current exam, while ebb is still insufficient to accommodate the north, hostile attacks to meet safety VANET to answer flow network, the driver and to meet the good life and infotainment manufacturer, Try to come to a palatable level.Methodology: In this paper, we evaluate to different sorts of security factors and difficulties of the VANET was investigated and talked about; examined a group of we forecasts presented similarly fuzzy-based solutions.Tryouts: VANET security assumes an indispensable part in current time.In this paper a fuzzy strategy on VANET architecture, attacks and their countermeasure utilizing calculation is finished.Additionally, similar investigation, counteraction measure for validation, Non-Repudiation and accessibility and exploration heading characterized for secure VANET network.",
      "published": "2021-01-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34218/ijm.11.12.2020.210",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kavita Srivastava",
        "Bineet Kumar Gupta"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.34218/ijm.11.12.2020.210",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34293/management.v11is1-may.7835",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Future Trends: Predicting the Evolution of Rail and Road Transportation in Logistics",
      "description": "The logistics industry represents the vital circulatory system of the global economy, responsible for the efficient movement of goods across sprawling supply chain networks. Historically, rail and road transportation modes have been the workhorses of logistics operations, facilitated by their extensive infrastructure and versatility in cargo handling. However, the convergence of rapid technological advancements, evolving consumer expectations, and mounting environmental pressures is catalyzing a transformative shift in the future evolution of these pivotal transportation sectors. This comprehensive study delves into the emerging trends that are poised to reshape the rail and road transportation landscape within the logistics realm. By synthesizing insights from industry leaders, academic research, and cutting-edge technological developments, the study aims to provide a holistic perspective on the forthcoming changes and their far-reaching implications. The study’s main objective is to integrate semi-autonomous and autonomous cars into fleets of transportation vehicles. The advent of self-driving trucks and trains promises to revolutionize logistics operations by enhancing efficiency, reducing human error, and optimizing route planning. Concurrently, this transition raises critical concerns related to workforce displacement, regulatory frameworks, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities that necessitate proactive mitigation strategies. Moreover, the logistics industry faces mounting pressure to embrace sustainable practices and curtail its environmental footprint. Consequently, the rail sector is anticipated to experience a renaissance fueled by its inherent energy efficiency and lower carbon emissions compared to road transportation. Innovations in electric and hydrogen-powered locomotives, coupled with advancements in rail infrastructure, could position rail as a greener and more cost-effective solution for long-haul freight movement. Concurrently, the road transportation sector is poised for a transformation driven by the proliferation of electric and alternative fuel vehicles. This adoption is projected to accelerate as battery technology improves, charging infrastructure expands, and governments implement stricter emissions regulations. Furthermore, the integration of advanced telematics systems and realtime data analytics could optimize route planning, load management, and vehicle maintenance, further enhancing the operational efficiency of road-based logistics.",
      "published": "2024-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34293/management.v11is1-may.7835",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "self-driving",
        "supply chain",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Santosh Kumar",
        "M. Rajapriya"
      ],
      "venue": "Shanlax International Journal of Management",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.34293/management.v11is1-may.7835",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34626/26rt-ca75",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Security Penetration Testing",
      "description": "These days, vehicles are composed mainly by electronic components and systems, designed to make our lives easier and more comfortable. However, with more significant amounts of electronics, the change of a vehicle being compromised also increases. This can be done by different means and approaches, but it is the manufacturers' responsibility to assure a secure product. One of the goals of AUTOSAR, being the same a worldwide development partnership of automotive interested parties, is to grant well-protected outputs. For this, some measures have been taken into account, like the development of security use cases. These, if successfully implemented and tested, provide additional defence against unintended users and attacks. This Master Thesis aims to verify the particular use case of Secure Variant Coding, making sure that a user without the right credentials cannot access undesired aspects of the system. This use case will be implemented in an Electronic Control Unit (ECU) being developed by BOSCH, where all the tests will be made, making use of the proper tools and approaches for this matter.",
      "published": "2019-07-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34626/26rt-ca75",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "penetration",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pinto, Pedro Filipe Agostinho Soares"
      ],
      "venue": "Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.34626/26rt-ca75",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34626/g1tg-7x72",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Atualização Automática de Hardware Via Over-the-Air Programming",
      "description": "Nowadays technology (namely on automotive systems and electric vehicles) is evolving at a fast and growing pace, mainly because of the public's constant demand for new features and also because of the existing market competition.Therefore, arises the urge for the companies to match their clients' needs, in a continuous and customized way through regular product updates.Traditionally updates are done through physical access in the devices.However the current trend is evolving into an automatic remote update distribution using over-the-air (OTA) programming.This change carries advantages concerning scalability and overall efficiency of the update delivery process.Nonetheless, this advance brings challenges regarding security, data integrity preservation and communication reliability with geographically distributed devices, whose location changes in real time.Several solutions adopt an OTA paradigm, a vast majority of its usage is present in sectors such as mobile devices industry and automotive industry.Specifically, in the automotive industry, there is a rising tendency in adopting a remote approach on the firmware updates targeting the Engine Control Unit (ECU).Also, with the growth of the Internet of Things ecosystem, emerge over-the-air applications focused on Wireless Sensor Networks.With this thesis it is intended to demonstrate the implementation process and results of the platform prototyping, that allows AddVolt to automate the remote firmware updates distribution management, thus discarding the need of physical intervention in the devices.The implemented solution follows a client-server architecture, with its core residing in the back-end, responsible for running the data transfer protocol, which ensures security and integrity throughout the information exchange, with the help of an appropriate module, up and running on the client side.i 5.4 Página de métricas da interface web. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.5 Registo das várias etapas da execução do protocolo FOTA. . . . . . . . . . . . .5.6 Reenvio de um pacote de dados . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.7 Teste de validação da autenticação com IMEI desconhecido. . . . . . . . . . . .5.8 Validação de integridade através do CRC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.9 Adulteração de dados após aplicação de assinatura digital. . . . . . . . . . . . .5.10 Assinatura de tramas com diferentes chaves RSA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.11 Utilização de recursos do servidor em vários casos de teste. . . . . . . . . . . . .5.12 Duração da execução protocolo em diferentes casos de teste. . . . . . . . . . . .5.13 Visão geral da utilização de recursos nos cinco casos de teste. . . . . . . . . . . .",
      "published": "2018-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34626/g1tg-7x72",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sérgio Augusto Pires Domingues"
      ],
      "venue": "Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.34626/g1tg-7x72",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34657/43911",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proactive security chain for automotive (ProSeCa)",
      "description": "ProSeCA erforscht Methoden zu Design und Analyse der Sicherheit von Fahrzeugsystemen: - Ziel 1: Cybersecurity-Architektur/ -Prozesse: Lösungsansätze, die den Anforderungen an Pflege von Cybersecurity im Fahrzeugsektor gerecht werden (Bedrohungsanalyse/Cybersecurity Konzept/SBoM/ Continuous integration). - Ziel 2: Sicherheitsanker: Entwicklung flexibler Lösungen zur Absicherung von Security Assets wie kryptographische Schlüssel, mit HSM-Implementierung wie auch als separater Chip umgesetzt werden können. - Ziel 3: Verwendung von Hypervisor-Ansätzen und Virtualisierung zur Bereitstellung von Sicherheitsdomänen - Ziel 4: Compiler-basierte Gegenmaßnahmen: Rust-Compiler-Einsatz in sicherheitskritischem (safety/security) Umfeld. Konzeption/Umsetzung von Schnittstellen zwischen Compiler und Security-Komponenten, z.B. C-Binding für Rust -Compiler. Best-Practice-Ansätze zur Nutzung von RUST zur Reduzierung von Security Vulnerabilities durch Compiler basierte memory safety, thread safety und type safety und Vermeidung von Schwachstellen schon während der Konzeptphase. - Ziel 5: Detektion von Angriffen mittels der Entwicklung eines Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) mit Laufzeitüberwachung. Das Monitoring beinhaltet hier ebenfalls den Hypervisor und wird hier als isolierter Prozess integriert.",
      "published": "2026-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34657/43911",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "sbom"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Plappert",
        "Marco Leeske",
        "Dirk Scheuermann",
        "Ludger Peters"
      ],
      "venue": "RENATE",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.34657/43911",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34657/44543",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Gemeinsamer Schlussbericht des Verbundprojektes ProSeCA - Proactive Security Chain for Automotive (ProSeCA); Ganzheitliches Sicherheitskonzept und IT-Sicherheitsarchitektur für vernetzte und automatisierte Fahrzeugarchitekturen",
      "description": "ProSeCA, als Projekt der Projektfamilie NovoMotive, setzt zur Gewährleistung größtmöglicher Funktions- und Datensicherheit auf einen ganzheitlichen Ansatz, mit dem auf fundamentaler Ebene typische Sicherheitsprobleme wie Speicherfehler gar nicht erst entstehen. Anlass: Zum vernetzten autonomen Fahren sind noch zentrale Systemfragen offen. Entscheidend ist eine sichere interne/externe Kommunikation. Das Safety-kritische System wird mit stärkerer Vernetzung Security-relevant. Die Vielfalt heterogener Elemente und Funktionen heutiger Automotive-Architekturen erzeugt bei steigenden Anforderungen große Angriffsflächen für Security-Attacken. Zwar fordert die Richtlinie UNECE R155 für künftige Neuzulassungen Cybersecurity-Management, doch fehlt bisher Erfahrung mit geeigneten Architekturen und Sicherheitsbausteinen. In diese Lücke zielt ProSeCA: Nach dem Leitgedanken \"Ein System ist nur so sicher wie sein schwächstes Glied\" geht es, ausgerichtet an ISO/SAE 21434, um ein Sicherheitskonzept als modularisierbare und standardisierbare vertrauenswürdige Hardware-/Softwarearchitektur für Fahrzeugsteuergeräte. Es beinhaltet als Sicherheitsbausteine neben Hardware-basierten Schutzmaßnahmen die Programmiersprache Rust und Lösungen zum automatisierten Testen der Softwarekomponenten. Ein Demonstrator zeigt die Realisierbarkeit derart neuer Architekturen als OEM-offene Lösung. Das Konsortium aus acht Partnern ist ein gezielter Ausschnitt der Automotive-Wertschöpfungskette.",
      "published": "2026-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34657/44543",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stephan Eder",
        "Martin Oberkönig",
        "Antoaneta Kondeva",
        "Stefan Hommes",
        "S. Lauer",
        "Holger Blasum",
        "Stefan Wagner",
        "Mario Cupelli",
        "Florian Gilcher",
        "Nils Ole Tippenhauer",
        "Christian Plappert",
        "Marco Leeske"
      ],
      "venue": "RENATE",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.34657/44543",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34657/44545",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ProSeCA - Proactive security chain for automotive: Ganzheitliches Sicherheitskonzept und IT-Sicherheitsarchitektur für vernetzte und automatisierte Fahrzeugarchitekturen; Infineon Technologies AG",
      "description": "ProSeCA, als Projekt der Projektfamilie NovoMotive, setzt zur Gewährleistung größtmöglicher Funktions- und Datensicherheit auf einen ganzheitlichen Ansatz, mit dem auf fundamentaler Ebene typische Sicherheitsprobleme wie Speicherfehler gar nicht erst entstehen. Anlass: Zum vernetzten autonomen Fahren sind noch zentrale Systemfragen offen. Entscheidend ist eine sichere interne/externe Kommunikation. Das Safety-kritische System wird mit stärkerer Vernetzung Security-relevant. Die Vielfalt heterogener Elemente und Funktionen heutiger Automotive-Architekturen erzeugt bei steigenden Anforderungen große Angriffsflächen für Security-Attacken. Zwar fordert die Richtlinie UNECE R155 für künftige Neuzulassungen Cybersecurity-Management, doch fehlt bisher Erfahrung mit geeigneten Architekturen und Sicherheitsbausteinen. In diese Lücke zielt ProSeCA: Nach dem Leitgedanken \"Ein System ist nur so sicher wie sein schwächstes Glied\" geht es, ausgerichtet an ISO/SAE 21434, um ein Sicherheitskonzept als modularisierbare und standardisierbare vertrauenswürdige Hardware-/Softwarearchitektur für Fahrzeugsteuergeräte. Es beinhaltet als Sicherheitsbausteine neben Hardware-basierten Schutzmaßnahmen die Programmiersprache Rust und Lösungen zum automatisierten Testen der Softwarekomponenten. Ein Demonstrator zeigt die Realisierbarkeit derart neuer Architekturen als OEM-offene Lösung. Das Konsortium aus acht Partnern ist ein gezielter Ausschnitt der Automotive-Wertschöpfungskette.",
      "published": "2026-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34657/44545",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stephan Eder",
        "Martin Oberkönig",
        "Antoaneta Kondeva"
      ],
      "venue": "RENATE",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.34657/44545",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.34726/hss.2020.75480",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Concept and Evaluation of an Off-Highway Electronic Control Unit",
      "description": "Mobile machinery and vehicles used for agricultural, construction, mining, and material handling purposes are currently experiencing a rapid transition from exclusively mechanical to cyber-physical systems. In order to increase the efficiency and productivity of such off-highway vehicles, electronic components with advanced connectivity are being integrated. However, these electronic systems and their interfaces introduce new cyber-security vulnerabilities.The off-highway industry is experienced in developing safe systems, but security is an emerging new field with less practice. The aim of this master thesis is to closely examine an example use case for an off-highway electronic control unit (ECU). Based on the identified cyber-security threats identified by aThreat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA), a security concept is developed, implemented and evaluated. The security requirements resulting from the risk assessment are refined and solutions to minimize the threats and increase cyber-security are presented. Appropriate cryptographic primitives for such an embedded system are selected. For the off-highway ECU an embedded software solution is developed. The ECU contains an automotive microprocessor with an additional security co-processor. The software solution consists of two programs, one executed on the main core of the microprocessor and one running on the microprocessor’s security co-processor. The software implemented for this thesis aims to mitigate the security threats and to make use of hardware accelerations provided by the security co-processor. The performance of the implementation is evaluated.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.34726/hss.2020.75480",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lukas Reier"
      ],
      "venue": "reposiTUm (TU Wien)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.34726/hss.2020.75480",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.35678/2539-5645.1(50).2025.145-167",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "THE IMPACT OF NEW ENERGY VEHICLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND PRIVACY PROTECTION ON PURCHASE INTENTION",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of science and technology, consumers’ demand for new energy vehicle functionalities has increasingly exhibited a trend toward diversification and greater integration of intelligent technologies. Consumers’ expectations regarding in-vehicle infotainment systems, advanced driving assistance systems, and privacy protection in new energy vehicles are also steadily increasing. This study developed a model to examine the impact of system functionalities and privacy protection on consumer purchase intention, focusing on the dimensions of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use. The research findings indicated that in-vehicle infotainment system functions, advanced driving assistance system functions, and privacy protection have a significant positive impact on consumer purchase intention, as well as on perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, respectively. Additionally, both perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use have a significant positive impact on purchase intention. Moreover, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use play a partial mediating role in the relationship between in-vehicle infotainment system functions, advanced driving assistance system functions, privacy protection, and purchase intention, respectively.",
      "published": "2025-01-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.35678/2539-5645.1(50).2025.145-167",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shaowen Zhong"
      ],
      "venue": "The EUrASEANs journal on global socio-economic dynamics",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.35678/2539-5645.1(50).2025.145-167",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.35741/issn.0258-2724.56.5.14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ANOMALY-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION FOR A VEHICLE CAN BUS: A CASE FOR HYUNDAI AVANTE CN7",
      "description": "Flooding, spoofing, replay, and fuzzing are common in various types of attacks faced by enterprises and various network systems. In-vehicle network systems are not immune to attacks and threats. Intrusion detection systems using different algorithms are proposed to enhance the security of the in-vehicle network. We use a dataset provided and collected in \"Car Hacking: Attack and Defense Challenge\" during 2020. This dataset has been realized by the organizers of the challenge for security researchers. With the aid of this dataset, the work aimed to develop attack and detection techniques of Controller Area Network (CAN) using different algorithms such as support vector machine and Feedforward Neural Network. This research work also provides a comparison of the rendering of these algorithms. Based on experimental results, this work will help future researchers to benchmark their results for the given dataset. The results obtained in this work show that the model selection does not depend only on the model's accuracy that is explained by the accuracy paradox. Therefore, for the overall result accuracy of 62.65%, they show that the support vector machine presents the most satisfying output in terms of precision and recall. The Radial basis kernel gives 65% and 67% precision for fuzzing and flooding and the recall of 64% and 100% for replay and spoofing, respectively.",
      "published": "2021-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.35741/issn.0258-2724.56.5.14",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "hyundai",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "hyundai"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kennedy Okokpujie",
        "Grace Chinyere Kennedy",
        "Vingi Patrick Nzanzu",
        "Mbasa Joaquim Molo",
        "Emmanuel Adetiba",
        "Joke A. Badejo"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.35741/issn.0258-2724.56.5.14",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.35833/mpce.2021.000777",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review on Optimization of Forecasting and Coordination Strategies for Electric Vehicle Charging",
      "description": "The rapid development of electric vehicles (EVs) has benefited from the fact that more and more countries or regions have begun to attach importance to clean energy and environmental protection. This paper focuses on the optimization of EV charging, which cannot be ignored in the rapid development of EVs. The increase in the penetration of EVs will generate new electrical loads during the charging process, which will bring new challenges to local power systems. Moreover, the uncoordinated charging of EVs may increase the peak-to-valley difference in the load, aggravate harmonic distortions, and affect auxiliary services. To stabilize the operations of power grids, many studies have been carried out to optimize EV charging. This paper reviews these studies from two aspects: EV charging forecasting and coordinated EV charging strategies. Comparative analyses are carried out to identify the advantages and disadvantages of different methods or models. At the end of this paper, recommendations are given to address the challenges of EV charging and associated charging strategies.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.35833/mpce.2021.000777",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zixuan Jia",
        "Jianing Li",
        "Xiaoping Zhang",
        "Ray Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.35833/mpce.2021.000777",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 71,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.35940/ijrte.f7482.0311623",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Attacks on Deep Learning Frameworks Employed in Self-Driving Vehicles",
      "description": "Deep convolutional networks have proven practical for autonomous vehicle applications as deep CNN technology has advanced. There has been a growing vogue for using end-to-end computational methods for the mechanization of vehicular activities. Preliminary studies, though, have demonstrated that deep learning network classifiers are sensitive to adversarial approaches. But, the impact of adversarial strategies on regression problems is not sufficiently known. We propose two white-box direct security breaches targeting progressive self-driving vehicles in this research. A prediction model is used in the navigation mechanism, which receives a picture as feed and returns a steering angle. By altering the input image, we may influence the actions of the automated driving unit. Two different attacks may be launched in practice on CPUs with no need for GPUs. The effectiveness of the threats is demonstrated by trials carried out in Udacity.",
      "published": "2023-03-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.35940/ijrte.f7482.0311623",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Syeda Kausar Fatima",
        "Syeda Gauhar Fatima"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Recent Technology and Engineering (IJRTE)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.35940/ijrte.f7482.0311623",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.35940/ijsce.b8105.14051124",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An In-Depth Analysis of the Mobile Application Rescuennect Leveraging Telematics Technology for Roadside Assistance and Emergency Response Solutions",
      "description": "This paper presents the development of Rescuennect, a mobile application designed to enhance roadside assistance and emergency response services on Siargao Island using telematics technology. The application integrates GPS and Google Maps API to provide real-time tracking, service availability, and a directory of roadside assistance and emergency response services. Users can request services such as battery jumps, flat tire changes, gasoline delivery, and towing with a few taps while tracking response times and the progress of assistance personnel in real time. Additionally, Rescuennect updates traffic conditions, road closures, and nearby points of interest. Developed using the Rapid Application Development (RAD) model and evaluated using ISO 9126 standards, Rescuennect achieved high scores in usability (4.37), functionality (4.13), and maintainability (4.20). This integrated approach promises to revolutionize Siargao Island's roadside assistance and emergency response landscape, providing faster, more reliable, and transparent services for residents and tourists.",
      "published": "2024-11-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.35940/ijsce.b8105.14051124",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "ALBERT PADILLA"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.35940/ijsce.b8105.14051124",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36096/ijbes.v1i1.105",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The evolving role of automated systems and its cyber-security issue for global business operations in Industry 4.0",
      "description": "Nowadays, effective business performance depends on digital competitive factors and its ability to transform corporate capabilities in the light of digitalization. In this study, the evolving role of automated systems for global business operations in the era of Industry 4.0 has been assessed from a theoretical perspective with a practical approach. It is aimed to demonstrate the role of high technologies in an effective supply chain management system with new technological components and cyber-security issues of automated vehicles in SCM. This study highlights that developments in Artificial Neural Networks, Image Processing, Multi-Purpose Decision-Making, Blurred Linguistic Variables, and automated systems increase the performance of the supply chain management system and boost business performance. It is also shown that the evolving role of the automated system requires capital investments on Research and Development efforts",
      "published": "2019-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36096/ijbes.v1i1.105",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cyber-security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ümit Hacıoğlu",
        "Gul Sevgilioglu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Business Ecosystem and Strategy (2687-2293)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.36096/ijbes.v1i1.105",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 41,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36227/techrxiv.174537621.13265208/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multifactor Authentication with Multimodal Synchronous Gaits for Passive Keyless Entry",
      "description": "Classical gait recognition and authentication aim to identify a person by their unique gait. However, gait is influenced by factors such as footwear, terrain, fatigue, injury, and pace of movement that make gait recognition unreliable in real-world applications. We propose synchronous gait authentication (SGA) as a more stable use of human gait biometric to confirm copresence of a person and key by comparing their kinematic states. Applied to a multifactor authentication protocol, the objective of SGA is to detect when two gait signatures of different sensor modalities are a match. We train a Siamese network to embed and compare partial-body landmark movement (from an inertia sensor) and full-body gait (from a camera) to verify if they originate from the same person at the exact time. Our method achieved a 92% SGA accuracy. Our multifactor authentication protocol can be applied to Passive Keyless Entry (PKE) in vehicles with exterior-facing cameras and low-energy Bluetooth key fobs embedded with inertia sensors to mitigate the relay attack vulnerability of wireless key fobs and PKE door systems, which is the predominant cause of car theft.",
      "published": "2025-04-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.174537621.13265208/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lawrence Amadi",
        "Antoine Courbot",
        "Chih-Hsien Chou",
        "Gady Agam B"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.36227/techrxiv.174537621.13265208/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36227/techrxiv.175288771.12188029/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OpenVehicle2Cloud (OpenV2C): A Lightweight Secure MQTT-Based Vehicle-to-Cloud Communication Standard",
      "description": "OpenVehicle2Cloud (OpenV2C) is a proposed open standard for vehicle-to-cloud (V2C) communication, leveraging the MQTT protocol to enable lightweight, secure data exchange between in-vehicle systems and cloud platforms. This white paper outlines the motivation for standardizing V2C communication in the automotive industry, describes the OpenV2C architecture (vehicle-side agent, MQTT broker, and cloud receiver components), and details how its design aligns with stringent automotive security standards (ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE WP.29) and privacy regulations. We discuss how OpenV2C addresses the performance constraints of resource-limited Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and uses the Vehicle Signal Specification (VSS) for standardized data modeling. The paper also covers extensibility for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to add custom signals cleanly, integration opportunities with initiatives like Eclipse SDV and COVESA, cloud platforms (AWS IoT Core, Azure IoT Hub, Eclipse Hono), deployment considerations, and the future roadmap for community-driven development. The goal is to present a technically sound, secure, and interoperable V2C framework suitable for broad industry adoption.",
      "published": "2025-07-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.175288771.12188029/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gokul Sivasankaran Kartha"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.36227/techrxiv.175288771.12188029/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36227/techrxiv.175978935.59813154/v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Enabled Smart Energy Meters with DC-DC Converter Integration for Electric Vehicle Charging Systems",
      "description": "The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has created significant challenges for existing power grids, particularly in terms of efficient energy management, real-time monitoring, and optimized charging. Conventional energy meters and static charging systems fail to address dynamic demand, grid balancing, and renewable energy integration. This paper presents an AI-enabled smart energy metering system integrated with DC-DC converters for EV charging infrastructures. The proposed framework leverages artificial intelligence for load prediction, dynamic pricing, and demand-side management, while the DC-DC converter ensures efficient voltage regulation, power quality improvement, and bi-directional energy flow for Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) applications. Simulation results demonstrate that the system improves charging efficiency, reduces peak load stress, and enhances renewable energy utilization.",
      "published": "2025-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.175978935.59813154/v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "regulation",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Asif Karim",
        "Md Towfiq Uz Zaman",
        "Saeed Hasan Nabil",
        "Md Mofakhkharul Islam Joarder"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.36227/techrxiv.175978935.59813154/v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 48,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36227/techrxiv.19314101.v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anti-Eavesdropping for Connected Cars",
      "description": "Physical layer security (PLS) is an essential way to provide security to users in wireless networks against active or passive attacks. The quantification of the provided security is measured through secrecy outage probability and outage probability. For cognitive vehicular networks (CVN), PLS can increase the amount of the quality of services in infotainment applications. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channels, it is challenging to achieve the perfect secrecy between the transmitting and receiving nodes. Furthermore, in CVN, when resources are being shared in an underlay manner, the need arises to find the highest and lowest achievable quantification of performance measures for poor fading scenarios. The knowledge of the maximum achievable performance helps to design and develop the anti eavesdropping solutions. In a particular direction, firstly, this paper finds the closed-form expressions of first-order secrecy metrics over multiple input multiple output 2x2 Nakagami-m channel for vehicular networks. The derived closed-form expressions are further utilized to find the upper and lower bounds of secrecy outage probability, and outage probability using the integral bound method for CVN. The derived bound provides the knowledge of the region over a valid signal-to-noise ratio for which the maximum and minimum achievable performance can exist. To restrict the amount of eavesdropping, the convex optimization-based approach is proposed. The optimization method helps secrecy metrics to remain in a specific region of the value. Therefore, the work provides insights over the classical approach and the information-theoretic approach. These works enhance the knowledge to prepare the anti-eavesdropping methods for connected cars. Moreover, the derived analytical expressions demonstrate the impact of the wireless medium on secrecy performance while the derived bound demonstrates the impact of the magnitude of wireless fading parameters.",
      "published": "2022-03-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.19314101.v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected cars",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sagar Kavaiya",
        "Dhaval K. Patel"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.36227/techrxiv.19314101.v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36227/techrxiv.23604495.v1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Aspects of Autonomous Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous or self-driven vehicles are new addition to horizons of automobiles.These vehicles are bringing revolution to transport and traffic control systems.Their automation and remotely control technologies for autonomous vehicles are today's heavily researched area for researchers.Sensors, electro-mechanical systems, network between various components collectively define an automobile.Being connected to either network comes the possibility of cyber-attacks on autonomous vehicles.This cyber-attack can harm human or infrastructure by exploiting some inherent flaw or induced error.This leads to need of cyber-security in autonomous cars.In this paper, we have studied various components of systems in autonomous vehicles, identified potential threats, and then pointed out potential attacks on these sensors and systems.Then we have discussed possible threat mitigations.First section is introduction of autonomous vehicles and systems in them.Then comes related work that contains survey of related research papers.In Third section, we have introduced tables containing threats and attacks on autonomous vehicles, their mitigations and a mapping to these threats and mitigations is introduced in form of use-cases.",
      "published": "2023-07-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.23604495.v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cyber-security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sara Sameen"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.36227/techrxiv.23604495.v1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36548/jaicn.2021.2.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Enhancement in Smart Vehicle Using Blockchain-based Architectural Framework",
      "description": "The concept of interconnecting smart vehicles and advancements in automotive automation leads to beneficial outcomes, such as a reduction in road fatalities and congestion. However, including a chain of automation in the attack surface will expand the attack surface and expose the security of automobiles to malicious infiltration. The proposed methodology provides access to specific users while restricting the third party requests. Moreover, it also makes use of data exchange that takes place between the roadside units and vehicle to track the vehicle status without compromising the in-vehicle network. To ensure a valid and authentic communication, vehicles with a proper and verifiable record will only be allowed to exchange messages in the blockchain network. Using qualitative arguments, we have identified that the proposed work is resilient to identified attacks. Similarly, quantitative experimentation indicates that this methodology shows a storage size compatibility and suitable response time in realistic scenarios. Simulation results indicate that, the proposed work shows positive results to secure vehicular networks, vehicular forensics and trust management.",
      "published": "2021-06-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36548/jaicn.2021.2.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Smys",
        "Haoxiang Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Capsule Networks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.36548/jaicn.2021.2.002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 78,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36548/jismac.2024.3.007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Integrated Security Framework for Fog Networking of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "In the rapidly evolving domain of connected vehicles, ensuring robust security and efficient data management is paramount. Traditional centralized architectures struggle with latency, scalability, and vulnerability to single points of failure. This research proposes a novel Blockchain-Integrated Security Framework (BISF) for fog networking in connected vehicles. The BISF leverages blockchain technology to enhance data integrity, transparency, and security while utilizing fog computing to reduce latency and improve real-time data processing. The proposed framework integrates smart contracts for automated trust management and distributed ledgers for immutable data records. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of BISF in enhancing security, reducing latency, and improving overall network performance compared to traditional centralized approaches.",
      "published": "2024-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36548/jismac.2024.3.007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abudhahir Buhari"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of ISMAC",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.36548/jismac.2024.3.007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36635/jlm.2020.who",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Who Gets to Operate on Herbie? Right to Repair Legislation in the Context of Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "You bought it, you own it, but do you have the right to repair it? As right-to-repair remains a hot topic in the context of consumer electronics such as smartphones, one must consider the ramifications it may have for the automated vehicle (“AV”) industry. As the backdrop for one of the first legislative victories for right-to-repair, the automobile industry has continued to push for the expansion of right-to-repair to cover increased access to telematics and exceptions to proprietary software controls. However, as we revisit the issue for more highly connected and automated vehicles, it is important to assess the unique considerations of the AV sector before we can transpose previously learned lessons into a new, nearly unpredictable context. As such, this article examines a possible framework that addresses the technical and privacy concerns that uniquely arise when applying right-to-repair legislation to AVs. By attempting to predict on how previously learned lessons may influence action going forward, this article hopes to influence the right-to-repair discourse that will arise between manufacturers, consumers, and independent repair technicians for AVs.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36635/jlm.2020.who",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jennifer Huseby"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Law and Mobility",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.36635/jlm.2020.who",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36676/urr.v9.i4.1397",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Leveraging Azure Data Lake for Efficient Data Processing in Telematics",
      "description": "In the telematics industry, the continuous generation of large volumes of data presents significant challenges in terms of storage, processing, and analysis. Azure Data Lake, a scalable and secure data storage solution, offers an efficient platform to handle these massive datasets. This paper explores the application of Azure Data Lake in telematics for efficient data processing, focusing on its capacity to store vast amounts of structured and unstructured data while providing seamless integration with various analytics tools. By leveraging Azure Data Lake, organizations can enhance their data processing capabilities, improve decision-making, and reduce operational costs. The study investigates how Azure Data Lake simplifies data management through its high availability and accessibility, allowing businesses to manage data from multiple sources with minimal complexity. Furthermore, the integration with Azure services like Azure Data Factory and Azure Databricks facilitates advanced analytics, enabling real-time insights and predictive analytics, which are crucial for the telematics sector. The findings suggest that adopting Azure Data Lake improves data processing efficiency, enhances scalability, and supports the development of innovative telematics applications such as fleet management and vehicle monitoring systems. The paper concludes by highlighting the potential of Azure Data Lake to revolutionize the telematics industry by enabling more agile and data-driven operations.",
      "published": "2022-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36676/urr.v9.i4.1397",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ravi Kiran Pagidi",
        "Pramod Kumar Voola",
        "Amit Mangal",
        "Aayush Jain",
        "Prof. Punit Goel",
        "Dr S P Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "Universal Research Reports",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.36676/urr.v9.i4.1397",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36893/jes.2024.v15i10.05",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ILLUMINATING AUTONOMY FEDERATED LEARNING FOR OBJECT DETECTION IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES UNDER LOW LIGHT",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles rely heavily on object detection systems to navigate safely, yet low-light conditions pose significant challenges to these systems. Traditional centralized machine learning approaches require substantial data aggregation, raising privacy and security concerns. This paper introduces an innovative approach, Illuminating Autonomy Federated Learning (IAFL), designed to enhance object detection in autonomous vehicles operating under low-light conditions. IAFL leverages federated learning to train object detection models across multiple vehicles without centralizing the data, thus preserving privacy while utilizing diverse realworld driving data. The approach integrates advanced image enhancement techniques to improve low-light object visibility, combined with robust federated learning algorithms to ensure model accuracy and generalization across varying environments. Extensive simulations and real-world testing demonstrate that IAFL significantly improves detection performance in low-light scenarios, maintaining high accuracy and efficiency while ensuring data privacy and security. This research marks a pivotal step toward safer and more reliable autonomous driving in challenging lighting conditions.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36893/jes.2024.v15i10.05",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devi Vara Prasad",
        "AAYUSHI HOTTA",
        "B Guru Sneha",
        "ADITI CHINTAREVULA",
        "Divya Sindhu"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of engineering sciences.",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.36893/jes.2024.v15i10.05",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2022.v04i04.55465",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Edge-supervised Learning Frameworks for Personalization in Embedded IVI Systems",
      "description": "The transformation of embedded In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems due to such edge-supervised learning frameworks will support vehicles to better connect with the driver by personalizing the car features. Utilizing local learning loops, on-device model updates, and federated-lite learning in these frameworks. They boost personalization, responsiveness, and data privacy while lessening the reliance on the cloud. Local learning loops let us change things in real time, like what shows you want to watch and where you want to sit. We update your model on your device over time so the changes can be learned all the time without delay or going to the cloud. Federated-lite learning improves personalization via a fleet of vehicles in a privacy and locality manner. The IVI experience will become increasingly adaptive because of the automotive industry’s adoption of edge computing and machine learning, enhancing innovation and personalization. Even so, conquering the technical struggles of embedded systems is critical to unlocking their potential. The importance of edge-supervised learning frameworks in IVI systems and the future directions to exploit them fully are discussed in this abstract.",
      "published": "2022-08-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2022.v04i04.55465",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ronak Indrasinh Kosamia"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.36948/ijfmr.2022.v04i04.55465",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2023.v05i04.21866",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Leveraging IoT and Big Data Analytics for Enhanced Operational Efficiency",
      "description": "The USA trucking industry serves as the backbone of the nation’s supply chain, yet it faces persistent challenges in fleet management, including inefficiencies, rising operational costs, and evolving regulatory requirements. This paper explores the integration of Internet of Things (IoT) technology and Big Data analytics as transformative tools to address these challenges. IoT-enabled devices, such as GPS and telematics systems, facilitate real-time monitoring of vehicles and assets, while Big Data analytics leverages the vast amounts of data generated for actionable insights. Together, these technologies offer unprecedented opportunities for route optimization, predictive maintenance, and driver safety, resulting in enhanced operational efficiency and cost savings. This paper also examines the benefits, challenges, and future prospects of these innovations, providing a roadmap for the USA trucking industry to adopt smarter fleet management solutions.",
      "published": "2023-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2023.v05i04.21866",
      "matched_terms": [
        "supply chain",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bhavya Vashisht -"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.36948/ijfmr.2023.v05i04.21866",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i05.28224",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous Vehicles: Challenges and Opportunities",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) represent a paradigm shift in transportation, promising safer, more efficient, and convenient mobility. Central to the realization of AVs are advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, enabling vehicles to perceive their environment, make decisions, and navigate autonomously. This paper examines the multifaceted role of AI in AVs, focusing on the challenges and opportunities it presents. The discussion encompasses the application of AI techniques such as machine learning, computer vision, and sensor fusion in enabling autonomous driving systems. Furthermore, it addresses the technical, regulatory, and ethical challenges associated with AI implementation in AVs, including sensor limitations, data privacy concerns, and legal frameworks. Despite these challenges, AI-enabled AVs offer significant opportunities, including improved road safety, enhanced mobility, and reduced environmental impact. Recent innovations and advancements in AI technologies pave the way for overcoming existing barriers and accelerating the adoption of AVs. Through case studies and real-world applications, this paper highlights the transformative potential of AI-driven AVs across various sectors, from transportation and logistics to urban planning. Looking ahead, future research and development efforts must focus on addressing remaining challenges and maximizing the societal benefits of AI in autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-10-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i05.28224",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sadik Bin Salim -",
        "Md. Tajbir Husain -"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i05.28224",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i06.30797",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "System and Method to provide a keyless mechanism to encrypt/decrypt Memory Context",
      "description": "In contemporary computing environments, safeguarding sensitive data is of paramount importance. Traditional encryption methods often rely on keys, which themselves pose security risks due to potential loss or compromise. In response to this challenge, this paper proposes a keyless mechanism for encrypting and decrypting memory context, leveraging the innovative keyless user defined optimal security (KUDOS) algorithm. Traditional encryption methods rely on cryptographic keys, which pose inherent security risks and complexity in key management. In contrast, the KUDOS algorithm offers a novel approach to encryption without the need for explicit cryptographic keys, providing enhanced security and simplicity in the encryption process. By deriving encryption parameters from the memory context itself, the KUDOS algorithm ensures robust protection of sensitive data stored in memory while eliminating the vulnerabilities associated with key storage and transmission. This paper presents the theoretical foundations of the KUDOS algorithm, along with practical implementation strategies for integrating keyless encryption and decryption mechanisms into memory management systems. Through experimental evaluation and analysis, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed keyless mechanism for securing memory context in various computing environments. The KUDOS algorithm holds significant promise for enhancing security and privacy in memory management systems, offering a keyless encryption solution that is both robust and scalable",
      "published": "2024-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i06.30797",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amit Rai -",
        "Puja Kumari -",
        "Naveen rai -"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i06.30797",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i05.55624",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Effective Management of Semiconductor Obsolescence in Automotive ECU Manufacturers",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of semiconductor technology poses a significant challenge for the automotive industry, particularly in managing the lifecycle of electronic components used in Electronic Control Units (ECUs). While automotive products typically require a 15-year service life, semiconductor components often become obsolete within 7–10 years, creating a critical gap that threatens both supply chain stability and product sustainability. This issue is further exacerbated by the rising number of End-of-Life (EOL) notices from semiconductor manufacturers, along with ongoing geopolitical policies. Without effective lifecycle management, ECU manufacturers face production delays, costly redesigns, and compliance risks with stringent functional safety standards mandated by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). This paper examines proactive and mitigative strategies for addressing semiconductor obsolescence risks, including enhanced component lifecycle monitoring during the development phase, database enrichment, multi-sourcing component strategies, and risk-sharing agreements with suppliers and customers. By implementing these measures, ECU manufacturers can improve supply chain resilience, ensure compliance with safety and reliability standards, and reduce the financial impact of semiconductor obsolescence. The findings of this study highlight the importance of a structured approach to lifecycle management, which can significantly enhance the sustainability and reliability of automotive electronics.",
      "published": "2025-09-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i05.55624",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "geopolitical",
        "resilience",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Espionage / sovereignty",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Priya Boopalan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i05.55624",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5129,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i05.55624 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain; impacts: espionage; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: espionage, suppliers, stability, creating, service, risks, without, impact."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i06.62655",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid Dilated and Attention-Based Framework for Effective Detection of Cybersecurity Spoofing in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "The need for constant data transmission among Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in the automotive environment has grown due to the quick development of linked and autonomous vehicle technologies. Despite being widely utilized due to its dependability and real-time communication capabilities, the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) is extremely vulnerable to spoofing attacks due to its lack of built-in security mechanisms. These assaults provide significant safety issues, allow adversaries to introduce fake messages, and interfere with regular ECU functions. CAN security has benefited greatly from existing intrusion detection techniques, such as entropy-based analysis, statistical detection, RNN/LSTM systems, reinforcement learning, and physical-layer authentication. Nevertheless, many of these techniques still have shortcomings, including computational overhead, sensitivity to noise, overfitting, slow training, scalability issues, and decreased accuracy in complex attack scenarios. To overcome these limitations, this research proposes an efficient cybersecurity spoofing attack detection framework for vehicular networks using a Hybridized Dilated and Attention-based Network (HD-AN). The framework incorporates a structured pipeline consisting of data preprocessing, weighted feature extraction through Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM), and optimization of feature weights using the Improved Coronavirus Mask Protection Algorithm (ICMPA). The optimized features are then processed through the HD-AN model, which combines dilated temporal convolutions with attention mechanisms and residual LSTM modules to capture long-range temporal dependencies in CAN traffic. This architecture enhances robustness, improves feature discrimination, and enables early detection of malicious patterns. The proposed framework is expected to outperform classical and state-of-the-art methods based on accuracy, precision, sensitivity, specificity, F1-score, MCC, and error-based metrics such as FPR, FNR, and FDR, thereby providing a reliable and computationally efficient defense mechanism for real-time vehicular cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2025-12-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i06.62655",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "V. Deshmukh",
        "Monika Tripathi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i06.62655",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i03.81663",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The PerfektBlue Attack Scenario: Deconstructing a Four-Stage Automotive Bluetooth Exploit and Implementing Defensive Modifications",
      "description": "The increasing complexity of In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems is characterized by smartphone integration via Bluetooth and has significantly expanded the automotive attack surface. Traditional automotive security models focused on CAN bus isolation, and are insufficient against remote, protocol-layer exploits targeting unauthenticated spheres. This paper presents a vast and detailed technical analysis of the \"PerfektBlue” exploit chain, which is a sophisticated four-stage attack targeting automotive Bluetooth frameworks. Here is a minute examination of the operational flow, progressing from initial unauthenticated access via CWE-306, through the exploitation of critical logic flaws in the L2CAP layer (CVE-2024-45431), silent pairing bypasses (CVE-2024-45433), data exfiltration through high-privilege bridge interfaces (CVE-2024-45432), and terminal system paralysis via command injection (CVE-2024-45434). The findings reveal that the logic errors born from improper input validation are devastating as memory corruption, requiring robust domain isolation in safety-critical automotive software.",
      "published": "2026-06-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i03.81663",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "exploit",
        "exploitation",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-45431",
        "CVE-2024-45432",
        "CVE-2024-45433",
        "CVE-2024-45434"
      ],
      "authors": [
        "Vivek Agashe",
        "Swati Deshmukh",
        "Manisha Ajaykumar Dudhedia"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i03.81663",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.37082/ijirmps.v11.i5.232510",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Risks in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicles (CVs) represent a major technological advancement in the transportation sector, offering enhanced functionality, safety features, and real-time data communication. With the integration of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technologies—including Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), and Vehicle-to-Cloud (V2C) systems—automobiles have transitioned into complex cyber-physical systems. However, this increased connectivity has exponentially expanded the attack surface, rendering vehicles vulnerable to numerous cybersecurity threats. Remote hijacking of vehicles, data breaches, denial of service attacks, and manipulation of vehicular control systems have been demonstrated in various research and real-world incidents. Such vulnerabilities pose significant risks not only to driver and passenger safety but also to broader public infrastructure. This paper investigates the cybersecurity threats facing connected vehicles, analyzing potential attack vectors, risk impacts, and current mitigation approaches. Utilizing a comprehensive methodology involving threat modeling through the STRIDE framework, risk prioritization using a modified DREAD analysis, and case study evaluation, key security challenges are systematically identified. A detailed literature review emphasizes recent advances in automotive cybersecurity, including machine learning-based intrusion detection systems and blockchain solutions for secure communications. Results indicate that while advancements in secure communication protocols and in-vehicle network segmentation offer partial defenses, connected vehicles remain substantially exposed to evolving cyber threats. Discussion of the findings reveals critical gaps in current defense strategies, underscoring the need for security-by-design practices, continuous monitoring, and a life-cycle security management approach. Standardization efforts by international bodies, though promising, are insufficient without rigorous industry adoption and frequent updates. The paper concludes by proposing future directions for research and policy, highlighting the importance of proactive and adaptive cybersecurity measures to ensure the safety, privacy, and reliability of connected vehicular ecosystems. By addressing cybersecurity risks comprehensively, stakeholders can facilitate the safe evolution of connected vehicles, balancing innovation with robust protection measures to safeguard individuals and societies at large.",
      "published": "2023-09-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.37082/ijirmps.v11.i5.232510",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sai Kalyani Rachapalli -"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Innovative Research in Engineering & Multidisciplinary Physical Sciences",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.37082/ijirmps.v11.i5.232510",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.458,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.37082/ijirmps.v11.i5.232510 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: individuals, frequent, though, remain, case, service, risks, without."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.37199/c41001034",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES IN MODERN VEHICULAR COMMUNICATION NETWORKS",
      "description": "Traffic sensor networks represent one of the key elements of modern Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), enabling real-time data collection, traffic flow analysis, signal management, and support for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication.With the development of concepts such as smart cities and autonomous vehicles, these networks are becoming increasingly complex and dynamic, but simultaneously more vulnerable to cyberattacks that can jeopardise their functionality, data accuracy, and the safety of traffic participants.Due to the large number of nodes, wireless communication methods, and limited computational resources of the sensors, these networks are exposed to risks such as communication interception, unauthorised data modification, DoS attacks, node compromise, injection of false information, and device identity spoofing.This paper analyses the fundamental security challenges that accompany the operation of traffic sensor networks, as well as the potential consequences that a successful attack can have on the transport system, including improper traffic light management, creation of artificial congestion, disruption of autonomous driving algorithms, and endangering the physical safety of drivers.The aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of the most significant threats, standards, and recommended security mechanisms, as well as to highlight the importance of a systemic approach to protecting traffic sensor networks as a critical component of the future transportation ecosystem.",
      "published": "2026-04-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.37199/c41001034",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aleksandar GRGUREVIĆ",
        "Nataša M. Gospić",
        "Oliver POPOVIĆ"
      ],
      "venue": "INTEC International Conference on Sustainable Mobility (INTEC-ICSM)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.37199/c41001034",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.37394/232016.2024.19.41",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integration of Communication Protocols for Electric Vehicle Charging: Functionality and Integration",
      "description": "EV charging stations are a critical piece of infrastructure to accelerate the transition to green and clean technologies. In recent years, the number of charging stations has grown significantly. This leads to the emergence of new problems and challenges for society, such as the management of charging processes, capacity balancing, and extended access. In this study, the basic concepts regarding standards and protocols for managing charging stations and capacities are presented. Over the years, the protocols have evolved and currently provide a variety of functionalities such as remote access, status tracking, station, and capacity control. The knowledge and development of these protocols will support easier and more adaptive use of charging stations. In addition, the current challenges that should be solved in the coming years are presented. They are related to the improvement of remote access, power balance, construction of hybrid systems of energy sources, and development of management information systems for management.",
      "published": "2024-12-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.37394/232016.2024.19.41",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Elena Blagoeva",
        "Denis Chikurtev",
        "Dimitar Kostadinov"
      ],
      "venue": "WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.37394/232016.2024.19.41",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.37745/ejcsit.2013/vol13n57790",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Transformative Impact of IoT on the Insurance Industry",
      "description": "The Internet of Things (IoT) is fundamentally transforming the insurance industry by enabling real-time data collection through connected devices, including telematics, wearables, and smart home systems. This technological integration is shifting the insurance paradigm from a reactive, transaction-based model focused on loss compensation to a proactive partnership centered on risk prevention and ongoing customer engagement. The paper examines how IoT enhances three critical dimensions of insurance operations: risk assessment, claims processing, and customer engagement. In risk assessment, IoT provides granular behavioral data that enables personalized pricing and encourages safer practices. For claims processing, connected devices deliver immediate, objective incident data that accelerates verification, reduces fraud, and streamlines settlement. In customer engagement, IoT creates unprecedented opportunities for continuous interaction through personalized guidance, proactive risk alerts, and incentive programs that reward risk-reducing behaviors. Despite significant implementation challenges related to data privacy, system integration, the digital divide, and regulatory compliance, the transformative potential of IoT in insurance is substantial. The convergence of IoT with artificial intelligence promises to revolutionize the industry, enabling increasingly sophisticated risk modeling, automated operations, and entirely new insurance products tailored to specific use cases and risk profiles.",
      "published": "2025-03-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.37745/ejcsit.2013/vol13n57790",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maruthi Prasad Gundla"
      ],
      "venue": "European Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.37745/ejcsit.2013/vol13n57790",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.38088/jise.1717959",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight CNN-Based Intrusion Detection for Automotive CAN Bus in Light Commercial Vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of digitalization and automation, modern vehicles, especially in the light commercial segment, have evolved into complex, interconnected platforms resembling mobile computing systems. This transformation has increased the dependency on in-vehicle communication networks and, as a result, exposed them to a wider range of cybersecurity threats. A fundamental aspect of the proposed method is the use of a lightweight CNN model specific for deployment in embedded automotive environments with limited computational resources and optimized for efficiency. Operating on low-power hardware platforms such as edge ECUs, the tiny device developed in this study works effectively unlike conventional deep learning architectures seeking high processing power and memory. Despite its minimal computational footprint, the model is capable of accurately distinguishing between legitimate and spoofed communication traffic, as well as detecting a variety of attack forms that target different CAN protocol components. The performance metrics of the model further highlight its effectiveness, achieving a ROC AUC Score of 0.9887, an Accuracy of 0.9887, a Precision of 0.9825, a Recall of 0.9952, and an F1-Score of 0.9888. Particularly for real-time on-vehicle intrusion detection systems, this harmony between performance and efficiency makes the strategy especially important. Just as importantly is the introduction of a specifically produced hybrid dataset, which is fundamental for system evaluation and training. The dataset aggregates synthetic generated attack scenarios with real-world spoofing, injection, and denial-of- service (DoS) conditions using actual CAN traffic acquired from a J1939-compliant light commercial vehicle. Standard 11-bit identities combined with industrial communication protocols help the dataset to reflect real-world vehicle dynamics across several ECUs under various scenarios. The model can learn fine-grained patterns often missed by conventional rule-based or manually engineered approaches by means of the image-like transformation of CAN messages—preserving bit-level and temporal information. In intelligent transportation systems, the lightweight CNN architecture and the strong dataset combine to create a scalable and deployable IDS framework that can improve in-vehicle cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2025-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.38088/jise.1717959",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emre Tüfekcioğlu",
        "Cemal Hanilçi",
        "Hakan Gürkan"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Innovative Science and Engineering (JISE)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.38088/jise.1717959",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.38124/ijisrt/25apr1584",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ensuring AI Safety in Autonomous Vehicles: A Framework Based on ISO PAS 8800",
      "description": "This study presents a structured exploration of ISO PAS 8800 as a dedicated safety framework addressing the unique challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) in autonomous vehicles (AVs). The research aims to establish the necessity of a distinct safety standard beyond conventional protocols, such as ISO 26262 and ISO 21448, which are insufficient to manage the probabilistic, adaptive, and opaque characteristics inherent in AI- driven systems. Employing a qualitative methodological approach grounded in standards analysis and case-based synthesis, the study evaluates the provisions of ISO PAS 8800 across multiple dimensions, risk governance, system transparency, continuous validation, and human oversight. Key findings demonstrate that ISO PAS 8800 fills critical gaps left by existing safety standards, offering AI-specific safety lifecycle processes, interpretability protocols, and robust risk management strategies. It intro- duces novel concepts such as Component Fault and Deficiency Trees (CFDTs), scenario-based validation, bounded incremental learning, and post-deployment monitoring, which are essential for certifying learning-enabled and continuously evolving AV systems. Furthermore, the framework emphasizes harmonization with cybersecurity standards (e.g., ISO/SAE 21434) to address adversarial vulnerabilities in AI pipelines. ISO PAS 8800 provides a comprehensive, adaptable, and forward-compatible framework for the governance of AI safety in autonomous driving. It facilitatesthe development of trustworthy, auditable, and socially accountable AV technologies, aligning technical innovation with emerging regulatory and ethical expectations.",
      "published": "2025-05-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/25apr1584",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jherrod Thomas"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.38124/ijisrt/25apr1584",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.38124/ijisrt/26oct1249",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Importance of Cybersecurity in Autonomous Vehicles and Potential Methods for Enhancing Security",
      "description": "With the increasing integration of autonomous vehicles (AVs) into modern transportation systems, cybersecurity has become a critical concern. The reliance of AVs on complex software and communication systems makes them vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which can lead to devastating consequences for both vehicle occupants and pedestrians. This paper examines the importance of cybersecurity in autonomous vehicles, presents a review of existing security protocols, and proposes potential methods for enhancing their security. Through a risk analysis and comparison of various techniques, we aim to provide insight into effective strategies for safeguarding AVs against cyber threats.",
      "published": "2026-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26oct1249",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S. Abirami",
        "Dr. K. Priya"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology (IJISRT)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.38124/ijisrt/26oct1249",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.38177/ajast.2024.8101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Revolutionizing Home Security: A Comprehensive Overview of an Advanced RFID Door Lock System for Keyless Access and Smart Home Protection",
      "description": "The abstract presents a cutting-edge RFID door lock system that does away with traditional physical keys to improve home security. The system uses state-of-the-art components, such as an RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) reader and an Arduino microcontroller, to provide a safe, keyless access option for homes. This technology provides homes with more protection and convenience, which is a comfort in a world where theft and unwanted access are ongoing issues. Conventional keys are not the best option for home security because they can be stolen, lost, or duplicated. By using customized RFID cards or key fobs, the RFID door lock system, on the other hand, streamlines the entry procedure while significantly lowering the possibility of unwanted access. An RFID reader module, an Arduino microcontroller, and an electronic locking mechanism are the three most crucial parts of the system. Once the authenticity of the card has been confirmed by the RFID reader, the Arduino microcontroller will utilize the obtained data to initiate the lock. Additionally, the system can be improved with features like smartphone applications for remote access control, which let homeowners monitor and grant access from a distance. This RFID door lock system has many advantages for homeowners, including strong security features, user-friendliness, and the capacity to monitor access events. These features provide homeowners with convenience and peace of mind. RFID-based security systems are an important development in the rapidly developing field of smart home technology.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.38177/ajast.2024.8101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohan Kumar A.",
        "Irfan Ahamath M.",
        "R Gowtham"
      ],
      "venue": "Asian Journal of Applied Science and Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.38177/ajast.2024.8101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3837/tiis.2017.02.013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Measures for Automaker’s Legal Risks from Security Threats in Connected Car Development Lifecycle",
      "description": "To improve passenger convenience and safety, today’s vehicle is evolving into a “connected vehicle,” which mounts various sensors, electronic control devices, and wired/wireless communication devices. However, as the number of connections to external networks via the various electronic devices of connected vehicles increases and the internal structures of vehicles become more complex, there is an increasing chance of encountering issues such as malfunctions due to various functional defects and hacking. Recalls and indemnifications due to such hacking or defects, which may occur as vehicles evolve into connected vehicles, are becoming a new risk for automakers, causing devastating financial losses. Therefore, automakers need to make voluntary efforts to comply with security ethics and strengthen their responsibilities. In this study, we investigated potential security issues that may occur under a connected vehicle environment (vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-infrastructure, and internal communication). Furthermore, we analyzed several case studies related to automaker’s legal risks and responsibilities and identified the security requirements and necessary roles to be played by each player in the automobile development process (design, manufacturing, sales, and post-sales management) to enhance their responsibility, along with measures to manage their legal risks.",
      "published": "2017-02-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3837/tiis.2017.02.013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "connected car",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "hacking",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dong Hee Kim",
        "Seung Jo Baek",
        "Jongin Lim"
      ],
      "venue": "KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.3837/tiis.2017.02.013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3846/transport.2020.12904",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CHALLENGES IN HOMOLOGATION PROCESS OF VEHICLES WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE",
      "description": "The traditional automotive homologation processes aim to ensure the safety of vehicles on public roads. Autonomous Vehicles (AV) with Artificial Intelligence (AI) are difficult to account for in these conventional processes. This research aims to map and attempt to close the gaps in the areas of testing and approval of such automated and connected vehicles. During our research into the homologation process of traditional vehicles; functional safety issues, challenges of AI in safety critical systems, along with questions of cyber security were investigated. Our process focuses on the integration of the already existing functions and prototypes into new products safely. As a key result, we managed to identify the main gaps between Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and automotive technology: the rigidity of the automotive homologation process, functional safety, AI in safety critical areas and we propose a solution.",
      "published": "2020-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3846/transport.2020.12904",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Máté Zöldy",
        "Zsolt Szalay",
        "Viktor Tihanyi"
      ],
      "venue": "Transport",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3846/transport.2020.12904",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3850/978-981-14-8593-0_5778-cd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Approach to Generic Multilevel Risk Assessment of Automotive Mobile Access Systems",
      "description": "Nowadays mobility companies have to deal with the digitization of analog products and services. A central scope of interest is the design of mobile access systems, intended to replace the physical key. However, these systems do not only involve new use cases but also risks that place safety and security issues in the foreground of the system design. To ensure protection against safety and security risks, a procedure that allows multilevel system evaluation is necessary. Practical experience in risk assessment (SRA) shows field-specific approaches widely used. In order to facilitate an embedded safe and secure system design, this paper introduces a generic assessment method, which considers different system configurations and multilevel safety and security risks. Within this procedure, previously identified technical requirements are mapped in a Morphological Box (MB) to describe the configuration space (CS) of the system. In order to evaluate the system, use cases and sequences as well as misuse cases are mapped using UML. Identified threats and attack paths are transferred into fault and attack trees. The results of the fault tree analysis (FTA) and attack tree analysis (ATA) allows the definition of security requirements. Additionally, the process reveals non-standard scenarios that demand further detailed analysis. The proposed approach is applied to the example of an automotive mobile access system.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3850/978-981-14-8593-0_5778-cd",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Termin",
        "Daniel Lichte",
        "Kai-Dietrich Wolf"
      ],
      "venue": "European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.3850/978-981-14-8593-0_5778-cd",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3850/978-981-18-8813-7_p229-cd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overview of Intelligent Connected Vehicles Security",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3850/978-981-18-8813-7_p229-cd",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yaling Zhu",
        "Yongchao Zhong",
        "Haonan Yang",
        "Bo Yang",
        "Jia Zeng",
        "Yangzhong Wang",
        "Yuqing Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3850/978-981-18-8813-7_p229-cd",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3850/978-981-94-3281-3_esrel-sra-e2025-p2178-cd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Infotainment System and Driver Distraction",
      "description": "This study examines the safety concerns related to the use of in-Vehicle Infotainment Systems and the implications for future road safety policy.A total of 44 students studying the driving instructor programme in Norway were asked to use four IVIS functions: to select a radio channel, change the car interior temperature, choose music on a streaming platform, and enter an address on the navigation system.They drove a car with double-pedal set on a specific route with a safety instructor on board.The rides were registered with eye-tracking glasses.Results show that vehicle touchscreen-based IVIS requires considerable attention and distracts drivers from the road and traffic situation.The NASA Raw Task Load Index and the evaluation of driver attention show that the navigation system led to longer and more fixations and increased the effort required to coordinate between brain, eyes and hands.The average total required time to solve the navigation task was 44 seconds, and of the 33 seconds of cumulative fixation time, drivers spent an average attention of 17 seconds on the road and traffic and 16 seconds on the touchscreen.A large share of drivers also spent a cumulative fixation time on the touchscreen over the NHTSA recommended threshold of 12 seconds.The longer the fixations are on the touchscreen, the more the traffic context may have changed.This work further discusses the risk incurred and the drivers' ability to react to risky situations, as well as the cognitive load associated with switching sequences between road and touchscreen.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3850/978-981-94-3281-3_esrel-sra-e2025-p2178-cd",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Isabelle Roche‐Cerasi",
        "Dagfinn Moe",
        "Ann-Helen Hansen",
        "Morten Johansen"
      ],
      "venue": "European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.3850/978-981-94-3281-3_esrel-sra-e2025-p2178-cd",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3897/jucs.71833",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Verification and Validation Testing in Automotive",
      "description": "The new generations of cars have a number of ECUs (Electronic Control Units) which are connected to a central gateway and need to pass cybersecurity integration tests to fulfil the homologation requirements of cars. Cars usually have a gateway server (few have additional domain servers) with Linux and a large number of ECUs which are real time control of actuators (ESP, EPS, ABS, etc. – usually they are multicore embedded controllers) connected by a real time automotive specific bus (CAN-FD) to the domain controller or gateway server. The norms (SAE J3061, ISO 21434) require cybersecurity related verification and validation. Fir the verification car manufacturers use a network test suite which runs > 2000 test cases and which have to be passed for homologation. These norms have impact on the way how car communication infrastructure is tested, and which cybersecurity attack patterns are checked before a road release of an ECU/car. This paper describes typical verification and validation approaches in modern vehicles and how such test cases are derived and developed.",
      "published": "2021-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3897/jucs.71833",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Jürgen Dobaj",
        "Alen Salamun"
      ],
      "venue": "JUCS - Journal of Universal Computer Science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3897/jucs.71833",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3897/jucs.72072",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recent Advances in Cybersecurity and Safety Architectures in Automotive, IT, and Connected Services",
      "description": "This is a special issue in cooperation with EuroSPI (www.eurospi.net). EuroSPI represents a large international network of renowned experts and annual European conference series running successfully since its foundation in 1994. From 2013 onwards, an international functional safety and from 2016 onwards a functional safety and cybersecurity workshop has been established, to which leading European and Asian industry and research have been actively contributing to. High-quality, original papers about best practices for implementing functional safety and cybersecurity in automotive, IT, and connected services have been selected for this special issue. They provide insights into the current state of the art implementations in automotive safety and cybersecurity, IT security, and safety in future highly autonomous self-learning vehicles.",
      "published": "2021-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3897/jucs.72072",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Richard Messnarz",
        "Ricardo Colomo‐Palacios",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Andreas Riel",
        "Miklós Bíró"
      ],
      "venue": "JUCS - Journal of Universal Computer Science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3897/jucs.72072",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3897/jucs.72367",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Threat Analysis, Risk Assessment and Design Patterns for Automotive Networked Embedded Systems: A Case Study",
      "description": "Cybersecurity has become a crucial challenge in the automotive sector. At the current stage, the framework described by the ISO/SAE 21434 is insufficient to derive concrete methods for the design of secure automotive networked embedded systems on the supplier level. This article describes a case study with actionable steps for designing secure systems and systematically eliciting traceable cybersecurity requirements to address this gap. The case study is aligned with the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and can provide the basis for integrating cybersecurity engineering into company-specific processes and practice specifications.",
      "published": "2021-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3897/jucs.72367",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jürgen Dobaj",
        "Damjan Ekert",
        "Jakub Štolfa",
        "Svatopluk Štolfa",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Richard Messnarz"
      ],
      "venue": "JUCS - Journal of Universal Computer Science",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.3897/jucs.72367",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3934/mbe.2022330",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GAN model using field fuzz mutation for in-vehicle CAN bus intrusion detection",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) are widely used in smart vehicles to realize information interactions between electronic control units and other devices in vehicles. Owing to an increase in external communication interfaces, the cybersecurity of in-vehicle CAN bus networks is threatened. In-vehicle CAN intrusion detection systems with high detection rates and low false-negative rates have become important security protection measures for automotive networks. The boundary of the current machine learning-based in-vehicle CAN bus intrusion detection algorithm to determine the anomalous behavior triggered by CAN messages is unclear, and a validity check is required after the intrusion detection algorithm is designed. To solve the low coverage rate problem in the process of validating intrusion detection algorithms, an in-vehicle CAN fuzz-testing message generation model, the field-associative mutation generation adversarial network (FAMGAN), is proposed. To improve the defects of high randomness in generating messages in traditional fuzz-testing algorithms, FAMGAN adopts field division based on a conditional random field and the field association method based on the Apriori algorithm. Experiments were conducted on a real car using a code-built intrusion detection algorithm. The results demonstrate that FAMGAN can efficiently generate anomalous CAN messages and evaluate the performance of an in-vehicle CAN intrusion detection algorithm.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3934/mbe.2022330",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhongwei Li",
        "Wenqi Jiang",
        "Xiaosheng Liu",
        "Kai Tan",
        "Xianji Jin",
        "Ming Yuan Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "Mathematical Biosciences & Engineering",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.3934/mbe.2022330",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3934/mbe.2023761",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "State-of-the-art survey of in-vehicle protocols and automotive Ethernet security and vulnerabilities",
      "description": "With the help of advanced technology, the automotive industry is in continuous evolution. Modern vehicles are not only comprised of mechanical components but also contain highly complex electronic devices and connections to the outside world. Today's vehicle usually has between 30 and 70 ECUs (Electronic Control Units), which communicate with each other over standard communication protocols. There are different types of in-vehicle network protocols and bus systems, including the Controlled Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnected Network (LIN), FlexRay, Media Oriented System Transport (MOST), and Automotive Ethernet (AE). Modern cars are also able to communicate with other devices through wired or wireless interfaces such as USB, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or even 5G. Such interfaces may expose the internal network to the outside world and can be seen as entry points for cyber-attacks. In this paper, the main interest is in the AE network protocol. AE is a special Ethernet design that provides the bandwidth needed for today's applications, and the potential for even greater performance in the future. However, AE is a \"best effort\" protocol, which cannot be considered reliable. This implies that it is not trustworthy in terms of reliability and timely deliveries. The focus of this paper is to present a state-of-the-art survey of security threats and protection mechanisms relating to AE. After introducing and comparing the different protocols being used in the embedded networks of current vehicles, we analyze the potential threats targeting the AE network and describe how attackers' opportunities can be enhanced by the new communication abilities of modern cars. Finally, we present and compare the AE security solutions currently being devised to address these problems and propose some recommendations and challenges to deal with security issue in AE protocol.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3934/mbe.2023761",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aida Ben Chehida Douss",
        "Ryma Abassi",
        "Damien Sauveron"
      ],
      "venue": "Mathematical Biosciences & Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.3934/mbe.2023761",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 42,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.3990/1.9789036542395",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Driving automation interface design : supporting drivers' changing role",
      "description": "Technology Design (MTD) from Delft University of Technology.His IDE Master assignment considered the ergonomic design of a workbench for healthcare in hospitals.While developing a strong interest in human-centred aspects of product design, rousing interests in automotive design made his MTD assignment a perfect match: Developing interaction solutions for an in-vehicle infotainment system.The result was successfully demonstrated in a showcar at the international automotive exhibition IAA in Frankfurt.Then, Arie Paul continued his professional career at his internship's company: automotive supplier Johnson Controlswhere he was appointed Interaction Designer and later Senior Interaction Designer at the Design department.While cooperating in a broad range of HMI-projects for international customers, he contributed to the implementation of an HMI design discipline as part of the company's strategic product development plan.In 2005, Arie Paul continued his career at Ford Motor Company where he worked on a cross car-line HMI product strategy at Ford's European Electrical and Electronic Systems Engineering (EESE) department.His focus included driver's interaction with driving assistance systems.In this position, his curiosity about the influence of driver-vehicle interfaces on drivers' behavioural aspects and system performance grew.In 2008, Arie Paul received the opportunity to start at the University of Twente as Assistant Professor.Here, Arie Paul combines his interests in product design -and specifically automotive design -with research and education on human-centred product development.His research focusses on improving driver's interaction with assistance systems -especially systems concerning driving automation.As a university lecturer, Arie Paul supervises students' assignments, lectures Human Factors, coordinates courses and is responsible for the BSc final assignments in Industrial Design Engineering.During his stay abroad Arie Paul met his wife.Together they have two children and live in Twente.viii ACC Adaptive Cruise Control ADAS Advanced Driver Assistance Systems AEB VRU Autonomous Emergency Braking (specifically for) Vulnerable Road Users CA Congestion Assistant (i.e.driving automation during congestion on motorways)",
      "published": "2016-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.3990/1.9789036542395",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arie Paul van den Beukel"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.3990/1.9789036542395",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/978-1-6684-5991-1.ch004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "The technological development observed in recent years has led to the expansion of automotive systems communication capabilities. Consequently, several security vulnerabilities and additional attack surfaces that a threat agent can potentially exploit are increased. The most employed communication protocol in a vehicle is the controller area network (CAN) serial bus protocol, designed with robust fault tolerance in mind, but little to no concern for security. This chapter offers a primer on the controller area network typical architecture, what messages are used in communication, its error management system, and its vulnerabilities. Possible CAN attack surfaces and attack methods are also presented, followed by an exposition on intrusion detection systems (IDS) as a potential solution to the security concerns raised by CAN bus vulnerabilities. Several case studies on IDS implementations for secure CAN bus systems are also presented, including a recently proposed framework to facilitate further development in this field of study.",
      "published": "2023-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-6684-5991-1.ch004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "exploit",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luis da Bernarda",
        "Leonel Santos",
        "Rogério Luís de C. Costa",
        "Carlos Manuel da Silva Rabadao"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in information security, privacy, and ethics book series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4018/978-1-6684-5991-1.ch004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/978-1-6684-7207-1.ch004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security Perspectives in Public Spaces",
      "description": "As the public use drones (aircraft that can operate semi or autonomous), sometimes referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles or automotive aircrafts, to ease daily people's lifestyles, there are cyber security threats and cyber-attacks that hinder public safety and privacy during the moments when these drones are used. Cyber threats are analyzed based on the commonly known approaches to evaluate the cyber perspective and its effect on the public. Public drones' cyber security hazards are well tested using the STRIDE approach connected with the considered threats. The evaluation is highly dependent on the accuracy of drone mission definition, potential intruders, social, and other human-related cases. This chapter therefore encompasses the most current studies focusing on possible intruders portrayed as critical when carrying out a cyber security assessment. A brief future direction to mitigate cyber-related threats as it entails the public are conclusively depicted.",
      "published": "2023-03-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-6684-7207-1.ch004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wasswa Shafik"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in information security, privacy, and ethics book series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4018/978-1-6684-7207-1.ch004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 38,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-6858-3.ch012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cryptocurrency-Based Payment Framework for EV Charging",
      "description": "The world is transforming from paper or plastic currency towards digital currency. Everyone is trying to benefit from the decentralized system, the anonymity, and lower transaction cost offered by cryptocurrencies. One of the hurdles in the ascension of electric vehicle is its charging and the transaction for charging. In this chapter, a cryptocurrency-based payment framework is formulated for electric vehicle charging to eliminate the third-party involvement as in the plastic currency system. In this payment framework, smart contracts are deployed which would ensure the conditions to be satisfied, like the amount sent by the consumer. Smart contract includes the transfer function that would transfer the amount of ether and set charging time according to the charging rate, amount of ether sent, and power delivered. Overview of the platform prototype of payment is presented to demonstrate the implementation of the framework in the real world. At last, the authors look at the security issues, challenges ahead, and also suggested some of the improvements that could be further done.",
      "published": "2021-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-6858-3.ch012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wasif Karim",
        "Mohammad Saad Alam",
        "Yasser Rafat"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in mechatronics and mechanical engineering (AMME) book series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4018/978-1-7998-6858-3.ch012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-7323-5.ch005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey of Automotive Cyber-Physical System Security",
      "description": "This chapter will provide a survey on cyber-physical systems security related to automobiles. In modern vehicles, there has been discussion on how automobiles fit into the world of cyber-physical systems, considering their interaction with both the cyber and physical worlds and interconnected systems. With many modern vehicles being connected to the outside world, there are many vulnerabilities introduced. Modern cars contain many electronic control units and millions of lines of code, which, if compromised, could have fatal consequences. Interfaces to the outside world (e.g., in-vehicle infotainment) may be used as a vector to attack these critical components.",
      "published": "2021-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7323-5.ch005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael Arienmughare",
        "Andrew Yoshimura",
        "Md Abdullah Al Momin"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in web technologies and engineering book series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4018/978-1-7998-7323-5.ch005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-7468-3.ch007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Services in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Smart vehicles have introduced many services which can be categorized by their functionality (infotainment, comfort, ADAS, OEM services). Introducing new services increases the risk of compromising security. A mobile app used by drivers to connect the vehicle could be infected with malware and spread to the vehicle. Forging remote starting signals enables an attacker to start the vehicle without a key. Security implications of these services should be investigated and addressed thoroughly. This chapter investigates such problems and provides an overview of vulnerabilities, attacks, and mitigations related to these services along with findings including software bugs and insecure protocols. The mitigations for these attacks include strengthening the security protocol of the vehicle CAN bus and incorporating security protocols such as TLS and IPsec. It is hard to say that all connected vehicles are secured. In conclusion, security cannot be neglected, and best practices like sufficient logging (e.g., IDS), reviewing, security testing, and updating of software and hardware should be used.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7468-3.ch007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "malware"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcus Bertilsson",
        "Michel Folkemark",
        "Qingyun Gu",
        "Viktor Rydberg",
        "Abdullah Yazar"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4018/978-1-7998-7468-3.ch007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-7468-3.ch008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of In-Vehicle Communication Systems",
      "description": "The automotive industry has seen remarkable growth in the use of network and communication technology. These technologies can be vulnerable to attacks. Several examples of confirmed attacks have been documented in academic studies, and many vehicular communications systems have been designed without security aspects in mind. Furthermore, all the security implications mentioned here would affect the functionality of decision support systems (DSS) of IoT and vehicular networks. This chapter focuses on in-vehicle security and aims to categorize some attacks in this field according to the exploited vulnerability by showing common patterns. The conclusion suggests that an ethernet-based architecture could be a good architecture for future vehicular systems; it enables them to meet future security needs while still allowing network communication with outside systems.",
      "published": "2021",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7468-3.ch008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dennis Dubrefjord",
        "Myeong-jin Jang",
        "Oscar Carlsson",
        "H. Hadi",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Computational Intelligence and Robotics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4018/978-1-7998-7468-3.ch008",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-9430-8.ch003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comprehensive Overview of Autonomous Vehicles and Their Security Against DDoS Attacks",
      "description": "The automotive industry is developing trends in autonomous driving and connected vehicular systems. These vehicles can access and send the data, download the software updates, connect with other vehicles or other IoT devices via the internet or wireless communication. Autonomous vehicle control urges very strict requirements about the security of the communication channels used by the vehicle to exchange information and the control logic that performs complex driving tasks. So, the increased connectivity results in a heightened risk of a cyber-security attack. For maintaining the advances in safe communication, it is important to establish strong security for connected vehicular systems. For this, existing cybersecurity attacks must be considered to minimize future cybersecurity risks in the connected and autonomous vehicle systems. In this chapter, the authors will emphasize recent works on how autonomous vehicles can ensure strong operation under ongoing cyber security attacks and their possible solutions.",
      "published": "2022-06-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-9430-8.ch003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Swati Jaiswal",
        "Pallavi Yevale",
        "Anuja R. Jadhav"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in information security, privacy, and ethics book series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4018/978-1-7998-9430-8.ch003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-1370-2.ch016",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Modern vehicles incorporate increasingly complex software and communication systems that expose them to evolving cyber threats. Attackers target crucial components like vehicle networks, sensors, and remote software update channels to compromise functionality and safety. This chapter investigates the urgent need to protect connected and autonomous vehicles from malicious activities. The authors examined present vulnerabilities, existing regulations, and next-generation defensive strategies to determine how effectively the industry addresses cybersecurity risks. Findings revealed both progress and gaps in standardized security implementations, especially in advanced sensor fusion and over-the-air processes. These observations suggest that manufacturers, policymakers, and researchers must enhance collaboration to establish robust defenses. This research contributes to a more holistic understanding of best practices in automotive and autonomous vehicle cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2025-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3373-1370-2.ch016",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohammad Alauthman",
        "Mouhammd Sharari Alkasassbeh",
        "Saad Alateef",
        "Ahmad Al–Qerem",
        "Ammar Almomani"
      ],
      "venue": "IGI Global eBooks",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.4018/979-8-3373-1370-2.ch016",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-7867-1.ch003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blockchain-Integrated RIS for Secure and Transparent Vehicular Communication",
      "description": "The integration of Blockchain and Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RIS) offers a secure, transparent, and high-performance foundation for 6G-enabled V2X communication. This chapter explores how blockchain's decentralized trust, immutable records, and smart contracts complement RIS-enabled wireless optimization to enhance signal reliability, reduce latency, and prevent tampering in dynamic vehicular environments. The proposed framework strengthens authentication, data integrity, and trust management while supporting advanced applications such as secure platooning and decentralized vehicular data marketplaces. Key challenges related to scalability, energy efficiency, and interoperability are examined, along with future prospects involving AI-driven optimization, post-quantum security, and autonomous RIS-blockchain coordination. Overall, the chapter demonstrates how merging programmable wireless control with distributed ledgers enables resilient and trustworthy next-generation mobility.",
      "published": "2026-03-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3373-7867-1.ch003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. N. Ravikumar",
        "Shilpa Aarthi"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in wireless technologies and telecommunication book series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4018/979-8-3373-7867-1.ch003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-9908-9.ch013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Challenges and Solutions in EV Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "This paper provides an overview of security challenges and potential solutions in electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. It examines the growing adoption of EVs, the expanding threat surface across charging systems, and the need for robust prevention, detection, and response mechanisms. The discussion highlights vulnerabilities in communication protocols, backend systems, and distributed infrastructure, and explores approaches such as fuzz testing, intrusion detection systems, and automated response mechanisms. Ensuring resilience and security in EV charging infrastructure is essential for maintaining reliability, safety, and trust as electrification continues to scale globally.",
      "published": "2026-08-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3373-9908-9.ch013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sutanu Ghosh",
        "Rigel Gjomemo",
        "Venkat N. Venkatakrishnan"
      ],
      "venue": "IGI Global eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4018/979-8-3373-9908-9.ch013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-9983-6.ch005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Software Engineering and Cybersecurity in Modern Electric Vehicles",
      "description": "Electric mobility is transforming vehicles into software-driven systems where functions like wheel control depend on integrated code rather than purely mechanical parts. This paper examines software-defined wheels in EVs, where motors, sensors, and actuators are managed through centralized and zonal architectures. While enabling features such as over-the-air updates, adaptive performance, and improved efficiency, this shift also introduces significant cybersecurity and safety risks. Large codebases increase vulnerability to threats that may impact braking and torque control. Addressing these challenges requires a co-engineering approach integrating cybersecurity and functional safety from the design stage. The study highlights secure-by-design practices, including encryption, intrusion detection, and compliance with standards such as ISO 21434, UNECE WP.29, and ISO 26262. It also stresses maintaining separation between safety-critical and non-critical systems during updates. Overall, unified frameworks are essential to ensure resilient and trustworthy EV systems.",
      "published": "2026-07-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3373-9983-6.ch005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "iso 21434",
        "secure",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Sasikumar"
      ],
      "venue": "IGI Global eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4018/979-8-3373-9983-6.ch005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-1970-3.ch012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Connected Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Multifaceted ramifications of integrating connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) into the transportation systems pose a complex puzzle, with no easily discernible solutions regarding their impact on traffic efficiency and safety. Arriving at a clearer understanding requires exhaustive assessments of the performance of mixed traffic involving AI and CAVs is imperative, as it holds the potential to furnish invaluable insights. The role of connectivity looms large in this context, as it wields the power to substantially enhance both road safety and traffic management, with spill-over advantages affecting congestion mitigation and, conceivably, air quality improvement. It is essential to recognize that the adoption of connectivity also ushers in a new set of challenges. These challenges encompass issues related to technology compatibility, safeguarding data privacy, and fortifying defenses against cyber threats. The knowledge generated from this comprehensive evaluation of CAVs can be harnessed to benefit stakeholders within the automotive industry, academia, and policymakers.",
      "published": "2023-12-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-1970-3.ch012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sharon L. Burton"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in business information systems and analytics book series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4018/979-8-3693-1970-3.ch012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-2715-9.ch013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Role of Cyber Security",
      "description": "The Fourth Industrial Revolution is reshaping travel and tourism with IoT, AI, and biometrics, enriching tourist experiences through enhanced vehicle technologies. However, heightened vehicle connectivity poses cybersecurity risks, endangering traveler safety and privacy. Effective cybersecurity strategies are essential to secure vehicle systems and sensitive data, ensuring a trustworthy tourism environment. Protection focuses on digital assets, personal information, and critical infrastructure like booking platforms and transport services. As cars integrate advanced infotainment, safeguarding navigation and communication data becomes crucial against evolving cyber threats. Reports highlight vulnerabilities in keyless entry systems, contrasting theft rates between vulnerable models and secure alternatives like Tesla, emphasizing encryption and biometric security measures. Enhanced cybersecurity practices, including updates, authentication, and compliance, are pivotal for mitigating risks in rental and connected vehicles, safeguarding against emerging threats in the automotive sector.",
      "published": "2024-05-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-2715-9.ch013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "infotainment",
        "keyless",
        "privacy",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kunal Ramesh Dhande"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in hospitality, tourism and the services industry (AHTSI) book series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4018/979-8-3693-2715-9.ch013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4779,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-2715-9.ch013 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: occupant_sensor, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: assets, personal, sensitive, platforms, transport, like, digital, services."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-9919-4.ch010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Ethical Issues in Cyber-Security for Autonomous Vehicles (AV) and Automated Driving",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) revolutionize the transportation landscape, they also introduce a profound set of ethical dilemmas. The convergence of complex networks, sensors, software, and AI creates an unprecedented cybersecurity risk, imperiling not only user privacy and data security but also safety. This study shines a light on the critical ethical concerns surrounding liability, responsibility, and decision-making algorithms, posing fundamental questions about how we allocate blame in the event of cyber breaches and ensure fairness in AV decision-making during life-or-death scenarios. In this groundbreaking research, we delve into the depths of these ethical challenges, offering comprehensive solutions and expert recommendations for fortifying cybersecurity in AVs. By exploring the intricate interplay between ethics, technology, and society, we can create a safer, more trustworthy, and equitable future for autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-04-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-9919-4.ch010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qais Al-Na’amneh",
        "Mahmoud Mohammad Aljawarneh",
        "Rahaf Hazaymih",
        "Rabia Emhamed Al Mamlook"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.4018/979-8-3693-9919-4.ch010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4018/ijcwt.2020040104",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Security Aspects of Automotive Over-the-Air Updates",
      "description": "Over-the-air (OTA) update is a method for vehicle manufacturers to remotely distribute maintenance updates, performance, and feature enhancements through the vehicle's lifespan. Recalls of vehicles cost the manufactures a lot of money. OTA solves the recall issue, while allowing consumers to pay for services and features via an update. The OTA ecosystem includes the coders who first developed the firmware, the 1st Tier suppliers, the vehicle manufacturers, and the vehicle itself. Currently, manufacturers designed the networks for speed and responsiveness, and not security. This article examines these elements and drills into the security available for each. The slowest and one of the most vulnerable parts of the system is the communications within the vehicle. The vehicle networks must ensure the integrity and authenticity of messages transmitted to guarantee software programmed onto ECUs are authorized and tamper-free. Specialist hardware within the vehicle makes this possible in an operation environment, such as hardware security modules.",
      "published": "2020-03-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4018/ijcwt.2020040104",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "James Howden",
        "Leandros A. Maglaras",
        "Mohamed Amine Ferrag"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.4018/ijcwt.2020040104",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4218/etrij.15.2314.0076",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Modal Interface Based on Novel HMI UI/UX for in-Vehicle Infotainment",
      "description": "Recent developments in the field of quantum computing have significantly impacted the domain of cryptography. In an innovative work, a group of researchers from Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute have proposed a quantum security strength analysis framework called ‘QCrypton’ that evaluates the quantum vulnerabilities underlying state-of-the-art cryptographic algorithms. QCrypton functions as an integrated platform encompassing steps from quantum circuit implementation to library generation. This framework could support future development of quantum hardware models.",
      "published": "2015-05-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4218/etrij.15.2314.0076",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "JINWOO KIM",
        "Jaehong Ryu",
        "Teaman Han"
      ],
      "venue": "ETRI Journal",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.4218/etrij.15.2314.0076",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4236/ajibm.2025.159062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimizing Operating Costs in Small Logistics Businesses (U.S.)",
      "description": "This study examines the structure and evolution of operating costs among small U.S. logistics firms from 2019 to 2024. We analyze marginal cost per mile and its sensitivity to fluctuations in fuel prices, insurance premiums, and labor shortages. Drawing on data from ATRI, ATA, Overdrive, and other industry sources, we document a market-cycle reversal: a surge of new carriers in 2020-2021 gave way to fleet contraction in 2022-2023. Three categories of cost-reduction practices are identified—telematics for vehicle-movement monitoring, freight-flow consolidation schemes, and financial risk-sharing instruments. Empirical estimates show that collectively implementing these measures can lower per-trip unit costs while maintaining service standards. The author contributes a typology of effective strategies, assessing their scalability and financial resilience for small fleets. Findings are directed to owner-operators, digital-platform developers, and regulators shaping policies to bolster industry competitiveness.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4236/ajibm.2025.159062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "resilience",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vitalii Kostrub"
      ],
      "venue": "American Journal of Industrial and Business Management",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.4236/ajibm.2025.159062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4236/jcc.2016.416004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Systematic Approach for Cyber Security in Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "Vehicular Networks (VANET) are the largest real-life paradigm of ad hoc networks which aim to ensure road safety and enhance drivers’ comfort. In VANET, the vehicles communicate or collaborate with each other and with adjacent infrastructure by exchanging significant messages, such as road accident warnings, steep-curve ahead warnings or traffic jam warnings. However, this communication and other assets involved are subject to major threats and provide numerous opportunities for attackers to launch several attacks and compromise security and privacy of vehicular users. This paper reviews the cyber security in VANET and proposes an asset-based approach for VANET security. Firstly, it identifies relevant assets in VANET. Secondly, it provides a detailed taxonomy of vulnerabilities and threats on these assets, and, lastly, it classifies the possible attacks in VANET and critically evaluates them.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4236/jcc.2016.416004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Farhan Ahmad",
        "Asma Adnane",
        "Virginia N. L. Franqueira"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer and Communications",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.4236/jcc.2016.416004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4236/jcc.2019.712003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Replay Attack and Defense of Electric Vehicle Charging on GB/T 27930-2015 Communication Protocol",
      "description": "The GB/T 27930-2015 protocol is the communication protocol between the non-vehicle-mounted charger and the battery management system (BMS) stipulated by the state. However, as the protocol adopts the way of broadcast communication and plaintext to transmit data, the data frame does not contain the source address and the destination address, making the Electric Vehicle (EV) vulnerable to replay attack in the charging process. In order to verify the security problems of the protocol, this paper uses 27,655 message data in the complete charging process provided by Shanghai Thaisen electric company, and analyzes these actual data frames one by one with the program written by C++. In order to enhance the security of the protocol, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) digital signature and adding random numbers are proposed to resist replay attack. Under the experimental environment of Eclipse, the normal charging of electric vehicles, RSA digital signature and random number defense are simulated. Experimental results show that RSA digital signature cannot resist replay attack, and adding random numbers can effectively enhance the ability of EV to resist replay attack during charging.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4236/jcc.2019.712003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yafei Li",
        "Yong Wang",
        "Min Wu",
        "Haiming Li"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer and Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.4236/jcc.2019.712003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4236/jcc.2024.127004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematics as a Transformative Agent for the Zimbabwean Auto Insurance Ecosystem",
      "description": "Zimbabwe has witnessed the evolution of Information Communication Technology (ICT). The vehicle population soared to above 1.2 million hence rendering the Transport and Insurance domains complex. Therefore, there is a need to look at ways that can augment conventional Vehicular Management Information Systems (VMIS) in transforming business processes through Telematics. This paper aims to contextualise the role that telematics can play in transforming the Insurance Ecosystem in Zimbabwe. The main objective was to investigate the integration of Usage-Based Insurance (UBI) with vehicle tracking solutions provided by technology companies like Econet Wireless in Zimbabwe, aiming to align customer billing with individual risk profiles and enhance the synergy between technology and insurance service providers in the motor insurance ecosystem. A triangulation through structured interviews, questionnaires, and literature review, supported by Information Systems Analysis and Design techniques was conducted. The study adopted a case study approach, qualitatively analyzing the complexities of the Telematics insurance ecosystem in Zimbabwe, informed by the TOGAF framework. A case-study approach was applied to derive themes whilst applying within and cross-case analysis. Data was collected using questionnaires, and interviews. The findings of the research clearly show the importance of Telematics in modern-day insurance and the positive relationship between technology and insurance business performance. The study, therefore revealed how UBI can incentivize positive driver behavior, potentially reducing insurance premiums for safe drivers and lowering the incidence of claims against insurance companies. Future work can be done on studying the role of Telematics in combating highway crime and corruption.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4236/jcc.2024.127004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prosper Tafadzwa Denhere",
        "Joyce Denhere",
        "Gracious Mutipforo",
        "Chipo Katsande",
        "Allan C. Muzenda",
        "Nelson Matanana",
        "Gibson Muridzi"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer and Communications",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4236/jcc.2024.127004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4236/jis.2025.161004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Multi-Factor Authentication for Keyless Entry Systems: An Innovative Approach to Automotive Security",
      "description": "Car manufacturers aim to enhance the use of two-factor authentication (2FA) to protect keyless entry systems in contemporary cars. Despite providing significant ease for users, keyless entry systems have become more susceptible to appealing attacks like relay attacks and critical fob hacking. These weaknesses present considerable security threats, resulting in unauthorized entry and car theft. The suggested approach combines a conventional keyless entry feature with an extra security measure. Implementing multi-factor authentication significantly improves the security of systems that allow keyless entry by reducing the likelihood of unauthorized access. Research shows that the benefits of using two-factor authentication, such as a substantial increase in security, far outweigh any minor drawbacks.",
      "published": "2024-12-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4236/jis.2025.161004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "hacking",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Danilo Brito",
        "Abdelshakour Abuzneid"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Information Security",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4236/jis.2025.161004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4236/wet.2018.94007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Classification Approach for Intrusion Detection in Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) enable wireless communication among Vehicles and Infrastructures. Connected vehicles are promising in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) and smart cities. The main ob-jective of VANET is to improve the safety, comfort, driving efficiency and waiting time on the road. VANET is unlike other ad hoc networks due to its unique characteristics and high mobility. However, it is vulnerable to various security attacks due to the lack of centralized infrastructure. This is a serious threat to the safety of road traffic. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a bus communication protocol which defines a standard for reliable and efficient transmission between in-vehicle parts simultaneously. The message moves through CAN bus from one node to another node, but it does not have information about the source and destination address for authentication. Thus, the attacker can easily inject any message to lead to system faults. In this paper, we present machine learning techniques to cluster and classify the intrusions in VANET by KNN and SVM algorithms. The intrusion detection technique relies on the analysis of the offset ratio and time interval between the messages request and the response in the CAN.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4236/wet.2018.94007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abdulaziz Alshammari",
        "Mohamed Ali Zohdy",
        "Debatosh Debnath",
        "George Corser"
      ],
      "venue": "Wireless Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4236/wet.2018.94007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 135,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3975,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4236/wet.2018.94007 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: serious, response, information, safety, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/11-01-01-0003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Using the Density Estimation of Reception Cycle Periods for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The automotive industry intends to create new services that involve sharing vehicle control information via a wide area network. In modern vehicles, an in-vehicle network shares information between more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) inside a vehicle while it is driven. However, such a complicated system configuration can result in security vulnerabilities. The possibility of cyber-attacks on vehicles via external services has been demonstrated in many research projects. As advances in vehicle systems (e.g., autonomous drive) progress, the number of vulnerabilities to be exploited by cyber-attacks will also increase. Therefore, future vehicles need security measures to detect unknown cyber-attacks. We propose anomaly-based intrusion detection to detect unknown cyber-attacks for the Control Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is popular as a communication protocol for in-vehicle networks. For the easy deployment and maintenance of the IDS, the proposed method learns the behavior model online. We compared the proposed method with conventional methods using captured CAN traffic data, and confirmed that, under attack, only the proposed method simultaneously achieved a high illegitimate frame detection rate and correct frame detection rate.",
      "published": "2018-05-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/11-01-01-0003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yoshihiro Hamada",
        "Masayuki Inoue",
        "Hiroshi Ueda",
        "Yukihiro Miyashita",
        "Yoichi Hata"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/11-01-01-0003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/11-01-02-0005",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancement of Automotive Penetration Testing with Threat Analyses Results",
      "description": "In this work, we present an approach to support penetration tests by combining safety and security analyses to enhance automotive security testing. Our approach includes a new way to combine safety and threat analyses to derive possible test cases. We reuse outcomes of a performed safety analysis as the input for a threat analysis. We show systematically how to derive test cases, and we present the applicability of our approach by deriving and performing test cases for a penetration test of an automotive electronic control unit (ECU). Therefore, we selected an airbag control unit due to its safety-critical functionality. During the penetration test, the selected control unit was installed on a test bench, and we were able to successfully exploit a discovered vulnerability, causing the detonation of airbags.",
      "published": "2018-11-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/11-01-02-0005",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploit",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jürgen Dürrwang",
        "Johannes Braun",
        "Marcel Rumez",
        "Reiner Kriesten",
        "Alexander Pretschner"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/11-01-02-0005",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/11-02-01-0002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability of FlexRay and Countermeasures",
      "description": "The importance of in-vehicle network security has increased with an increase in automated and connected vehicles. Hence, many attacks and countermeasures have been proposed to secure the controller area network (CAN), which is an existent in-vehicle network protocol. At the same time, new protocols-such as FlexRay and Ethernet-which are faster and more reliable than CAN have also been proposed. European OEMs have adopted FlexRay as a control network that can perform the fundamental functions of a vehicle. However, there are few studies regarding FlexRay security. In particular, studies on attacks against FlexRay are limited to theoretical studies or simulation-based experiments. Hence, the vulnerability of FlexRay is unclear. Understanding this vulnerability is necessary for the application of countermeasures and improving the security of future vehicles. In this article, we highlight the vulnerability of FlexRay found in the experiments conducted on a real FlexRay network. Consequently, we clarify the conditions under which attackers masquerade as legitimate electronic control units (ECUs) and transmit spoofed FlexRay frames. We also confirm that a consumer vehicle’s functions such as steering, braking, and acceleration can be controlled maliciously using spoofing attacks. Furthermore, we discuss countermeasures against spoofing attacks on FlexRay networks.",
      "published": "2019-05-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/11-02-01-0002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takeshi Kishikawa",
        "Ryo Hirano",
        "Yoshihiro Ujiie",
        "Tomoyuki Haga",
        "Hideki Matsushima",
        "Kazuya Fujimura",
        "Jun Anzai"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.4271/11-02-01-0002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4293,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/11-02-01-0002 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy, vehicle_control; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: vehicle., limited, functions, studies, there, privacy, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/11-02-02-0009",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the On-Board Diagnostics Port (OBD-II) in Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles integrate Internet of Things (IoT) components to bring value-added services to both drivers and passengers. These components communicate with the external world through different types of interfaces including the on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) port, a mandatory interface in all vehicles in the United States and Europe. While this transformation has driven significant advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also opened a door to a wide variety of cyberattacks, as the architectures of vehicles were never designed with external connectivity in mind, and accordingly, security has never been pivotal in the design. As standardized, the OBD-II port allows not only direct access to the internal network of the vehicle but also installing software on the Electronic Control Units (ECUs). While this privilege, historically, is achieved through physical access on the underlying port using a dedicated tool, remote access is recently supported in many modern vehicles, i.e., self-driving ones, and via OBD-II dongles, making the OBD-II port the most significant automotive interface that has to be secured. Motivated by various recent attacks and vulnerability analyses of OBD-II, this paper tackles the problem of lack of security in OBD-II by proposing a novel end-to-end role-based access control (RBAC) mechanism that would prevent unauthorized access to any of the vehicle functionality through existing vulnerable OBD-II ports. The proposed solution is AUTOSAR compliant and architecture independent, and does not require modifying any hardware inside the vehicle. Accordingly, it applies to the millions of current on-road vehicles. Furthermore, while physical attacks are not avoidable, they are not scalable, considering our approach, and only affect the attacked vehicle. We provide a proof of concept implementation and evaluation of the proposed solution, showing its robustness and efficiency.",
      "published": "2020-08-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/11-02-02-0009",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecus",
        "obd-ii",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahmoud Ammar",
        "Hassaan Janjua",
        "Ashok Samraj Thangarajan",
        "Bruno Crispo A",
        "Danny Hughes"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.4271/11-02-02-0009",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/11-02-02-0013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assuring Vehicle Update Integrity Using Asymmetric Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key Cryptography (PKC)",
      "description": "Over the past forty years, the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) technology has grown in both sophistication and volume in the automotive sector, and modern vehicles may comprise hundreds of ECUs. ECUs typically communicate via a bus-based network architecture to collectively support a broad range of safety-critical capabilities, such as obstacle avoidance, lane management, and adaptive cruise control. However, this technology evolution has also brought about risks: if ECU firmware is compromised, then vehicle safety may be compromised. Recent experiments and demonstrations have shown that ECU firmware is not only poorly protected but also that compromised firmware may pose safety risks to occupants and bystanders. While there have been no known instances of ECU firmware tampering on consumer vehicles outside of controlled academic or security research, and other work has been done to separate and compartmentalize ECUs, the security risks of unprotected ECU firmware must be addressed, especially as additional ECUs are developed to enable Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2X), and automated driving functionalities. To this end, we propose an asymmetric key-based infrastructure for signing and validating ECU firmware leveraging the existing federation in the vehicle component manufacturing space that exists between major automotive manufacturers and their major suppliers (“Tier-1 Suppliers”). Verification of firmware integrity occurs at ECU boot as well as during firmware updates. We developed a software implementation to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach and its resistance to certain types of attacks. Lastly, we performed an analysis of the scheme’s possible attack surface, demonstrating how our proposal can enhance the current state of the art in ECU firmware integrity.",
      "published": "2020-08-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/11-02-02-0013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel Kent",
        "Betty H. C. Cheng",
        "Joshua Eric Siegel"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.4271/11-02-02-0013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/11-03-02-0007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Simple Cryptographic Key Management Scheme of the Electronic Control Unit in the Lifecycle of a Vehicle",
      "description": "Connecting vehicles to various network services increases the risk of in-vehicle cyberattacks. For automotive industries, the supply chain for assembling a vehicle consists of many different organizations such as component suppliers, system suppliers, and car manufacturers (CMs). Moreover, once a vehicle has shipped from the factory of the CM, resellers, dealers, and owners of the vehicle may add and replace the optional authorized and third-party equipment. Such equipment may have serious security vulnerabilities that may be targeted by a malicious attacker. The key management system of a vehicle must be applicable to all use cases. We propose a novel key management system adaptable to the electronic control unit (ECU) lifecycle of a vehicle. The scope of our system is not only the vehicle product line but also the third-party vendors of automotive accessories and vehicle maintenance facilities, including resellers, dealers, and vehicle users. Our system consists of in-vehicle communication and backend information systems of CMs, ECU manufacturers (EMs), and vehicle maintenance facilities. We introduce an authentication ECU (A-ECU) and apply a one-time pad (OTP) to encrypt pre-shared keys. A pre-shared key ciphered by an OTP is installed in each ECU in an EM. An A-ECU obtains an OTP through the server of the CM from the EM, shares the pre-shared keys with the ECU using the OTP, authenticates the ECU mutually, and generates a session key to communicate with the ECU. When the ECU is replaced in a vehicle maintenance factory, the vehicle maintenance factory obtains the OTP of the replaced ECU from the CM and installs a pre-shared key. With this scheme, there is no critically important information, such as a master key for key generation. In addition, such communications are protected by the public key infrastructure (PKI). If the management of the backend communication is adequately protected, it becomes difficult to crack into the system. To prove the practicality of the system, we estimate the performance of our protocol in a high-speed controller area network (CAN). The sharing of a pre-shared key costs 10 data frames and, in the best case, takes 1.12 ms.",
      "published": "2021-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/11-03-02-0007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Toru Sakon",
        "Yukikazu Nakamoto"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/11-03-02-0007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/11-03-02-0008",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Delivering Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Based on ISO 21434: Practical and Tooling Considerations",
      "description": "Automotive cybersecurity engineers now have the challenge of delivering Risk Assessments of their products using a method that is described in the new standard for automotive cybersecurity: International Organization for Standardization/Society of Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434. The ISO standards are not treated in the same way as regulations that are mandated by governing bodies. However, the new United Nations (UN) Regulation No. 155 “Cyber Security and Cyber Security Management” actually drives a need to apply ISO/SAE 21434. This article investigates the practical aspects of performing such a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) from system modelling and asset identification to attack modelling and the consequences an attack will have. The processes involved contain complex interactions, meaning that the support of software tools is beneficial; while not aiming to provide a review of the state-of-the-art of TARA tooling, this article provides observations based on the real-world use of two software tools that support the development of TARAs.",
      "published": "2020-12-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/11-03-02-0008",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kamil Svancara",
        "Martin J. Thompson"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/11-03-02-0008",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/12-04-04-0026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Threat Analysis of In-vehicle Network Using STRIDE-Based Attack Tree and Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process",
      "description": "The development of electrification, industrial intelligence, and interconnectivity has driven the transformation of the automobile from a mechanical to an intelligent product. Automobiles have gradually changed from a closed system to an open environment. Therefore, a variety of security threats and attack surfaces are emerging. Hackers or attackers can illegally access and control vehicles through external interfaces such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular. Automotive cybersecurity issues are becoming more prominent than ever. SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434 being drafted also indicate that automotive cybersecurity has been elevated to a position equal to or more important than functional safety. Security threat analysis helps the development of the early concept phase of automotive cybersecurity. However, the threat analysis based on the traditional attack tree has the disadvantages of multiple subjective factors and low accuracy. In this article, we present an attack tree analysis method based on Microsoft’s threat model and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP). First, a hierarchical in-vehicle network model is proposed. Then, with the help of Microsoft’s threat model, we identify the threats corresponding to the assets and construct a more comprehensive attack tree. Finally, for each threat attack sequence of the attack tree, the attack probability is calculated based on the FAHP. Furthermore, FAHP is compared with the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and traditional methods. The results show that the proposed method plays a certain role in security threat analysis.",
      "published": "2021-10-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/12-04-04-0026",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Xuan Zhang",
        "Shuo Hou"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International Journal of Connected and Automated Vehicles",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/12-04-04-0026",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/12-05-03-0020",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physics-Based Misbehavior Detection System for V2X Communications",
      "description": "Vehicle to Everything (V2X) allows vehicles, pedestrians, and infrastructure to share information for the purpose of enhancing road safety, improving traffic conditions, and lowering transporation costs. Although V2X messages are authenticated, their content is not validated. Sensor errors or adversarial attacks can cause messages to be perturbed increasing the likelihood of traffic jams, compromising the decision process of other vehicles, and provoking fatal crashes. In this article, we introduce V2X Core Anomaly Detection System (VCADS), a system based on the theory presented in [1] and built for the fields provided in the periodic messages shared across vehicles (i.e., Basic Safety Messages, BSMs). VCADS uses physics-based models to constrain the values in each field and detect anomalies by finding the numerical difference between a field and and its derivation using orthogonal values. VCADS evaluation is performed with four real V2X field testing datasets and a suite of attack simulations. The results show that VCADS can constrain a variety of real-world network environments and is able to detect ~85% to ~95% of attacks coming from an adversary capable of perturbing one or more data fields.",
      "published": "2022-03-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/12-05-03-0020",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alejandro Antonio Andrade Salazar",
        "Patrick Drew McDaniel",
        "Ryan Sheatsley",
        "Jonathan Petit"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International Journal of Connected and Automated Vehicles",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/12-05-03-0020",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/12-07-02-0013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Global Survey of Standardization and Industry Practices of Automotive Cybersecurity Validation and Verification Testing Processes and Tools",
      "description": "The United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Regulation 155—Cybersecurity and Cybersecurity Management System (UN R155) mandates the development of cybersecurity management systems (CSMS) as part of a vehicle’s lifecycle. An inherent component of the CSMS is cybersecurity risk management and assessment. Validation and verification testing is a key activity for measuring the effectiveness of risk management, and it is mandated by UN R155 for type approval. Due to the focus of R155 and its suggested implementation guideline, ISO/SAE 21434:2021—Road Vehicle Cybersecurity Engineering, mainly centering on the alignment of cybersecurity risk management to the vehicle development lifecycle, there is a gap in knowledge of proscribed activities for validation and verification testing. This research provides guidance on automotive cybersecurity testing and verification by providing an overview of the state-of-the-art in relevant automotive standards, outlining their transposition into national regulation and the currently used processes and tools in the automotive industry. Through engagement with state-of-the-art literature and workshops and surveys with industry groups, our study found that national regulatory authorities are moving to enshrine UN R155 as part of their vehicle regulations, with differences of implementation based on regulatory culture and pre-existing approaches to vehicle regulation. Validation and verification testing is developing aligned to UN R155 and ISO21434:2021; however, the testing approaches currently used within industry utilize elements of traditional enterprise information technology methods for penetration testing and toolsets. Electrical/electronic (E/E) components such as embedded control units (ECUs) are considered the primary testing target; however, connected and autonomous vehicle technologies are increasingly attracting more focus for testing.",
      "published": "2023-11-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/12-07-02-0013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "penetration",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andrew Roberts",
        "Stefan Marksteiner",
        "Müjdat Soytürk",
        "Berkay Yaman",
        "Yi Huai Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International Journal of Connected and Automated Vehicles",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/12-07-02-0013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2016-01-0056",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Feasibility Study for a Secure and Seamless Integration of Over the Air Software Update Capability in an Advanced Board Net Architecture",
      "description": "Vehicle manufacturers are challenged by rising costs for vehicle recalls. A major part of the costs are caused by software updates. This paper describes a feasibility study on how to implement software update over the air (SOTA) in light vehicles. The differences and special challenges in the automotive environment in comparison to the cellular industry will be explained. Three key requirements focus on the drivers’ acceptance and thus are crucial for the vehicle manufacturers: SOTA must be protected against malicious attacks. SOTA shall interfere as little as possible with the availability of a vehicle. Long update processes with long vehicle downtimes or even complete fails must be avoided. The functional safety of the vehicle during operation may not be limited in any way The study gives options how those objectives can be achieved. It considers the necessary security measures and describes the required adaptations of the board-net architectures both on software and hardware level.",
      "published": "2016-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2016-01-0056",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bjoern Steurich",
        "Klaus Scheibert",
        "Axel Freiwald",
        "Martin Klimke"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.4271/2016-01-0056",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2016-01-0081",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected Car Architecture and Virtualization",
      "description": "Connectivity has become an essential need for daily device users. With the car projected to be the “ultimate mobile device”, connectivity modules will eventually be mainstream in every car. Network providers are expanding their infrastructure and technology to accommodate the connected cars. Besides making voice and emergency calls the connected car will be sharing data with telematics service providers, back end systems and other vehicles. This trend will increase vehicle modules, complexity, entry points and vulnerabilities. This paper will present the current connected car architectures. The paper will present current architectural issues of the connected car and its vulnerabilities. The paper will present a new proposed architecture for the future connected car that enhances efficiency and security.",
      "published": "2016-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2016-01-0081",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Husein Dakroub",
        "Adnan Shaout",
        "Arafat Awajan"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of passenger cars. Electronic and electrical systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.4271/2016-01-0081",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2016-01-1948",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safe and Secure Software Updates Over The Air for Electronic Brake Control Systems",
      "description": "Vehicle manufacturers are suffering from increasing expenses for fixing software issues. This fact is mainly driving their desire to use mobile communication channels for doing Software Updates Over The Air (SOTA). Software updates today are typically done at vehicle service stations by connecting the vehicles’ electronic network via the On Board Diagnostic (OBD) interface to a service computer. These operations are done under the control of trained technicians. SOTA means that the update process must get handled by the driver. Two critical aspects need to get considered when doing SOTA at Electronic Brake Control (EBC) systems. Both will determine the acceptance of SOTA by legal authorities and by the passengers: The safety and security of the vehicle The availability of the vehicle for the passengers The security aspect includes the necessity to protect the vehicle and the manufacturers IP from unwanted attacks. Existing safety measures ensure safe operation of a vehicle at all times. In general and especially for EBC systems the existing safety measures need extensions for updating software in remote locations. It must be absolutely ensured, that the vehicle will not move while changing the software. In difference to software updates at service stations the SOTA concept must consider any possible level of technical knowhow of any potential driver, who might start an update. This requirement is not just critical for updating the EBC itself but also for updating other ECUs. Vehicles cannot be driven while updating the software and thus they are not available for a certain period of time. In this paper three different approaches are discussed how to execute SOTA and what this means with respect to the duration of the update process. The study starts with a detailed analysis of the operations and activities for updating software within a vehicle and EBC unit. It includes descriptions of data flows and examples of the influences by the various bus options of the vehicles’ networks. Next are explained options for scalable system solutions and implementing security functions within the vehicles network with examples of its implementation by using existing electronic components. Finally we show options for the implementation and how to reduce the downtime of the EBC system. Several aspects of cyber security in vehicles have been studied in the past. This paper concentrates onto the specifics for EBC systems in a holistic system approach.",
      "published": "2016-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2016-01-1948",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "obd",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Axel Freiwald",
        "Gunn Hwang"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of passenger cars. Electronic and electrical systems",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.4271/2016-01-1948",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2017-01-1654",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploiting Consistency Among Heterogeneous Sensors for Vehicle Anomaly Detection",
      "description": "Modern vehicles house many advanced components; sensors and Electronic Control Units (ECUs) — now numbering in the 100s. These components provide various advanced safety, comfort and infotainment features, but they also introduce additional attack vectors for malicious entities. Attackers can compromise one or more of these sensors and flood the vehicle’s internal network with fake sensor values. Falsified sensor values can confuse the driver, and even cause the vehicle to misbehave. Redundancy can be used to address compromised sensors, but adding redundant sensors will increase the cost per vehicle and is therefore less attractive. To balance the need for security and cost-efficiency, we exploit the natural redundancy found in vehicles. Natural redundancy occurs when the same physical phenomenon causes symptoms in multiple sensors. For instance, pressing the accelerator pedal will cause the engine to pump faster and increase the speed of the vehicle. Engine RPM and vehicle speed are multiple sensors which respond in a related fashion to the same cause of the accelerator pedal. The challenge is identifying the relationship between similar but different sensors under normal operation and detecting anomalous be-havior accurately. In this paper, we develop the tools to capture the relationship between sensors. Specifically, we use the pairwise correlation between key variables, and use cluster-analysis to identify distinct behavior of drivers. Moreover, we show preliminary results of using these tools to detect attacks within a vehicular communication bus.",
      "published": "2017-03-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2017-01-1654",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arun Ganesan",
        "Jayanthi Rao",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.4271/2017-01-1654",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 61,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2017-01-1931",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Truck of the Future: Autonomous and Connected Driving at Daimler Trucks",
      "description": "Due to the continuous increasing highway transport and the decreasing investments into infrastructure a better usage of the installed infrastructure is indispensable. Therefore the operation and interoperation of assistance and telematics systems become more and more necessary. Regarding these facts Highway Pilot was developed at Daimler Trucks. The Highway Pilot System moves the truck highly automated and independent from other road users within the allowed speed range and the required security distance. Daimler Trucks owns diverse permissions in Germany and the USA for testing these technologies on public roads. Next generation is the Highway Pilot Connect System that connects three highly automated driving trucks. The connection is established via Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication (V2V).",
      "published": "2017-05-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2017-01-1931",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christian Ballarin",
        "Martin Zeilinger"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.4271/2017-01-1931",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2018-01-0012",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Leveraging Hardware Security to Secure Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Advanced safety features and new services in connected cars depend on the security of the underlying vehicle functions. Due to the interconnection with the outside world and as a result of being an embedded system a modern vehicle is exposed to both, malicious activities as faced by traditional IT world systems as well as physical attacks. This introduces the need for utilizing hardware-assisted security measures to prevent both kinds of attacks. In this paper we present a survey of the different classes of hardware security devices and depict their different functional range and application. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by conducting a case study on an exemplary implementation of a function-on-demand use case. In particular, our example outlines how to apply the different hardware security approaches in practice to address real-world security topics. We conclude with an assessment of today’s hardware security devices. Based on our presented case study we outline the identified gaps and derive the necessary future developments for next-generation hardware security devices to meet the requirements for automotive applications.",
      "published": "2018-04-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2018-01-0012",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christopher Corbett",
        "Martin Brunner",
        "Karsten Schmidt",
        "Rolf Schneider",
        "Udo Dannebaum"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/2018-01-0012",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2018-01-0013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proposal of HILS-Based In-Vehicle Network Security Verification Environment",
      "description": "We propose a security-testing framework to analyze attack feasibilities for automotive control software by integrating model-based development with model checking techniques. Many studies have pointed out the vulnerabilities in the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is widely used in in-vehicle network systems. However, many security attacks on automobiles did not explicitly consider the transmission timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. Additionally, in terms of security testing for automobiles, most existing studies have only focused on the generation of the testing packets to realize vulnerabilities, but they did not consider the timing of invoking a security testing. Therefore, we focus on the transmit timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. In our experiments, we have demonstrated the classification of feasible attacks at the early development phase by integrating the model checking techniques into a virtualized environment.",
      "published": "2018-04-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2018-01-0013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ryo Kurachi",
        "Toshiyuki Fujikura"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/2018-01-0013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2018-01-0014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Case Study for Defining Security Goals and Requirements for Automotive Security Parts Using Threat Modeling",
      "description": "Several external networks like telematics, and SOTA and many in-vehicle networks by gateways and domain controllers have been increasingly introduced. However, these trends may potentially make many critical data opened, attacked and modified by hackers. These days, vehicle security has been significantly required as these vehicle security threats are related to the human life like drivers and pedestrians. Threat modeling is process of secure software development lifecycle which is developed by Microsoft. It is a systematic approach for analyzing the potential threat in software and identifying the security risk associated with software. Through threat modeling, security risk is be mitigated and eliminated. In vehicle software System, one of vulnerability can affect critical problem about safety. An approach from experience and hacking cases is not enough for analyzing the potential threat and preparing new hacking attack. Thus, as specified J3061, in concept phase, threat analysis and risk assessment is needed. At the beginning of this paper, weaknesses of several current security use cases are shown. As the first step, with use cases shown in the first step, system components based on threat modeling are defined. As the second step, threat identification and risk assessment are executed. As the last step, security goal and requirements of each component are defined. The 32-bit MCU with embedded hardware security module (HSM) is used for threat identification and risk assessment.",
      "published": "2018-04-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2018-01-0014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jin Seo Park",
        "Daehyun Kim",
        "Seokmin Hong",
        "Hyunjung Lee",
        "Eui-Jung Myeong"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/2018-01-0014",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2018-01-0016",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigating Unknown Cybersecurity Threats in Performance Constrained Electronic Control Units",
      "description": "Externally-connected Electronic Control Units (ECUs) contain millions of lines of code, which may contain security vulnerabilities. Hackers may exploit these vulnerabilities to gain code execution privileges, which affect public safety. Traditional Cybersecurity solutions fall short in meeting automotive ECU constraints such as zero false positives, intermittent connectivity, and low performance impact. A desirable solution would be deterministic, require minimum resources, and protect against known and unknown security threats. We integrated Autonomous Security on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) system to evaluate the feasibility of mitigating Cybersecurity risks against potential threats. We identified key metrics that should be measured, such as level of security, ease of integration and system performance impact. In this paper, we describe the integration and evaluation process and present its results. We show that Autonomous Security can provide this protection with zero false-positives while meeting automotive constraints.",
      "published": "2018-04-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2018-01-0016",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Assaf Harel",
        "Tal Ben David",
        "Ameer Kashani",
        "Gopalakrishnan Iyer",
        "Ando Motonori",
        "Masumi Egawa"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/2018-01-0016",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2018-01-0018",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Mechanisms Design for In-Vehicle Network Gateway",
      "description": "In the automotive network architecture, the basic functions of gateway include routing, diagnostic, network management and so on. With the rapid development of connected vehicles, the cybersecurity has become an important topic in the automotive network. A spoof ECU can be used to hack the automotive network. In order to prevent the in-vehicle networks from attacking, the automotive gateway is an important part of the security architecture. A secure gateway should be able to authenticate the connected ECU and control the access to the critical network domain. The data and signals transferred between gateway and ECUs should be protected to against wiretap attacking. The purpose of this paper is to design a secure gateway for in-vehicle networks. In this paper, the designing process of the automotive secure gateway is presented. Based on the threat analysis, security requirements for automotive gateway are defined. Secure communication, key master, and firewall are proposed as the security mechanisms to protect the automotive gateway. Secure communication mechanisms contain the message authentication and data encryption. Key master is a gateway function to distribute and update the keys for the secure communication of connected ECUs. Firewall based on message filter is designed to isolate the untrusted network domain and trusted network domain. The security functions of the automotive gateway are validated in a simulated attacking environment. A microcontroller with HSM is used to implement the secure gateway. Considering the influences of security mechanisms, the network latency is tested and the results have proved the secure gateway is effective and efficient.",
      "published": "2018-04-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2018-01-0018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Qiang Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/2018-01-0018",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2019-01-0481",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Mechanisms Design of Automotive Gateway Firewall",
      "description": "Automotive security has become one of important topics in recent years under new automotive Electronic and Electrical Architecture (EEA). With the development of Intelligent Connected Vehicle (ICV), it has become possible to hack an automotive through in-vehicle networks. The introduction of Information Communications Technology (ICT) brings more risk threats to automotive. Researchers have shown that an attacker can easily tamper with many automotive functions via On-Board Diagnostic II (OBD-II) or In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI). In order to protect automotive against malicious attacks, automotive security risks were analyzed and then security mechanisms based on network firewall were designed in this paper. Automotive network firewall is a security system that monitors and controls incoming and outgoing network traffics of automotive based on predetermined security rules. The main functions of network firewall include packet filter, anti-DoS and access control. Because of deferent security requirements of in-vehicle networks, CAN/FD and Ethernet were divided into two domains respectively. Packet filter mechanisms were designed to monitor CAN/FD, in which security level and time delay were considered. Ethernet firewall mechanisms were designed based on Stateful Packet Filter (SPF) technology. Beside packet filter mechanisms, anti-DoS and access control mechanisms were also designed. Security Real Time Operating System (SRTOS) was introduced to ensure lower layer security. Considering the ECU constraint, Hardware Security Module (HSM) is chosen to implement cryptography function. At last, proposed automotive network firewall were implemented base on a multicore MCU with HSM. The system is evaluated in several aspects such as packet throughput, time delay, anti-attack and memory usage. The evaluation results show that the automotive network firewall is effective and efficient.",
      "published": "2019-04-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2019-01-0481",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Shuo Hou"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.4271/2019-01-0481",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2019-26-0363",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Inter-Processor Communication in Automotive ECUs",
      "description": "Modern cars now come with sophisticated telemetry which often involve connecting to the internet over mobile telephone networks or Wi-Fi. The telemetry or cloud functions of the car is typically handled by a Telematics Control Unit or the Infotainment System. The microcontrollers (Host Processor) powering the ECUs are very powerful and often have operating systems such as Linux or QNX to drive the large displays or perform modem functionalities. These powerful microcontrollers take several seconds to startup and does not offer hard real-time performance - both of which are critical to handle the vehicle CAN network. Hence, it is common to include a less powerful microcontroller to the ECU to perform the management of the vehicle CAN network. These smaller microcontrollers (Vehicle Processor) can startup fast and provide hard real-time performance. The Host Processor and the Vehicle Processor are connected by the Inter-Processor Communication Link (IPCL) to exchange information between them. This communication link, while often overlooked regarding complexity and importance, must be included in security/threat analysis, as well. This was made obvious when the vehicle functionalities of the 2015 Jeep vehicle was controlled remotely by unauthorized actors, which involved compromising the communication link and reprogramming the Vehicle Processor to take control of the Vehicle CAN bus. This paper analyses the threat vectors pertaining to IPCL and provides solutions that address each of those threats with minimal impact to the performance of the communication link.",
      "published": "2019-01-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2019-26-0363",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "jeep",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karthik Shanmugam"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.4271/2019-26-0363",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2020-01-1295",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Analysis of Android Automotive",
      "description": "In-vehicle infotainment (IVI) platforms are getting increasingly connected. Besides OEM apps and services, the next generation of IVI platforms are expected to offer integration of third-party apps. Under this anticipated business model, vehicular sensor and event data can be collected and shared with selected third-party apps. To accommodate this trend, Google has been pushing towards standardization among proprietary IVI operating systems with their Android Automotive platform which runs natively on the vehicle’s IVI platform. Unlike Android Auto’s limited functionality of display-projecting certain smartphone apps to the IVI screen, Android Automotive will have access to the in-vehicle network (IVN), and will be able to read and share various vehicular sensor data with third-party apps. This increased connectivity opens new business opportunities for both the car manufacturer as well as third-party businesses, but also introduces a new attack surface on the vehicle. Therefore, Android Automotive must have a secure system architecture to prevent any potential attacks that might compromise the security and privacy of the vehicle and the driver. In particular, malicious third-party entities could remotely compromise a vehicle’s functionalities and impact the vehicle safety, causing financial and operational damage to the vehicle, as well as compromise the driver’s privacy and safety. This paper presents an Android Automotive system architecture and provides guidelines for conducting a high-level security analysis. It also describes what countermeasures have already been taken by Google to prevent potential attacks, and discusses what still needs to be done in order to offer a secure and privacy-preserving Android experience for next-generation IVI platforms.",
      "published": "2020-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2020-01-1295",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Kang Geun Shin",
        "Josiah Bruner",
        "Amy Chu"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International Journal of Advances and Current Practices in Mobility",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.4271/2020-01-1295",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2020-01-1373",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Diagnostic System for Prognostics and OTA Updates of Automated/Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The increasing complexity of microcontroller-based automotive E/E systems that control road-vehicles and non-road mobile machinery comes with increased self-diagnosis functions and diagnosability via external test equipment (diagnostic tester). Technicians in the development, production and service depend on diagnostic test equipment that is connected to the E/E system and performs diagnostic communication. Examples of use cases of diagnostic communication include but are not limited to condition monitoring, data acquisition, (guided) fault finding and flash programming. More and more functions of a modern vehicle are realized by software (firmware). Powerful multicore servers replace the numerous control units and many control unit functions can be performed directly by smart sensors and actuators. New E/E system architectures come with increased self-diagnostic capabilities. They automatically perform tests, log diagnostic data and push such data for prognostics purposes and condition (health) monitoring to the cloud. They also support over-the-air firmware updates (FOTA). This paper describes the components of an E/E system that is equipped with an in-vehicle diagnostic tester. The tester consists of standardized components, including MVCI-Server (ISO 22900), ODX (ISO 22901), OTX (ISO 13209) and UDS on IP (ISO 14229-5). The paper includes a description of cybersecurity measures to protect the vehicle against malicious attacks.",
      "published": "2020-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2020-01-1373",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Peter Subke",
        "Muzafar Moshref",
        "Julian Erber"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International Journal of Advances and Current Practices in Mobility",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.4271/2020-01-1373",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2021-01-0138",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Metrics for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Cybersecurity for automotive systems is challenging, and one of the major challenges is how to measure this specific system property. With the increased need for cybersecurity in automotive systems due to the development of more advanced technologies and corresponding increased threat vectors, coupled with the upcoming International Organization for Standardization and the Society for Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 cybersecurity standard for automotive systems and cybersecurity regulations in The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (UNECE WP.29), it is becoming increasingly important for auto manufacturers and suppliers to have a clear and common understanding and agreement of cybersecurity metrics for the development and deployment of vehicles. The main contribution of this article is the contextualization of existing metrics from literature and mapping out how they may fit within a standardized framework. We highlight the challenges to create awareness around the lack of common understanding and outline the first potential steps towards a consensus. For example, one can consider assurance levels as a form of metric. Since guarantees of security are not possible, verification and validation methods such as various forms of testing can be used to give an assurance of security. For the automotive industry, there are discussions around cybersecurity assurance levels (CALs), which are outlined in an informative annex in the ISO/SAE 21434 draft standard. The CAL values are used to indicate subsequently the increasing scope, extent, and depth of assurance activities to be performed to achieve that level of assurance. A common understanding of the answer to “how much cybersecurity is enough?” will inspire greater confidence in practitioners who design and test the technical measures, in the industry as regards a balanced approach to cybersecurity and ultimately, in consumers who need to know that the products that they buy will be safe and secure.",
      "published": "2021-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-0138",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Madeline Cheah",
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/2021-01-0138",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2021-01-0139",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Fuzz Testing into the Cybersecurity Validation Strategy",
      "description": "Automotive systems have become increasingly more complex, interconnected and prone to cyberattacks in recent years. With larger software bases and multiple external communication interfaces, the risks for new vulnerabilities and attack vectors on vehicles also increase. Therefore, modern cybersecurity validation is highly stressed for finding security vulnerabilities and robustness issues early and systematically at every stage of the product development process. The integration of a sophisticated fuzz testing program within the overall cybersecurity validation strategy allows for accommodating towards these challenging demands. In this paper, we review a general automotive cybersecurity engineering process containing functional testing, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, and highlight shortcomings that can be complemented by fuzz testing. We present how fuzz testing is not only beneficial to improve product security directly by detecting weaknesses, but also indirectly by providing input to allow enhancing other testing activities. Finally, we provide a suggestion for an updated cybersecurity engineering process, which gives guidance on when fuzz testing should be performed and how fuzz testing should interface with other testing activities. Our approach is compliant to the ISO/SAE DIS 21434 cybersecurity engineering process. The approach uses Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) together with Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CALs) for the systematic identification of high-priority attack vectors and assignment of testing priorities. With this knowledge, it is possible to decide where, when and how often fuzz testing shall be applied for both finding unknown vulnerabilities and regressions in an automatized manner. This approach identifies issues earlier and with greater coverage than functional testing, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing could achieve on their own. As a result, by following this approach, the overall cybersecurity engineering process is more comprehensive, security remediation costs are lower, and resources for manual activities such as penetration testing are used more efficiently.",
      "published": "2021-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-0139",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nico Vinzenz",
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/2021-01-0139",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2021-01-0148",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat/Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment: A Framework to Align the Functional Safety and Security Process in Automotive Domain",
      "description": "The modern automobile consists of several Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to support various safety-critical functionalities. The underlying systems are susceptible to safety and cybersecurity attacks as the involved ECUs are interconnected. The security attacks can lead to disrupting the safe operation of the vehicle while causing injury to the passengers. Traditionally, the safety team performs hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA), while the security team performs threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) in evaluating the risk associated with security incidents. The safety risk, calculated through HARA, does not consider the impact of security incidents on it. Similarly, the security risk calculated in TARA does not consider all the aspects of functional safety associated with the involved assets. Thus, the aim of this article is to merge the impact of safety hazards and security attacks through a uniform framework, THARA. Consequently, the functional safety requirements and cybersecurity requirements can be aligned with each other. In this article, a case study of the application of the THARA framework is presented through the risk analysis of safety and security threats applicable to the rearview camera (RVC) feature of the vehicle.",
      "published": "2021-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-0148",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vivek Agrawal",
        "Balasubramanian Achuthan",
        "Asadullah Ansari",
        "Vishal Tiwari",
        "Vikas Pandey"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International journal of transportation cybersecurity and privacy",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/2021-01-0148",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2021-01-1249",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Onboard Cybersecurity Diagnostic System for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Today’s advanced vehicles have high degree of interaction due to numerous sensors, actuators and also with complex communication within the control units. In order to hack a vehicle, it has to be within a certain range of communication. Here, we discuss the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) regulations for next generation BEV/HEV, its vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats that come with hacking. We propose three cybersecurity attack detection and defense methods: Cyber-Attack detection algorithm, Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Method and, Feistel Cipher Block Method. These control methods autonomously diagnose a cybersecurity problem in a vehicle’s onboard system using an OBD interface, such as OBD-II when a fault caused by a cyberattack is detected, All of this is achieved in an internal communication network structure. The results discussed here focus on the first detection method that is Cyber-Attack detection algorithm.",
      "published": "2021-09-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-1249",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking",
        "obd",
        "obd-ii"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sumanth Reddy Dadam",
        "Di Zhu",
        "Vivek Kumar",
        "Vinod Ravi",
        "Venkata Sai Srikar Palukuru"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/2021-01-1249",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4321,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2021-01-1249 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: onboard, next, sensors, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2021-26-0506",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluation of Protected Boot Mechanism in Automotive Domain",
      "description": "In the recent years the electronics and software in the car has been increased with the request of new features. Todays vehicles are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their connectivity with internet and infrastructure. Due to this security in the automotive domain has gained importance. Earlier the software updates were done at the service station and probability of tampering the software was less. As the vehicles are connected through internet, the car manufacturers are shifting towards over the air updates (OTA). It should be ensured that only authentic software is executed on the micro controller. Protected boot is a security control used to ensure authentic software is executed on the microcontroller. Protected boot is a mechanism in which authenticity and integrity of the software is checked during the booting phase by using the chain of Trust mechanism. Protected boot can be achieved by using authenticated boot or secure boot mechanism. Integrity of the software is ensured by using symmetric and asymmetric crypto algorithms. Protected boot is executed using sequential or parallel execution mode. Trade off in choosing the correct execution mode is the boot time of the software. This paper provides introduction to protected boot security control. A comparison of different execution modes for protected boot mechanism is also provided so that the users can select suitable protected boot execution mode based on their use case.",
      "published": "2021-09-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-26-0506",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashikiran Panchakseri",
        "Mahesh Karabasannavar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/2021-26-0506",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-0116",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Identifying Cybersecurity Focus Areas in Connected Cars Based on WP.29 UN-R155 Attack Vectors and Beyond",
      "description": "The UN working group WP.29 published UN Regulation No. 155, the “Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to cyber security and cyber security management systems,” which became a binding resolution on January 22nd, 2021 with expectations that at least 54 countries will mandate it starting July 2022. The regulation lists 69 attack vectors directly affecting vehicle cyber security. Car manufacturers, suppliers, government organizations, etc. all stakeholder’s cooperation and efforts are necessary for the successful implementation of the published regulation. The first course of action is to sort these attack vectors according to their expected threat severity levels, so stakeholders can determine the order in which to tackle mitigating said threats. In this paper, using the industry standard DREAD threat modelling, we calculated the severity levels of the attack vectors listed in the WP.29 UN-R155 cyber security regulation. Additionally, we go beyond the attack vectors listed in UN-R155 - using our own analysis, experience and insights, we explored other attack vectors that will also affect vehicle cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2022-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-0116",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected cars",
        "cybersecurity",
        "regulation",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Numaan Huq",
        "Rainer Vosseler"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-0116",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-0121",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategy to Adopt ISO/SAE 21434 Cyber Security Assurance Level in the Organization",
      "description": "The recent standard, ISO/SAE 21434, is introduced to address the cybersecurity requirements for the development of electrical and electronic components in the road vehicles. This standard has introduced a new classification scheme, cybersecurity assurance level (CAL), that helps in validating the process rigor needed for mitigating different threat scenarios. CAL values can range from 1(Least stringent process rigor) to 4 (most stringent process rigor). CAL provides assurance that the assets of an item or component are adequately protected against the relevant threat scenarios by defining the scope of various processes at different phases of the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDL). CAL values can be determined at the earlier stages of the SDLC (cybersecurity concept phase) through the knowledge of attack vectors and attack severity specific to a system. The CAL value can be used as a reference to define the scope of rigor in the design, development, and verification phase of the SDLC. This paper aims to define a process to determine CAL based on the existing concepts of ISO/SAE21434 guidelines. The study adopts an RVC (Rear-View Camera) system and performs a threat modeling to describe the details of the proposed process and helps cybersecurity experts, organizations to implement a structured process of CAL in their existing cybersecurity management system.",
      "published": "2022-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-0121",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vivek Agrawal",
        "Balasubramanian Achuthan"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-0121",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-0122",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Future of Automotive Embedded Hardware Trust Anchors (AEHTA)",
      "description": "The current automotive electronic and electrical (EE) architecture has reached a scalability limit and in order to adapt to the new and upcoming requirements, novel automotive EE architectures are currently being investigated to support: a) an Ethernet backbone, b) consolidation of hardware capabilities leading to a centralized architecture from an existing distributed architecture, c) optimization of wiring to reduce cost, and d) adaptation of service-oriented software architectures. These requirements lead to the development of Zonal EE architectures as a possible solution that require appropriate adaptation of used security mechanisms and the corresponding utilized hardware trust anchors. 1 The current architecture approaches (ECU internal and in-vehicle networking) are being pushed to their limits, simultaneously, the current embedded security solutions also seem to reveal their limitations due to an increase in connectivity. In conjunction with an increasing number of related laws and regulations (such as UNECE R155 and ISO 21434), these drive security requirements in different domains and areas. 2 In this paper we examine the upcoming trends in EE architectures and investigate the underlying cyber-security threats and corresponding security requirements that lead to potential requirements for “Automotive Embedded Hardware Trust Anchors” (AEHTA). We see that communication requirements including increased feature set (such as Authenticated Encryption for Associated Data (AEAD) and Authentication of Associated Data (AAD)) and increased performance requirements significantly impact the architecture of AEHTA. Additionally, we try to point out how new smart solutions could improve overall performance of applications needing security mechanisms. 3 We show, that the overall impact of new security requirements on AEHTA can be categorized into security feature set, safety for security requirements and performance requirements.",
      "published": "2022-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-0122",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso 21434",
        "security",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abhijit Ambekar",
        "Rolf Schneider",
        "Karsten Schmidt",
        "Udo Dannebaum"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-0122",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-0123",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigation of Privacy Monitoring Systems in the Android Device - A Case Study of Automotive IVI System",
      "description": "An Android operating system is a comprehensive software framework for mobile communication devices (Smartphones, Tablet PC, watches, home appliances, In-Vehicle Infotainment systems). End users or consumers are attracted by various interesting features offered by these devices and the associated applications. However, Android devices are still vulnerable to several types of attacks, a particularly concerning one being privacy leakage. Apart from providing several user-experience features, these systems store and share more sensitive data throughout the day. The sensitive information includes not only the personal data of the user but also the data collected through the vehicle sensors. The breach/leakage of the sensitive data may impact the vehicle manufacturer because of the stringent privacy regulation requirements. Thus, the vehicle manufacturer needs to adopt a privacy leakage detection mechanism to identify any potential source of leakage and mitigate it. There are a lot of privacy leakage detection methods available today, and the main task for an organization is to determine which one to use considering its effectiveness and inclusion with their requirements. However, there is a lack of review study of existing methods, tools, and good practices to detect privacy leakage in the Android system. This review study aims to provide an overview of the current state of the methods and tools for privacy leakage detection in the Android system. Firstly, we performed a comparative study to analyze the execution and effectiveness of various existing privacy monitoring techniques/ schemes. Subsequently, an evaluative study is performed through a use case of the personal data involved in automotive In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI). We identified various data components present in IVI and classified them based on different sensitivity levels and their transmission outside the IVI along with the associated scenarios. Furthermore, we evaluated the privacy issues with the data transmission through the privacy leakage detection tools. Finally, we summarized which privacy leakage detection techniques are more effective for IVI.",
      "published": "2022-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-0123",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "personal data",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pooja Mittal",
        "Ramakrishnan Naryanan",
        "Tanya Agarwal",
        "Vivek Agrawal"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-0123",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-0124",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Requirements for the Automated Generation of Attack Trees to Support Automotive Cybersecurity Assurance",
      "description": "As the need for automotive assurance continues to grow, it becomes necessary to develop approaches which can provide assurance cases in a systematic and efficient manner. In the case of cybersecurity, this problem is exacerbated by the increasing complexity of vehicular onboard systems, their inherent obscurity due to their heterogenous architecture, emergent behaviors, and the disparate motivations and resources of potential threat agents. Furthermore, the advancement of connected autonomous vehicles (CAV) may allow external attackers to leverage the naïve trust ECUs have for adjacent devices to compromise the safety and security of the vehicle. To that end, there is an increased interest in automatically producing threat models such as attack trees, which usually rely on intensive expert driven construction or rudimentary formally defined processes, to identify potential threats to a vehicle. Therefore, this paper will explore the ways in which such an automated scheme could be applied for a practicable identification and analysis of potential attack paths. Although ISO/SAE 21434 recommends the development of an assurance case for cybersecurity, the precise nature of a cybersecurity case is not explicitly defined within the standard. Therefore, this paper also explores the combination of threat modelling techniques with assurance case techniques adapted from accepted practice in vehicle safety for functional safety (per ISO 26262) while taking into consideration the relevant standards.",
      "published": "2022-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-0124",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kacper Sowka",
        "Luis-Pedro Cobos",
        "Alastair R. Ruddle",
        "Paul Wooderson"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-0124",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-0125",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mechanism to Identify Legitimate Vehicle User in Remote Keyless Entry System",
      "description": "The advancements of the automotive system in all the aspects from safety to user experience brings never ending list of electronics components into the system. One of the pure critical components in providing the vehicle safety is the digital key or wireless vehicle entry systems. This component is responsible for protecting all the other components of the vehicle and the vehicle itself from thieves and illegal usage of the vehicle. The compromisations of this critical component is equivalent to a compromisations of the entire vehicle along with some legal implications on the vehicle owner. There are numerous additional systems in automotive electronics which enhances the security of the critical, digital key/wireless vehicle entry system in protecting the vehicles from attackers. However, there is no component available in the market which does user/owner authentication considering its impact and criticality on both the vehicle and its owner. Either the lost key or the stolen key in the hands of the illegitimate person who may be an attacker or a thief result in the vehicle theft or the usage of the stolen vehicle for the illegal purposes. These situations cause legal circumstances on the legitimate owner of the vehicle. Hence, in this regard there is a need of user/owner authentication in the existing digital key/wireless vehicle entry systems. The proposed system tries to address this concern by combining the user/owner biometrics with the command passing from the user in-hand device. The proposed system transmits the cryptographically secure combined bio-crypto data from the user in-hand device to the vehicle, where the cryptographic verification if followed by a user verification before proceeding on executing the user requested commands on the vehicle. Upon successful user verification, the respective command actions will be undertaken. Otherwise, the command is considered to be from an illegitimate user using the in-hand device and is discarded. This system also proposes an infrastructure support and mechanism for the user biometric enrollments through Tier-1s and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs).",
      "published": "2022-03-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-0125",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Asadullah Ansari",
        "P. C. Karthik",
        "DH Sharath",
        "Mohammad Aziz",
        "Sourik Mukherjee"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-0125",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-7087",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Identification and Verification of Attack-Tree Threat Models in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "As a result of the ever-increasing application of cyber-physical components in the automotive industry, cybersecurity has become an urgent topic. Adapting technologies and communication protocols like Ethernet and WiFi in connected vehicles yields many attack scenarios. Consequently, ISO/SAE 21434 and UN R155 (2021) define a standard and regulatory framework for automotive cybersecurity. Both documents follow a risk management-based approach and require a threat modeling methodology for risk analysis and identification. Such a threat modeling methodology must conform to the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) framework of ISO/SAE 21434. Conversely, existing threat modeling methods enumerate isolated threats disregarding the vehicle's design and connections. Consequently, they neglect the role of attack paths from a vehicle's interfaces to its assets. In other words, they are missing the TARA work products, e.g., attack paths compromising assets or feasibility and impact ratings. We propose a threat modeling methodology to construct attack paths by identifying, sequencing, and connecting vulnerabilities from a valid attack surface to an asset. Initially, we transform cybersecurity guidelines to attack trees, and then we use their formal interpretations to assess the vehicle's design. This workflow yields compositional construction of attack paths along with the required TARA work products (e.g., attack paths, feasibility, and impact). More importantly, we can apply the workflow iteratively in the context of connected vehicles to ensure design conformity, privacy, and cybersecurity. Finally, to show the complexity and the importance of preemptive threat identification and risk analysis in the automotive industry, we evaluate the presented model-based approach in a connected vehicle testing platform, SPIDER.",
      "published": "2022-12-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-7087",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Masoud Ebrahimi",
        "Christoph Striessnig",
        "Joaquim M. Castella Triginer",
        "Christoph Schmittner"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-7087",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4456,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2022-01-7087 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: assets, regulatory, like, impact, privacy, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-01-7123",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhanced Penetration Testing for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022-12-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-01-7123",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "C. Ebert",
        "Ruschil Ray",
        "J. John",
        "Zhen Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-01-7123",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2022-28-0304",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Common Vulnerability Considerations as an Integral Part of the Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering Process",
      "description": "In the present scenario, the automotive industry is driven by information technology. Most of the innovations such as automotive interconnectivity, e-mobility, automotive electronics are data-driven systems to decide and to act on the functionality of vehicle architecture. Connectivity has its own concerns about message spoofing, tampering, and increased privacy-focused information hardening by exploiting weak points. Weaknesses ends up in a vulnerability resulting in legal consequences, reputation, cost of recalls, installation of software package bug fixes. Vulnerability tracking and control are taken into consideration because of the incident responses for on-avenue vehicles. Several weaknesses associated with degreed vulnerabilities are documented in databases like CWE (common weakness enumeration) and CVE (common vulnerability and exposures) respectively, significantly to automotive, it’s miles obvious that most of the methods employed by the attackers are known and reused strategies. To build secure systems of road vehicles, the cybersecurity engineering standard ISO21434[11] suggests the evaluation of vulnerabilities throughout engineering process, such as attack path analysis, system requirement stage, software architecture, design, and implementation and testing phases. With my analysis and practices, it is appropriate to include the common vulnerabilities that ought to be an integral part of the automotive cybersecurity engineering process. In this paper, the author would like to provide a list of vulnerabilities that might be a suggestion for threat analysis and risk assessment and propose two solutions that may be adopted directly in the V-model for security-relevant software development.",
      "published": "2022-10-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2022-28-0304",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sreenikethana Venkatachalapathy"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.4271/2022-28-0304",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity by Agile Design",
      "description": "ISO/SAE 21434 [1] Final International Standard was released September 2021 to great fanfare and is the most prominent standard in Automotive Cybersecurity. As members of the Joint Working Group (JWG) the authors spent 5 years developing the 84 pages of precise wording acceptable to hundreds of contributors. At the same time the auto industry had been undergoing a metamorphosis probably unmatched in its hundred-year history. A centerpiece of the metamorphosis is the adoption of the Agile development method to meet market demands for time-to-market and flexibility of design. Unfortunately, a strategic decision was made by the JWG to focus ISO/SAE 21434 on the V-Model method. Agile does not break ISO/SAE 21434. Agile is a framework that can be adapted to suit any process. In the end the goals are the same regardless of development method; security by design must be achieved. This paper will outline the work products of ISO/SAE 21434 and discuss how the work products required by the standard can be achieved using Agile. The application to Agile may require interpreting the standard from another angle, which could involve reordering the sequence of activities and work products, breaking down the acceptable criteria of some work products to allow rapid iterations, and verifications of meta data or intermediate work products. In cybersecurity engineering, Agile has its unique strength compared to the V-model method, as its cyclical nature is better aligned with best practices for Cybersecurity Frameworks.",
      "published": "2023-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bill Mazzara",
        "Yuanbo Guo"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0035",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0036",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital-Twin-Based Approaches and Applications for Improving Automotive Cybersecurity in Different Lifecycle Stages",
      "description": "With the increasing connectivity and complexity of modern automobiles, cybersecurity has become one of the most important properties of a vehicle. Various strategies have been proposed to enhance automotive cybersecurity. Digital twin (DT), regarded as one of the top 10 strategic technology trends by Gartner in 2018 and 2019, establishes digital representations in a virtual world and raises new ideas to benefit real-life objects. In this paper, we explored the possibility of using digital twin technology to improve automotive cybersecurity. We designed two kinds of digital twin models, named mirror DT and autonomous DT, and corresponding environments to support cybersecurity design, development, and maintenance in an auto’s lifecycle, as well as technique training. The mirror DT, which displays the external behaviors of the physical object, collects, displays, and analyzes real-time data, for specific purposes like security analysis, anomaly detection, and so on. The autonomous DT models the internal logic of the real-world object, and is applicable for virtual design and debugging, system evaluation, and training in a purely virtual world. We proposed approaches for building the DT models, established a real-virtual interaction environment, and explored several feasible applications. Prototypes were developed to verify the effectiveness and expansibility of the proposed approaches and applications. In summary, DT technology helps engineers to improve work efficiency and effectiveness of cybersecurity design and management activities during the whole product lifecycle. Furthermore, the digital world is also ideal for professional training to help learners to better understand corresponding technics and do more exercises in the virtual world at a low cost.",
      "published": "2023-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0036",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jing Yu",
        "Zeru Lou",
        "Hong-Xing Hu",
        "G. Pu",
        "Mingsong Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0036",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0038",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware-Based Cyber Security for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "<div class=\"section abstract\"><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">There continues to be massive advancements in modern connected vehicles and with these advancements, connectivity continues to rapidly become more integral to the way these vehicles are designed and operated.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">Vehicle connectivity was originally introduced for the purpose of providing software updates to the vehicle’s main system software, and we have seen the adoption of Over The Air updates (OTA) become mainstream with most OEMs. The exploitation of this connectivity is far more reaching than just basic software updates. In the latest vehicles it is possible to update software not just on the main vehicle systems, but to potentially update embedded software in all smart ECUs within the vehicle.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">Only using the connectivity to push data to the vehicle is not making full use of the potential of this increased connectivity. Being able to collect vehicle data for offline analysis and processing also brings huge benefits to the use of this technology.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">Using these technologies brings not only great advantages and ease of use, but it also provides an extremely attractive threat landscape for modern cyber attackers – which must be appropriately secured to guard against such threats.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">The technology described in this paper provides a comprehensive solution to the problems of vehicle intrusion and in-life threat management - using hardware monitors to provide low-latency and reliable threat detection.</div></div>",
      "published": "2023-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0038",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "exploitation",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lee Harrison",
        "James Pickford"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0038",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3806,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2023-01-0038 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collect, vehicle., making, there, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0039",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Processing Fuzz Testing Results into an Evidence Report",
      "description": "In recent years, fuzz testing has established itself as a reliable and indispensable testing method for finding previously unknown and product specific vulnerabilities within the code base of automotive systems. As such, we see increased requirements for automotive products that call for fuzz testing per default. Based on the semidecidable characteristic for finding fuzz testing results, i.e., virtually an infinite test space, it is a non-trivial task to generate plausible evidence that sufficient fuzz testing has been applied to the target system. In this paper, starting from fuzz test result generation, we specify the individual steps necessary for preparing a sound evidence report. We describe how evidence is created in this context and which information is relevant. The traceability of fuzz testing product requirements is a driving factor thereby. We also analyze how useful Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL) are in this process and how quantitative as well as qualitative metrics can be utilized as evidence. Finally, we discuss the conclusiveness of various fuzz testing evidence types and show the limits of evidence generation of this testing method. Our approach allows owners of security-relevant systems to provide evidence to customers or authorities showing that there was, based on a systematic risk-based methodology, sufficient fuzz testing conducted on the target system. Moreover, this approach brings the additional benefits of allowing more proven test diversification of the product, thereby reducing the effort on expensive manual testing methods like penetration testing and allowing more sophisticated overall test reporting of the product.",
      "published": "2023-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0039",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nico Vinzenz",
        "Dennis Kengo Oka"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0039",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0043",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Protection of Firewall Rules Using Secure Storage for the Infotainment System",
      "description": "A modern car is enhancing the driver’s in-vehicle experience through the infotainment system which is a combination of both information and entertainment. The Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) are being driven to provide this luxurious experience through the development and adaptation of new technology. In a luxurious car, an infotainment system consists of a high-resolution touchscreen display, smartphone pairing, support for multimedia, installed applications for entertainment, etc. The applications responsible for this experience will exchange the data from the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to the server and vice versa. If all applications require a unique port for the exchange, then the number of ports will be more which means the number of entry points to exploit the system by an intruder will be increased. For the secure exchange of information, the ECU software consists of a firewall that monitors this exchange and allows only the safe transfer of data to avoid the compromise of the system. A firewall blocks unwanted traffic and data from unauthorized resources. Linux system establishes the firewall through the iptables which has rules to filter ipv4 and ipv6 packets. But these rules are in the root file system which can be accessed directly. If there is no monitoring system for these tables, an intruder can change the rules which leads to an entire system compromise. The proposal is to place the rules in secure storage which is difficult to access by an intruder. This concept makes use of ARM TrustZone technology and requires an implementation of a trusted application running in a secure world through which secure storage can be accessed. In this paper, a comparison of the time taken to enforce the rules between the default process and the proposed process is shown.",
      "published": "2023-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0043",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sreedhar Reddy Pacharla",
        "Pavan Kumar Prasad",
        "Suryansh Vimlendra",
        "Saurav Varshney",
        "Vishal Tiwari"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0043",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Intrusion Detection System Based on the Double-Decision-Tree Method for In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), technically speaking, is to monitor the network, system, and operation status according to certain security policies, and try to find various attack attempts, attacks or attack results to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of network system resources. Automotive intrusion detection systems can identify and alert by analyzing in-vehicle traffic and log when software applications or devices with malicious activity exist, or the in-vehicle network is tampered and injected. But unfortunately, automotive cybersecurity researchers hardly produce a comprehensive detection method due to the confidential nature of Controller Area Network (CAN) DBC format files, which is a standard long maintained by car manufacturers. In this paper, an enhanced intrusion detection method is proposed based on the double-decision-tree to classify different attack models for in-vehicle CAN network without the need to obtain complete DBC files. Unlike the existing method that is using data from the simulated CAN traffic traces, we construct three attack models based on real CAN bus traffic collected from Pentium T99. A totally new data split method is provided to divide training set, validation set and test dataset. Three experiments are set to verify this new data split method and the results show that we have achieved high accuracy in the recognition of the three types of attacks, and the model has high operating efficiency.",
      "published": "2023-04-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bowen Wang",
        "Yuance Zhang",
        "Zhaojing Zhang",
        "Hongxing Hu",
        "Geguang Pu"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0044",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0046",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in EV’s: Approach for Systematic Secured SW Development through ISO/SAE 21434 & ASPICE",
      "description": "Cybersecurity (CS) is crucial and significantly important in every product that is connected to the network/internet. At present, society is getting used to a lot of connected devices for multiple day-to-day needs that are as small as controlling the air conditioner (AC) temperature of the house when we are away, to the fully equipped high end modern car which may have 100+ electronic control units (ECU’s) [1]. Hence making it very important to guarantee that every single connected device shall have cybersecurity measures implemented to ensure the safety of the entire system. Looking into the forecasted worldwide growth in the electric vehicles (EV’s) segment, CS researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EV’s, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) devices, communications to EVs, and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. The impending impact of attacks on these systems can range from relatively minor local effects to the large-scale national disruptions. Fortunately, for automotive, there are standards that lay down a strong perspective for the safety and security of road vehicles. ISO/SAE 21434:2021 ensures appropriate consideration of the CS for engineering of electrical & electronic (E/E) systems to keep up with state-of-the-art technology and evolving attack methods. One more such standard is Automotive SPICE (ASPICE) that lays down a process assessment model, when used with a proper assessment methodology helps to identify process related risks. Additional processes have been defined in the process reference and assessment model for the CS engineering in order to incorporate the cybersecurity related processes in the ASPICE scope. This paper aims at providing a model & brief overview to establish a correlation between the ASPICE, ISO/SAE 21434 and the ISO 26262 functional safety (FS) standards for development of a secured cybersecurity software with all the considerations that an organization can undertake.",
      "published": "2023-04-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0046",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "evse",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sandeep Ambesange",
        "Ashwin Patwekar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0046",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0047",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Consequence-Driven Cybersecurity for High-Power Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "Cybersecurity of high-power charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is critical to the safety, reliability, and consumer confidence in this publicly accessible technology. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities in high-power EV charging infrastructure may also present risks to broader transportation and energy-infrastructure systems. This paper details a methodology used to analyze and prioritize high-consequence events that could result from cybersecurity sabotage to high-power charging infrastructure. The highest prioritized events are evaluated under laboratory conditions for the severity of impact and the complexity of cybersecurity manipulation. Mitigation solutions and strategies are presented to secure the vulnerabilities that potentially lead to high-consequence events. These mitigations can be immediately implemented by industry or executed during the design stage.",
      "published": "2023-04-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0047",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Richard Barney Carlson",
        "Kenneth W Rohde",
        "Matthew Joseph Crepeau",
        "Sean Salinas",
        "Anudeep Medam",
        "Stacey Cook"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0047",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0579",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Adaptable Security by Design Approach for Ensuring a Secured Remote Monitoring Teleoperation (RMTO) of an Autonomous Vehicle",
      "description": "Remote Monitoring and Teleoperation (RMTO) of Autonomous Vehicles (AV) is advancing rapidly in the industry. Researchers and industrial partners explore the role RMTO plays in helping AV navigate complicated situations, among many others. At the heart of this lies the problem of potential pathways and attack vectors or threat surfaces by which a malicious attack can be carried out on an RMTO and an AV. The separation of cybersecurity considerations in RMTO is barely considered, as so far, most available research and activities are mainly focused on AV. The main focus of this paper is addressing RMTO cybersecurity utilising an adaptable security-by-design approach, although security-by-design is still in the infant state within automotive cybersecurity. An adaptable security-by-design approach for RMTO covers Security Engineering Life-cycle, Logical Security Layered Concept, and Security Architecture. Based on the international automotive cybersecurity standards - ISO/SAE 21434, a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) with a formalisation of the highest level of threats identified from the TARA of the RMTO system is carried out, with corresponding mitigation actions as per UNECE WP29. The adaptable security-by-design approach has been then applied to a prototype RMTO system developed by an industrial partner. Finally, penetration testing has been carried out where the results verify the capability of the adoptable security-by-design to reinforce the security of the RMTO systems against some of the identified risks and threats.",
      "published": "2023-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0579",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Victormills Iyieke",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans",
        "Tom Robinson",
        "Odysseas Kosmas",
        "Alastair Shipman",
        "Hesamaldin Jadidbonab"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0579",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-0926",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review on CAN Bus Protocol: Attacks, Difficulties, and Potential Solutions",
      "description": "The new generation vehicles these days are managed by networked controllers. A large portion of the networks is planned with more security which has recently roused researchers to exhibit various attacks against the system. This paper talks about the liabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) inside In-vehicle communication protocol and a few potentials that could take due advantage of it. Moreover, this paper presents a few security measures proposed in the present examination status to defeat the attacks. In any case, the fundamental objective of this paper is to feature a comprehensive methodology known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which has been a significant device in getting network data in systems over many years. To the best of our insight, there is no recorded writing on a through outline of IDS execution explicitly in the CAN transport network system. Therefore, we proposed a top-down examination of IDS through a write-up based on the following perspectives: Detection draws near, Organization systems, going after methods, and technical challenges. Likewise, it has additionally arranged the abnormality-based IDS as per the strategies stated below, i.e. Frequency-based, AI-based, measurable-based, and statistical-based strategies as a component.",
      "published": "2023-04-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-0926",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kalyan Sai Vital Vamsi Appajosyula",
        "Sreedhar Reddy Pacharla"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-0926",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2023-01-1224",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Concept for an Approval-Focused Over-The-Air Update Development Process",
      "description": "The idea of keeping a vehicle safe and secure throughout its whole life cycle, as well as having the opportunity to add functionality after initial delivery, is the key motivation behind automotive software updates. Today, safety or security issues that appear after vehicle delivery need to be resolved by starting a recall campaign. These campaigns require the vehicle user to visit a car repair workshop to get an update. Over The Air (OTA) software updates, being location-independent, can pave the way for higher update frequencies and more efficiency regarding customer satisfaction, resource consumption as well as safety and security. In this paper we analyze requirements for OTA software updates phrased in various standards and regulations as well as in existing development and type approval processes. Prevailing challenges for OTA updates are extracted to identify necessary activities and artifacts within the procedure. Based on that a concept for the approval and execution processes of OTA updates is designed. This concept includes the involved entities, required communication and exchange paths as well as the OTA update specification.",
      "published": "2023-06-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2023-01-1224",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jacqueline Henle",
        "Mona Gierl",
        "Houssem Guissouma",
        "Felix Müller",
        "Goutham Bharadwaj Ramesh",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.4271/2023-01-1224",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2793",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Zero Trust Architecture for Automotive Networks",
      "description": "Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. Zero Trust (ZT) originated as an Information Technology (IT) principle of “never trust, always verify”; it is the concept that a network must never assume assets can be trusted regardless of their ownership or network location. This research focused on drastically improving security of the cyber-physical vehicle network, with minimal performance impact measured as timing, bandwidth, and processing power. The automotive ZTA was tested using a software-in-the-loop vehicle simulation paired with resource constrained hardware that closely emulated a production vehicle network. For example, the vehicle’s Advanced Gateway electronic control unit (ECU) is utilized to enforce cyber policy, monitor the network, distribute keys, and implement network segmentation. The technical approach applied other security solutions, including Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC) for authentication and verification of network traffic, and Secure Boot to ensure the system is running authentic software. Implementing these elements and the other security controls was complicated by cost, resource constraints, and the complexity of building and maintaining vehicles. The project team identified four metrics to demonstrate performance success and feasibility of the implementation. They are as follows: 1) Error monitoring system detected 100% of illicit messages, 2) ECUs refused unauthorized firmware 100% of the time, 3) ECUs discarded unauthenticated messages 100% of the time, 4) Latency at first ignition cycle was less than one second. This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2793",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maggie Shipman",
        "Nathan Millwater",
        "Kyle Owens",
        "Seth Smith"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2793",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2795",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fuzzing CAN vs. ROS: An Analysis of Single-Component vs. Dual-Component Fuzzing of Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Robust communications are crucial for autonomous military fleets. Ground vehicles function as mobile local area networks utilizing Controller Area Network (CAN) backbones. Fleet coordination between autonomous platforms relies on the Robot Operating System (ROS) publish/subscribe robotic middleware for effective operation. To bridge communications between the CAN and ROS network segments, the CAN2ROS bridge software supports bidirectional data flow with message mapping and node translation. Fuzzing, a software testing technique, involves injecting randomized data inputs into the target system. This method plays a pivotal role in identifying vulnerabilities. It has proven effective in discovering vulnerabilities in online systems, such as the integrated CAN/ROS system. In our study, we consider ROS implementing zero-trust access control policies, running on a Gazebo test-bed connected to a CAN bus. Our objective is to evaluate system security using fuzzers in three scenarios: (i) fuzzing the CAN bus alone, (ii) fuzzing the CAN bus with a ROS Fuzzer, and (iii) fuzzing both systems simultaneously using the CAN2ROS bridge. This paper poses the question: is fuzzing the unified system more effective than fuzzing individual components. By analyzing interactions between the bridge and the military fleets’ CAN systems, we identify and address flaws potentially introduced in the software, or data leakage between communication segments. Our analysis employs experimental design and statistical analysis to shed light on the bridge’s security robustness and its potential implications for the overall system’s integrity. This research holds significant implications for both industry and academia. Stakeholders involved in the development of autonomous military and civilian fleets can leverage our findings to enhance system security and reliability. Ultimately, the identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities contribute to safer and more resilient military operations.",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2795",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iwinosa Aideyan",
        "Richard R. Brooks",
        "Mert D. Pesé"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2795",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2797",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Functional and Component-Level Threat Analyses in Automotive Systems: A Holistic Approach to Risk Assessment",
      "description": "Threat Analysis Risk Assessment (TARA) for automotive systems is standardized in ISO/SAE 21434. Traditionally these analyses have been bifurcated into either analysis focused on system functionality identifying impacts to assets based on the mission of the product, or analysis targeting vulnerabilities associated with the hardware and software of interfaces selected to be a part of a product. Furthermore, in the age of Software Defined Vehicles, the challenges to decouple use cases and the software that implements such from specific fixed hardware designs magnifies the disconnect between these risk methods. Use Case Based threat analysis, grounded in understanding features, stakeholders, and user stories, inherently yields security requirements tailored to specific functionalities and their contexts. While component-based threat analysis, derived from enumerations of vulnerabilities associated with interface choices, inherently yields security requirements tailored to specific defenses of these vulnerabilities. This paper will outline how a Use Case Based TARA partitions a user story into its assets and stakeholders and maintains traceability to risk through the development of that user story. This method's detailed approach ensures that cybersecurity requirements can be readily implemented as a part of feature design, addressing the concerns of feature owners directly. This paper will discuss the merits of asset based approach to cybersecurity over attack based recognizing the inherent strengths and limitations of both methods and underscores the need for a unified approach. Combining these analyses fosters a holistic view, ensuring that security requirements are both actionable and comprehensive. This paper provides the opportunity to point out the shift toward agile development and the need to provide incremental value on short intervals. This article delves into the intricacies of these concurrent threat analysis processes, highlighting the potential gaps and overlaps that may arise when treated in isolation. We argue that a fragmented approach not only leads to potential vulnerabilities but also results in redundancies, making the threat mitigation process inefficient.",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2797",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bill Mazzara",
        "Issak Davidovich"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2797",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2799",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Comparing Open-Source UDS Implementations Through Fuzz Testing",
      "description": "In the ever-evolving landscape of automotive technology, the need for robust security measures and dependable vehicle performance has become paramount with connected vehicles and autonomous driving. The Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) protocol is the diagnostic communication layer between various vehicle components which serves as a critical interface for vehicle servicing and for software updates. Fuzz testing is a dynamic software testing technique that involves the barrage of unexpected and invalid inputs to uncover vulnerabilities and erratic behavior. This paper presents the implementation of fuzz testing methodologies on the UDS layer, revealing the potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious entities. By employing both open-source and commercial fuzzing tools and techniques, this paper simulates real-world scenarios to assess the UDS layer’s resilience against anomalous data inputs. Specifically, we deploy several open-source UDS implementations on a Controller Area Network (CAN) testbed and use them as a target for the aforementioned fuzzing tools. The outcomes of the fuzzing campaigns provide both automakers and researchers with insights about the completeness of open-source UDS implementations, as well as existing vulnerabilities. Our recommendations are intended to inform researchers and developers about the current state of these implementations, especially if they consider integrating them into their products. Ultimately, the use of open-source implementations in the automotive domain promises a more secure, easier to maintain, safer, and cheaper development process. This paper underscores the significance of continuous testing and fortification in ensuring the integrity of automotive systems with a particular focus on UDS, offering a valuable contribution to the advancement of secure vehicular technology.",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2799",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "fuzzing",
        "resilience",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Levent Çelik",
        "John McShane",
        "Christian Scott",
        "Iwinosa Aideyan",
        "Richard R. Brooks",
        "Mert D. Pesé"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2799",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2800",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Training Approach for Automotive Cybersecurity Engineering",
      "description": "Cybersecurity assumes a major role in the context of the automotive domain, where both existing and forthcoming regulations are heightening the need for robust security engineering. A significant milestone in advancing cybersecurity within the automotive industry is the release of the first international standard for automotive cybersecurity ISO/SAE 21434:2021 ‘Road Vehicles — Cybersecurity Engineering’. A recently published type approval regulation for automotive cybersecurity (UN R155) is also tailored for member countries of the UNECE WP.29 alliance. Thus, the challenges for embedded automotive systems engineers are increasing while frameworks, tools and shared concepts for cybersecurity engineering and training are scarce. Hence, cybersecurity training in the automotive domain necessitates an understanding of domain-specific intricacies and the unique challenges at the intersection of cybersecurity and embedded systems engineering, elevating the need for improving the skill set and knowledge of automotive cybersecurity engineers. This paper delves into an automotive cybersecurity training concept aimed at enhancing the proficiency of development engineers. In that context, we also consider the framework to train over CAN. While the presented work primarily addresses technical aspects, we recognize the importance of aligning development within the framework of relevant standards. This is crucial because any training courses must adhere to the expectations set by standardization boundaries. The presented PENNE1 framework simulates a network of CAN controllers, which enables the testing and hands-on experiences for attack vectors and mitigation methods in a simulated environment, providing basic implementations for the most common attack types of this network. The framework is extendable for training and testing purposes with series controllers and real-world demonstrators.",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2800",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Faschang",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Omar Veledar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2800",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2803",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Rating Framework and Its Application to J1939-91C Standard",
      "description": "Connectivity is becoming increasingly prevalent in the automotive industry, and with that comes a growing awareness among consumers and regulators of the potential risks. Present-day automobiles are becoming smart and more software-driven. Conversely, every line of code equals a possible threat to the vehicle, the passenger, or the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). To hit the brakes on the alarming increase in cyber threats, government bodies have introduced standards and regulations globally. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) WP.29 R155 & R156 regulations and International Organization for Standardization/Society of Automotive Engineers (ISO/SAE) 21434 standards are becoming mandatory for all OEMs and are designed to ensure that vehicle functionalities work as intended and are built to mitigate safety risks. UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools. This framework could empower automakers to implement a process to measure and report their vehicle security rating. Thus, this rating system may be instrumental in building vehicle owners’ trust and confidence in their vehicles’ cyber safety when adopting advanced technology. This paper proposes a CSRF framework to identify a security rating for a particular vehicle system to complement other existing or under-development CSR-type standards. In addition, this paper overviews the SAE J1939-91C (CAN-FD security standard), which then is utilized in experiments to simulate on-board communications. Then the CSRF method is applied to measure the security rating of the electronic control units (ECUs), identify the gaps, and recommend the mitigations. SAE J1939-91C provides methods for establishing trust and securing mutual messages with optional encryption. SAE J1939-91C ensures message authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality by implementing complex cryptographic operations including hash functions and random key generation. The CSRF framework will generate numerous metrices based on simulated communications using the SAE J1939-91C standard to measure and rate the security level of an ECU or a connected off-board device (such as a diagnostics tool). This CSRF rating system may be easily applied with other cybersecurity industry standards including ISO/SAE 21434, WP.29 R155/156, in addition to the ever-evolving attack vectors landscape. CSRF can extend these ratings for all ECUs in the vehicle and thereby achieve the security rating of the entire vehicle variant. The detailed discussion of CSRF specification is out of scope for this paper.",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2803",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "unece r155",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mark P. Zachos",
        "Vishal Bajpai",
        "Preeti Agarwal"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2803",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2809",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automated TARA Framework for Cybersecurity Compliance of Heavy Duty Vehicles",
      "description": "Recent advancements towards autonomous heavy-duty vehicles are directly associated with increased interconnectivity and software driven features. Consequently, rise of this technological trend is bringing forth safety and cybersecurity challenges in form of new threats, hazards and vulnerabilities. As per the recent UN vehicle regulation 155, several risk-based security models and assessment frameworks have been proposed to counter the growing cybersecurity issues, however, the high budgetary cost to develop the tool and train personnel along with high risk of leakage of trade secrets, hinders the automotive manufacturers from adapting these third party solutions. This paper proposes an automated Threat Assessment & Risk Analysis (TARA) framework aligned with the standard requirements, offering an easy to use and fully customizable framework. The proposed framework is tailored specifically for heavy-duty vehicular networks and it demonstrates its effectiveness on a case study. The proposed framework incorporates the findings of UN Task Force on Cyber Security and over-the-air (OTA) issues and guidelines from ISO/SAE 21434 to identify the security lapses in the design phase of a vehicular electrical and/or electronic E/E network. It is designed to automate the process of TARA, thereby assisting the security analysts and reducing the inconsistencies in TARA evaluation. It draws the architectural model of the case study using data flow diagrams (DFD), performs threat modeling, estimates the risk value for the system and suggests controls for the reported threats. The versatile nature of the framework enables it to be adapted for threat modeling of other types of vehicles and cyber physical systems in general.*",
      "published": "2024-04-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2809",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qazi Mairaj ud din",
        "Qadeer Ahmed"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2809",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-2983",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Approval Criteria: Application of UN R155",
      "description": "The UN R155 regulation is the first automotive cybersecurity regulation and has made security a mandatory approval criterion for new vehicle types. This establishes internationally harmonized security requirements for market approval, presenting a challenge for manufacturers and suppliers to demonstrate compliance throughout the product life cycle. An issued type approval is internationally recognized by the member states of the UN 1958 Agreement. International recognition implies that uniform assessment criteria are applied to demonstrate compliance and to decide whether security efforts are sufficient. Independent accredited assessors assess the security engineering results during type approval. Considering the risk-based approach of ISO/SAE 21434 to security engineering, assessing whether threats have been appropriately addressed is a challenge. While there are currently no uniform assessment criteria at product level, the question arises as to which development artifacts serve as indicators for determining the efficacy of mitigation strategies. In response to this challenge, the paper conducts an analysis of existing security concepts of the automotive security standard ISO/SAE 21434 and the Information Technology Security Evaluation Standard ISO 15408 (Common Criteria) and therefore provides an insight into the state-of-the-art of security evaluation methods. The overall objective is to derive applicable assessment criteria and recommendations for the UN R155 approval while taking into account relevant security properties that help to decide on the sufficiency of security measures. These recommendations aim to enhance the comprehensiveness of the security assessment associated with UN R155, fostering a more uniform approach to evaluating cybersecurity in the context of vehicle type approvals.",
      "published": "2024-07-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2983",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mona Gierl",
        "Stefan Langhanki",
        "Florian Grün",
        "Reiner Kriesten",
        "Eric Sax"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-2983",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-3679",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Spoofing Attack on Clock Based Intrusion Detection System in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "ABSTRACT The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is still a de-facto standard for in-vehicle communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs). The CAN protocol lacks basic security features such as absence of sender node information, absence of authentications mechanism and the plug and play nature of the network. The payload in a CAN data packet is very small i.e. 8 bytes, therefore, implementation of cryptographic solutions for data integrity verification is not feasible. Various methods have been proposed for ECU identification, one of the methods is clock intrusion detection system (CIDS) [ 14 ]. The proposed method is based on authenticating the message sender by estimating the unique characteristics of the clock crystal. In an asynchronous network, the clocking information in a transmitted payload is entirely dependent upon the crystal which invokes the clock. These unique characteristics exists because of the asymmetry in the microstructure of the material. The challenge is to correctly estimate these unique characteristics. Authors proposed the technique to estimate the parameters sufficient enough to prove the clock uniqueness. This method is efficient in detecting the advanced variants of source spoofing attacks. In this paper, we have analyzed the design and architecture of the proposed method and found different weaknesses in the gist of the technique. These weaknesses are present in the mathematical model and can easily be exploited under the same threat models which have been used to evaluate CIDS previously. These vulnerabilities attack the assumption that constructed mathematical model of the sender node at monitoring or receiver is unique. We have proved it that exploiting the proposed vulnerabilities is sufficient to construct the same model for the traffic stream generated from the compromised node. As a proof of concept, we have proposed an attack, clock-spoofing attack, which can be used easily to bypass the CIDS by replicating the clock parameters, hence challenging the assumed uniqueness of clock parameters. Under our observations and the analysis of the found weaknesses, we have concluded that current approach to realize CIDS or similar solutions are defective and are prone to the advanced spoofing attacks. To mitigate against such advanced attacks, we have proposed an idea of authenticating the ECU’s based on the immutable unique fingerprints in the electrical signals at physical layer. Electrical devices leave unique fingerprints in the transmitted signal due to natural asymmetry of the material, which can be used to fingerprint the source. As per the CAN transmission at physical level, these are the dominant bits which are transmitted instead of the recessive bits. So, a statistical analysis of the dominant bits in the received physical signal will contain the unique characteristics of the transmitter which can be used for designing an efficient and highly accurate Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus. We have discussed this idea briefly.",
      "published": "2018-08-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-3679",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Tayyab",
        "Azeem Hafeez",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-3679",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-01-7044",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Fuzz Testing Method Based on DDPM for Intelligent Connected Vehicles CAN Communication",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are increasingly integrating electronic control units (ECUs), enhancing their intelligence but also amplifying potential security threats. Vehicle network security testing is crucial for ensuring the safety of passengers and vehicles. ECUs communicate via the in-vehicle network, adhering to the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol. Due to its exposed interfaces, lack of data encryption, and absence of identity authentication, the CAN network is susceptible to exploitation by attackers. Fuzz testing is a critical technique for uncovering vulnerabilities in CAN network. However, existing fuzz testing methods primarily generate message randomly, lacking learning from the data, which results in numerous ineffective test cases, affecting the efficiency of fuzz testing. To improve the effectiveness and specificity of testing, understanding of the CAN message format is essential. However, the communication matrix of CAN messages is proprietary to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and varie s among different models of the same vehicle brand, requiring manual reverse analysis of the CAN protocol, which significantly increases the cost and complexity of an attack. To enhance the efficiency of fuzz testing data generation, a fuzz testing data generation algorithm based on Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models (DDPMs) is proposed. This method learns the distribution of existing CAN bus message data, enabling the generation of data messages similar to the original data distribution for testing purposes. Furthermore, the LoRA fine-tuning method is introduced to accommodate the differences between communication matrices of various vehicles. Comparative analysis indicates that this method can generate fuzz test messages that more closely resemble real message data than existing methods.",
      "published": "2024-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-7044",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lin Shen",
        "Jiapeng Xiu",
        "Zhuopeng Zhang",
        "Zhengqiu Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-01-7044",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-28-0035",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security Challenges in V2C and in Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Based on advanced Automotive functionality, Vehicle networks has enabled the exchange of data to multiple domains and to meet these demands, more complex software applications, some of which require service-based cloud are developed. Exposure of data creates multiple threats for attacker to tamper security and privacy. Automotive cybersecurity topic has gained momentum based on multiple gaps identified in Automotive In vehicle and around the vehicle networks. In this paper, we provide an extensive overview on V2C (Vehicle to Cloud) and In-vehicle data protection, we also highlight methods to identify threats on any vehicle network connected to V2C and identify methods to verify security functionality using Fuzz or Penetration test protocol, we have identified gaps in existing security solutions and outline possible open issues and probable solution.",
      "published": "2024-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-28-0035",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in vehicle network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jyotiprakash Panda",
        "Rushabh Deepakchand Jain"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International Journal of Advances and Current Practices in Mobility",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-28-0035",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4004,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2024-28-0035 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: exposure, extensive, applications, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-28-0037",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Security Solution Using Hardware Security Module (HSM)",
      "description": "In today’s world, Vehicles are no longer mechanically dominated, with increased complexity, features and autonomous driving capabilities, vehicles are getting connected to internal and external environment e.g., V2I(Vehicle-to-Infrastructure), V2V(Vehicle-to-Vehicle), V2C(Vehicle-to-Cloud) and V2X(Vehicle-to-Everything). This has pushed classical automotive system in background and vehicle components are now increasingly dominated by software’s. Now more focus is made on to increase self-decision-making capabilities of automobile and providing more advance, safe and secure solutions e.g., Autonomous driving, E-mobility, and software driven vehicles, due to which vehicle digitization and lots of sensors inside and outside the vehicle are being used, and automobile are becoming intelligent. i.e., intelligent vehicles with advance safe and secure features but all these advancements come with significant threat of cybersecurity risk. Therefore, providing an automobile that is safe and secure through cyber-attack is also got equal importance. In this paper, we will discuss some of the challenges and key application of cybersecurity in the automotive sector. We will also discuss some possible approaches to address these challenges and enhance the security and privacy of automotive systems. Certain Automotive cybersecurity applications include Secure ECU communication, Digital signature generation and verification, Secure V2X, In-vehicle infotainment (IVI) security, Secure key management and storage, Secure remote vehicle access and control, and Secure over-the-air (OTA) updates. The main challenges for all these applications are to maintain confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the data, which can be maintained using cryptographic algorithms and key management realized in Hardware Security Module (HSM). The HSM is a specialized Hardware component designed and integrated as a part of advanced microcontroller unit (MCU) architecture, dedicated to implement cryptographic security tasks. HSM provide various solutions for secure boot/authenticated boot, secure communication, secure key storage, certificate management, standard encryption / decryption algorithms, which strengthen the mode of algorithm and implements very robust Secured ECU communication.",
      "published": "2024-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-28-0037",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arvind Kumar",
        "Ashish Gholve",
        "Kedar Kotalwar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-28-0037",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-28-0038",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Contextual Study of Security and Privacy in V2X Communication for Architecture & Networking Products",
      "description": "In recent times there has been an upward trend in “Connected Vehicles”, which has significantly improved not only the driving experience but also the “ownership of the car”. The use of state-of-the-art wireless technologies, such as vehicle-to-everything (V2X) connectivity, is crucial for its dependability and safety. V2X also effectively extends the information flow between the transportation ecosystem pedestrians, public infrastructure (traffic management system) and parking infrastructure, charging and fuel stations, Etc. V2X has a lot of potential to enhance traffic flow, boost traffic safety, and provide drivers and operators with new services. One of the fundamental issues is maintaining trustworthy and quick communication between cars and infrastructure. While establishing stable connectivity, reducing interference, and controlling the fluctuating quality of wireless transmissions, we have to ensure the Security and Privacy of V2I. Since there are multiple and diverse stakeholders in the V2I development, harmonizing standards and security protocols have become crucial, to ensure scalability and interoperability. To address these issues, the authors have surveyed into a landscape of security solutions that can possibly be implemented to reduce the challenges associated with V2X such as secure key exchange or secure crypto materials and have identified the appropriate security control to face this challenge In this paper we discuss the common threats and cyber-attacks performed by hackers around the world such as jamming attacks, network traffic attack, Sybil attacks, False data injection, location tracking. The paper also includes few possible privacy solutions i.e., strong privacy enhancing technologies and efficient data encryption techniques that could prevent the breach of private data (PII). In various scientific domains, artificial intelligence (AI) has been frequently used to enhance traditional data-driven methodologies. AI-based on the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) system collects data from vehicles and uses it to improve driver awareness, predict accidents and intrusions. The use of few deep learning techniques to improve the precision of intrusion detection in V2X such as Convolution neural networks (CNN), Recurrent neural networks (RNN), Graph Neural networks (GNN) are also surveyed with the authors opinions expressed contextually. ISO (International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) have established a number of standards for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technologies to assure interoperability, safety, and security in V2X systems. A brief detailing on these standards are also included in this paper. The paper also focuses on the application of these solution in product lines belonging to Continental Architecture and Networking (AN).",
      "published": "2024-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-28-0038",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shyam N. Sundar",
        "Krantiveer Pundalik",
        "Ushma Unnikrishnan"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-28-0038",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4443,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2024-28-0038 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: location, strong, intelligence, there, car, privacy, information, safety."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-28-0123",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity: Defend the Future of Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "<div class=\"section abstract\"><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">Cybersecurity, particularly in the automotive sector, is of paramount importance in today’s digital age. With the advent of connected commercial vehicles, which leverage telematics for efficient fleet management, the landscape of automotive cybersecurity is rapidly evolving. These vehicles, integral to logistics and transportation businesses, are becoming increasingly connected, thereby escalating the risks associated with cybersecurity threats.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">These commercial vehicles are becoming prime targets for cyber-attacks due to their connectivity and the valuable data they hold. The potential consequences of these cyber-attacks can range from data breaches to disruptions in fleet operations, and even safety risks. This paper analyses the unique challenges faced by the commercial vehicle sector, such as the need for robust telematics systems, secure communication channels, and stringent data protection measures.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">Case studies of notable cybersecurity incidents involving commercial vehicles are presented, providing valuable insights into the modus operandi of cybercriminals. Strategies and best practices to mitigate these risks are proposed, emphasizing the need for secure vehicle architecture and design, intrusion detection systems, and regular OTA updates.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">The role of employee training programs in enhancing cybersecurity awareness is also highlighted. Emerging trends like AI and machine learning in threat detection, blockchain technology for secure data transmission, and collaborations with ethical hackers for vulnerability assessment are discussed.</div><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">The paper reviews the current regulatory landscape, stressing the need for international standards specifically for connected commercial vehicles. It concludes with an outlook on anticipated developments in automotive cybersecurity, recommendations for industry stakeholders, and the assertion that prioritizing cybersecurity is crucial for the future of the commercial vehicle industry.</div></div>",
      "published": "2024-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-28-0123",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shrinidhi Mahendrakar",
        "Manoj Madarla",
        "Siva Gangapuram",
        "Vishal Dadoo"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-28-0123",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4292,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2024-28-0123 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: commercial, valuable, regulatory, studies, like, even, case, digital."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2024-28-0256",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategic Utilization of Digital Twins for Examining Elastic Attack Surfaces and Replicating Attack Scenarios for Vulnerability Analysis on Road Vehicle Components",
      "description": "As vehicles adopt software-centric architectures, assessing vehicle software behavior becomes more complex, which can lead to the exploitation of overlooked or untreated vulnerabilities. Using these backdoors, attacks frequently targeted automotive products for malicious reasons. Automotive security incident management involves continuous monitoring of incidents and vulnerabilities. However, it faces challenges in reproducing attacks and revalidating security goals. The lack of visualization of attack scenarios, and vectors, and the knowledge required to replicate attacks hinders vulnerability assessment. The proposed approach aims to improve vulnerability assessment and document residual risks. It promotes replicating attack scenarios using cyber digital twins to support threat modeling, risk assessment, and threat analysis. The research paper focuses on utilizing digital twins for cybersecurity incident response, threat monitoring, and vulnerability exploitation by examining elastic attack surfaces and promoting threat Intelligence.",
      "published": "2024-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2024-28-0256",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sreenikethana Venkatachalapathy"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/2024-28-0256",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2025-01-0456",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing Automotive Software Supply Chain Security: A Blockchain-Reproducible Build Approach",
      "description": "The automotive industry’s systems and over-the-air (OTA) updates have vulnerabilities in its software supply chain (SSC). Although frameworks like Uptane have improved OTA security, gaps remain in ensuring software integrity and provenance. In this paper, we examine challenges securing the automotive SSC and introduce a framework, GUIXCHAIN, that integrates version control, reproducible builds, blockchain technology, and software bills of materials (SBoMs) for transparency, auditability, and resilience. Reproducible builds guarantee identical resulting binaries when compiling the same source code in different environments, as any deviation in the final output indicates a potential compromise in the build process, such as malware injection. Our preliminary study shows Guixchain’s use of reproducible builds ensures consistent and integrity-secured software across various build environments. The blockchain provides forensic capabilities, offering a history of the what, who and where of discrepancies within the SSC process. SBoMs provide an inventory of the software components used. Our preliminary study demonstrates that Guixchain effectively mitigates risks such as ransomware, unauthorized modifications, and build server compromises, reinforcing the system’s integrity and resilience throughout the software life cycle. Future work will focus on the full implementation of Guixchain and a comprehensive evaluation of its performance in real-world automotive software supply chain scenarios.",
      "published": "2025-09-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2025-01-0456",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "malware",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Iwinosa Aideyan",
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Richard R. Brooks"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.4271/2025-01-0456",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2025-01-8091",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LLM-Powered Fuzz Testing of Automotive Diagnostic Protocols",
      "description": "Modern vehicles contain tens of different Electronic Control Units (ECUs) from several vendors. These small computers are connected through several networking busses and protocols, potentially through gateways and converters. In addition, vehicle-to-vehicle and internet connectivity are now considered requirements, adding additional complexity to an already complex electronic system. Due to this complexity and the safety-critical nature of vehicles, automotive cyber-security is a difficult undertaking. One critical aspect of cyber-security is the robust software testing for potential bugs and vulnerabilities. Fuzz testing is an automated software testing method injecting large input sets into a system. It is an invaluable technique across many industries and has become increasingly popular since its conception. Its success relies highly on the “quality” of inputs injected. One shortcoming associated with fuzz testing is the expertise required in developing “smart” fuzz testing tools (fuzzers). Developing a fuzzer requires expertise on various topics, from input types and underlying networks to potential system configurations. Moreover, fuzzers are generally not transferable between different systems, limiting their reuse. This study investigates whether Generative AI technologies can meaningfully assist in their development by comparing an AI-generated fuzzer against a commercial one. An automotive fuzzer focusing on Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) was developed by exclusively querying an AI model. First, the pre-trained AI is taught the underlying structure and constraints of UDS and is then used to generate semantically valid test cases. The effectiveness of test cases for vulnerability and fault detection is evaluated. The impact of specific queries and the underlying protocol network configurations on the generated test cases is then investigated through comparison with a commercial fuzzer.",
      "published": "2025-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2025-01-8091",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "ecus",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "John McShane",
        "Levent Çelik",
        "Iwinosa Aideyan",
        "Richard R. Brooks",
        "Mert D. Pesé"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.4271/2025-01-8091",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2025-01-8118",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Uncovering Security Flaws in DC Chargers for Electric Vehicles",
      "description": "The added connectivity and transmission of personal and payment information in electric vehicle (EV) charging technology creates larger attack surfaces and incentives for malicious hackers to act. As EV charging stations are a major and direct user interface in the charging infrastructure, ensuring cybersecurity of the personal and private data transmitted to and from chargers is a key component to the overall security. Researchers at Southwest Research Institute® (SwRI®) evaluated the security of direct current fast charging (DCFC) EV supply equipment (EVSE). Identified vulnerabilities included values such as the MAC addresses of both the EV and EVSE, either sent in plaintext or encrypted with a known algorithm. These values allowed for reprogramming of non-volatile memory of power-line communication (PLC) devices as well as the EV’s parameter information block (PIB). Discovering these values allowed the researchers to access the IPv6 layer on the connection between the EV and EVSE and use traditional ethernet penetration testing methods, including port and vulnerability scanning. Port scanning exposed open SSH and HTTP services, the latter of which was vulnerable and allowed unauthenticated retrieval of proprietary information. The ports should be secured, or closed if unneeded, to prevent this type of vulnerability.",
      "published": "2025-03-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2025-01-8118",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Katherine Kozan"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.4271/2025-01-8118",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-01-0086",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "New Era of Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "<div class=\"section abstract\"><div class=\"htmlview paragraph\">The automotive industry is evolving from a reactive, independently self-determined approach to cybersecurity, complicated by a complex supply chain. Over time, this has resulted in a fragmented industry comprised of any number of proprietary solutions verses a standardized, regulated paradigm to facilitate a platform-oriented approach. This document, an update on collaborative work from the SAE Vehicle Electrical Hardware Security Task Force (TEVEES18B) and GlobalPlatform Automotive Task Force, outlines this transition strategy. An extensible number of additional examples of use cases of Global Platform Technologies are explored in this document.</div></div>",
      "published": "2026-04-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-01-0086",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bill Mazzara",
        "C. Rawlings"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-01-0086",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-01-0170",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Understanding Adversarial Transferability in Vision-Language Models for Autonomous Driving: A Cross-Architecture Analysis",
      "description": "Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used in autonomous driving because they combine visual perception with language-based reasoning, supporting more interpretable decision-making, yet their robustness to physical adversarial attacks, especially whether such attacks transfer across different VLM architectures, is not well understood and poses a practical risk when attackers do not know which model a vehicle uses. We address this gap with a systematic cross-architecture study of adversarial transferability in VLM-based driving, evaluating three representative architectures (Dolphins, OmniDrive, and LeapVAD) using physically realizable patches placed on roadside infrastructure in both crosswalk and highway scenarios. Our transfer-matrix evaluation shows high cross-architecture effectiveness, with transfer rates of 73-91% (mean TR = 0.815 for crosswalk and 0.833 for highway) and sustained frame-level manipulation over 64.7-79.4% of the critical decision window even when patches are not optimized for the target model.",
      "published": "2026-04-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-01-0170",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Fernandez",
        "Pedram MohajerAnsari",
        "Amir Salarpour",
        "Mert D. Pese"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE Technical Paper 2026-01-0170, SAE WCX 2026",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-01-0170",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-01-0782",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Risk Assessment and Experimental Validation of Automotive Ultrasonic Sensors",
      "description": "Ultrasonic sensors are widely deployed in automotive driver assistance systems for near-range environment perception and provide safety-relevant inputs for functions such as parking assistance and automated parking. With increasing vehicle automation, the integrity and availability of ultrasonic sensor data become more critical, as compromised measurements may lead to incorrect vehicle decisions and hazardous behavior. While prior research has extensively studied physical attacks on ultrasonic sensors, a structured cybersecurity risk analysis in accordance with automotive cybersecurity standards, combined with experimental validation, is largely missing. In particular, the communication interface between ultrasonic sensors and control units has received limited attention despite its relevance as a potential attack surface. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of an automotive ultrasonic sensing system based on a demonstrator setup. The work applies a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment methodology aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 and HEAVENS 2.0 to identify security-relevant assets, threat scenarios, and attack paths. Risk levels are derived by evaluating potential impact and attack feasibility. To validate the risk assessment, a structured test strategy is developed using the ISTQB test process and translated into laboratory experiments. Both digital attacks targeting the sensor communication interface, with DSI3 selected as the representative protocol, and physical manipulations of the sensor environment are examined. Experimental results show that selected communication-level attacks can be realized with moderate effort and can cause controlled falsification or loss of measurement data. Physical environmental manipulations significantly degrade signal quality but do not fully suppress object detection in the evaluated configuration. The findings largely confirm the initial risk assessment while enabling refinement of attack feasibility parameters. The results provide a validated linkage between automotive cyber-security risk assessment methods and practical testing of ultrasonic sensing systems and underline the importance of jointly addressing communication interfaces and physical effects in future security concept development.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-01-0782",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "driver assistance",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sebastian Gahm",
        "Jonathan Haller",
        "Reiner Kriesten"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-01-0782",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0202",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Cybersecurity Protocols for Secure Communication between Electric Vehicles and the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment",
      "description": "The increasing adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has raised the importance of secure communication between EVs and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). As EV infrastructure rapidly evolves, cybersecurity threats targeting the vehicle-charger interface pose major risks to user safety, data integrity, and operational continuity. This paper presents an overview of existing EV-EVSE communication standards and explores their associated vulnerabilities. We identify potential cyber threats, including man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, and protocol spoofing, that could compromise the security of EV charging systems. The study proposes an enhanced cybersecurity framework incorporating session authentication, and anomaly detection techniques to fortify EV-EVSE communication. The proposed mitigation strategies aim to ensure secure, reliable, and resilient charging infrastructure essential for the widespread adoption of electric mobility.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0202",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "evse"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sreekumar Uthaman",
        "Urmila A. Patil"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0202",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0480",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development of HIL Based Methodology for Over-The-Air Updates Validation",
      "description": "Over-the-Air (OTA) update technology has come forth as a transformative aider in the domain of automotive technology, allowing Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and Tier-1 suppliers of Electric vehicles (EVs) to frequently make software modifications, enhancements, and bug fixes that are essential to optimize the performance of powertrain components such as the motor controller unit (MCU), Battery Management System (BMS), and Vehicle Control Unit (VCU). This facilitates them to remotely supply updates to the vehicle firmware and software by giving inputs of calibration data without requiring physical access to the vehicle. However, as OTA updates have a direct impact on vehicle’s performance, safety and cybersecurity, a stringent validation methodology is of prime importance prior to deployment process. This paper explores the integration of Hardware-in-Loop (HIL) simulation into the OTA validation pipeline as a means to ensure reliability, safety, and functional correctness of updates before they are applied in the field. We present a structured approach of combining HIL systems with OTA workflows, wherein a virtual vehicle environment is simulated in real time to reproduce a replica of the actual operating conditions for the target ECU under test. The OTA update is injected through a simulated or physical OTA backend and transmitted to the control unit interfaced within the HIL loop. This setup facilitates the emulation of update scenarios including firmware re-flashing, configuration updates, security checks, and rollback mechanisms under controlled, observable conditions. Key advantages include the ability to inject faults, monitor system response, verify communication integrity, and perform automated regression tests without risking physical prototypes or production vehicles. This integration of OTA and HIL not only enhances pre-deployment validation but also lays the foundation for continuous development and in-field update strategies in connected EV platforms. The proposed framework can be scaled to multiple ECUs and integrated with CI/CD pipelines for automated nightly testing. Future work will explore combining this setup with Digital Twin environments and Machine Learning-based anomaly.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0480",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shivani Khare",
        "Ujjwala Shailesh Karle",
        "Anand Subramaniam"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0480",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0608",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Post-EOL Cybersecurity Validation for Automotive Production Units",
      "description": "ISO/SAE 21434 emphasizes comprehensive cybersecurity risk management throughout the automotive lifecycle. However, specific guidance on validating cybersecurity measures at the production level remains limited. This paper addresses the gap in production-stage validation, particularly after End-of-Line (EOL) flashing, which includes configurations of security hardware and software protection (e.g., hardware register configuration, Debug and P-flash password settings etc.) Current automotive cybersecurity validation methods, despite adherence to ISO/SAE 21434, lack specific procedures for the production stage. The existing system-level validation using the ASPICE V-model (e.g., SWE.6, SYS.5) does not ensure the integrity and functionality of cybersecurity features in the final manufactured unit post-EOL flashing. This gap poses a risk of vulnerabilities being introduced during the EOL process, compromising critical security measures. To mitigate the cybersecurity risks in production units, particularly the binary which has been introduced during End-of-Life (EOL) flashing, we propose a dedicated testing phase on the right side of the V-cycle. This phase of testing will be focused on identifying and resolving vulnerabilities stemming from EOL flashing processes, such as incorrect memory addresses or erroneous configuration values to activate the cybersecurity protection. The current ASPICE V-cycle process lacks dedicated validation for software flashed via EOL procedures. This proposal addresses this critical gap by advocating for dedicated testing that will verify the integrity of hardware & Software Cybersecurity configuration (example: UCB addresses, values, DEBUG, BMHD passwords etc.,). By implementing this validation process, we aim to substantially strengthen the overall cybersecurity solutions in production units. We have defined the necessary verification criteria and test cases and developed a performance testing strategy for the production unit testing stage. This strategy aims to ensure the robustness and reliability of cybersecurity measures in the final production units.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0608",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sucheta Chakraborty",
        "Nagarajan Kulanthaisamy",
        "Ganesh Sankar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0608",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0609",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MOSAIC-TARA: A Comprehensive TARA Methodology for Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) is a continuous activity, acting as a foundation of cybersecurity analysis for electrical and electronics automotive products. Existing TARA methodologies in the automotive domain exhibits challenges due to redundant and manual processes, particularly in handling recurring common assets across Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and functional domains. Two primary approaches observed for performing TARA are Manual-Asset-Centric TARA and Catalogue-Driven TARA. Manual-Asset Centric TARA is constructed from scratch by manually identifying the assets, calculating risks by likelihood, and impact determination. Catalogue-Driven TARA utilizes the precompiled likelihood and impact against identified assets. Both approaches lack standardized and modular mechanisms for abstraction and reuse. This results in poor scalability, increased efforts, and difficulty in maintaining consistency across vehicle platforms. The proposed method in this research overcomes such challenges, named as “MOSAIC-TARA”. It is a Modular, Scalable, Adaptive, Interoperable, Comprehensive TARA, decomposing a vehicle system into functional domains or ECUs, and further into its components. Each module is independently assessed and analyzed for potential threats, damage scenarios, and security goals, formulating the multiple TARA modules. These independent individual TARAs are then aggregated based on the architecture to derive ECU level TARA. The modularity of this method supports reusability of assessments across different ECUs, functional domains, and vehicle platforms. This enables optimized and efficient TARA tailored to different system configurations. Additionally, the presented approach introduces damage scenarios classification based on impact criticality, as the same component may lead to varying damage impact depending on the context. Thus, the TARA modules are developed for various levels of damage impacts, provides adaptability towards impact criticality of selected ECU or its functions. MOSIAC-TARA aligns with ISO/SAE 21434 and supports efficient reusable risk-driven design.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0609",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yogendra Goyal",
        "Swati Sinha",
        "Swapnil Sutar",
        "Sanjay Jaisingh"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International Journal of Advances and Current Practices in Mobility",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0609",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0610",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assessment of Cybersecurity Risks in State-Operated Connected Electric Passenger Buses in India",
      "description": "State Transport Units (STUs) are increasingly using electric buses (EVs) as a result of India's quick shift to sustainable mobility. Although there are many operational and environmental benefits to this development, like lower fuel prices, fewer greenhouse gas emissions, and quieter urban transportation, there are also serious cybersecurity dangers. The attack surface for potential cyber threats is expanded by the integration of connected technologies, such as cloud-based fleet management, real-time monitoring, and vehicle telematics. Although these systems make fleet operations smarter and more efficient, they are intrinsically susceptible to remote manipulation, data breaches, and unwanted access. This study looks on cybersecurity flaws unique to connected passenger electric vehicles (EVs) that run on India's public transit system. Electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), telematics control units (TCUs), over-the-air (OTA) update systems, and in-car networks (such as the Controller Area Network or CAN bus) are important areas of interest. Potential interruptions to vehicle functionality and passenger safety are examined in relation to common attack techniques such spoofing, data injection, denial-of-service (DoS), and remote code execution. In comparison to international standards like ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE rules R155/R156, the report also assesses regulatory and compliance deficiencies in India. It lists the operational difficulties that Indian STUs encounter, including as antiquated infrastructure, a deficiency in cybersecurity knowledge, and a lack of established protocols. The paper suggests a plan for installing a Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) in STU-operated EV fleets in order to reduce these threats. Strong incident response mechanisms, focused training initiatives, and the creation of cybersecurity standards tailored to India are among the recommendations. Implementing these measures will enhance the resilience of electric vehicle infrastructure against emerging cyber risks. Furthermore, collaboration between government agencies, industry stakeholders, and academic institutions is emphasized to ensure a comprehensive cybersecurity framework.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0610",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "evse",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "resilience",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "EV charging",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devendra Ashok Mokhare"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0610",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Incident Response (CSIR) Framework and Its Integration into OEM Processes",
      "description": "The exponential growth of connected and autonomous vehicles has significantly escalated cybersecurity threats, compelling automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to adopt robust and structured Cybersecurity Incident Response (CSIR) capabilities. Current automotive cybersecurity regulations, such as AIS 189 in India and UNECE WP.29 globally, mandate precise frameworks for proactive threat detection, timely response, and comprehensive incident documentation. This research presents an innovative, comprehensive CSIR framework specifically tailored to integrate seamlessly into OEM cybersecurity management processes. Leveraging a combination of real-time monitoring systems, structured threat categorization methodologies, and integrated escalation and communication protocols, the proposed CSIR framework ensures efficient incident handling aligned with stringent regulatory compliance. The framework encompasses advanced methodologies including Vehicle Security Operations Center (VSOC) integration for continuous monitoring, standardized incident classification based on severity and potential impact, and well-defined communication channels with national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and regulatory authorities. By integrating this framework, OEMs can significantly elevate their cybersecurity resilience, strengthen stakeholder confidence, and effectively meet evolving global cybersecurity regulatory demands.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience",
        "security",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vikash Chaudhary lng",
        "Manoj Desai",
        "Avik Chatterjee",
        "Avik Chatterjee lng"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0613",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0615",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-ICA Trust Mechanism in Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "With the increasing complexity and connectivity in modern vehicles, cybersecurity has become an indispensable technology. In the era of Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) and Ethernet-based architectures, robust authentication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) is critical to establish a trust. Further, the cloud connected ECUs must perform authentication with backend servers. These authentication requirements often demand multiple certificates to be provisioned within a vehicle, ensuring secure communication between various combinations of ECUs. As a result, a single ECU may end up storing multiple certificates, each serving a specific purpose. This work proposes a method to limit the number of certificates required in a given ECU without compromising security. We introduce a Cross-Intermediate Certificate Authority (Cross-ICA) Trust Architecture, which enables the use of a single certificate per ECU for inter-ECU communication as well as backend server authentication. In this architecture, each ECU is issued a certificate from an Intermediate Certificate Authority (ICA), with all ICAs anchored to a common Root CA. The ICAs are structured based on the nature or domain of the ECU (e.g., infotainment, telematics, ADAS), while maintaining trust through the shared root. During the authentication handshake, the ECU presents its certificate chain. The receiving party (another ECU or backend server) verifies the chain up to the common root, thus establishing mutual trust, even if their certificates originate from different ICAs. The participating ECUs don’t need prior information about certificate chains of each other. This approach reduces certificate storage requirements, simplifies certificate management, and maintains strong security by leveraging a scalable trust model anchored to a unified root. The proposed method is primarily validated in a virtual environment using an OpenSSL implementation. Additionally, the approach is verified on a simulation setup involving two ECU and cloud connectivity, establishing mTLS with certificates issued by cross-signed Intermediate Certificate Authorities (ICAs).",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0615",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vaisakh Venugopal",
        "Yogendra Goyal",
        "Solomon Raja J",
        "Ajay Rai",
        "Sowjanya Rath"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0615",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0616",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Based Security Monitoring Framework for CAN Network",
      "description": "There is rapidly increasing advancement in Connectivity, Autonomous, Subscription and Electrification features in vehicles which are being developed. These trends have resulted in an increase in attack surface and security risks on vehicles. To handle these growing risks, it has become important to include passive security systems such as Intrusion detection systems (IDS) which can detect successful or possible attempts of intrusion into vehicle systems compromising their security. In vehicles based on Zonal Architecture, two types of IDS can be implemented, Network based IDS (NIDS) and Host Based IDS (HIDS). The NIDS is implemented in Gateway Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and can monitor multiple networks connected to Gateway, whereas the HIDS usually monitors one single host ECU. Extensive research material is available on NIDS for CAN Networks. For example, the CAN Network in a vehicle is monitored for various abnormal behaviours such as increased busload and invalid signal values. But most of the literature doesn't answer the question, how to ensure the monitoring achieved by NIDS is sufficient? In this paper we try to answer the question by deriving requirements for security monitoring of in-vehicle CAN network using a novel method to guarantee sufficiency in terms of having better coverage of intrusion scenarios. We employ a fusion of (i) Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment approach and (ii) Attack Tree Based approach for deriving security monitoring requirements for the CAN network. We show that security requirements derived by our approach have better coverage of intrusion scenarios, thus enhancing the efficiency in intrusion detection.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0616",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nanda Kumar E L",
        "Megha Dharnendra Mutagi",
        "Preeti Sonnad",
        "Dhiraj Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0616",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0619",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Proactive AI-Enhanced Cybersecurity for Next-Gen Automotive Infotainment ECU",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of connected vehicle technologies, infotainment Electronic Control Units (ECUs) have become central to user interaction and connectivity within modern vehicles. However, this enhanced functionality has introduced new vulnerabilities to cyberattacks. This paper explores the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in enhancing the cybersecurity framework of infotainment ECUs. The study introduces AI-powered modules for threat detection and response, presents an integrated architecture, and validates performance through simulation using MATLAB, CANoe, and NS-3. This approach addresses real-time intrusion detection, anomaly analysis, and voice command security. Key benefits include zero-day exploit resistance, scalability, and continuous protection via OTA updates. The paper references real-world automotive cyberattack cases such as OTA vulnerability patches, Connected Drive exploits, and Uconnect hack, emphasizing the critical need for AI-enabled proactive cybersecurity frameworks.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0619",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploit",
        "exploits",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shweta More",
        "Shraddha Kulkarni",
        "Priyanshu Kumar",
        "Hemant Ghanwat",
        "Vivek S. Joshi"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0619",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0621",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Automotive OTA Update Systems and Automotive Software Stores",
      "description": "Automotive Over-the-Air (OTA) software updating has become a cornerstone of the modern connected vehicle, enabling manufacturers to remotely deploy bug fixes, security patches, and new features. However, this convenience comes with significant cybersecurity challenges. This paper provides a detailed examination of automotive OTA update security and the software store (software Applications & services store) mechanisms. I discuss the current industry standards and regulations, notably ISO/SAE 21434 and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) regulations UN R155 (cybersecurity) and UN R156 (software updates) and explain their relevance to secure OTA and software update management. I then explored the Uptane framework, an open and widely adopted architecture specifically designed to secure automotive OTA updates. Next, OTA-specific threat models are analyzed, detailing potential attack vectors and corresponding mitigation strategies. Real-world case studies are presented to illustrate both the risks and the successful deployment of secure OTA systems in the industry. I conclude with insights into best practices for implementing a robust, compliant OTA update ecosystem, emphasizing a global perspective on regulations and the need for continuous vigilance throughout the vehicle lifecycle.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0621",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prashanth Ram Kurumbudel"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0621",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0622",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Feasibility and Performance of Post-Quantum Cryptography on Embedded Systems for Two-Wheeler Security",
      "description": "The proliferation of connectivity features (V2X, OTA updates, diagnostics) in modern two-wheelers significantly expands the attack surface, demanding robust security measures. However, the anticipated arrival of quantum computers threatens to break widely deployed publickey cryptography (RSA, ECC), rendering current security protocols obsolete. This paper addresses the critical need for quantum-resistant security in the automotive domain, specifically focusing on the unique challenges of two-wheeler embedded systems. This work presents an original analytical and experimental evaluation of implementing selected Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms, primarily focusing on NIST PQC standardization candidates (e.g., lattice-based KEMs/signatures like Kyber/Dilithium), on microcontroller platforms representative of those used in two-wheeler Electronic Control Units (ECUs) - typically ARM Cortex-M series devices characterized by limited computational power, memory (RAM/ROM), and strict real-time requirements. Our experimental study involved porting and optimizing PQC reference implementations for these constrained environments. We rigorously benchmarked key performance indicators, including key generation time, encapsulation/decapsulation speeds, signing/verification times, and memory footprint (stack usage, code size). The results demonstrate the feasibility of deploying specific PQC schemes, achieving practical execution times (e.g., key operations completing within tens to hundreds of milliseconds) and manageable memory overhead (fitting within typical MCU constraints) for securing functions like secure boot, firmware updates, and authenticated communication. Performance trade-offs between different PQC algorithms regarding speed, key/signature sizes, and memory consumption are analyzed. The significance of this contribution lies in providing the first quantitative performance data and feasibility analysis for PQC adoption within the specific context of two-wheeler embedded systems. These findings offer crucial insights for OEMs and suppliers planning the transition to quantum-safe security architectures, ensuring the long-term security and trustworthiness of connected two-wheelers against future cryptographic threats.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0622",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abhigyan Mishra"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0622",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0623",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Navigating the Field of Automotive Cybersecurity Relevant Regulations",
      "description": "In recent years many automotive cybersecurity relevant regulations have been released and some have already started to come into effect. Moreover, some other regulations will come into effect in the next few years. These regulations provide requirements and guidance to automotive organizations with different degree of specifics. In this paper, we review a number of different cybersecurity relevant regulations such as UNR 155, UNR 156, AIS 189, AIS 190, GB 44495, GB 44496, EU Cyber Resilience Act, and BIS Final Rule. We break down and categorize these regulations based on their scope and highlight key areas relevant to different teams within the organizations. These key areas include Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS), Software Update Management System (SUMS), secure software development and software supply chain security, continuous cybersecurity activities (monitoring, incident response), and vulnerability disclosure and management. We then map responsibilities from the regulations to respective relevant teams such as cybersecurity team, software development team, IT team, legal/compliance and procurement. The purpose is to help clarify roles and responsibilities within the organization to ensure relevant teams are involved to meet the specific requirements. We further analyze the regulations to identify similarities as well as potential challenges for organizations when preparing their organizations in addressing multiple regulations. Examples we discuss in detail include incident reporting, security testing and Software Bill of Material (SBOM) management. As more regulations are coming into effect in the next coming years, organizations need to ensure that they are readily prepared to fulfill the necessary requirements to comply with relevant regulations.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0623",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience",
        "sbom"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dennis Kengo Oka",
        "R. S. Vadamalu"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0623",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0624",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementation of Automotive Cybersecurity Assurance Level",
      "description": "This paper explores the implementation of ISO 21434 Automotive Cybersecurity Assurance Levels (CAL), focusing on enhancing component level cybersecurity for a vehicle. CAL values, which range from 1 to 4, provide a metric for ensuring that assets are protected against relevant threats at various phases of the product life cycle. By identifying parameters in the attack feasibility rating and their severity early in the product life cycle, specifically during the concept phase of ISO 21434, organizations can determine the CAL values. The CAL value serves as a benchmark to determine the level of severity required during the design, development and verification phases of the product life cycle. This paper outlines a method to establish CAL values as per ISO 21434 guidelines. The proposed methodology includes a detailed analysis of threat modeling, which is crucial for identifying and mitigating potential cybersecurity risks. By conducting threat modeling, organizations can systematically assess vulnerabilities and implement appropriate countermeasures to enhance the security posture of automotive components. Furthermore, the paper discusses the integration of CAL into an existing cybersecurity framework, emphasizing the importance of continuous monitoring and improvement. The case study demonstrates how CAL values can be effectively utilized to prioritize cybersecurity efforts and allocate resources efficiently. Additionally, we append different cases to determine the correct CAL value based on test results, ensuring comprehensive validation and robustness of the cybersecurity measures. By incorporating CAL into the product life cycle, organizations can ensure that cybersecurity considerations are embedded throughout the development process, from initial concept to final deployment. This comprehensive approach not only enhances the security of automotive components but also contributes to the overall resilience of the vehicle against cyber threats.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0624",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Subham Ghosh",
        "Jashic Khader Batcha"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0624",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0628",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity Measures in ECU Production",
      "description": "Modern vehicles use a network of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that transmit over thousands of signals. The production of these ECUs is fraught with cybersecurity challenges that can lead to significant vulnerabilities, which pose risks not only to the suppliers but also to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and end users. The automotive industry increasingly relies on sophisticated electronic systems but there is a lack of standardized approach to ensure implementation of robust cybersecurity measures during ECU production. It is imperative to establish effective safeguards against potential threats to ensure vehicle and passenger safety. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to enhancing cybersecurity in ECU production. Key measures include the activation of cybersecurity protections in production units, secure flashing at plant and memory upload process, effective plant password generation, and securing the debug interface to prevent unauthorized access. By implementing these measures during the production process, suppliers can significantly reduce the risk of security breaches. The value of this paper lies in its potential to standardize and recommend essential cybersecurity practices within existing standards. By adhering to these proposed processes, suppliers can uniformly enhance the security in ECU production, thereby minimizing vulnerabilities. This uniformity not only benefits the suppliers but also ensures a higher level of protection for OEMs and end users. The recommendations provided in this paper aim to contribute to the development of robust cybersecurity standards in the automotive industry, fostering a safer and more secure production environment. The study is based on current and existing cybersecurity implementations at the supplier side during the ECU production process. The findings and recommendations are derived from practical experience and observations, aiming to provide actionable insights. This paper is at the stage of proposing these recommendations for inclusion in available cybersecurity standards, with the goal of achieving widespread adoption across the industry.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0628",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nagarajan Kulanthaisamy",
        "Tejaswini M S",
        "Ganesh Sankar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0628",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4204,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2026-26-0628 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: insights., suppliers, unauthorized, there, risks, significant, control."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0629",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity: Safeguarding Connected and Automomous Mobility",
      "description": "As vehicles transform into complex cyber-physical systems within Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), automotive cybersecurity has become a foundational pillar in securing safe, reliable, and trustworthy transportation. This paper examines cybersecurity challenges in connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), focusing on Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications technologies, including Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), and Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), and critical systems like electronic control units (ECUs), battery management units (BMUs), and sensor fusion modules. Key vulnerabilities, such as remote hacking, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, malware injection, and data breaches, threaten vehicle functionality, passenger safety, and privacy. Key protection mechanisms, including encryption, intrusion detection systems (IDS), cryptographic protocols, secure over-the-air (OTA) updates, and Advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) algorithms, enhance threat detection, anomaly monitoring, and adaptive security responses. Additionally, emerging blockchain-based security frameworks offer decentralized solutions for data integrity and secure transactions. For electric vehicles (EVs), lightweight and energy-efficient cybersecurity solutions are critical to securing EV-specific architectures. Global standardization efforts, including ISO/SAE 21434 and UN Regulation No. 155, are shaping industry best practices, ensuring interoperability and scalable security frameworks for next-generation vehicles. This review synthesizes research advancements from 2001 to 2024, identifying key challenges such as real-time threat mitigation, scalability, and adaptive security architectures. The paper aims to provide valuable insights for researchers, engineers, and policymakers, fostering the development of secure, resilient, and sustainable automotive ecosystems in an increasingly digitized transportation network.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0629",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "hacking",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Om Kumar",
        "Dr.G. Rajiv Suresh Kumar",
        "Gopi Sankar M",
        "Rushikesh Sambhaji Haregaonkar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0629",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-26-0691",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Software-Defined Vehicles: Architecting the Future of Intelligent and Connected Mobility",
      "description": "This paper presents a comprehensive technical review of the Software-Defined Vehicle (SDV), a paradigm that is fundamentally reshaping the automotive industry. We analyze the architectural evolution from distributed Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to centralized zonal compute platforms, examining the critical role of Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA), the AUTOSAR standard, and virtualization technologies in enabling this shift. A comparative analysis of leading High-Performance Computing (HPC) platforms, including NVIDIA DRIVE, Tesla FSD, and Qualcomm Snapdragon Ride, is conducted to evaluate the silicon foundation of the SDV. The paper further investigates key enabling technologies such as Over- the-Air (OTA) updates, Digital Twins, and the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for applications ranging from predictive maintenance to software-defined battery management. We scrutinize the competing V2X communication standards (DSRC vs. C-V2X) and address the paramount challenges of functional safety (ISO 26262) and cybersecurity (ISO/SAE 21434) in this new landscape. Finally, we identify open research challenges, ethical considerations, and the future trajectory of SDVs toward fully AI-defined, intelligent, and connected mobility.",
      "published": "2026-01-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-26-0691",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "tesla",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aqueel Ahmad",
        "Khimavath Hemanth",
        "Om Kumar",
        "Dr.G. Rajiv Suresh Kumar",
        "Rushikesh Sambhaji Haregaonkar"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-26-0691",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-28-0121",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Ethernet Proxy-Based Security Architecture in Vehicle Computers",
      "description": "Modern vehicles require sophisticated, secure communication systems to handle the growing complexity of automotive technology. As in-vehicle networks become more integrated with external wireless services, they face increasing cybersecurity vulnerabilities. This paper introduces a specialized Proxy based security architecture designed specifically for Internet Protocol (IP) based communication within vehicles. The framework utilizes proxy servers as security gatekeepers that mediate data exchanges between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and outside networks. At its foundation, this architecture implements comprehensive traffic management capabilities including filtering, validation, and encryption to ensure only legitimate data traverses the vehicle's internal systems. By embedding proxies within the automotive middleware layer, the framework enables advanced protective measures such as intrusion detection systems, granular access controls, and protected over-the-air (OTA) update channels. This strategy enhances both data security and system isolation, creating protective boundaries between critical vehicle operations and potential external attacks. The architecture particularly excels in supporting Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) connectivity, facilitating seamless information exchange between vehicles, roadside infrastructure, and pedestrians. This capability is essential for enhancing roadway safety, optimizing traffic flow, and supporting autonomous driving technologies. The system incorporates dedicated proxy modules for specialized protocols including Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), Diagnostic Over Internet Protocol (Doip), and Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), each fulfilling specific functions in vehicle diagnostics, software updates, and telemetry data management. Performance evaluations will measure latency and throughput metrics to validate the architecture's efficiency and reliability. The framework's modular design aims to provide scalability and adaptability to accommodate both technological advancements and emerging security challenges. The proxy-based security framework presented offers a holistic and forward-looking approach to safeguarding in-vehicle networks. It provides automotive manufacturers with the tools to develop connected vehicles that combine intelligence and efficiency with robust protection against diverse cybersecurity threats.",
      "published": "2026-02-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-28-0121",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Arvind M",
        "Appana Durga Praneetha",
        "Ravi Teja Remalli"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-28-0121",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4517,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.4271/2026-28-0121 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: servers, creating, transport, functions, services, intelligence, access, information."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/2026-28-0205",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Phantom Radar Object Injection in Automotive Automatic Emergency Braking: Attack Quantification, Two-Layer Software Countermeasure, and Dual ISO/SAE 21434 and ISO 21448 Compliance Evidence",
      "description": "Automotive radar systems do not authenticate the signals they receive, allowing an external transmitter to create phantom objects that can trigger automatic emergency braking (AEB). This paper quantifies the threat using real radar measurements from the public RadarScenes dataset and evaluates a software countermeasure that requires no hardware modification. Computer-generated phantom radar returns were added to 200 motorway sequences and adjusted so the OS-CFAR detector accepted them as real objects. In the undefended system, radar detections were tracked as obstacles and braking was initiated when an object appeared within 30 m, resulting in unnecessary braking in 87.0 percent of attacked sequences. The proposed two-layer filter combines kinematic plausibility gating with camera-radar cross-validation. Layer 1 checks track history and physical movement over three consecutive frames, while Layer 2 reduces confidence when a clear-weather radar detection lacks camera confirmation. With both layers active, false braking fell to 3.5 percent, with no genuine detections missed across 200 genuine sequences. SHAP analysis of a Random Forest classifier identified kinematic implausibility as responsible for 62.3 percent of correct suppressions and produced a machine-readable evidence record to support cybersecurity documentation under ISO/SAE 21434 and safety documentation under ISO 21448. These results apply to an offline replay experiment using synthetic injections. Validation with real attack hardware, synchronized camera data, and vehicle testing remains future work.",
      "published": "2026-11-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/2026-28-0205",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vishal Sehgal",
        "Nikhil Sekaran"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE technical papers on CD-ROM/SAE technical paper series",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.4271/2026-28-0205",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/9781468600810",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity: An Introduction to ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "Industries, regulators, and consumers alike see cybersecurity as an ongoing challenge in our digital world. Protecting and defending computer assets against malicious attacks is a part of our everyday lives. From personal computing devices to online financial transactions to sensitive healthcare data, cyber crimes can affect anyone. As technology becomes more deeply embedded into cars in general, securing the global automotive infrastructure from cybercriminals who want to steal data and take control of automated systems for malicious purposes becomes a top priority for the industry. Systems and components that govern safety must be protected from harmful attacks, unauthorized access, damage, or anything else that might interfere with safety functions. Automotive Cybersecurity: An Introduction to ISO/SAE 21434 provides readers with an overview of the standard developed to help manufacturers keep up with changing technology and cyber-attack methods. ISO/SAE 21434 presents a comprehensive cybersecurity tool that addresses all the needs and challenges at a global level. Industry experts, David Ward and Paul Wooderson, break down the complex topic to just what you need to know to get started including a chapter dedicated to frequently asked questions. Topics include defining cybersecurity, understanding cybersecurity as it applies to automotive cyber-physical systems, establishing a cybersecurity process for your company, and explaining assurances and certification.",
      "published": "2021-12-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/9781468600810",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Ward",
        "Paul Wooderson"
      ],
      "venue": "SAE International eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/9781468600810",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/j3061_202112",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "This recommended practice provides guidance on vehicle Cybersecurity and was created based off of, and expanded on from, existing practices which are being implemented or reported in industry, government and conference papers. The best practices are intended to be flexible, pragmatic, and adaptable in their further application to the vehicle industry as well as to other cyber-physical vehicle systems (e.g., commercial and military vehicles, trucks, busses). Other proprietary Cybersecurity development processes and standards may have been established to support a specific manufacturer’s development processes, and may not be comprehensively represented in this document, however, information contained in this document may help refine existing in-house processes, methods, etc. This recommended practice establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to cyber-physical vehicle systems. This includes: Defining a complete lifecycle process framework that can be tailored and utilized within each organization’s development processes to incorporate Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems from concept phase through production, operation, service, and decommissioning. Providing information on some common existing tools and methods used when designing, verifying and validating cyber-physical vehicle systems. Providing basic guiding principles on Cybersecurity for vehicle systems. Providing the foundation for further standards development activities in vehicle Cybersecurity. The appendices provide additional information to be aware of and may be used in helping improve Cybersecurity of feature designs. Much of the information identified in the appendices is available but some experts may not be aware of all of the available information. Therefore, the appendices provide an overview of some of this information to provide further guidance on building Cybersecurity into cyber-physical vehicle systems. The objective of the overviews is to encourage research to help improve designs and identify methods and tools for applying a company’s internal Cybersecurity process. Appendices A-C - Describe some techniques for Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment, Threat Modeling and Vulnerability Analysis (e.g., Attack Trees) and when to use them. Appendices D-I - Provide awareness of information that is available to the Vehicle Industry. Appendix D - Provides an overview of sample Cybersecurity and privacy controls derived from NIST SP 800-53 that may be considered in design phases. Appendix E - Provides references to some available vulnerability databases and vulnerability classification schemes. Appendix F - Describes vehicle-level considerations, including some good design practices for electrical architecture. Appendix G -Lists current Cybersecurity standards and guidelines of potential interest to the vehicle industry. Appendix H - Provides an overview of vehicle Cybersecurity-related research projects starting from 2004. Appendix I - Describes some existing security test tools of potential interest to the vehicle industry. Refer to the definitions section to understand the terminology used throughout the document.",
      "published": "2016-01-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/j3061_202112",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4271/j3061_202112",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 60,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4271/j3201_202409",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Guidelines for Automotive Environment Cybersecurity Key Management and Credential Distribution",
      "description": "This document specifically pertains to cybersecurity for road vehicles. This document encompasses the entire vehicle lifecycle of key management. It has been developed by SAE Committee TEVEES18F, Vehicle Security Credentials Interoperability (VSCI), a subcommittee of SAE Committee TEVEES18A, Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee. This committee is authorized under the scope and authority fo the SAE Electronic Design Automation Steering Committee (also known as the Electronic Systems Group) that is directly under the scope and authority fo the SAE Motor Vehicle Council. The SAE Motor Vehicle Council’s stated scope of influence and authority, as defined by the SAE includes, passenger car and light truck in conjunction with ISO/SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2024-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4271/j3201_202409",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vehicle Electrical System Security Committee"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4271/j3201_202409",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4273/ijvss.13.3.15",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "New Vision Zero Measures with the use of Telematics and Mobility Data",
      "description": "Worldwide, 1.35 million people die every year as a result of road accidents [Status 2018]. More than half of all traffic deaths are among vulnerable road users: pedestrians, cyclist, and motorcyclists [1]. To reduce this number, there are many approaches, an effective and sustainable variant is the Vision Zero(VZ). First and foremost, VZ should be seen as a strategy based on an ethical foundation, creating and supporting a totally new perspective on the road safety problem and the approach to solve it. In Germany, the German Road Safety Council (DVR) has pursued the strategy since 2006 and in 2018 the German Parliament has committed to VZ in the coalition agreement [2]. Since the turn of the century, many European countries have been pursuing the vision of zero traffic fatalities. Numerous VZ measures for traffic infrastructure, vehicle safety features and for instruction have been defined, implemented and validated in order to improve traffic safety, but facing new digital technologies as telematics systems and mobility data via smart phone sensors, these measures need to be redefined in order to be smarter, more efficient and cheaper.",
      "published": "2021-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4273/ijvss.13.3.15",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "I. Hackner",
        "T. Berger",
        "P. Koenig"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Vehicle Structures and Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4273/ijvss.13.3.15",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4314/jfas.v10i2s.2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EXTERNAL ATTACKS ON AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEM THROUGH WIRELESS COMMUNICATION CHANNELS",
      "description": "The reliance of today’s automotive system on electronics control system is expected to make the cars to be state-of-the-art vehicle. However, this technology dependency results in the cars to be exposed to attacks by the hacker through the manipulation of electronics system. Previously, for the attacker to compromise car’s system, he/she must access the car directly and internally. However, with the incorporation of wireless technologies such as Bluetooth and cellular into automotive system for example in its telematic units, the attacks are evolved from internal attacks into remote attack where the adversary does not have to internally access the car’s system. This paper analyses the vulnerabilities of the automotive system by the remote attacks performed through Bluetooth and cellular. Once the vulnerabilities were analyzed, the threats imposed by these vulnerabilities are accessed. Two scenarios namely theft and surveillance are used to exemplify the threats that are carried by the vulnerability of the automotive system to the remote attacks. From the vulnerability analysis and threat assessment, it can be deduced that the automotive system is vulnerable to attacks and proper countermeasure must be taken to curb the implication from the attacks. Keywords: Hardware Trojan, Insertion, Third-part IP, Trust",
      "published": "2018-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4314/jfas.v10i2s.2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nur Qamarina Mohd Noor",
        "Kamilia Kamardin",
        "Salwani Mohd Daud",
        "Nilam Nur Amir Sjarif",
        "Norhaiza Ahmad",
        "Azwan Iskandar Azmi",
        "Suriani Mohd Sam"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4314/jfas.v10i2s.2",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4324/9780323296243-4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Border Threats, Border Security, and Risk Assessment",
      "description": "This chapter discusses the changing nature of U.S. land, sea and air borders. In particular, it charts the growing securitization of borders and the creation of government apparatus to secure the southern U.S. land border in particular. Agencies, such as the U.S. Border Patrol, which are responsible for securing U.S. international borders are also discussed. Finally, sidebar sections discuss specific contemporary border security issues such as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and the unaccompanied minor crisis. The chapter includes an interview with former Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano.",
      "published": "2019-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9780323296243-4",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threats",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ehsan Zaffar"
      ],
      "venue": "Routledge eBooks",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.4324/9780323296243-4",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4324/9781003075011-10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile",
      "description": "Modern automobiles are no longer mere mechanical devices; they are pervasively monitored and controlled by dozens of digital computers coordinated via internal vehicular networks. While this transformation has driven major advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also introduced a range of new potential risks. In this paper we experimentally evaluate these issues on a modern automobile and demonstrate the fragility of the underlying system structure. We demonstrate that an attacker who is able to infiltrate virtually any Electronic Control Unit (ECU) can leverage this ability to completely circumvent a broad array of safety-critical systems. Over a range of experiments, both in the lab and in road tests, we demonstrate the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input — including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, and so on. We find that it is possible to bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car, such as maliciously bridging between our car’s two internal subnets. We also present composite attacks that leverage individual weaknesses, including an attack that embeds malicious code in a car’s telematics unit and that will completely erase any evidence of its presence after a crash. Looking forward, we discuss the complex challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities while considering the existing automotive ecosystem.",
      "published": "2020-07-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003075011-10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karl Koscher",
        "Alexei Czeskis",
        "Franziska Roesner",
        "Shwetak Patel",
        "Tadayoshi Kohno",
        "Stephen Checkoway",
        "Damon McCoy",
        "Brian Kantor",
        "Danny L. Anderson",
        "Hovav Shacham",
        "Stefan Savage"
      ],
      "venue": "Routledge eBooks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.4324/9781003075011-10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 71,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4324/9781003177906-10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive",
      "description": "This chapter explores emerging innovations in the automotive industry. It provides detailed descriptions, examples, and charts about new developments, emerging technologies, leading solution providers, and the revenue impact of innovations through 2035 in the automotive industry. Eight major innovation areas such as powertrain advancement, weight reduction, autonomous cars, electric cars, safety and security, comfort and convenience, connectivity/Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS)/telematics, and shared mobility are discussed in terms of revenue growth, technology maturity, market opportunity, and the Three Horizon framework. We have observed that in the past five to ten years, the automotive industry has increased advancement in four key technologies: ADAS, vehicle automation, vehicle connectivity, and new mobility services. In addition, regulatory pressure on fuel economy, emissions, and safety requirements has accelerated advancement in materials and process innovation. The content of this section can be used for technology/opportunity scouting and strategic planning based on your organization’s objectives and risk tolerance.",
      "published": "2021-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003177906-10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanjay Mazumdar",
        "Cheryl Perkins"
      ],
      "venue": "Routledge eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.4324/9781003177906-10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4324/9781032724072-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Maritime Autonomous Vehicles into National Maritime Security Architecture",
      "description": "This chapter examines the potential use of maritime autonomous vehicles (MAVs) as part of national maritime security architectures and particularly in enhancing maritime domain awareness. A range of countries in Southeast Asia are already making increasing use of a variety of MAVs for maritime security purposes. Using Australia’s Maritime Border Command as a case study, the chapter explores how MAVs can be used by lead maritime security agencies to addresses operational challenges and existing technological limitations. It considers whether there has been a degree of ‘techno-optimism’ regarding MAVs, including concerns about their maintenance, sustainability, and effectiveness in diverse maritime environments. The chapter also discusses the interaction between MAVs and artificial intelligence systems in improving maritime domain awareness and in conducting threat assessments, such as the Australian Maritime Threat Risk Assessment Capability. While MAVs will likely make a useful contribution to national maritime security architecture, they do not represent a ‘silver bullet’ solution to the basic problem of patrolling large maritime domains with limited assets. Nonetheless, the efficiencies created by autonomous systems may also be overstated, as the problem of back-end analysis of gathered data remains.",
      "published": "2024-12-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032724072-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Douglas Guilfoyle"
      ],
      "venue": "Routledge eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4324/9781032724072-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4324/9781315658667-13",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Press in the Cold War",
      "description": "“The Press in the Cold War: Murrow, McCarthy, and Shakespeare” provides examples of new styles, new media, and new forms of entertainment popularized by the press during the Cold War, an era of intense competition between national superpowers. It opens with an overview of John Hersey’s Hiroshima , a compilation of stories from survivors of the U.S. nuclear attack on the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945 that many press historians consider a masterpiece of modern reporting. It then describes the way the press responded to the ensuing climate of fear tied to the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the efforts of CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow to confront anti-communist Senator Joseph McCarthy. It includes a cross-section of content featured on television in the 1950s, such as CBS’s entertainment-based The Ed Sullivan Show , to describe how broadcasters attracted audiences with entertainment. Using materials from this chapter, students should identify the growth of “infotainment,” as noted in previous chapters, and see how news as delivered by print media continued to take a role of secondary importance to entertainment-based media. They should explore the ways television executives often found that fun sold more effectively than fear, and they should understand how Murrow’s concerns about advertising’s effect on news content proved prophetic. Key words, names, and phrases associated with Chapter 12 include: Hiroshima , John Hersey, and the New Yorker ; Joseph McCarthy, HUAC, and the Hollywood Ten; Edward R. Murrow, See It Now , and Hank Greenspun; and The Ed Sullivan Show and Elvis Presley.",
      "published": "2018-08-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315658667-13",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gregory A. Borchard"
      ],
      "venue": "Routledge eBooks",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.4324/9781315658667-13",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4324/9781351309363-10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two Faces of Mickey Mouse",
      "description": "In the beginning, B.C., a 1937 miniature comic book featured Mickey Mouse writing and running his own newspaper, the Daily War-Drum . Initially, the owner/journalist/printer was a pillar of the Republic. By the late 19th century, as mammoth metropolitan newspapers came of age, ownership moved from the editor in the newsroom to the publisher in the counting room. Portrayals of newspapers in motion pictures of the 1930s weren’t all seriousness. Television dramas, novels and other forms of fiction treat the spread of newspaper chains and other big businesses as an attack on America; they romanticize the independent owner. Increasingly, fiction and film replace the metropolitan newspaper with the superficial, suspect TV network as the institutional symbol of news. Hollywood’s antipathy toward media barons, often shadowy or invisible figures, increasingly shapes its portrayal of all the press. And Hollywood’s press is that shallow infotainment called, oxymoronically, television journalism.",
      "published": "2020-03-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351309363-10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Loren Ghiglione"
      ],
      "venue": "Routledge eBooks",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.4324/9781351309363-10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.4337/9781803928241.00013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Korean ethical guidelines for autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of science and technology, autonomous vehicles are expected to significantly enhance human safety and protect lives during operation compared to traditional human-driven vehicles. However, even with technically perfect manufacturing, it may not be possible to completely eliminate all safety concerns, such as accidents, loss of life and property, and other unpredictable issues. Although autonomous vehicles can make decisions and respond to situations without human intervention through autonomous driving systems, it can be challenging for machines to bear the responsibility for these problems. As a result, designers, manufacturers, administrators, service providers, and users of autonomous vehicles must assume their own share of responsibility. The purpose of establishing Korean ethical guidelines for autonomous vehicles is to prevent accidents, clarify where the responsibility lies in the event of an accident. It also outlines the responsibilities of all involved parties and encourages compliance with principles rooted in the underlying values of autonomous vehicles. The values that guide the development of autonomous vehicles include respect for human dignity, compliance with laws and customs, improvement of human welfare, prioritization of life and safety, protection of vulnerable road users, and promoting sustainable development for society. To uphold these values, actors involved with autonomous vehicles must abide by the following five principles: transparency in clarifying responsibility in the event of an accident, controllability to follow human-made laws and regulations, security, and two other principles. The ethical guideline serves as a general direction for autonomous vehicle-related legislation, including design, manufacturing, management, service provision, and utilization.",
      "published": "2024-11-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803928241.00013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Keeyeon Hwang"
      ],
      "venue": "Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.4337/9781803928241.00013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46254/na07.20220249",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on Hacking Attacks and Vulnerabilities in Self-Driving Car with Artificial Intelligence",
      "description": "AI-based self-driving vehicles use open networks and develop self-driving vehicles using ICT technology based on artificial intelligence on computer platforms.However, as hacking attacks on electronic control systems of self-driving vehicles have become possible, various hacking cases such as vehicle control system attacks and remote-control attacks have occurred.Cases of such hacking attacks are increasing the threat of hacking by outside attackers, and if self-driving cars become popular, the number of hacking cases will increase further.In this paper, we propose countermeasures for hacking attacks in terms of cybersecurity systems and technology to cope with hacking attacks.By separately presenting technology and institutional-centric security enhancement measures related to cybersecurity, it contributes to the construction of security for self-driving vehicles and the development of cybersecurity for unmanned defense robots.As security holes owned by self-driving technology are expected to leak personal information or cause personal injury, the need for security research on self-driving cars is increasing, and research on hacking attacks and security measures against self-driving cars is needed.As an additional research task, it is necessary to study the development of smart keys using NFC communication methods for self-driving vehicles and encryption programming methods for security authentication.",
      "published": "2023-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46254/na07.20220249",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "DONG HO SHIN"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Operations Management (IEOM)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.46254/na07.20220249",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46254/sa02.20210803",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Understanding the Impact of Industry 4.0 Technologies on Operational Performance: An Empirical Investigation in the US and EU Automotive Industry",
      "description": "The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR -Industry 4.0) is an emerging and revolutionary step transforming the overall manufacturing industry business model.Over the past decade, 4IR is witnessing increasing attention by both scholars and practitioners due to its ability to achieve high competitiveness growth and innovation.The adoption of 4IR technologies (I4T) can tremendously improve the operational performance of any industry and it can solve many difficulties linked to the production process, the provision of services, and the overall supply chain.In this context, a pilot study was carried out in the automotive industry where managers from 51 US and EU firms were interviewed to investigate the 4IR technologies adopted within their manufacturing practices.The aim of the current study is to examine the most utilized 4IR solutions among 16 key technologies and then to tackle the correlations between those and multiple operational performance metrics (OPMs).Findings showed that more than 80% of the respondents were implementing multiple 4IR technologies at a time.The latter was found to be significantly correlated with the studied OPMs.The technologies that mostly improve quality were Cloud Computing (p < .05),Additive Manufacturing (p < .05),and Industrial Internet (p < .01).Additive manufacturing also boosted the efficiency and productivity performance (p < .01),while employee morale was positively correlated with Cyber Security implementation (p < .01).Furthermore, the better delivery performance was noticed by mainly employing Virtualization (p < .05),and Industrial Internet (p < .1).Finally, both Cloud Computing (p < .01)and Cyber Security (p < .05)had a significant impact on cost reduction.",
      "published": "2021-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46254/sa02.20210803",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joelle Nader",
        "Mohamad Ali Mezher",
        "Raed El-Khalil"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Operations Management (IEOM)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.46254/sa02.20210803",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46299/979-8-90600-152-8",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving the Operational Efficiency of Road Transport",
      "description": "The monograph Improving the Operational Efficiency of Road Transport presents a systematic scientific, methodological, and applied framework for improv- ing the performance of road transport enterprises under contemporary operating conditions. Road transport is treated as an open socio-technical and production- service system whose results depend on the interaction of rolling stock, personnel, infrastructure, demand, maintenance resources, digital information flows, safety requirements, environmental constraints, and economic feasibility. The publication is intended for students, postgraduate students, researchers, lecturers, transport en- gineers, fleet managers, logistics specialists, public transport planners, maintenance managers, and professionals involved in digital fleet management. The relevance of the study is determined by the growing complexity of road transport operations: higher traffic intensity, unstable demand, increasing fuel and energy costs, staff shortages, stricter safety expectations, environmental pressure, and expanding dependence on digital information systems. Under these conditions, management based only on delayed reports and average indicators is insufficient. Operational efficiency is therefore interpreted not merely as cost reduction, but as the ability of the transport system to provide stable, safe, reliable, economically justified, environmentally responsible, and socially useful service. The object of the study is the operational activity of road transport enterprises. The subject of the study is the set of technical, organizational, economic, and information-analytical mechanisms that determine fleet productivity, technical availability, service quality, cost efficiency, safety, and adaptability. The purpose of the monograph is to develop an integrated approach to the assessment and improvement of road transport operational efficiency by combining performance indicators, maintenance models, route and timetable decisions, telematics data, economic evaluation, and implementation monitoring. The monograph systematizes production, technical, economic, service- quality, reliability, safety, environmental, and integrated indicators. Particular attention is paid to vehicle productivity, fleet technical availability, mileage uti- lization, load factor, fuel and energy consumption, downtime, maintenance cost, regularity, punctuality, delivery reliability, environmental performance, and user satisfaction. Each indicator is considered as a management instrument that should have a data source, responsible unit, threshold value, decision rule, and verification procedure. Technical availability and maintenance are analyzed as central prerequisites for efficiency. The study considers preventive maintenance, corrective repair, pre- dictive diagnostics, failure-risk assessment, component life, workshop capacity, spare-parts planning, and maintenance prioritization. The maintenance system is interpreted as a subsystem that must minimize not only direct repair costs, but also downtime, emergency failures, repeated defects, safety risks, service cancellations, and long-term degradation of rolling stock. Organizational reserves are examined through route and timetable planning, rolling-stock utilization, dispatching, driver work organization, operational disci- pline, and coordination with external stakeholders. The monograph shows that many efficiency losses are organizational rather than purely technical: they arise from unbalanced schedules, excessive empty mileage, weak reserve-vehicle management, insufficient terminal or customer coordination, delayed managerial reaction, and lack of standardized procedures. A separate group of issues concerns digital technologies in operational man- agement. Telematics, GPS/AVL monitoring, onboard diagnostics, fuel and energy sensors, driver-behavior recorders, electronic ticketing, maintenance information systems, transport management systems, mobile applications, cloud platforms, dashboards, and digital twins are considered as elements of an integrated digital management environment. The text explains how raw records are transformed into trajectories, trips, indicators, alerts, forecasts, and managerial recommendations, while also emphasizing data quality, interoperability, cybersecurity, backup, and reliability of digital services. The scientific novelty of the monograph lies in the integrated interpretation of road transport efficiency as a balanced result of technical readiness, organiza- tional coordination, economic feasibility, service quality, digital data reliability, and feedback-based management. The practical value lies in the possibility of using the proposed indicators, formulas, tables, models, and management procedures for enterprise efficiency programs, maintenance improvement, telematics implementa- tion, route optimization, investment prioritization, and educational work in road transport specialties. Keywords: road transport; operational efficiency; fleet management; technical availability; predictive maintenance; telematics; transport enterprise; digital fleet management; route optimization; maintenance organization.",
      "published": "2026-07-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46299/979-8-90600-152-8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kostiantyn Viktorovych Dolia"
      ],
      "venue": "Іnternational Science Group eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.46299/979-8-90600-152-8",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46586/tches.v2019.i3.66-85",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fast, Furious and Insecure: Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Supercars",
      "description": "The security of immobiliser and Remote Keyless Entry systems has been extensively studied over many years. Passive Keyless Entry and Start systems, which are currently deployed in luxury vehicles, have not received much attention besides relay attacks. In this work we fully reverse engineer a Passive Keyless Entry and Start system and perform a thorough analysis of its security.Our research reveals several security weaknesses. Specifically, we document the use of an inadequate proprietary cipher using 40-bit keys, the lack of mutual authentication in the challenge-response protocol, no firmware readout protection features enabled and the absence of security partitioning.In order to validate our findings, we implement a full proof of concept attack allowing us to clone a Tesla Model S key fob in a matter of seconds with low cost commercial off the shelf equipment. Our findings most likely apply to other manufacturers of luxury vehicles including McLaren, Karma and Triumph motorcycles as they all use the same system developed by Pektron.",
      "published": "2019-05-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2019.i3.66-85",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "immobiliser",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lennert Wouters",
        "Eduard Marin",
        "Tomer Ashur",
        "Benedikt Gierlichs",
        "Bart Preneel A"
      ],
      "venue": "IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.46586/tches.v2019.i3.66-85",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 57,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46586/tches.v2021.i2.106-135",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure, Accurate, and Practical Narrow-Band Ranging System",
      "description": "Relay attacks pose a serious security threat to wireless systems, such as, contactless payment systems, keyless entry systems, or smart access control systems. Distance bounding protocols, which allow an entity to not only authenticate another entity but also determine whether it is physically close by, effectively mitigate relay attacks. However, secure implementation of distance bounding protocols, especially of the time critical challenge-response phase, has been a challenging task. In this paper, we design and implement a secure and accurate distance bounding protocol based on Narrow-Band signals, such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), to particularly mitigate relay attacks. Narrow-Band ranging, specifically, phase-based ranging, enables accurate distance measurement, but it is vulnerable to phase rollover attacks. In our solution, we mitigate phase rollover attacks by also measuring time-of-flight (ToF) to detect the delay introduced by such attacks. Therefore, our protocol effectively combines the best of both worlds: phase-based ranging for accuracy and time-of-flight (ToF) measurement for security. To demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of our solution, we prototype it on NXP KW36 BLE chips and evaluate its performance and relay attack resistance. The obtained precision and accuracy of the presented ranging solution are 2.5 cm and 30 cm, respectively, in wireless measurements.",
      "published": "2021-02-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i2.106-135",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aysajan Abidin",
        "Mohieddine El Soussi",
        "Jac Romme",
        "Pepijn Boer",
        "Dave Singelée",
        "Christian Bachmann"
      ],
      "venue": "IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.46586/tches.v2021.i2.106-135",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46586/tches.v2021.i4.149-172",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "My other car is your car: compromising the Tesla Model X keyless entry system",
      "description": "This paper documents a practical security evaluation of the Tesla Model X keyless entry system. In contrast to other works, the keyless entry system analysed in this paper employs secure symmetric-key and public-key cryptographic primitives implemented by a Common Criteria certified Secure Element. We document the internal workings of this system, covering the key fob, the body control module and the pairing protocol. Additionally, we detail our reverse engineering techniques and document several security issues. The identified issues in the key fob firmware update mechanism and the key fob pairing protocol allow us to bypass all of the cryptographic security measures put in place. To demonstrate the practical impact of our research we develop a fully remote Proof-of-Concept attack that allows to gain access to the vehicle’s interior in a matter of minutes and pair a modified key fob, allowing to drive off. Our attack is not a relay attack, as our new key fob allows us to start the car anytime anywhere. Finally, we provide an analysis of the update performed by Tesla to mitigate our findings. Our work highlights how the increased complexity and connectivity of vehicular systems can result in a larger and easier to exploit attack surface.",
      "published": "2021-08-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i4.149-172",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "exploit",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "tesla",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lennert Wouters",
        "Benedikt Gierlichs",
        "Bart Preneel A"
      ],
      "venue": "IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.46586/tches.v2021.i4.149-172",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 36,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46630/msae.1.2022.12",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "META-REFERENTIAL REALITY IN THE ABYSS OF MEDIA IMAGES AND THEORIES",
      "description": "McLuhan’s statement “the medium is the message”, made at the time of the expansion of television in the 1960s, was confirmed by the advent of the Internet, social media platforms and the digital transformation of modern society. The media form encircles the recipients, becoming an environment more real than reality, much like Baudrillard’s simulacrum. “Immersed” in a media kaleidoscope in which “pictures within a picture” are endlessly multiplied, users find it increasingly difficult to distinguish facts from interpretations, facts from factoids, lost like “Alice in Wonderland” in the virtual space of never-ending stories. Technological progress has preserved all the old media, while producing new ones, in a way similar to the Russian “matryoshka dolls”, but has pushed the truth and moral dilemmas into the background. Entertainment has become the main media content, information is delivered in the “infotainment” form, with the rapid succession of images as a popularized “montage of attractions”. Marx’s fascination with machines and productive forces as grounds of a “social existence that determines men’s consciousness” has undergone an unusual inversion: the media production represents and creates a worldview in a much more sophisticated way than heavy industry, which as a relic of the past becomes an ecological threat to humanity and the planet. “Reality”, the one word that, at the insistence of writer Nabokov, should always appear in quotation marks, is an astonishing artifact of the media and their powerful masters, and the Earth itself has been utilized as Duchamp’s “readymade”, thus becoming an artwork subjected to relentless exploitation for profit. Mastering Manovich’s “language of new media” is necessary for understanding modern information and visual culture, in order to make communication between people possible at all, because the contemporary culture is meta-referential and self-centered. A critical understanding of the world, which requires media literacy and continuous media education, is the only way to avoid complicity in the collapse of reality under the weight of media images that erase the boundaries between reality and fiction, facts and theoretical interpretations.",
      "published": "2022-09-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46630/msae.1.2022.12",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploitation",
        "infotainment",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Velibor Petković"
      ],
      "venue": "MEDIA STUDIES AND APPLIED ETHICS",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.46630/msae.1.2022.12",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46759/iijsr.2022.6409",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Investigations on Cybersecurity Challenges and Mitigation Strategies in Intelligent transport systems",
      "description": "Automobiles are becoming more linked, also with the ability to synchronize to cellular telephones, offer atmospheric as well as navigational alerts for vehicle passengers, and even broadcast safety alerts to all other automobiles and nearby infrastructures. Although automobile connectivity or digitalization provides obvious benefits to passenger satisfaction including accident prevention, these have indeed increased potential enabling attackers to take over automobiles that endanger either driver's or pedestrians' life. Since the attackers are capable of hacking vehicular communications, some of the notable automobile attacks became effective. This study expands on discussio",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46759/iijsr.2022.6409",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vinod Varma Vegesna"
      ],
      "venue": "Irish Interdisciplinary Journal of Science & Research",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.46759/iijsr.2022.6409",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.46827/ejefr.v8i4.1790",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBERSECURITY AND THE AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY CHAIN IN MOROCCO: EXPLORATORY STUDY",
      "description": "Technological evolution exposes the Moroccan automotive supply chain to cyberattack risks, which could potentially lead to interruptions detrimental to operational continuity. In order to better understand the security measures currently in place to address these potential threats, an exploratory study was conducted within companies in the Moroccan automotive sector. This research was conducted through structured interviews, guided by specific questionnaires, with four carefully selected companies. The sample included two small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as two large companies in the automotive sector in Morocco. The results obtained from these interviews reveal significant differences in the level of awareness and security approach towards cyberattack risks among the different companies interviewed. JEL: L91, L62, O33, D80, M15, R41 Article visualizations:",
      "published": "2024-08-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.46827/ejefr.v8i4.1790",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kenza Raissouni",
        "Zakia Errabih",
        "Rajaa Raissouni",
        "Mohammed Rabih Raissouni",
        "Soukaina Charroud",
        "Bourkkadi Salmane"
      ],
      "venue": "European Journal of Economic and Financial Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.46827/ejefr.v8i4.1790",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47001/irjiet/2024.804004",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Over-the-Air (OTA) Update Mechanisms for ADAS",
      "description": "This research aims to develop robust, resilient, and user-friendly over-the-air (OTA) software update mechanisms for advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) in modern vehicles. The study conducts a comprehensive review on existing OTA update approaches, identifies security threats and vulnerabilities, and proposes an algorithm that incorporates cryptographic techniques, secure authentication, firmware validation, and rollback protection. The methodology utilized in this study involves secure package generation, distribution, installation, and monitoring, as well as adhering to automotive cybersecurity standards, such as ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE WP.29. Extensive evaluation of OTA systems is important as it helps to assess their resilience against adversarial attacks, ensures regulatory compliance, and optimizes usability through user studies. The results demonstrate successful execution of secure OTA update mechanisms, preventing risks, fostering reliability and safety of ADAS software updates. The case studies highlight real-world deployments, best practices, and the effectiveness of the developed solution in improving automotive cybersecurity and functional safety.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47001/irjiet/2024.804004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alex Mathew﻿"
      ],
      "venue": "International Research Journal of Innovations in Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.47001/irjiet/2024.804004",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47059/revistageintec.v11i3.1925",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Communication between Automotive Grade Processors",
      "description": "The project proposes about securing communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in vehicles. ECUs are the microprocessors which are used in the vehicles/automobiles and these processors are also termed as automotive grade processors. Few of the automotive grade processors are “Renesas Processors”, “Raspberry Pi Processors”, “Freescale Processors”, etc. The goal of the project is to incorporate secure data encryption and decryption measures and its impact on the system hardware along with the increase in communication latency. A danger that has been insulant tended to in existing vehicle security assaults, in which the enemy compromises the program of ECUs. In most cases, the assailants overseen to remotely abuse vulnerabilities found on web empowered ECUs such as the media transmission unit or the infotainment framework and from there along the side move through the in vehicle organize and take over security basic components such as the brake, steering wheel and the motor control ECUs. Due to the criticality of such occurrences and the expanding level of security dangers against vehicles, there's a critical got to address the security concerns of inner and outside vehicular communication to ensure the security of travelers. Hence it is vital to maintain safe and secured transmission of data in mobiles.",
      "published": "2021-06-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47059/revistageintec.v11i3.1925",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gujanatti Rudrappa"
      ],
      "venue": "Revista Gestão Inovação e Tecnologias",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.47059/revistageintec.v11i3.1925",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47191/etj/v10i07.07",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Review on Connected Vehicle Cyber-Attacks and Various Intrusion Detection Techniques",
      "description": "In today’s world, self-driving and connected vehicles are becoming more interconnected with the internet. This integration allows for many features and services, such as cellular service, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. However, this increased connectivity comes with increased vulnerability to cyber threats, making automotive systems more attractive targets for potential cyberattacks. It is imperative to prioritise intrusion detection when securing the network of vehicles, particularly self-driving cars and vehicles with open connectivity. This paper presents an overview of cyberattacks that can threaten connected and autonomous vehicles and various intrusion detection techniques that can be used to avoid them. Keywords: Connected vehicle, Internet of Things (IoT), Cyber-attack, Intrusion Detection, Automotive, Network, Internet. Proceedings Citation Format Segun Ebenezer Olaniyan (2024): A Review on Connected Vehicle Cyber-Attacks and Various Intrusion Detection Techniques. Proceedings of the Cyber Secure Nigeria Conference held at The Ballroom Center, Central Business District, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria - 25th - 26th September, 2024. Pp 35-42. https://cybersecurenigeria.org/conference-proceedings/volume-1-2024/ dx.doi.org/10.22624/AIMS/CSEAN-SMART2024P3",
      "published": "2024-09-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47191/etj/v10i07.07",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Segun Ebenezer Olaniyan"
      ],
      "venue": "Engineering and Technology Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.47191/etj/v10i07.07",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3975,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.47191/etj/v10i07.07 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: threaten, making, services, service, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47191/ijmcr/v14ispc3.05",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Comprehensive Review on VANET-Cloud Architecture for Intelligent Transportation Systems",
      "description": "The rapid and unprecedented growth of urban populations has led to increased traffic congestion and road accidents, necessitating the development of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) to improve road safety, traffic management, and driving efficiency. Among emerging technologies, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) integrated with cloud computing have gained significant attention for enabling seamless vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-cloud (V2C) communication. In such systems, vehicles are equipped with advanced sensors that collect real-time data about the environment, roadway, and surrounding vehicles. This data is processed, stored, and shared through cloud infrastructure to support a range of applications, including real-time traffic updates, collision avoidance alerts, navigation assistance, infotainment(“information” and “entertainment.”), and emergency response. The VAN-Cloud architecture offers a scalable and efficient framework for managing vehicular data and cloud resources, ensuring secure communication, low latency, and reliable data exchange. Furthermore, modern vehicles are increasingly equipped with intelligent onboard units that enhance these capabilities, contributing to the development of safer, smarter, and more efficient transportation systems.",
      "published": "2026-03-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47191/ijmcr/v14ispc3.05",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Satish kumar Mulgi",
        "Prajakta Phakatkar",
        "Yogesh Ingale"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER RESEARCH",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.47191/ijmcr/v14ispc3.05",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47297/taposatwsp2633-456913.20260706",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on CAN Bus Injection Attack Detection Method for Internet of Vehicles Based on Deep Learning",
      "description": "With the rapid development of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) technology, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, serving as the core communication protocol in vehicles, faces severe injection attack threats due to the lack of built-in security mechanisms. This paper proposes an injection attack detection method that integrates multi-dimensional features with a lightweight spatiotemporal hybrid network. The proposed method first constructs a multi-dimensional feature space and realizes adaptive feature weighted fusion through an attention mechanism. On this basis, a lightweight hybrid architecture is designed, where depthwise separable convolution and model pruning techniques are introduced to reduce computational overhead, and a contrastive learning strategy is adopted to enhance the model's discriminative capability for anomalous samples. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly reduces inference latency while maintaining high detection accuracy, providing an effective solution for real-time intrusion detection in resource-constrained in-vehicle environments.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47297/taposatwsp2633-456913.20260706",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haoyu Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "Theory and Practice of Science and Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.47297/taposatwsp2633-456913.20260706",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47392/irjaeh.2025.0555",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection System in CAN-BUS Vehicle Networks Using Machine Learning",
      "description": "As vehicles become more connected and software-rich, securing communications inside vehicles is increasingly important. The Controller Area Network (CAN-BUS) is simple and efficient, which is why it remains the dominant vehicle network. That simplicity comes at a cost: the protocol lacks built-in authentication or encryption, leaving it exposed to injection, flooding and impersonation attacks. Here we describe a practical, real-time Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for CAN-BUS that combines supervised machine learning with features useful for deployment. The core detector is a Random Forest trained on the OCS-Lab dataset; it distinguishes benign traffic from DoS, fuzzy and impersonation attacks and achieves a validation accuracy of 85.37%. Importantly, the IDS is more than a model: it includes a retraining dashboard, a timeline for investigation, live packet classification and automated email alerts so operators can react quickly and with context.",
      "published": "2025-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47392/irjaeh.2025.0555",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "G. R. Deekshith",
        "S R Sheetal",
        "Divya G. S.",
        "Darshan B. M.",
        "Varun Balakrishna"
      ],
      "venue": "International Research Journal on Advanced Engineering Hub (IRJAEH)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.47392/irjaeh.2025.0555",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47604/ijts.2402",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advanced Data Science Applications in Vehicles: A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "Purpose: This research paper aims to explore the transformative impact of data science applications within the automotive industry, with a focus on the evolution of vehicles into intelligent, connected, and autonomous entities. Through an extensive literature review and analysis of recent developments, the paper seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the current state and future prospects of data science in vehicles. Methodology: Advancements in sensor technologies, such as LiDAR, HD maps, radars, location tracking and cameras, are discussed, highlighting their role in data collection for applications like advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) and autonomous driving. Relevant citations are provided. This subsection covers the collection and transmission of real-time data through telematics systems, showcasing their importance for predictive maintenance, fleet management, and personalized insurance programs. Citations support the presented information. The deployment of edge computing for real-time data processing in vehicles is discussed, emphasizing its significance for safety-critical applications like collision avoidance. Citations are provided to support the information. This section explores the application of machine learning algorithms to predict vehicle failures, optimize fuel efficiency, and analyze driver behavior. The importance of leveraging historical data to create accurate models is highlighted with supporting citations. Findings: The pivotal role of data science in enabling autonomous vehicles to navigate complex environments is discussed, emphasizing the use of machine learning models for real-time decision-making. Citations support the presented information. This subsection explores the integration of data science in traffic management systems, covering dynamic traffic signal control, congestion prediction, and route optimization. Citations support the findings related to traffic management applications. The paper discusses challenges associated with widespread implementation, including data privacy concerns, cybersecurity risks, and the need for standardized communication protocols. Additionally, potential future directions are outlined, such as the integration of blockchain for secure data sharing and the development of advanced human-machine interfaces. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: This research paper provides a well-rounded contribution by seamlessly integrating theoretical concepts, practical applications, and policy considerations in the realm of advanced data science applications in vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-03-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47604/ijts.2402",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hirya Richard Edymond -"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Technology and Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.47604/ijts.2402",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47611/jsrhs.v13i2.6789",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Need for Cybersecurity in Automotive Industry",
      "description": "This research paper analyzes the importance of cybersecurity in the automotive industry and explains how cybersecurity threats impact the modern world of connected, autonomous, and electrical vehicles. Furthermore, this paper covers in-depth research into the different types of automotive cyber threats such as physical, sensor, software, and network attacks on a vehicle, and various methods to prevent these threats from happening in real-world scenarios. The research paper also helps the reader to gain a broader understanding of cybersecurity in the automotive world. The methodology of this research involved analyzing and collecting information through various external websites, articles, and research papers. Information was collected on automotive cybersecurity incidents from news articles and international cyber security conference presentations. Based on this evidence from various external sources, the research problem was supported by factual data. This paper also talks about all the various solutions to cybersecurity threats in depth such as authentication and encryption, malware detection, software analysis, VPNs (Virtual Private Network), and cryptography. This paper also provides information about some of the new regulations and standards that are currently adopted in the automotive industry. With the rapid change in automotive technology, it is important to be aware that cars can have up to 150 ECUs (Electronic Control Unit) and about 300 million lines of code in near future which could expose more vulnerabilities. (2020, McKinsey & Company). To meet the challenge of these automotive cyber security threats, it is important that awareness should be created among the product engineers and researchers working on future automobiles. This paper attempts at exploring the challenges with automotive cyber security and creating this awareness.",
      "published": "2024-05-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47611/jsrhs.v13i2.6789",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anay Prasanth Nair",
        "Sarada Prasad Gochhayat",
        "Virgel Torremocha",
        "Jothsna Kethar"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Student Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.47611/jsrhs.v13i2.6789",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47750/pnr.2022.13.s03.028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ECU To ECU Communication in Automotive Grade Processors and Security of Messages Exchanged",
      "description": "An Electronic control unit (ECU) is small microprocessors in a vehicle's body which plays a major role in controlling a specific function.Vehicles recently may contain 80-100 ECUs or more, managing different functions in the vehicle like security and giving access to Passive safety measures such as airbags, as well as active safety features such as autonomous emergency braking, are all available.The various problems encountered by ECUs are because of loss of communication, incorrect protocol, memory checksum error and also by cause of illegal hacking.In this project inter and intra communication of vehicle is secured thorough encryption and decryption measure.Electronic Control Units (ECUs) create specific and telemetric data that is transferred across the vehicle's internal network.ECUs are low-resource devices with little resources to dedicate to data security.Threats to vehicle networks have recently surfaced, requiring the attention of the scientific community.We propose in this work to employ message transposition and then encrypt the transposed messages, which will assist to improve message security.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47750/pnr.2022.13.s03.028",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "hacking",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moin Gorikhan",
        "Bhagyashri Patil",
        "Mrunali Panhalkar",
        "Kapila Patil",
        "Sushant Jadhav",
        "Gujanatti Rudrappa",
        "Harshal Mutkekar",
        "Shreyas Anand",
        "Nataraj A. Vijapur"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Pharmaceutical Negative Results",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.47750/pnr.2022.13.s03.028",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47814/ijssrr.v8i7.2822",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Privacy Paradox in Personalised Advertising: Insights from Demographic and Behavioural Data in Delhi NCR",
      "description": "Personalised advertising, which individually pushes content based on the users’ consumer data has become a main feature of modern digital marketing across platforms such as Instagram and Amazon. As its prevalence increases, understanding consumer perceptions of personalisation has become increasingly vital. While existing research has predominantly focused on Western contexts and has typically examined either privacy concerns or the effects of personalisation in isolation, limited attention has been paid to the interplay between demographic characteristics, privacy attitudes and perceived advertising value; particularly in under-researched regions. This study investigates consumer perception on personalised advertising, focusing on the role of privacy concerns, demographic variables (gender, age, internet experience) and perceived advertising value. Additionally, it explores whether these factors influence trust and behavioural responses towards targeted advertising. Employing a quantitative survey design, data was collected from 100 participants using standardised 5-point Likert scales. The findings indicate that female and younger participants reported higher levels of infotainment and more favourable attitudes toward personalised advertising, although younger respondents also experienced higher levels of advertising irritation. Participants who reported falsifying personal data demonstrated marginally elevated irritation levels. Notably, privacy concerns were consistently high across all demographic groups. These findings suggest that while personalised ads may engage certain user groups more strongly, widespread privacy skepticism continues to pose a significant barrier to consumer trust and acceptance. Ethical, transparent data practices and clearer privacy regulations are recommended to foster trust and further acceptance of personalised advertising strategies.",
      "published": "2025-08-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47814/ijssrr.v8i7.2822",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "personal data",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shivam Chaudhary"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Social Science Research and Review",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.47814/ijssrr.v8i7.2822",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.47893/ijssan.2023.1230",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Effect of Cyber Vulnerabilities on the Adoption of Self-Driving Vehicles – A Review",
      "description": "One of the leading disruptive technologies in the upcoming technological revolution is Self-Driving vehicles. However, the absence of security is the greatest obstacle to adoption. This study looks at how cybersecurity impacts the adoption of driverless cars. The purpose of this paper is to perform a literature review supporting the in-depth analysis of cybersecurity and its impacts on the slower adoption rate of Self-Driving Vehicles. The study's primary goal is to determine the connection between worries about cybersecurity and the rate of adoption of self-driving vehicles. Driverless vehicles are the most effective and cutting-edge technology in the transportation sector, yet there are barriers to their widespread adoption because of cybersecurity worries. As a result, this study will clarify the cybersecurity issues that contributed to the slower deployment of autonomous vehicles. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework serves as the study's theoretical foundation. This paradigm consistently identifies the barriers to new technology adoption in cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.47893/ijssan.2023.1230",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vidhi Shah",
        "Azad Ali"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Smart Sensor and Adhoc Network",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.47893/ijssan.2023.1230",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48084/etasr.12581",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigating Relay Attacks in Vehicle Access Systems Using BLE and UWB",
      "description": "The technology for accessing vehicles has evolved significantly from traditional mechanical keys to advanced keyless systems, utilizing smartphones and smart wearables. The conventional LF-RF-based Passive Entry and Passive Start (PEPS) systems, struggle with inherent vulnerabilities. In particular, they suffer from relay attacks that exploit signal amplification to bypass proximity detection mechanisms. As vehicles become more connected through V2X and other shared mobility ecosystems, securing access systems is more critical than ever. To address these challenges, this research proposes a secured vehicle access framework that combines Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Ultra-Wideband (UWB), and Near Field Communication (NFC). Our system introduces multi-layered defense mechanisms, including asymmetric encryption-based digital key applets, dynamic Unique Rolling Session Keys (URSKs), and UWB-based secure ranging, using Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) and trilateration techniques for precise user localization. BLE is used exclusively for authenticating the legitimate device. Passive unlocking is permitted only after proximity is verified by UWB, ensuring that the user’s device is truly near the vehicle. The development process utilized ANSYS HFSS 3D High Frequency Simulation for dual antenna design which enabled precise calibration. The implementation was achieved using a chipset with an ARM Cortex M33 core with hardware accelerators. Our experiments demonstrated that the system reliably triggers door unlock within only a 1.6 m radius, thus effectively mitigating relay attack risks. This framework offers a robust, future-ready, and user-centric solution for next-generation vehicle access control.",
      "published": "2025-10-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48084/etasr.12581",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "exploit",
        "keyless",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "D. Suresh",
        "Prashant V. Joshi",
        "Parag Parandkar"
      ],
      "venue": "Engineering Technology & Applied Science Research",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48084/etasr.12581",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48175/ijarsct-19513",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing Threat and Risk Analysis with a Combined Approach: Asset Container Method and CWSS Integration",
      "description": "In recent years, the development of cybersecurity standards for cyber-physical systems, such as automotive systems, has seen significant progress. One key development is ISO/SAE 21434, released in 2021, which provides a framework for managing and analyzing cybersecurity in the electrical systems of road vehicles. This standard also introduces methods for the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process. However, current security analysis techniques face two notable challenges: first, the conventional CVSS-based approach is inadequate for assessing attack feasibility in cyber-physical systems. Second, the relationship between damage factors and their impact on assets remains unclear. This paper addresses these issues by enhancing the TARA process through the use of the \"asset container\" method for threat classification, as proposed at DECSoS 2017, alongside a CWSS-based risk quantification approach. Furthermore, the paper suggests improvements to risk evaluation methods specifically tailored for automotive systems, focusing on direct access attacks on in-vehicle networks.",
      "published": "2024-09-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48175/ijarsct-19513",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mr. Mounesh A",
        "Ms. Shikha Shetty",
        "Ms. Shilpa",
        "Ms. Shilpa A",
        "Mr. Showrya Shetty"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Advanced Research in Science Communication and Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48175/ijarsct-19513",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48175/ijarsct-22531",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Bike Control System",
      "description": "Including warning mechanisms is essential in modern car safety systems to improve driver awareness and reduce hazards. A phone call alerting system that activates when a car's ignition is turned on is shown in this abstract. The goal of the suggested solution is to solve the frequent problem of drivers unintentionally leaving their cell phones behind or in dangerous positions while driving. With the ignition state of the vehicle as a trigger, the system guarantees the rapid transmission of a phone call alert to the driver's mobile device. This warning can encourage safer driving habits and lessen distractions by reminding the driver to find and secure their phone before starting their trip. To ensure dependability and user-friendliness, the installation of such a system requires the smooth integration of mobile communication technologies with ignition status sensors. According to preliminary assessments, this alarm system greatly raises driver awareness and lowers the risk of driving while distracted by a phone.",
      "published": "2024-11-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48175/ijarsct-22531",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A R Nisha",
        "Prof. Mrs. Usha Sree R"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Advanced Research in Science Communication and Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48175/ijarsct-22531",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48175/ijarsct-37252",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Automotive Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are increasingly connected and intelligent; however, this connectivity introduces significant vulnerabilities, making them more susceptible to cyberattacks. This study presents the process of building a real-time vehicle security monitoring system from the ground up, employing an ESP8266 microcontroller and several affordable sensors. The proposed system simultaneously monitors five parameters sound levels, vibrations, temperature, physical touch, and movement using a three-axis accelerometer. All data are transmitted to a web-based dashboard that features a distinctive hexagonal layout, is updated in real time, and flashes red when anomalies are detected. A simulated cyber-attack trigger was also integrated to demonstrate the system’s response to attempted network tampering. The entire system is cost-effective, exhibits a response time of well under one second, and operates reliably in practice. This implementation addresses a gap in the literature: while numerous research papers discuss vehicle cybersecurity theoretically, there is a lack of practical demonstrations detailing the construction of tangible and testable solutions.",
      "published": "2026-06-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48175/ijarsct-37252",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sagar Dhanake, Ruturaj A. Wakchaure, Vedanti G. Shende",
        "Linesh S. Sonawane Siddhant R. Ghungarde"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Advanced Research in Science Communication and Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48175/ijarsct-37252",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1705.09872",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient Keyless Fragmentation Algorithm for Data Protection",
      "description": "The family of Information Dispersal Algorithms is applied to distributed systems for secure and reliable storage and transmission. In comparison with perfect secret sharing it achieves a significantly smaller memory overhead and better performance, but provides only incremental confidentiality. Therefore, even if it is not possible to explicitly reconstruct data from less than the required amount of fragments, it is still possible to deduce some information about the nature of data by looking at preserved data patterns inside a fragment. The idea behind this paper is to provide a lightweight data fragmentation scheme, that would combine the space efficiency and simplicity that could be find in Information Dispersal Algorithms with a computational level of data confidentiality.",
      "published": "2017-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.09872",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Katarzyna Kapusta",
        "Gérard Memmi",
        "Hassan Noura"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1705.09872",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1707.03501",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "NO Need to Worry about Adversarial Examples in Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "It has been shown that most machine learning algorithms are susceptible to adversarial perturbations. Slightly perturbing an image in a carefully chosen direction in the image space may cause a trained neural network model to misclassify it. Recently, it was shown that physical adversarial examples exist: printing perturbed images then taking pictures of them would still result in misclassification. This raises security and safety concerns. However, these experiments ignore a crucial property of physical objects: the camera can view objects from different distances and at different angles. In this paper, we show experiments that suggest that current constructions of physical adversarial examples do not disrupt object detection from a moving platform. Instead, a trained neural network classifies most of the pictures taken from different distances and angles of a perturbed image correctly. We believe this is because the adversarial property of the perturbation is sensitive to the scale at which the perturbed picture is viewed, so (for example) an autonomous car will misclassify a stop sign only from a small range of distances. Our work raises an important question: can one construct examples that are adversarial for many or most viewing conditions? If so, the construction should offer very significant insights into the internal representation of patterns by deep networks. If not, there is a good prospect that adversarial examples can be reduced to a curiosity with little practical impact.",
      "published": "2017-07-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1707.03501",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiajun Lu",
        "Hussein Sibai",
        "Evan Fabry",
        "David Alexander Forsyth"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1707.03501",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 230,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1708.08414",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Viden: Attacker Identification on In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Various defense schemes --- which determine the presence of an attack on the in-vehicle network --- have recently been proposed. However, they fail to identify which Electronic Control Unit (ECU) actually mounted the attack. Clearly, pinpointing the attacker ECU is essential for fast/efficient forensic, isolation, security patch, etc. To meet this need, we propose a novel scheme, called Viden (Voltage-based attacker identification), which can identify the attacker ECU by measuring and utilizing voltages on the in-vehicle network. The first phase of Viden, called ACK learning, determines whether or not the measured voltage signals really originate from the genuine message transmitter. Viden then exploits the voltage measurements to construct and update the transmitter ECUs' voltage profiles as their fingerprints. It finally uses the voltage profiles to identify the attacker ECU. Since Viden adapts its profiles to changes inside/outside of the vehicle, it can pinpoint the attacker ECU under various conditions. Moreover, its efficiency and design-compliance with modern in-vehicle network implementations make Viden practical and easily deployable. Our extensive experimental evaluations on both a CAN bus prototype and two real vehicles have shown that Viden can accurately fingerprint ECUs based solely on voltage measurements and thus identify the attacker ECU with a low false identification rate of 0.2%.",
      "published": "2017-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1708.08414",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyong-Tak Cho",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1708.08414",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 228,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.01725",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "State-of-the-Art Survey on In-Vehicle Network Communication (CAN-Bus) Security and Vulnerabilities",
      "description": "Nowadays with the help of advanced technology, modern vehicles are not only made up of mechanical devices but also consist of highly complex electronic devices and connections to the outside world. There are around 70 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicle which are communicating with each other over the standard communication protocol known as Controller Area Network (CAN-Bus) that provides the communication rate up to 1Mbps. There are different types of in-vehicle network protocol and bus system namely Controlled Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnected Network (LIN), Media Oriented System Transport (MOST), and FlexRay. Even though CAN-Bus is considered as de-facto standard for in-vehicle network communication, it inherently lacks the fundamental security features by design like message authentication. This security limitation has paved the way for adversaries to penetrate into the vehicle network and do malicious activities which can pose a dangerous situation for both driver and passengers. In particular, nowadays vehicular networks are not only closed systems, but also they are open to different external interfaces namely Bluetooth, GPS, to the outside world. Therefore, it creates new opportunities for attackers to remotely take full control of the vehicle. The objective of this research is to survey the current limitations of CAN-Bus protocol in terms of secure communication and different solutions that researchers in the society of automotive have provided to overcome the CAN-Bus limitation on different layers.",
      "published": "2018-02-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1802.01725",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omid Avatefipour",
        "Hafiz M. A. Malik"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1802.01725",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 101,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1804.07381",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Security: Risk Assessment in Transportation",
      "description": "Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are critical infrastructure that are not immune to both physical and cyber threats. Vehicles are cyber/physical systems which are a core component of ITS, can be either a target or a launching point for an attack on the ITS network. Unknown vehicle security vulnerabilities trigger a race among adversaries to exploit the weaknesses and security experts to mitigate the vulnerability. In this study, we identified opportunities for adversaries to take control of the in-vehicle network, which can compromise the safety, privacy, reliability, efficiency, and security of the transportation system. This study contributes in three ways to the literature of ITS security and resiliency. First, we aggregate individual risks that are associated with hacking the in-vehicle network to determine system-level risk. Second, we employ a risk-based model to conduct a qualitative vulnerability-oriented risk assessment. Third, we identify the consequences of hacking the in-vehicle network through a risk-based approach, using an impact-likelihood matrix. The qualitative assessment communicates risk outcomes for policy analysis. The outcome of this study would be of interest and usefulness to policymakers and engineers concerned with the potential vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures.",
      "published": "2018-04-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1804.07381",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "exploit",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaveh Bakhsh Kelarestaghi",
        "Mahsa Foruhandeh",
        "Kevin P. Heaslip",
        "Ryan Gerdes"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1804.07381",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 24,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1807.09338",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "C-V2X Security Requirements and Procedures: Survey and Research Directions",
      "description": "The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) defines the first specifications for cellular-based vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) communications in Release 14. C-V2X extends LTE's device-to-device communication modes by adding two new modes of operation for vehicular systems in coverage and out of coverage of an LTE base station, or eNB. The vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication mode does not rely on the cellular infrastructure and the C-V2X devices employ a distributed and sensing-based semi-persistent scheduling to schedule their packet transmissions. As a promising alternative to dedicated short range communications, the security aspects of C-V2X need to be carefully designed and evaluated to ensure the availability and integrity of the service and data. This paper discusses possible threat scenarios, reviews the 3GPP specifications and finds that, despite the safety-critical nature of C-V2X, only few mechanisms and procedures have be specified to secure the system. We discuss emerging technologies and provide research directions to improve C-V2X system security and reliability and ensure their widespread adoption in civilian and mission-critical communication contexts.",
      "published": "2018-07-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1807.09338",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vuk Marojevic"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1807.09338",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1810.04144",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Brief Survey on Autonomous Vehicle Possible Attacks, Exploits and Vulnerabilities",
      "description": "Advanced driver assistance systems are advancing at a rapid pace and all major companies started investing in developing the autonomous vehicles. But the security and reliability is still uncertain and debatable. Imagine that a vehicle is compromised by the attackers and then what they can do. An attacker can control brake, accelerate and even steering which can lead to catastrophic consequences. This paper gives a very short and brief overview of most of the possible attacks on autonomous vehicle software and hardware and their potential implications.",
      "published": "2018-10-03",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1810.04144",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "driver assistance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amara Dinesh Kumar",
        "Koti Naga Renu Chebrolu",
        "R. Vinayakumar",
        "Soman KP"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1810.04144",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 51,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1812.04967",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Issues for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles contain more than a hundred Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate over different in-vehicle networks, and they are often connected to the Internet, which makes them vulnerable to various cyber-attacks. Besides, data collected by the connected vehicles is directly connected to the vehicular network. Thus, big vehicular data are collected, which are valuable and generate insights into driver behavior. Previously, a probabilistic modeling and simulation language named vehicleLang is presented to analyze the security of connected vehicles. However, the privacy issues of vehicular data have not been addressed. To fill in the gap, this work present a privacy specification for vehicles based on vehicleLang, which uses the Meta Attack Language (MAL) to assess the security of connected vehicles in a formal way, with a special focus on the privacy aspect. To evaluate this work, test cases are also presented.",
      "published": "2018-12-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1812.04967",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenjun Xiong",
        "Robert Lagerström"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1812.04967",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3992,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.1812.04967 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: valuable, makes, privacy, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1905.05075",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Physical Layer Security Approach for V2X Communication",
      "description": "Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) with advanced sensing and computing technologies are expected to support a whole new set of services including pedestrian and vehicular safety, internet access for vehicles, and eventually, driverless cars. Wireless communication is a major driving factor behind ITS, enabling reliable communication between vehicles, infrastructure, pedestrians and network, generally referred to as vehicle to everything (V2X) communication. However, the broadcast nature of wireless communication renders it prone to jamming, eavesdropping and spoofing attacks which can adversely affect ITS. Keeping in view this issue, we suggest the use of an intelligent security framework for V2X communication security, referred to as intelligent V2X security (IV2XS), to provide a reliable and robust solution capable of adapting to different conditions, scenarios and user requirements. We also identify the conditions that impact the security and describe the open challenges in achieving a realistic IV2XS system.",
      "published": "2019-05-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1905.05075",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "jamming",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haji Muhammad Furqan",
        "Muhammad Sohaib J. Solaija",
        "Jehad M. Hamamreh",
        "Hüseyin Arslan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1905.05075",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1905.05694",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LASER: Lightweight And SEcure Remote keyless entry protocol (Extended version)",
      "description": "Since Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems started to be widely used, several vulnerabilities in their protocols have been found. Attacks such as jamming-and-replay attacks and relay attacks are still effective against most recent RKE systems, even when many secure schemes have been designed. Although they are interesting from a theoretical point of view, the complexity of these solutions is excessive to implement them into a fob. This paper presents a lightweight and general solution based on a one message protocol, which guarantees the integrity and validity of the authentication in RKE systems, protecting the communication against the well-known jamming-and-replay and relay attacks, without using complex cryptographic schemes. Moreover, we also adapt our protocol for passive RKE (PRKE) systems. Our solution also includes a novel frequency-hopping-based approach which mitigates deny-of-service attacks. Finally, a prototype has been implemented using non-expensive hardware. Obtained results assure scalability, effectiveness and robustness.",
      "published": "2019-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1905.05694",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "jamming",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vanesa Daza",
        "Xavier Salleras"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1905.05694",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1905.11587",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Network intrusion detection systems for in-vehicle network - Technical report",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are complex safety critical cyber physical systems, that are connected to the outside world, with all security implications that brings. To enhance vehicle security several network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) have been proposed for the CAN bus, the predominant type of in-vehicle network. The in-vehicle CAN bus, however, is a challenging place to do intrusion detection as messages provide very little information; interpreting them requires specific knowledge about the implementation that is not readily available. In this technical report we collect how existing solutions address this challenge by providing an organized inventory of various CAN NIDSs present in the literature, categorizing them based on what information they extract from the network and how they build their model.",
      "published": "2019-05-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1905.11587",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dupont, Guillaume",
        "Jerry den Hartog",
        "Sandro Etalle",
        "Alexios Lekidis"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1905.11587",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1906.10203",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle False Information Attack Detection and Mitigation Framework using Machine Learning and Software Defined Networking",
      "description": "A modern vehicle contains many electronic control units (ECUs), which communicate with each other through the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to ensure vehicle safety and performance. Emerging Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) will have more ECUs and coupling between them due to the vast array of additional sensors, advanced driving features (such as lane keeping and navigation) and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) connectivity. As a result, CAVs will have more vulnerabilities within the in-vehicle network. In this study, we develop a software defined networking (SDN) based in-vehicle networking framework for security against false information attacks on CAN frames. We then created an attack model and attack datasets for false information attacks on brake-related ECUs in an SDN based in-vehicle network. We subsequently developed a machine-learning based false information attack/anomaly detection model for the real-time detection of anomalies within the in-vehicle network. Specifically, we utilized the concept of time-series classification and developed a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) based model that detects false information within the CAN data traffic. Additionally, based on our research, we highlighted policies for mitigating the effect of cyber-attacks using the SDN framework. The SDN-based attack detection model can detect false information with an accuracy, precision and recall of 95%, 95% and 87%, respectively, while satisfying the real-time communication and computational requirements.",
      "published": "2019-06-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1906.10203",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zadid Khan",
        "M. Chowdhury",
        "Mhafuzul Islam",
        "Chin-Ya Huang",
        "Mizanur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1906.10203",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.05418",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Objects Against LiDAR-Based Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "Deep neural networks (DNNs) are found to be vulnerable against adversarial examples, which are carefully crafted inputs with a small magnitude of perturbation aiming to induce arbitrarily incorrect predictions. Recent studies show that adversarial examples can pose a threat to real-world security-critical applications: a \"physical adversarial Stop Sign\" can be synthesized such that the autonomous driving cars will misrecognize it as others (e.g., a speed limit sign). However, these image-space adversarial examples cannot easily alter 3D scans of widely equipped LiDAR or radar on autonomous vehicles. In this paper, we reveal the potential vulnerabilities of LiDAR-based autonomous driving detection systems, by proposing an optimization based approach LiDAR-Adv to generate adversarial objects that can evade the LiDAR-based detection system under various conditions. We first show the vulnerabilities using a blackbox evolution-based algorithm, and then explore how much a strong adversary can do, using our gradient-based approach LiDAR-Adv. We test the generated adversarial objects on the Baidu Apollo autonomous driving platform and show that such physical systems are indeed vulnerable to the proposed attacks. We also 3D-print our adversarial objects and perform physical experiments to illustrate that such vulnerability exists in the real world. Please find more visualizations and results on the anonymous website: https://sites.google.com/view/lidar-adv.",
      "published": "2019-07-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1907.05418",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yulong Cao",
        "Chaowei Xiao",
        "Dawei Yang",
        "Jing Fang",
        "Ruigang Yang",
        "Mingyan Liu",
        "Bo Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1907.05418",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 132,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.07455",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Attacks and Defences on Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Cyber security is one of the most significant challenges in connected vehicular systems and connected vehicles are prone to different cybersecurity attacks that endanger passengers' safety. Cyber security in intelligent connected vehicles is composed of in-vehicle security and security of inter-vehicle communications. Security of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and the Control Area Network (CAN) bus are the most significant parts of in-vehicle security. Besides, with the development of 4G LTE and 5G remote communication technologies for vehicle-toeverything (V2X) communications, the security of inter-vehicle communications is another potential problem. After giving a short introduction to the architecture of next-generation vehicles including driverless and intelligent vehicles, this review paper identifies a few major security attacks on the intelligent connected vehicles. Based on these attacks, we provide a comprehensive survey of available defences against these attacks and classify them into four categories, i.e. cryptography, network security, software vulnerability detection, and malware detection. We also explore the future directions for preventing attacks on intelligent vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2019-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1907.07455",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "malware",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahdi Dibaei",
        "Xi Zheng",
        "Kun Jiang",
        "Sasa Maric",
        "Hassan Abbas",
        "Shigang Liu",
        "Yuexin Zhang",
        "Yao Deng",
        "Sheng Wen",
        "Jun Zhang",
        "Yang Xiang",
        "Shui Yu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1907.07455",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 45,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3849,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.07455 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: significant, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.10783",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigating Vulnerabilities of Voltage-based Intrusion Detection Systems in Controller Area Networks",
      "description": "Data for controlling a vehicle is exchanged among Electronic Control Units (ECUs) via in-vehicle network protocols such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. Since these protocols are designed for an isolated network, the protocols do not encrypt data nor authenticate messages. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are developed to secure the CAN protocol by detecting abnormal deviations in physical properties. For instance, a voltage-based IDS (VIDS) exploits voltage characteristics of each ECU to detect an intrusion. An ECU with VIDS must be connected to the CAN bus using extra wires to measure voltages of the CAN bus lines. These extra wires, however, may introduce new attack surfaces to the CAN bus if the ECU with VIDS is compromised. We investigate new vulnerabilities of VIDS and demonstrate that an adversary may damage an ECU with VIDS, block message transmission, and force an ECU to retransmit messages. In order to defend the CAN bus against these attacks, we propose two hardware-based Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs) that disconnect the compromised ECU from the CAN bus once these attacks are detected. We develop four voltage-based attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities of VIDS and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed IRSs using a CAN bus testbed.",
      "published": "2019-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1907.10783",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sang Uk Sagong",
        "Radha Poovendran",
        "Linda G. Bushnell"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1907.10783",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1909.08407",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CASAD: CAN-Aware Stealthy-Attack Detection for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Nowadays, vehicles have complex in-vehicle networks (IVNs) with millions of lines of code controlling almost every function in the vehicle including safety-critical functions. It has recently been shown that IVNs are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks capable of taking control of vehicles, thereby threatening the safety of the passengers. Several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature in response to the arising threats, however, hurdle requirements imposed by the industry is hindering their adoption in practice. In particular, detecting attacks on IVNs is challenged by strict resource constraints and utterly complex communication patterns that vary even for vehicles of the same model. In addition, existing solutions suffer from two main drawbacks. First, they depend on the underlying vehicle configuration, and second, they are incapable of detecting certain attacks of a stealthy nature. In this paper, we propose CASAD, a CAN-Aware Stealthy-Attack Detection mechanism that does not abide by the strict specifications predefined for every vehicle model and addresses key real-world deployability challenges. Our fast, lightweight, and system-agnostic approach learns the normal behavior of IVN dynamics from historical data and detects deviations by continuously monitoring IVN traffic. We demonstrate the effectiveness of CASAD by conducting various experiments on a CAN bus prototype, a 2018 Volvo XC60, and publicly available data from two real vehicles. Our approach is experimentally shown to be effective against different attack scenarios, including the prompt detection of stealthy attacks, and has considerable potential applicability to real vehicles.",
      "published": "2019-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1909.08407",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nasser Nowdehi",
        "Wissam Aoudi",
        "Magnus Almgren",
        "Tomas Olovsson"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1909.08407",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 26,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.1911.09881",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the Robustness of Signal Characteristic-Based Sender Identification",
      "description": "Vehicles become more vulnerable to remote attackers in modern days due to their increasing connectivity and range of functionality. Such increased attack vectors enable adversaries to access a vehicle Electronic Control Unit (ECU). As of today in-vehicle access can cause drastic consequences, because the most commonly used in-vehicle bus technology, the Controller Area Network (CAN), lacks sender identification. With low limits on bandwidth and payload, as well as resource constrains on hardware, usage of cryptographic measures is limited. As an alternative, sender identification methods were presented, identifying the sending ECU on the basis of its analog message signal. While prior works showed promising results on the security and feasibility for those approaches, the potential changes in signals over a vehicle's lifetime have only been partly addressed. This paper closes this gap. We conduct a 4~months measurement campaign containing more than 80,000 frames from a real vehicle. The data reflects different driving situations, different seasons and weather conditions, a 19-week break, and a car repair altering the physical CAN properties. We demonstrate the impact of temperature dependencies, analyze the signal changes and define strategies for their handling. In the evaluation, the identification rate can be increased from 91.23% to 99.98% by a targeted updating of the system parameters. At the same time, the detection of intrusions can be improved from 76.83% to 99.74%, while no false positives occured during evaluation. Lastly, we show how to increase the overall performance of such systems by double monitoring the bus at different positions.",
      "published": "2019-11-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1911.09881",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marcel Kneib",
        "Oleg Schell",
        "Christopher Huth"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.1911.09881",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2001.08014",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy in Vehicular Social Networks",
      "description": "We surveyed and presented the state-of-the-art VC systems, security and privacy architectures and technologies, emphasizing on security and privacy challenges and their solutions for P2P interactions in VSNs towards standardization and deployment. We note that beyond safety applications that have drawn a lot of attention in VC systems, there is significant and rising interest in vehicle-to-vehicle interaction for a range of transportation efficiency and infotainment applications, notably LBS as well as a gamut of services by mobile providers. While this enriches the VC systems and the user experience, security and privacy concerns are also intensified. This is especially so, considering (i) the privacy risk from the exposure of the users to the service providers, and (ii) the security risk from the interaction with malicious or selfish and thus misbehaving users or infrastructure. We showed existing solutions can in fact evolve and address the VSN-specific challenges, and improve or even accelerate the adoption of VSN applications.",
      "published": "2020-01-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2001.08014",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hongyu Jin",
        "Mohammad Khodaei",
        "Panos Papadimitratos"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2001.08014",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2006.09108",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An STPA-based Approach for Systematic Security Analysis of In-vehicle Diagnostic and Software Update Systems",
      "description": "The in-vehicle diagnostic and software update system, which supports remote diagnostic and Over-The-Air (OTA) software updates, is a critical attack goal in automobiles. Adversaries can inject malicious software into vehicles or steal sensitive information through communication channels. Therefore, security analysis, which identifies potential security issues, needs to be conducted in system design. However, existing security analyses of in-vehicle systems are threat-oriented, which start with threat identification and assess risks by brainstorming. In this paper, a system-oriented approach is proposed on the basis of the System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The proposed approach extends the original STPA from the perspective of data flows and is applicable for information-flow-based systems. Besides, we propose a general model for in-vehicle diagnostic and software update systems and use it to establish a security analysis guideline. In comparison with threat-oriented approaches, the proposed approach shifts from focusing on threats to system vulnerabilities and seems to be efficient to prevent the system from known or even unknown threats. Furthermore, as an extension of the STPA, which has been proven to be applicable to high level designs, the proposed approach can be well integrated into high-level analyses and perform co-design in different disciplines within a unified STPA framework.",
      "published": "2020-06-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2006.09108",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobiles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jinghua Yu",
        "Stefan Wagner",
        "Feng Luo"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2006.09108",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2008.03621",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Consumer UAV Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Using Fuzzing Tests",
      "description": "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are remote-controlled vehicles capable of flight and are present in a variety of environments from military operations to domestic enjoyment. These vehicles are great assets, but just as their pilot can control them remotely, cyberattacks can be executed in a similar manner. Cyber attacks on UAVs can bring a plethora of issues to physical and virtual systems. Such malfunctions are capable of giving an attacker the ability to steal data, incapacitate the UAV, or hijack the UAV. To mitigate such attacks, it is necessary to identify and patch vulnerabilities that may be maliciously exploited. In this paper, a new UAV vulnerability is explored with related UAV security practices identified for possible exploitation using large streams of data sent at specific ports. The more in-depth model involves strings of data involving FTP-specific keywords sent to the UAV's FTP port in the form of a fuzzing test and launching thousands of packets at other ports on the UAV as well. During these tests, virtual and physical systems are monitored extensively to identify specific patterns and vulnerabilities. This model is applied to a Parrot Bebop 2, which accurately portrays a UAV that had their network compromised by an attacker and portrays many lower-end UAV models for domestic use. During testings, the Parrot Bebop 2 is monitored for degradation in GPS performance, video speed, the UAV's reactivity to the pilot, motor function, and the accuracy of the UAV's sensor data. All these points of monitoring give a comprehensive view of the UAV's reaction to each individual test. In this paper, countermeasures to combat the exploitation of this vulnerability will be discussed as well as possible attacks that can branch from the fuzzing tests.",
      "published": "2020-08-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2008.03621",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "fuzzing",
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rudo, David",
        "Kai Zeng"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2008.03621",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 15,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.04753",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact Evaluation of Falsified Data Attacks on Connected Vehicle Based Traffic Signal Control",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) technology enables data exchange between vehicles and transportation infrastructure and therefore has great potentials to improve current traffic signal control systems. However, this connectivity might also bring cyber security concerns. As the first step in investigating the cyber security of CV-based traffic signal control (CV-TSC) systems, potential cyber threats need to be identified and corresponding impact needs to be evaluated. In this paper, we aim to evaluate the impact of cyber attacks on CV-TSC systems by considering a realistic attack scenario in which the control logic of a CV-TSC system is unavailable to attackers. Our threat model presumes that an attacker may learn the control logic using a surrogate model. Based on the surrogate model, the attacker may launch falsified data attacks to influence signal control decisions. In the case study, we realistically evaluate the impact of falsified data attacks on an existing CV-TSC system (i.e., I-SIG).",
      "published": "2020-10-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2010.04753",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shihong Huang",
        "Wai Hung Wong",
        "Yiheng Feng",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Zhuoqing Morley Mao",
        "Henry X. Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2010.04753",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.08844",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Finding Physical Adversarial Examples for Autonomous Driving with Fast and Differentiable Image Compositing",
      "description": "There is considerable evidence that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations applied directly to their digital inputs. However, it remains an open question whether this translates to vulnerabilities in real systems. For example, an attack on self-driving cars would in practice entail modifying the driving environment, which then impacts the video inputs to the car's controller, thereby indirectly leading to incorrect driving decisions. Such attacks require accounting for system dynamics and tracking viewpoint changes. We propose a scalable approach for finding adversarial modifications of a simulated autonomous driving environment using a differentiable approximation for the mapping from environmental modifications (rectangles on the road) to the corresponding video inputs to the controller neural network. Given the parameters of the rectangles, our proposed differentiable mapping composites them onto pre-recorded video streams of the original environment, accounting for geometric and color variations. Moreover, we propose a multiple trajectory sampling approach that enables our attacks to be robust to a car's self-correcting behavior. When combined with a neural network-based controller, our approach allows the design of adversarial modifications through end-to-end gradient-based optimization. Using the Carla autonomous driving simulator, we show that our approach is significantly more scalable and far more effective at identifying autonomous vehicle vulnerabilities in simulation experiments than a state-of-the-art approach based on Bayesian Optimization.",
      "published": "2020-10-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2010.08844",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jinghan Yang",
        "Adith Boloor",
        "Ayan Chakrabarti",
        "Xuan Zhang",
        "Yevgeniy Vorobeychik"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2010.08844",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.13725",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Denial-of-Service Attacks on C-V2X Networks",
      "description": "Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) networks are increasingly adopted by automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). C-V2X, as defined in 3GPP Release 14 Mode 4, allows vehicles to self-manage the network in absence of a cellular base-station. Since C-V2X networks convey safety-critical messages, it is crucial to assess their security posture. This work contributes a novel set of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on C-V2X networks operating in Mode 4. The attacks are caused by adversarial resource block selection and vary in sophistication and efficiency. In particular, we consider \"oblivious\" adversaries that ignore recent transmission activity on resource blocks, \"smart\" adversaries that do monitor activity on each resource block, and \"cooperative\" adversaries that work together to ensure they attack different targets. We analyze and simulate these attacks to showcase their effectiveness. Assuming a fixed number of attackers, we show that at low vehicle density, smart and cooperative attacks can significantly impact network performance, while at high vehicle density, oblivious attacks are almost as effective as the more sophisticated attacks.",
      "published": "2020-10-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2010.13725",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nataša Trkulja",
        "D. Starobinski",
        "R. Berry"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings Third International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2010.13725",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.15080",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Engineering for ISO 21434",
      "description": "The ISO 21434 is a new standard that has been proposed to address the future challenges of automotive cybersecurity. This white paper takes a closer look at the ISO 21434 helping engineers to understand the ISO 21434 parts, the key activities to be carried out and the main artefacts that shall be produced. As any certification, obtaining the ISO 21434 certification can be daunting at first sight. Engineers have to deploy processes that include several security risk assessment methods to produce security arguments and evidence supporting item security claims. In this white paper, we propose a security engineering approach that can ease this process by relying on Rigorous Security Assessments and Incremental Assessment Maintenance methods supported by automation. We demonstrate by example that the proposed approach can greatly increase the quality of the produced artefacts, the efficiency to produce them, as well as enable continuous security assessment. Finally, we point out some key research directions that we are investigating to fully realize the proposed approach.",
      "published": "2020-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2012.15080",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuri Gil Dantas",
        "Vivek Nigam",
        "Harald Rueß"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2012.15080",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2101.11720",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MiniV2G: An Electric Vehicle Charging Emulator",
      "description": "The impact of global warming and the imperative to limit climate change have stimulated the need to develop new solutions based on renewable energy sources. One of the emerging trends in this endeavor are the Electric Vehicles (EVs), which use electricity instead of traditional fossil fuels as a power source, relying on the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) paradigm. The novelty of such a paradigm requires careful analysis to avoid malicious attempts. An attacker can exploit several surfaces, such as the remote connection between the Distribution Grid and Charging Supply or the authentication system between the charging Supply Equipment and the Electric Vehicles. However, V2G architecture's high cost and complexity in implementation can restrain this field's research capability. In this paper, we approach this limitation by proposing MiniV2G, an open-source emulator to simulate Electric Vehicle Charging (EVC) built on top of Mininet and RiseV2G. MiniV2G is particularly suitable for security researchers to study and test real V2G charging scenarios. MiniV2G can reproduce with high fidelity a V2G architecture to easily simulate an EV charging process. Finally, we present a MiniV2G application and show how MiniV2G can be used to study V2G communication and develop attacks and countermeasures that can be applied to real systems. Since we believe our tool can be of great help for research in this field, we also made it freely available.",
      "published": "2021-01-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2101.11720",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luca Attanasio",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Denis Donadel",
        "Federico Turrin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2101.11720",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2102.10128",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Point Voltage Fingerprinting: Increasing Detectability of ECU Masquerading Attacks",
      "description": "Automotive systems continuously increase their dependency on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and become more interconnected to improve safety, comfort and Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS) functions to passengers and drivers. As a consequence of that trend, there is an expanding attack surface which may potentially expose vehicle's critical functions to cyberattacks. It is possible for an adversary to reach the underlying Control Area Network (CAN) through a compromised node or external-facing network interface, and launch masquerading attacks that can compromise road and passenger safety. Due to lack of native authentication in the CAN protocol, an approach to detect masquerading attacks is to use ECU voltage fingerprinting schemes to verify that the messages are sent by authentic ECUs. Though effective against simple masquerading attacks, prior work is unable to detect attackers such as hardware Trojans, which can mimic ECU voltages in addition to spoofing messages. We introduce a novel Two-point ECU Fingerprinting scheme and demonstrate efficacy in a controlled lab setting and on a moving vehicle. Our results show that our proposed two-point fingerprinting scheme is capable of an overall F1-score over 99.4%. The proposed approach raises the bar for attackers trying to compromise automotive security both remotely and physically, therefore improving security and safety of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2021-02-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.10128",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shabbir Ahmed",
        "M. Juliato",
        "Christopher Gutierrez",
        "Manoj R. Sastry"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2102.10128",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2107.02488",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On Robustness of Lane Detection Models to Physical-World Adversarial Attacks in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "After the 2017 TuSimple Lane Detection Challenge, its evaluation based on accuracy and F1 score has become the de facto standard to measure the performance of lane detection methods. In this work, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study to evaluate the robustness of state-of-the-art lane detection methods under physical-world adversarial attacks in autonomous driving. We evaluate 4 major types of lane detection approaches with the conventional evaluation and end-to-end evaluation in autonomous driving scenarios and then discuss the security proprieties of each lane detection model. We demonstrate that the conventional evaluation fails to reflect the robustness in end-to-end autonomous driving scenarios. Our results show that the most robust model on the conventional metrics is the least robust in the end-to-end evaluation. Although the competition dataset and its metrics have played a substantial role in developing performant lane detection methods along with the rapid development of deep neural networks, the conventional evaluation is becoming obsolete and the gap between the metrics and practicality is critical. We hope that our study will help the community make further progress in building a more comprehensive framework to evaluate lane detection models.",
      "published": "2021-07-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2107.02488",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takami Sato",
        "Qi Alfred Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2107.02488",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2109.11075",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Statistical Analysis of ReRAM-PUF based Keyless Encryption Protocol Against Frequency Analysis Attack",
      "description": "There has been a growing interest in fully integrating Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) for cryptographic primitives, or keyless encryption. Keyless primitives do not store key information during the entire encryption and decryption phase, providing full security against volatile and non-volatile memory attacks. The concept of keyless encryption using ReRAM PUF is a relatively new concept, and the security aspect of the protocol has not been tested yet. In this paper, we use statistical models to analyze the randomness of the protocol and its resistance against frequency attacks.",
      "published": "2021-09-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2109.11075",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dina Ghanai Miandoab",
        "Sareh Assiri",
        "Joseph R. Mihaljevic",
        "Bertrand Cambou"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2109.11075",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.11612",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Developments in Connected Vehicles and the Requirement for Increased Cybersecurity",
      "description": "The increase in popularity of connected features in intelligent transportation systems, has led to a greater risk of cyber-attacks and subsequently, requires a more robust validation of cybersecurity in vehicle design. This article explores three such cyber-attacks and the weaknesses in the connected networks. A review is carried out on current vulnerabilities and key considerations for future vehicle design and validation are highlighted. This article addresses the vehicle manufactures desire to add unnecessary remote connections without appropriate security analysis and assessment of the risks involved. The modern vehicle is All Connected and only as strong as its weakest link.",
      "published": "2021-11-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2111.11612",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Phillip Garrad",
        "Shane Gilroy"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2111.11612",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2201.02893",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integration of Vehicular Clouds and Autonomous Driving: Survey and Future Perspectives",
      "description": "For decades, researchers on Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) and autonomous vehicles presented various solutions for vehicular safety and autonomy, respectively. Yet, the developed work in these two areas has been mostly conducted in their own separate worlds, and barely affect one-another despite the obvious relationships. In the coming years, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), encompassing sensing, communications, connectivity, processing, networking, and computation is expected to bridge many technologies to offer value-added information for the navigation of self-driving vehicles, to reduce vehicle on board computation, and to deliver desired functionalities. Potentials for bridging the gap between these two worlds and creating synergies of these two technologies have recently started to attract significant attention of many companies and government agencies. In this article, we first present a comprehensive survey and an overview of the emerging key challenges related to the two worlds of Vehicular Clouds (VCs) including communications, networking, traffic modelling, medium access, VC Computing (VCC), VC collation strategies, security issues, and autonomous driving (AD) including 3D environment learning approaches and AD enabling deep-learning, computer vision and Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques. We then discuss the recent related work and potential trends on merging these two worlds in order to enrich vehicle cognition of its surroundings, and enable safer and more informed and coordinated AD systems. Compared to other survey papers, this work offers more detailed summaries of the most relevant VCs and ADs systems in the literature, along with some key challenges and insights on how different technologies fit together to deliver safety, autonomy and infotainment services.",
      "published": "2022-01-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2201.02893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yassine Maalej",
        "Elyes Balti"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2201.02893",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2201.06362",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Silently Disabling ECUs and Enabling Blind Attacks on the CAN Bus",
      "description": "The CAN Bus is crucial to the efficiency, and safety of modern vehicle infrastructure. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) exchange data across a shared bus, dropping messages whenever errors occur. If an ECU generates enough errors, their transmitter is put in a bus-off state, turning it off. Previous work abuses this process to disable ECUs, but is trivial to detect through the multiple errors transmitted over the bus. We propose a novel attack, undetectable by prior intrusion detection systems, which disables ECUs within a single message without generating any errors on the bus. Performing this attack requires the ability to flip bits on the bus, but not with any level of sophistication. We show that an attacker who can only flip bits 40% of the time can execute our stealthy attack 100% of the time. But this attack, and all prior CAN attacks, rely on the ability to read the bus. We propose a new technique which synchronizes the bus, such that even a blind attacker, incapable of reading the bus, can know when to transmit. Taking a limited attacker's chance of success from the percentage of dead bus time, to 100%. Finally, we propose a small modification to the CAN error process to ensure an ECU cannot fail without being detected, no matter how advanced the attacker is. Taken together we advance the state of the art for CAN attacks and blind attackers, while proposing a detection system against stealthy attacks, and the larger problem of CAN's abusable error frames.",
      "published": "2022-01-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2201.06362",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Rogers",
        "Kasper Rasmussen"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2201.06362",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2202.04631",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of EV-Charging Protocols",
      "description": "The field of electric vehicle charging involves a complex combination of actors, devices, networks, and protocols. These protocols are being developed without a clear focus on security. In this paper, we give an overview of the main roles and protocols in use in the Netherlands. We describe a clear attacker model and security requirements, show that in light of this many of the protocols have security issues, and provide suggestions on how to address these issues. The most important conclusion is the need for end-to-end security for data in transit and long-term authenticity for data at rest. In addition, we highlight the need for improved authentication of the EV driver, e.g. by using banking cards. For the communication links we advise mandatory use of TLS, standardization of TLS options and configurations, and improved authentication using TLS client certificates.",
      "published": "2022-02-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2202.04631",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pol Van Aubel",
        "Erik Poll"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2202.04631",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2203.05314",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SoK: On the Semantic AI Security in Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Autonomous Driving (AD) systems rely on AI components to make safety and correct driving decisions. Unfortunately, today's AI algorithms are known to be generally vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, for such AI component-level vulnerabilities to be semantically impactful at the system level, it needs to address non-trivial semantic gaps both (1) from the system-level attack input spaces to those at AI component level, and (2) from AI component-level attack impacts to those at the system level. In this paper, we define such research space as semantic AI security as opposed to generic AI security. Over the past 5 years, increasingly more research works are performed to tackle such semantic AI security challenges in AD context, which has started to show an exponential growth trend. In this paper, we perform the first systematization of knowledge of such growing semantic AD AI security research space. In total, we collect and analyze 53 such papers, and systematically taxonomize them based on research aspects critical for the security field. We summarize 6 most substantial scientific gaps observed based on quantitative comparisons both vertically among existing AD AI security works and horizontally with security works from closely-related domains. With these, we are able to provide insights and potential future directions not only at the design level, but also at the research goal, methodology, and community levels. To address the most critical scientific methodology-level gap, we take the initiative to develop an open-source, uniform, and extensible system-driven evaluation platform, named PASS, for the semantic AD AI security research community. We also use our implemented platform prototype to showcase the capabilities and benefits of such a platform using representative semantic AD AI attacks.",
      "published": "2022-03-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2203.05314",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junjie Shen",
        "Ningfei Wang",
        "Ziwen Wan",
        "Yunpeng Luo",
        "Sato, Takami",
        "Zhisheng Hu",
        "Xinyang Zhang",
        "Shengjian Guo",
        "Zhenyu Zhong",
        "Kang Li",
        "Ziming Zhao",
        "Chunming Qiao"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2203.05314",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 27,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2203.16130",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sensor Data Validation and Driving Safety in Autonomous Driving Systems",
      "description": "Autonomous driving technology has drawn a lot of attention due to its fast development and extremely high commercial values. The recent technological leap of autonomous driving can be primarily attributed to the progress in the environment perception. Good environment perception provides accurate high-level environment information which is essential for autonomous vehicles to make safe and precise driving decisions and strategies. Moreover, such progress in accurate environment perception would not be possible without deep learning models and advanced onboard sensors, such as optical sensors (LiDARs and cameras), radars, GPS. However, the advanced sensors and deep learning models are prone to recently invented attack methods. For example, LiDARs and cameras can be compromised by optical attacks, and deep learning models can be attacked by adversarial examples. The attacks on advanced sensors and deep learning models can largely impact the accuracy of the environment perception, posing great threats to the safety and security of autonomous vehicles. In this thesis, we study the detection methods against the attacks on onboard sensors and the linkage between attacked deep learning models and driving safety for autonomous vehicles. To detect the attacks, redundant data sources can be exploited, since information distortions caused by attacks in victim sensor data result in inconsistency with the information from other redundant sources. To study the linkage between attacked deep learning models and driving safety...",
      "published": "2022-03-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2203.16130",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jindi Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2203.16130",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2205.03537",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection in Intra-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "The progression of innovation and technology and ease of inter-connectivity among networks has allowed us to evolve towards one of the promising areas, the Internet of Vehicles. Nowadays, modern vehicles are connected to a range of networks, including intra-vehicle networks and external networks. However, a primary challenge in the automotive industry is to make the vehicle safe and reliable; particularly with the loopholes in the existing traditional protocols, cyber-attacks on the vehicle network are rising drastically. Practically every vehicle uses the universal Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol for the communication between electronic control units to transmit key vehicle functionality and messages related to driver safety. The CAN bus system, although its critical significance, lacks the key feature of any protocol authentication and authorization. Resulting in compromises of CAN bus security leads to serious issues to both car and driver safety. This paper discusses the security issues of the CAN bus protocol and proposes an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that detects known attacks on in-vehicle networks. Multiple Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms are employed to provide recognition of known potential cyber-attacks based on messages, timestamps, and data packets traveling through the CAN. The main objective of this paper is to accurately detect cyberattacks by considering time-series features and attack frequency. The majority of the evaluated AI algorithms, when considering attack frequency, correctly identify known attacks with remarkable accuracy of more than 99%. However, these models achieve approximately 92% to 97% accuracy when timestamps are not taken into account. Long Short Term Memory (LSTM), Xgboost, and SVC have proved to the well-performing classifiers.",
      "published": "2022-05-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2205.03537",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dwivedi, Ajeet Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2205.03537",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.392,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.2205.03537 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: primary, serious, intelligence, car, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2208.11878",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vulnerability Analysis of Time Synchronization in Automotive Ethernet",
      "description": "The operation of many network communication protocols require accurate time synchronization between nodes. In the automotive space, IEEE 802.3bw (commonly referred to as automotive ethernet) is quickly becoming the most popular in-vehicle communication protocol between electronic control units (ECUs). The rapid advance of autonomous vehicles is predicated on a high throughput of multiple HD video streams, LIDAR readings, ML inferences, and vehicular control signals propagating on the same bus. To ensure reliability, security, and safety, for millions of passengers and bystanders, it is essential that the stack is robust at even the lowest level. The time synchronization protocol in this standard is IEEE 802.1 AS which was initially developed for virtual and virtual bridge local area networks (LANs). This paper presents an analysis of failure modes affecting the ability of in-vehicle automotive ethernet networks to synchronize clocks between ECUs. To demonstrate this, we use the OMNet++ discrete event simulator to showcase normal operation, failover to the hot-standby clock, and a black hole attack on one network switch.",
      "published": "2022-08-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2208.11878",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rishikesh Kakade",
        "Joey Chou",
        "Shannon Torcato"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2208.11878",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2209.07842",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Overview of Cyber Security and Privacy on the Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) are key to alleviate our dependency on fossil fuels. The future smart grid is expected to be populated by millions of EVs equipped with high-demand batteries. To avoid an overload of the (current) electricity grid, expensive upgrades are required. Some of the upgrades can be averted if users of EVs participate to energy balancing mechanisms, for example through bidirectional EV charging. As the proliferation of consumer Internet-connected devices increases, including EV smart charging stations, their security against cyber-attacks and the protection of private data become a growing concern. We need to properly adapt and develop our current technology that must tackle the security challenges in the EV charging infrastructure, which go beyond the traditional technical applications in the domain of energy and transport networks. Security must balance with other desirable qualities such as interoperability, crypto-agility and energy efficiency. Evidence suggests a gap in the current awareness of cyber security in EV charging infrastructures. This paper fills this gap by providing the most comprehensive to date overview of privacy and security challenges To do so, we review communication protocols used in its ecosystem and provide a suggestion of security tools that might be used for future research.",
      "published": "2022-09-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2209.07842",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roberto Metere",
        "Zoya Pourmirza",
        "Walker, Sara",
        "Myriam Neaimeh"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2209.07842",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2212.12101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Interpretability in Automotive Systems",
      "description": "The lack of any sender authentication mechanism in place makes CAN (Controller Area Network) vulnerable to security threats. For instance, an attacker can impersonate an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) on the bus and send spoofed messages unobtrusively with the identifier of the impersonated ECU. To address the insecure nature of the system, this thesis demonstrates a sender authentication technique that uses power consumption measurements of the electronic control units (ECUs) and a classification model to determine the transmitting states of the ECUs. The method's evaluation in real-world settings shows that the technique applies in a broad range of operating conditions and achieves good accuracy. A key challenge of machine learning-based security controls is the potential of false positives. A false-positive alert may induce panic in operators, lead to incorrect reactions, and in the long run cause alarm fatigue. For reliable decision-making in such a circumstance, knowing the cause for unusual model behavior is essential. But, the black-box nature of these models makes them uninterpretable. Therefore, another contribution of this thesis explores explanation techniques for inputs of type image and time series that (1) assign weights to individual inputs based on their sensitivity toward the target class, (2) and quantify the variations in the explanation by reconstructing the sensitive regions of the inputs using a generative model. In summary, this thesis (https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/handle/10012/18134) presents methods for addressing the security and interpretability in automotive systems, which can also be applied in other settings where safe, transparent, and reliable decision-making is crucial.",
      "published": "2022-12-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2212.12101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shailja Thakur"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2212.12101",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2212.12347",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Technical Report: Automating Vehicle SOA Threat Analysis using a Model-Based Methodology",
      "description": "While the adoption of Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA) eases the implementation of features such as autonomous driving and over-the-air updates, it also increases the vehicle's exposure to attacks that may place road-users in harm. To address this problem, standards (ISO 21434/UNECE) expect manufacturers to produce security arguments and evidence by carrying out appropriate threat analysis. As key threat analysis steps, e.g., damage/threat scenario and attack path enumeration, are often carried out manually and not rigorously, security arguments lack precise guarantees, e.g., traceability w.r.t. safety goals, especially under system updates. This article proposes automated methods for threat analysis using a model-based engineering methodology that provides precise guarantees with respect to safety goals. This is accomplished by proposing an intruder model for automotive SOA which together with the system architecture and the loss scenarios identified by safety analysis are used as input for computing assets, impact rating, damage/threat scenarios, and attack paths. To validate the proposed methodology, we developed a faithful model of the autonomous driving functions of the Apollo framework, a widely used open-source autonomous driving stack. The proposed machinery automatically enumerates several attack paths on Apollo, including attack paths not reported in the literature.",
      "published": "2022-12-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2212.12347",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "iso 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuri Gil Dantas",
        "Simon Barner",
        "Ke, Pei",
        "Vivek Nigam",
        "Ulrich Schöpp"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2212.12347",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2305.15396",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Efficient Key Management Scheme For In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "Vehicle technology has developed rapidly these years, however, the security measures for in-vehicle network does not keep up with the trend. Controller area network(CAN) is the most used protocol in the in-vehicle network. With the characteristic of CAN, there exists many vulnerabilities including lacks of integrity and confidentiality, and hence CAN is vulnerable to various attacks such as impersonation attack, replay attack, etc. In order to implement the authentication and encryption, secret key derivation is necessary. In this work, we proposed an efficient key management scheme for in-vehicle network. In particular, the scheme has five phases. In the first and second phase, we utilize elliptic curve cryptography-based key encapsulation mechanism(KEM) to derive a pairwise secret between each ECU and a central secure ECU in the same group. Then in the third phase, we design secure communication to derive group shared secret among all ECU in a group. In the last two phases, SECU is not needed, regular ECU can derive session key on their own. We presented a possible attack analysis(chosen-ciphertext attack as the main threat) and a security property analysis for our scheme. Our scheme is evaluated based on a hardware-based experiment of three different microcontrollers and a software-based simulation of IVNS. We argue that based on our estimation and the experiment result, our scheme performs better in communication and computation overhead than similar works.",
      "published": "2023-05-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2305.15396",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hsinlin Tan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2305.15396",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2306.15588",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Developing and Deploying Security Applications for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Radiological material transportation is primarily facilitated by heavy-duty on-road vehicles. Modern vehicles have dozens of electronic control units or ECUs, which are small, embedded computers that communicate with sensors and each other for vehicle functionality. ECUs use a standardized network architecture--Controller Area Network or CAN--which presents grave security concerns that have been exploited by researchers and hackers alike. For instance, ECUs can be impersonated by adversaries who have infiltrated an automotive CAN and disable or invoke unintended vehicle functions such as brakes, acceleration, or safety mechanisms. Further, the quality of security approaches varies wildly between manufacturers. Thus, research and development of after-market security solutions have grown remarkably in recent years. Many researchers are exploring deployable intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms using machine learning and data science techniques. However, there is a gap between developing security system algorithms and deploying prototype security appliances in-vehicle. In this paper, we, a research team at Oak Ridge National Laboratory working in this space, highlight challenges in the development pipeline, and provide techniques to standardize methodology and overcome technological hurdles.",
      "published": "2023-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2306.15588",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samuel C. Hollifield",
        "Pablo Moriano",
        "William Luke Lambert",
        "Joel Asiamah",
        "Isaac Sikkema",
        "Michael D. Iannacone"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2306.15588",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2307.02261",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Risk Analysis Methodologies for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Nowadays, systematic security risk analysis plays a vital role in the automotive domain. The demand for advanced driver assistance systems and connectivity of vehicles to the internet makes cyber-security a crucial requirement for vehicle manufacturers. This paper summarizes the risk analysis method stated in the recently released automotive security standard ISO/SAE 21434, which lays the high-level principles for threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) methods. Following, we introduce a specific use case to compare different security analysis approaches which OEMs can benefit from to achieve compliance with the standard.",
      "published": "2023-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2307.02261",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "driver assistance",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M.E. Abouelnaga",
        "Christine Jakobs"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2307.02261",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.16714",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Vehicle-to-everything Autonomous Driving: A Survey on Collaborative Perception",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) autonomous driving opens up a promising direction for developing a new generation of intelligent transportation systems. Collaborative perception (CP) as an essential component to achieve V2X can overcome the inherent limitations of individual perception, including occlusion and long-range perception. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of CP methods for V2X scenarios, bringing a profound and in-depth understanding to the community. Specifically, we first introduce the architecture and workflow of typical V2X systems, which affords a broader perspective to understand the entire V2X system and the role of CP within it. Then, we thoroughly summarize and analyze existing V2X perception datasets and CP methods. Particularly, we introduce numerous CP methods from various crucial perspectives, including collaboration stages, roadside sensors placement, latency compensation, performance-bandwidth trade-off, attack/defense, pose alignment, etc. Moreover, we conduct extensive experimental analyses to compare and examine current CP methods, revealing some essential and unexplored insights. Specifically, we analyze the performance changes of different methods under different bandwidths, providing a deep insight into the performance-bandwidth trade-off issue. Also, we examine methods under different LiDAR ranges. To study the model robustness, we further investigate the effects of various simulated real-world noises on the performance of different CP methods, covering communication latency, lossy communication, localization errors, and mixed noises. In addition, we look into the sim-to-real generalization ability of existing CP methods. At last, we thoroughly discuss issues and challenges, highlighting promising directions for future efforts. Our codes for experimental analysis will be public at https://github.com/memberRE/Collaborative-Perception.",
      "published": "2023-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2308.16714",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous driving",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Si Liu",
        "Chen Gao",
        "Yuan Chen",
        "Xingyu Peng",
        "Xianghao Kong",
        "Kun Wang",
        "Runsheng Xu",
        "Wentao Jiang",
        "Xiang, Hao",
        "Jiaqi Ma",
        "Miao Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2308.16714",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 50,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2309.10173",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GCNIDS: Graph Convolutional Network-Based Intrusion Detection System for CAN Bus",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as a standard protocol for facilitating communication among various electronic control units (ECUs) within contemporary vehicles. However, it has been demonstrated that the CAN bus is susceptible to remote attacks, which pose risks to the vehicle's safety and functionality. To tackle this concern, researchers have introduced intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to identify and thwart such attacks. In this paper, we present an innovative approach to intruder detection within the CAN bus, leveraging Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) techniques as introduced by Zhang, Tong, Xu, and Maciejewski in 2019. By harnessing the capabilities of deep learning, we aim to enhance attack detection accuracy while minimizing the requirement for manual feature engineering. Our experimental findings substantiate that the proposed GCN-based method surpasses existing IDSs in terms of accuracy, precision, and recall. Additionally, our approach demonstrates efficacy in detecting mixed attacks, which are more challenging to identify than single attacks. Furthermore, it reduces the necessity for extensive feature engineering and is particularly well-suited for real-time detection systems. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the pioneering application of GCN to CAN data for intrusion detection. Our proposed approach holds significant potential in fortifying the security and safety of modern vehicles, safeguarding against attacks and preventing them from undermining vehicle functionality.",
      "published": "2023-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2309.10173",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. K. Devnath"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2309.10173",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2310.10336",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Multilayered Security Infrastructure for Connected Vehicles -- First Lessons from the Field",
      "description": "Connected vehicles are vulnerable to manipulation and a broad attack surface can be used to intrude in-vehicle networks from anywhere on earth. In this work, we present an integrated security infrastructure comprising network protection, monitoring, incident management, and counteractions, which we built into a prototype based on a production car. Our vehicle implements a Software-Defined Networking Ethernet backbone to restrict communication routes, network anomaly detection to make misbehavior evident, virtual controller functions to enable agile countermeasures, and an automotive cloud defense center to analyse and manage incidents on vehicle fleets. We present first measurements and lessons learned from operating the prototype: many network attacks can be prevented through software-defined access control in the backbone; anomaly detection can reliably detect misbehavior but needs to improve on false positive rate; controller virtualization needs tailored frameworks to meet in-car requirements; and cloud defence enables fleet management and advanced countermeasures. Our findings indicate attack mitigation times in the vehicle from 257 ms to 328 ms and from 2,168 ms to 2,713 ms traversing the cloud.",
      "published": "2023-10-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2310.10336",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Häckel, Timo",
        "Meyer, Philipp",
        "Lukas Stahlbock",
        "Falk Langer",
        "Sebastian A. Eckhardt",
        "Franz Korf",
        "Thomas C. Schmidt"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2310.10336",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4822,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.2310.10336 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: incident, functions, access, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2311.01478",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversary ML Resilience in Autonomous Driving Through Human Centered Perception Mechanisms",
      "description": "Physical adversarial attacks on road signs are continuously exploiting vulnerabilities in modern day autonomous vehicles (AVs) and impeding their ability to correctly classify what type of road sign they encounter. Current models cannot generalize input data well, resulting in overfitting or underfitting. In overfitting, the model memorizes the input data but cannot generalize to new scenarios. In underfitting, the model does not learn enough of the input data to accurately classify these road signs. This paper explores the resilience of autonomous driving systems against three main physical adversarial attacks (tape, graffiti, illumination), specifically targeting object classifiers. Several machine learning models were developed and evaluated on two distinct datasets: road signs (stop signs, speed limit signs, traffic lights, and pedestrian crosswalk signs) and geometric shapes (octagons, circles, squares, and triangles). The study compared algorithm performance under different conditions, including clean and adversarial training and testing on these datasets. To build robustness against attacks, defense techniques like adversarial training and transfer learning were implemented. Results demonstrated transfer learning models played a crucial role in performance by allowing knowledge gained from shape training to improve generalizability of road sign classification, despite the datasets being completely different. The paper suggests future research directions, including human-in-the-loop validation, security analysis, real-world testing, and explainable AI for transparency. This study aims to contribute to improving security and robustness of object classifiers in autonomous vehicles and mitigating adversarial example impacts on driving systems.",
      "published": "2023-11-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2311.01478",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aakriti Shah"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2311.01478",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2311.03360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performance Analysis of Security Certificate Management System in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)",
      "description": "In Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, providing accurate information and safeguarding the privacy of end entities is one of the crucial information security issues. Therefore, several international standardization organizations have begun to develop V2X communication security standards in recent years. For instance, the IEEE 1609.2.1 standard designs a Security Credential Management System (SCMS) that specifies certificate application and issuance processes, as well as certificate revocation processes. Furthermore, the IEEE 1609.2 standard defines certificate formats and Secure Protocol Data Units (SPDUs) for secure data transmission based on these standards. As a result, end entity manufacturers and SCMS providers worldwide have started building V2X security systems in accordance with these standards and conducting interoperability testing. Although international standards mainly employ Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) for signature/verification and encryption/decryption functions, performance analysis remains a crucial issue for the practical deployment of these systems. Therefore, this study implements end entities and a SCMS conforming to IEEE 1609.2 and IEEE 1609.2.1 standards. It measures the computation and transmission times for each security communication action within the system from the perspective of end entities and identifies potential system bottlenecks. In the experimental results, this study analyzes the most performance-intensive actions and provides relevant suggestions for enhancing system efficiency for SCMS developers to reference.",
      "published": "2023-09-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2311.03360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abel C. H. Chen",
        "Cheng‐Kang Liu",
        "Chun-Feng Lin",
        "Bon‐Yeh Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2311.03360",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2404.06635",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Current Affairs: A Measurement Study of Deployment and Security Trends in EV Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2404.06635",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Szakály",
        "Sebastian Köhler",
        "Ivan Martinovic"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2404.06635",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.13111",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PG-Attack: A Precision-Guided Adversarial Attack Framework Against Vision Foundation Models for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Vision foundation models are increasingly employed in autonomous driving systems due to their advanced capabilities. However, these models are susceptible to adversarial attacks, posing significant risks to the reliability and safety of autonomous vehicles. Adversaries can exploit these vulnerabilities to manipulate the vehicle's perception of its surroundings, leading to erroneous decisions and potentially catastrophic consequences. To address this challenge, we propose a novel Precision-Guided Adversarial Attack (PG-Attack) framework that combines two techniques: Precision Mask Perturbation Attack (PMP-Attack) and Deceptive Text Patch Attack (DTP-Attack). PMP-Attack precisely targets the attack region to minimize the overall perturbation while maximizing its impact on the target object's representation in the model's feature space. DTP-Attack introduces deceptive text patches that disrupt the model's understanding of the scene, further enhancing the attack's effectiveness. Our experiments demonstrate that PG-Attack successfully deceives a variety of advanced multi-modal large models, including GPT-4V, Qwen-VL, and imp-V1. Additionally, we won First-Place in the CVPR 2024 Workshop Challenge: Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Vision Foundation Models and codes are available at https://github.com/fuhaha824/PG-Attack.",
      "published": "2024-07-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2407.13111",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jiyuan Fu",
        "Zhaoyu Chen",
        "Kaixun Jiang",
        "Haijing Guo",
        "Shuyong Gao",
        "Wenqiang Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2407.13111",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.04474",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Understanding and Applying Security Assurance Cases for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Security Assurance Cases (SAC) are structured bodies of arguments and evidence used to reason about security properties of a certain artefact. SAC are gaining focus in the automotive domain as the need for security assurance is growing due to software becoming a main part of vehicles. Market demands for new services and products in the domain require connectivity, and hence, raise security concerns. Regulators and standardisation bodies started recently to require a structured for security assurance of products in the automotive domain, and automotive companies started, hence, to study ways to create and maintain these cases, as well as adopting them in their current way of working. In order to facilitate the adoption of SAC in the automotive domain, we created CASCADE, an approach for creating SAC which have integrated quality assurance and are compliant with the requirements of ISO/SAE-21434, the upcoming cybersecurity standard for automotive systems. CASCADE was created by conducting design science research study in two iterative cycles. The design decisions of CASCADE are based on insights from a qualitative research study which includes a workshop, a survey, and one-to-one interviews, done in collaboration with our industrial partners about the needs and drivers of work in SAC in industry, and a systematic literature review in which we identified gaps between the industrial needs and the state of the art. The evaluation of CASCADE was done with help of security experts from a large automotive OEM. It showed that CASCADE is suitable for integration in industrial product development processes. Additionally, our results show that the elements of CASCADE align well with respect to the way of working at the company, and has the potential to scale to cover the requirements and needs of the company with its large organization and complex products",
      "published": "2024-09-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2409.04474",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mazen Mohamad"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2409.04474",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.15561",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analyzing Privacy Implications of Data Collection in Android Automotive OS",
      "description": "Modern vehicles have become sophisticated computation and sensor systems, as evidenced by advanced driver assistance systems, in-car infotainment, and autonomous driving capabilities. They collect and process vast amounts of data through various embedded subsystems. One significant player in this landscape is Android Automotive OS (AAOS), which has been integrated into over 100M vehicles and has become a dominant force in the in-vehicle infotainment market. With this extensive data collection, privacy has become increasingly crucial. The volume of data gathered by these systems raises questions about how this information is stored, used, and protected, making privacy a critical issue for manufacturers and consumers. However, very little has been done on vehicle data privacy. This paper focuses on the privacy implications of AAOS, examining the exact nature and scope of data collection and the corresponding privacy policies from the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). We develop a novel automotive privacy analysis tool called PriDrive which employs three methodological approaches: network traffic inspection, and both static and dynamic analyses of Android images using rooted emulators from various OEMs. These methodologies are followed by an assessment of whether the collected data types were properly disclosed in OEMs and 3rd party apps' privacy policies (to identify any discrepancies or violations). Our evaluation on three different OEM platforms reveals that vehicle speed is collected at a sampling rate of roughly 25 Hz. Other properties such as model info, climate & AC, and seat data are collected in a batch 30 seconds into vehicle startup. In addition, several vehicle property types were collected without disclosure in their respective privacy policies. For example, OEM A's policies only covers 110 vehicle properties or 13.02% of the properties found in our static analysis.",
      "published": "2024-09-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2409.15561",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bulut Gözübüyük",
        "Tang, Brian",
        "Kang Geun Shin",
        "Mert D. Pesé"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2409.15561",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3981,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.15561 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: volume, collect, collection, platforms, very, nature, sensor, extensive."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.13778",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Adversarial Robustness of LiDAR-based Machine Learning Perception in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "In autonomous driving, the combination of AI and vehicular technology offers great potential. However, this amalgamation comes with vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. This survey focuses on the intersection of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) and autonomous systems, with a specific focus on LiDAR-based systems. We comprehensively explore the threat landscape, encompassing cyber-attacks on sensors and adversarial perturbations. Additionally, we investigate defensive strategies employed in countering these threats. This paper endeavors to present a concise overview of the challenges and advances in securing autonomous driving systems against adversarial threats, emphasizing the need for robust defenses to ensure safety and security.",
      "published": "2024-11-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2411.13778",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junae Kim",
        "Kaur, Amardeep"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2411.13778",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.00416",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ACTISM: Threat-informed Dynamic Security Modelling for Automotive Systems",
      "description": "Evolving cybersecurity threats in complex cyber-physical systems pose significant risks to system functionality and safety. This experience report introduces ACTISM (Automotive Consequence-Driven and Threat-Informed Security Modelling), an integrated security modelling framework that enhances the resilience of automotive systems by dynamically updating their cybersecurity posture in response to prevailing and evolving threats, attacker tactics, and their impact on system functionality and safety. ACTISM addresses the existing knowledge gap in static security assessment methodologies by providing a dynamic and iterative framework. We demonstrate the effectiveness of ACTISM by applying it to a real-world example of the Tesla Electric Vehicle's In-Vehicle Infotainment system, illustrating how the security model can be adapted as new threats emerge. We also report the results of a practitioners' survey on the usefulness of ACTISM and its future directions. The survey highlights avenues for future research and development in this area, including automated vulnerability management workflows for automotive systems.",
      "published": "2024-11-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2412.00416",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "resilience",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huang, Shaofei",
        "Christopher Michael POSKITT",
        "Lwin Khin Shar"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2412.00416",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.15348",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicle Security: A Deep Dive into Threat Modeling",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are poised to revolutionize modern transportation, offering enhanced safety, efficiency, and convenience. However, the increasing complexity and connectivity of AV systems introduce significant cybersecurity challenges. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of AV security with a focus on threat modeling frameworks, including STRIDE, DREAD, and MITRE ATT\\&CK, to systematically identify and mitigate potential risks. The survey examines key components of AV architectures, such as sensors, communication modules, and electronic control units (ECUs), and explores common attack vectors like wireless communication exploits, sensor spoofing, and firmware vulnerabilities. Through case studies of real-world incidents, such as the Jeep Cherokee and Tesla Model S exploits, the paper highlights the critical need for robust security measures. Emerging technologies, including blockchain for secure Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication, AI-driven threat detection, and secure Over-The-Air (OTA) updates, are discussed as potential solutions to mitigate evolving threats. The paper also addresses legal and ethical considerations, emphasizing data privacy, user safety, and regulatory compliance. By combining threat modeling frameworks, multi-layered security strategies, and proactive defenses, this survey offers insights and recommendations for enhancing the cybersecurity of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2024-12-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2412.15348",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "jeep",
        "tesla",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amal Yousseef",
        "S. Satam",
        "B. Latibari",
        "Jesus Pacheco",
        "Soheil Salehi",
        "Salim Hariri",
        "Partik Satam"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2412.15348",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2501.04479",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Understanding, Implementing, and Supporting Security Assurance Cases in Safety-Critical Domains",
      "description": "The increasing demand for connectivity in safety-critical domains has made security assurance a crucial consideration. In safety-critical industry, software, and connectivity have become integral to meeting market expectations. Regulatory bodies now require security assurance cases (SAC) to verify compliance, as demonstrated in ISO/SAE-21434 for automotive. However, existing approaches for creating SACs do not adequately address industry-specific constraints and requirements. In this thesis, we present CASCADE, an approach for creating SACs that aligns with ISO/SAE-21434 and integrates quality assurance measures. CASCADE is developed based on insights from industry needs and a systematic literature review. We explore various factors driving SAC adoption, both internal and external to companies in safety-critical domains, and identify gaps in the existing literature. Our approach addresses these gaps and focuses on asset-driven methodology and quality assurance. We provide an illustrative example and evaluate CASCADE's suitability and scalability in an automotive OEM. We evaluate the generalizability of CASCADE in the medical domain, highlighting its benefits and necessary adaptations. Furthermore, we support the creation and management of SACs by developing a machine-learning model to classify security-related requirements and investigating the management of security evidence. We identify deficiencies in evidence management practices and propose potential areas for automation. Finally, our work contributes to the advancement of security assurance practices and provides practical support for practitioners in creating and managing SACs.",
      "published": "2025-01-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2501.04479",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mazen Mohamad"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2501.04479",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.16650",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Analysis of 5G NR Device-to-Device Sidelink Communications",
      "description": "5G NR sidelink communication enables new possibilities for direct device-to-device interactions, supporting applications from vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems to public safety, industrial automation, and drone networks. However, these advancements come with significant security challenges due to the decentralized trust model and increased reliance on User Equipment (UE) for critical functions like synchronization, resource allocation, and authorization. This paper presents the first comprehensive security analysis of NR V2X sidelink. We identify vulnerabilities across critical procedures and demonstrate plausible attack, including attacks that manipulate data integrity feedback and block resources, ultimately undermining the reliability and privacy of sidelink communications. Our analysis reveals that NR operational modes are vulnerable, with the ones relying on autonomous resource management (without network supervision) particularly exposed. To address these issues, we propose mitigation strategies to enhance the security of 5G sidelink communications. This work establishes a foundation for future efforts to strengthen 5G device-to-device sidelink communications, ensuring its safe deployment in critical applications.",
      "published": "2025-02-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2502.16650",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Evangelos Bitsikas",
        "Aanjhan Ranganathan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2502.16650",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2503.05839",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing AUTOSAR-Based Firmware Over-the-Air Updates in the Automotive Industry with a Practical Implementation on a Steering System",
      "description": "The automotive industry is increasingly reliant on software to manage complex vehicle functionalities, making efficient and secure firmware updates essential. Traditional firmware update methods, requiring physical connections through On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) ports, are inconvenient, costly, and time-consuming. Firmware Over-the-Air (FOTA) technology offers a revolutionary solution by enabling wireless updates, reducing operational costs, and enhancing the user experience. This project aims to design and implement an advanced FOTA system tailored for modern vehicles, incorporating the AUTOSAR architecture for scalability and standardization, and utilizing delta updating to minimize firmware update sizes, thereby improving bandwidth efficiency and reducing flashing times. To ensure security, the system integrates the UDS 0x27 protocol for authentication and data integrity during the update process. Communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) is achieved using the CAN protocol, while the ESP8266 module and the master ECU communicate via SPI for data transfer. The system's architecture includes key components such as a bootloader, boot manager, and bootloader updater to facilitate seamless firmware updates. The functionality of the system is demonstrated through two applications: a blinking LED and a Lane Keeping Assist (LKA) system, showcasing its versatility in handling critical automotive features. This project represents a significant step forward in automotive technology, offering a user-centric, efficient, and secure solution for automotive firmware management.",
      "published": "2025-03-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2503.05839",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "obd",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mostafa A. Mostafa",
        "M. K. Mohamed",
        "Radwa Ezzat"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2503.05839",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2504.09527",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure Communication Protocol for Remote Keyless Entry System with Adaptive Adjustment of Transmission Parameters",
      "description": "Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems have become a standard feature in modern vehicles, yet their unidirectional fixed-frequency radio communication renders them vulnerable to replay attacks, impersonation attacks, cryptanalysis, and intentional interference. Existing cryptographic authentication methods enhance security but often fail to address real-world constraints such as computational efficiency and radio interference. To mitigate these threats, we designed the Adaptive Frequency-Hopping Algorithm and the Adaptive TXP and PHY Mode Control Algorithm that can dynamically optimize channel selection, transmission power, and PHY modes based on real-time channel quality assessment. To enhance the security and reliability of RKE systems, we propose the Lightweight Vehicle-Key Authentication Protocol. In addition, a prototype of the proposed scheme was implemented to verify its effectiveness in mitigating interference and preventing unauthorized access.Experimental results show that our scheme significantly enhances communication security and reliability while maintaining low computational overhead. Under mild interference conditions, the packet delivery rate (PDR) of the adaptive scheme increases from 93% to 99.23%, and under strong interference, it improves from 85% to 99.01%. Additionally, the scheme effectively prevents replay and impersonation attacks, ensuring secure vehicle access control by dynamically optimizing communication parameters to maintain stable and reliable transmission.",
      "published": "2025-04-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2504.09527",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jingjing Guo",
        "Tang, Bo",
        "Jiayuan Xu",
        "Li, Qingyi",
        "Qin, Yuyuan",
        "Xinghua Li"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2504.09527",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2504.10717",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "FuzzSense: Towards A Modular Fuzzing Framework for Autonomous Driving Software",
      "description": "Fuzz testing to find semantic control vulnerabilities is an essential activity to evaluate the robustness of autonomous driving (AD) software. Whilst there is a preponderance of disparate fuzzing tools that target different parts of the test environment, such as the scenario, sensors, and vehicle dynamics, there is a lack of fuzzing strategies that ensemble these fuzzers to enable concurrent fuzzing, utilizing diverse techniques and targets. This research proposes FuzzSense, a modular, black-box, mutation-based fuzzing framework that is architected to ensemble diverse AD fuzzing tools. To validate the utility of FuzzSense, a LiDAR sensor fuzzer was developed as a plug-in, and the fuzzer was implemented in the new AD simulation platform AWSIM and Autoware.Universe AD software platform. The results demonstrated that FuzzSense was able to find vulnerabilities in the new Autoware.Universe software. We contribute to FuzzSense open-source with the aim of initiating a conversation in the community on the design of AD-specific fuzzers and the establishment of a community fuzzing framework to better target the diverse technology base of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-04-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2504.10717",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roberts, Andrew",
        "Lorenz Teply",
        "Mert D. Pesé",
        "Olaf Maennel",
        "Mohammad Hamad",
        "Sebastian Steinhorst"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2504.10717",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2504.11867",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MDHP-Net: Detecting an Emerging Time-exciting Threat in IVN",
      "description": "The integration of intelligent and connected technologies in modern vehicles, while offering enhanced functionalities through Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and interfaces like OBD-II and telematics, also exposes the vehicle's in-vehicle network (IVN) to potential cyberattacks. Unlike prior work, we identify a new time-exciting threat model against IVN. These attacks inject malicious messages that exhibit a time-exciting effect, gradually manipulating network traffic to disrupt vehicle operations and compromise safety-critical functions. We systematically analyze the characteristics of the threat: dynamism, time-exciting impact, and low prior knowledge dependency. To validate its practicality, we replicate the attack on a real Advanced Driver Assistance System via Controller Area Network (CAN), exploiting Unified Diagnostic Service vulnerabilities and proposing four attack strategies. While CAN's integrity checks mitigate attacks, Ethernet migration (e.g., DoIP/SOME/IP) introduces new surfaces. We further investigate the feasibility of time-exciting threat under SOME/IP. To detect time-exciting threat, we introduce MDHP-Net, leveraging Multi-Dimentional Hawkes Process (MDHP) and temporal and message-wise feature extracting structures. Meanwhile, to estimate MDHP parameters, we developed the first GPU-optimized gradient descent solver for MDHP (MDHP-GDS). These modules significantly improves the detection rate under time-exciting attacks in multi-ECU IVN system. To address data scarcity, we release STEIA9, the first open-source dataset for time-exciting attacks, covering 9 Ethernet-based attack scenarios. Extensive experiments on STEIA9 (9 attack scenarios) show MDHP-Net outperforms 3 baselines, confirming attack feasibility and detection efficacy.",
      "published": "2024-11-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2504.11867",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "driver assistance",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd-ii",
        "telematics",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Qi Liu",
        "Yanchen Liu",
        "Ruifeng Li",
        "Chen-Hong Cao",
        "Yufeng Li",
        "Xingyu Li",
        "Peng Wang",
        "Run-Han Feng",
        "Shiyang Bu"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2504.11867",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.02713",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SoK: Stealing Cars Since Remote Keyless Entry Introduction and How to Defend From It",
      "description": "Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems have been the target of thieves since their introduction in automotive industry. Robberies targeting vehicles and their remote entry systems are booming again without a significant advancement from the industrial sector being able to protect against them. Researchers and attackers continuously play cat and mouse to implement new methodologies to exploit weaknesses and defense strategies for RKEs. In this fragment, different attacks and defenses have been discussed in research and industry without proper bridging. In this paper, we provide a Systematization Of Knowledge (SOK) on RKE and Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES), focusing on their history and current situation, ranging from legacy systems to modern web-based ones. We provide insight into vehicle manufacturers' technologies and attacks and defense mechanisms involving them. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive SOK on RKE systems, and we address specific research questions to understand the evolution and security status of such systems. By identifying the weaknesses RKE still faces, we provide future directions for security researchers and companies to find viable solutions to address old attacks, such as Relay and RollJam, as well as new ones, like API vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2025-05-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2505.02713",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tommaso Bianchi",
        "Alessandro Brighente",
        "Mauro Conti",
        "Edoardo Pavan"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2505.02713",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.09048",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Modeling Interdependent Cybersecurity Threats Using Bayesian Networks: A Case Study on In-Vehicle Infotainment Systems",
      "description": "Cybersecurity threats are increasingly marked by interdependence, uncertainty, and evolving complexity challenges that traditional assessment methods such as CVSS, STRIDE, and attack trees fail to adequately capture. This paper reviews the application of Bayesian Networks (BNs) in cybersecurity risk modeling, highlighting their capacity to represent probabilistic dependencies, integrate diverse threat indicators, and support reasoning under uncertainty. A structured case study is presented in which a STRIDE-based attack tree for an automotive In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system is transformed into a Bayesian Network. Logical relationships are encoded using Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs), and threat likelihoods are derived from normalized DREAD scores. The model enables not only probabilistic inference of system compromise likelihood but also supports causal analysis using do-calculus and local sensitivity analysis to identify high-impact vulnerabilities. These analyses provide insight into the most influential nodes within the threat propagation chain, informing targeted mitigation strategies. While demonstrating the potential of BNs for dynamic and context-aware risk assessment, the study also outlines limitations related to scalability, reliance on expert input, static structure assumptions, and limited temporal modeling. The paper concludes by advocating for future enhancements through Dynamic Bayesian Networks, structure learning, and adaptive inference to better support real-time cybersecurity decision-making in complex environments.",
      "published": "2025-05-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2505.09048",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sangita Sridar"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2505.09048",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2507.21759",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The impact of large-scale EV charging on the real-time operation of distribution systems: A comprehensive review",
      "description": "With the large-scale integration of electric vehicles (EVs) in the distribution grid, the unpredictable nature of EV charging introduces considerable uncertainties to the grid's real-time operations. This can exacerbate load fluctuations, compromise power quality, and pose risks to the grid's stability and security. However, due to their dual role as controllable loads and energy storage devices, EVs have the potential to mitigate these fluctuations, balance the variability of renewable energy sources, and provide ancillary services that support grid stability. By leveraging the bidirectional flow of information and energy in smart grids, the adverse effects of EV charging can be minimized and even converted into beneficial outcomes through effective real-time management strategies. This paper explores the negative impacts of EV charging on the distribution system's real-time operations and outlines methods to transform these challenges into positive contributions. Additionally, it provides an in-depth analysis of the real-time management system for EV charging, focusing on state estimation and management strategies.",
      "published": "2025-07-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2507.21759",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhe Yu",
        "Chuang Yang",
        "Qin Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2507.21759",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2508.01207",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Showcasing standards and approaches for cybersecurity, safety, and privacy issues in connected and autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "In the automotive industry there is a need to handle broad quality deficiencies, eg, performance, maintainability, cybersecurity, safety, and privacy, to mention a few. The idea is to prevent these issues from reaching end-users, ie, road users and inadvertently, pedestrians, aiming to potentially reduce accidents, and allow safe operation in dynamic attack surfaces, for the benefit of a host of stakeholders. This paper aims to bridge cybersecurity, safety, and privacy concerns in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAV) with respect to Risk Assessment (RA) and Threat Modelling (TM) altogether. Practitioners know the vast literature on this topic given the sheer number of recommendations, standards, best practices, and existing approaches, at times impairing projects and fostering valuable and actionable threat analysis. In this paper we collate key outcomes by highlighting latest standards and approaches in RA and TM research to tackle complex attack surfaces as the ones posed by automotive settings. We aim to provide the community with a list of approaches to align expectations with stakeholders when deciding where and when to focus threat related analysis in automotive solutions.",
      "published": "2025-08-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2508.01207",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ricardo Melo Czekster"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2508.01207",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2510.25375",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From ECU to VSOC: UDS Security Monitoring Strategies",
      "description": "Increasing complexity and connectivity of modern vehicles have heightened their vulnerability to cyberattacks. This paper addresses security challenges associated with the Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) protocol, a critical communication framework for vehicle diagnostics in the automotive industry. We present security monitoring strategies for the UDS protocol that leverage in-vehicle logging and remote analysis through a Vehicle Security Operations Center (VSOC). Our approach involves specifying security event logging requirements, contextual data collection, and the development of detection strategies aimed at identifying UDS attack scenarios. By applying these strategies to a comprehensive taxonomy of UDS attack techniques, we demonstrate that our detection methods cover a wide range of potential attack vectors. Furthermore, we assess the adequacy of current AUTOSAR standardized security events in supporting UDS attack detection, identifying gaps in the current standard. This work enhances the understanding of vehicle security monitoring and provides an example for developing robust cybersecurity measures in automotive communication protocols.",
      "published": "2025-10-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2510.25375",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ali Recai Yekta",
        "Nicolas Loza",
        "Jens Gramm",
        "Michael Peter Schneider",
        "Stefan Katzenbeisser"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2510.25375",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2512.00424",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recovering Origin Destination Flows from Bus CCTV: Early Results from Nairobi and Kigali",
      "description": "Public transport in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) often operates in overcrowded conditions where existing automated systems fail to capture reliable passenger flow data. Leveraging onboard CCTV already deployed for security, we present a baseline pipeline that combines YOLOv12 detection, BotSORT tracking, OSNet embeddings, OCR-based timestamping, and telematics-based stop classification to recover bus origin--destination (OD) flows. On annotated CCTV segments from Nairobi and Kigali buses, the system attains high counting accuracy under low-density, well-lit conditions (recall $\\approx$95\\%, precision $\\approx$91\\%, F1 $\\approx$93\\%). It produces OD matrices that closely match manual tallies. Under realistic stressors such as overcrowding, color-to-monochrome shifts, posture variation, and non-standard door use, performance degrades sharply (e.g., $\\sim$40\\% undercount in peak-hour boarding and a $\\sim$17 percentage-point drop in recall for monochrome segments), revealing deployment-specific failure modes and motivating more robust, deployment-focused Re-ID methods for SSA transit.",
      "published": "2025-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2512.00424",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nthenya Kyatha",
        "Jay Taneja"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2512.00424",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2512.15966",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Charge It to My Neighbor: A Relay Attack on ISO 15118 Plug and Charge Payment",
      "description": "ISO 15118, the leading standard for DC fast charging in Europe, includes a plug-and-charge mechanism that allows electric vehicles to handle payment automatically via contract certificates. We present a novel relay attack against this mechanism: an attacker builds a fake charging station, plugs it into a victim's vehicle, and relays the cryptographic authentication to a real charging station - charging the attacker's vehicle while billing the victim. The attack exploits the absence of station-identifying information in the plug-and-charge signature, combined with weaknesses in how ISO 15118 handles TLS certificates. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation demonstrating the full attack chain and discuss possible mitigations and alternatives. As plug-and-charge adoption grows, addressing this vulnerability is critical before it becomes widely exploitable.",
      "published": "2025-12-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2512.15966",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "authentication",
        "charging station",
        "iso 15118"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jakob Löw",
        "V. Vasu",
        "Thomas Hutzelmann",
        "Hans‐Joachim Hof"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2512.15966",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2604.20895",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Systematic Risk Assessment of Deep Neural Network Limitations in Autonomous Driving Perception",
      "description": "Safety and security are essential for the admission and acceptance of automated and autonomous vehicles. Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely used for perception and further components of the autonomous driving (AD) stack. However, they possess several limitations, including lack of generalization, efficiency, explainability, plausibility, and robustness. These insufficiencies can pose significant risks to autonomous driving systems. However, hazards, threats, and risks associated with DNN limitations in this domain have not been systematically studied so far. In this work, we propose a joint workflow for risk assessment combining the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) following ISO 26262 and threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) following the ISO/SAE 21434 to identify and analyze risks arising from inherent DNN limitations in AD perception.",
      "published": "2026-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2604.20895",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Svetlana Pavlitska",
        "Christopher Gerking",
        "J. Zöllner"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2604.20895",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2606.15728",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Distorted Mirrors to Sovereign Reflections: Resisting the Grotesque Depiction of Our Digital Selves",
      "description": "As Ambient Intelligence weaves computing into everyday life, human existence has become inextricably linked to ubiquitous digital infrastructures, triggering a crisis of personal data sovereignty. Driven by extractivism and data colonialism, platforms exploit human experience as a terra nullius, enclosing proprietary user models within isolated silos. We argue that legal frameworks like the EU Digital Rights and GDPR fail to counter this power asymmetry because they regulate inert raw data while leaving monopolies over algorithmic inferences unchallenged. Consequently, current architectures act as funhouse mirrors, creating a grotesque, distorted depiction of our digital selves. Through critical posthumanism and four contemporary scenarios (entertainment, e-commerce, fintech, and telematics), this paper illustrates how data siloing inflicts cognitive amputation, ontological violence, and self-censorship. We argue that securing digital rights requires moving beyond defensive regulation toward a decolonial infrastructure that guarantees the functional transferability of algorithmic identities, reclaiming technology for the emancipation of the posthuman self.",
      "published": "2026-06-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2606.15728",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "gdpr",
        "personal data",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Espionage / sovereignty"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Komninos",
        "Gerasimos Vonitsanos",
        "Spyros Sioutas"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2606.15728",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4366,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.2606.15728 and T-017: structured overlap in impacts: espionage, privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: espionage, personal, creating, platforms, requires, like, user, digital."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2607.07371",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "zk-ScalHard: Scalable and Hardware-Rooted Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Secure OTA Updates in Zonal SDVs",
      "description": "The automotive industry is transitioning to Zonal-oriented Architectures (ZoA) for Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs), enabling frequent over-the-air (OTA) updates for 100+ Electronic Control Units (ECUs). While OTA updates improve efficiency, they introduce safety-critical security risks. Current standards like Uptane and AUTOSAR Adaptive rely on Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, PKI-based authentication creates bandwidth bottlenecks in in-vehicle and vehicle-to-cloud (V2I) communication as ECU density increases. It also risks exposing sensitive vehicle configurations and passenger privacy due to centralized architectures. Next-generation Zonal SDVs require decentralized, scalable authentication with data privacy. To address this, we propose zk-ScalHard, a hardware-rooted, privacy-preserving authentication protocol. We introduce a decentralized, hierarchical trust-promotion model utilizing Silicon Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and two novel Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) circuits: (1) Zonal Identity and Integrity (ZIDI) and (2) High-Performance Computing Aggregation (HPCA). These circuits employ multi-party computation (MPC) and recursive aggregation to achieve decentralization and scalability. The integration of ZKPs and PUFs ensures 100% vehicle-level data sovereignty. Benchmarked against Uptane, zk-ScalHard achieves constant O(1) communication and verification complexity, improving upon the linear O(n) complexity of current systems. Evaluation shows a 99.2% reduction in authentication bandwidth and a 99.9% reduction in the temporal attack surface. Our results demonstrate that zk-ScalHard provides a scalable, secure, and GDPR-compliant architecture for future Zonal SDVs.",
      "published": "2026-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2607.07371",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "gdpr",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Espionage / sovereignty",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shrikant Tangade",
        "Bansi Pambhar",
        "Valéria Loscrì",
        "Mauro Conti"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2607.07371",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2607.23059",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GLST: Defending Confidence-Driven V2X Collaborative Perception Against Stealthy Multi-Attacker Feature Injection",
      "description": "Collaborative perception (CP) improves autonomous-driving perception by enabling connected vehicles to exchange intermediate features via V2X. Confidence-driven sparse communication reduces bandwidth by transmitting only perception-critical spatial regions, but creates a security risk: once a collaborator is compromised, malicious features in high-confidence or ego-uncertain regions may be preferentially selected and amplified during fusion. Using Where2comm as a representative framework, we show that the proposed Pretend Benign attack exploits its spatial-confidence mechanism by injecting stealthy perturbations into uncertain yet perception-critical regions, substantially degrading 3D object detection while preserving benign-like feature characteristics. Beyond this attack-framework pair, we identify a broader weakness of existing trust-based defenses: their reliance primarily on a single consistency signal leaves them vulnerable when multiple attackers form a pseudo-consensus that biases trust estimation. We therefore propose Global-Local Structural Trust (GLST), a lightweight defense that assesses collaborator reliability through three complementary perspectives: global feature consistency, multi-scale local residual consistency, and structural consistency with ego-side semantic topology. The resulting trust scores guide feature fusion to suppress unreliable collaborators. Experiments on OPV2V show that GLST achieves competitive performance against single-attacker Pretend Benign attacks and substantially stronger robustness in multi-attacker settings. Under a four-attacker Pretend Benign attack, GLST maintains 0.69 AP@0.3, whereas existing single-signal defenses degrade severely. GLST also remains effective against gradient-based attacks such as PGD, indicating that multi-level trust modeling is essential for securing confidence-driven CP.",
      "published": "2026-07-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2607.23059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ji He",
        "Ying Wang",
        "Li-Jie Zheng",
        "Xing-Hui Zhu",
        "Yu-Long Shen",
        "Xiao-Hong Jiang"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2607.23059",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3938,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.2607.23059 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: trust, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.03567",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CAN Disabler: Hardware-based Prevention method of Unauthorized Transmission in CAN and CAN-FD networks",
      "description": "There have been a quite number of security attack cases against Controller Area Network (CAN) reported in recent years, but in the meantime no security function is included in the ECU in the current in-vehicle control network. Thus, in-vehicle control networks particularly require cost-effective security features. In this paper, therefore, we propose a method to block unauthorized CAN-bus access using a CAN controller that is modified to prevent the ECU from transmitting messages to the CAN-bus at abnormal frequency. Then, we have also demonstrated the effectiveness of the disabler on CAN with flexible data-rate (CAN-FD) buses.",
      "published": "2026-08-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2608.03567",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ryo Kurachi",
        "T. D. Pyun",
        "S. Honda",
        "Hiroaki Takada",
        "Hiroshi Ueda",
        "S. Horihata"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2608.03567",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.07591",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Zero-Trust Federated Learning for Connected Aftermarket Devices",
      "description": "Connected aftermarket devices extend vehicle diagnostics, repair workflows, and over-the-air software maintenance beyond original equipment manufacturer boundaries, yet their heterogeneous ownership and long service life complicate conventional perimeter security. This paper develops Zero Trust Federated Learning for Connected Aftermarket Devices (ZT FL CADE), an edge-learning architecture that combines device-level access control, privacy-preserving federated learning, and adversarial validation for over-the-air update and predictive maintenance decisions. The evaluation uses a single synthetic dataset of 144,000 telemetry windows from 240 devices, 12 vendor domains, and 180 days of operation. Features include bus entropy, update latency, attestation age, signature retries, environmental signals, fault-code rates, packet loss, drift, mileage, and trust score, with targets for maintenance risk, update intrusion, and access action. ZT FL CADE trains local temporal models, aggregates privacy-bounded updates, scores each device against behavioral and update integrity evidence, and routes update requests to allow, challenge, or quarantine actions. Synthetic experiments improve maintenance risk F1 from 0.837 for Fed Avg to 0.883, improve intrusion F1 from 0.856 to 0.897, and preserve 0.842 intrusion recall when 20 percent of selected clients are adversarial. Mean access-decision latency remains 44 MS, below the 100 MS operational budget used in the simulation. The results do not establish field validation, but they indicate that zero-trust policy enforcement and federated learning can be evaluated jointly rather than as separate aftermarket security controls. Index Terms Zero trust architecture, federated learning, connected aftermarket devices, over-the-air updates, adversarial machine learning, edge artificial intelligence, predictive maintenance, automotive cybersecurity",
      "published": "2026-08-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2608.07591",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shunmukha Sagar Puppala"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2608.07591",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.13450",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LLM-Assisted Dynamic Threat Analysis for Attacker-Reachable Software Weaknesses in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles depend on large safety-critical software stacks, where weaknesses reachable from adversarial inputs may affect steering, braking, or other control decisions. Static analysis can identify candidate sites, but dynamically confirming exploitability requires executable test artifacts that are difficult to construct manually. We investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can automate this process for Autoware, an open-source autonomous-driving stack. We perform compiler-precise static analysis across 185 packages, identifying 1,375 decision rules, 2,274 validation checks, and 482 input-to-safety-output flows, from which we derive a weakness taxonomy and sample 740 reachable sites. Two local open-weight LLMs, a no-static-context ablation, and a naive-template baseline generate 3,700 artifact sets, which are compiled against the real build under sanitizers, repaired through compiler-in-the-loop feedback, and fuzzed when executable. The main result is a build-integration failure taxonomy showing that 80% of first-shot compilation failures arise from dependency wiring rather than program logic. The reasoning model compiled 64% of harnesses on the first attempt, compared with 6% for the code-specialized model. Repair achieved full object-compileability for the reasoning model only through extensive stubbing; fewer than half of its harnesses reached the fuzzer, and all 37 observed crashes originated in stubbed code rather than Autoware. No candidate weakness was dynamically confirmed within budget. These results show that build integration, not candidate generation or fuzzing, is the primary barrier to reliable LLM-assisted dynamic analysis of full autonomous-vehicle software stacks.",
      "published": "2026-08-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2608.13450",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md. Wasiul Haque",
        "Sagar Dasgupta",
        "Mizanur Rahman",
        "Md Rayhanur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2608.13450",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.17093",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Twin-Based Intrusion Detection for Vehicle Powertrain CAN Bus Systems",
      "description": "Existing automotive intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for the Controller Area Network (CAN) largely target discrepancies in message timing, frequency, or sequencing and cannot detect attacks that preserve these properties while manipulating the payload. Digital twins (DTs) have been used to emulate CAN traffic and generate attack scenarios for IDS evaluation, but their use for intrusion detection remains unexplored. This study develops a DT-based IDS that jointly models physical relationships among decoded powertrain signals and identifies attacks through residuals between predicted and observed behavior. A shared-encoder LSTM DT was trained on 17 decoded signals from a real Hyundai/Kia CAN log to jointly predict seven numeric and two categorical gear signals over a 24-step window. A timestep is flagged when a residual exceeds a calibrated threshold, while adaptive rollout protects the twin's input history from sustained contamination. Four attacks (plateau, continuous drift, masquerade, and gear masquerade) were evaluated against the twin and a range-and-plausibility baseline. The DT outperformed the baseline across all attacks, achieving detection rates of 94.6% for continuous drift and 89.2% for masquerade, while the baseline detected almost none of the fabricated payload attacks. These results demonstrate that learning coupled vehicle dynamics enables detection of stealthy payload manipulations that preserve normal CAN communication patterns. False positive rates reached 39.6%, highlighting the need for improved robustness under sustained attacks. The DT-based IDS shows promise for detecting stealthy payload-level CAN attacks that preserve normal communication patterns, supporting behavior-based cybersecurity for connected and automated vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-08-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2608.17093",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hyundai",
        "kia"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "hyundai",
        "kia"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. al Rahman",
        "M Sabbir Salek",
        "Mashrur A. Chowdhury"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2608.17093",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.19135",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Cyber Defense in Connected Vehicles: A Multi-Agent Approach to V2X Security",
      "description": "A connected vehicle has roughly 100 milliseconds to decide whether an incoming Basic Safety Message is real or fabricated. If a false emergency braking alert reaches the planning pipeline in time, the car brakes - a safety failure triggered by a security failure. Existing intrusion detection systems are not designed to handle that coupling. They operate per vehicle, per message, with static rules - blind to attack patterns that only emerge across a fleet or over time, and blind to the fundamental tension between dropping a suspicious message and dropping a real emergency alert. We propose a three-tier multi-agent architecture that treats this timing constraint as a hard design requirement, not a performance target. At the vehicle level, an onboard agent classifies each incoming V2X message into one of four actions - Accept, Drop, Quarantine, or Escalate - within a 10-millisecond budget, deliberately biased toward Escalate when uncertain, passing ambiguous cases to the roadside edge agent rather than risking a dropped legitimate alert. The edge agent operates across a roadside unit zone with a 50-millisecond budget, fusing threat assessments from multiple vehicles and resolving safety-security conflicts using complementary sensor observations. The cloud tier refines detection models through Byzantine fault-tolerant federated learning and redistributes updated weights to the fleet. Every timing constraint derives directly from the 100-millisecond Basic Safety Message cycles mandated by SAE J2735 and ETSI EN 302 637-2. No existing framework simultaneously assigns standards-grounded latency budgets to all three deployment tiers while treating safety-security conflict resolution as a first-class design constraint. Remaining open problems - adversarial poisoning at the edge and the absence of regulatory frameworks for autonomous security response - are discussed as future work.",
      "published": "2026-08-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2608.19135",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Krishna Teja Medam"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv.org",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2608.19135",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4828,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.19135 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: onboard, regulatory, patterns, response, sensor, car, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.28778",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Calibration Attack on Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on accurate camera-LiDAR calibration for multimodal sensor fusion. In practice, calibration can drift due to vibration, temperature variation, or minor sensor displacement, motivating online calibration algorithms that detect and correct misalignment at runtime while allowing the vehicle to continue operating without a factory visit. Existing AV attacks largely assume correct calibration. We instead identify online sensor calibration as a new attack plane. A corrupted calibration update can persist across subsequent fusion operations, causing system-wide errors that propagate from perception to planning and control. We present Adversarial Calibration Attack (ACA), the first physical attack against camera-LiDAR online calibration. Using a single adversarial poster, ACA first spoofs the miscalibration detector to trigger the calibration process and then steers the calibration estimator toward an incorrect transformation. A unified optimization jointly designs the poster's geometry and texture for both objectives. We evaluate ACA across benchmark datasets, simulation, and physical experiments. On benchmark datasets such as KITTI and nuScenes, ACA induces up to 33.9 degrees mean rotational calibration error, thereby severely degrading object detection. In the CARLA simulator, the attack causes a collision when the corrupted calibration is accepted in vulnerable scenarios crafted by the attacker. On a real Husky robot, a printed adversarial poster successfully reproduces the calibration error. These results demonstrate that online calibration is a practical and safety-critical attack surface for AVs.",
      "published": "2026-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2608.28778",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Liangkai Liu",
        "Qingzhao Zhang",
        "Kang G. Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2608.28778",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2609.02741",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SPADE: SPaT Attack Detection from the Connected Vehicle's Perspective",
      "description": "Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages are a cornerstone of connected vehicle (CV) safety, enabling CVs to perceive and respond to intersection state through Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication. The integrity of these messages is threatened by a range of application-layer attacks that can bypass conventional authentication when a roadside unit or peer vehicle is compromised. Existing intrusion detection research either defends the infrastructure side or targets V2V Basic Safety Message (BSM) / Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM) misbehavior, leaving the onboard CV perspective on SPaT integrity unaddressed. To close this gap, we introduce SPADE --- the SPaT Attack Detection and Evaluation dataset --- a labelled, multi-modal, simulation-based dataset designed specifically for deep learning IDS research in this space. SPADE is generated through Eclipse MOSAIC using runtime attack injection at the SAE J2735 application layer across six attack classes and one benign class. By combining four intersection geometries, six operating conditions, and five independent random-seed repetitions, SPADE comprises 180 unique base scenario runs, yielding $\\sim$1,890,000 labelled timestep records (270,000 per class). Each record fuses SPaT message fields, onboard camera confidence scores, and cooperative V2V peer data across 40 features, reflecting the multi-modal signal space required to distinguish deliberate attacks from environmental degradation. The dataset, generation code, and scenario configurations are released publicly to support reproducible and comparative IDS research in C-V2X security. The developed toolbox, instructions, and dataset link are publicly available on GitHub: https://github.com/jdinovo/SPADE.",
      "published": "2026-09-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2609.02741",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicle",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "James Di Novo",
        "Hany Ragab",
        "Sylvain P. Leblanc"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2609.02741",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2609.12251",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless secrecy against bounded adversaries",
      "description": "We introduce a keyless coding/cryptographic primitive that asks for two guarantees at once: the receiver is never fooled into accepting a message other than the one sent, and the adversary learns nothing about the message unless the receiver aborts. Neither the sender nor the receiver holds a secret key, and no computational hardness is assumed. The only restriction is on the adversary's online computation: the receiver aborts if nothing arrives by a fixed deadline, so the adversary must forward something before it, and her map in that window is computed by a circuit of size (or depth) at most $p$; before and after, she is unbounded. For every polynomial $p$ we construct such an efficient quantum scheme, encoding $k$-bit messages into $n = O(k)$ qubits with circuits of size $\\mathrm{poly}(n,p)$. No classical scheme achieves this type of everlasting security, at any choice of parameters. Our techniques also resolve open questions about universal tamper detection against families restricted in cardinality rather than in circuit size. We settle a question of Broadbent, Kapshikar and Rochette on relaxed tamper detection. As a corollary, we obtain the first efficient non-malleable code secure against global quantum tampering, with no split-state restriction, whereas the current constructions in the literature require the codeword to be split into non-communicating shares.",
      "published": "2026-09-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2609.12251",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "tampering"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anne Broadbent",
        "Upendra Kapshikar",
        "Denis Rochette"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2609.12251",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2610.09697",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Hardware Attacks: An Architect's Guide to TARA",
      "description": "Threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) according to ISO/SAE 21434 treats implementation-level hardware attacks inconsistently. We show that two of the three attack-feasibility approaches exemplified in the standard rate every attack path that requires physical access as very low by construction, independent of the implementation, while the third can assign the same path any of the four ratings, depending on the assumed state of attacker knowledge and on the attacker profile. This paper presents a hardware-aware extension of the TARA that covers side-channel analysis (SCA), fault-injection attacks (FIA), and abuse of debug and test interfaces. It adds an attacker model for physical access over the vehicle lifecycle; a path-dominance relation on the attack-potential factors that identifies when a simpler path makes a sophisticated one irrelevant; a three-level hardware relevance gate (H0 to H2) with an explicit decision rule that fixes whether resistance of a hardware step may be argued, must be documented, or must be demonstrated by test; and a rating rule under which a hardware step receives no credit for implementation-specific resistance until the required evidence exists. The gate is positioned relative to cybersecurity assurance levels and targeted attack feasibility. The method is applied to a reference gateway architecture, and its structural inputs are examined on ten published attacks on automotive components. In seven of the ten studies, the demonstrated attack included a debug, programming, boot, diagnostic, or update mechanism, whereas only four studies included an attack on a cryptographic computation.",
      "published": "2026-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2610.09697",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jakub Breier",
        "Xiaolu Hou"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2610.09697",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.48550/arxiv.2610.40944",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating of Attack Patterns and Threat Modeling to Support Security Analysis in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "The increasing connectivity of cyber-physical systems in the automotive domain demands systematic approaches for identifying and mitigating cybersecurity threats. While ISO 21434 defines a structured workflow for Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA), it does not prescribe a specific method for identifying attack paths or evaluating risks. This paper proposes a conceptual model grounded in ISO 21434 that integrates the STRIDE threat classification with the CAPEC attack pattern database, focusing on the identification of attack scenarios and risk assessment. Its applicability is demonstrated through a case study involving Bluetooth-based threats to an automotive headlamp system.",
      "published": "2026-10-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2610.40944",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eduardo Santos de Oliveira Marques",
        "Saulo Moraes Villela",
        "Heder S. Bernardino",
        "Alex Borges Vieira",
        "Bernardo Martins Rocha",
        "André Luiz de Oliveira"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv (Cornell University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2610.40944",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5120/ijca",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimal Keyless Algorithm for Security",
      "description": "In Modern era, every business is dependent on the Internet.The Network is growing so quickly that now at this stage no one can ever imagine anything without use of internet.But at the same time security over network is very important because of the vulnerability of data to eavesdropping.To protect the data from eavesdropping, it must be appropriately encrypted before sending over the network.There are two types of algorithms, keyed and keyless, exist to protect data.The keyed algorithms are efficient but to avoid the overhead of key generation and key management, keyless algorithms are getting popularity now days.The proposed algorithm \"Optimal Keyless Algorithm for Security\" represents a new way of using data itself to create a protective shield.The algorithm provides security at both character level as well as bit level.The number of rounds and the number of shifts applied at bit level are made data dependent to increase the security level, is a major advantage of the algorithm.The system is proposed with the motive to provide highest security level with minimum execution time in terms of encryption and decryption.This paper presents simulation results of proposed algorithm and its comparison with the commonly used JS keyless algorithm.",
      "published": "2015-08-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5120/ijca",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Neha Insan",
        "Paramjeet Singh",
        "Shaveta Rani"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer Applications",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "10.5120/ijca",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 88,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51202/9783181023105-29",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "How to Prepare Automotive for Future Challenges – ISO 21434 – A Standard for Cybersecurity Engineering",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51202/9783181023105-29",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Markus Tschersich"
      ],
      "venue": "VDI Verlag eBooks",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.51202/9783181023105-29",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51202/9783181024232-613",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed development along the automotive supply chain: 8 insightful recommendations for OEMs and suppliers to jointly implement cybersecurity",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51202/9783181024232-613",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Sandler"
      ],
      "venue": "VDI Verlag eBooks",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.51202/9783181024232-613",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51202/9783181024416-541",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TARAs Performed on Different Levels of the Supply Chain – Experiences Based on Real Example ESLF Insights into Applying ISO/SAE 21434:2021 in Automotive Cybersecurity",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51202/9783181024416-541",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Liedtke",
        "Richard Messnarz"
      ],
      "venue": "VDI Verlag eBooks",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.51202/9783181024416-541",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5121/csit.2018.81813",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A PREFERMENT PLATFORM FOR IMPLEMENTING SECURITY MECHANISM FOR AUTOMOTIVE CAN BUS",
      "description": "The design of cryptographic mechanisms in automotive systems has been a major focus over the last ten years as the increase of cyber attacks against in-vehicle networks.The integration of these protocols into CAN bus networks is an efficient solution for leaving security level, but features of CAN bus make the performance requirements within cryptographic schemes very challenging.In the literature most of academic researches focused on designing security mechanisms for the CAN bus.Yet, very few research proposals are interested in analyzing performances requirements by using cryptographic protocols.In this paper, we investigate effects of implementing cryptographic approaches on performance by proposing an analysis methodology for implementing cryptographic approach in CAN bus communication and measuring real-time performances.Next, we propose our system which presents a tool for determining the impact of implementing of cryptographic solutions.On the other hand we have proposed an intrusion detection system using the same platform.Our tool allows the implementation of any security strategy as well as the real-time performance analysis of CAN network.",
      "published": "2018-12-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5121/csit.2018.81813",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mabrouka Gmiden",
        "Mohamed Hedi Gmiden",
        "Hafedh Gmiden"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.5121/csit.2018.81813",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5121/csit.2024.141101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Assessment of in-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection in Real-Life Scenarios",
      "description": "This research focuses on evaluating the security of an intrusion detection system in a CAN bus-based vehicle control network. A series of studies were conducted to evaluate the performance of models proposed by previous researchers, testing their effectiveness in real-world scenarios as opposed to those on which they were trained. The article demonstrates that models trained and tested on the same dataset can only sometimes be considered adequate. An approach that included models trained only on CAN ID, payload, or full data was chosen. The research results show that such methods are ineffective enough in real-world attack scenarios because they cannot distinguish between new scenarios not presented during training. The results of testing the models in various attack scenarios are presented, and their limitations are identified. In addition, a new method is proposed explicitly for attack scenarios that may occur in the real-world use of an invehicle CAN communication system.",
      "published": "2024-06-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5121/csit.2024.141101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kamronbek Yusupov",
        "Md Rezanur Islam",
        "Insu Oh",
        "Mahdi Sahlabadi",
        "Kangbin Yim"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Security, Privacy and Trust Management (SPTM)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5121/csit.2024.141101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5121/ijci.2024.130211",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancements and Hurdles in the Evolution of Automotive Wireless Interfaces: A Technical Exploration",
      "description": "The integration of wireless interfaces into vehicles has posed some challenges for the automotive industry over the years. While manufacturers strive to impress consumers with cutting-edge features, these features also bring security risks that cannot be ignored. To prevent potentially fatal incidents, a thorough protocol must be established to address system vulnerabilities. As the modern century moves towards an era of autonomous vehicles, security must be a top priority to avoid compliance breaches and delays in feature development. The significance of vehicle interfaces in the modern automotive industry cannot be overstated. The present study aims to explore the prospective advantages and challenges associated with the integration of wireless interfaces in the automotive industry. This analysis will primarily focus on the latest technological advancements in vehicle technology and the critical need to secure against possible cyber-attacks. A wide range of topics will be covered in this paper, from the evolution of vehicle interfaces to the industry’s hurdles and strategies to minimize the risks associated with cyber threats. The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive understanding of wireless interfaces in the automotive sector, including the benefits of implementing such technology, the challenges that it poses, and the measures needed to maintain the security and safety of vehicles, as well as the passengers.",
      "published": "2024-03-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5121/ijci.2024.130211",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nuha Sabek",
        "Joseph Loftus",
        "Kati Sneath",
        "Spencer Ames",
        "Tauheed Khan Mohd"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Cybernetics & Informatics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5121/ijci.2024.130211",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5121/ijcnc.2019.11102",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Machine Learning Algorithm of Detection of DOS Attacks on an Automotive Telematic Unit",
      "description": "Today vehicles are connected to private networks which are owned by the car manufacturer. But in coming years, vehicles become more and more connected to the public Internet for infotainment applications but also to safety applications. Like any Internet terminal, some hackers can attack the wireless connectivity unit of the vehicle with Distribution Denial of Services (DDOS) attacks, so that the wireless connectivity unit of the vehicle is not available and the service is lost. Therefore, it is critical to developing a mechanism to detect such an attack and eliminate it, to maintain the availability of the wireless connectivity unit. This paper proposes an algorithm which proceeds in 2 steps: it uses an unsupervised machine learning algorithm to detect DDOS attacks in the incoming Internet data. When it detects an attack, it uses the results of the machine learning algorithm to split the legitimate flow and the rogue flows. The rogue flow is filtered so that the availability of the wireless connectivity unit of the vehicle is restored. This proposed algorithm needs very few CPU computing power and is compatible with low-cost CPUs which are used in an automotive wireless connectivity unit.",
      "published": "2019-01-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5121/ijcnc.2019.11102",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Eric Perraud"
      ],
      "venue": "International journal of Computer Networks & Communications",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.5121/ijcnc.2019.11102",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5121/ijcsit.2024.16101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring the EV Charging Ecosystem and Performing an Experimental Assessment of its Cloud and Mobile Application Infrastructure Security",
      "description": "The security of Electric Vehicle (EV) charging has gained momentum after the increase in the EV adoption in the past few years. Mobile applications have been integrated into EV charging systems that mainly use a cloud-based platform to host their services and data. Like many complex systems, cloud systems are susceptible to cyberattacks if proper measures are not taken by the organization to secure them. In this paper, we explore the security of key components in the EV charging infrastructure, including the mobile application and its cloud service. We conducted an experiment that initiated a Man in the Middle attack between an EV app and its cloud services. Our results showed that it is possible to launch attacks against the connected infrastructure by taking advantage of vulnerabilities that may have substantial economic and operational ramifications on the EV charging ecosystem. We conclude by providing mitigation suggestions and future research directions.",
      "published": "2024-02-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5121/ijcsit.2024.16101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pooja Patil",
        "Sara Acikkol Dogan",
        "Samir Tout",
        "Ranu Parmar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5121/ijcsit.2024.16101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5121/ijnsa.2026.18207",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A RISK-AWARE DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FRAMEWORK FOR AI-DRIVEN INTRUSION DETECTION AND ADAPTIVE RESPONSE IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles expose in-vehicle networks to sophisticated intrusion threats. Although deep learning-based intrusion detection systems achieve high accuracy, most approaches remain detectioncentric and do not address adaptive mitigation under real-time constraints. This paper proposes a multilayer AI-driven framework integrating temporal deep learning, contextual risk modeling, and deep reinforcement learning-based mitigation. A hybrid CNN–BiLSTM model captures spatial payload characteristics and bidirectional temporal dependencies in CAN sequences. Detection output feeds a riskaware formulation fusing attack probability with ECU criticality, vehicle speed, and safetyindicators. A Deep Q-Network learns mitigation policies minimizing residual system damages. Evaluation on the HCRL car-hacking dataset demonstrates strong detection performance. The adaptive policy reduces average system damage cost by 54.63% compared to static monitoring. End-to-end latency of 0.0205 ms per sample satisfies real-time constraints. By integrating detection, severity modeling, and adaptive response, the proposed architecture advances intrusion detection toward intelligent cyber-physical mitigation for resilient autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-03-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5121/ijnsa.2026.18207",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecu",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Faisal Shafiq",
        "Muhammad Irshad",
        "Muhammad Naveed Sajjad"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5121/ijnsa.2026.18207",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51219/jaimld/priyank-anurag/116",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware Fuzzer for the Type-C Host System",
      "description": "A hardware fuzzer, a unique testing tool, is designed to test hardware systems by introducing a variety of invalid, unexpected, or random inputs.It's an extension of software fuzzing, which targets software applications to find issues through unconventional input data.This type of fuzzer is particularly useful in developing embedded systems or crucial systems, including automotive, aerospace, and medical devices.However, it can test any hardware that enables system interfaces.Many systems enabled in their early stages can use this mechanism to see if the enablement has all the supported features enabled.There are many ways to test the system, and such methods can be used to find vulnerabilities and defects in software and hardware-based systems.In the current article, fuzzing Type-C devices involves applying unconventional inputs (test vectors) to test the device's behavior and identify vulnerabilities or defects.It would include sending invalid or unexpected input to the device and observing its behavior to identify potential vulnerabilities.Fuzzing a Type-C device can target various aspects such as the USB protocol, data transfer, power delivery negotiation, and other features.",
      "published": "2022-10-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51219/jaimld/priyank-anurag/116",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "fuzzing",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Priyank Rathod",
        "Anurag Anurag"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning and Data Science",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.51219/jaimld/priyank-anurag/116",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51219/jaimld/ronak-indrasinh-kosamia/566",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Android Automotive: A Machine Learning Approach to Intrusion and Malware Detection",
      "description": "Modern vehicles increasingly incorporate connected technologies that rival traditional computing platforms in capability and complexity.Among these android Automotive has emerged as a popular infotainment platform, offering a rich ecosystem of apps and services.However, heightened connectivity also expands the attack surface, making the vehicle susceptible to malware and intrusion attempts targeting critical systems.This paper proposes a machine learning (ML)-based framework to detect intrusions and malware within Android Automotive environments.By analyzing system logs, app behaviors, network flows and ECU interactions, we illustrate how ML models can adaptively detect anomalies that may indicate malicious activity.Our approach emphasizes a multi-layered defense, leveraging data from diverse sources and employing both supervised and anomaly detection techniques to identify emerging threats.We offer an in-depth discussion on feature engineering, model selection, on-device performance considerations and how to deploy these security mechanisms in a resource-constrained automotive setting.We also highlight open challenges-including labeling complexities, false-positive management and the secure delivery of model updates via Over-the-Air (OTA) channels.The results and recommendations presented aim to guide automotive OEMs, Tier 1 suppliers and cybersecurity practitioners toward implementing robust, machine learning-driven security solutions for next-generation vehicles.",
      "published": "2023-01-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51219/jaimld/ronak-indrasinh-kosamia/566",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ronak Indrasinh Kosamia"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning and Data Science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.51219/jaimld/ronak-indrasinh-kosamia/566",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4588,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.51219/jaimld/ronak-indrasinh-kosamia/566 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: suppliers, platforms, making, intelligence, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51219/jaimld/sateesh-reddy-adavelli/549",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Impact of Autonomous Vehicles on P&C Insurance: Preparing for the Next Frontier of Risk and Liability",
      "description": "The arrival of autonomous vehicles (AVs) promises to revolutionize transportation with significant implications in the property and casualty (P&C) insurance business.Traditional paradigms for risk assessment and liability in auto insurance are under attack as self-driving technology evolves.This paper examines the emerging risks and opportunities that AVs have introduced to the P&C insurance world.On the key considerations side, product and manufacturer liability for human operator injuries, the increase in automation of insurance underwriting using advanced technologies like AI and machine learning and potentially decreased accident frequency but an increased severity in accidents caused by more advanced vehicle systems is all on the table.The paper also considers regulatory frameworks that guide the adoption of AV and their implications for Insurance should the different modes of operation of AV and human-driven vehicles begin to converge.It addresses how telematics and data analytics play into a fault and pricing premium decision in a market where AVs are dominant.The paper discusses adapting to the evolving risk environment and looks at regional Collaboration between insurers, policymakers and automakers.Insurers can prepare for the future in which AVs rewrite mobility, assure against uncertainty and capture opportunity in the era of transformational change through understanding these dynamics.The alarming findings add weight to the call to proactively develop insurance products and other risk management apparatuses to fit into the complexities of autonomous technologies.",
      "published": "2025-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51219/jaimld/sateesh-reddy-adavelli/549",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "self-driving",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sateesh Reddy Adavelli",
        "Ravi Teja Madhala",
        "Nivedita Rahul"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning and Data Science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.51219/jaimld/sateesh-reddy-adavelli/549",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51382/978-3-96100-190-3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Optimizing the Automotive Security Development Process in Early Process Design Phases",
      "description": "Security is a relatively new topic in the automotive industry. In the former days, the only security defense methods were the engine immobilizer and the anti-theft alarm system. The rising connection of vehicles to external networks made it necessary to extend the security effort by introducing security development processes. These processes include, amongothers, risk analysis and treatment steps. In parallel, the development of ISO/SAE 21434 and UN-ECE No. R155 started. The long development cycles in the automotive industry made it necessary to align the development processes' early designs with the standards' draft releases. This work aims to design a new consistent, complete and efficient security development process, aligned with the normative references. The resulting development process design aligns with the overall development methodology of the underlying, evaluated development process. Use cases serve as a basis for evaluating improvements and the method designs. This work concentrates on the left leg of the V-Model. Nevertheless, future work targets extensions for a holistic development approach for safety and security.",
      "published": "2023-06-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51382/978-3-96100-190-3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "immobilizer",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christine Jakobs"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.51382/978-3-96100-190-3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51483/ijaiml.6.5s.2026.929-936",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Resilient And Integrity-Verified Over-The-Air Software Update Architecture For Software-Defined Vehicles",
      "description": "Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) increasingly rely on over-the-air (OTA) update mechanisms to deliver enhanced functionality, security patches, and performance improvements across their lifecycle. However, existing OTA architectures expose vehicular systems to significant risks, including firmware tampering, incomplete update rollouts, replay attacks, and man-in-the-middle exploits. This paper proposes a resilient and integrity-verified OTA update architecture specifically tailored for SDV deployment. The proposed framework integrates a four-layer security stack comprising a secure authentication layer, a cryptographic integrity verification layer, a fault-tolerant resilient delivery layer, and a vehicle update manager responsible for controlled deployment and rollback. Formal threat modeling using STRIDE and TARA methodologies underpins the security design, while A/B partition-based rollback ensures operational continuity during update failures. Comparative analysis against existing OTA paradigms demonstrates that the proposed framework substantially improves update reliability, reduces mean-time-to-recovery (MTTR), and strengthens resistance to adversarial exploits. The architecture is aligned with UNECE WP.29 R156 regulations and ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity standards, making it suitable for production deployment in modern connected automotive ecosystems.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51483/ijaiml.6.5s.2026.929-936",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "vehicular",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srikanth Puram"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.51483/ijaiml.6.5s.2026.929-936",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51583/ijltemas.2026.150600052",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Direction-Aware Telematics Crash Detection and Injury Plausibility Scoring for False Injury Claim Mitigation",
      "description": "Modern connected-vehicle programs enable insurers and fleet operators to receive high-frequency inertial signals during collisions, supporting both rapid crash detection (for emergency response and First Notice of Loss) and post-loss analytic validation of claimed injuries. However, many deployed pipelines treat crash severity as a scalar (e.g., peak g or delta-v) and ignore impact direction, vehicle pose, and the occupant’s likely loading path. This omission reduces both safety performance (missed oblique and side impacts) and claim integrity performance (false positives and insufficient context for injury plausibility decisions). This paper proposes a direction-aware, end-to-end telematics architecture that jointly estimates (i) crash occurrence, (ii) impact direction in the vehicle reference frame, and (iii) injury plausibility scores for claim triage. The method fuses accelerometer and gyroscope streams with road context (map-matching, speed limit, surface condition proxies) and optional vehicle signals (airbag, belt, ADAS). A physics-based module derives biomechanically motivated bounds over expected injury risk given delta-v, pulse duration, and direction, while a machine-learning model learns residual patterns associated with suspicious injury narratives. The design supports stream processing for real-time alerts and batch re-scoring for audits, and includes governance controls for privacy and regulated data handling. Using representative evaluation scenarios constructed from mixed telematics datasets, the proposed direction-aware model improves suspicious-claim detection AUC by ~0.06 over severity-only baselines while keeping real-time scoring within sub-second latency. We discuss implementation considerations, failure modes, and responsible deployment practices.",
      "published": "2026-07-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51583/ijltemas.2026.150600052",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sasibhushana Matcha",
        "Dr Munish Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Latest Technology in Engineering Management & Applied Science",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.51583/ijltemas.2026.150600052",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51646/jsesd.v13i2.292",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Feasibility Assessment of Hybrid Renewable Energy Based EV Charging Station in Libya",
      "description": "This study presents an assessment of the feasibility of implementing a hybrid renewable energy-based electric vehicle (EV) charging station at a residential building in Tripoli, Libya. Utilizing the advanced capabilities of HOMER Grid software, the research evaluates multiple scenarios involving combinations of solar and wind energy sources integrated with energy storage and the utility grid. This analysis provides a novel approach to enhancing urban energy systems with renewable technologies in a region traditionally reliant on fossil fuels. Key contributions of this study include the demonstration of an innovative integration strategy that combines solar and wind power with battery storage to ensure a reliable and efficient energy supply for EV charging. Furthermore, the study addresses the practical implications for local energy policy, suggesting that such hybrid systems can significantly enhance energy security and support sustainable urban development. The authors studied five scenarios using HOMER. The results reveals that the annual total costs and payback periods are as follows: for Scenario 1 (wind/utility grid), the expenditure totals US$1,554,416 and payback period of 4.8/5.8 years; for Scenario 2 (solar/wind/Utility grid), the amount is US$1,554,506 and payback period of 4.8/5.8 years; and for Scenario 3(solar/wind/storage/utility grid), it escalates slightly to US$1,554,731, all predicated on the utility grid tariffs and payback period of 4.8/5.8 years. Furthermore, in Scenario 4 (solar/utility grid), the annual total cost is significantly reduced to US$30,589 and a payback period of 8.1/14.3 years, while Scenario 5 (solar/storage/utility grid) incurs an even lower expenditure of US$28,572, again based on the utility grid tariffs and a payback period of 14.0 years. The findings contribute valuable insights into the scalability and adaptability of renewable energy solutions, providing a robust framework for policymakers and planners considering similar implementations in other regions. Overall, the research underscores the potential of integrated renewable energy systems to transform urban energy infrastructures, promoting a sustainable and resilient energy future. The HOMER Grid analysis shows that configurations with energy storage are more cost-effective in the long run, even though they require higher initial costs. It also offers important insights into the economic viability and optimization of hybrid renewable energy systems for an EV charging station in Tripoli, Libya. These results highlight the significance of making calculated investments in renewable energy infrastructure and supporting policies for the development of sustainable energy.",
      "published": "2024-11-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51646/jsesd.v13i2.292",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Abodwair",
        "M. Guneser",
        "M. Khaleel",
        "Y. Nassar",
        "H. El-khozondar",
        "A. Elbaz"
      ],
      "venue": "Solar Energy and Sustainable Development Journal",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.51646/jsesd.v13i2.292",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 31,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.51867/aqssr.3.4.43",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Utilization of TikTok by journalists for news production and engagement at Tuko Media Group, Kenya",
      "description": "Kenya ranks highest globally in TikTok usage, with 54% of users engaging with the platform for various purposes, and 29% specifically for news consumption. However, TikTok presents several challenges as a source of news and public information. Unlike traditional media, TikTok lacks formal editorial structures and verification protocols, making it vulnerable to the spread of misinformation and disinformation. The overall objective of the study was to examine the Utilization of TikTok for news production and engagement at Tuko Media Group. This study was anchored on Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The study was conducted at Tuko Media Group, a leading digital news platform in Kenya. It adopted a qualitative approach. The target population was Tuko Media Group journalists who produce content on Tuko TikTok account. They included journalists who work in the five segments namely; My Story, Couples Show, TUKO Explainers, TUKO Talks, and TUKO Xtra. These segments represented various content genres, ranging from human interest stories to infotainment. This study employed purposive sampling. From the TUKO TikTok account, a total of 15 videos was selected, 3 from each of the five identified segments over a period of one year (July 2024 to June 2025). In addition, interviews were conducted with TUKO’s Producers (3), Videographers (2), Editors (2), Photographers (2), and Writers (3). This made a total of 12 in-depth interviews. The interviews provided deeper insights regarding the phenomenon under study. In relation to data collection from Tuko TikTok videos, the researcher visited TUKO TikTok account where the videos have been uploaded for viewers input. This is where viewers can like, comment, repost and share. The researcher logged into Tuko TikTok page with her TikTok account, downloaded videos with highest likes and shares and watched videos which were purposively selected noting the information based on visual appeal, language use and conformity to journalistic ethics. A qualitative content analysis approach was used for this study. Regarding the interview data, thematic analysis was conducted and results were presented in prose form. Based on the findings, the study concludes that TikTok has emerged as an important digital platform influencing news production practices at TUKO Media Group. Journalists increasingly integrate TikTok into their daily work processes as a tool for storytelling, audience engagement, and content distribution. Based on the findings, the study recommends that media organizations should strengthen journalists’ utilization of TikTok by providing regular training on short-form video production, audience engagement, and effective use of the platform’s interactive features.",
      "published": "2026-10-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.51867/aqssr.3.4.43",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Grace Njeri Wekesa",
        "Lydia Anyonje",
        "Rose Auma",
        "Robert Peter Ogutu"
      ],
      "venue": "African Quarterly Social Science Review",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.51867/aqssr.3.4.43",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5194/isprs-archives-xlviii-4-w3-2022-61-2022",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DATA SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SELF-DRIVING CAR",
      "description": "Abstract. As modern vehicles are sophisticated IoT devices with intelligence, capable of connecting to external infrastructure and utilizing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications, communications need to be secured so that cyberattacks do not reach their destination. In addition, the various organs of the car (sensors, communications, and controls) can have weaknesses that lead to accidents or potential fatalities. Automakers have a major responsibility for the safety of their customers and should not ignore important security research, but should ensure that important security measures are implemented that are less likely to attack your vehicle. This paper addresses the relevant attacks and threats to modern vehicles and presents a security analysis and possible countermeasures. We discussed the future of modern and autonomous vehicles and concluded that further countermeasures must be taken to create a future-proof concept.",
      "published": "2022-12-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5194/isprs-archives-xlviii-4-w3-2022-61-2022",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sara Lahdya",
        "T. Mazri"
      ],
      "venue": "The International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.5194/isprs-archives-xlviii-4-w3-2022-61-2022",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5204/thesis.eprints.247165",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Understanding and mitigating cybersecurity risks of electric vehicle charging",
      "description": "In recent years, the adoption of Electric Vehicles (Evs) has increased with global sales to 23 million. EVs act as prosumers and have transformed the transportation and energy sectors. However, challenges of cybersecurity and scalability persists. This thesis helps to understand and quantify those potential coordinated attacks on EV charging. It also explores Blockchain based architecture for secure, transparent, and decentralized EV charging networks. While appreciating Blockchain’s potential, this study directs the creation of a reliable and long-lasting EV charging network.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5204/thesis.eprints.247165",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fatima Nisar"
      ],
      "venue": "Queensland University of Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5204/thesis.eprints.247165",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.52058/2695-1592-2023-11(30)-394-402",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "THE SCIENT ISSUE OF CYBER SECURITY OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS AND ROBOTICS",
      "description": "The paper examines the safety of autonomous systems and robots.The analysis of threats related to the use of artificial intelligence in autonomous vehicles, robots, and other autonomous systems was carried out.The importance of cyber security and the imperative of close cooperation between the various disciplines involved in the development of autonomous driving systems, such as vehicle development, software development, and IT security, are emphasised.Information flows in autonomous systems and the technological component of communication are described.It is emphasised that the data generated by external sensors includes communication between various means connected to the overall system.Both cascading and cross-level control loops are defined, emphasising that they become necessary to meet the diverse requirements of all levels of the hierarchical model, such as hardware, operating system, software, server, and cloud.Security issues are outlined, emphasising that the main problem arises from autonomous systems being in the field for long periods of time, so future systems must be prepared for changes in cryptocomputing power and key length requirements, taking into account or balancing new cryptographic techniques such as post-quantum cryptography, etc.An innovative concept is proposed, which is aimed at the constant assessment and optimisation of the capabilities of autonomous driving systems in real-time is an adaptive real-time manager, taking into account the environment of the autonomous vehicle, implementation conditions, visibility, and quality of the network connection, which affect the ability of autonomous driving systems in the real-time mode It is noted that the adaptive real-time manager",
      "published": "2023-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.52058/2695-1592-2023-11(30)-394-402",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Denys Tsvaig"
      ],
      "venue": "Věda a perspektivy",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.52058/2695-1592-2023-11(30)-394-402",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5209/esmp.67817",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Desregulación y soberanía del público en la televisión española: el infoentretenimiento como alternativa al modelo de noticias clásico",
      "description": "The economic deregulation of the last three decades has globally affected the journalistic practices of television. The most visible consequence of this change has to do with the emergence of infotainment, a hybridization of the thematic and pragmatic functions of journalism for the extensive and intensive exploitation of audiences. Through a Content Analysis assisted by qualitative data software, the possible effects of infotainment are analysed through a strategic sample of El Intermedio; a programme that adequately represents the journalistic practices and contents associated with this genre. Regarding the thematic, the results indicate that the format replicates the agenda and the framing of the Spanish reference press. In relation to the pragmatic function, the space provides a plethora of rhetorical mechanisms that suggest a more pronounced engagement with the publics.",
      "published": "2020-04-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5209/esmp.67817",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploitation",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "José Luís Valhondo Crego",
        "Salomé Berrocal Gonzálo"
      ],
      "venue": "Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.5209/esmp.67817",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 16,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0007412104790486",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Modeling and Attack Simulations of Connected Vehicles: A Research Outlook",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are dependent on software, and are often connected to the Internet or other external services, which makes them vulnerable to various attacks. To improve security for Internet facing systems, holistic threat modeling is becoming a common way to proactively make decisions and design for security. One approach that has not been commonly implemented is to enhance the threat models with probabilistic attack simulations. That is, incorporating security intelligence, attack types, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to get objective security metrics and risk assessments. This combination has been shown efficient in other disciplines, e.g. energy and banking. However, it has so far been fairly unexplored in the vehicle domain. This position paper reviews previous research in the field, and implements a vehicle threat model using a tool called securiCAD, based on which future research requirements for connected vehicle attack simulations are also derived. The main findings are: 1) not much work has been done in the combined area of connected vehicles and threat modeling with attack simulations, 2) initial tests show that the approach is useful, 3) more research in vehicle specific attacks and countermeasures is needed in order to provide more accurate simulation results, and 4) a more tailored metamodel is needed for the vehicle domain.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0007412104790486",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wenjun Xiong",
        "Fredrik Krantz",
        "Robert Lagerström"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.5220/0007412104790486",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 20,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4074,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.5220/0007412104790486 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: makes, services, intelligence, privacy, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0007764205500555",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Practical Security and Privacy Threat Analysis in the Automotive Domain: Long Term Support Scenario for Over-the-Air Updates",
      "description": "Keeping a vehicle secure implies provide of a long-term support, where over-the-air updates (OTA) play an essential role. Clear understanding of OTA threats is essential to counter them efficiently. Existing research on OTA threats often exclude human actors, such as drivers and maintenance personnel, as well as leave aside privacy threats. This paper addresses the gap by investigates security and privacy OTA threats relevant for vehicle manufacturers for the whole product lifecycle. We report on a practical scenario \"long term support\", its data flow elements, and outcomes of threat analyses. We apply state of the art approaches, such as STRIDE (extended with an automotive template) and LINDDUN, to an automotive case and consider an automotivespecific UNECE OTA threat catalogue. Outcomes indicate complementarity of these methods and provide inputs to studies how well they address practical automotive cases.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0007764205500555",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexandr Vasenev",
        "Florian Stahl",
        "Hayk Hamazaryan",
        "Zhendong Ma",
        "Lijun Shan",
        "Joerg Kemmerich",
        "Claire Loiseaux"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.5220/0007764205500555",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0007957407950801",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Time-based Countermeasures for Relay Attacks on PKES Systems",
      "description": "The development of passive keyless entry and start (PKES) systems in modern vehicles enables drivers to access and control their vehicles remotely using smart keys, which improves the driving conveniences. The PKES system verifies the smart key identity if the communication channel between the vehicle and the smart key is established. When the message in the communication channel is relayed by other devices, it can be manipulated by the attackers and the PKES systems become vulnerable. The distance bounding protocol, which estimates the physical proximity between the vehicle and the smart key, is one of the countermeasures against relay attacks. In this paper, the time-based distance bounding is studied. Since the effectiveness of distance bounding protocol relies heavily on the estimation accuracy, various time-based estimation algorithms are enumerated and compared in this paper.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0007957407950801",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yifan Xie",
        "Hyung Lae Kim",
        "Sa Yong Chong",
        "Taek Lyul Song"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Informatics in Control, Automation and Robotics (ICINCO)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.5220/0007957407950801",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0009355500002550",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluating the Dedicated Short-range Communication for Connected Vehicles against Network Security Attacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0009355500002550",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tu C. Le",
        "Ingy Elsayed-Aly",
        "Weizhao Jin",
        "Seunghan Ryu",
        "Guy Verrier",
        "Tamjid Al Rahat",
        "Byungkyu Park",
        "Yuan Tian"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.5220/0009355500002550",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0010398300002932",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Functional Safety and Electric Vehicle Charging: Requirements Analysis and Design for a Safe Charging Infrastructure System",
      "description": "As society moves from fossil fuels towards electric mobility, there’s an increasing need for charging infrastructure for electric vehicles. Aside from a network of public charging stations, charging equipment will also be increasingly installed in homes and used on a daily basis to charge electric vehicles (EVs) overnight. With this increasing role of charging infrastructure in day-to-day life, safety and security should be guaranteed for these systems. In this work we present the requirements analysis and a charging infrastructure system design for both private and public charging stations, with the goal of fulfilling the requirements of current functional safety and EV supply equipment (EVSE) standardization. Risk assessment for the charging process and the derived functional safety requirements are presented. The overall system design is discussed, with the main focus on the safety-related parts. The presented work can be used as a basis for the development of functionally safe nex t generation EVSE.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0010398300002932",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "evse",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tommi Kivelä",
        "Mohamed Abdelawwad",
        "Marvin Sperling",
        "Malte Drabesch",
        "Michael H. Schwarz",
        "Josef Börcsök",
        "Kai Furmans"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.5220/0010398300002932",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0010445500002932",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detecting Message Modification Attacks on the CAN Bus with Temporal Convolutional Networks",
      "description": "Multiple attacks have shown that in-vehicle networks have vulnerabilities which can be exploited. Securing the Controller Area Network (CAN) for modern vehicles has become a necessary task for car manufacturers. Some attacks inject potentially large amount of fake messages into the CAN network; however, such attacks are relatively easy to detect. In more sophisticated attacks, the original messages are modified, making the detection a more complex problem. In this paper, we present a novel machine learning based intrusion detection method for CAN networks. We focus on detecting message modification attacks, which do not change the timing patterns of communications. Our proposed temporal convolutional network-based solution can learn the normal behavior of CAN signals and differentiate them from malicious ones. The method is evaluated on multiple CAN-bus message IDs from two public datasets including different types of attacks. Performance results show that our lightweight approach compares favorably to the state-of-the-art unsupervised learning approach, achieving similar or better accuracy for a wide range of scenarios with a significantly lower false positive rate.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0010445500002932",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Irina Chiscop",
        "András Gazdag",
        "Joost Bosman",
        "Gergely Biczók"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.5220/0010445500002932",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv",
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0010603000002998",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Goal and Threat Modelling for Driving Automotive Cybersecurity Risk Analysis Conforming to ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "As cars are increasingly connected and autonomous, they also become more exposed to cyber security threats. Providing strong protection and reactive response to such threats in a large industry involving many tiers and complex safety critical systems is challenging and required the development of the new ISO 21434 standard. Along with ISO 2626 dedicated to safety, it provides solid grounds for safety-security co-engineering. This paper focuses on how to provide effective and efficient support to the risk assessment phase based on a model-based approach. A rich goal-oriented meta-model is proposed to capture automotive assets and system properties, to estimate the impact of damage scenarios, to identify threats and to assess their feasibility. The approach is implemented as proof-of-concept through the meta-model adaptation of a generic co-engineering platform and is illustrated on the car light control sub-system.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0010603000002998",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christophe Ponsard",
        "V. Ramon",
        "Jean‐Christophe Deprez"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Security and Cryptography",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.5220/0010603000002998",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0011109500003194",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advanced Lightweight Cryptography for Automotive Security: Surveys, Challenges and Solutions",
      "description": ": Recently, automotive embedded systems have become strong principles of computing, along with an increas-ing need for secure communication. The rapid development of the V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) technology for the entity’s interconnection leads to the rise of attack surface and the demand for cryptographic security standard. In addition, the requirement of having secure automotive services and devices against not only current but also future attacks are emerged. Unfortunately, providing robust, secure solutions for automotive embedded systems still faces big challenges. Because of the distinctive characteristics and infrastructures of the vehicular networks, the requirements for automotive security are far more complicated as compared to other type of networks, such as conventional wireless networks, and mobile networks. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of the developments in automotive security from the perspective of lightweight cryptographic solutions, including lightweight algorithms and lightweight protocols. Furthermore, security challenges, issues and their cryptographic countermeasures as well as limitations of future automotive industry are also discussed. These strategies can be flexibly adapted to meet strict security levels of automotive security in the future.",
      "published": "2022",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0011109500003194",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Phuc Tran",
        "Duc Cuong Nguyen"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Internet of Things, Big Data and Security",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.5220/0011109500003194",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0011267500003283",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Real-time Method for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection by Means of Supervised Machine Learning",
      "description": ": Nowadays vehicles are not composed only of mechanical parts, exits a plethora of electronics components in our cars, able to exchange information. The protection devices such as the airbags are activated electronically. This happens because the braking or acceleration signal from the pedal to the actuator arrives through a packet. The latter is an electronic and not a mechanical signal. For packets transmission a bus, i.e., the Controller Area Network, was designed and implemented in vehicles. This bus was not designed to receive access from the outside world, which happened when info-entertainment systems were introduced, opening up the possibility of accessing bus information from devices external to the vehicle. To avoid the possibility of those attacks, in this research article, we propose a method aimed to detect intrusions targeting the CAN bus. In particular, we analyze packets transiting through the CAN bus, and we build a set of models by exploiting supervised machine learning. We experiment with the proposed method on three different attacks (i.e., speedometer attack, arrows attack, and doors attack), obtaining interesting performances.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0011267500003283",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Francesco Mercaldo",
        "Rosangela Casolare",
        "Giovanni Ciaramella",
        "Giacomo Iadarola",
        "Fabio Martinelli",
        "Francesco Maria Ranieri",
        "Antonella Santone"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Security and Cryptography",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.5220/0011267500003283",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0011605300003405",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IVNPROTECT: Isolable and Traceable Lightweight CAN-Bus Kernel-Level Protection for Securing in-Vehicle Communication",
      "description": "Cyberattacks on In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) are becoming the most urgent issue. The Controller Area Network (CAN), one of the IVNs, is a standard protocol for automotive networks. Many researchers have tackled the security issues of CAN, such as the vulnerability of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and impersonation attacks. Though existing methods can prevent DoS attacks, they have problems in deployment cost, isolability of a compromised Electronic Control Unit (ECU), and traceability for the root cause of isolation. Thus, we tackle to prevent DoS attacks on CAN. To solve these problems of the existing methods, we propose an isolable and traceable CAN-bus kernel-level protection called IVNPROTECT. IVNPROTECT can be installed on an ECU, which has a wireless interface, just by the software updating because it is implemented in the CAN-bus kernel driver. We also confirm that our IVNPROTECT can mitigate two types of DoS attacks without distinguishing malicious/benign CAN identifie rs. After mitigating DoS attacks, IVNPROTECT isolates a compromised ECU with a security error state mechanism, which handles security errors in IVNPROTECT. And, we evaluate the traceability that an ECU with IVNPROTECT can report warning messages to the other ECUs on the bus even while being forced to send DoS attacks by an attacker. In addition, the overhead of IVNPROTECT is 9.049 $00B5s, so that IVNPROTECT can be installed on insecure ECUs with a slight side-effect.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0011605300003405",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shuji Ohira",
        "Araya Kibrom Desta",
        "Ismail Arai",
        "Kazutoshi Fujikawa"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.5220/0011605300003405",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0013293300003941",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Topology-Aware Prioritized Patching for EV Charging Infrastructure Vulnerabilities",
      "description": ": Modern critical infrastructures are becoming increasingly complex and exposed to cyber-attacks. As with any digitalized system, these systems suffer from vulnerabilities that threaten overall system security. As a result, eliminating vulnerabilities is imperative for security analysts to counteract potential future attacks. However, vulnerability management is time-consuming and expensive because it requires testing, verification, and validation for the patches. Therefore, there is a need to prioritize which vulnerabilities to fix first in an efficient manner. This paper introduces a patching strategy by identifying the attack path that poses the most severe system risk and the patches with the highest potential to mitigate this risk. The risk assessment is based on novel metrics incorporating dynamic exploitability, impact scores, and the network topology. The method is evaluated on a case study based on electric vehicle charging infrastructures. We collect information on vulnerabilities, exploits, and available patches for this domain and instantiate a realistic network model with relevant components, some of which contain vulnerabilities. Our results show that the proposed method outperforms baseline methods to reduce overall system risk.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0013293300003941",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roland Plaka",
        "Mikael Asplund",
        "Simin Nadjm-Tehrani"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5220/0013293300003941",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0013321200003899",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Compliance Standards and Frameworks and Its Implications on Cybersecurity: A NIS2 Study Within the Swedish Automotive Industries",
      "description": ": Cybersecurity standards and regulations are pivotal in guiding organizations toward mitigating cyber risks and enhancing their overall security posture. The European Union’s NIS2 Directive, which introduces stringent and comprehensive security requirements, exemplifies a Current regulatory framework designed to address evolving cyber threats. This study critically examines the regulatory, governance, cybersecurity, and compliance challenges introduced by NIS2 within the Swedish automotive industry. It further explores the strategic integration of NIS2 with existing regulatory frameworks to streamline compliance approaches and foster long-term resilience. The findings reveal the increasing complexity and financial implications of compliance, while also identifying significant opportunities to bolster cybersecurity resilience. This paper underscores the necessity for organizations to adopt proactive and adaptive strategies in response to the dynamic European regulatory landscape. While the focus is on the Swedish automotive sector, the study provides valuable insights that may inform future research into the broader implications of NIS2 across diverse industries and regions within the European Union.",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0013321200003899",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adenike Adesina",
        "Elias Seid",
        "Fredrik Blix",
        "Oliver Popov"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5220/0013321200003899",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0014715900004030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Replay Cyber-Attack Detection and Isolation in Vehicle Lateral Dynamics with Event-Based Communication",
      "description": ": This paper investigates the problem of replay cyber-attack detection and isolation in vehicle lateral dynamics with event-triggered communication. To reduce communication load, event-triggered communication schemes are considered on the output channels between the vehicle plant and the Electronic Control Unit (ECU). By utilizing the notion of auxiliary systems operating in parallel with the lateral dynamics, a detection framework is developed to identify inconsistencies in both received measurements and inter-event timing. In addition, an isolation mechanism is proposed to distinguish replay cyber-attacks from general false data injection cyber-attacks. Sufficient conditions are provided to ensure boundedness of the closed-loop system and to prevent Zeno behavior, making the proposed approach suitable for real-time vehicular applications.",
      "published": "2026",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0014715900004030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "ecu",
        "electronic control unit",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fatemeh Tohfeh",
        "Ali Eslami",
        "Khashayar Khorasani"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5220/0014715900004030",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0014722200004030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle Security Operations Center: Future-Proofing ISO/SAE 21434 and UN Regulation No. 155 for Modern Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0014722200004030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jenny Hofbauer",
        "Manfred Vielberth",
        "Kevin Mayer"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5220/0014722200004030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5220/0014817500004030",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey of AI Applications and Their Security Challenges for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5220/0014817500004030",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Leon Ramirez",
        "Marco Leeske",
        "Christian Plappert"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems (VEHITS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5220/0014817500004030",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.52202/068431-1861",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SafeBench: A Benchmarking Platform for Safety Evaluation of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "As shown by recent studies, machine intelligence-enabled systems are vulnerable to test cases resulting from either adversarial manipulation or natural distribution shifts. This has raised great concerns about deploying machine learning algorithms for real-world applications, especially in safety-critical domains such as autonomous driving (AD). On the other hand, traditional AD testing on naturalistic scenarios requires hundreds of millions of driving miles due to the high dimensionality and rareness of the safety-critical scenarios in the real world. As a result, several approaches for autonomous driving evaluation have been explored, which are usually, however, based on different simulation platforms, types of safety-critical scenarios, scenario generation algorithms, and driving route variations. Thus, despite a large amount of effort in autonomous driving testing, it is still challenging to compare and understand the effectiveness and efficiency of different testing scenario generation algorithms and testing mechanisms under similar conditions. In this paper, we aim to provide the first unified platform SafeBench to integrate different types of safety-critical testing scenarios, scenario generation algorithms, and other variations such as driving routes and environments. Meanwhile, we implement 4 deep reinforcement learning-based AD algorithms with 4 types of input (e.g., bird's-eye view, camera) to perform fair comparisons on SafeBench. We find our generated testing scenarios are indeed more challenging and observe the trade-off between the performance of AD agents under benign and safety-critical testing scenarios. We believe our unified platform SafeBench for large-scale and effective autonomous driving testing will motivate the development of new testing scenario generation and safe AD algorithms. SafeBench is available at https://safebench.github.io.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.52202/068431-1861",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chejian Xu",
        "Wenhao Ding",
        "Weijie Lyu",
        "Zuxin Liu",
        "Shuai Wang",
        "Yihan He",
        "Hanjiang Hu",
        "Ding Zhao",
        "Bo Li"
      ],
      "venue": "neural information processing systems",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.52202/068431-1861",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 49,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.52710/ijept.941",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Transformation and Customer Decision-Making in Insurance: A Review of Digital Touchpoints, Trust, and Intelligent Service",
      "description": "Digital transformation is changing insurance from a product-centred business into a data-intensive, continuously connected service ecosystem. This article reviews how research has conceptualised and investigated the relationship between digital transformation and customer decision-making in insurance, with particular attention to digital touchpoints, trust, and intelligent service. A bibliometric-informed review design is used to integrate performance evidence, science-mapping findings, and customer-level empirical studies. The literature shows a rapid expansion of insurtech research after 2017 and a movement from technology description toward questions of adoption, customer experience, governance, personalisation, and algorithmic accountability. Three interdependent knowledge domains emerge. The first concerns the digital infrastructure of insurance, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, big data, Internet of Things devices, telematics, blockchain, mobile applications, and conversational agents. The second concerns the customer journey, in which perceived usefulness, information quality, convenience, personalisation, and service continuity shape evaluations across multiple touchpoints. The third concerns trust, privacy, perceived risk, fairness, explainability, and human involvement, which determine whether technology-enabled value propositions become actual behavioural intentions. The review identifies a fragmented evidence base, excessive reliance on cross-sectional survey and structural-equation designs, limited longitudinal and cross-cultural research, and weak integration between technology adoption theory and insurance-specific decision processes. A research agenda is proposed around longitudinal customer journeys, hybrid human–AI service, explainable personalisation, fairness, vulnerable consumers, and causal identification. The article also specifies reporting requirements for future Scopus-based bibliometric studies and clarifies why bibliometric mapping must be followed by theory-led interpretation.",
      "published": "2026-08-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.52710/ijept.941",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sathya Prakash Urs S.N",
        "Maksud A. Madraswale"
      ],
      "venue": "IJEPT",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.52710/ijept.941",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.52768/3067-7947/1007",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber security challenges to future mobility of artificial intelligence",
      "description": "Today s Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) and collaborative robots are considered smart things because they are networked and have the ability to send and receive data over the network.",
      "published": "2024-10-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.52768/3067-7947/1007",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Robotics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.52768/3067-7947/1007",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.52783/jes.1535",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The performance of Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, KNN, Naive Bayes and SVM for identifying Automotive Cybersecurity Attack and Prevention: An Experimental Study",
      "description": "The automotive industry has witnessed a significant increase in cyber threats as vehicles become more connected and reliant on software-driven systems. To safeguard against these threats, effective cybersecurity measures must be implemented. This paper explores the use of Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithms as a means of bolstering automotive cybersecurity attack prevention. SVM algorithms have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in various domains due to their ability to handle complex and high-dimensional data. By leveraging SVM algorithms, this research aims to enhance the detection and prevention of cybersecurity attacks targeting automotive systems. The proposed approach involves training SVM models using labeled datasets that include both normal and anomalous driving scenarios. By analyzing various features and patterns extracted from the data, the SVM models can learn to differentiate between normal and malicious behaviour. These models can then be used in real-time to identify and mitigate potential cyber threats. The results of this study is compared with other machine learning algorithm like Logistic Regression, Naive Bayes, KNN, Decision Tree, highlight the effectiveness of SVM algorithms in detecting and preventing automotive cybersecurity attacks. The models exhibit high accuracy rates in distinguishing between normal and anomalous behavior, providing a robust defense mechanism against potential threats. In conclusion, this research emphasizes the significance of leveraging SVM learning algorithms for automotive cybersecurity attack prevention. By harnessing the power of machine learning, automotive systems can be fortified against cyber threats, ensuring the safety and integrity of vehicles and their passengers.",
      "published": "2024-04-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.52783/jes.1535",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vaishali Mishra, Sonali Kadam"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Electrical Systems",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.52783/jes.1535",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.17580892",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hybrid Quantum-safe OCPP",
      "description": "This demo is part of the DITM (Digital Infrastructure for Future-proof and Mobility) project, which is a National Growth Fund project and it is subsidized by the Dutch government. Within the project, the digital infrastructure for automated transport to make mobility more efficient and safer is designed and implemented. The project focuses on enabling secure, interoperable, and future-proof communication for electric vehicle charging and broader mobility ecosystems. DITM addresses the challenges posed by emerging quantum threats by integrating post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into critical protocols like OCPP. The goal is to ensure that EV charging infrastructures remain resilient against quantum-enabled attacks while maintaining compatibility with existing standards. Through hybrid cryptographic approaches and practical demonstrations, DITM supports a smooth migration path from classical to post-quantum security. This repository contains a demo concerning a OCPP connection between a Central Station Management System and a Charging Point using for EV Charging. The connection between the CSMS and the CP is guaranteed to have post-quantum confidentiality and authentication. It is a proof of concept showing the achievability of adding post-quantum security to a pre-existing library. The demo is based on a python implementation of OCPP. The post-quantum hybrid key exchange is set to default to X25519MLKEM768 by OpenSSL 3.5.0. The post-quantum hybrid authentication is done in a hybrid way by leveraging hybrid certificates with ECC (NIST P-curve)+MLDSA signatures provided by oqs-provider. Using the demo, interoperability can be testen between classical, post-quantum, and hybrid setups: The classical setup is based on Ubuntu 24.10, which does not come with OpenSSL 3.5. It uses RSA certificates. The postquantum setup is a copy of the classical setup, with an updated local install of OpenSSL 3.5.0. It makes use of mldsa87. The hybrid setup is a copy of the postquantum setup, including liboqs and the OQS Provider for OpenSSL, allowing the use of p521_mldsa87.",
      "published": "2025-11-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17580892",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amadori, Alessandro",
        "Sierink, Thomas"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.17580892",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.17834775",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GEM-CAN: Real-World CAN-Bus Attack Scenarios on an Autonomous Vehicle for Intrusion Detection",
      "description": "This dataset provides labeled CAN-bus traffic captured from a GEM e6 autonomous vehicle under normal operation and controlled cyberattacks. It includes ~143K frames spanning nominal driving (~100K), DoS floods using ID 0x00000000 (~41K), and data-tampering injections targeting brake and steering functions (~1.3K). Each entry records timestamp, arbitration ID, DLC, payload bytes, and a Normal/Attack label, with metadata detailing attack windows, bus load, bitrate, and test conditions. Data were collected via PCAN-View/PCAN-USB on a closed track while the vehicle operated autonomously. The dataset provides real-vehicle evidence of availability and integrity attacks—supporting reproducible evaluation of lightweight automotive intrusion detection systems. A JSON metadata file is provided to summarize experimental conditions, attack definitions, logging parameters, and labeling policy, complementing the CSV files.",
      "published": "2025-12-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17834775",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tavasoli, Mahsa",
        "Sarrafzadeh, Abdolhossein",
        "Karimoddini, Ali",
        "Phuapaiboon, Tienake",
        "Khaleghi, Milad",
        "Tobias, Daniel"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.17834775",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.180258",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Autonomous Vehicles And Automated Driving: Status, Perspectives And Societal Impact",
      "description": "Autonomous systems, automated vehicles in general and particularly the most popular concept of Automated Driving are not just a vision of a remote future – rather closed systems like metros and similar rail systems, air traffic, large logistic systems in storehouses and highly automated production lines have already autonomous systems in use. In open systems like road traffic, only first trials are under way, under severe restrictions. But all large automotive OEMs are active in this field since many years, building on the increasing number and capabilities of ADAS, Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, already in use or implementation. Topics addressed are the European and national Roadmaps on Automated Driving or general on automated vehicles, the impact on transport in general (not only road traffic but also intermodal transport modes), and the potential benefits and threats to society and business. This includes increase of mobility to people not allowed or able to drive, the environmentally fascinating aspect of considerable reduction of the number of vehicles because of better utilization of vehicle fleets, new chances for transport optimization and reduction of resource usage, but also severe threats expected from the safety, cyber-security and privacy side of such highly automated, connected systems. Businesses will change dramatically, some becoming obsolete, but also new ones will be created. Additionally, legal, liability and even ethical aspects have to be taken into account.",
      "published": "2016-09-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.180258",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "driver assistance",
        "privacy",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Erwin Schoitsch"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.180258",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18138409",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Overview of Information Security and Assurance Considerations for Micro Controller Integration",
      "description": "The advancement of small-scale computing has enabled the integration of highly efficient microcontroller device integration into consumer, medical, automotive, and industrial devices. The miniaturized form factor, reduced resource specifications, and network connectivity of these devices are optimal for the unique requirements of embedded electronic sensors, industrial control systems, and Internet of Things applications. The direct physical accessibility and network enabled connectivity combined with reduced power, processing, and memory characteristics of these devices increases the physical and cyber security attack surfaces which complicate information security and risk management. This review article provides an evaluative summary of physical and cyber security risk, impact, and mitigation considerations associated with the integration of microcontroller devices into information and operational technology networks.",
      "published": "2024-07-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18138409",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "James Burrell"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18138409",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18202965",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Challenges and Defense Strategies in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "As Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) become more prevalent, they bring with them a host of cybersecurity challenges from their reliance on complex electronics, embedded systems, and integrated communication networks. The increased interconnectivity between critical vehicle systems such as braking, steering, infotainment, and telematics introduces multiple entry points for potential cyber threats. This paper investigates these vulnerabilities, with a focus on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and in-vehicle networks including Controller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay, and Automotive Ethernet. Traditional in-vehicle communication protocols were not originally developed with security as a priority, leaving them exposed to risks such as spoofing, message injection, denial-of-service attacks, and unauthorized control. As vehicles adopt Ethernet-based architectures to meet growing data demands, new risks emerge due to the broader system complexity and deeper integration with external networks like cloud platforms and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interfaces. The paper analyzes plausible attack scenarios, such as remote access through infotainment systems, direct physical exploitation via diagnostic ports, tampering with over-the-air (OTA) updates, and threats to artificial intelligence systems used in autonomous functions. The study further evaluates existing and emerging defense mechanisms, such as cryptographic protocols, secure ECU communication, intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS), secure boot loaders, and hardware security components. Emphasis is placed on real-time detection techniques, including AI-enhanced anomaly detection models that recognize deviations from standard vehicle behavior patterns. Additionally, the paper explores cutting-edge developments like blockchain-based firmware distribution, next-generation cryptographic solutions resistant to quantum threats, and virtual simulation tools used for cybersecurity validation. Regulatory and industry frameworks such as ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE WP.29 are also discussed to provide insight into evolving compliance expectations. By presenting an overview of the threats and mitigation strategies, this paper provides more resilient automotive ecosystems as the industry continues its transformation toward fully connected, software-defined vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-07-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18202965",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "telematics",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Veera Venkata Krishnarjun Rao Adabala"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18202965",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18363538",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Graph-Based Defense Strategies for CAN Bus Security: A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "Modern automotive systems heavily rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. This standard protocol enables communication between multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that manage critical vehicle functions such as acceleration, braking, and steering. However, CANs lack fundamental security mechanisms, and as automotive technology evolves with increasingly intelligent vehicles offering innovative applications through ECUs, the growing number of ECUs creates more attack surfaces, making the CAN bus more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This paper offers a detailed overview of the security issues and vulnerabilities of CAN bus systems, the available datasets for CAN bus research, and the existing graph-based defense techniques for intrusion detection. In addition, this article compares these techniques and highlights open issues and future directions.",
      "published": "2026-01-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18363538",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Tamim Dari Chowdhury",
        "Md Azim Khan",
        "Maloy Kumar Devnath"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18363538",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18714147",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automatically Generating Fuzz Tests from Automotive Communication Databases",
      "description": "The vehicle is quickly becoming part of the internet of things (IoT). While this enables exciting new features and business models, it also increases the attack surface for cyber security threats. As part of a holistic security engineering process, security testing methods play an important role to make vehicles more secure. In this paper we propose an efficient approach for automotive fuzz testing. The concept uses existing automotive testing frameworks as a user front end and handles the automotive-specific processing and communication tasks. Our approach aims at extending existing testing tools and frameworks by integrating open source fuzzing engines, which are well established in classical IT security testing. Knowledge about automotive communication databases, including DBC, CDD, ODX, LDF, FIBEX, and AUTOSAR SD are used to automatically derive configurations for the fuzzing engine. CANoe as a robust automotive testing framework is used as message publisher and target monitor. The approach has the potential to provide OEMs, suppliers, and security service providers with an additional highly efficient building block for their security testing strategy.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18714147",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "fuzzing",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Philip Lapczynski",
        "Heinemann, Holger",
        "Tobias Schoneberger",
        "Eduard Metzker"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18714147",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18714652",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Assessment based on ISO/SAE 21434:2021 - Experiences",
      "description": "One of the key points of the recently published cyber security standard ISO/SAE 21434:2021 [1] is the performance of threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA). The risk assessment method (described in clause 15) is universally applicable in different phases of the development life cycle. In a chain of step-by-step identification and analysis activities, it describes how to proceed from asset identification over threat scenario identification, impact rating, attack path analysis, attack feasibility rating, risk value determination to risk treatment decision. In the last step, one of four predefined options (see also ISO 31000 [2]) is selected. Once the decision has been made to reduce the risk, cybersecurity goals, cybersecurity controls and cybersecurity requirements have to be selected and specified. The clauses (requirements) of ISO/SAE 21434 are mainly describing what to do, but not exactly how to do it. To perform TARAs in an efficient way additional sources of knowledge and in-formation have to be considered. Supporting information can be found e.g., in ENISA guidelines (e.g., [3]), UNECE Regulation No. 155 [4] and associated interpretive recommendations [5], threat modeling like MS-STRIDE [6], and others.There is no such thing as 100 percent security, so that the degree of cybersecurity achieved correlates not only with the technical expertise in the project, but also with the quality of the processes used for product development. In the accompaniment in many TARA customers projects (OEM, Tier1, ...) we were able to gain practical experience on the implementation and identify pitfalls in the application of the standard. We would like to share some of them.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18714652",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Liedtke",
        "Webb, Juan"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18714652",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18714708",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-assisted Vulnerability Analysis and Classification Framework for UDS on CAN-bus Fuzzer",
      "description": "Controller area network (CAN) bus system is widely accepted for connecting Electronic Control Units (ECUs) on in-vehicle networks. Fuzz-testing (i.e., testing with anomalous input data, often pseudo-random) over the CAN-bus is considered a proven method to detect security vulnerabilities within the in-vehiclenetwork. The automatic execution of the test cases and checking the robustness makes CAN-bus fuzzing a popular choice in the automotive testing community. However, due to the large number of fuzz testcases, the execution logs are often large for CAN-bus fuzzing. Root cause analysis of these logs is not a trivial task and requires expert manual effort as not all the failures are security critical and some failures can be contextual issues or false positives. Thus, automatic determination of the class, relative severity, and robustness of a potential failure is desirable for prompt analysis of the vulnerabilities. In this workwe propose a testing architecture to automate the determination of the potential security vulnerabilities from the vast fuzz testing logs and generate a risk score associated with the failure class, relative severity, and robustness of the failure. We also identify different classes of the vulnerabilities can be found in the in-vehicle networks, with the techniques to measure the relative severity, and robustness of the failures. In addition, we provide direction to implement a scoring system to quantify the risk associated with a potential vulnerability.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18714708",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Golam Kayas",
        "Zachariah Pelletier",
        "Douglas Gordon",
        "Tim Arntson",
        "Jamier Payton"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18714708",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18715898",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Elicitation of privacy requirements and design specifications for new automotive product designs and implications for current automotive privacy standardization",
      "description": "The amount of software in new automotive vehicle designs continue to escalate and this poses a serious threat to the safety and security of the vehicle, and this includes the privacy of the persons and complex permutations that are engaged in the driving experience. Much research and developments exist in theareas of security and privacy. However, the existing knowledge in terms of privacy tends to be generic and not available information exist on privacy of vehicular systems from the viewpoint of new vehicle designs. This paper provides a detailed discussion of privacy aspects that arise in the design of vehicularsystems, an elicitation of privacy requirements and design specifications as a result of applying the privacy LINDDUN methodology in the context of the design of an ADAS sub-system, and a discussion on the implications of integrating privacy methodologies in current standards such as ISO/SAE 21434.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18715898",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Juan Pimentel"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18715898",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18715953",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Opportunities, Monetization, and Cybersecurity Threats in the Connected Vehicle Landscape",
      "description": "Technological advancements in the automotive industry have transformed modern vehicles into data hubs. These vehicles are continuously generating, consuming, and transmitting large volumes of data. The analysis and use of this vehicle data create many new opportunities, from the enhancement of vehicle functions to the generation of new revenue streams. However, this shift toward a data-centric ecosystem also brings with it a set of unique challenges and responsibilities for the automotive industry. This research paper delves into vehicle data and its generation, transmission, and usage. In particular, this paperhighlights the privacy and security concerns associated with vehicle data. Quite often, vehicle data is collected without the users’ explicit consent and/or knowledge, or the data collection details are hidden deep in the fine print of purchase agreements. This raises serious concerns about the potential of data misuse or abuse, including contraventions of data protection laws. This paper explores macro categories of vehicle data collected, ways in which this data could be used and monetized, and cybersecurity threats associated with this data. Our research found examples of vehicle data leakage via MQTT brokers and demonstrated that even small amounts of vehicle data could be used to profile drivers or fleets, highlighting privacy and security risks associated with unsecured data. An unexpected find was discovering vehicle API communications logs in Trend Micro telemetry data; these API calls could expose vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cybercriminals. All of our findings highlight the need for secure data transmission and stringent measures to protect data. The success of the connected car enterprise presents a lucrative target for cybercriminals, driving the need for robust data security measures. As the automotive industry evolves into a data-driven industry, it becomes crucial for stakeholders such as OEMs and Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers to strike a balance between innovation and data protection.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18715953",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Numaan Huq",
        "Vladimir Kropotov",
        "Philippe Lin",
        "Rainer Vosseler"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18715953",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5456,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.5281/zenodo.18715953 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: suppliers, expose, continuously, collection, serious, large, functions, even."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18716228",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Full-vehicle testing: The Silver Bullet for Cybersecurity Homologation?",
      "description": "During recent years, penetration testing on the full-vehicle (system) level has become a standard and practical validation method for car makers to prove conformity with cybersecurity regulation, specifically UN-R155 in conjunction with ISO/SAE 21434. The witnessing of cybersecurity tests and the analysis of result reports by Technical Service Providers (TSP) became the defacto standard for Vehicle Type Approval (VTA) of new and existing car models, especially for the EU market. In this article, we will give an overview of how cybersecurity attestation has been set up on a global scale among the UN-R 155 member states. In a next step, we share our insights as a provider of cybersecurity verification & validation (V&V) and will demonstrate why penetration and fuzz testing at the vehicle level can serve as a final checkpoint for testing. We show that this cannot be a stopgap for tests omitted on an item level. We investigate how and to which extent cybersecurity testing for road vehicles provides a reasonable dimension in the overall VTA process. On one hand, weshare our experience about efficient test setups as well as powerful tools for vehicle testing, and, on the other hand, we point out test steps better covered byadditional tests during vehicle type approval, e.g., on the component level.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18716228",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "penetration",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Irmscher",
        "Thomas Enderle",
        "Abdallah Zoubir Ourad",
        "Zachariah Pelleteir"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18716228",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18716274",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ISO/SAE 21343-based Automotive Risks Assessment Revisited",
      "description": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) is one of the cornerstones for complying with the UN-R155 automotive cybersecurity regulation. In fact, the UN-R155 requires OEMs to perform risks assessments and demonstrate the appropriate management of risks throughout vehicle's lifecycle. To meet these regulatory requirements, automotive stakeholders rely on the recently published ISO/SAE 21434 standard which addresses several cybersecurity aspects including TARA methods. More specifically, the UN-R155 provides a list of threats to be considered in TARAs. These threats are not always relevant when analyzing a given feature as it depends on the attacker's motivation. If we consider the threat related to physical attacks for example, a vehicle user would bemore interested in tuning his vehicle than triggering safety related feared events; whereas a thief would be rather interested in inviolability relatedfeatures, and he has very limited interest in infotainment features. In this paper, based on our experience with the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and more specifically ISO/SAE 21434-based TARAs, we describe how to achieve pragmatic and efficient risks assessments. First, we recall some limitations of ISO/SAE 21434-based risks assessment and propose improvements related to attack feasibility rating. Then, relying on the Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (TVRA) methodology, we show how relevant automotive threat agents' capability and motivation levels can be taken into account to focus on relevant attack paths and determine risk values that better re ect the probability of real attacks, thus facilitating risk treatment decisions.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18716274",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "infotainment",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Amira Barki",
        "Jean-Baptiste Mangé"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18716274",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.18903557",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OCPP Telemetry Falsification in EV Charging Infrastructure: From Man-in-the-Middle Exploitation to Grid-Level Impact Quantification",
      "description": "The proliferation of networked electric vehicle (EV) charging stations in- tegrated with utility grid control systems introduces cyber-physical attack surfaces whose consequences extend far beyond individual devices. This pa- per presents the first empirical analysis demonstrating how protocol-level vulnerabilities in Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) implementations en- able telemetry falsification with quantifiable downstream impact on Super- visory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Automated De- mand Response (ADR) mechanisms. We develop a formal threat model for OCPP communication security and demonstrate a multi-layer man-in-the- middle (MITM) attack against the EVerest open-source charging framework, exploiting the absence of end-to-end message authentication through coor- dinated ARP cache poisoning, DNS spoofing, and TLS interception. Our attack achieves real-time manipulation of charging telemetry with config- urable amplification factors, creating phantom grid loads of 64.8 kW per compromised Level 2 charger under 10× falsification. We ground our im- pact analysis in IEEE 2030.5, OpenADR 2.0, and NERC frequency response standards to quantify how falsified telemetry propagates through Distribu- tion Management Systems (DMS), demonstrating that compromise of as few as 11 chargers on a typical suburban feeder can trigger erroneous demand response actions. We propose a defense-in-depth architecture spanning net- work, transport, application, and semantic validation layers that achieves complete attack prevention with less than 10 ms additional latency. Experi- mental validation across 50 controlled trials on a representative testbed con- firms reliable attack success against unprotected systems, while the proposed defense layer independently prevents exploitation. Analysis of OCPP 2.0.1 security profiles reveals specification gaps that persist even in compliant im- plementations and motivates concrete protocol evolution recommendations.",
      "published": "2026-03-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18903557",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "exploitation",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anonymou(s), Author(s)"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.18903557",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.19429092",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "MINIDS: Multi-domain In-Vehicle Network Intrusion Detection Dataset for SCIMI",
      "description": "- This is the dataset of our paper \"SCIMI: Semantic-Aware Collaborative Intrusion Detection for Multi-domain In-Vehicle Networks\", which is accepted by 63rd ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC 2026). - This repository is the public version of our dataset. - We conducted multi-stage attack experiments on a real autonomous transport vehicle and collected traces from the CAN, Ethernet, and host systems. - The label.txt file contains annotations of the attack periods, which are synchronized with the timestamps in all data. Each attack's can.csv file includes frame-level labels. Metrics files contain the host log of the vehicle. Output.pcap is the recorded Ethernet traffic. - You can find more details about this dataset in our paper. - Anyone who uses this dataset in his/her work should cite our paper. - Download: dac_pub_dataset.zip dac_pub_dataset.z01 dac_pub_dataset.z02 dac_pub_dataset.z03 - Run: unzip dac_pub_dataset.zip",
      "published": "2026-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19429092",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chang Zhu"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.19429092",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.19682384",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Artifact for Beyond Classical PKI: A Quantum-Safe Authentication Framework for Automotive OTA Updates",
      "description": "The zenodo is for USENIX Security’26 Artifact access, includes demo video, coding, readme and Artifact Appendix file. The artifact select a C-based programming of the proposed protocol: Quantum-Safe Ticket-Gated Server Authentication. The experimental hardware device select a Windows PC/wsl environment as the OEM server and a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ as the vehicle client.New updated by 05/14, we added new version: VS_ticket_Revised_0514.zip Update on 05/19:(1) we revised artifact archive: VS_ticket_Revised_0519.zip,(2) We updated the artifact appendix document: USENIX_Security__26_Artifact_Appendix__eyond_Classical_PKI__A_Quantum_Safe_Authentication_Framework_for_Automotive_OTA_Updates__Revised.pdf",
      "published": "2026-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19682384",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lin Wei-Lun",
        "Ting-Yu Chen",
        "Arijit Karati"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.19682384",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.19754104",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "HotWire: Real-World Impersonation and Discharge Attacks on Electric Vehicle Charging Systems (USENIX WOOT '26 Artifact)",
      "description": "HotWire is a bidirectional testbed for the DIN 70121 and ISO 15118-2 vehicle-to-grid charging protocols. It implements both sides — a rogue EVSE (charging station) and a rogue PEV (electric vehicle) — plus two concrete attacks: (A1) Autocharge EVCCID impersonation, and (A2) forced discharge via fabricated PreChargeRes voltage claims. This archive accompanies the USENIX WOOT '26 paper \"HotWire: Real-World Impersonation and Discharge Attacks on Electric Vehicle Charging Systems\". It contains the full Python implementation, a Docker-based CI test harness (240 unit + integration tests), parametric simulation scripts, hardware design and recovery documentation, safety notes, an Artifact Evaluation Committee (AEC) verification entry-point, and the historical Luxgen N7 forced-discharge bench logs cited as A2 evidence. The artifact can be evaluated entirely inside Docker plus IPv6 loopback simulation — no real charging station, no real vehicle, and no PLC modem are required. See ARTIFACT.md in the archive root for the AEC evaluation path. Source repository: https://github.com/sickcell6000/HotWireLicense: GNU GPL-3.0 (inherited from upstream pyPLC).",
      "published": "2026-04-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19754104",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "evse",
        "iso 15118",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kuan Yu Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.19754104",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.19897654",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Blue-Tap: Sub-HCI Bluetooth Vulnerability Discovery, Fuzzing, and Exploitation Framework for Automotive Infotainment",
      "description": "Bluetooth security research lives in three historically-separate tool lineages: standards-level attack proofs of concept, single-layer protocol fuzzers, and below-HCI instrumentation frameworks built from scratch for one chipset family. Practitioners assessing an automotive in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) system must stitch these together by hand, yielding non-reproducible assessments that miss an informationally richer view of the controller side. Even when a host-side probe can detect a CVE by side-effect, host-only tooling cannot read controller RAM or capture LMP. DarkFirmware originated as a reverse-engineering scaffold by Dark Mentor LLC and extended by us into a 4-hook RTL8761B controller-firmware interception platform with 2,866 RE'd functions. It is also the only path to active exploitation of LMP-resident bugs (KNOB / BIAS / BLUFFS / BrakTooth-class) and to triggering raw-ACL flaws (BlueFrag). We present Blue-Tap, a unified Bluetooth pentest framework deployable on commodity USB hardware. Blue-Tap contributes: (1) a 4-hook below-HCI interception platform for the Realtek RTL8761B, released as our open-source DarkFirmware fork that extends the upstream Dark Mentor LLC project with the hook architecture, 6 in-flight modification modes, expanded reverse engineering (slot stride 0x2B8, encryption flag at +0x26, link-key COMB_KEY XOR offset +0x51), and a 16-script assessment toolkit, all exposed to the Blue-Tap module surface via a Python integration layer with post-reset HCI re-resolution; (2) a coverage-guided fuzzer spanning 14 corpus-backed protocols and 16 transport-mapped surfaces with 7,400+ pre-generated seeds, protocol-aware field-weight tracking, response-diversity coverage, and behavioural crash deduplication; (3) 25 CVE detection modules covering 27 unique CVE IDs (2017–2026), 11 non-CVE vulnerability checks, 29 DoS probes (10 CVE-backed), 9 active-exploitation modules, and 7 post-exploitation modules behind structured evidence; and (4) a typed RunEnvelope data contract with atomic session persistence yielding bit-identical reports across runs.",
      "published": "2026-04-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19897654",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "exploitation",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ballikonda Santhosh"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.19897654",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.19965640",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "devender-sharma-emb/automotive-cve-tool: Automotive CVE Checker v1.0.0 — Initial Release",
      "description": "First public release Open-source CVE intelligence and C/C++ source code scanner for automotive software teams, OEMs, and Tier-1 suppliers. Features CVE search via NIST NVD API v2.0 SBOM CVE matching (CycloneDX, SPDX) C/C++ static scanner — 25 rules MISRA C:2012 pattern detection Automotive anti-patterns (CAN, UDS, OTA) Watchlist with CSV export Daily NVD polling with alerts Docker deployment Standards ISO/SAE 21434 Clause 8 UNECE WP.29 R155 MISRA C:2012 (subset) License MIT",
      "published": "2026-05-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19965640",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "sbom",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Devender Sharma"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.19965640",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.20020148",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Smart Vehicle Security and Face Authentication",
      "description": "The Smart Vehicle Security with Facial Authentication is an advanced embedded system that assists in securing a vehicle through real-time, camera-based user recognition. Using a USB webcam connected to a Raspberry Pi 4, it analyses a live video feed to detect faces, process their features, and grant or deny access without relying on traditional keys or key fobs. The system compares detected faces against a pre-trained database of authorized users. The processed data is used to trigger an actuator (such as a relay) to unlock the vehicle or enable the ignition. This cost-effective and robust system enhances vehicle security, provides a keyless and secure authentication method, and is more flexible than traditional alarms. It effectively blends modern computer vision with embedded systems for a smart, reliable security experience. The study highlights the potential of biometric-based authentication in developing secure, intelligent, and user-friendly vehicle security systems suitable for modern smart transportation environments.",
      "published": "2026-05-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20020148",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mrs. Minal Patil",
        "Prathamesh Nikam",
        "Vyankatesh Vedpathak",
        "Chetan Kamble",
        "Imran Nadaf"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.20020148",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.20387213",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AMEAÇAS CIBERNÉTICAS EM VEÍCULOS CONECTADOS E AUTÔNOMOS: UMA ANÁLISE DOS VETORES DE ATAQUE E ESTRATÉGIAS DE MITIGAÇÃO APLICADAS AO CONTEXTO BRASILEIRO",
      "description": "O avanço dos veículos conectados e autônomos expõe superfícies de ataque inéditas que vão desde protocolos de comunicação V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) via 5G e DSRC até sistemas embarcados como o barramento CAN, a porta OBD-II e as Unidades de Controle Eletrônico (ECUs). Nesse contexto, este artigo realiza uma revisão narrativa da literatura especializada, complementada por análise normativa comparada entre os principais referenciais internacionais — ISO/SAE 21434:2021 e os regulamentos UNECE R155/R156 — e o arcabouço legal brasileiro, representado pelo Código de Trânsito Brasileiro e pelo PL 1317/2023. Foram identificados cinco vetores de ataque críticos: spoofing de GPS, injeção maliciosa no CAN Bus via OBD-II, exploração de ECUs, ataques a canais de comunicação V2V/V2I e manipulação de atualizações OTA. A análise comparativa revela que o Brasil opera num vácuo normativo: não é signatário do 1958 Agreement da UNECE, não possui norma técnica equivalente à ISO/SAE 21434 e o PL 1317/2023, embora avance na responsabilização civil, não estabelece requisitos técnicos de cibersegurança automotiva. Como contribuição central, o artigo propõe um framework de mitigação em três camadas — técnica (IDS/IPS embarcado, PKI para V2X, fusão de sensores anti-spoofing), normativa (adoção referenciada na ISO/SAE 21434 via CONTRAN/ABNT) e de governança (grupo interministerial de cibersegurança automotiva). Conclui-se que a adoção estruturada desses referenciais, adaptada às condições de infraestrutura brasileira, é condição essencial para a implantação segura dos Sistemas de Transporte Inteligente no país.",
      "published": "2026-05-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20387213",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "obd-ii",
        "spoofing",
        "unece r155",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Osvaldo Janeri Filho"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.20387213",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.20409660",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Replication Package for: Cloud-Native Carjacking: Fleet-wide Compromise via Telematics Authorization Failures",
      "description": "This is the official replication package and artifact appendix for the paper \"Cloud-Native Carjacking: Fleet-wide Compromise via Telematics Authorization Failures.\" **Overview:**This repository contains sanitized scripts, pseudocode, and redacted analysis outputs used to evaluate telematics backend authorization across different protocol planes (MQTT, HTTPS, SMS). It demonstrates how authenticated vehicle identities can be improperly bound to requested resources, leading to cross-tenant access and fleet-wide compromise. **Contents of the Archive (Resource.rar):*** **Tooling & Scripts:** Sanitized pseudocode for memory credential extraction (`pseudocode_tools.py`) and shell scripts for testing unauthorized MQTT control commands and eavesdropping (`mqtt_control_test.sh`, `gtsp_sub_test.sh`).* **Schemas & Logs:** Redacted samples of TSP-related MQTT messages (`gtsp_log_sample.txt`).* **Redacted Outputs:** Visual proofs of the vulnerabilities, including HTTPS Sentry Mode media leaks via IDOR, SMS fallback confusion, and MQTT topic confusion. **Ethical Considerations:**In strict adherence to ethical disclosure guidelines and to ensure the safety of operational fleets, this package does not contain functional exploit scripts, live backend endpoints, or raw credentials. All sensitive OEM-related information has been heavily redacted or replaced with placeholders to support scientific validation without enabling malicious exploitation.",
      "published": "2026-05-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20409660",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "exploitation",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yangyang LIU"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.20409660",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.20434284",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EV charging vulnerabilities",
      "description": "This multi-variate dataset integrates high-resolution spatial infrastructure parameters with real-time macro-scale electric utility waveforms to evaluate regional grid vulnerabilities. The upper stratum contains localized geospatial infrastructure profiles parsed from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), mapping 85,868 active charging stations alongside non-linear structural power weights (such as DC Fast Charger kilowatt ratings vs. standard Level 2 nodes). The lower stratum synchronizes this physical layer with continuous, chronological time-series grid metrics extracted directly from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Balancing Authority logs, capturing hourly system demand spikes and generation capacity differentials for major regulatory zones like CAISO (California) and ERCOT (Texas). When cross-referenced with regional travel metrics, this framework maps how localized vehicle mobility patterns and high-power charging demands collide with systemic utility constraints to expose fluid, data-driven vectors of grid load volatility and infrastructure stress.",
      "published": "2026-05-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20434284",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "ev charging",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Karl Roesch"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.20434284",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.20477751",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Configuration-Driven OTA Firmware Update Orchestration for Scalable ECU Management in Software-Defined Vehicles",
      "description": "The rapid proliferation of electronic control units (ECUs) in modern software-defined vehicles has fundamentally transformed how automotive manufacturers deliver and manage software functionality. Over-the-air (OTA) firmware update mechanisms have emerged as a critical infrastructure component enabling remote diagnostics, feature additions, and security patching without physical dealer intervention. However, the heterogeneous nature of ECU bootloader strategies, memory architectures, and security access requirements imposes significant engineering complexity on scalable OTA orchestration. This paper presents a configuration-driven OTA firmware update orchestration framework in which ECU-specific update sequences are encoded in YAML-defined configuration schemas, eliminating hard-coded, device-specific C implementations that impede fleet scalability. The proposed architecture decouples update logic from ECU hardware specifics by centralizing policy definitions within cloud-managed configuration payloads, enabling dynamic enumeration, firmware validation, and post-update verification across distributed ECU networks. A key contribution of the framework is its cloud-initiated ECU authentication mechanism, wherein firmware-side validation sequences are dynamically triggered upon cloud requests, transmitting verified inventory data to ensure vehicle authenticity prior to update execution. The framework leverages Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS) over CAN and Ethernet (DoIP) for diagnostic session management and memory transfer operations, and integrates with RTOS task scheduling to maintain deterministic update progression across any real-time platform, including but not limited to FreeRTOS-based and microcontroller environments. Experimental evaluation demonstrates significant improvements in update orchestration scalability, reduction in integration overhead, and consistent maintenance of firmware rollback safety guarantees across heterogeneous ECU populations. The results establish a principled foundation for scalable, maintainable OTA infrastructure in next-generation software-defined vehicle platforms.",
      "published": "2026-05-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20477751",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Utkarsh Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.20477751",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.20596634",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Constructive Assurance Cases for Product Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Automotive product cybersecurity assurance is increasingly expected across the supply chain, yet prevailing approaches often rely on exhaustive process compliance and many work products that are costly and difficult for small technology suppliers to sustain. While ISO/SAE 21434 defines required activities and artifacts, it does not prescribe how to construct a convincing and eEicient cybersecurity assurance argument. This paper presents a practical approach to cybersecurity assurance cases based on eliminative argumentation and a constructive assurance case method. By employing structured arguments grounded in explicit assumptions, evidence, and logical inference, suppliers can produce assurance cases that are both credible and efficient. Rather than treating the assurance case as a documentation exercise performed at the end of development, the proposed method uses the assurance case itself to guide cybersecurity activities, ensuring that only evidence necessary to support the argument is generated. We illustrate the approach using a case study derived from ISO/SAE 21434 Annex H and discuss how model-based and modular assurance case techniques can further reduce cost and enable reuse across programs and customers. The result is a lightweight, scalable method for demonstrating cybersecurity assurance that is accessible to technologystartups and small organizations while also supporting OEMs and system integrators.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20596634",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Brian Murray",
        "Anuja Sonalker"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.20596634",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.21218601",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Threat Assessment for 5G-Connected Remote Vehicle Control Systems",
      "description": "This dataset provides a quantitative Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) for Infrastructure-Based Tele-Operated Driving (IB-ToD) within a Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) environment. It evaluates 14 threat scenarios (TS1–TS14) across three distinct system architecture variants, resulting in 42 threat–architecture combinations. The considered architectures are defined as follows. Variant A represents a fully centralized teleoperation model in which all driving decisions are generated by a central control system, while roadside units (RSUs) operate as passive sensing and forwarding entities and the 5G network provides the sole control communication channel. Variant B introduces RSU-assisted control, where the central system remains responsible for primary command generation but RSUs actively participate in local enforcement and safety-related intervention, thereby introducing distributed control authority. Variant C implements a hybrid redundant control architecture combining a primary 5G-based teleoperation channel with an independent V2X safety channel, supported by a vehicle-level arbitration mechanism capable of resolving conflicts and executing emergency interventions. Risk is computed using an enhanced ISO/SAE 21434-aligned multiplicative model defined as:R = Impact × Feasibility × Detectability × Scalability. Each aggregate score is fully decomposed into its constituent sub-components, including safety, financial, operational, and privacy impact dimensions; multiple attack feasibility factors; detectability; and scalability factors capturing connectivity exposure, architectural layer criticality, and fleet-wide propagation effects. The results highlight that cybersecurity risk is not uniformly reduced by introducing redundancy but is instead redistributed across system components and communication domains. Variant B exhibits the highest aggregate risk across all evaluated threat scenarios due to the increased attack surface introduced by RSU-based functional extension. In Variant C, the introduction of a redundant V2X safety channel significantly alters the risk landscape, with V2X spoofing shifting from a low-risk condition in the centralized architecture to a high-risk condition, demonstrating that resilience mechanisms can simultaneously introduce new critical attack surfaces. Files:TARA-CITS.csv contains the complete dataset with 42 rows covering all threat–architecture combinations, including decomposed sub-scores, aggregated risk values, risk classifications, qualitative justifications, and corresponding mitigation mappings.",
      "published": "2026-07-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21218601",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zsombor Pethő",
        "Árpád Török"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.21218601",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.21696539",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Deep-Learning Intrusion Detection for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles increasingly rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to interconnect dozens of electronic control units (ECUs). The CAN protocol is reliable and real-time, yet it was designed without authentication, encryption, or sender verification. In-vehicle networks are therefore exposed to message injection threats such as denial-of-service (DoS), fuzzing, spoofing, and replay attacks. This paper presents a hybrid deep-learning intrusion detection system (IDS) that combines one-dimensional convolutional layers, a bidirectional long short-term memory (BiLSTM) network, and a temporal attention mechanism to detect malicious activity directly from CAN frame streams. The model ingests sliding windows of CAN identifiers, payload bytes, and inter-arrival timing features. It can therefore learn both the spatial structure of individual frames and the temporal regularity of legitimate bus traffic. The approach is evaluated on the public CAR-Hacking dataset, which contains labelled DoS, fuzzy, and spoofing attacks captured from a real vehicle, augmented here with a replay scenario. On the held-out test set the proposed IDS attains 99.93% overall accuracy, a macro-averaged F1-score of 0.993, and a mean per-window detection latency of about 0.71 ms. It outperforms support-vector-machine, deep-neural-network, and pure convolutional baselines, particularly on the harder fuzzy and replay classes. Deployment considerations for resource-constrained ECUs and automotive edge gateways are discussed, including model quantization, throughput headroom, and alignment with the ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity engineering standard. The results are illustrative of the design rather than a deployed field study.",
      "published": "2026-07-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21696539",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ginne M James"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Information Technology Research Studies (IJITRS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.21696539",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.21819157",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication requires ultra-low latency, high throughput, and robust identity verification to support critical safety, telematics, and cross-OEM cloud interactions. Traditional centralized telematics architectures struggle with high latency overhead during security token validation and experience performance bottlenecks under peak load concurrency. In this paper, we propose a resilient, multi-cloud microservice architecture for V2X telematics brokerage and token management. The proposed platform integrates a short-lived JSON Web Token (JWT) verification pipeline with distributed in-memory caching (Redis) and containerized cloud-native execution (GCP Cloud Run / Azure App Service). Asynchronous message routing is handled via managed Cloud Pub/Sub topics equipped with automated circuit breaker and retry resilience patterns. Experimental evaluations using simulated workloads of up to 500,000 concurrent vehicle connections demonstrate an average end-to-end processing latency of under 35 ms, a 99.99% successful authorization rate, and near-zero service degradation during sudden traffic spikes. This framework establishes an open, scalable model for multi-OEM connected vehicle interoperability and cloud-based telematics management.",
      "published": "2026-08-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21819157",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicle",
        "resilience",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. K. Hall",
        "H. Park"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.21819157",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.21900469",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "КИБЕРБЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ ПОДКЛЮЧЁННЫХ И АВТОНОМНЫХ АВТОМОБИЛЕЙ: НЕЙРОСЕТЕВЫЕ МЕТОДЫ ОБНАРУЖЕНИЯ АНОМАЛИЙ ВО ВНУТРИШИННЫХ СЕТЯХ",
      "description": "Аннотация. В настоящей статье рассматривается проблема обеспечения кибербезопасности подключённых и автономных автомобилей посредством нейросетевых методов обнаружения аномалий во внутришинных сетях. Проанализирована архитектура современных автомобильных сетей (CAN, CAN FD, FlexRay, Automotive Ethernet) и соответствующие векторы кибератак, включая атаки на шину CAN, внедрение ложных сообщений, атаки типа replay и fuzzing. Систематизированы существующие подходы к обнаружению аномалий: от сигнатурных методов и статистических контролей до современных нейросетевых архитектур (автоэнкодеры, LSTM, CNN-LSTM, трансформеры, GAN). Особое внимание уделено специфике обнаружения аномалий в реальном времени при жёстких вычислительных ограничениях бортовых систем. Проведён сравнительный анализ применимости нейросетевых методов к задачам мониторинга CAN-шины и V2X-коммуникации. Сформулирована архитектура многоуровневой системы кибербезопасности автомобиля, интегрирующей методы глубокого обучения с традиционными механизмами защиты. Обсуждаются нормативно-правовые аспекты (UNECE R155/R156, ISO/SAE 21434) и направления будущих исследований в контексте конференций Automotive Safety Summit. Ключевые слова: кибербезопасность автомобиля, подключённый автомобиль, автономное вождение, CAN-шина, обнаружение аномалий, нейронные сети, автоэнкодер, LSTM, трансформер, V2X, UNECE R155, ISO/SAE 21434",
      "published": "2026-08-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21900469",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "flexray",
        "fuzzing",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "unece r155",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Maxim Dupley"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.21900469",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.22091825",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Assurance Gaps in an Integrated Safety and Cybersecurity Case for an AI-Based Perception Component in Highly Automated Driving",
      "description": "Supplementary material for two SAFECOMP 2026 papers. Builds the single GSN argument that ISO 26262, ISO 21448, ISO/SAE 21434 and ISO/PAS 8800 jointly imply for an AI-based perception component in highly automated driving, and reports the decision points and findings the combination exposes. Includes the argument as machine-readable YAML, the five-step integration code, a generated traceability index from every claim to its clause or paper passage, an interactive argument view, and a notebook that follows one runtime anomaly clause by clause until no clause assigns it to a concern.",
      "published": "2026-08-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22091825",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Milin M Patel",
        "Rolf Jung"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.22091825",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.22217734",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis of Seed/Key Authentication in Automotive OBD Diagnostic Protocols: Attack Vectors and Cryptographic Countermeasures",
      "description": "The On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) interface, standardized across modern vehicles through ISO 14229 (UDS), SAE J1939, and related protocols, presents a critical and frequently underestimated attack surface in automotive cybersecurity. Central to access control within these protocols is the seed/key authentication mechanism — a challenge-response scheme designed to restrict privileged diagnostic sessions to authorized entities. Despite its widespread deployment across hundreds of millions of vehicles, seed/key implementations remain highly heterogeneous, frequently relying on proprietary algorithms whose security rests on the wrong foundation: the secrecy of the algorithm itself rather than the secrecy of cryptographic key material. This paper presents a structured threat analysis of seed/key authentication in automotive OBD diagnostic contexts, applying a methodology aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA). We introduce the distinction between algorithm secrecy and key secrecy as a central analytical lens, apply it to characterize attack vectors including brute force, reverse engineering, replay attacks, and ECU memory extraction, and evaluate the adequacy of cryptographic countermeasures currently deployed in the industry. Based on this analysis, we propose the Seed/Key Security Assessment Framework (SKSAF), a practical four-phase methodology for evaluating seed/key implementations in multi-brand diagnostic environments.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22217734",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "obd"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Carlos Eduardo R. de S. Oliveira"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.22217734",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.22853990",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-Vehicle Network Security: Securing the Internal Communication Network Within a Vehicle and Preventing Unauthorised Access to Critical Vehicle Systems",
      "description": "Abstract Modern vehicles are software-rich cyber-physical systems in which ECUs, zonal and central computing systems, sensors, diagnostic systems, and external interfaces share safety-critical and privacy-sensitive information. The evolution has created a larger attack surface for in-vehicle networks (IVNs), and widely used communication technologies like Controller Area Network (CAN) were never intended to provide authentication, confidentiality or protection against malicious manipulation. This article critically reviews recent open-access research on IVN cybersecurity. It presents an integrated defence-in-depth framework for CAN/CAN-FD, LIN, FlexRay, Automotive Ethernet, diagnostics, vehicle gateway, ECU security, firmware updates, and over-the-air updates. This article critically collates recent open-access research on IVN security. It proposes an integrated defence-in-depth framework for CAN/CAN-FD, LIN, FlexRay, Automotive Ethernet, diagnostics, vehicle gateway, ECU security, firmware updates, and OAT. It specifically focuses on Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), and ML-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), including Convolutional, Recurrent, Autoencoder, Federated, and Lightweight approaches. Accurate detection rates are not enough in scenarios where the dataset may leak, class imbalances exist, adversarial attacks can target the system, false alarms can occur, and computation time and complexity are non-negligible; the analysis argues that all of these can significantly impact the system's security. The proposed framework thus does not treat AI-enabled IDS as an alternative to authentication, cryptographic protection, secure gateways, hardware-bound key protection, or software integrity as monitoring layers, but as an additional security layer that must be applied alongside the others. The framework maps attack surfaces, including security properties and complementary controls, throughout the vehicle's lifecycle. It offers a technically coherent way to mitigate unauthorised access to security-critical vehicle systems while also accounting for real-time, computational, and operational constraints and lifecycle requirements.",
      "published": "2026-09-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853990",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gaurav Rajendra Chavan"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.22853990",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4625,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.5281/zenodo.22853990 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage, privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information., confidentiality, operational, like, sensors, intelligence, where, impact."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.23003707",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bluetooth Stack Gaps in Automotive IVI: Mapping BlueSDK (PerfektBlue) Vulnerabilities to the CIA Triad",
      "description": "Bluetooth is a widely used wireless interface for in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems, yet the security posture of the embedded stacks that implement it rarely receives the same scrutiny as the protocol itself. This paper analyzes OpenSynergy's BlueSDK, a closed-source Bluetooth framework deployed across multiple automotive OEMs, using a five-axis qualitative framework covering protocol layer, impact severity, proximity/band context, attack surface breadth, and standards alignment. PerfektBlue — a chain of four CVEs disclosed in 2025 — is used as a case study. PCA Cyber Security demonstrated the complete exploit chain on vulnerable BlueSDK-based IVI platforms and separately confirmed PerfektBlue-related vulnerabilities in BMW vehicles, where an information leak was demonstrated but remote code execution was not completed during that research. The analysis draws exclusively on public advisories, CVE records, and vendor disclosures; no new exploitation work was performed. We find that the disclosed defects are implementation-level flaws rather than demonstrated weaknesses in the Bluetooth specification. At the CIA level, the direct mechanisms do not map uniformly to a single property: most exploit stages are primarily associated with integrity, while CVE-2024-45432 is directly associated with confidentiality because its public description identifies sensitive-information disclosure. At the chain level, successful RCE can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability. OpenSynergy reported that patches were rolled out in September 2024, while PCA reported that not all affected OEMs had received the patch by June 2025, highlighting the distinction between component-level patch availability and downstream remediation. The paper closes with hardening recommendations and a discussion of residual risk in automotive Bluetooth deployments. Keywords: Bluetooth Security, Automotive IVI, BlueSDK, PerfektBlue, CIA Triad, Vulnerability Management, Automotive Cybersecurity, Supply-Chain Security, Use-After-Free",
      "published": "2026-09-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23003707",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "bmw",
        "cybersecurity",
        "exploit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "bmw"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [
        "CVE-2024-45432"
      ],
      "authors": [
        "Rahim Alizada"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.23003707",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.23516925",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Replication package: the outlook for artificial intelligence in twenty industries (papers P22-P41)",
      "description": "Code, manuscript specifications, derived data, results files and figures for twenty short studies of where artificial intelligence stands, and where it may go, in healthcare, pharmaceuticals, banking, insurance, agriculture, manufacturing, automotive, energy, mining and oil and gas, retail, logistics, education, legal services, media, telecommunications, construction, aerospace and defence, cybersecurity, software and tourism. Includes yearly OpenAlex counts, a Eurostat extract on AI use in enterprises by sector (isoc_eb_ain2), the public FDA list of AI-enabled medical devices, and the scripts that rebuild the manuscripts.",
      "published": "2026-10-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23516925",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "P. Ghorbani"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.23516925",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.23832880",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Behavioral Linkability of EV Charging Sessions — Analysis Code",
      "description": "Complete leakage-controlled evaluation pipeline for the paper 'Behavioral Linkability of Electric Vehicle Charging Sessions in ISO 15118-Enabled Ecosystems: A Privacy–Utility Evaluation': data acquisition (ACN-Data via acnportal), preprocessing, per-user chronological splits, hard-negative pair construction, pairwise verification and candidate-set retrieval attacks, feature ablation, metadata-generalization profiles with operational-utility metrics, figure generation, and an automated leakage test suite. No charging records or user identifiers are included; the pipeline reproduces the study from a fresh download with fixed seed 20260712.",
      "published": "2026-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23832880",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anonymized For Review"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.23832880",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.240551",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Modeling For Automotive Security Analysis",
      "description": "The technological development of connected and intelligent vehicle creates cybersecurity threats and risks to road safety. Securing automotive systems is one of the biggest challenges for the automotive industry undergoing a profound transformation. As a building block of automotive security, threat modeling is a technique that identifies potential threats in order to find corresponding mitigations. In this paper, we propose a practical and efficient approach to threat modeling for the automotive domain. We extend existing tool support and demonstrate the applicability and feasibility of our approach.",
      "published": "2016-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.240551",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhendong Ma",
        "Christoph Schmittner"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.240551",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.571164",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security By Design: Introduction To Mils",
      "description": "A \"security by design\" method achieves robustness against programming errors and malicious attacks. A security by design method must be simple to understand. It must be simple to implement, and also to simple to verify. It must enable the developer to create assurance evidence coherent with the design decisions. MILS is a security by design method. In short, application of the MILS approach starts with partitioning the system under design into isolated compartments. System resources, e.g. CPUs, CPU time, memory, IO devices, files, are assigned to compartments. After that the communication channels between compartments are defined with respect to the required API (e.g. POSIX, ARINC, AUTOSAR). Communication and resource sharing between security domains have to be explicit, i.e. everything is forbidden what is not explicitly allowed. In parallel threat modeling is executed, i.e. define system assets to be protected, threat agents and possible malicious actions, system objectives to fight the threats. MILS provides a way to execute mixed-critical applications of different pedigrees on one system. The system as a whole still can be certified to the highest security and safety assurance levels. This makes the approach extremely interesting for modern complex systems, e.g. in a car infotainment system: Android applications can run on the same platform as AUTOSAR applications that communicate with the engine. Until ca. 2000 the MILS concept was mainly used in the US military. Now the commercial interest has picked up. We explain a MILS Architectural Template that simplifies to set up MILS systems. We finish with applications of the MILS concepts across automotive and avionics.",
      "published": "2017-03-14",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.571164",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sergey Tverdyshev"
      ],
      "venue": "Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.571164",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5281/zenodo.7857063",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBER SECURITY IN TRAVEL, TOURISM AND HOSPITALITY",
      "description": "Today, tourism is popular in many countries around the world. Tourism is usually organized by tourism routes through tourism organizations. There are many types and forms of tourism: domestic, international, amateur tourism, organized tourism, travel somewhere nearby, distant travel, tourism aimed at expanding knowledge, climbing, water tourism, automotive tourism, walking tourism, sports tourism, and so on. Uzbekturism is still operating in the tourism industry in Uzbekistan, formed on July 27, 1992. Today it is called the Ministry of Tourism and Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The company's main task is to develop tourism infrastructure, build modern tourist complexes with foreign investment, develop new tourist destinations, expand the range of services, and so on. (motas.uz)",
      "published": "2023-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7857063",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sharipov Shakhriyor Shamsiddin ugli"
      ],
      "venue": "CyberLeninK (CyberLeninka)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.5281/zenodo.7857063",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5287/ora-vqjq1mbrd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The impact of domestic electric vehicle charging on electricity networks",
      "description": "This thesis investigates the impact that home charging of a large private fleet of electric vehicles would have on the power system. A large multi-regional travel survey dataset is used to model vehicle use and charging spatially heterogeneously, and a selection of representative network models are used to assess the impact of charging on system operation. A stochastic data-driven model is proposed to model uncontrolled charging of vehicles, and convex optimisation is used to calculate the optimal smart charging strategy. The power system is commonly broken down into the generation, transmission, and distribution systems. The operation of each of these systems will be impacted by the addition of EV charging to residential networks. A variety of objectives have been proposed for smart charging, each of which would protect the system in a different way. Existing research tends to focus on a single part of the system, and considers only the smart charging objective that most benefits that part of the system. Here, the three systems are modelled simultaneously, and a large range of smart charging objectives are investigated. The value of explicit loss minimising smart charging is quantified, compared to a simpler and more standard load flattening algorithm. These results are used to propose a novel optimisation formulation which reduces losses without requiring extensive network information. The value of bi-directional smart charging is also quantified compared to uni-directional smart charging, in order to investigate the viability of residential vehicle-to-grid. It is demonstrated that it is not possible to optimise the transmission level and distribution level systems simultaneously, and the penalty of only optimising for one is quantified. A method for finding a compromising solution between both system levels is proposed, which exploits the sections of the distribution where components are over-specified. Two specific case studies are investigated. The majority of the analysis in the thesis is based on the GB power system, however the Texas system is also presented as a comparative case study.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5287/ora-vqjq1mbrd",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "exploits",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Constance Crozier"
      ],
      "venue": "Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.5287/ora-vqjq1mbrd",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.52953/spql9105",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Edge ML for CAN bus intrusion detection in AVs",
      "description": "Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are revolutionizing transportation, but their reliance on interconnected cyber-physical systems exposes them to unprecedented cybersecurity risks. This study addresses the critical challenge of detecting real-time cyber intrusions in self-driving vehicles by leveraging a dataset from the Udacity self-driving car project. We simulate four high-impact attack vectors, Denial of Service (DoS), spoofing, replay, and fuzzy attacks, by injecting noise into spatial features (e.g., bounding box coordinates) to replicate adversarial scenarios. We develop and evaluate two lightweight neural network architectures (NN-1 and NN-2) alongside a logistic regression baseline (LG-1) for intrusion detection. The models achieve exceptional performance, with NN-2 attaining an AUC score of 93.15% and 93.15% accuracy, demonstrating their suitability for edge deployment in AV environments. Through explainable AI techniques, we uncover unique forensic fingerprints of each attack type, such as spatial corruption in fuzzy attacks and temporal anomalies in replay attacks, offering actionable insights for feature engineering and proactive defense. Visual analytics, including confusion matrices, ROC curves, and feature importance plots, validate the models' robustness and interpretability. This research sets a new benchmark for AV cybersecurity, delivering a scalable, field-ready toolkit for Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and policymakers. By aligning intrusion fingerprints with SAE J3061 automotive security standards, we provide a pathway for integrating machine learning into safety-critical AV systems. Our findings underscore the urgent need for security-by-design AI, ensuring that AVs not only drive autonomously but also defend autonomously. This work bridges the gap between theoretical cybersecurity and life-preserving engineering, offering a leap toward safer, more secure autonomous transportation.",
      "published": "2025-06-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.52953/spql9105",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prosenjit Paul",
        "Xingya Liu",
        "H. Lou",
        "Ru-Hai Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "ITU Journal on Future and Evolving Technologies",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.52953/spql9105",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.53022/oarjet.2025.8.2.0059",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Zero trust architecture for connected aftermarket devices: An adversarial ML approach to securing OTA updates in automotive edge networks",
      "description": "The proliferation of connected aftermarket devices has introduced critical vulnerabilities in over-the-air update ecosystems for automotive networks. This article presents a novel Zero Trust framework leveraging adversarial machine learning to authenticate device communications without traditional PKI dependencies. The architecture implements behavioral fingerprinting through lightweight LSTM models analyzing CAN bus telemetry and continuous device attestation via edge-based neural networks. Adversarial robustness is achieved through generative adversarial networks synthesizing attack vectors to harden detection models. The middleware-agnostic deployment enables cloud-coordinated model updates while preserving endpoint autonomy. Validated across multiple anonymized aftermarket supply chains, the framework successfully detects supply chain attacks with minimal false positives, adds negligible latency per authentication cycle, and reduces cloud security overhead through edge preprocessing.",
      "published": "2025-06-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.53022/oarjet.2025.8.2.0059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shiva Kumar Bhuram"
      ],
      "venue": "Open Access Research Journal of Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.53022/oarjet.2025.8.2.0059",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.53106/160792642022012301020",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Edge Based Lightweight Authentication Architecture Using Deep Learning for Vehicular Networks",
      "description": "When vehicles are connected to the Internet through vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems, they are exposed to diverse attacks and threats through the network connections. Vehicle-hacking attacks in the road can significantly affect driver safety. However, it is difficult to detect hacking attacks because vehicles not only have high mobility and unreliable link conditions, but they also use broadcast-based wireless communication. To this end, V2X systems need a simple but a powerful authentication procedure on the road. Therefore, this paper proposes an edge based lightweight authentication architecture using a deep learning algorithm for road safety applications in vehicle networks. The proposed lightweight authentication architecture enables vehicles that are physically separated to form a vehicular cloud in which vehicle-to-vehicle communications can be secured. In addition, an edge-based cloud data center performs deep learning algorithms to detect car hacking attempts, and then delivers the detection results to a vehicular cloud. Extensive simulations demonstrate that the proposed authentication architecture significantly enhanced the security level. The proposed authentication architecture has 94.51 to 99.8% F1-score results depending on the number of vehicles in the intrusion detection system using control area network traffic.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.53106/160792642022012301020",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "hacking",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyunhee Park Hyunhee Park"
      ],
      "venue": "網際網路技術學刊",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.53106/160792642022012301020",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.53375/ijecer.2024.426",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security of Electric Vehicle Charging Stations",
      "description": "The rapid growth of the electric vehicle (EV) market requires a robust and secure charging infrastructure, addressing cyber threats and security issues within Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS). This paper gives an insight into EV adoption and charging options such as Home-based charging systems, Public-based charging systems, and DC fast charging. An analysis of EVCS vulnerabilities, risks associated with EV user interfaces, network connections, and terminal maintenance are presented. Leveraging the STRIDE threat model, potential cyberattacks including various attack modes are identified and discussed. The paper proposes a range of countermeasures such as secure coding practices, tamper detection sensors, network segmentation, intrusion detection systems, and control mechanisms’ role-based access to fortify EV charging systems against these threats. This paper identifies security gaps in EV charging systems and proposes remedies that can be suitably modified for EVCS applications. Innovative solutions like Artificial Intelligence-Based Scheduling Models, Over-the-Air (OTA) Updates, and Vehicle to Grid (V2G) concepts are explored for enhanced security and efficiency. We present the security challenges in EVCS for the reliability, safety, and integrity of these systems and the countermeasures that can be adapted to EVCS.",
      "published": "2024-12-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.53375/ijecer.2024.426",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intrusion",
        "secure",
        "v2g",
        "vehicle to grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dhrumil Kamleshbhai Patel",
        "Rhea Chokalingam",
        "Subramaniam Ganesan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.53375/ijecer.2024.426",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.53469/jrse.2024.06(09).08",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Progress of VANETS and ITS: A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "Roadside accidents have increased significantly as urban and highway traffic has grown. Vehicular communication systems, which include safety features and on - demand infotainment services, were designed to enhance driving safety and enjoyment. The primary role of these vehicular ad hoc networks, or VANETs, is to communicate information (emergency, general, multimedia) between automobiles using unique routing algorithms not available in standard wireless technologies. Many methods, tactics, and plans have been developed to safeguard and secure data. To improve existing security measures and build new ones, principles from machine learning (ML), deep learning (DL), and artificial intelligence (AI) must be integrated. This document covers a wide range of assaults on VANET communications, compromised security targets, and actual attacks in manufacturing hubs. VANETs are vulnerable to attacks because to their complexity, making real - time implementation and security challenging. The paper examines many strategies that leverage machine learning approaches to maintain efficiency while boosting security and reducing false positives. Data security and the verification of vehicle IDs during communication are prioritised. In addition, the paper briefly discusses VCPS implementation. Advanced driver assistance systems and wireless communication rely on data exchange, raising severe concerns about its reliability. Methods such as Unscented Kalman filtering will be critical for data integrity security, vehicle behaviour verification, and 5G V2V localization. Intelligent transportation systems provide credibility and security by assessing gearbox technology, protocols, and networks used to govern vehicle communication. Future developments will address VANET and intelligent transportation concerns, improving driving safety and efficiency through communication and technical advancements.",
      "published": "2024-09-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.53469/jrse.2024.06(09).08",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobiles",
        "driver assistance",
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "El Sayed",
        "Mohammed Hathout"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Research in Science and Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.53469/jrse.2024.06(09).08",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.53555/ks.v10i2.3760",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Leveraging AI and Big Data for Real-Time Risk Profiling and Claims Processing: A Case Study on Usage-Based Auto Insurance",
      "description": "The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data analytics in the insurance industry has revolutionized traditional processes, particularly in risk profiling and claims processing. This case study explores the application of AI and Big Data in the context of usage-based auto insurance (UBI), where real-time data collected from connected vehicles is leveraged to create dynamic, personalized risk profiles and optimize claims handling. By analyzing vast amounts of data from telematics devices, including driving behavior, vehicle performance, and environmental factors, AI algorithms can predict risk with unprecedented accuracy, enabling insurers to offer tailored premiums and enhance customer satisfaction. Furthermore, AI-driven automation in claims processing streamlines operations, reduces fraud, and accelerates settlement times. This case study demonstrates the transformative potential of these technologies in improving operational efficiency, customer engagement, and profitability within the auto insurance sector, while highlighting the challenges of data privacy, regulatory compliance, and the need for robust data infrastructure.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.53555/ks.v10i2.3760",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lahari Pandiri",
        "Subrahmanyasarma Chitta"
      ],
      "venue": "Kurdish Studies",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.53555/ks.v10i2.3760",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 75,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4592,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.53555/ks.v10i2.3760 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: regulatory, operational, studies, case, intelligence, where, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.53555/kuey.v30i5.5418",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Exploring Cyber Threats Associated With Autonomous And Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous and connected vehicles (ACVs) are transforming the transportation industry by increasing efficiency, reducing costs, and improving safety. However, these developments also create new vulnerabilities and expose ACVs to cyber threats. The consequences of these threats range from mere inconvenience to severe accidents, highlighting the urgent need to address the issue of cyber security in ACVs. This literature review aims to provide an overview of the current research on cyber threats for ACVs to create awareness about the major vulnerabilities faced by modern vehicles. The review covers various types of cyber threats, such as attacks on sensors, communication networks, and control systems, and countermeasures to mitigate these threats.",
      "published": "2024-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.53555/kuey.v30i5.5418",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pradnya Kashikar"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.53555/kuey.v30i5.5418",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.53907/enpesj.v6i1.358",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Review of ISO 15118-20 with TLS1.3 for Secure and Trustworthy EV Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) and the communication protocols that support it are essential to modern electric mobility, yet they remain vulnerable to significant cyber-physical risks. These risks largely arise from fragmented security adoption and the inconsistent use of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This paper reviews and analyses the security enhancements introduced by ISO 15118-20, with particular emphasis on the requirement for mandatory, mutually authenticated TLS 1.3 to secure end-to-end electric vehicle charging communication. Through an examination of protocol message flows and a synthesis of documented vulnerabilities, the study shows how stronger cryptographic enforcement, certificate-based authentication, and encrypted control signalling reduce the risks of replay, impersonation, man-in-the-middle, and backend exploitation attacks. The analysis also highlights the cyber-physical consequences of communication failures, demonstrating how protocol-level disruptions can result in wider operational risks. As a promoting solution, the paper concludes that the consistent implementation of ISO 15118-20, supported by effective certificate lifecycle management, is essential for developing resilient and trustworthy EV charging infrastructure. While additional advanced security approaches may further strengthen system robustness, future research is required to address additional technical, operational, and environmental factors not covered in this study.",
      "published": "2026-07-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.53907/enpesj.v6i1.358",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "exploitation",
        "iso 15118"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Akram Salem",
        "Mian Hammad Nazir",
        "Leshan Uggalla",
        "Abdulla Rahil",
        "Khayri Abu Sayf"
      ],
      "venue": "ENP Engineering Science Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.53907/enpesj.v6i1.358",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54097/qnhjph62",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Information Security Vulnerability Testing and Verification Methods and Protection Countermeasures for LLM Applications in Intelligent Cockpits",
      "description": "In recent years, the application of large language models (LLMs) in intelligent cockpits has been continuously deepened, significantly improving the natural human-vehicle interaction experience. However, the generative characteristics of models, multi-modal data interaction, and access to vehicle control privileges have also introduced a series of new information security vulnerabilities such as prompt injection, data privacy leakage, unauthorized vehicle manipulation, and model hallucinations. Traditional in-vehicle security testing systems mostly target vulnerabilities in in-vehicle operating systems, in-vehicle buses, and network communications, and are difficult to adapt to the semantic-level and generative security risks brought by LLMs. To address this issue, this paper classifies and analyzes the security vulnerabilities of LLM applications in intelligent cockpit scenarios, constructs a vulnerability testing and verification method integrating static auditing, dynamic fuzz testing, red team adversarial testing, and multi-modal boundary testing, and establishes a corresponding security evaluation index system. On this basis, a hierarchical protection strategy is proposed from five dimensions: input protection, model hardening, system isolation, data security, and compliance auditing. Verified through real-vehicle environment testing, the proposed testing method can effectively identify 92.7% of known security vulnerabilities. After deploying the protection countermeasures, the relevant attack success rate drops from 38.5% to 4.3%, which can provide technical support for the secure development, testing verification, and engineering implementation of LLMs in intelligent cockpits.",
      "published": "2026-04-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54097/qnhjph62",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ziyi Wang",
        "Yihong Qin",
        "吴本银",
        "Xuesong Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.54097/qnhjph62",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54105/ijcns.a1436.05010525",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Home and Commercial Security: A Multi-Modal Authentication Framework for Keyless Door Lock Systems",
      "description": "The lock-and-key paradigm of yesteryears is vulnerable to the current scenario of more frequent cyber attacks and breaches of physical security, making the current systems ask for more innovative protection for homes and businesses. In this paper, an innovative triadic multimodal authentication framework has been proposed to have facial recognition, voice based authentication, and number pad entry into the highly elevated security protocol for convenient usage. The current research is well-grounded within a comprehensive review of 50 peer-reviewed studies covering all the critical gaps in today's access control systems, mainly in smart environments where security demands are paramount. The architecture of the proposed system is elaborately delineated in a way that describes the seamless integration of hardware and software components into a robust and adaptable authentication mechanism. Performance evaluations show high accuracy rates in different environmental conditions, and users also give good feedback regarding the ease of use and reliability. This work provides a practical solution to the current security challenges and opens up future research directions by promoting adaptive authentication methodologies and new biometric technologies that can further enhance security in smart environments. The implications of this framework stretch far beyond the individual systems into proposing a template for security improvements in the wider scheme of smart homes and offices as connected systems.",
      "published": "2025-05-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54105/ijcns.a1436.05010525",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anand Desai",
        "Chintan A. Shah",
        "Mandar K. Bivalkar"
      ],
      "venue": "Indian Journal of Cryptography and Network Security",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.54105/ijcns.a1436.05010525",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54216/jcim.140109",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fortifying Connected Vehicles Based Cybersecurity Measures for Secure Over-the-Air Software Updates",
      "description": "The emergence of connected vehicles has transformed the automotive sector by enhancing the vehicle’s functionality, efficiency, and safety. The performance and security of these vehicles significantly rely on the deployment of the over-the-air software update. However, the execution of OTA comes with many challenges, especially with regard to security vulnerabilities and risks. The current paper delves into the complexities of the secure OTA software update for connected vehicles addressing the most critical issues; authentication; encryption and integrity verification, and risk management. Through advanced cryptographic methodologies, stringent authentication processes, and secure communication channels, automotive manufacturers and other service providers can guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of the updates, and consumers’ data from malicious attack. Moreover, the paper explores the regulatory and other standards-related matters that control the use of OTA in the automotive sector. An understanding of the secure OTA update mechanisms aids the stakeholders in establishing a resilient connection in connected vehicles boosting consumer trust and the future of the automobiles industry.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54216/jcim.140109",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shashikant Shashikant",
        "Senthil Kumar A",
        "Saket Mishra",
        "N Gobi",
        "Intekhab Alam",
        "Romil Jain"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Cybersecurity and Information Management",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.54216/jcim.140109",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3917,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.54216/jcim.140109 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: providers, confidentiality, regulatory, trust, service, information, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54254/2755-2721/2025.tj22524",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vision-Language Model Security in Autonomous Driving: A Survey",
      "description": "With the rapid advancement of Vision-Language Models (VLMs), their remarkable capabilities in multimodal perception and decision-making have garnered significant attention in autonomous driving. By integrating VLMs, autonomous driving systems can achieve a deeper understanding of their environment, thereby enhancing safety and efficiency. However, despite their advantages, the deployment of VLMs also introduces potential security vulnerabilities that pose critical challenges to real-world applications. They stem from the complex nature of multimodal processing, making VLMs susceptible to various adversarial manipulations. This paper presents a comprehensive and systematic review of various attack vectors targeting VLMs in autonomous driving, including adversarial attacks, backdoor attacks, jailbreak attacks, prompt injection attacks, zero-shot attacks, and hallucinations. Furthermore, we analyze defensive mechanisms against each attack type and discuss promising future research directions to bolster the robustness and security of VLMs in autonomous driving. By addressing these challenges, we believe that our survey provides insights to the development of safer autonomous driving systems, ensuring their reliability in practical deployments.",
      "published": "2025-05-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54254/2755-2721/2025.tj22524",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junyi Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied and Computational Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.54254/2755-2721/2025.tj22524",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54254/2755-2721/34/20230307",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development and analysis of autonomous driving technology for wheeled robots",
      "description": "A The remarkable progress achieved in the evolution and utilization of autonomous driving technology in wheeled robots is thoroughly analysed in this extensive review article. It begins by stressing the significance of autonomous driving technology in the functioning of wheeled robots. The article proceeds to explore the advancement and application of the core components of autonomous driving technology, namely perception, decision-making, and control, in wheeled robots. Moreover, the comprehensive examination sheds light on the main stumbling blocks and restrictions faced in the current implementation of self-driving technology in wheeled robots, including the need for advanced perception systems and decision-making abilities. Touching on future directions in this domain and offering suggestions for further investigation, the review ultimately emphasizes the capacity of self-driving technology to augment the efficiency and security of wheeled robots, while stressing the inevitable requirement for continuous research and innovation to surmount existing hurdles and actualize this potential in its entirety.",
      "published": "2024-02-02",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54254/2755-2721/34/20230307",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Baiquan Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied and Computational Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.54254/2755-2721/34/20230307",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54254/2755-2721/45/20241041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analysis of the current development and future prospect of autonomous driving",
      "description": "Autonomous driving technology, a rapidly advancing field, holds great potential to transform the way people commute and travel. This technology enables vehicles to operate without human intervention through the integration of sensors, cameras, and sophisticated algorithms. The race to perfect autonomous driving is well underway with major automobile manufacturers like Tesla, Ford, and General Motors heavily invested in research and development. This paper mainly discusses the current development status of autonomous driving, its advantages and challenges. The key benefit of autonomous driving lies in its potential to significantly enhance safety on the roads. Moreover, autonomous driving can mitigate traffic congestion issues and enhance fuel efficiency, ultimately leading to a more sustainable and eco-friendly transportation system. However, this technological advancement does not come without its challenges. The lack of a robust regulatory framework poses a hurdle to adopting autonomous vehicles. Additionally, the high cost associated with developing and implementing autonomous driving technology has been a barrier to its accessibility. Although autonomous driving technology is still in its early stages, it holds immense promise for the future. The potential benefits of autonomous driving, such as improved safety, reduced traffic congestion, and enhanced fuel efficiency, make it an exciting prospect for the future of transportation. Nonetheless, overcoming challenges related to regulation, implementation costs, and security remains crucial for the widespread integration of this technology. As research and development efforts in autonomous driving continue, it can be anticipated that a more sustainable and efficient transportation system that could fundamentally reshape people’s daily lives.",
      "published": "2024-03-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54254/2755-2721/45/20241041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "general motors",
        "regulation",
        "security",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "general motors",
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kaitian Yuan"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied and Computational Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.54254/2755-2721/45/20241041",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54254/2755-2721/75/20240523",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-based IoT attack filtering methods in the context of connected vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid development of connected vehicle technology, the volume of data generated in the context of connected vehicles is exhibiting an exponential growth trend compared to the traditional automotive industry. This data is closely related to the security of connected vehicles. However, if threats such as malicious intrusions, information tampering, and data theft cannot be effectively resisted, they will pose significant risks and hazards to users, the entire automotive industry, and society. Therefore, researching and implementing security measures for connected vehicles becomes crucial to ensure the sustainable development and widespread application of connected vehicle technology. In this regard, this paper proposes an optimized IoT attack filtering method based on random forest and neural network algorithms in deep learning to predict and filter malicious attacks. The CICIOT2023 dataset is used for training and evaluation, and results are analyzed based on accuracy, recall, precision, and F1 scores. A comparison between models constructed using random forest and neural networks reveals that while both perform similarly in terms of accuracy and precision, the model built with neural networks significantly outperforms random forest in terms of recall and F1 score. Therefore, for IoT attack filtering methods targeted at connected vehicle scenarios, the algorithm using neural networks for attack identification and filtering is recommended, as it can better protect the confidentiality and security of data in connected vehicle scenarios, ensuring user driving safety and safeguarding societal transportation security.",
      "published": "2024-07-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54254/2755-2721/75/20240523",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yiwen Lu"
      ],
      "venue": "Applied and Computational Engineering",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.54254/2755-2721/75/20240523",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54254/2977-3903/2025.21619",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive DoIP Cybersecurity analysis",
      "description": "The paradigm shifts from a closed system to an always-on and fully connected vehicle leads to a largely increased risk to the automotive in-vehicle domain. Thereby, important automotive-specific protocols, which must be protected from a security point of view. This paper focuses on security aspects of Automotive Ethernet to address security challenges of the DoIP. First, it starts with an overview description of DoIP. Then, based on an exemplary in-vehicle network architecture, diagnostic via automotive ethernet by using DoIP are analyzed under security aspects with the help of Microsofts threat model. We identify the assets and attack surface of DoIP End Nodes and DoIP data flow, and risk assessment is carried out for DoIP data flow. Finally, the DoIP Cybersecurity goals and risk treatments are proposed to tackle the identified DoIP attacks.",
      "published": "2025-03-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54254/2977-3903/2025.21619",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ning Xu",
        "Feng Luo"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Engineering Innovation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.54254/2977-3903/2025.21619",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54392/irjmt25327",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Firmware over the Air Updates for Vehicles using Blockchain, Signcryption, and Proxy Re-encryption",
      "description": "Modern electric cars with upgraded passenger vehicles experience security risks from wireless firmware updates that allow attackers to threaten the safety of drivers and their passengers. This research develops a distinctive technique that unites blockchain technology with signcryption and proxy re-encryption to ensure vehicle-manufacturer communication and resolve this problem. Through IPFS (Inter Planetary File System) firmware updates can be safely distributed to permissioned vehicles. The proposed method implements identity-based cryptography as a fusion of signcryption with proxy re-encryption to enhance air-based firmware update security. The security evaluation of this method provides evidence about how well the cryptographic update operations function within the firmware procedure. The study performs a simulation investigation with AVISPA through the implementation of OFMC and Cl-AtSe models. The simulation study results demonstrate that the proposed security techniques prove their resistance to both man in the middle and replay attacks. The study investigates vehicle firmware update security weaknesses to develop a framework which protects firmware update integrity and confidentiality.",
      "published": "2025-05-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54392/irjmt25327",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "secure",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rachana Patil",
        "Yogesh H. Patil",
        "Deepali Arun Bhanage",
        "Rupali Gangarde",
        "Aparna Joshi",
        "Aparna Bannore"
      ],
      "venue": "International Research Journal of Multidisciplinary Technovation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.54392/irjmt25327",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5445/ir/1000195433",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A cybersecurity operations approach for vehicles based on holistic monitoring",
      "description": "Fahrzeuge entwickeln sich zu vollständig programmierbaren, hochautomatisierten und umfassend vernetzten Systemen. Doch Vernetzung und Softwarewachstum bergen auch das Risiko von Cyberangriffen. Jede Schnittstelle kann als Angriffsvektor dienen, und jede Zeile Code kann eine Schwachstelle darstellen, die Angreifern die Fernsteuerung von Fahrzeugfunktionen ermöglicht. Rechtliche Rahmenwerke wie die UN-Regelung 155 und ISO/SAE 21434 haben Cybersicherheit im Entwicklungsprozess etabliert, doch Angreifer entdecken und nutzen weiterhin neue Schwachstellen aus. Es reicht daher nicht aus, Cybersicherheitsrisiken nur während der Entwicklung zu berücksichtigen. Diese Dissertation legt den Fokus auf die Cybersicherheit während des Betriebs. Um die Sicherheit von Fahrzeugen über ihren gesamten Lebenszyklus hinweg zu gewährleisten, sind Überwachungs-, Analyse- und Reaktionsfähigkeiten erforderlich, und Risikobewertungen müssen kontinuierlich aktualisiert werden. Die sechs wesentlichen Beiträge (1)-(6) befassen sich mit den damit verbundenen prozessualen und technologischen Herausforderungen. Ein Vergleich von ISO/SAE 21434 mit anderen Cybersicherheitsprozessen zeigt mehrere Lücken in der Cybersicherheit während des Betriebs auf, insbesondere beim Umgang mit Vorfällen. Ein neuer Betriebsprozess (1) wird vorgeschlagen, um diese zu schließen. Die obligatorische Risikoanalyse während der Entwicklung hat bislang die Cybersicherheitsüberwachung nicht berücksichtigt. Diese Arbeit schlägt daher eine risikoorientierte Überwachung (2) vor. Geeignete Anforderungen werden bereits in der Risikoanalyse definiert, um eine frühzeitige Erkennung kritischer Angriffspfade zu ermöglichen. Die Integration formalisierten Wissens über das Verhalten von Angreifern und daraus resultierende Beobachtungsgrößen erlaubt die methodische Auswahl geeigneter Maßnahmen. Technologisch konzentrieren sich verwandte Arbeiten auf netzwerkzentrierte Maßnahmen wie Intrusion Detection Systeme (IDS). Die Bewertung der Cybersicherheitslage der Fahrzeuge beschränkt sich daher auf isolierte, technische Informationen. Diese Arbeit schlägt einen ganzheitlichen Ansatz vor, der den Betriebskontext des Fahrzeugs (3) einbezieht, Informationen drahtlos (4) in einem Vehicle Security Operations Center (VSOC) sammelt und dort einen Knowledge Graph (KG) mit umfassendem Datenmodell einsetzt (5). Die Verknüpfung technischer Informationen mit Fahrzeugvarianten, dem Betriebskontext, dem Fahrzeugnetzwerk, bekannten Risiken, Schwachstellen und vergangenen Vorfällen schafft die Grundlage, um schnell zu beurteilen, ob ein Vorfall vorliegt und welche Bedrohungen davon ausgehen. Überwachung und Analyse zielen letztendlich darauf ab, geeignete Gegenmaßnahmen zu ermitteln. Zwar sind Software-Updates die unverzichtbare endgültige Lösung, doch kann ihre Entwicklung Monate dauern. Da sicherheitskritische Bedrohungen eine rasche Eingrenzung erfordern können, ermöglichen die Vorab-Typgenehmigung und drahtlose Aktivierung von Reaktionsmaßnahmen (6), wie die Unterbrechung der Internetverbindung, eine sofortige und gezielte Reaktion. Zukünftige Arbeiten können auf diesen Beiträgen in zwei wesentlichen Richtungen aufbauen. Die Datenmenge und -strukturierung im KG bieten vielfältige Möglichkeiten für künstliche Intelligenz (KI), den Arbeitsaufwand der Analysten zu verringern, wobei spezifische Herausforderungen wie das Vertrauen in KI-Entscheidungen bestehen. Darüber hinaus schafft die Erfassung des Betriebskontexts die Grundlage für die Integration von Safety- und Cybersicherheitsüberwachung. Eine gemeinsame Kontextualisierung von Unzulänglichkeiten, Cybersicherheitsvorfällen und Ausfällen ist derzeit noch wenig erforscht, aber für hochautomatisierte Fahrzeuge besonders wichtig. Nachdem Software und Vernetzung in Fahrzeugen unverzichtbar geworden sind, bleibt die Cybersicherheit ein zentraler Forschungsbereich, da Angreifer stets versuchen werden, Schwachstellen zu finden und auszunutzen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit bilden eine Grundlage für die Absicherung von Fahrzeugen nicht nur bei ihrer Einführung, sondern über ihren gesamten Lebenszyklus.",
      "published": "2026-07-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5445/ir/1000195433",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel Grimm"
      ],
      "venue": "Repository KITopen (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5445/ir/1000195433",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54660/ijfei.2026.3.2.105-113",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent AI Agents for Cybersecurity in IoT-Enabled Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "While this Integrating of Internet of Things (IoT) technology in autonomous vehicles has opened up new opportunities for the, automobile industry, but it also brings enormous security challenges. The sheer number of connected devices within the automotive ecosystem can introduce feasible exploitable vulnerabilities. This paper investigates how the security of IoT ecosystems in autonomous vehicles can be strengthened using AI agents. AI agents can analyze data patterns and detect anomalies that could indicate potential vulnerabilities, helping to maintain the integrity of the vehicle's control systems and sensitive information. With data available until the proposed cybersecurity strategy involves an end-to-end layered defense with additional AI-based anomaly detection, intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, and predictive analytics. They also talk about how AI agents help secure communication of data, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) exchanges, and over-the-air (OTA) software updates. Not only is this method about the safety of self-driving cars from cyber-attacks but also their drivers, passengers and connected infrastructure. The research exemplifies how Artificial Intelligence could be utilized as an indispensable tool to improve the security of Internet of Things environment, particularly with the increasing momentum of the automobile market.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54660/ijfei.2026.3.2.105-113",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Phani Raj Kumar Bollipalli"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Future Engineering Innovations",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.54660/ijfei.2026.3.2.105-113",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54660/ijmer.2022.3.1.36-48",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advanced Machine Learning, Insurtech & Cloud Data Stack",
      "description": "The insurance industry is undergoing a profound digital transformation driven by the convergence of advanced machine learning (ML), InsurTech innovations, and scalable cloud data architectures. As insurers grapple with evolving customer expectations, increasing market competition, and complex risk landscapes, the adoption of AI-driven analytics and cloud-native platforms has become a strategic imperative. Advanced ML techniques—ranging from predictive risk modeling and personalized underwriting to real-time fraud detection and automated claims processing—are revolutionizing traditional insurance workflows, enabling data-driven decision-making with unprecedented accuracy and efficiency. Central to this transformation is the modern cloud data stack, which provides the scalable, flexible, and secure infrastructure necessary to manage vast volumes of structured and unstructured data. Key components, including cloud data lakes, real-time streaming platforms, orchestration pipelines, and AI-enabled analytics services, collectively empower insurers to derive actionable insights from diverse data sources, including IoT devices, telematics, and customer interaction channels. Moreover, the integration of MLOps practices ensures the seamless deployment, monitoring, and continuous improvement of ML models within agile cloud environments. However, the journey towards AI-first insurance ecosystems is not without challenges. Ensuring data privacy, regulatory compliance, model transparency, and cost-effective scalability are critical concerns that insurers must navigate. Additionally, overcoming legacy system constraints and fostering a culture of data-driven innovation remain pivotal for industry incumbents. This explores the interplay between advanced machine learning, InsurTech solutions, and cloud data stack architectures, highlighting practical applications, industry case studies, and emerging trends such as federated learning, serverless computing, and edge-based analytics. By harnessing these technologies in a cohesive, strategic manner, insurers can build resilient, customer-centric ecosystems that drive operational excellence, mitigate risks, and unlock new value streams in an increasingly digital insurance landscape.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54660/ijmer.2022.3.1.36-48",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Damilola Christiana Ayodeji",
        "Ehimah Obuse",
        "Oyetunji Oladimeji",
        "Joshua Oluwagbenga Ajayi",
        "Ayorinde Olayiwola Akindemowo",
        "Bukky Okojie Eboseremen",
        "Adegbola Oluwole Ogedengbe",
        "Eseoghene Daniel Erigha"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Multidisciplinary Evolutionary Research",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.54660/ijmer.2022.3.1.36-48",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 17,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54691/hdatbk31",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Security Mechanism and Testing Verification Method of Encryption Chips for Automotive Information Security Components",
      "description": "Against the background of the rapid popularization of intelligent connected vehicles, the in-vehicle electronic and electrical architecture is continuously upgraded to domain control and centralization, putting forward higher requirements for information security in links such as in-vehicle data interaction, vehicle-cloud communication, firmware upgrade, and identity authentication. As the hardware root of trust in the in-vehicle information security system, encryption chips undertake key functions such as key storage, encryption and decryption operations, digital signature, secure boot, and communication authentication, and their security directly determines the entire vehicle network and data security capabilities. Starting from the actual application scenarios of in-vehicle encryption chips, this paper systematically sorts out their hardware security architecture, key management system, cryptographic algorithm implementation, physical anti-attack design, and secure communication mechanism, analyzes the typical risks faced by encryption chips in the current in-vehicle environment such as physical attacks, side-channel attacks, illegal interface access, and key leakage, and constructs a comprehensive testing verification method covering functional testing, cryptographic performance, physical security, interface security, and environmental reliability combined with ISO/SAE 21434, national cryptographic algorithm standards, and automotive-grade security requirements. Verified through bench testing and real-vehicle environment, the testing system proposed in this paper can comprehensively identify the security shortcomings of encryption chips and realize quantitative evaluation of security capabilities, providing a systematic technical reference for the selection, development, evaluation, and engineering implementation of in-vehicle security chips.",
      "published": "2026-04-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54691/hdatbk31",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ziyi Wang",
        "Junjie Xu",
        "Zongyao Ji",
        "Xuesong Wu"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Journal of Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.54691/hdatbk31",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4004,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.54691/hdatbk31 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: continuously, national, trust, functions, digital, risks, physical, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54941/ahfe1002948",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safety and security analysis of Connected and Automated Vehicles: A methodology based on Interaction with stakeholders",
      "description": "Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) are becoming global phenomena and making their way into our society. With the increase in vehicle system automation and connectivity levels, reliance on technology increases, which reduces the human influence on vehicle dynamic driving tasks. This development significantly transformed the nature of human-vehicle interaction design from control to supervisory control. The final goal of CAVs is to enable driverless rides (SAE L 4 – 5), where various stakeholders (passengers, service providers, and insurers) will interact during the post-development phases of the vehicle life cycle. CAVs are susceptible to safety and cyber security attacks where a successful attack could lead to various safety, operational, financial, and privacy losses. This paper aims to propose a methodology for safety and security analysis of CAV interaction with various stakeholders and is aligned with automotive cyber security standard ISO/SAE 21434 TARA. This standard provides the guideline to perform risk management for vehicles, considering the vehicle system level only; whereas the prescribed methodology will complement standard ISO/SAE 21434, performs safety and security analysis based on the CAV - Stakeholders interaction model and investigates the impact of cybersecurity incidents on various stakeholders. The paper presents the methodology which builds upon knowledge combining the known techniques from safety and security domains. The research results in developing an interaction model, and identifying interaction assets, their vulnerabilities, and threats. Furthermore, it performs an attack consequences analysis to demonstrate the impact of the attack on various stakeholders. The developed methodology can be applied to any post-development phase of the CAV life such as operation, maintenance, and decommissioning.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54941/ahfe1002948",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shahzad Alam",
        "Giedre Sabaliauskaite",
        "Hesamaldin Jadidbonab",
        "Jeremy W. Bryans"
      ],
      "venue": "AHFE international",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.54941/ahfe1002948",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54941/ahfe1003719",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Effects of Cyber Readiness and Response on Human Trust in Self Driving Cars",
      "description": "Self driving cars (SDC) are potentially set to revolutionise the automotive industry. Despite the promise of a plethora of purported benefits (e.g. fewer road traffic accidents, better traffic flow; lower emissions), one key concern relates to the potential for SDCs and their connected infrastructure to be cyber attacked. Aside from material losses, an adverse cyber experience is likely to undermine human trust – with trust being a key contributing factor to the uptake and use of automated technology such as SDCs.Many studies have projected the different types of cyber attacks an SDC could fall victim to [1]. Concerns about the consequences of cyber attacks for e.g. users, other road users, manufacturers, legislators, legal experts, and governments have also been raised. Procedural and technical solutions have been proposed to tackle the SDC-cyber security challenge, which includes the proposition of rankings for SDCs GPS system vulnerabilities [2].Nonetheless, it is inevitable that threat actors will compromise an SDC system(s) through either exploited vulnerabilities and/or user error. It is crucial that such an event(s) does not erode trust (e.g. leading to misuse or even disuse) if the long-term benefits of this technology are to be reaped. Therefore, the study explores whether the capability and obligation from a SDC company (who are most likely to be blamed when an attack happens) to manage a cyber attack – with regards to its readiness and response activities – impacts trust in SDC technology.Using a cutting-edge AV Simulation Driving Simulator and simulation software generated animations (SCANeR Studio) embedded into an online survey, participants watch a futuristic driving scenario where the SDC executes a variety of successful driving manoeuvres before the system falls victim to an unspecified cyber-attack. Self-reported trust is measured after each successful manoeuvre as well as following the cyber attack. The experiment follows a 3x2 – 6 condition design – manipulated between participants. In each condition, all participants are shown the same driving scenario. The independent variables (IVs) consist of the information given to the participant before and after watching the scenario: IV1 being the SDCs cyber readiness (low/medium/high) and IV2, the SDCs company’s response to the incident (positive/negative). Before watching the scenario, information about cars status (including its cyber readiness) is provided. After watching the scenario and experiencing the cyber attack, participants are provided with text detailing how the SDC company responded to the cyber attack. The key prediction is that a company with higher cyber maturity (i.e. has a high level of cyber readiness and responds positively to the incident) will be trusted more than a company/companies with lower cyber security considerations. Currently the experiment is in progress and findings and details on the implications will be presented in the paper. Future research will involve exploring the boundary conditions of the effects and extending to physiological as well as subjective measures of trust.References: [1] Phama, M. & Xiongb, K. (2021) A survey on security attacks and defense techniques for connected and autonomous vehicles, Computers & Security, 109(1), 1-29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2021.102269[2] Sheehan, B., Murphy, F., Mullins, M., Ryan, C. (2019) Connected and autonomous vehicles: A cyber-risk classification framework. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice. 124(1), 523-536. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2018.06.033The work is part of a PhD funded project by the EPSRC IDTH in Cyber Security Analytics. It is also part of an ESRC-JST (Economic & Social Research Council - Japan Science & Technology Agency) project grant reference: ES/T007079/1, Prof Morgan is UK PI : Rule of Law in the Age of AI: Principles of Distributive Liability for Multi-Agent Societies.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54941/ahfe1003719",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Victoria Marcinkiewicz",
        "Qiyuan Zhang",
        "Phillip L. Morgan"
      ],
      "venue": "AHFE international",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.54941/ahfe1003719",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54941/ahfe1005593",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat analysis for autonomous vehicle systems",
      "description": "Connected Automated Vehicles (CAVs) have significant role for enhancing logistics operations by providing improved efficiency, cost savings, traffic safety and to diminish environmental foot print. These are all major features of a competitive logistic operations of a modern company that seeks business advantage via its logistic operations. Already multiple types of CAVs are supporting logistic operations in warehouses, mines and generally in restricted areas in factory type environments. Reliability and safety of automated vehicle systems (AVS) can be realized in restricted environment for CAVs that operate on predetermined fixed routes relatively easy since these restricted environments have usually dedicated communication network that is not open to the Internet. This is not the case when CAVs start operating on public roads, in air space or at sea. There are already pilots in place that are using level 5 CAVs for delivering packages for a first/last mile logistic service on public roads and to provide taxi services for public with in a city. These CAVs require full support from AVS and they rely fully on public communication infrastructure to provide safe and secure services. Vehicles that require AVS services are in all practical means computers with full of multiple sensors and software that can and must utilize variable communication solutions in order to function as intended. Therefore, this paper’s research problem and focus is to analyse potential threats scenarios of a CAV and to find vulnerabilities of an AVS. The problem is analysed via general AVS use case and focus is on level 5 fully autonomous system when a vehicle can perform all driving tasks under all conditions without human intervention. Some of the very same vulnerabilities already exists today even for level 2 vehicles that have advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) since they regularly use public communication infrastructure to access service providers data platform. The vulnerability analysis mainly focuses on vehicle to everything communication cases, vehicle to vehicle communication cases and analyses potential risks for intra-vehicle operations if cyber security protection fails. This will provide better understanding for logistic operators how to prevent AVS’s complete, disastrous shut down by an external threat.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54941/ahfe1005593",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "driver assistance",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Markus Sihvonen",
        "Reijo M. Savola"
      ],
      "venue": "AHFE international",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.54941/ahfe1005593",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.54941/ahfe100953",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Distributed Ledger Technology in Autonomous Driving: A Security Protection Layer",
      "description": "Cybersecurity in autonomous driving is of utmost importance since a hacked self-driving car could turn into a remote-controlled weapon. Appropriate measures must be taken and implemented to ensure future road safety. The substantially shorter renewal cycles in the hardware (e.g., sensors, computer hardware) and especially software domain compared to the current service life of a vehicle represent a further challenge The use of blockchain technology could enhance security in autonomous driving and thus reduce cybersecurity risks. This paper studies current developments of Swiss pilot projects in autonomous driving and discusses existing solutions for increasing safety of autonomous driving through blockchain.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.54941/ahfe100953",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "security",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nicola Raemy",
        "Galia Kondova"
      ],
      "venue": "AHFE international",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.54941/ahfe100953",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsmt.v2i5.125",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks and Defense Mechanisms in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The integration of deep learning (DL) and artificial intelligence (AI) has significantly advanced the capabilities of autonomous vehicles (AVs), enabling intelligent perception, planning, and decision-making. However, these enhancements have also introduced new cybersecurity vulnerabilities, particularly in the form of adversarial attacks. This review focuses on four key adversarial attack types—Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), physical adversarial patch attacks, and sensor spoofing—that pose serious threats to AV safety. It further explores advanced and practical defense mechanisms such as hybrid deep learning models, patch-based occlusion-aware detection, autoencoders with memory modules, and sensor fusion-based spoofing detection frameworks. The review is supported by recent research papers and highlights both theoretical and applied perspectives, covering classification and perception tasks, sensor vulnerabilities, and real-world validation. Through detailed analysis of attack mechanisms, impacts, and mitigation strategies, the urgent need for scalable, real-time, and integrated defense systems threats is emphasized to secure AI-driven transportation from evolving adversarial.",
      "published": "2026-05-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsmt.v2i5.125",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sudha D",
        "Antony Adwin Luiz"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Science Strategic Management and Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsmt.v2i5.125",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem25927",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Why Cybersecurity Is a Corporate Priority in the Automotive Industry",
      "description": "The automotive industry is going through a rapid transformation due to technological advancements like connected cars (V2X technologies), artificial intelligence, autonomous driving, 5G, and cloud computing. These changes provide opportunities and numerous challenges to OEMs, suppliers, and other stakeholders. This review paper first lists the various threats encountered by the industry on different vehicle attack surfaces. It highlights the adoption of different technologies in modern cars and the potential threats they may bring. It finally justifies why cybersecurity has become a corporate priority for stakeholders in the automotive industry. Keywords: Connected Vehicles, Cybersecurity, Connectivity, CAN (Controller Area Network), Autonomous, V2X(Vehicle-to-Everything), Artificial Intelligence.",
      "published": "2025-02-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem25927",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suresh Sureddi"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem25927",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4307,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.55041/ijsrem25927 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: corporate, stakeholders., suppliers, like, intelligence, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem29517",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "GEOSILENCE – LOCATION TRIGERRED DEVICE MUTING",
      "description": "Mobile devices have become an integral part of human lifestyle. The convenience offered by mobile devices usage can’t be denied. However, there are growing concerns about the disturbances caused by usage of mobile devices. One of the concerns is the disturbances caused by ringing sound of mobile devices at places that require silence such as mosque, library, cinema, and meeting room. Mobile device owners often forget to turn on silence mode on their devices in these places. To overcome such problem, this paper proposes an auto-notification application for mobile device using geofencing technique. Geofencing technique is used to detect virtual boundary that have been preset around required places. When a user enters the particular place, the application will detect that the user’s mobile device has crossed the virtual boundary and will automatically notify the user to turn the silence mode on the device. The opposite process will happen when the user crosses the boundary to exit the place. The main advantage of the application is that it will remind mobile device users to mute their devices when they are entering places that require silence. Nearly everything around us holds significance, be it data, expensive items, land, people and/or animals. It is essential that we keep all that matters to us safe and secure. To employ the highest form of security, we want to keep track of all the significant things on our own. This gives rise to the need for the meantime tracking o anything which is highly valuable to us. Hence, GPS tracking is employed in this technological solution to keep track. Innovative technology, based on telematics and satellite positioning, is the subject of this study on geofencing. With the use of geofencing technology, users can create virtual boundaries in the context of the actual world. By automatically detecting when monitored mobile items enter or leave geographical areas that are encircled by a virtual fence, it aids in the surveillance of those areas. A geofence is a virtual barrier that is set up around a specific region of interest utilizing several technologies, including Wi-Fi, cellular mobile, RFID, and GPS. A specific radius area on the map can be specified by the user. If any entry or exit is made from that location, they will be updated in real time. This assures the asset's safety and security and provides a system for inspection to deter any unwanted activity. Keyword : Auto notification,Cellular mobile, Geofencing, GPS, Mobile device, RFID, Window phone.",
      "published": "2024-03-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem29517",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "surveillance",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S Dhanasekar"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem29517",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem34426",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Holistic Approach to Cybersecurity Integration in Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The breakthrough of the self-driving car technology is a double-edged sword that gives us incredible opportunities and at the same time, it is the source of huge cybersecurity challenges. This paper champions the creation of a complete legal system and worldwide standards, like the ISO 26262, to regulate different parts of the autonomous vehicle (AV) operations, such as safety testing, liability, data privacy, and cybersecurity. By highlighting the significance of cybersecurity from the very start, the stakeholders and the automakers have to incorporate the practices like secure programming, routine updates, intrusion detection systems and encryption methods which will be the effective shield against the unauthorized access and data breaches. People should be informed and educated about the cybersecurity risks of AVs so that they can take the steps to protect themselves. Nevertheless, the integration of AVs with the Internet of Things (IoT) and other devices makes the cybersecurity landscape even more complicated, which means that there is a constant need for research and development to deal with problems like adversarial attacks. Presently, the deep learning-driven AV systems do not have the explainability which complicates the safety-critical applications, hence the need to increase the resilience training and deepen the deep learning models against attacks. The paper goes through all the literature on AV cybersecurity which stresses the need for functional safety standards and cybersecurity engineering guidelines. Collaboration between the governments, the industry, and the researchers is a must to set the legal foundations and the technical details for the AV cybersecurity across all levels of automation. Finally, solid cybersecurity is the key to the success of the autonomous vehicle revolution, hence the road to transformative safety, efficiency, and sustainability is paved. INDEX TERMS: Autonomous vehicles, Cybersecurity, ISO 26262, Encryption methods, ISO 21434, EU regulations, Security and Privacy.",
      "published": "2024-05-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem34426",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chandana R M"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem34426",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem35687",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Assessment of Electric Vehicles Industry in India",
      "description": "The electric vehicle (EV) industry in India is growing, but it faces some risks. One risk is the lack of enough charging stations across the country. This can make people worried about running out of battery power while driving long distances. Another risk is the high cost of EVs compared to regular cars. Most people in India may find EVs too expensive, especially without good incentives or subsidies from the government. The industry also depends on imported batteries, which can cause supply issues and increase costs. There is a need for more battery manufacturing within India. Frequently changing government policies and incentives create uncertainty for EV makers and buyers. Clear and stable policies are needed to support the industry's growth. Competition from big global EV companies is another risk for Indian manufacturers. Keeping up with rapidly changing technology and customer preferences is important. Environmental concerns related to battery production, disposal, and recycling need to be addressed. Job losses in the traditional auto sector due to the shift to EVs can also be a social challenge. To overcome these risks, India needs better charging infrastructure, incentives, domestic battery production, stable policies, consumer awareness programs, and strategies to manage environmental and social impacts.",
      "published": "2024-06-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem35687",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aarav Raj"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem35687",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem45201",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EV Charging Reservation and Tracker using OCPP",
      "description": "The EV Slot Booking app is an innovative solution designed to streamline the process of locating and reserving electric vehicle (EV) charging stations. Developed as an Android application, it leverages modern technologies such as Firebase, Google Maps API, and OpenChargeMap API to provide users with real-time access to nearby charging points. The app’s core feature is its integration with the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), enabling seamless communication with charging stations for booking and charging management.Users can authenticate using Firebase’s secure login methods and utilize the app to search for stations, track routes, and make reservations. The booking process is completed through an intuitive interface, supported by a payment gateway integration with platforms like Razorpay and PayPal for secure transactions. Once a booking is confirmed, the app generates a QR code that users can scan at the station for validation. This EV Slot Booking app addresses the growing need for efficient charging station management in the expanding electric vehicle ecosystem. It offers a convenient and user-friendly platform for EV owners to ensure access to charging infrastructure while providing station operators with an OCPP-compliant system for handling reservations and usage. Ethical considerations, such as ensuring user data privacy and secure payment processing, are integrated into the app's design to maintain trust and security. Keywords— EV slot booking, Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), Firebase, Google Maps API, OpenChargeMap API, Android app, Razorpay, PayPal, electric vehicle charging stations, real-time booking.",
      "published": "2025-04-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem45201",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging station",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "ocpp",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aadarsh Pandey"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem45201",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem54226",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Artificial Intelligence in Hazardous Cargo Transportation: Risk Prediction and Route Optimization for U.S. Highways",
      "description": "Abstract: The highway transportation of hazardous materials poses unique safety and security challenges that demand innovative risk management and routing strategies. Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are increasingly being applied to predict accident risk and optimize routing for hazardous cargo. This article reviews AI‐based risk prediction systems and AI‐driven route optimization methods specifically in the context of U.S. highway hazmat transport. Discuss accident‐prediction models leveraging historical crash data, real‐time sensor and telematics integration, and predictive maintenance insights. On the routing side, we examine reinforcement‐learning and optimization frameworks that incorporate safety constraints, time‐varying traffic conditions, and regulatory requirements. Real‐world examples from U.S. Department of Transportation initiatives and industry platforms (e.g. Convoy, KeepTruckin/Project44) are integrated to illustrate current practices. Key risk factors (e.g. population density, material hazard class, driver conditions) are summarized in a structured risk table. We also outline a conceptual AI system architecture for hazmat routing, highlighting data sources and decision‐support components. The review concludes that AI can significantly enhance proactive safety management and efficient routing of hazardous shipments, supporting federal safety goals. Future work should address data integration challenges, model validation, and regulatory acceptance of AI systems. Keywords: Hazardous materials, highway transportation, accident prediction, route optimization, artificial intelligence, risk assessment, logistics, U.S. DOT, Convoy, Project44, KeepTruckin.",
      "published": "2025-11-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem54226",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Engineer «Abris», Russia",
        "Snurnikov Aleksandr"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem54226",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem61058",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DESINGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IOT ENABLED SMART VEHICLE BLACK BOX SYSTEM",
      "description": "Abstract— This project presents the design and implementation of an IoT-enabled smart vehicle black box system aimed at enhancing road safety, accident analysis, and real-time monitoring. The system integrates sensors, a microcontroller, and wireless communication modules to continuously capture critical parameters such as vehicle speed, location, acceleration, and impact force. In the event of an accident, the system automatically records and transmits essential data to a cloud platform, enabling quick access for emergency response and post-incident investigation. Additionally, features such as GPS tracking, driver behaviour monitoring, and remote data access improve vehicle security and accountability. The proposed solution offers a cost-effective, reliable, and scalable approach to modern vehicular data logging, contributing to smarter transportation systems and improved safety outcomes. Keywords— IoT, Smart Vehicle System, Black Box, Accident Detection, GPS Tracking, Data Logging, Real-Time Monitoring, Vehicle Safety, Cloud Storage, Sensor Integration, Emergency Alert System, Telematics",
      "published": "2026-04-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem61058",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "tracking",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "S VIKRAM",
        "P DHANASEKARAN",
        "G AJAY",
        "B PAVITHRA",
        "G SRI PUBITHA"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem61058",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3867,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.55041/ijsrem61058 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: backend_cloud, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy, vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: continuously, project, location, response, sensor, sensors, impact, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem62062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "UPI-Integrated Smart Electric Vehicle Charging Estimator",
      "description": "Growing adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) across India has intensified the need for payment infrastructure that is both technically robust and operationally simple. Existing charging facilities are largely dependent on grid power and rely on cumbersome payment methods such as prepaid cards and RFID tokens, which introduce friction and undermine the convenience that EV users expect. This paper proposes a UPI-driven smart EV charging estimator that removes these barriers by enabling users to trigger and settle charging sessions directly through QR code scanning or UPI intent, with no requirement for pre-registration or third-party wallet applications. A dedicated smart controller oversees energy distribution from storage and grid backup sources to guarantee uninterrupted operation, while a precision energy metering unit tracks the exact quantum of electricity supplied to the vehicle. Power delivery is gated exclusively on verified UPI payment confirmation, which strengthens transaction security and minimizes the risk of unauthorized energy consumption.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem62062",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vaibhav Vaibhav"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem62062",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/ijsrem68097",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Cloud-Native Car Rental Platforms: A Review of CRM-Centric Architectures, Conversational Booking, Digital KYC, and Concurrency-Safe Reservation Systems",
      "description": "Car rental platforms are evolving from counter-based operations and stand-alone booking websites into integrated, cloud-native systems that combine customer self-service with enterprise fleet governance. This review surveys the technologies and research that underpin such platforms. We organise the literature into eight themes: cloud and CRM platforms, conversational and voice interfaces, pricing transparency and revenue management, digital identity verification and privacy, concurrency control for reservations, emergency response and telematics, customer service recovery and sentiment, and governance, auditability, and business intelligence. For each theme we summarise the foundational work, the techniques used in practice, and the trade-offs that affect rental systems. We then compare architectural approaches and concurrency-control strategies, and use Homeride, a Salesforce-based car rental platform, as a reference case to show how the themes combine in a single implementation. The review identifies open challenges, including multilingual voice understanding for Indian users, legally compliant e-KYC after the 2018 Aadhaar judgment and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, race-safe booking under API and bulk traffic, connectivity-independent emergency alerts, and the lack of empirical evaluations of integrated platforms. We conclude with research directions for building secure, transparent, and user-centred mobility platforms.",
      "published": "2026-10-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem68097",
      "matched_terms": [
        "personal data",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Om Taskar Om Taskar",
        "Sanket Timande",
        "Khushi Jambhulkar",
        "Dr. Pooja Jaiswal",
        "Dr. Sudhir Shelke"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.55041/ijsrem68097",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55041/isjem01446",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematics – Evolution of Stolen vehicle Tracking solutions in Automotive Engineering",
      "description": "The automotive industry has transformed drastically over the past two decades with the advancements in IoT, connectivity and Artificial intelligence (AI). Among the connectivity features, technologies for stolen vehicle tracking are continuously evolving as the battle between the car thieves and those committed to protect the vehicle theft is ongoing. This article first details the evolution of stolen vehicle tracking technologies, provides insights into the one of the typical early architectures of Stolen vehicle tracking system using GPS + GSM+ Immobilization technique and then providesthe details of latest security technologies like IoT and LPWAN to recover stolen vehicles. Keywords: Connected Vehicles, Stolen vehicle Tracking, GPS (Global Positioning System), GSM (Global System for Mobile), Internet of Things (IoT), Connectivity, CAN (Controller Area Network), TCU (Telematics Control Unit), Artificial Intelligence.",
      "published": "2024-12-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55041/isjem01446",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Suresh Sureddi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Scientific Journal of Engineering and Management",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.55041/isjem01446",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3885,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.55041/isjem01446 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: continuously, like, intelligence, car, privacy, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55214/25768484.v8i4.1446",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A comprehensive investigation of an LTE-enabled smart door system using the Arduino UNO",
      "description": "Traditional residential security systems frequently lack remote access and real-time reaction capabilities, necessitating home automation security technology developments. With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), solutions such as the Smart Door are prepared to transcend these constraints by leveraging modern communication technology. The article aims to develop, implement, and evaluate an LTE-enabled Smart Door system built on the Arduino Uno platform. The goal is to improve home security by offering keyless entry, real-time surveillance, and remote operation, increasing user convenience and system reliability. We created a Smart Door system with an Arduino Uno microcontroller and LTE connectivity. The system's performance was measured using a variety of measures, including response time, reliability, and security against unwanted access. Testing included simulation environments and real-world scenarios to ensure the system's operational efficacy and security. The Smart Door system performed admirably, with a reaction time of less than two seconds in 95% of commands and strong resilience to brute force attacks. It effectively incorporated keyless entry, live video streaming, and real-time alarms, all controlled by a smartphone app, demonstrating the system's dependability and efficiency in live scenarios. The LTE-enabled Smart Door system considerably improves over traditional home security options. It provides enhanced security, simple operation, and more outstanding remote management capabilities by utilizing IoT technology. These enhancements fill essential holes in existing systems, providing a safer, dependable, and convenient answer for modern home security requirements.",
      "published": "2024-09-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55214/25768484.v8i4.1446",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "resilience",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nameer Hashim Qasim",
        "Fakher Rahim",
        "Nataliia Bodnar"
      ],
      "venue": "Edelweiss Applied Science and Technology",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.55214/25768484.v8i4.1446",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55248/gengpi.2023.32358",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security Issues in Connected Autonomous Vehicle",
      "description": "The growth in autonomous vehicles and its adoptability in the today's society is not a nightmare.The journey of intelligent and autonomous vehicles has come far away with the recent advancement in its control, driving and especially in communication and connectivity related aspects.The cyber security is a major issue in all web connected devices.Hence the connected vehicles are not an exception.The cyber attacks on connected vehicles are classified broadly based on the three important parts of the system namely control system, driving system components and V2X communications.In this paper a review of various cyber security attacks on connected vehicles, importance of cyber security and its side effects are discussed.",
      "published": "2023-03-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55248/gengpi.2023.32358",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "P B Savitha",
        "S Madhu",
        "S Arjun"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.55248/gengpi.2023.32358",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55324/enrichment.v3i6.429",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Community Preference-Based Approach to Public EV Charging Station Site Selection Using ANP and ELECTRE I",
      "description": "The provision of charging infrastructure is essential to support electric vehicle (EV) adoption and promote sustainable energy policies. Surabaya, one of the largest metropolitan cities in Indonesia, is preparing for a transition toward electric mobility but still faces a limited number of public EV charging stations (EVCS). This study addresses the EVCS location selection problem using an integrated multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach: the Analytic Network Process (ANP) and ELECTRE (Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality). ANP is used to structure the decision problem and determine criteria weights, while ELECTRE ranks the alternative locations. A community preference–based approach is adopted to capture the expectations of future users, all of whom are currently conventional vehicle users but interested in switching to EVs. Quantitative analysis reveals that usage-oriented factors (66.68%) outweigh travel-related considerations (33.32%). Among criteria, cleanliness and tidiness (36.40%) and security (31.90%) are especially influential, followed by road condition (10.72%) and amenities such as cafés and restaurants (8.71%). Less influential factors include retail facilities (4.20%), malls and entertainment access (4.27%), and traffic volume (3.80%). Three candidate locations, identified in a prior study based on expert judgment (e.g., accessibility, energy availability, and population), were evaluated. Based on the weighted criteria and alternative scores, location rankings were determined. Sensitivity analysis confirms the stability of the results, supporting the model’s robustness. This study offers a holistic and practical framework for EVCS site selection that incorporates future users’ preferences, ensuring that the charging infrastructure is both technically feasible and socially responsive to real urban mobility needs.",
      "published": "2025-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55324/enrichment.v3i6.429",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "B. Baihaqi",
        "S. Suparno"
      ],
      "venue": "Enrichment: Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.55324/enrichment.v3i6.429",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55524/ijirem.2021.8.6.226",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "V2X Wellbeing and Security Issues: A Survey",
      "description": "Vehicle to Everything (V2X) is a communication system used in a Vehicular Adhoc Networks that supports the exchange of information from a vehicle to moving components of the traffic system that might impact the vehicle. Technologies such as the Machine Learning, Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, cloud computing, have enhanced the digital capabilities of V2X technology. However, along with communication performance improvement there is increase in security and privacy issues. A trust value has to be calculated to mitigate the uncertainties and risk caused by unreliable information in vehicular environments. In this paper, a fuzzy trust model based on various vehicular parameters is proposed to secure the vehicular network.",
      "published": "2021-11-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55524/ijirem.2021.8.6.226",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. Raghunarh",
        "G V K Murthy",
        "B. Nagaraju",
        "K.Sowjan Kumar"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Innovative Research in Engineering & Management",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.55524/ijirem.2021.8.6.226",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55549/epstem.1518424",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Connected Vehicle Security: Innovations in Two-Factor Authentication",
      "description": "The automotive sector is undergoing profound changes with the advancement of technology, and connected vehicles represent one of the most notable examples. These vehicles, equipped with internet connectivity and communication capabilities with other devices, are becoming increasingly widespread. Consequently, they accumulate substantial amounts of data concerning drivers and their environments. However, this connectivity also brings about significant security concerns, particularly regarding the privacy and security of the metadata stored in these vehicles. Metadata encompasses diverse information about user activities, habits, location data, and personal preferences, making it an appealing target for potential attackers. Therefore, safeguarding the security of metadata in connected vehicles stands out as a primary concern for manufacturers. This study aims to surpass the two-factor authentication (2FA) systems developed to protect the metadata stored in connected vehicles. The system comprises two components: the Central Security Unit (CSU) and the AutoGuard (AG) mobile application. Integrated with the Remote Keyless Entry System (RKES), CSU initiates the 2FA process when the driver approaches the vehicle. Upon entering the second authentication factor (biometric, pattern, PIN code), successful authentication unlocks the vehicle doors via RKES, while failure prompts notification to the driver. To advance the 2FA system, a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)-based communication system has been integrated between CSU and AG. This integration enhances communication between the two, making it more secure and energy efficient. Furthermore, it enables data exchange without the need for a network connection, ensuring a seamless user experience. These innovative communication features transcend the 2FA system by rendering communication between CSU and AG more reliable and flexible. Additionally, by integrating the phone's location into the authentication system, AG functionality can enhance the accuracy of the 2FA system, potentially using the phone's location as an additional authentication factor.",
      "published": "2024-08-13",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55549/epstem.1518424",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "keyless",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huseyin Karacalı",
        "Efecan Cebel",
        "Nevzat Dönüm"
      ],
      "venue": "The Eurasia Proceedings of Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.55549/epstem.1518424",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4388,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.55549/epstem.1518424 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: occupant_sensor, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: personal, concern, successful, location, primary, activities, vehicle., making."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5555/3241094.3241166",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lock It and Still Lose It —on the (In)Security of Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "While most automotive immobilizer systems have been shown to be insecure in the last few years, the security of remote keyless entry systems (to lock and unlock a car) based on rolling codes has received less attention. In this paper, we close this gap and present vulnerabilities in keyless entry schemes used by major manufacturers. In our first case study, we show that the security of the keyless entry systems of most VW Group vehicles manufactured between 1995 and today relies on a few, global master keys. We show that by recovering the cryptographic algorithms and keys from electronic control units, an adversary is able to clone a VW Group remote control and gain unauthorized access to a vehicle by eavesdropping a single signal sent by the original remote. Secondly, we describe the Hitag2 rolling code scheme (used in vehicles made by Alfa Romeo, Chevrolet, Peugeot, Lancia, Opel, Renault, and Ford among others) in full detail. We present a novel correlation-based attack on Hitag2, which allows recovery of the cryptographic key and thus cloning of the remote control with four to eight rolling codes and a few minutes of computation on a laptop. Our findings affect millions of vehicles worldwide and could explain unsolved insurance cases of theft from allegedly locked vehicles.",
      "published": "2016-08-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5555/3241094.3241166",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "immobilizer",
        "keyless",
        "renault",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "renault"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Flavio D. Garcia",
        "David Oswald",
        "Timo Kasper",
        "Pierre Pavlidès"
      ],
      "venue": "University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "10.5555/3241094.3241166",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 155,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.55677/sshrb/2026-3050-0904",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Impact of Digital Transformation on Financial Performance and Competitiveness of Freight Transport Enterprises in Vietnam",
      "description": "Digital transformation is redefining the way the organization and management of freight transport is being handled, with the help of transport management systems, vehicle positioning and telematics, electronic documents, digital freight platforms, real-time tracking, data analytics and artificial intelligence. However, for freight transport companies in Vietnam, the key question is not whether digital technologies are being used, but whether digital investment can yield tangible financial results and competitive advantages. The research method adopted in this study is a qualitative research design with the combination of document analysis and evidence synthesis to analyze the mechanisms of digital transformation on the financial performance and competitiveness of freight transport companies in Vietnam. The evidence base covers basic research on the resource-based view and dynamic capabilities, international research on digital transformation and Logistics 4.0, recent empirical research in Vietnam, official transport statistics and national policy documents. The results reveal two interrelated value-conversion pathways. First, digital transformation can boost financial performance by cutting down on coordination and transaction costs, optimizing routes and loads, maximizing vehicle utilization, minimizing waiting time, enabling predictive maintenance, streamlining the invoice-to-cash cycle and unlocking new revenue streams through value-added services. Second, by enhancing transparency, reliability, responsiveness, customer-partner integration, service innovation, and participation in digital supply chains, digital transformation can contribute to strengthening competitiveness. These benefits are not guaranteed, but are contingent. A digitalization paradox can occur when fragmented technology investments, weak managerial skills, lack of digital skills, financial limitations, digital incompatibility among partners and poor data integration leads to rising investments and declining performance. The study recommends a Digital Capability - Operational Conversion - Firm Outcomes Framework and a roadmap for the phased transformation, starting from the process and data standardization and then moving to the advanced analytics and digital-green convergence.",
      "published": "2026-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.55677/sshrb/2026-3050-0904",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "MSc. Nhu Thuy Lien",
        "Ha Thi Lien"
      ],
      "venue": "Social science and human research bulletin.",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.55677/sshrb/2026-3050-0904",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56028/aetr.12.1.558.2024",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research on Information Security of Key Systems for Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Telematics is a new industry that deeply integrates new-generation network communication technology with vehicles, electronics, transportation and other fields, and is an important driving force for promoting the high-quality development of manufacturing, accelerating economic transformation and upgrading, and building a new development pattern. Along with the development of automotive intelligence and network connectivity, the threat of cyberattacks has accelerated to spread to the vehicle end and vehicle networking platform. In this paper, we look at the typical information security problems of automotive parts and components such as in-vehicle infotainment systems, telematics box, and driver fatigue detection systems, and propose corresponding mitigation and repair measures.",
      "published": "2024-11-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56028/aetr.12.1.558.2024",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yuqiao Ning",
        "Yang Chen",
        "Zhe Huang",
        "Shihao Xue"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Engineering Technology Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.56028/aetr.12.1.558.2024",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3989,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.56028/aetr.12.1.558.2024 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: economic, intelligence, information, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56028/aetr.17.1.394.2026",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Incorporating a Cross-Standard Semantic Alignment Graph into RAG-Based Automotive Information Security Compliance Assessment",
      "description": "Cross-standard semantic alignment is fundamental to improving recall integrity and judgment accuracy in multi-document compliance RAG systems. This paper proposes an automotive cybersecurity compliance RAG method incorporating a cross-standard semantic alignment graph, targeting two structural deficiencies of existing RAG approaches: insufficient cross-standard semantic coverage caused by isolated text block retrieval, and ranking deviation caused by cosine similarity failing to capture logical implication. A directed heterogeneous graph covering semantic equivalence, hierarchical attribution, and cross-reference edges is constructed with atomic clauses as nodes—quantifying equivalence confidence via bidirectional entailment probability harmonic mean—unifying \"synonymous but differently expressed\" clauses from ISO/SAE 21434, UNECE R155, TISAX, and GB/T into a single graph space (15,000 nodes, 28,600 heterogeneous edges). four-stage retrieval pipeline leverages graph nodes as retrieval units, expands cross-standard candidates via equivalence edges, completes chapter context via hierarchical attribution edges, and refines candidates through multi-dimensional fusion scoring. An NLI-based entailment reranking mechanism replaces cosine similarity with unidirectional entailment probability, upgrading the ranking objective from semantic similarity to logical coverage and constraining LLM generation within a logically reachable compliance solution space. On a 1,500-item evaluation set with Qwen3-8B and BGE-M3, the proposed method improves Recall@5, CSCR, and FAI by 12.2%, 20.5%, and 9.2% over the Dense RAG baseline, with an end-to-end expert score of 2.94. For cross-standard equivalent queries, CSCR rises from 54.2% to 82.1% (+27.9%) with an expert score of 3.00, exceeding single-standard precise queries at 2.95, strongly validating the targeted gain of the semantic equivalence graph. The proposed method offers a novel technical path for intelligent multi-standard compliance detection in automotive cybersecurity, with strong applicability in cross-standard query mapping, TARA automated review, and regulatory approval verification.",
      "published": "2026-07-08",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56028/aetr.17.1.394.2026",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "tara",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yi Li",
        "Quanshan Hou",
        "Jun Xu",
        "Xu Wang",
        "Meng Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Advances in Engineering Technology Research",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.56028/aetr.17.1.394.2026",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56038/ejrnd.v5i1.633",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Factor Authentication System for Protecting Metadata and Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicles are becoming increasingly common, and they store a significant amount of data about their drivers and their surroundings. This data is attractive to attackers, and there is a need for effective security measures to protect it. This study proposes a two-factor authentication (2FA) system to protect the metadata stored in connected vehicles and the vehicles themselves. The system consists of two main components: the Central Security Unit (CSU) and the AutoGuard (AG) mobile application. The CSU is integrated with the Remote Keyless Entry System (RKES), while the AG is installed on the authorized driver's phone. The 2FA process begins when the remote key is in proximity to the vehicle. This triggers the CSU, which then initiates the second authentication factor. The AG prompts the driver to enter a valid security method, such as a biometric, pattern, or PIN code. If the second authentication is successful, the AG authorizes the CSU and the vehicle doors are opened by the RKES. The driver is notified by CSU through AG if the 2FA process is unsuccessful. As a result, this system aims to protect the metadata stored in authorized users' vehicles and their vehicles from unauthorized invaders. Furthermore, it is possible to enhance the accuracy of the 2FA system by integrating the location of the phone with AG functionality into the authentication system.",
      "published": "2025-06-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56038/ejrnd.v5i1.633",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicles",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hüseyin Karacali",
        "Nevzat Donum",
        "Efecan Cebel"
      ],
      "venue": "The European Journal of Research and Development",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.56038/ejrnd.v5i1.633",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56397/jwe.2025.02.02",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Risk Assessment Models for Autonomous Vehicle Insurance Pricing: A Study on Level 4 and Level 5 Automation in Germany",
      "description": "The adoption of Level 4 and Level 5 autonomous vehicles presents significant challenges and opportunities for the insurance industry, requiring a fundamental shift from traditional driver-based risk assessment to AI-driven liability models. This study examines the financial, technological, and regulatory implications of autonomous vehicle insurance pricing in Germany, focusing on risk distribution, AI-based assessment frameworks, and emerging insurance models. The analysis highlights key risk factors, including cybersecurity threats, AI decision-making reliability, and V2V/V2I communication effectiveness, which influence insurance premium adjustments and liability allocation. The study further explores existing insurance frameworks and their limitations, emphasizing the need for new actuarial models that integrate real-time vehicle data, machine learning, and telematics-based risk assessment. Regulatory challenges are discussed in the context of EU and German liability laws, underscoring the ethical and legal complexities of AI-driven accident claims and responsibility sharing between manufacturers, AI developers, and insurers. The findings suggest that usage-based insurance (UBI), fleet policies, and blockchain-driven liability tracking will define the future of autonomous vehicle insurance. As AV adoption increases, insurers must adapt to data-driven, predictive, and scalable pricing models that ensure fair risk distribution and regulatory compliance while fostering public trust in self-driving mobility solutions.",
      "published": "2025-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56397/jwe.2025.02.02",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "risk assessment",
        "self-driving",
        "telematics",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Braun-Fischer Hannah"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of World Economy",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.56397/jwe.2025.02.02",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4507,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.56397/jwe.2025.02.02 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: requiring, regulatory, trust, significant, privacy, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56553/popets-2022-0066",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Privacy into the Electric Vehicle Charging Architecture",
      "description": "The Electric Vehicle (EV) charging architecture consists of several actors which communicate with different protocols. A serious issue is the lack of adequate privacy-preserving measures that enables the generation of movement profiles or inferring consumer habits by all of the involved actors. In this paper, we propose an extension of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-based Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) scheme to enable privacy-preserving charging authorization and billing. Our implementation shows that our solution can be easily integrated into existing protocols of the Plug-and-Charge (PnC) EV charging architecture and introduces only minor overhead. The formal analysis using the Tamarin prover shows the security and privacy of our protocol extension.",
      "published": "2022-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2022-0066",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dustin Kern",
        "Timm Lauser",
        "Christoph Krauß"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.56553/popets-2022-0066",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56557/ajpam/2025/v7i1201",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Anomaly Detection in Time Series Data for Cyber Security: Integrating Supervised, Semi-supervised and Unsupervised Methods",
      "description": "This research aims to address the gap between evolving cyber threats and existing detection systems. Organizations face challenges with large data streams and sophisticated attacks. Current methods have weaknesses like low labeled datasets and high false positive rates. An integrated approach combining supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised detection paradigms is needed to address modern cybersecurity threats. Some of the traditional techniques were examined, weighing their pros and cons, along with real-world applications, where cybersecurity threats pose significant risks is applicable such as Banking Networks, Military Networks, Hospital Networks, Trading Platforms, Power Grids and Utilities, Large super market services, Automotive Industry, etc. The experimental findings of this study using R package reveal that using ensemble approaches—where multiple detection methods work together—can significantly outperform single-method strategies, cutting false positive rates by as much as 37% and boosting detection accuracy by 24% across a range of attack types. The paper concludes with thoughts on future research paths, especially focusing on adaptive learning systems that can keep pace with the ever-changing threat landscape.",
      "published": "2025-06-12",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56557/ajpam/2025/v7i1201",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Howard, C.C",
        "L Omamoke",
        "Tamaramiebi K. Waidor"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.56557/ajpam/2025/v7i1201",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56578/mits050401",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AMI-SMPA: Secure Authentication for Advanced Metering Infrastructure in Networked Electric-Vehicle Charging Systems",
      "description": "Networked electric-vehicle (EV) charging increasingly depends on advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) for charging authorization, metered-energy reporting, and demand-response control, making authenticated key establishment a safety-relevant communication requirement.This study reconstructs the security-relevant equations of a recently developed elliptic-curve multi-phase authentication protocol and evaluates whether its claimed properties follow from the specified algebra.Six structural weaknesses are identified: reversible exposure of the infrastructure private-key term, long-term key disclosure through the proposed signature equation, replay susceptibility inside the timestamp window, lack of binding between authentication and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values, dual session-key definitions, and static-identity linkability.Advanced Metering Infrastructure-Secure Multi-Phase Authentication (AMI-SMPA) is designed with signed credentials, transcript-bound ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman, Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF), role-separated HMAC key confirmation, Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM), rotating aliases, and replay-aware state.The protocol is mapped to the EV, EV supply equipment, charging-station controller, smart meter (SM), data concentrator, and utility control center (UCC); it protects stationmeter-to-utility metering and charging-control messages without replacing ISO 15118.In an isolated emulator, all four reconstructed attack conditions succeeded in 1,000/1,000 trials, whereas all corresponding AMI-SMPA checks succeeded in 1,000/1,000 trials.A controlled 1,000-run profile estimated 16.92 ms computation time, 19.35 ms endto-end latency, 612 bytes/session, 4.35 mJ/session, 99.14% packet-delivery ratio, 98.77% replay detection, 98.76% unauthorized message-modification rejection (UMR), and 97.63% key-compromise containment.A fixed-seed, allat-once EV charging burst model for 50, 200, and 1,000 charging points yielded 60.36-60.46 completed sessions/s, with queue-inclusive mean completion time rising from 423.69 to 8,279.05 ms.These controlled results support protocol-level feasibility and expose capacity-planning requirements; they do not establish operational-network performance or power-grid stability.",
      "published": "2026-10-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56578/mits050401",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haewon Byeon"
      ],
      "venue": "Mechatronics and intelligent transportation systems",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.56578/mits050401",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56670/jsrd.v5i2.1668",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BEYOND THE FEED: THE POWER OF POLITICAL INFLUENCERS IN FRAMING ELECTION NARRATIVES",
      "description": "The development of digital communication technology has shifted the electoral campaign landscape from physical spaces to cyberspace through the involvement of digital influencers. This study aims to analyze the strategies used by influencers to construct political narratives on social media and their implications for shaping public opinion ahead of the General Election. Using a qualitative approach with a descriptive analytical design, this research focuses on the textual analysis of digital documents through non-participant observation (netnography) of content posts, captions, and comment threads on social media platforms, without the use of field interviews or respondent sampling. The results show that political influencers effectively act as new opinion leaders, packaging rigid public policy issues into popular content (infotainment) through three main pillars: humanistic personification of candidates, policy simplification, and counter-narrative advocacy. Analysis of digital comment threads reveals that the cyberspace beneath influencer posts functions as an arena for opinion consolidation, rich in emotional engagement, despite being vulnerable to distortion due to echo chamber effects and platform algorithm bias. These findings conclude that the involvement of political influencers has confirmed a radical shift in digital agenda-setting theory and the two-stage communication flow, where they are no longer merely campaign support instruments but rather determining pillars in directing support for modern digital democracy.",
      "published": "2023-12-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56670/jsrd.v5i2.1668",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Prasetya Yoga Santoso"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Scientech Research and Development",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.56670/jsrd.v5i2.1668",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56975/ijcrt.v14i2.301542",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Real-Time Hybrid Machine Learning Intrusion Detection System for CAN-Based In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Modern connected vehicles rely on Controller Area Network (CAN)-based in-vehicle networks to coordinate safety-critical electronic control units, yet these legacy protocols lack intrinsic security mechanisms such as authentication and encryption.This makes modern vehicles vulnerable to cyber-attacks, including message injection, replay, spoofing, and denial-of-service.This paper proposes a real-time hybrid machine learning intrusion detection system for CAN-based in-vehicle networks that integrates supervised and unsupervised learning through an ensemble decision architecture.CAN frames from the CAN-Intrusion and Car-Hacking benchmark datasets are segmented into time windows and transformed into protocol-level and statistical feature vectors.A Random Forest classifier is trained on labelled data to detect known attacks, while an Autoencoder is trained on normal traffic to identify previously unseen intrusions.Their outputs are fused using a Gradient Boosting meta-classifier.Experiments are conducted using a standardized 70:15:15 train-validation-test split and repeated over ten independent runs.The proposed hybrid model achieves an average detection accuracy of 97.8% with a 95% confidence interval of ±0.6%, a false positive rate of 3.2% ±0.4%, and an average inference latency of 4.0 ms on embedded-class hardware.Paired statistical tests and effect-size analysis confirm that the observed performance improvements over individual supervised and unsupervised models are statistically significant.The results demonstrate that hybrid ensemble learning provides both high detection reliability and real-time feasibility, making the proposed framework suitable for deployment in next-generation automotive electronic control units.",
      "published": "2026-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56975/ijcrt.v14i2.301542",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jayant Kumar Kachhwaha",
        "Dhirendra Kumar Tripathi"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CREATIVE RESEARCH THOUGHTS",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.56975/ijcrt.v14i2.301542",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3801,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.56975/ijcrt.v14i2.301542 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: confidence, normal, makes, making, control, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.56975/tijer.v12i6.158434",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure and Efficient OTA Updates for Connected Vehicles: A Systems Engineering Approach",
      "description": "As vehicles become increasingly software-defined, Over-the-Air (OTA) update platforms have emerged as critical infrastructure for deploying software patches, feature enhancements, and security updates remotely. However, enabling secure, reliable, and bandwidth-efficient OTA updates presents significant technical and architectural challenges—especially in systems that govern safety-critical functions. This article presents a systems engineering approach to the design of secure and efficient OTA frameworks for connected vehicles. Drawing upon case studies from automotive OEMs and simulations of in-vehicle networks, the article analyzes attack surfaces, latency constraints, and resource limitations. A novel multi-layered OTA update architecture is proposed, integrating encrypted firmware distribution, in-transit authentication, ECU-level validation, delta encoding, and redundancy-based rollback. By aligning cybersecurity, embedded systems, and vehicle diagnostics under a unified OTA pipeline, this work contributes to a scalable, OEM-agnostic solution for secure vehicle software lifecycle management.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.56975/tijer.v12i6.158434",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gopi Krishna Kommineni"
      ],
      "venue": "Technix International Journal for Engineering Research",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.56975/tijer.v12i6.158434",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5753/sbrc_estendido.2025.6908",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Cybersecurity of Automotive Ethernet Networks with Deep Learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems",
      "description": "The growing number of attack surfaces in vehicles, driven by increased connectivity and the demand for automotive Ethernet, a high-bandwidth in-vehicle network technology, emphasizes the need for effective security mechanisms. This dissertation proposes two deep learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for identifying cyberattacks in automotive Ethernet networks. The first proposal features an IDS based on a multi-criteria optimized convolutional neural network, designed to enhance detection accuracy, speed, and storage efficiency simultaneously. The second proposal introduces a multi-stage deep learning-based IDS, where the initial stage prioritizes fast detection while the second stage focuses on achieving more accurate results and classifying attacks. The main results of this dissertation comprehend the publication of a paper in SBRC 2023 and another in the Ad Hoc Networks journal.",
      "published": "2025-05-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5753/sbrc_estendido.2025.6908",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luigi F. Marques da Luz",
        "Paulo Freitas de Araujo-Filho",
        "D. Campelo"
      ],
      "venue": "Brazilian Symposium on Computer Networks and Distributed Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5753/sbrc_estendido.2025.6908",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5753/sbrc_estendido.2026.23250",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Yes, CARLA CAN: Extending the CARLA Simulator for In-Vehicle Network Cybersecurity Experimentation",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely on in-vehicle networks (IVNs), but protocols such as CAN lack built-in security, exposing critical systems to cyber threats. Existing platforms often require real vehicles or hardware, limiting accessibility. This work presents a software-based platform for automotive cybersecurity research and experimentation. It integrates a virtual CAN bus with dynamic driving scenarios using the CARLA simulator. A modular design enables ECUs (Electronic Control Units), attackers, and intrusion detection systems to operate as independent nodes. The platform enables monitoring and manipulation of CAN traffic without hardware, providing a reproducible environment for research, teaching, dataset generation, and evaluation of IVN security.",
      "published": "2026-05-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5753/sbrc_estendido.2026.23250",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Luigi F. Marques da Luz",
        "Vinicius L. Ventura",
        "Divanilson Rodrigo de Sousa Campelo"
      ],
      "venue": "Simpósio Brasileiro de Redes de Computadores e Sistemas Distribuídos (SBRC)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5753/sbrc_estendido.2026.23250",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5753/sbseg.2026.27039",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Model-based Safety and Security Co-Analysis using Component Attack Fault Trees in the Automotive Domain",
      "description": "Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in critical domains such as self-driven cars and unmanned aerial vehicles involve complex interactions between safety and security concerns. Failures in CPSs such as self-driven cars are caused either by hardware/software component faults or attacks. The identification of hazards, their risks, and root causes is addressed by Safety Engineering, e.g., using Fault Tree Analysis. On the other hand, Security Engineering addresses the identification of asset vulnerabilities, their associated external threats, risks, and causes, using Attack Tree Analysis. Although both disciplines use separate terminology, processes, and tools, they rely on a common system architecture and in the use models such as Component Fault Trees and Attack Trees to support their analyses. In the automotive domain, such analyses should be performed in alignment with guidance defined in assurance standards, e.g., ISO 26262 for functional safety, and ISO 21434 for cybersecurity. However, existing techniques that integrate safety and security models are not fully aligned with the ISO 21434. In this paper, we introduce a novel Component Attack Fault Trees (CAFT) modelling language, built upon Component Fault Trees and ISO 21434 concepts, for integrating safety and security analysis models. Since CAFT was built in alignment with traditional safety and security analysis formalisms and standards, it has the potential to guide engineers in the development of multi-concern analysis model-driven engineering tools. We illustrate the use of our CAFT language to support safety and security co-analysis of an automotive headlamp system.",
      "published": "2026-09-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2026.27039",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Victor Luiz Grechi",
        "André Luiz de Oliveira",
        "Barbara Gallina",
        "Leonardo Montecchi",
        "Rosana T. V. Braga"
      ],
      "venue": "Simpósio Brasileiro de Cibersegurança (SBSeg)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5753/sbseg.2026.27039",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5753/ssv.2025.39492",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Authentication Protocol Implementation for V2X Communication: a Simulation Study-Case",
      "description": "Secure Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication is a key for the development of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Compromising the sensitive data exchanged by vehicles, pedestrians and the infrastructure can lead to critical safety and privacy risks. Nevertheless, implementing robust security protocols that respect the real-time requirements of such critical applications is challenging due to the significant computational overhead of traditional PKI and the strict latency constraints of safety messages. This work investigates the application of a secure IIoT authentication protocol, proposed in previous work by the group, in the context of V2X communication. The secure protocol is implemented on a V2X simulation environment built over the Artery framework (which integrates OMNeT++ and SUMO) and accounts for vehicles and Roadside Units communication. We evaluated the implementation in a 100-vehicle simulation in terms of latency and jitter, with a mean end-to-end authentication latency of 24.15 ms. The results corroborate the suitability of the secure IIoT protocol implemented here for V2X communication, demonstrating its ability to provide robust security without introducing prohibitive delays.",
      "published": "2025-11-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5753/ssv.2025.39492",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "privacy",
        "secure",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emanuely Poncio do Amaral",
        "Leonardo Passig Horstmann",
        "Antônio Augusto Fröhlich"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5753/ssv.2025.39492",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5762/kais.2025.26.10.235",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development of an Integrated V&V System for Security Validation of Automotive Electronic Components",
      "description": "차량은 다양한 전자제어장치(ECU)와 네트워크 인터페이스의 상호 연결에 점점 더 의존하게 되면서 차량 내 시스템에 대한 사이버보안 확보가 필수 과제로 부상하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 자동차 전장부품의 보안성 검증을 위해 설계된 통합형 Validation & Verification(V&V) 시스템을 제안한다. 본 시스템은 다중 프로토콜(CAN, LIN, Ethernet, V2X)을 지원하는 테스트 인터페이스, 자동화된 퍼징 및 침투 테스트 모듈, 시나리오 기반의 실행 엔진을 갖춘 보안 테스트 라이브러리, 포렌식 로그 수집 및 자동 보고 기능을 포함한다. Gateway ECU, Domain Controller, TCU를 대상으로한 사례 연구를 통해 본 시스템은 퍼징 기반 취약점 17건, 침투 시나리오 3건을 탐지하였으며 기존 대비 평균 38%의 테스트 시간 단축 효과를 입증하였다. 제안된 시스템은 ISO/SAE 21434 Part 8 및 UNECE WP.29 CSMS 규정과의 정합성을 확보하였으며 향후 국가 단위 형식승인 체계와의 통합 가능성도 높다. 앞으로는 AI 기반 이상행위 탐지, OTA 환경의 실시간 보안 검증, 국제 인증 연계성 확보 등이 주요 발전 방향으로 제시된다.",
      "published": "2025-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5762/kais.2025.26.10.235",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyung-Uk Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5762/kais.2025.26.10.235",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5762/kais.2025.26.10.809",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automated TARA System for Compliance with Automotive Cybersecurity Regulations",
      "description": "차량의 연결성과 복잡성이 증가함에 따라 사이버보안 위협이 현실화되고 있으며 이에 따라 UNECE WP.29 UN R155 및 ISO/SAE 21434 등 국제 법규는 위협 기반의 위험 평가(TARA)를 필수 활동으로 요구하고 있다. 그러나 기존의 TARA 분석은 수작업 중심으로 이루어져 분석 시간, 반복성, 정량성 측면에서 한계를 갖는다. 본 논문에서는 TARA의 자산 식별, 위협 시나리오 도출, 공격 경로 추론, 위험도 평가, 대응 전략 제안 과정을 자동화하는 시스템을 설계하고 Gateway ECU 및 TCU를 대상으로 실증 테스트를 수행하였다. 분석 결과, 수작업 대비 평균 분석 소요 시간을 40% 단축하였고 위협 탐지율은 25% 향상되었으며 위험도 정량화도 가능함을 확인하였다. 또한 본 시스템은 ISO/SAE 21434 및 UN R155의 규정에 기반한 보안 목표 및 완화 전략 제안을 자동화함으로써 차량 제조사의 사이버보안 법규 대응과 CSMS 문서화 자동화를 지원할 수 있는 기반을 제공한다. 향후에는 AI 기반 예측, 위협 DB 자동 갱신, 차량 아키텍처 확장성 확보를 통해 법규 대응 도구로서의 실용성을 더욱 강화할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.",
      "published": "2025-10-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5762/kais.2025.26.10.809",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "tara",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyung-Uk Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.5762/kais.2025.26.10.809",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5762/kais.2026.27.8.978",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on the Application of ISO/SAE 21434 for Smart Ship Cybersecurity Risk Management",
      "description": "최근 스마트 선박과 자율운항선박의 확산으로 IT/OT 융합 환경이 확대되면서 선박의 사이버 공격 표면과 보안 위험이 급격히 증가하고 있다. 기존 선박 보안 기법은 정성적 평가에 치중되어 체계적인 정량적 위험 분석에 한계가 존재한다. 본 연구에서는 IACS UR E26/E27 요구사항을 반영하고 자동차 사이버보안 표준인 ISO/SAE 21434의 TARA 방법론을 해양 운항 환경 특성에 맞게 재정의하여 스마트 선박에 적합한 정량적 사이버보안 위험관리 방안을 제안하였다. 데이터 흐름도(DFD) 기반의 STRIDE 위협 모델링을 통해 주요 공격 시나리오를 도출하였으며 베이지안 네트워크를 활용하여 위협 전파를 정량화하는 동적 위험 평가 모델을 구축하였다. 또한 IACS UR E26 기준을 준수하는 Enterprise- DMZ-Control 구조의 5계층 Zone-Conduit 네트워크를 설계하고 방화벽과 데이터 다이오드를 배치하여 심층 방어 체계를 수립하였다. VMware 기반 가상화 테스트베드에서 Kali Linux를 활용해 비인가 접근 및 DoS 공격 시나리오를 수행하여 보안성을 실증하였다. 실험 결과, 보안 완화 조치 적용 후 평균 위협 발생 확률은 64.1%에서 9.7%로 감소하여 84.9%의 위험 저감 효과를 나타냈다. 네트워크 평균 지연시간은 1.8ms에서 2.3ms로 소폭 증가했으나 3ms 이하를 유지하여 실시간 제어 성능에 미치는 영향이 제한적임을 검증하였다. 제안한 방법론은 스마트 선박의 Security-by-Design 구현과 실효성 있는 위험관리 체계 구축을 위한 구체적 가이드를 제공한다.",
      "published": "2026-08-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5762/kais.2026.27.8.978",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hyung-Uk Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5762/kais.2026.27.8.978",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.57683/epub-3598",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Password- / Keyless authentication",
      "description": "The aim of this academic thesis is to investigate and identify the usage possibilities, security and convenience of Password- / Keyless authentication. This is performed within the Web presence of Jamestown US-Immobilien GmbH to specify its use. These requirements will be analyzed in the context of authenticating transactions in the Jamestown Online (JTO) application, presenting a passwordless approach. In the first part, an introduction to Jamestown US-Immobilien GmbH, Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) Alliance and passwords is given. These will show off their company profile, business field and the increasing demand of a convenient authentication in applications like JTO. Also showing off the limitations of password-based authentication, comparing them to the pros and cons of similar approaches. The thesis subsequently identifies various methods in detail, and further outlines the structure of a passwordless-based approach in contrast to a password-based approach. In conclusion, the thesis argues that convenient access to applications is essential for a company to stay competitive and presents an example for JTO.",
      "published": "2026-09-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.57683/epub-3598",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mert Torun"
      ],
      "venue": "ePublications (Technical University of Cologne)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.57683/epub-3598",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5772/intechopen.1014246",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Risk Management in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems",
      "description": "Vehicles have been connected for decades through over-the-air updates, infotainment systems, Wi–Fi, and Bluetooth interfaces. The emergence of cooperative intelligent transport systems (C-ITS) as the next generation of intelligent transport systems (ITS) has greatly expanded this connectivity. C-ITS is a key enabler for autonomous driving, providing real-time coordination between vehicles and infrastructure. By linking vehicles, infrastructure, road users, and cloud platforms through vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, C-ITS supports safer, more efficient, and intelligent transport. At the same time, expanded connectivity enlarges the cyberattack surface, exposing safety functions such as braking, steering, and traffic signal control to potential manipulation. This chapter contributes a literature-based conceptual mapping that uses a tri-level perspective to relate vulnerabilities to detection techniques. It pinpoints technical challenges, including false positives, latency, scalability, heterogeneity, and adversarial machine learning, and discusses strategies such as hybrid intrusion detection systems (IDS). To further enhance applicability, it presents methodologies including simulations, hardware-in-the-loop testbeds, and case studies based on C-Roads implementations. It further incorporates cybersecurity asset management and cybersecurity risk assessment as part of the C-ITS ecosystem, consistent with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and ISO/SAE 21434 standard, to enforce regulation and lifecycle-dependent security administration. The chapter also highlights the research challenges, which include asset-agnostic detection, insider and supply-chain threats, adversarial resilience, regulation alignment, and few real-world verifications, and provides a roadmap to further develop IDS research and practice toward C-ITS.",
      "published": "2026-01-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.1014246",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ramin Ranjbar Motlagh"
      ],
      "venue": "Civil engineering.",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5772/intechopen.1014246",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5772/intechopen.1014482",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Threats in Connected Vehicle Environment",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) technologies and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications are reshaping transportation by enabling vehicles to exchange data with other vehicles, roadside infrastructure, pedestrians, and cloud services. These systems rely on protocols such as dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) and cellular-V2X (C–V2X) to support safety-critical applications like collision avoidance and traffic flow optimization. However, the reliance on continuous connectivity introduces significant security and privacy concerns, including eavesdropping, spoofing, denial of service, and large-scale traffic manipulation. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security and privacy threats in CV environments. We first introduce the fundamental concepts of CVs and their communication protocols. We then analyze threat actors, attack surfaces, and attack models with real-world examples. Existing solutions, including cryptographic authentication, intrusion detection systems, and blockchain-based trust management, are surveyed. Finally, we highlight open-ended research challenges such as scalability, postquantum resilience, and privacy-preserving data sharing.",
      "published": "2026-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.1014482",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ayan Roy"
      ],
      "venue": "Civil engineering.",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.5772/intechopen.1014482",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3988,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.5772/intechopen.1014482 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: backend_cloud, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: espionage, fleet_scale, privacy; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: large-scale, trust, like, service, applications, significant, privacy, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5772/intechopen.114378",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advanced System Diagnostics Tools: Innovations and Applications",
      "description": "This chapter explores the evolution and significance of advanced diagnostics tools in complex system management, emphasizing the shift toward integrated, intelligent, and predictive diagnostics. It covers the application of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) for predictive maintenance, real-time monitoring, and the integration of sensor technologies with the Internet of Things (IoT). The text examines the use of diagnostic tools in various fields, including mechanical, electrical, software, and network systems, with specific attention to industry applications in automotive, aerospace, and healthcare sectors. These examples illustrate how diagnostics are transforming these industries by enhancing efficiency, safety, and reliability. The chapter also discusses the role of diagnostics in system design, the importance of built-in diagnostics, and the challenges of managing and interpreting the large volumes of data these tools generate. It highlights innovative data analysis and visualization techniques and looks ahead to future trends in diagnostics, such as the potential impact of quantum computing and concerns over cybersecurity and data privacy. Overall, the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the current state and future directions of advanced system diagnostics.",
      "published": "2024-06-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.114378",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adeel H. Suhail",
        "Fiseha M. Guangul",
        "Abdul Nazeer"
      ],
      "venue": "Industrial engineering and management.",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5772/intechopen.114378",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5772/intechopen.99394",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving Communication System for Vehicle-to-Everything Networks by Using 5G Technology",
      "description": "Next-generations of wireless communication systems (5G scheme & beyond) are rapidly evolving in the contemporary life. These schemes could propose vital solutions for many existing challenges in various aspects of our lives, eventually to ensure stable communications. Such challenges are even greater when it comes to address ubiquitous coverage and steady interconnection performance in fast mobile vehicles (i.e., trains or airplanes) where certainly blind spots exist. As an early initiative, the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has proposed a regulation for Long Term Evolution (LTE)-based Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) network in order to offer solid solutions for V2X interconnections. V2X term should comprise the following terminologies: vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-network (V2N) communications, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P). Superior V2X communications have a promising potential to improve efficiency, road safety, security, the accessibility of infotainment services (any service of user-interface exists inside a vehicle). In this chapter, the aforementioned topics will be addressed. In addition, the chapter will open the door on investigating the role of wireless cooperative and automatic signal identification schemes in V2X networks, and shedding light on the machine learning techniques (i.e, Support Vector Machines (SVMs), Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)) when they meet with the next-generations of wireless networks.",
      "published": "2021-09-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.99394",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "regulation",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tarik Adnan Almohamad",
        "Muhammet Tahir Güneşer",
        "Mohd Nazri Mahmud",
        "Cihat Şeker"
      ],
      "venue": "IntechOpen eBooks",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.5772/intechopen.99394",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.58346/jowua.2024.i2.001",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight IDS Framework Using Word Embeddings for In-Vehicle Network Security",
      "description": "As modern vehicle systems evolve into advanced cyber-physical systems, vehicle vulnerability to cyber threats has significantly increased. This paper discusses the need for advanced security in the Controller Area Network (CAN), which currently lacks security features. We propose a novel Intrusion Detection System (IDS) utilizing word embedding techniques from Natural Language Processing (NLP) for effective sequential pattern representations to improve intrusion detection in CAN traffic. This method transforms CAN identifiers into multi-dimensional vectors, enabling the model to capture complex sequential patterns of CAN traffic behaviors. Our methodology focuses on a lightweight neural network adaptable for automotive systems with limited computational resources. At first, a Word2Vec model is trained to make the embedding matrix of CAN IDs. Then, using the pre-trained embedding layer extracted from the Word2Vec network, the classifier analyzes embeddings from CAN data to detect intrusions. This model is viable for resource-constrained environments due to its low computational expense and memory usage. Key contributions of this research are (1) the application of word embeddings for intrusion detection in CAN traffic, (2) a streamlined neural network that balances accuracy with efficiency, and (3) a comprehensive evaluation showing our model’s competitive performance compared to relatively heavy deep learning models. Experimental results using the Car-Hacking dataset, widely used for automotive security research, demonstrate that our IDS effectively detects four different types of attacks on CAN. This work advances vehicle security technologies, contributing to safer transportation systems.",
      "published": "2022-06-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.58346/jowua.2024.i2.001",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ha Rang Kim",
        "Hyun Min Song"
      ],
      "venue": "J. Wirel. Mob. Networks Ubiquitous Comput. Dependable Appl.",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.58346/jowua.2024.i2.001",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 10,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.58436/jeepa.v2i1.1041",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "IMPLEMENTATION OF MOTORCYCLE SECURITY EQUIPMENT USING RFID BASED ARDUINO UNO E-KTP: Array",
      "description": "During a pandemic like now, many workers are being expelled by the company, resulting in a decline in the economy in various regions. To meet the needs of a person may do bad things such as curanmor (motorcycle theft). Even though the motorbike is equipped with a fairly strict security system, it is still sometimes broken by thieves. This study aims to create a motor vehicle security system based on Arduino R3 and RFID as an e-KTP sensor. Where this system can turn on or turn off the motorbike using an ID card or using its RFID Pin. even though the thief managed to break into the ignition, the motor still couldn't start because it needed other access. Based on the results of observations and tests carried out, the authors can conclude that the performance of the motorcycle safety device system using e-KTP works quite well. When the contact is on, it will activate the safety device system before activating the motor electrical system. RFID needs access to the appropriate e-KTP and is forwarded to the microcontroller (Arduino) then produces output to the relay to turn on the motor's electricity so that the motor can be turned on/started",
      "published": "2022-05-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.58436/jeepa.v2i1.1041",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nama Penulis"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Electronic and Electrical Power Applications",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.58436/jeepa.v2i1.1041",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.58532/nbennurissdb2p4c1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF VAPT FRAMEWORK FOR AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY",
      "description": "The automotive industry's rapid transformation, driven by the integration of connected and autonomous technologies, has introduced a complex landscape of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Modern vehicles, equipped with sophisticated electronic control units (ECUs), advanced communication interfaces, and over-the-air (OTA) update capabilities, are increasingly susceptible to cyber-attacks that can compromise vehicle safety, functionality, and data privacy. This project addresses the limitations of current automotive Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing (VAPT) tools, which often lack universality, extensibility, and automation, particularly for diverse vehicle architectures and regional specificities. The report proposes the development of a modular, Command-Line Interface (CLI)-based VAPT framework designed to provide a unified and efficient platform for automotive cybersecurity testing. The framework's core objectives include automating key VAPT tasks (e.g., scanning, fuzzing, message injection), supporting multiple communication protocols (e.g., CAN, DoIP), and ensuring compatibility with various vehicle models, with a specific focus on addressing the unique requirements of Indian automotive systems. As part of the project's foundational phase, an in-depth analysis of the Mahindra BE.6 electric vehicle was conducted to understand modern automotive architectures, including zonal ECU distribution and communication networks, and to identify potential cyber-attack surfaces. The proposed framework aims to enhance the efficacy of automotive cybersecurity assessments by providing a scalable, modular, and compliance-aware solution that facilitates tasks such as vulnerability detection, threat simulation, and regulatory compliance mapping.",
      "published": "2026-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.58532/nbennurissdb2p4c1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mosam Patel",
        "Khyat A. Talsaniya",
        "Sarang N. Asnani",
        "Keerthana A",
        "Rishi Dedia"
      ],
      "venue": "Iterative International Publishers eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.58532/nbennurissdb2p4c1",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.59075/crsss.4.1.2026.1941",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity and Public Trust in Autonomous Vehicles: Challenges, Mitigation Strategies, and Future Directions",
      "description": "Autonomous and connected vehicles depend on complex software, artificial intelligence (AI), sensor fusion, wireless communication, cloud services, and over-the-air updates. These capabilities may improve mobility and traffic operations, but they also create cyber-physical risks: a compromised digital component can influence a physical system operating among people. This conceptual review examines how cybersecurity vulnerabilities affect operational safety, privacy, organizational accountability, and public trust in driverless technology. It synthesizes established research on vehicle attack surfaces with current guidance and standards, including ISO/SAE 21434, ISO 24089, United Nations Regulation No. 155, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s cybersecurity guidance, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. The review distinguishes attacks on in-vehicle networks, remote connectivity, sensors, machine-learning systems, software supply chains, and personal data. It also reassesses widely cited incidents, especially the 2015 Jeep Cherokee demonstration, without treating a connected vehicle as equivalent to a fully autonomous vehicle or implying that a general internet outage itself constitutes a vehicle compromise. The central argument is that trust cannot be established through security claims or a single protective technology. It requires demonstrable lifecycle risk management, layered technical controls, independent validation, privacy safeguards, coordinated vulnerability disclosure, incident transparency, and clear accountability across manufacturers, suppliers, operators, and regulators. The paper proposes an integrated trust-oriented framework that links cybersecurity assurance to safety outcomes and public communication. Because this is a conceptual review rather than an empirical study, its recommendations should be tested through field data, structured expert assessment, and comparative evaluations across vehicle platforms.",
      "published": "2026-03-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.59075/crsss.4.1.2026.1941",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "jeep"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kamran Arshad",
        "Junaid Shaukat",
        "Muhammad Faraz Tahir Bhatti"
      ],
      "venue": "The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.59075/crsss.4.1.2026.1941",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5375,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.7,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.59075/crsss.4.1.2026.1941 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: backend_cloud, supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: incident, suppliers, personal, national, operational, requires, sensor, trust."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.59324/ejaset.2025.3(1).16",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Security of Autonomous Vehicle Software and its National Security Implications",
      "description": "The rapid proliferation of autonomous vehicles (AVs) presents a transformative technological leap with significant implications for safety, efficiency, and societal well-being. However, this advancement introduces a complex web of security vulnerabilities posing substantial risks to national security. This analysis explores the multifaceted security challenges inherent in AV software, examining their cascading effects on critical infrastructure, economic stability, and national defense. The core argument is that AV software vulnerabilities represent a significant and underappreciated national security threat. This threat manifests in several key ways. First, the interconnectedness of AVs—relying on communication networks (5G, V2X), mapping data, and real-time information sharing—creates a large attack surface. Cyberattacks can cause cascading failures, disrupting transportation networks and impacting supply chains. Second, the economic consequences of large-scale attacks are potentially devastating, encompassing vehicle recalls, repairs, insurance claims, and lost productivity leading to economic instability and national security concerns. Third, the integration of AV technology into military applications amplifies these risks. Autonomous military systems inherit and may amplify the vulnerabilities present in civilian AVs, jeopardizing national defense capabilities. Geopolitical implications are significant; state-sponsored attacks and the potential for cyber warfare demand international cooperation in establishing cybersecurity norms and standards. Furthermore, the potential for AV misuse in terrorism or criminal activities, alongside data privacy concerns, increases the urgency of addressing these security challenges. Connected AVs collect vast amounts of data, presenting significant privacy risks and potential for exploitation. The analysis details various software vulnerabilities, including susceptibility to adversarial attacks on sensor systems (cameras, LiDAR, radar), vulnerabilities in machine-learning-based decision-making algorithms (adversarial examples, model poisoning, algorithmic bias), weaknesses in V2X communication protocols, risks associated with OTA updates, and supply chain security challenges. Hardware vulnerabilities further expand the attack surface. Mitigating these risks necessitates a multi-pronged approach: robust cybersecurity regulations and standards, investment in research and development of more resilient systems, and strong international cooperation. Implementing secure software development lifecycle practices, enhanced hardware security, transparent supply chains via SBOMs, and comprehensive incident response plans are crucial. Continuous research, development, and collaboration are essential for ensuring AVs' secure and responsible deployment, preventing significant consequences for national security and global stability.",
      "published": "2025-02-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.59324/ejaset.2025.3(1).16",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Espionage / sovereignty"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Satyajit Lingras",
        "Aruni Basu"
      ],
      "venue": "European Journal of Applied Science Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.59324/ejaset.2025.3(1).16",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.5567,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "medium",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.59324/ejaset.2025.3(1).16 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain; impacts: espionage, fleet_scale, privacy; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: societal, lost, espionage, disrupting, military, incident, collect, large-scale."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.5935/jetia.v10i50.1433",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VaultGuard: The Advanced Keyless Security System",
      "description": "The VaultGuard is a cutting-edge password management solution designed to enhancesecurity, convenience, and user experience. A full-featured research work namedVaultGuard is developed to assist users in safely creating, organizing, and storing strongpasswords for a variety of online accounts and programs. This paper offers a wide range offeatures, including secure storage for multiple encrypted passwords using AES256 oncloud, Random key generation algorithm for creating an advanced password, updating userpassword timely, and a user-friendly dashboard for managing and organizing logininformation. The system provides a seamless registration process using Fast IdentityOnline 2 algorithm (FIDO2) with Web Authentication (WebAuthn) component, allowingusers to securely login without needing any password. To further enhance security, theresearch paper employs AES256 Algorithm to safeguard stored passwords, protectingthem from unauthorized access and data breaches. The system also proactively monitorsthe age of passwords and sends SMS and email notifications to users when their passwordsare older than a predetermined time period, such as a month, prompting them to updatetheir passwords for added security. By combining the convenience of passwordmanagement with authentication, strong encryption, and proactive password monitoring,the VaultGuard sets a new standard for secure and user-friendly password managementsystems, effectively addressing the shortcomings of traditional methods with 97.66 %accuracy and 98.63% precision.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.5935/jetia.v10i50.1433",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "AKSHAY SHANKAR AGRAWAL",
        "Yogita Deepak Mane",
        "Neeta Patil",
        "Sanketi Raut",
        "Vishal Shinde"
      ],
      "venue": "ITEGAM- Journal of Engineering and Technology for Industrial Applications (ITEGAM-JETIA)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.5935/jetia.v10i50.1433",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.59573/emsj.9(4).2025.101",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Recent Advances in Automotive Cybersecurity: From Secure Boot to Vehicle-to-Everything Communication",
      "description": "The automotive industry's transformation toward connected and software-defined vehicles has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape, necessitating comprehensive security frameworks that address unprecedented threats while maintaining safety-critical system performance. This article examines the evolution of automotive cybersecurity from foundational technologies such as secure boot mechanisms, trusted execution environments, and hardware security modules to advanced network protection strategies that have transitioned from vulnerable Controller Area Network protocols to secure Automotive Ethernet implementations with sophisticated intrusion detection capabilities. The article explores Vehicle-to-Everything communication security frameworks, including cryptographic protocols for vehicle identity management, infrastructure authentication, and privacy-preserving vehicle-to-vehicle communications that enable secure connected mobility ecosystems. Over-the-air update security mechanisms are investigated through secure package development, digital signature implementation, and rollback protection systems that ensure software integrity throughout vehicle lifecycles. The critical balance between cybersecurity measures and real-time performance requirements is addressed through performance impact analysis and adaptive security mechanisms that maintain system responsiveness in safety-critical applications. Industry case studies demonstrate defense-in-depth implementation strategies employed by leading manufacturers, while regulatory compliance frameworks, including international standards and certification procedures, establish mandatory cybersecurity requirements for vehicle type approval. Emerging challenges from quantum computing and artificial intelligence present both opportunities for enhanced security capabilities and new threat vectors that require post-quantum cryptography implementation and secure machine learning systems. The article reveals that effective automotive cybersecurity requires integrated multi-layered approaches that combine hardware-based security foundations with advanced software protection mechanisms, continuous monitoring systems, and industry-wide collaboration to address evolving threats while preserving the safety, reliability, and user experience essential to modern connected vehicle deployment.",
      "published": "2025-08-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.59573/emsj.9(4).2025.101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Narendra Babu Atmakuri"
      ],
      "venue": "European Modern Studies Journal",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.59573/emsj.9(4).2025.101",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.486,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.59573/emsj.9(4).2025.101 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy, vehicle_control; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: regulatory, requires, studies, user, case, digital, intelligence, impact."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.6007/ijarems/v15-i3/28585",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Transformation of the Insurance Sector through Emerging Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities in the European Union and Romania",
      "description": "HRMARS - The insurance market became increasingly digitalized in recent years due to the penetration of emerging disruptive technologies such as blockchain, chatbots and drones. These play an important role in more effective risk assessment and management, improving claims and subscription processes and reducing verification costs. Technologies which had a significant impact on the insurance market include artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT) and telematics. AI provides personalized customer experiences, while IoT provides data from devices such as smart homes and car sensors to reduce risks and prevent losses. Telematics is used in providing personalized auto policies to customers. It determines the associated risks by monitoring dedicated auto indicators and implicitly, determining the cost of insurance. In addition to the direct impact that these technologies have within the insurance field, they can lead to innovative business models such as on-demand insurance, microinsurance, continuous subscription and partner insurance. The research methodology consists of an exploratory analysis on the degree of use of emerging technologies in the insurance sector, both at the European Union and at the Romanian level. For this purpose, the degree of digitalization existing in this sector, as well as future development directions of the insurance market, were illustrated.",
      "published": "2026-07-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.6007/ijarems/v15-i3/28585",
      "matched_terms": [
        "penetration",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Daniel-Andrei Balica",
        "Ivona Stoica",
        "Ana-Maria Nedelcu Severin",
        "Anamaria-Cătălina Radu",
        "Andreea Grigorescu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.6007/ijarems/v15-i3/28585",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.6028/nist.sp.2200-03",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An evolving regulatory landscape for commercial electric vehicle fueling",
      "description": "Plug-in electric vehicles (PEV), which include \"all-electric\" battery EV (BEV) and plug-in hybrid EV (PHEV), comprise a rapidly growing proportion of the U.S. automobile market - nearly 8% of all light-duty vehicles sold in Oct. 2022, a 41.4% rise over October 2021 sales. In response to projected demands for PEV charging, private companies, utilities, and state and local governments have strived to develop policies and infrastructure that promote broad access to electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) used to fuel electric vehicles. However, long-standing regulatory oversight of retail electricity distribution and sales through utilities has presented ambiguities and constraints regarding the sales of electricity for motor vehicle fueling, particularly via public charging stations. As these matters are addressed separately by the responsible authorities in each state, a patchwork of policies and rules has evolved across the U.S. concerning regulation of public EVSE sites and charging-related transactions. These policies, or lack thereof, have influenced permissible EVSE site ownership models, methods of sale and pricing for charging sessions, and requirements for metrological control of EVSE. Nonuniformity in EVSE operations across the U.S. can stimy expansion of interstate charging networks, hinder equity in the charging market, frustrate price comparison, and diminish consumer confidence. Thus, it is advantageous that many states in recent years have begun to adopt some consistent regulatory measures, including changes in most states to utility regulations to allow owners of EVSEs to make a profit from the sale of electrical energy used as a vehicle fuel. However, significant gaps and variation in oversight remain as charging networks expand. Considering these developments, this publication summarizes the current, albeit evolving, EVSE regulatory landscape in the U.S. and explores the increasingly relevant role of legal metrology in PEV charging. The implications of these topics and their relation to other currently evolving issues, including submetering for utility PEV time of use rates and for PEV fuel excise taxes, are also discussed.",
      "published": "2023-08-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.2200-03",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "charging stations",
        "evse",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Michael A Nelson",
        "Tina G Butcher"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.6028/nist.sp.2200-03",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.6084/m9.figshare.21830418",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Improving unlinkability in C-ITS: a methodology for optimal obfuscation",
      "description": "In this paper, we develop a new methodology to provide high assurance about privacy in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS). Our focus lies on vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications enabled by Cooperative Awareness Basic Service. Our research motivation is developed based on the analysis of unlinkability provision methods indicating a gap. To address this, we propose a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to express unlinkability for the situation where two cars are communicating with a Roadside Unit (RSU) using Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs). Our HMM has labeled states specifying distinct origins of the CAMs observable by a passive attacker. We then demonstrate that a high assurance about the degree of uncertainty (e.g., entropy) about labeled states can be obtained for the attacker under the assumption that he knows actual positions of the vehicles (e.g., hidden states in HMM). We further demonstrate how unlinkability can be increased in C-ITS: we propose a joint probability distribution that both drivers must use to obfuscate their actual data jointly. This obfuscated data is then encapsulated in their CAMs. Finally, our findings are incorporated into an obfuscation algorithm whose complexity is linear in the number of discrete time steps in HMM.",
      "published": "2023-01-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.21830418",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "privacy",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yevhen Zolotavkin",
        "Yurii Baryshev",
        "Vitalii Lukichov",
        "Jannik Mähn",
        "Stefan Köpsell"
      ],
      "venue": "arXiv",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.6084/m9.figshare.21830418",
      "sources": [
        "arxiv"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.6084/m9.figshare.32856245",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Processed CAN Bus Dataset for Hybrid 1D CNN-BiLSTM with Focal Loss for Robust Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "This repository contains the processed CAN bus dataset used in the study titled \"Hybrid 1D CNN-BiLSTM with Focal Loss for Robust Intrusion Detection in In-Vehicle Networks.\" The dataset was derived from the publicly available Car Hacking: Attack & Defense Challenge 2020 Dataset. The original dataset was preprocessed by converting hexadecimal CAN identifiers to decimal values, extracting payload bytes, constructing sliding windows of 32 CAN frames, applying the Any-Attack window labeling strategy, and performing feature normalization for deep learning experiments. This processed dataset supports the experimental results reported in the associated manuscript. The original dataset is publicly available through IEEE DataPort (DOI: https://doi.org/10.21227/qvr7-n418).",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.32856245",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "can bus",
        "hacking",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Malini",
        "Gerardine Immaculate Mary"
      ],
      "venue": "Figshare",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.6084/m9.figshare.32856245",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.61173/vqgrsq76",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Current Status and Future Development of Intelligent Transportation Systems in the Logistics Industry",
      "description": "With the rapid development of the global logistics industry and the deepening of digital transformation, Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) has become the core driving force for the optimization of modern logistics supply chain. In this study, we systematically review the current status of ITS application, technical architecture and challenges in the logistics industry, and look forward to its future development trend. The study finds that ITS significantly improves the efficiency, safety and sustainability of logistics and transportation through the integration of cutting-edge technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), Big Data Analytics (BDA) and Blockchain. The global ITS market is expected to grow from USD 30.64 billion in 2024 to USD 60.92 billion by 2033, at a CAGR of 7.94%. However, the deployment of the system still faces multiple challenges such as complex technology integration, high infrastructure investment, data security risks, and lagging regulatory policies. In the future, self-driving vehicles, Telematics, digital twins and smart distribution will become the main direction of the development of intelligent transportation systems. This paper provides a theoretical basis and practical guidance for the digital transformation of logistics enterprises and the formulation of government industrial policies.",
      "published": "2026-02-28",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.61173/vqgrsq76",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "supply chain",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zhang Jiaen"
      ],
      "venue": "Science and Technology of Engineering Chemistry and Environmental Protection",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.61173/vqgrsq76",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.61366/2576-2176.1103",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Attacks on Automotive CAN and Their Detection",
      "description": "The main highway of communication in a vehicle is the Controller Area Network, commonly known by the acronym CAN. Any vulnerability in this network could allow bad actors to block communication between vehicle subsystems, risking the safety of the vehicle’s occupants. With the ever growing list of vulnerabilities being exposed in the CAN, it is critical to address its safety. This paper looks at one of the known vulnerabilities in the data link layer of the CAN and an Intrusion Detection System that could detect attacks on this network. We detail a few processes of the CAN, arbitration and error states, and how they are leveraged during different attacks. We also explain the core component of the Intrusion Detection System, the Detection Engine, and discuss testing results.",
      "published": "2022-03-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.61366/2576-2176.1103",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Halley M. Paulson"
      ],
      "venue": "Scholarly Horizons University of Minnesota Morris Undergraduate Journal",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.61366/2576-2176.1103",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.61366/2576-2176.1128",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "LiDAR Segmentation-based Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles utilizing LiDAR-based 3D perception systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks. This paper focuses on a specific attack scenario that relies on the creation of adversarial point clusters with the intention of fooling the segmentation model utilized by LiDAR into misclassifying point cloud data. This can be translated into the real world with the placement of objects (such as road signs or cardboard) at these adversarial point cluster locations. These locations are generated through an optimization algorithm performed on said adversarial point clusters that are introduced by the attacker.",
      "published": "2023-06-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.61366/2576-2176.1128",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Blake Johnson"
      ],
      "venue": "Scholarly Horizons University of Minnesota Morris Undergraduate Journal",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.61366/2576-2176.1128",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.61366/2576-2176.1188",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Limitations of the CAN Bus and Detection through Power Fingerprinting",
      "description": "This paper examines the vulnerabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN), the standard communication protocol used in most modern vehicles. It explains why CAN is widely adopted and outlines key security weaknesses in its design. The paper then reviews recent research efforts to detect and mitigate these vulnerabilities, with particular focus on an approach to origin authentication that relies on the unique power consumption patterns of each individual electronic control unit on a CAN bus.",
      "published": "2026-07-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.61366/2576-2176.1188",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "electronic control unit",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ken Broden"
      ],
      "venue": "Scholarly Horizons University of Minnesota Morris Undergraduate Journal",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.61366/2576-2176.1188",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.61467/2007.1558.2026.v17i2.1263",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Incremental Development of a Multilayer Neural Network for CAN bus Attack Detection",
      "description": "The growing integration of electronic systems in vehicles has transformed the automotive industry, enabling improved performance, reduced costs, and enhanced functionality. However, the increased complexity of vehicular networks and the lack of built-in cybersecurity mechanisms in communication protocols such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus have left modern vehicles vulnerable to cyberattacks. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation on intrusion detection in the CAN bus using multilayer neural networks (MLPs). A process is presented to find a neural network capable of detecting three types of attacks. This consisted of a series of experiments to find the minimal structure of a neural network that can detect malicious traffic on the CAN bus, allowing the identification of attack-free data and data with three types of attacks, denial-of-service (DoS), impersonation, and fuzzy attacks. Additionally, this work contextualizes CAN security issues, discusses related contributions, and presents future research opportunities. Smart citations: https://scite.ai/reports/10.61467/2007.1558.2026.v17i2.1263Dimensions.Open Alex.",
      "published": "2026-02-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.61467/2007.1558.2026.v17i2.1263",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ponciano Jorge Escamilla-Ambrosio",
        "Juan Carlos Venegas Segura",
        "Magdalena Saldaña-Pérez",
        "Abraham Rodríguez-Mota"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Informatics.",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.61467/2007.1558.2026.v17i2.1263",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.62674/ijiee.2024.v1i01.002",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ANALYZING THE CAN PROTOCOL: VULNERABILITIES, PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND IMPROVEMENTS",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, originally designed for internal communication among a limited number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within vehicles, faces significant security challenges due to the rapid expansion of ECUs in modern automobiles. This expansion necessitates accessibility for diagnostic purposes, yet the CAN protocol lacks fundamental security features such as encryption, authentication, and integrity checks, rendering it vulnerable to various attacks including message injection, Denial of Service (DoS), and masquerading ECUs. This paper surveys existing literature and investigates potential intrusions on the CAN bus, highlighting attacks ranging from GPS spoofing to remote sensor tampering. Various solutions are discussed, including network subdivision, encryption, authentication techniques, and intrusion detection systems (IDS). Recent research proposes IDS solutions utilizing machine learning algorithms such as Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and Deep Neural Networks (DNN), demonstrating effectiveness in detecting known attacks. However, challenges persist in identifying unknown attacks and enhancing overall system performance. Innovative approaches, such as event-triggered detection and bloom filtering techniques, show promise in mitigating specific attack vectors but may introduce overhead or limitations in real-time response. Deep learning-based IDS systems exhibit high performance but struggle with the detection of novel attacks. Furthermore, while some solutions address specific vulnerabilities, others propose more comprehensive security measures, such as preventing remote manipulation of critical vehicle functions like steering and braking. Overall, the research emphasizes the critical need for robust security measures in automotive systems to safeguard against evolving threats to vehicle safety and integrity.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.62674/ijiee.2024.v1i01.002",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mahender Reddy Bobbala",
        "Ramaswami Jothi Kavitha"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Interpreting Enigma Engineers.",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.62674/ijiee.2024.v1i01.002",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.62791/20526",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On enabling multi-modal sensing and security techniques for connected vehicles",
      "description": "Future transportation systems are expected to be transformed by connected vehicles, offering greatly improvements in traffic efficiency, mobility, and road safety. However, realizing these benefits requires not only seamless connectivity but also robust security to ensure there liable exchange of extensive sensor data and contextual information among vehicles, infrastructures, and surrounding environments. To this end, the integration of advanced communication and sensing technologies is essential for paving the way toward next-generation autonomous mobility. In this dissertation, four key contributions are presented. First, it provides a comprehensive performance assessment of mmWave-enabled vehicle-to-vehicle communications, evaluating achievable throughput, latency, and reliability metrics. Second, a deep learning based solution is presented so that the optimal beams having sufficient mmWave received powers can be estimated by utilizing multi-modality sensing data. Third, a transformer-based framework is introduced, where multi-head cross-modal attention is utilized to capture dependencies and correlations between different sensing modalities, and subsequently fused the multimodal features to improve beam prediction. Finally, it develops an attack-defense tree methodology to systematically evaluate cyber security vulnerabilities in connected vehicles. Together, these contributions aim to advance the design of safe, intelligent, and resilient transportation systems by bridging reliable connectivity with strengthened security mechanisms for connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.62791/20526",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Muhammad Baqer Mollah"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.62791/20526",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4417,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.62791/20526 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: requires, sensor, extensive, where, there, information, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.62915/2472-2707.1045",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Car Hacking: Accessing and Exploiting the CAN Bus Protocol",
      "description": "With the rapid adoption of internet-connected and driver-assist technologies, and the spread of semi-autonomous to self-driving cars on roads worldwide, cybersecurity for smart cars is a timely concern and one worth exploring both in the classroom and in the real world. Highly publicized hacks against production cars, and a relatively small number of crashes involving autonomous vehicles, have brought the issue of securing smart cars to the forefront as a matter of public and individual safety, and the cybersecurity of these “data centers on wheels” is of greater concern than ever. However, up to this point there has been a steep learning curve involved in applying cybersecurity research to car hacking. The purpose of this paper is to present a clear, step-by-step process for creating a car-hacking research workstation and to give faculty, students, and researchers the ability to implement car hacking in their own courses and lab environments. This article describes the integration of a module on car hacking into a semester-long ethical hacking cybersecurity course, including full installation and setup of all the open-source tools necessary to implement the hands-on labs in similar courses. This work demonstrates how to test an automobile for vulnerabilities involving replay attacks, and how to reverse-engineer CAN bus messages, using a combination of open-source tools and a commodity CAN-to-USB cable or wireless connector for under $100 (USD). Also provided are an introduction to the CAN (controller area network) bus in modern automobiles and a brief history of car hacking.",
      "published": "2019-06-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.62915/2472-2707.1045",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "hacking",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bryson R. Payne"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Cybersecurity Education Research and Practice",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "10.62915/2472-2707.1045",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 28,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.62915/2472-2707.1201",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Digital Twin and Cybersecurity in Additive Manufacturing",
      "description": "Additive manufacturing (AM) has been applied to automotive, aerospace, medical sectors, etc., but there are still challenges such as parts’ porosity, cracks, surface roughness, intrinsic anisotropy, and residual stress because of the high level of thermal gradient. It is significant to conduct the modeling and simulation of the AM process and achieve quality products. Digital Twin (DT) can help AM with forecasting defects/errors through simulation and real-time process monitoring. DT is a concept of Industry 4.0, and its digital structure reflects the real-time behaviors of a cyber-physical or physical system. This paper introduces the progress of DT applications in AM, cyber digital twin (CDT), cybersecurity digital twin, and cybersecurity in AM, and highlights the challenges of DT and cybersecurity in AM. A case study is presented, including the flaw formation of laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) due to cyber intrusions and the flaw formation during the printing process of LPBF, the impacts of the factors of cyber resilience on the AM supply chain, and cyberattacks on various data categories of AM and their business impacts. The methods and related information in this paper not only help promote professionals’ research and development in the industry, but also are very useful for faculty’s research and teaching as well as students’ learning in the areas of DT, AM, and cybersecurity.",
      "published": "2024-12-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.62915/2472-2707.1201",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience",
        "supply chain"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lidong Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Cybersecurity Education Research and Practice",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.62915/2472-2707.1201",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.62970/ijirct.v12.i2.2605013",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Lightweight Zero-Trust Architecture for Secure Over-the-Air (OTA) Updates in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "The rapid evolution of Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) has cemented Over-the-Air (OTA) updates as a critical mechanism for deploying feature enhancements and security patches. However, this hyper-connectivity introduces severe vulnerabilities, particularly when transmitting executable firmware across legacy, resource-constrained internal vehicle networks. Traditional enterprise Zero-Trust Architectures (ZTA) are computationally prohibitive for standard Electronic Control Units (ECUs). This paper proposes a novel, Gateway-Centric Lightweight Zero-Trust Architecture tailored for connected vehicles. By centralizing heavy cryptographic verification at the vehicle gateway and deploying ultra-lightweight hash chains for internal bus transmission, this framework secures the \"last mile\" of OTA delivery. The proposed model bridges the gap between the computational realities of edge ECUs and the stringent cybersecurity mandates of UNECE WP.29 (R156) and ISO/SAE 21434, ensuring firmware integrity without inducing latency that compromises vehicle safety systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.62970/ijirct.v12.i2.2605013",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srinivasa Sandilya Jandhyala -"
      ],
      "venue": "International journal of innovative research and creative technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.62970/ijirct.v12.i2.2605013",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63075/6mgd6f45",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Performance and Security Trade-offs in Keyless Data Encryption and Decryption",
      "description": "Traditional cryptographic systems heavily depend on secure key management, distribution, and storage, creating vulnerabilities that become critical in the face of quantum computing threats and complex network environments. This paper explores keyless data encryption and decryption paradigms that derive security from intrinsic properties of communication channels, data context, physical environments, or biological traits, eliminating the need for pre-shared or stored keys. Drawing on information-theoretic foundations such as Shannon's perfect secrecy and Wyner's wiretap channel model, the review examines key architectural modalities, including Physical Layer Security (PLS) techniques (e.g., artificial noise injection and unshared secret key generation in 5G/6G networks), the Keyless User Defined Optimal Security (KUDOS) algorithm for memory context protection, All-or-Nothing Transforms (AONT) combined with information dispersal for distributed storage, biometric-based fuzzy vault schemes, chaos-based image encryption, and emerging quantum-resilient AI-integrated frameworks like QSAFE-MM1.A detailed analysis of performance-security trade-offs reveals inherent tensions, such as the Secrecy-Reliability Performance Trade-off (SRPT) in NOMA systems, energy efficiency constraints in IoT environments, computational overhead in fully homomorphic encryption, and acceptance-rate declines in biometric systems with increasing polynomial complexity. While keyless approaches offer advantages in reduced attack surface, lower latency, and quantum resistance, they demand careful balancing against reliability, throughput, energy consumption, and scalability limitations.The findings underscore the shift toward adaptive, hybrid security architectures that integrate physical randomness, AI-driven monitoring, and context-aware mechanisms to achieve robust, future-proof protection in heterogeneous digital ecosystems.",
      "published": "2026-01-23",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63075/6mgd6f45",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "keyless",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haider Abbas",
        "Malik Sikandar Hayat Khiyal",
        "Muhammad Daud Awan"
      ],
      "venue": "Annual Methodological Archive Research Review",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.63075/6mgd6f45",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63125/xgp15k85",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE: A REVIEW OF SMART POWERTRAIN AND MECHATRONIC DIAGNOSTICS",
      "description": "The evolution of automotive systems has accelerated with the integration of intelligent electronics, embedded sensors, and AI-driven software, resulting in increasingly complex vehicles that demand advanced diagnostic and reliability frameworks. This systematic review explores the convergence of technologies that underpin smart diagnostics, focusing on powertrain systems, mechatronic diagnostics, artificial intelligence, digital platforms, and cybersecurity. Guided by the PRISMA 2020 methodology, a total of 112 peer-reviewed articles were rigorously analyzed to identify key advancements, application trends, and emerging challenges in automotive fault diagnostics and system reliability. The findings reveal a paradigm shift from traditional, reactive maintenance approaches to predictive and condition-based strategies enabled by real-time sensor monitoring, machine learning algorithms, and cloud-edge computing architectures. Notably, the implementation of AI techniques-such as convolutional neural networks, support vector machines, and unsupervised learning models-has enabled earlier and more accurate fault classification across critical systems, including powertrains, batteries, and thermal subsystems. The review also highlights the growing adoption of digital twin technologies, which allow virtual modeling of vehicle components for predictive maintenance, system optimization, and remote diagnostics without physical testing. Additionally, the incorporation of cybersecurity frameworks, particularly SAE J3061 and ISO/SAE 21434, is shown to be essential in protecting diagnostic systems against evolving digital threats in connected vehicle environments. Cloud-based and edge-based diagnostic platforms emerged as scalable solutions for managing real-time fault data, supporting over-the-air updates, and ensuring rapid decision-making in distributed vehicle networks. A recurring challenge identified across the literature is the widening skill gap in diagnostics engineering, particularly in the application of AI and systems integration, which hampers effective technology adoption in industry settings. Furthermore, the review underscores the importance of standards compliance and system interoperability to ensure diagnostics consistency across multi-vendor environments. By synthesizing insights from 112 high-impact studies across multiple disciplines, this review offers a comprehensive assessment of current capabilities, limitations, and future directions in smart diagnostics and automotive reliability management. It serves as a critical resource for researchers, engineers, and industry leaders aiming to optimize vehicle performance, safety, and maintainability through intelligent diagnostics technologies.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63125/xgp15k85",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicle",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Md Nuruzzaman"
      ],
      "venue": "American Journal of Scholarly Research and Innovation",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.63125/xgp15k85",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4095,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.63125/xgp15k85 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: platforms, sensor, studies, digital, sensors, intelligence, without, physical."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63180/jcsra.thestap.2025.3.3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security and Privacy Challenges and Solutions in Autonomous Driving Systems: A Comprehensive Review",
      "description": "The rapid advancement of autonomous driving technology has transformed modern transportation, offering enhanced safety, efficiency, and convenience. However, as these vehicles become increasingly connected and reliant on complex software and sensor-based systems, they also become prime targets for a wide range of cyber and privacy threats. This review paper comprehensively examines the current landscape of security and privacy in autonomous driving systems. We explore emerging attack vectors targeting key components such as sensor perception, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, machine learning models, and internal control systems. Particular attention is given to adversarial machine learning, GPS spoofing, Controller Area Network (CAN) bus attacks, and data privacy breaches. In parallel, we evaluate existing defense mechanisms and mitigation strategies, including intrusion detection systems (IDS), secure communication protocols, hardware-based security modules, and privacy-preserving architectures. We also highlight key challenges in securing autonomous systems, identify gaps in current research, and propose directions for future work to build resilient and trustworthy autonomous vehicles. This review aims to provide researchers and practitioners with a consolidated foundation for understanding and advancing the security posture of next-generation autonomous driving technologies.",
      "published": "2025-05-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63180/jcsra.thestap.2025.3.3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Giuseppe Lippi",
        "Mahmoud Mohammad Aljawarneh",
        "Qais Al-Na’amneh",
        "Rahaf Hazaymih",
        "Lachhman Das Dhomeja"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Cyber Security and Risk Auditing",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.63180/jcsra.thestap.2025.3.3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 33,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63282/3050-9416.ijaibdcms-v5i3p108",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematics & IoT-Driven Insurance with AI in Salesforce",
      "description": "The insurance sector is digitalizing thanks in part to the combination of telematics, the Internet of Things (IoT) & artificial intelligence (AI). These technologies are transforming conventional underwriting & the risk assessment methods in concert with Usage-Based Insurance (UBI), therefore allowing insurers to provide individualized health & life insurance policies. By means of IoT-enabled devices connected cars, wearable health monitors, smart home sensors & linked homes insurance companies may compile actual time data on policyholders' activities, lifestyles & the surroundings. Telematics should be included into auto insurance as it methodically assesses driving habits like mileage, speed & braking patterns to provide customized policy cost. Wearable IoT devices in health and life insurance evaluate physical activity, heart rate variability & sleep habits, therefore allowing tailored risk appraisal and the premium changes. Leading this revolution with a complete platform combining telematics, IoT & AI-driven data into insurance operations is Salesforce CRM. Using salesforce's cloud features benefits insurers: Combine IoT data and actual time telematics into underwriting models, claim processing & the customer profiles. Using predictive analytics and risk assessment generated from behavioral information, instantly adjust premiums. Look over policyholder information and claims for discrepancies to help find fraud. Client engagement is increased via policy recommendations, automated AI-driven discussions & anticipatory danger alerts. By adding actual time data analytics into Salesforce, insurance businesses can generate tailored policies, increase risk accuracy & simplify processes. AI systems evaluate driving behavior in vehicle insurance to dynamically adjust premium prices, therefore encouraging improved safe driving habits. Wearable AI-generated insights help insurance companies in health and life insurance by tailoring wellness programs, motivating good living & identifying the potential health problems",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63282/3050-9416.ijaibdcms-v5i3p108",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vasanta Kumar Tarra"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of AI BigData Computational and Management Studies",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.63282/3050-9416.ijaibdcms-v5i3p108",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63282/3050-9416.ijaibdcms-v7i1p122",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Device Identity and Trust Establishment in Mass-Manufactured IoT Systems",
      "description": "Security in mass-manufactured IoT systems depends on device identity established during manufacturing and preserved across operational lifecycles spanning 10-20 years. Current deployments use identity models that fail under physical access, supply-chain compromise, or credential abuse. This paper analyzes device identity as an architectural primitive, examines failures in automotive infotainment, HVAC, and water-heating deployments, and presents a hardware-rooted, lifecycle-aware architecture that emphasizes establishing manufacturing-time trust, explicit revocation, and zero-trust operation.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63282/3050-9416.ijaibdcms-v7i1p122",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vignesh Alagappan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of AI BigData Computational and Management Studies",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.63282/3050-9416.ijaibdcms-v7i1p122",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63345/sjaibt.v1.i2.103",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Autonomous Vehicles Using AI-Blockchain Architecture",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles (AVs) promise safer and more efficient mobility but are exposed to an evolving attack surface spanning on-board sensors, in-vehicle networks, over-the-air (OTA) software updates, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications. Traditional perimeter defenses and centralized public-key infrastructures (PKIs) struggle to keep pace with adversarial machine learning (ML), Sybil attacks in vehicular networks, and supply-chain compromises. This manuscript proposes an end-to-end security architecture that fuses artificial intelligence (AI) with a permissioned blockchain to deliver verifiable identity, tamper-evident telemetry, decentralized policy enforcement, and adaptive intrusion detection. The architecture binds device and model identities to decentralized identifiers (DIDs), anchors data and update artifacts to an immutable ledger, and coordinates a privacy-preserving federated-learning loop to continuously refine anomaly detectors. We describe the threat model and system components (edge validators, roadside units, OEM validators, on-vehicle guardians), define a trust and attestation workflow, and integrate AI modules for CAN-bus anomaly detection and V2X trust scoring. A simulation study using realistic traffic patterns evaluates detection efficacy, latency, and ledger throughput under benign and adversarial conditions (false-data injection, spoofing, replay, and Sybil attacks). Statistical analysis across 30 independent runs shows significant improvements in true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), and end-to-end decision latency compared with a PKI-only baseline, while maintaining transaction throughput suitable for V2X policy events. We conclude that AI-Blockchain co-design can harden AV ecosystems by coupling adaptive detection with cryptographic accountability, and we discuss deployment considerations, limitations, and paths to certification-grade assurance.",
      "published": "2024-04-05",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63345/sjaibt.v1.i2.103",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Deependra Rastogi"
      ],
      "venue": "Scientific Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain Technologies",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.63345/sjaibt.v1.i2.103",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63503/acset.978-81-995593-9-4.68",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-DRIVEN FAULT DETECTION AND DIAGNOSTICS",
      "description": "Artificial intelligence (AI) has changed the game when it comes to fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) because with AI, identifying and solving faults in machines, systems, and networks becomes easy and effective. Manual techniques have traditionally been used to perform these tasks; however, they are tedious and costly. Utilizing the concept of FDD using AI involves a lot of machine learning (ML), deep learning (DL), and data analysis techniques in order to detect and predict possible faults. The sensors continuously, in real time, parse enormous amounts of data, and automated AI readily identifies equipment errors, especially in manufacturing, healthcare, energy, automotive, cybersecurity, and other industries, where error prevention averts failure, enhances safety, and reduces expenses. AI-based systems help organisations optimise machine performance while reducing downtime. AI has the potential to reduce faults through the use of smart algorithms and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It is important to note that concerns remain regarding data quality, high costs, and the interpretability of AI decisions. With the advancement in AI. The technology, reliability, and usability of AI are improving over time, and fault detection and diagnostics are becoming faster and more effective. This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the applications of artificial intelligence for fault detection and diagnosis, with a critical analysis of the advantages, challenges, and future scope of AI in this domain for improved system performance.",
      "published": "2026-07-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63503/acset.978-81-995593-9-4.68",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kahkasha Ahmed",
        "Sonam",
        "Nisha",
        "Puneet Garg"
      ],
      "venue": "Adroid Conference Series Engineering and Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.63503/acset.978-81-995593-9-4.68",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63646/jtis.2023.010403",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Usage-Based Insurance, Algorithmic Fairness, and Risk-Based Pricing: A Socio-Technical Perspective on Telematics Regulation",
      "description": "The rapid proliferation of telematics technology has fundamentally transformed auto insurance pricing through Usage-Based Insurance (UBI) programmes, which link premium rates to directly measured driving behaviour. While these developments offer significant potential for actuarial precision and risk differentiation, they simultaneously introduce profound challenges related to algorithmic fairness, proxy discrimination, and regulatory transparency. This paper adopts a socio-technical perspective to examine how telematics-derived variables interact with socio-economic and demographic factors in ways that may systematically disadvantage certain policyholder groups. Drawing on a synthetic UBI dataset, we apply Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) and Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) to model both claim frequency and severity, and we employ interpretable K-means clustering to develop a territory risk classification framework. Our analysis demonstrates that while annual miles driven, credit score, and years without claims are the most statistically significant predictors of insurance risk, their joint effects can create indirect disparate impacts across socio-economic strata. We further conduct a fairness decomposition analysis that distinguishes direct risk-based differentiation from indirect proxy discrimination. On the regulatory side, we propose a three-pillar governance framework—transparency, auditability, and adaptive oversight—designed to reconcile the competing imperatives of actuarial fairness and social equity in UBI pricing. Our findings contribute to an emerging interdisciplinary literature at the intersection of actuarial science, algorithmic fairness, and insurance regulation.",
      "published": "2023-12-30",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63646/jtis.2023.010403",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Wei Chen",
        "Jing Liu",
        "Hao Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Technology Innovation and Society",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.63646/jtis.2023.010403",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.63748/feticon2026.v4i1cmt059",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBER SECURITY AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM",
      "description": "Autonomous systems such as self-driving vehicles, intelligent drones, smart manufacturing platforms, and AI-driven decision systems are rapidly transforming modern society by improving efficiency, precision, and operational independence. However, their increasing dependence on interconnected networks, artificial intelligence, and real-time data exchange exposes them to significant cyber security risks. This study examines the cyber security challenges associated with autonomous systems, focusing on vulnerabilities such as adversarial machine learning attacks, data poisoning, sensor spoofing, unauthorized access, and system hijacking. Unlike conventional systems, autonomous platforms can make compromised decisions without immediate human intervention, increasing the potential impact of attacks on safety, reliability, and trust. The paper critically evaluates current defense mechanisms, including intrusion detection systems, cryptographic protocols, secure communication frameworks, and AI-based anomaly detection, assessing their effectiveness in mitigating emerging threats. It also emphasizes the importance of adopting security-by-design principles, where cyber security measures are integrated throughout the development lifecycle rather than added post-deployment. Additionally, the study discusses the role of regulatory standards, ethical considerations, and continuous monitoring in strengthening system resilience. By synthesizing recent research and technological trends, this paper contributes to the development of robust cyber security strategies for safeguarding next-generation autonomous technologies in increasingly hostile digital environments.",
      "published": "2026-06-06",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.63748/feticon2026.v4i1cmt059",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "intrusion",
        "self-driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Osezua Iredia",
        "Josephine Dedetolu"
      ],
      "venue": "Faculty of Engineering and Technology International Conference",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.63748/feticon2026.v4i1cmt059",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.64252/pap7ey28",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Digital Forensics Framework For Vehicles",
      "description": "Vehicle digital forensics is a rapid growing sub domain of cyber forensic investigations on vehicles involved in crimes or in accidental cases. It focuses on collection, extraction and analysis of the digital evidence preserved from a vehicle subject. Modern vehicles are becoming more and more computers themselves by incorporating many advance technologies like ECUs, Infotainment system, ADAS system, Telematics and GPS systems, ABS, Traction and Rollover control etc., On one side these advanced enhancements push more safety and convenience while other side they bring new vulnerabilities and challenges in digital forensic investigations. While a normal personal car may have around 40 ECUs, a luxury or sports car may have even more than 150 ECUs and this number itself vary for heavy vehicles used in long distance transport along with millions of lines of codes for enabling the overall integrated vehicle system. It further fuels the complexity of a vehicle internal digital and electronic system and imposing many challenges in their forensic examination even more when no fully functional and well accepted vehicular forensic framework is in place. In this paper we propose a comprehensive digital forensic framework for modern vehicles. Vehicle digital forensic framework will provide a systematic guideline to conduct digital forensic investigation on any subject vehicle by acquiring data from advance digital and electronic equipment and sensors such as Event Data Recorder (EDR), Telematics and GPS systems etc., It will also provide invaluable insights for law enforcement and accident reconstruction experts. This framework aims to provide actionable insights to investigators, ensuring accurate and efficient resolution for digital forensic investigations of modern vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-07-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.64252/pap7ey28",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "telematics",
        "vehicular",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ashish Kumar Sharma",
        "Sumitra Singar",
        "Vishwas Bhardwaj"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Environmental Sciences",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.64252/pap7ey28",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.64388/irev9i3-1710490-550",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Mechanodynamics",
      "description": "The rapid integration of digital technologies into mechanodynamic systems has revolutionized various industrial sectors, from automotive manufacturing to robotics and aerospace. These systems, often relying on complex networks of interconnected sensors, actuators, and communication modules, are vulnerable to cyber threats that can lead to significant financial, operational, and safety consequences. This research paper delves into the emerging field of cybersecurity in mechanodynamics, analyzing the types of cyber risks faced by mechanodynamic systems, the vulnerabilities inherent to mechanical networks, and the effectiveness of current defensive strategies. This study explores the implications of a compromised mechanodynamic system, ranging from disruption of supply chains to the malfunctioning of critical infrastructure.",
      "published": "2025-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.64388/irev9i3-1710490-550",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threats",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jai Tanji Girawale",
        "Jagruti Sinkar",
        "Mahant Zade"
      ],
      "venue": "Iconic Research and Engineering Journals",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.64388/irev9i3-1710490-550",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.64476/jtbc.v2i1.31",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PENERAPAN TEKNOLOGI WEB UNTUK SMART TRANSPORTATION DAN MANAJEMEN ARMADA DI ERA IOT SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 2020-2025",
      "description": "Perkembangan Internet of Things (IoT), teknologi web, cloud computing, digital twins, dan data analytics telah mendorong transformasi besar pada sektor transportasi dan manajemen armada. Penelitian ini menyajikan Systematic Literature Review (SLR) terhadap 20 publikasi internasional periode 2020–2025 yang menyoroti integrasi web technologies (REST APIs, web dashboards, cloud platforms), IoT sensors, telematics, digital twins, dan machine learning dalam smart transportation serta pengelolaan armada. Proses SLR mengikuti tahapan PRISMA, dimulai dari identifikasi 842 artikel, seleksi judul/abstrak, penilaian kelayakan, hingga penyaringan akhir. Hasil menunjukkan lima fokus utama: (1) IoT-based sensing & monitoring, (2) Web-based fleet dashboards & APIs, (3) Data analytics & predictive maintenance, (4) Digital twin–enabled transportation optimization, dan (5) Security & interoperability. Analisis klaster mengungkapkan pergeseran inovasi dari sekadar pelacakan kendaraan menuju sistem berbasis data real-time dan digital twins. Penelitian ini menghasilkan model konseptual transformasi digital yang mengintegrasikan teknologi web, analytics, IoT, dan digital twins untuk mendukung sistem transportasi cerdas. Studi ini juga mengidentifikasi kesenjangan seperti keamanan sensor, interoperabilitas web services, serta kurangnya implementasi berskala besar.",
      "published": "2026-01-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.64476/jtbc.v2i1.31",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nurul Yaqin Sangka",
        "Muh. Rizqi Ardiansyah",
        "Asya Syara Marzan",
        "Dhimas Tribuana",
        "Dayanti Dayanti"
      ],
      "venue": "Jurnal Teknologi dan Bisnis Cerdas",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.64476/jtbc.v2i1.31",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.64799/rebicte.v11.9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Survey on Electric Vehicle Charging Systems: Derivation of Security Requirements and Research Directions",
      "description": "The proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs) is shifting the paradigms of transportation and energy, and electric vehicle charging infrastructure (EVCS) is emerging as a key element for achieving sustainable mobility. From a systems perspective, EVCS consists of heterogeneous components, including power electronics, communication controllers, and cloud-based management platforms, which are interconnected via standard protocols such as ISO 15118 and OCPP, yet still face technical challenges such as grid instability, lack of interoperability, and high deployment costs. From a security perspective, EVCS functions as a cyber-physical interface between vehicles and the grid and thus presents a broad attack surface, with threats such as charge manipulation attacks (CMA), distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), false data injection (FDI), and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks being actively reported. To address these challenges, various AI-based security techniques—including machine learning-based anomaly detection, transfer learning, federated learning, and temporal convolutional network (TCN)-based intrusion detection systems—have been explored; however, their practical deployment remains limited by insufficient datasets, computational resource constraints, and hardware compatibility issues. This paper comprehensively examines EVCS from both systems and security perspectives by analyzing recent charging technology trends, grid integration strategies, standardization issues, and major security vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Building on this analysis, this paper derives security requirements for EVCS and proposes future research directions for realizing more efficient, reliable, and secure charging infrastructures.",
      "published": "2025-12-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.64799/rebicte.v11.9",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "intrusion",
        "iso 15118",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soowang Lee",
        "Jiyoon Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Briefs on Information and Communication Technology Evolution",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.64799/rebicte.v11.9",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.65351/aosec25.011",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrated Approach of ISO15288, 26262 and 21434 in Technical Processes",
      "description": "The automotive industry is undergoing rapid transformation due to advances in connected, autonomous, shared & services, and electric (CASE), resulting in exponentially increasing vehicle system complexity. To ensure safety, security, and reliability, rigorous and systematic engineering methods are essential. International standards such as ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 (systems and software life cycle processes) [1], ISO 26262 (functional safety) [2], and ISO/SAE 21434 (automotive cybersecurity) [3] play an important role in this context. However, when these standards are applied separately, duplication arises in documentation, analysis, and verification, also it leads to inefficiencies in the development process, longer lead times, and increased costs. This study proposes an \"integrated approach\" that systematically maps and integrates the requirements of ISO 26262 [2] and ISO/SAE 21434 [3] with the \"system analysis\" process of ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [1] at the center, which is the basis of system development. The proposed approach is validated using an electric parking brake (EPB) system as a case study of an in-vehicle control system. Functional safety and security requirements are mapped on the basic architecture of EPB at the three levels, System Context level, System/Subsystem and Component level. with functions such as brake torque control and countermeasures against external input are visually and integrally represented. The results confirm that both requirements can be incorporated in parallel, improving development efficiency and quality while reducing document redundancy and duplication of work. This integrated approach enables the realization of safe and secure vehicle systems through the application of international standards. By integrating functional requirements with safety and security measures in accordance with systems engineering principles, this study contributes to the establishment of a development process that ensures high reliability and safety for increasingly complex vehicle systems.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.65351/aosec25.011",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Takatsugu ADACHI",
        "Seiji Honda",
        "Midori Daida",
        "Takeshi Ejima",
        "Akiyuki Takoshima",
        "Shota Matsumoto",
        "Seiichi Takahashi"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.65351/aosec25.011",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.65391/r1747",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hierarchical Approaches to Product Cyber Security: An Automotive Case Study",
      "description": "Securing the operation of an out-of-context component can be extremely challenging. This is due to a number of reasons, not least that the context of use for the system component has a huge impact on the exposure of the system to specific risks. Many standards across multiple sectors focus on the role of system integrators and Tier 1 suppliers. But how should that security argument flowdown to Tier 2 suppliers and below? Can Tier 2 suppliers be “intelligent suppliers”, providing security assurances that feed into hierarchical or modular assurance cases? In this paper we approach these questions, illustrating the challenges and proposed solutions using the use case of a safety-assured, automotive operating system. The automotive sector was selected because the cybersecurity standard (ISO 21434) demands that the security argument extend beyond safety related security issues. An operating system is a highly versatile component that can have multiple contexts. The paper concludes that there are activities that lower-tier suppliers can do to support the integrated security/safety argument. These activities are then highlighted as potential requirements for system integrators, Tier 2 suppliers and below.",
      "published": "2023-02-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.65391/r1747",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aditya Deshpande",
        "Robert Oates"
      ],
      "venue": "Safety-Critical Systems Symposium (SSS)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.65391/r1747",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.67228/30713315/ijaidt-2023pi7sj67",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Based Risk Assessment Models for Insurance Technology",
      "description": "The insurance industry is evolving due to digitalization, big data, and InsurTech, making traditional actuarial models insufficient for handling complex and dynamic risks. This paper explores AI-based risk assessment using machine learning, deep learning, and hybrid models to analyze diverse data sources like IoT, telematics, and social media. The proposed framework includes data preprocessing, feature engineering, model training, validation, and deployment. AI models enable personalized underwriting, dynamic pricing, fraud detection, and proactive risk management. Results show that AI approaches outperform traditional methods in accuracy, scalability, and robustness. The study also addresses ethical, regulatory, and interpretability challenges, and suggests future directions such as federated learning and trustworthy AI for next-generation InsurTech systems.",
      "published": "2023-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.67228/30713315/ijaidt-2023pi7sj67",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dr. Ethan Williams"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Digital Transformation",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.67228/30713315/ijaidt-2023pi7sj67",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.67313/stanzaleafbookchapter.2026.15",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA ANALYTICS IN INSURANCE RISK ASSESSMENT: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND THE ROAD AHEAD",
      "description": "The insurance industry, long dependent on actuarial tables and static underwriting, is being reshaped by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data Analytics.This paper examines how AI and large-scale data analytics are transforming risk assessment across underwriting, pricing, claims processing and fraud detection.Drawing on secondary data from industry reports, regulatory publications and academic literature, the study traces the shift from traditional actuarial models to dynamic, predictive risk engines using telematics, wearables, satellite imagery and unstructured text.It highlights key benefitsimproved risk granularity, faster claims settlement, reduced fraud, and financial inclusion for previously uninsurable segmentsalongside challenges such as data privacy, algorithmic bias, poor model explainability, cybersecurity risk, and gaps in India's regulatory framework, with reference to IRDAI guidelines.Drawing on illustrative examples from Indian and global insurers, the paper offers recommendations on explainable AI, data governance, regulatory sandboxes, and consumer protection.It concludes that realising AI's potential in insurance risk assessment depends on embedding trust, transparency and fairness into algorithmic systems.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.67313/stanzaleafbookchapter.2026.15",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "SANTHIYA R"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.67313/stanzaleafbookchapter.2026.15",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.67440/ahj.v21i4s.1182",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Attention-Driven CNN-BIGRU Architecture For Privacy-Preserving Federated Intrusion Detection In Internet Of Vehicles Can-Bus Networks",
      "description": "The growing number of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) ecosystems has greatly increased the options for cyberattack on Controller Area Network (CAN) buses. Centralized Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are incapable of performing effectively in a distributed vehicular environment because they rely on centralized data collection, have single points of failure and have significant privacy weaknesses. The framework proposed in this paper is a new privacy-preserving federated IDS framework that uses a hybrid CNN-BiGRU-Attention deep learning architecture and an Adaptive Weighted Input (AWI) aggregation function. This hybrid architecture includes the use of 1D convolutional layers to extract local spatial features from CAN payload bytes; two independent BiGRUs to capture forward and reverse temporal dependencies in sequences of network traffic; and a soft attention mechanism to dynamically weight the most discriminative temporal segments. The AWI aggregation replaces conventional FedAvg with continuous trust-based weighting combining cosine similarity and norm deviation analysis, enabling adaptive suppression of adversarial client contributions. Experimental evaluation on the CIC-IoV 2024 benchmark dataset (281,644 labeled CAN-bus samples with DoS, spoofing, and replay attacks) demonstrates 98% accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score in the federated setting, with an ROC-AUC of 0.998. Five-fold cross-validation confirms stable generalization at 97.14% ± 0.29%. A paired t-test (p < 0.05) confirms superiority over CNN, LSTM, SVM, Random Forest, XGBoost, and FL-CNN baselines. The ablation study establishes that the dual-stage defense and AWI mechanism are the largest individual contributors under adversarial conditions.",
      "published": "2026-07-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.67440/ahj.v21i4s.1182",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sarah H. Mnkash",
        "Faiz A. Alawy",
        "Israa T. Ali"
      ],
      "venue": "Adolescência e Saúde",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.67440/ahj.v21i4s.1182",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.67553/sol21.v2i1.40",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "REVISÃO CRÍTICA NARRATIVA DO ESTADO DA ARTE DA ISO/SAE 21434: EVOLUÇÃO CIENTÍFICA, REQUISITOS, APLICAÇÕES, LIMITAÇÕES E PERSPECTIVAS DA CIBERSEGURANÇA AUTOMOTIVA",
      "description": "A ISO/SAE 21434 organiza a engenharia de cibersegurança automotiva, cuja relação com a literatura precisa ser examinada junto aos métodos de análise de riscos, controles técnicos e evidências de aplicação. Este artigo apresenta uma revisão crítica narrativa de estado da arte, com busca web orientada por temas e seleção intencional, sobre publicações de janeiro de 2016 a 12 de setembro de 2026. O corpus reúne 28 estudos, analisados por problema, método, resultado e alcance da validação: 19 com consulta dirigida ao texto completo, sete por resumo ou material de apresentação e dois por metadados e documentação dos autores. A descoberta inicial não é integralmente reproduzível e a consulta normativa é parcial. Os antecedentes selecionados desenvolveram modelos de risco, detecção de intrusões e atualização segura. A literatura posterior examinada adapta a análise de ameaças e avaliação de riscos (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment, TARA), automatiza artefatos e estrutura argumentos de assurance e sua manutenção entre fornecedores e versões do produto. Experimentos em redes veiculares e carregamento elétrico fornecem evidência técnica específica; avaliações de processo concentram-se em exemplos, estudos de caso e participação de especialistas. As lacunas do corpus dizem respeito à reprodutibilidade das decisões de risco, representatividade dos testes e atualização distribuída das evidências. Os estudos não estabelecem equivalência entre conformidade normativa, completude da análise e eficácia operacional. A agenda proposta combina avaliação adversarial, comparação independente de métodos e acompanhamento longitudinal de mudanças no produto.",
      "published": "2026-10-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.67553/sol21.v2i1.40",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "risk assessment",
        "tara"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexandre Lopes",
        "Angelo Machado de Souza",
        "Davis Souza Alves"
      ],
      "venue": "Revista Científica SOL21 - Standard Open Literature",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.67553/sol21.v2i1.40",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.67725/ist-africa.2026.tbyp4802",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Security Risks of Keyless Car Entry Systems: A Qualitative Study on South African Drivers",
      "description": "This study investigates the security vulnerabilities of keyless car entry systems within the South African context, where technologically facilitated vehicle theft remains a significant concern. Guided by Protection Motivation Theory, the aim of the study was to identify key technological risks, examine documented evidence of driver awareness, and propose mitigation strategies. A qualitative desktop study was conducted using PRISMA-informed source selection and thematic analysis of thirty credible academic, industry, and policy sources. The findings highlight persistent vulnerabilities in passive keyless entry systems, awareness gaps reported in existing literature, and institutional challenges affecting effective risk mitigation. Furthermore, the study underscores the need for coordinated technological, behavioural, and regulatory interventions. While grounded in South Africa, the identified risks have broader relevance to similar high-theft environments. Also, the paper contributes practical recommendations for manufacturers, insurers, and policymakers to strengthen automotive cybersecurity and reduce emerging theft risks.",
      "published": "2026-05-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.67725/ist-africa.2026.tbyp4802",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emil Namaan Reuben Murray",
        "Victor Temitayo Faniran"
      ],
      "venue": "IST-Africa Conference (IST-Africa)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.67725/ist-africa.2026.tbyp4802",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.68302/std2026.vol3.138",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBERSECURITY THREATS IN INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTION PATHWAYS",
      "description": "The rapid integration of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) into urban and interurban mobility has significantly improved efficiency, safety, and automation in transport operations. Nevertheless, the extensive connectivity enabled by vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and cloud services has also increased exposure to cyber threats. The primary scientific challenge is that compromising Cooperative ITS (C-ITS) can enable manipulation of critical transport functions, such as automated control, braking, and signaling, through falsified or maliciously injected communication messages. The increasing frequency of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks exacerbates this vulnerability, as these attacks account for most publicly recorded incidents worldwide and directly affect the transportation sector. Furthermore, ransomware and supply-chain attacks have led to a marked increase in system breaches and significant financial losses. IoT devices widely deployed within ITS often use inadequately secured communication protocols, creating opportunities for remote intrusion and infrastructure compromise. Simultaneously, Artificial Intelligence (AI) functions as a dual-use technology, facilitating both cyber-attacks, such as automated phishing, adaptive threat generation, and vulnerability analysis, and defense through the deployment of anomaly detection models. Additional risk arises from adversarial attacks that can mislead AI models in autonomous vehicles, thereby undermining real-time decision-making processes. Proposed solutions include integrating international standards, such as ISO/SAE 21434 and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework; applying cryptographic protection to V2X communications; implementing hybrid intrusion detection systems; and adopting lifecycle-oriented risk management across ITS infrastructures. AI-based predictive analytics and anomaly detection are identified as critical approaches to enhancing cyber resilience. Ongoing coordination among operators, vendors, and public institutions is essential to mitigate systemic risks and protect the integrity of ITS environments.",
      "published": "2026-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.68302/std2026.vol3.138",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dimitar Dimitrov",
        "Krassimir Lalov",
        "Ivan Manchev",
        "Irena Petrova"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the International Conference on Secure Systems Design and Technology Development",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.68302/std2026.vol3.138",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.69882/adba.cs.2025011",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The Role of Technological Approaches in Cyber Security of Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "Autonomous vehicles play a significant role in future transportation systems by enabling driverless travel. These vehicles offer advantages such as reducing accidents, improving travel times, and conserving energy. However, ensuring the independent operation of these technologies requires robust cybersecurity measures. Protecting autonomous vehicles against security threats they may face within their internal systems or during communication with other vehicles and infrastructure is crucial. This study examines the security measures used in autonomous vehicles. Encryption and data protection techniques safeguard information from unauthorized access during in-vehicle and inter-vehicle communication. Additionally, intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) detect abnormal activities to protect against potential threats. Machine learning-based anomaly detection methods analyze data from sensors and network traffic to identify emerging threats. Regular software updates help mitigate vulnerabilities, while network segmentation isolates different systems to protect critical components. Multi-layered security solutions ensure the safe operation of autonomous vehicles. These approaches contribute to the development of future security standards.",
      "published": "2025-01-29",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.69882/adba.cs.2025011",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ebubekir Seyyarer",
        "FARUK AYATA",
        "Selim Özdem"
      ],
      "venue": "ADBA computer science.",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.69882/adba.cs.2025011",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.70315/uloap.ulete.2025.0203003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Current Models for Implementing Crash Detection in Digital Mobile Platforms",
      "description": "This article provides an in-depth examination of contemporary crash detection models integrated into digital mobile platforms and Internet of Vehicles (IoV) infrastructures. The study first discusses hardware configurations—including accelerometers, GPS modules, and dashcams—and explores how these sensors interact in real-time telematics environments. It then delineates the algorithmic frameworks underlying crash detection, contrasting threshold-based heuristics with machine learning and deep learning approaches. Further, practical facets such as multi-sensor calibration, federated learning for privacy preservation, and adaptable data communication strategies are critically analyzed. The article also highlights integration with external service ecosystems (e.g., emergency assistance, insurance) and addresses legal, privacy, and standardization challenges surrounding crash detection deployment. Taken together, these investigations elucidate the potential of holistic, data-driven systems for reducing false alarms and accelerating life-saving interventions in traffic accidents.",
      "published": "2025-07-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.70315/uloap.ulete.2025.0203003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yaryha Andrei"
      ],
      "venue": "Universal library of engineering technology.",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.70315/uloap.ulete.2025.0203003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.70454/jrist.2025.10104",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Systematic Review on Cyber Security in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV)",
      "description": "The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) represents a critical evolution in intelligent transportation systems. It is a key advancement in intelligent transportation systems, where vehicles connect and communicate effectively with each other, utilizing great infrastructure that enables real-time data exchange and various advanced features. The paper spells out the attack vectors—such as MITM, DoS, spoofing and malware-based intrusions. However, it also poses some serious cybersecurity threats. This systematic literature review investigates the key security challenges in the IoV landscape and their countermeasures in VANETs through a comprehensive analysis of research conducted from 2015-2024. The review explores a range of security solutions that are currently being studied. Emphasis is focused on cryptographic protocols, machine learning based intrusion detection systems, and blockchain technologies, given their effectiveness, limitations, and suitability for resource-constrained vehicular environments. Even with the substantial progress, challenges remain in achieving real-time threat detection, ensuring interoperability, and developing lightweight yet effective security solutions. This review highlights these gaps and outlines future research directions, advocating for an integrated and adaptive cybersecurity framework according to the dynamic and heterogeneous nature of IoV networks.",
      "published": "2025-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.70454/jrist.2025.10104",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nishu Kumari",
        "Shashank Jha",
        "Beer Singh"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Recent Innovation in Science and Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.70454/jrist.2025.10104",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.70456/efjj2885",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES AND SECURITY ANALYSIS OF CAR IMMOBILIZER SYSTEMS BASED ON SHORT-RANGE TRANSPONDERS",
      "description": "This article presents a comprehensive analysis of short-range automotive immobilizer systems using low-frequency (LF) transponder technology operating at 125 kHz. The basic electromagnetic principles governing the inductive coupling between the transponder and the antenna are presented, the factors determining the effec-tive operating range are analyzed, and current security vulnerabilities and strategies for their prevention are evaluated. The study includes mathematical modeling of electromagnetic interactions, range optimization tech- niques, and security assessment of modern cryptographic implementations, including AES-128, Hitag, and Megamos protocols. The analysis shows that although LF-based systems provide inherent resistance to remote attacks due to their limited range (2-10 cm), they remain vulnerable to side-channel attacks, relay attacks, and cryptographic weaknesses. Improved security measures are proposed, including dynamic key rolling, hardware-based protection mechanisms, and secure communication protocols to address the identified vulnerabilities.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.70456/efjj2885",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "immobilizer",
        "relay",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Strahil Subev",
        "Dobroslav Danailov Dankov"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE - UNITECH",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.70456/efjj2885",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.70675/47a202a4z7f19z49e3zb547z88e58f1b4753",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Finding and Mitigating Security and Privacy Issues in the Web and The Internet of Things",
      "description": "Détection et mitigation des problèmes de sécurité et de confidentialité sur le Web et dans l’IoT Dans cette thèse, nous abordons deux axes principaux : i) le défi du traçage en ligne, avec un accent particulier sur les méthodes sans état comme le browser fingerprinting (BF), qui reste un problème difficile en termes de détection et de mitigation,ii) la sécurité et la confidentialité des protocoles de communication IoT pervasifs, en particulier le protocole Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) utilisé dans l'infrastructure de recharge des véhicules électriques comme étude de cas. La thèse introduit de nouvelles techniques et outils pour mesurer, détecter et mitiger les atteintes à la vie privée sur le Web. Premièrement, FP-Tracer est une méthodologie permettant de détecter et de classifier les fingerprinters de navigateurs grâce au taint tracking dynamique et à la classification par entropie jointe. Nous avons implémenté FP-Tracer en étendant Foxhound, un dérivé de Firefox orienté vie privée, et l'avons évalué via un crawl à grande échelle du Tranco Top 100K. L'étude révèle des activités de fingerprinting à travers les API audio, canvas et stockage, avec une activité élevée identifiée dans 8 % des domaines et modérée dans 75 %. Deuxièmement, EntroShield propose une technique conçue pour détecter et prévenir le BF, en combinant la surveillance en temps réel des API JavaScript avec le calcul d'entropie jointe (JE) afin de classifier et bloquer les activités potentiellement malveillantes. EntroShield est implémenté dans une extension Firefox, EntroShield-Plug, et évalué sur le Tranco Top 1000. Parmi les 737 domaines accessibles, il a été constaté que les collectes de données à forte entropie, sans utilité fonctionnelle, sont fréquentes : 13,6 % des domaines au niveau « Très élevé » et jusqu'à 23,8 % au niveau « Élevé ». Ces collectes ont lieu sans le consentement des utilisateurs, enfreignant potentiellement le RGPD. La thèse introduit également de nouvelles techniques et outils pour mesurer, détecter et mitiger les problèmes de sécurité et de confidentialité dans l'espace IoT. Premièrement, EmuOCPP présente une plateforme d'émulation évolutive, basée sur des conteneurs, capable de simuler des centaines de bornes de recharge et de véritables systèmes de gestion (CSMS). À l'aide de ce banc d'essai, cinq nouvelles attaques contre OCPP 1.6/2.0/2.0.1 ont été découvertes (par exemple : exploitation des transitions de profils de sécurité, usurpation de borne de recharge) et validées sur des implémentations open source et propriétaires, une borne physique et un réseau de production. Enfin, CheckOCPP fonctionne comme un dissector et un vérificateur de conformité, analysant passivement le trafic OCPP, identifiant les violations de schémas et révélant les déploiements non sécurisés.",
      "published": "2025-12-04",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.70675/47a202a4z7f19z49e3zb547z88e58f1b4753",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploitation",
        "ocpp",
        "privacy",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Soumaya Boussaha"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.70675/47a202a4z7f19z49e3zb547z88e58f1b4753",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.70675/5d893223z18efz439eza641z058923788f27",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion detection with deep learning for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "Détection d'intrusion avec les techniques d'apprentissage en profondeur pour les réseaux automobiles embarqués La communication automobile embarquée, qui désigne la communication et l'échange de données entre les calculateurs embarqués, joue un rôle crucial dans le développement des systèmes de transport intelligents (STI), qui visent à améliorer l'efficacité, la sécurité et la durabilité des systèmes de transport. La prolifération des dispositifs informatiques et de communication embarqués, centrés sur des capteurs connectés à un réseau embarqué (IVN), a permis le développement de fonctions de sécurité et de commodité, notamment la surveillance du véhicule, la réduction du câblage physique et l'amélioration de l'expérience de conduite. Cependant, la complexité et la connectivité croissantes des véhicules modernes suscitent des inquiétudes quant à l'évolution des menaces liées aux réseaux embarqués. Une série de risques de sécurité potentiels peuvent compromettre la sécurité et la fonctionnalité d'un véhicule, mettant en danger la vie des conducteurs et des passagers. De nombreuses approches ont donc été proposées et mises en œuvre pour pallier ce problème, notamment les pare-feu, le cryptage, l'authentification sécurisée et les contrôles d'accès. Comme les mécanismes traditionnels ne parviennent pas à contrer complètement les tentatives d'intrusion, il est nécessaire de mettre en place une contre-mesure défensive complémentaire. Les systèmes de détection d'intrusion (IDS) sont donc considérés comme un élément fondamental de toute infrastructure de sécurité réseau, y compris le RVI. L'objectif principal de cette thèse est d'étudier la capacité des techniques d'apprentissage profond à détecter les intrusions à bord des véhicules. Les algorithmes d'apprentissage profond ont la capacité de traiter de grandes quantités de données et de reconnaître des modèles complexes qui peuvent être difficiles à discerner pour les humains, ce qui les rend bien adaptés à la détection des intrusions dans les IVN. Cependant, comme l'architecture E/E d'un véhicule évolue constamment avec l'apparition de nouvelles technologies et exigences, nous proposons différentes solutions basées sur l'apprentissage profond pour différentes architectures E/E et pour diverses tâches, notamment la détection d'anomalies et la classification.",
      "published": "2023-03-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.70675/5d893223z18efz439eza641z058923788f27",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "surveillance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Natasha Alkhatib"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.70675/5d893223z18efz439eza641z058923788f27",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.70917/ijcisim-2026-5573",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Factors Influencing Telematics System Acceptance Among Logistics Companies in Malaysia: The Moderating Role of User Attitude",
      "description": "The logistics industry is increasingly adopting telematics systems to enhance efficiency and safety. This research examines the factors influencing the acceptance of telematics systems among Malaysian logistics companies using a hybrid model of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT). Perceived Usefulness (PU) and Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) from TAM. Social Influence (SI) and Facilitating Condition from UTAUT. One new variable added to the model which is Perceived Trust (PT). Data was collected from 382 logistics personnel via stratified random sampling across Malaysia’s central, northern, and southern hubs. This study focus on third party logistics (3PL) companies. The data had analysed through Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM), the study reveals that Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU), Facilitating Conditions (FC), and Perceived Trust (PT) are significant direct drivers of acceptance, in a sector where systems monitor driver behaviour and real-time positioning, employees must trust that data will be used for safety rather than \"punitive surveillance, while User Attitude (UA) serves as a critical moderator for social and environmental factors. It acted as a catalyst for external enablers, strengthening the impact of Social Influence and Facilitating Conditions on actual acceptance. Notably, Perceived Trust emerged as the single largest structural driver, while Perceived Usefulness (PU) was found to be a non-significant \"baseline\" requirement for the digitally native workforce. For a digitally native workforce, basic functional utility is a \"hygiene factor\" assumed baseline that provides no incremental motivation for adoption. Future research should utilize longitudinal designs and qualitative methods to explore the post-adoption phases and long-term sustainability of telematics integration.",
      "published": "2026-09-07",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.70917/ijcisim-2026-5573",
      "matched_terms": [
        "surveillance",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamad Yusuf Mislam",
        "Azahari Jamaludin",
        "Zila Zainal Abidin"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.70917/ijcisim-2026-5573",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.71097/ijsat.v11.i1.11599",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementing Continuous Monitoring of IoT Data Streams into Legacy Database Analytics for Dynamic Underwriting",
      "description": "The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) has catalyzed a fundamental transformation in data generation across the financial services landscape, yet the insurance industry remains largely tethered to legacy database architectures that favor batch processing over real-time agility. This paper addresses the critical systemic gap between high-velocity IoT data streams and the static nature of traditional risk assessment frameworks. We propose a novel hybrid integration framework designed to ingest continuous streams from telematics and sensor-based ecosystems directly into legacy analytical environments. By establishing a specialized middleware layer for data normalization and schema compatibility, the framework enables a transition from periodic, historical risk evaluation to dynamic underwriting. The study delineates a methodology for stream processing that respects the structural rigidities of incumbent relational databases while leveraging machine learning techniques for feature extraction. Our findings demonstrate that integrating real-time telemetry not only enhances the granularity of risk intelligence but also optimizes operational responsiveness in policy pricing and fraud detection. This research provides a technical roadmap for institutional digital transformation, proving that legacy infrastructure can be effectively augmented to support the next generation of predictive financial analytics without requiring immediate, wholesale system replacement.",
      "published": "2020-01-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.71097/ijsat.v11.i1.11599",
      "matched_terms": [
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pavan Kumar Veerapally"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Science and Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.71097/ijsat.v11.i1.11599",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.71097/ijsat.v17.i1.10807",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Software Update Architectures for Embedded Automotive and Consumer Systems: A Policy-Driven Architectural Recommendation Framework",
      "description": "Software update systems in embedded and automotive domains have evolved from simple firmware delivery mechanisms into distributed governance and execution platforms. Modern systems must operate under intermittent connectivity, power instability, heterogeneous hardware, and in automotive systems, safety-critical operating conditions constrained by functional safety standards such as ISO 26262 and in-vehicle networks governed by protocols including Controller Area Network (CAN) and Automotive Ethernet. This paper synthesizes two decades of cross-industry experience spanning automotive infotainment platforms, manufacturing IoT systems, and connected consumer products to present a comprehensive policy-driven architectural framework for software update systems. The framework treats Over-the-Air (OTA) updates as a distributed control problem requiring coordinated governance across cloud and device domains, introducing dual governance layers, cryptographically signed deployment intent aligned with ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity requirements, local rule enforcement mechanisms, transactional update execution patterns, and two-hop OTA distribution architectures for vehicle systems compliant with AUTOSAR specifications. An architectural recommendation model guides system designers in selecting appropriate update patterns and governance depth based on operational constraints, safety criticality, and regulatory compliance requirements. This work bridges theoretical safety and security frameworks with practical implementation patterns validated across multiple production systems managing millions of connected devices.",
      "published": "2026-03-11",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.71097/ijsat.v17.i1.10807",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vignesh Alagappan"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal on Science and Technology",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.71097/ijsat.v17.i1.10807",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.71143/wzg80v68",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Based Predictive Maintenance Systems for Smart Manufacturing: A Review and Future Outlook",
      "description": "Predictive maintenance (PdM) is one of the enabling technologies of smart manufacturing in which artificial intelligence (AI) is used to predict equipment troubles, or even better anticipate the failure of equipment, based on sensor data, machine learning algorithms, and digital twins. The traditional techniques of maintenance such as the reactive maintenance technique and the preventive maintenance technique will most probably introduce undue downtimes, wastages or redundancy. In comparison, AI-oriented predictive maintenance is a combination of real-time data analytics, industrial internet (IIoT), and existing deep learning technology will allow equipment to operate 24/7, minimize the risk of operations, and make decisions. It is a review article on the use of AI-based predictive maintenance in smart manufacturing. It talks about the establishment of PdM, how AI can develop real-time faults and use machine learning, deep learning and deep reinforcement learning procedures. Providing the advantages of PdM systems, the list below states with comment of automatic saving in case of downtime, of low cost and sustainability of aerospace case, case of automotive and case of energy. The issue of the heterogeneity of the data, non-standardization, threat to cybersecurity, and explainable AI is solved. Predictive maintenance and its combination with Industry 4.0, such as digital twins, edge computing, and blockchain, is another item on the list of the ways to make manufacturing systems more autonomous and resilient. The paper ends with a definition of future directions that include hybrid AI model, federated learning of collaborative PdM, and explainable AI model of trust and adoption. Smart manufacturing ecosystems can enable all this by adding intelligence to maintenance to move to more sustainable, reliable, and adaptable operations as defined in Industry 5.0.",
      "published": "2025-10-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.71143/wzg80v68",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Priyanka Panchal"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Research and Review in Applied Science Humanities and Technology",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.71143/wzg80v68",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.71222/a3bs1m81",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Asset Optimization and Value Enhancement of EV Charging Infrastructure under Aggregated Operation Models: Methods, Frameworks, and Practices",
      "description": "The rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) has significantly increased the demand for efficient and profitable charging infrastructure. Traditional station-level deployment often suffers from low utilization and delayed return on investment. Aggregated operation models-integrating multi-station, multi-brand, and multi-operator networks-offer new pathways for asset optimization, cost reduction, and value enhancement. This review systematically examines the methods, frameworks, and practices of aggregated EV charging networks. Key aspects include demand and load forecasting, infrastructure capacity planning, intelligent operational control, and digital twin-based simulations. The study further explores mechanisms for CAPEX and OPEX optimization, multi-stream revenue generation, grid integration, and flexibility services such as V1G/V2G participation. Global case studies illustrate successful implementations, while challenges such as interoperability, real-time dispatch scalability, and data security are discussed. Finally, future directions including AI-driven optimization, ultra-large-scale aggregation, and cross-energy-system coordination are proposed, highlighting the strategic potential of aggregation in sustainable EV infrastructure development.",
      "published": "2025-11-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.71222/a3bs1m81",
      "matched_terms": [
        "ev charging",
        "security",
        "v2g"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yongnian Su"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Engineering Advances",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.71222/a3bs1m81",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.71465/ajml3557",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OTA data consistency and transaction security optimization in hybrid cloud environments",
      "description": "Hybrid cloud systems are widely used for over-the-air (OTA) software updates, but keeping data consistent and transactions reliable across different cloud providers is still difficult. This study built an improved 2PC+Raft method that combines the two-phase commit process with Raft replication, cache separation, and adaptive heartbeat control. The method was tested on 500 transaction tasks between Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure. The results showed a 99.9% consistency rate, a 0.7% timeout rate, a 19.3% shorter synchronization delay, and a 78% lower write-conflict rate compared with the standard 2PC–Paxos model. These findings show that coordinated commit control and simple heartbeat adjustment can keep OTA updates stable and reliable under hybrid cloud conditions. The method offers a practical way to improve transaction reliability in OTA systems and can be applied to smart vehicles, industrial control, and Internet-of-Things platforms.",
      "published": "2026-01-31",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.71465/ajml3557",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Emma J. Lawson",
        "Hiroshi Tanaka",
        "Carlos Manuel Fernández"
      ],
      "venue": "American Journal of Machine Learning",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.71465/ajml3557",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.71465/fbf396",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Usage-Based and Personalized Insurance Enabled by AI and Telematics",
      "description": "The insurance industry is undergoing a fundamental transformation driven by artificial intelligence (AI) and telematics technologies, enabling the shift from traditional risk pooling models to usage-based insurance (UBI) and personalized coverage frameworks. This paper examines how AI algorithms, including machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL), combined with telematics data collection systems, are revolutionizing insurance pricing, risk assessment, and customer engagement. The integration of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, connected vehicles, and wearable sensors provides insurers with granular, real-time behavioral data that enables dynamic premium adjustment and individualized policy customization. Through comprehensive analysis of current implementations and emerging applications, this study explores the technical architecture of AI-enabled UBI systems, examines the transformation of actuarial practices through predictive analytics, and evaluates the implications for stakeholders across the insurance ecosystem. The findings reveal that AI-driven telematics solutions significantly enhance pricing accuracy, reduce adverse selection, improve customer satisfaction through fairness perceptions, and create new opportunities for preventive risk management. However, challenges persist regarding data privacy, algorithmic transparency, regulatory compliance, and equitable access to technology-enabled insurance products. This paper provides insights into how insurers can leverage AI and telematics to create sustainable competitive advantages while addressing ethical considerations and ensuring consumer protection in the evolving landscape of personalized insurance.",
      "published": "2025-10-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.71465/fbf396",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tiejiang Sun",
        "Mengdie Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Frontiers in Business and Finance",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.71465/fbf396",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4574,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.71465/fbf396 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: collection, regulatory, sensors, intelligence, applications, access, privacy, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.71892/11143/1441",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Détection d’anomalies et de pannes de chargeurs pour les systèmes de recharge de véhicules électriques utilisant OCPP",
      "description": "L’adoption généralisée des véhicules électriques dépend du déploiement d’une infrastructure de recharge robuste, sécurisée et fiable. À mesure que le réseau de bornes de recharge pour véhicules électriques s’étend, il devient de plus en plus vulnérable aux cybermenaces sophistiquées et aux pannes matérielles opérationnelles. Actuellement, l’industrie s’appuie fortement sur des stratégies de maintenance réactive et des systèmes de détection d’intrusion supervisés, qui peinent à identifier les attaques « zero-day » et la dégradation latente des équipements. Ce mémoire aborde ces limitations en proposant un cadre unifié pour la détection proactive d’anomalies exploitant le protocole standard Protocole de Point de Recharge Ouvert (OCPP : Open Charge Point Protocol). La recherche est divisée en deux études complémentaires axées sur la cybersécurité et la fiabilité matérielle. Premièrement, nous abordons le défi de la détection des cyberintrusions dans des environnements où les données d’attaque étiquetées sont rares. En utilisant le jeu de données CICEVSE2024, nous évaluons l’efficacité des techniques d’apprentissage non supervisé et semi-supervisé. En combinant des auto-encodeurs Mémoire à court terme (LSTM : Long Short-Term Memory) avec des algorithmes de regroupement (KMoyens, KMoyens par Mini-Lots et modèles de mélange gaussien), nous démontrons qu’une approche semi-supervisée surpasse significativement les méthodes purement non supervisées. Deuxièmement, nous étudions la maintenance prédictive pour les chargeurs rapides à courant continu, en ciblant spécifiquement les défaillances du système de refroidissement. Nous explorons l’utilité du traitement du signal sur les valeurs des compteurs standards d’OCPP. Bien que l’analyse fréquentielle soit limitée par la faible résolution d’échantillonnage, l’analyse temporelle a permis d’identifier un motif morphologique distinct précédant la panne, nommé topologie en aileron de requin. Nous avons formalisé un modèle de détection basé sur le ratio de durée du plateau (Rp), qui identifie avec succès les événements d’étranglement thermique avant qu’une panne catastrophique ne survienne.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.71892/11143/1441",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intrusion",
        "ocpp"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chris Tchimmegne Tchassem"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.71892/11143/1441",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7250/9789934372322",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Sustainable Digital Transformation in Automotive Industry",
      "description": "The textbook “Sustainable Digital Transformation in the Automotive Industry” provides an overview of the key concepts, technologies, and practices related to electric drive systems, automotive electronics, and energy-efficient transport solutions. It highlights the role of digitalization, automation, and sustainability in shaping modern automotive production, business planning, and human resource management. The book also addresses ecological challenges, cybersecurity issues, and the rise of online marketplace platforms as part of digital transformation. Combining theoretical foundations with practical case studies, it equips students, researchers, and industry professionals with the tools needed to innovate and adapt in a rapidly evolving automotive ecosystem. The textbook was developed within the EU-supported ERASMUS+ project.",
      "published": "2026-04-16",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7250/9789934372322",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ribickis, Leonids,",
        "Kunicina, Nadezhda,",
        "Ziravecka, Anastasija,",
        "Romanovs, Andrejs,",
        "Zabasta, Anatolijs,",
        "Gudele, Ina,",
        "Caiko, Jelena,",
        "Patlins, Antons,",
        "Ion, Ion,",
        "Brūzgienė, Rasa,",
        "Sarakis, Lambros,",
        "Kazymyr, Volodymyr,"
      ],
      "venue": "RTU Press eBooks",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.7250/9789934372322",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7251/jtttp2101035d",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematics of new vehicles for the purpose of pedestrian safety",
      "description": "Pedestrians are a vulnerable group of traffic users who most often suffer serious physical injuries in collisions with motor vehicles, which very often have a fatal outcome. The modern automotive industry is investing great efforts in the development of active and passive protection systems for all traffic participants, including pedestrians. Pedestrian protection is tried to be achieved by changing the shape of the front parts of the vehicle, by using plastic materials with higher deformation potential which, in collision with the body of the pedestrian, will spend most of the impact energy on its own deformation and thus maximally spare the delicate biological tissue of the pedestrian. Instead of protruding, rigid metal structures of insignificant elasticity and deformation potential, today’s cars are characterized by appropriate body design, use of high elasticity materials and deformation of contact surfaces, specially shaped and integrated bumpers, elastic and raised bonnet, headlights integrated into the contour of the vehicle front which are capable of absorbing part of the impact energy. Modern research shows a certain efficiency of these improvements on modern cars. Most of these studies are of the experimental type and are done in strictly controlled conditions on dolls, often commissioned and funded by wealthy automobile corporations, while there is less research in real field conditions. Recently, experiments have been made with testing the active bonnet, the airbag under the bonnet, and the google model of gluing the pedestrian body.",
      "published": "2021-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7251/jtttp2101035d",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Danislav Drašković",
        "Slobodan Tošić",
        "Тomislav Vujinović"
      ],
      "venue": "JTTTP - JOURNAL OF TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT THEORY AND PRACTICE",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.7251/jtttp2101035d",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7302/24920",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Software Over-the-air Updates in Automotive Modern Software Architecture",
      "description": "The automotive industry has seen a dynamic transformation from traditional hardware-defined to software-defined architecture enabling higher levels of autonomy and connectivity, better safety and security features, as well as new in-vehicle experiences and richer functions through software and ongoing updates of both functional and safety-critical features. Such architecture evolution demands new development paradigms to address the increasing comÂ¬plexity of software. This is crucial to guarantee seamless software development, integration, and deploymentâall the way from cloud or backend repositories to the vehicle. Additionally, it calls for enhanced collaboration between OEMs and suppliers. Simultaneously, it introÂ¬duces challenges associated with the necessity for ongoing updates and support ensuring vehicles remain safe and up to date. Current approaches to software updates have primarÂ¬ily been implemented for traditional vehicle architectures, which mostly comprise specialized electronic control units (ECUs) designed for specific functions. These ECUs are programmed with a single comprehensive executable that is then flashed onto the ECU all at once. DifÂ¬ferent approaches should be considered for new software-based modular vehicle architectures and specifically for ECUs with multiple independent software modules and support multiple variants. These modules should be updated independently and selectively for each ECU.In this study, the objective is to identify the most effective approach for implementing software over-the-air updates (SOTA) in modern modular automotive software architectures. Specifically, this research focuses on the critical challenges and requirements associated with software updates for automotive systems, with a particular emphasis on software-defined vehicles (SDVs). Given the complexity of vehicular software updates, particularly when dealing with highly distributed embedded ECUs, a software-centric approach is more effiÂ¬cient and suitable to cover different architectures and configurations, ensuring consistency across all platforms. Therefore, we propose a variability-rich scheme for software updates based on a Merkle tree approach that can cope with the complexity of the new software architecture while addressing the safety and security requirements of real-time and resource-constrained embedded systems in the vehicle. The Merkle tree-based Software Over-The-Air update (MT-SOTA) proposal enables secure updates for individual software modules. These modules are developed and integrated by diverse entities with varying release timelines. The technical analysis and experiments conducted in this research demonstrate how the proposed scheme, which combines a digital signature and a Merkle hash tree, achieves synergistic authentication and verification of multiple software modules. The MT-SOTA scheme can enhance the speed of software update execution without significantly increasing the process overhead within the ECU. In parallel, this approach offers OEMs the ability to sign a software module once and verify it across multiple ECU variants, providing a more efficient alternative to the traditional method of creating a software update package for each variant. This approach not only adds flexibility to software updates and reduces the complexity of software variant management, but also maintains the security of the vehicle, ensuring that there is no compromise in the safety of the passengers.",
      "published": "2024-08-21",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7302/24920",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abir Bazzi"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.7302/24920",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7302/5977",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Bringing Practical Security to Vehicles",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are getting increasingly connected. Together with more automotive electronics and wireless interfaces, the number of possible attack surfaces increases, raising security concerns. Attacks on cars can have multiple implications, ranging from financial incentives or damage to the compromise of human safety. Although attacks vary, all of them have one component in common, namely CAN bus injection. The CAN bus is the de-facto technology used inside the in-vehicle network to interconnect automotive controllers. An attacker who compromises the CAN bus can inject arbitrary CAN messages to it, making the vehicle misbehave. As a result, countermeasures against the CAN bus attacks need to be implemented by carmakers. Unfortunately, the carmakers have been reluctant to adopt any approach proposed thus far to secure CAN. The main reasons for this reluctance are that (i) CAN injection requires the knowledge of semantics which differs from vehicle to vehicle and is proprietary to the car-makers, as well as (ii) industry-specific functional and cost constraints which have not been reflected in the existing solutions. Any solution that accounts for these constraints has to incur minimal overhead on computational resources and message latency. I address these two points by first showing that proprietary semantics can be automatically reverse-engineered, effectively removing the barrier for CAN injection attacks. I demonstrated this by developing LibreCAN which can quickly and accurately reverse engineer both automotive powertrain- and body-related information in an automated fashion. Adversaries can significantly accelerate their preparation time for a CAN injection attack by obtaining the semantics which car-makers were trying to keep secret by not disclosing it publicly. Second, to meet the industry-specific constraints, I propose S2-CAN and MichiCAN. The former adds confidentiality, authenticity and integrity to the CAN bus without the overhead of cryptography, but by leveraging protocol-specific properties. The latter protects the CAN bus against attacks on its availability, e.g., Denial of Service, by leveraging novel hardware features of automotive controllers. Its main difference from existing work is practicality. Instead of adapting well-known cryptographic techniques from the realm of computer networks which do not satisfy the aforementioned cost and functional constraints, I propose out-of-the-box solutions that leverage protocol- and hardware-based features of automotive networks and controllers. Furthermore, both S2-CAN and MichiCAN are fully backward-compatible with existing hardware and specifications, as well as incur minimal computation and network overheads. CAN injection attacks can also be conducted remotely by accepting malicious data from other cars in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication scenarios. I propose textbf{CARdea}, a two-phase anomaly detection system that sanitizes incoming data from surrounding vehicles. Compared to computationally-intensive prior work, CARdea combines an in-vehicle light-weight anomaly detection phase with a more resource-heavy machine-learning phase that can be executed on the vehicle, edge or cloud based on available computational resources and manufacturer constraints. Overall, this dissertation demonstrates the omnipresence of CAN injection attacks and develops novel, practical security solutions for CAN and V2X by analyzing the inherent trade-off between security and performance.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7302/5977",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mert Dieter Pese"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.7302/5977",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7302/6800",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Connected and Automated Vehicle through Proactive Vulnerability Analysis and Security Enhancement",
      "description": "The rapidly evolving Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) technology brings new security challenges to vehicular systems, because newly introduced communication and system components inevitably increase the attack surface of vehicles if being abused, leading to potential safety hazards on the road. For example, the emerging Connected Vehicle (CV) technology, which enables vehicles to exchange safety and mobility information wirelessly (e.g., location and speed) with traffic infrastructure and other vehicles, opens a door for spoofing attacks. On the other hand, the development of Autonomous Vehicle (AV) results in the increasing data transfer needs of various sensors (e.g., cameras, LiDAR), which stimulates the adoption of Automotive Ethernet, the next-generation in-vehicle network. However, no common standard has been established for the security protocol of the in-vehicle Ethernet network. Therefore, it is highly desirable to systematically understand vulnerabilities in the current CAV systems and the corresponding security/safety consequences to proactively uncover and address these flaws before large-scale deployment. To achieve this goal, in this dissertation, we demonstrate that rigorous techniques, such as formal methods, program analysis, and the trusted execution environment (TEE), can be used for proactive vulnerability discovery and security enhancement in the safety-critical CAV system. At the design level, we leverage formal methods to uncover design flaws and ensure the security guarantee of the proposed defense. To study the emerging CV network interface, we propose a model-checking-based approach, CVAnalyzer, that harnesses the attack discovery capability of the general model checker and the quantitative threat assessment of the probabilistic model checker to automate the analysis. For in-vehicle Ethernet security, we present Gatekeeper, a gateway-based source authentication protocol. Except for the source authentication property, we then verify that Gatekeeper can defend against the spoofing attack and alleviate the impact of the DoS attack. At the implementation level, we employ both static and dynamic program analysis. To defend against the spoofing attack, we build a TEE-based defense system, CVShield, to protect the integrity of the sensor data reading and processing pipeline. To uncover semantic vulnerabilities in the CAV system, we prototype CAVFuzzer that incorporates a novel object-level mutator and utilizes the data-flow feedback to guide the fuzzing process.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7302/6800",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "connected vehicle",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shengtuo Hu"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.7302/6800",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7302/6838",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in Connected and Automated Transportation Systems",
      "description": "The last decade has been a witness to critical advancements in the field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS), with a great volume of research focusing on connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). A CAV leverages connected vehicle (CV) and automated vehicle (AV) technologies to enable automation and cooperation between vehicles and/or infrastructures to improve mobility, safety, efficiency, and sustainability in transportation systems. Despite these benefits, both connectivity and automation increase potential attack surfaces on CAVS, thereby introducing unprecedented cybersecurity challenges. This dissertation addresses these challenges by developing a comprehensive cybersecurity framework, which consists of two major components. The first component of the framework focuses on anomaly detection in CAV sensors. A CAV requires high fidelity data for automated and cooperative driving tasks. However, oftentimes there exist uncertainties in the CAV sensor measurements, including noise and time delay. Therefore, the first part of the dissertation proposes a signal filtering-detection framework to estimate the CAV sensor state in the presence of potential cyberattacks. This dissertation considers sensor anomaly as a result of either malicious attacks or sensor faults, and proposes a series of data-driven detectors in conjunction with extended Kalman filter (EKF)-based algorithms for both signal filtering and anomaly detection. The first part of the dissertation consists of studies under different driving scenarios, including in car following and platooning modes. The study on the platooning mode further analyzes platoon stability under cybersecurity uncertainties, where a new class of string stability measures, namely pseudo string stability, is introduced to analyze the stability of a vehicle string under various types of attacks and imperfect detectors. Despite the necessity of anomaly detection, a well-developed security monitor should also consider the dynamically changing environment faced by a CAV and the strategic behavior of the adversary to ensure both security and energy efficiency of the CAV. Therefore, the second component of the framework focuses on a macroscopic perspective to address security monitoring challenges faced by a CAV. First, the dissertation addresses the attack profile prediction and sensor selection problem under a security resource constraint. Toward this goal, the dissertation considers a sequential two-player game involving an attacker and a defender. This dissertation thereby develops an online learning algorithm for the defender to solve a variant of the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, namely, the multi-armed bandit with variable plays (MAB-VP). The dissertation provides a sublinear regret bound of the proposed algorithm, and derives the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game exists. Based on the analysis of the asymptotic expected reward of the two players, the dissertation assesses the effectiveness of the following two defense strategies from a game theoretical perspective: (1) increasing security resources for monitoring, and (2) improving the performance of the detector. Considering the fact that continuously monitoring all sensors aboard a CAV can be increasingly energy-intensive and therefore impractical, this dissertation introduces a dynamic security resource allocation problem to selectively monitor a subset of sensors for potential cyberattacks. This is accomplished by providing a mathematical framework based on a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), which prescribes a policy to dynamically assign security resource by balancing the trade-off between detection performance and energy-efficiency. This dynamic resource allocation problem serves as a complementary supplement to the sensor selection study, and together they form the last component of the proposed framework.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7302/6838",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "intelligent transportation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yiyang Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.7302/6838",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7302/6919",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Compiler Support for Robust and High Performance Autonomous Driving Environments",
      "description": "With the emergence of autonomous vehicles, the entire world is undergoing a transportation revolution. An autonomous vehicle is a cyber-physical system that can sense its surrounding environments through a set of advanced sensors and calculate an optimal driving route to safely arrive at the specified destination without human intervention. Despite the potential benefits brought by self-driving cars, autonomous driving systems are still a maturing technology and face two unresolved problems. First, autonomous vehicles are vulnerable to malicious attacks and hardware faults which will compromise the execution correctness of the system, so making these systems robust against adverse events is a high priority. Second, with the growing computation demands of machine learning models, execution latency has become a critical constraint on resource-limited vehicles. To address these challenges, this thesis proposes a set of compiler methods that can not only enhance the safety of the self-driving system through efficient code-generation techniques, but also improve its execution efficiency by optimizing various machine learning models used by the perception module. First, I develop a systematic approach to protect measuring sensors from a variety of malicious cyber-physical attacks using user-defined safety and security policies. Inspired from existing defense mechanisms deployed in other domains such as internet of things and software defined networks, a centralized communication scheme is proposed to validate messages sent between different software modules. To enable the validation functionality of the central control module, we add two sets of program analysis algorithms to provide this module with system-level information and develop a domain specific language to define and generate the safety policies that it must enforce. This centralized framework, AVMaestro, can accurately detect sensor attacks and system anomalies while only incurring around 3% end-to-end delay. In addition to ensuring the sensor safety, I present a lightweight and effective method to detect illegal control flows happening in decision-making modules of the system. Two different checking methods are explored to detect control flow errors that erroneously jump to both nearby and faraway locations by comparing a run-time signature with statically determined candidates. Further, a low-cost inter-procedural control flow protection scheme is also investigated to cover function calls and returns. The combination of proposed checking methods, PaSS, only incurs 19.1% performance overhead while maintaining 99.0% fault coverage. In the last part of this thesis, I shift my focus from robust execution to performance optimization by reducing the execution latency on perception related machine learning models. A novel graph substitution algorithm is developed to efficiently identify and fuse parallel nodes in the computation graph of a machine learning model when doing so improves performance. Similarly, a set of node fission transformations is also developed to split one node into multiple nodes that can be executed in parallel. The proposed technique, GraphMorph, can further improve models' inference performance by up to 10.5% compared to state-of-the-art optimization approaches.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7302/6919",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security",
        "self-driving",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ze Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "10.7302/6919",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7302/8040",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection Systems to Secure In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "With recent advancements in the automotive world and the introduction of autonomous vehicles, more software-driven electrical components and wireless connectivity are being introduced to increase reliability and improve safety systems for modern vehicles. However, these advanced systems also bring new risks, particularly from the security perspective, as attack surfaces are expanding and new attacks are emerging. Automotive security has become a real and important issue. For modern vehicles, in-vehicle networks that connect Electronic Control Units (ECUs) have increasingly become targets of vehicle cyberattacks. Researchers have demonstrated that attackers can intentionally control a vehicle by gaining access to the in-vehicle network, posing security and safety risks for vehicles and passengers. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) provide effective countermeasures for IT systems. However, they cannot be applied to automotive systems directly due to the challenges posed by real-time automotive systems. Some schemes for in-vehicle networks have limitations in detecting certain critical attacks, while others need to improve their efficiency to meet the challenges of real-time requirements. Existing CAN IDS designs based on anomaly detection usually follow two approaches: rule-based and machine learning-based. Generally, rule-based approaches are more efficient but lack abilities to detect certain types of attacks. It is difficult, if not impossible, to come up with a complete set of rules that can cover all abnormal behaviors. Machine learning-based approaches usually achieve relatively high detection accuracy but, at the same time, often involve high computational costs as well as a higher rate of false positives. Moreover, many existing schemes do not consider the real-time requirements of in-vehicle networks and the memory constraints of ECUs. In addition, their evaluations often rely on simulated data or data collected from only one or a few vehicles, given the lack of standard benchmark datasets in this domain. This dissertation aims to address the challenges mentioned above. We (1) investigate how existing IDS schemes work and understand their strengths and weaknesses, and conduct a detailed literate review and an empirical comparative study to provide a comprehensive understanding; (2) design a new hybrid approach for efficient and accurate intrusion detection. Specifically, we explore the combination of rule-based and machine learning-based approaches to build a two-stage IDS framework that inherits the advantages of both; (3) propose a novel IDS based on Binarized Neural Network (BNN) to accelerate intrusion detection with the consideration of real-time demand of in-vehicle networks. Furthermore, it can be further accelerated by hardware through Field-Programmable Grid Arrays (FPGAs); (4) present a new Binarized Convolutional Neural Network (BCNN)-based IDS to stick a balance between accuracy and acceleration. In particular, we design an input generator that helps machine learning models learn better for higher accuracy; (5) collect real Controller AreaNetwork (CAN) data from seven different vehicle models from different OEMs; and (6) evaluate the proposed schemes with real CAN data. Our research includes a comparative study to provide a comprehensive understanding of existing IDSs, the development of a novel hybrid IDS framework, the exploration of BNN and BCNN to design advanced IDSs suited for in-vehicle environments, the data collection from seven different real vehicles, and the evaluation of the IDSs we proposed. Results show that our research is promising, and the proposed schemes have the potential to improve vehicle security significantly. Overall, this dissertation develops novel IDSs to effectively and efficiently protect in-vehicle networks and meet the unique challenges posed by real-time requirements of in-vehicle networks. This research provides innovative solutions to enhance the security of in-vehicle networks, ensuring vehicle security in an increasingly connected and autonomous world.",
      "published": "2023-06-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7302/8040",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Linxi Zhang"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.7302/8040",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7307/ptsm.2020.10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "The impact of telematics on traffic safety",
      "description": "The development of traffic that is conditioned by the high mobility of people, goods and services must be in line with the principles of sustainable development, but it is only possible if the consumption of renewable resources is less than natural renewal opportunities. The future is in implementation of innovative technologies such as telematics systems that offer not only technical solutions but also a new way of life, a new business approach and a new cultural aspect of living for all traffic participants. Advanced telematics solutions such as inflow management and speed limit management greatly help to solve traffic problems, like incidents, environmental pollution, traffic congestion, fuel consumption, etc. Impact of telematics can increase safety but can also introduce new risks for drivers that pose special challenges to traffic psychology and public health. In order to reduce traffic congestion, longer waiting times, environmental pollution, reduce fuel consumption in incident situation various advanced grammatical solutions have been implemented in order to reduce these problems. Telematics, using techniques such as informatics, optoelectronics, automatics and telecommunications, helps to reduce costs of transportation potential management, improves the security and reliability of the transportation service.",
      "published": "2021-09-09",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7307/ptsm.2020.10",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Igor Jelić",
        "Maja Balenović"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "10.7307/ptsm.2020.10",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7307/ptt.v38i2.1067",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment for Intelligent Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid development of intelligent connected vehicles, cybersecurity issues have become increasingly prominent, posing significant challenges to vehicle safety and user privacy. This paper conducts a study on threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) for intelligent connected vehicles based on the ISO/SAE 21434 standard. The research analyses and examines the practical methodologies of the standard from systematic and practical perspectives, constructing a comprehensive risk assessment framework that covers risk identification, analysis, assessment and response strategies. The rationality and effectiveness of the framework are validated through case studies. This study not only provides systematic security guidance for automotive manufacturers and technology developers but also offers empirical evidence for regulatory compliance reviews, thereby promoting the secure development of intelligent connected vehicles.",
      "published": "2026-02-24",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7307/ptt.v38i2.1067",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "privacy",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Huasheng XIE",
        "Lie Wang"
      ],
      "venue": "PROMET - Traffic&Transportation",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.7307/ptt.v38i2.1067",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4595,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.7307/ptt.v38i2.1067 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: regulatory, response, user, case, significant, privacy, safety, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7467/ksae.2024.32.7.609",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Mechnism for Replay Attack Prevention in Vehicle Keyless Entry Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024-07-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7467/ksae.2024.32.7.609",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "keyless",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seong-Min Cho",
        "Sanghoon Jeon"
      ],
      "venue": "Transactions of Korean Society of Automotive Engineers",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.7467/ksae.2024.32.7.609",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.1648",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-vehicle network intrusion detection systems: a systematic survey of deep learning-based approaches",
      "description": "Developments in connected and autonomous vehicle technologies provide drivers with many convenience and safety benefits. Unfortunately, as connectivity and complexity within vehicles increase, more entry points or interfaces that may directly or indirectly access in-vehicle networks (IVNs) have been introduced, causing a massive rise in security risks. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a practical method for controlling malicious attacks while guaranteeing real-time communication. Regarding the ever-evolving security attacks on IVNs, researchers have paid more attention to employing deep learning-based techniques to deal with privacy concerns and security threats in the IDS domain. Therefore, this article comprehensively reviews all existing deep IDS approaches on in-vehicle networks and conducts fine-grained classification based on applied deep network architecture. It investigates how deep-learning techniques are utilized to implement different IDS models for better performance and describe their possible contributions and limitations. Further compares and discusses the studied schemes concerning different facets, including input data strategy, benchmark datasets, classification technique, and evaluation criteria. Furthermore, the usage preferences of deep learning in IDS, the influence of the dataset, and the selection of feature segments are discussed to illuminate the main potential properties for designing. Finally, possible research directions for follow-up studies are provided.",
      "published": "2023-10-26",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.1648",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Feng Luo",
        "Jiajia Wang",
        "Xuan Zhang",
        "Yifan Jiang",
        "Zhihao Li",
        "Cheng Luo"
      ],
      "venue": "PeerJ Computer Science",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "10.7717/peerj-cs.1648",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 40,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.3108",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "BEPCD: an ensemble learning-based intrusion detection framework for in-vehicle CAN bus",
      "description": "With the rapid development and widespread adoption of intelligent vehicles and the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), vehicle security has become a growing concern. Modern vehicles manage key components via the controller area network (CAN) connected electronic control units (ECUs). CAN bus intrusion techniques are the primary methods of compromising the IoV, posing a significant threat to the normal operation of critical vehicle systems, such as the power systems. However, existing attack detection methods still have shortcomings in terms of feature extraction and the diversity of attack type detection. To address these challenges, we propose an intrusion detection framework named basic ensemble and pioneer class decision (BEPCD). The framework first constructs a 15-dimensional feature model to hierarchically characterize CAN bus messages. Subsequently, BEPCD incorporates multi-model ensemble learning enhanced by a Pioneer class selector and confidence-driven voting mechanisms, enabling precise classification of both conventional and emerging attack patterns. Additionally, we analyze the importance of different data features across four machine learning algorithms. Experimental results on public datasets demonstrate that the proposed detection framework effectively detects intrusions in-vehicle CAN bus. Compared to other intrusion detection frameworks, our framework improves the overall F1-score by 1% to 5%. Notably, it achieves an approximately 77.5% performance enhancement in detecting replay attacks.",
      "published": "2025-08-19",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.3108",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bocheng Xu",
        "Fei Cao",
        "Xilong Li",
        "Song Tian",
        "Wenbo Deng",
        "Shudan Yue"
      ],
      "venue": "PeerJ Computer Science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.7717/peerj-cs.3108",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7717/peerj-cs.3360",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A keyless multimodal-based user authentication scheme using generative adversarial networks",
      "description": "Biometrics are increasingly used for access control, fraud detection, and authentication systems. Nevertheless, attackers can deceive such systems using forged biometrics. This research proposes a novel method that makes biometric security systems more resilient to such attacks. The proposed method transforms the user’s biometric data into an irreversible code to protect the original data. This code combines data from multiple biometric modalities, making fabricating a false biometric harder. Additionally, the proposed method does not depend on any secret keys, which helps avoid cases of stolen tokens. The proposed method utilizes the generative adversarial network (GAN) to generate synthetic biometric templates from multiple modalities, which is considered a transformation function for biometric data. Three fusion levels are presented; features from multiple biometric modalities are extracted first in each fusion level. Subsequently, the features train a generative adversarial network to produce synthesized biometric templates. These synthesized templates serve as secure substitutes for the original biometrics during authentication, preventing direct exposure of raw biometric data. We evaluated our methods on the CASIA-V3-Internal and MMU1 iris datasets and the AT&T (ORL) and FERET face datasets. The results showed that our proposed methods can achieve higher accuracy, usability, and improved security compared to a single biometric modality. The proposed feature-level, GAN-based, and decision-level fusion schemes achieved 2.03%, 0.82%, and 0.0297% error rates, respectively, for CASIA and ORL datasets and 1.53%, 0.80%, and 0.0313% error rates, respectively, for MMU1 and FERET datasets. Moreover, we have demonstrated that our method resists pre-image and correlation attacks.",
      "published": "2025-11-18",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.3360",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mayada Tarek",
        "Eslam Hamouda",
        "Amjad Alsirhani",
        "Abdullah Alomari",
        "Ayman Mohamed Mostafa"
      ],
      "venue": "PeerJ Computer Science",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.7717/peerj-cs.3360",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7753/ijcatr0812.1010",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Redefining Global Logistics Leadership: Integrating Predictive AI Models to Strengthen Competitiveness",
      "description": "Global logistics is undergoing a profound transformation as evolving trade demands, supply chain volatility, and technological acceleration converge to challenge traditional operational models.In a landscape defined by increased consumer expectations, tighter delivery cycles, and rising cost pressures, conventional logistics strategies-grounded in static routing and reactive resource allocation-no longer offer the responsiveness or resilience required to maintain global leadership.As emerging economies ramp up their investment in transportation innovation and digital infrastructure, maintaining competitiveness requires a strategic pivot toward intelligence-driven decision-making frameworks.This paper explores the integration of predictive artificial intelligence (AI) models as a foundational approach to redefining logistics leadership.Emphasizing the capacity of machine learning and forecasting systems to anticipate freight flows, model traffic congestion, optimize fleet utilization, and reduce fuel inefficiencies, the research frames predictive AI not as an incremental improvement, but as a transformative enabler.By analyzing systems architectures, key deployment platforms, and case applications in fleet management, the study reveals how predictive AI can unlock new levels of supply chain agility and real-time responsiveness.Particular focus is given to the implications for national logistics strategy, with the United States positioned as a pivotal case.The paper argues that deploying predictive AI at scale-integrated across cloud, edge, and telematics infrastructure-constitutes a critical pathway for strengthening America's competitive advantage in global logistics innovation, while supporting sustainability, efficiency, and long-term resilience.",
      "published": "2025-05-25",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7753/ijcatr0812.1010",
      "matched_terms": [
        "resilience",
        "supply chain",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer Applications Technology and Research",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.7753/ijcatr0812.1010",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 29,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7753/ijcatr1305.1009",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Machine Learning and IoT to Revolutionize Self-Driving Cars and Enhance SCADA Automation Systems",
      "description": "The integration of Machine Learning (ML) and the Internet of Things (IoT) is revolutionizing the domains of autonomous vehicles and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) automation systems.These cutting-edge technologies synergize to address complex challenges, including real-time decision-making, predictive maintenance, and operational efficiency, thereby transforming industries reliant on automation.Autonomous vehicles, empowered by IoT sensors and ML algorithms, achieve enhanced situational awareness, seamless navigation, and adaptive decision-making capabilities.IoT-enabled devices provide continuous streams of data from vehicular environments, while ML processes these datasets to predict potential obstacles, optimize routes, and enhance safety.Similarly, SCADA systems leverage IoT and ML to improve monitoring, control, and fault detection in critical infrastructure such as energy, water management, and industrial processes.IoT integration enables SCADA systems to collect vast amounts of operational data, while ML models analyse these datasets to predict system failures, optimize resource allocation, and enhance operational resilience.The convergence of these technologies not only automates processes but also ensures higher accuracy, scalability, and cost-efficiency.However, the deployment of IoT and ML in these domains raises concerns about cybersecurity and data privacy.SCADA systems and autonomous vehicles are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats, requiring robust security frameworks.Addressing these challenges is essential to fully harness the potential of IoT-ML integration.This paper explores the transformative role of IoT and ML in advancing self-driving cars and SCADA systems, highlighting innovations, challenges, and future directions for achieving sustainable and secure automation.",
      "published": "2024-05-15",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7753/ijcatr1305.1009",
      "matched_terms": [
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "privacy",
        "resilience",
        "self-driving",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer Applications Technology and Research",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.7753/ijcatr1305.1009",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 85,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7753/ijsea1410.1003",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Mitigating Cybersecurity Risks in Automotive Embedded Systems Through AI-Driven Intrusion Detection and Secure Communication Protocols",
      "description": "The rapid digitization of the automotive industry has ushered in advanced connectivity features, autonomous functionalities, and data-driven decision-making processes.However, this technological transformation has also introduced significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities within automotive embedded systems, where traditional security frameworks struggle to address evolving threats.Cyberattacks targeting vehicle control units, in-vehicle networks, and external communication interfaces can compromise passenger safety, disrupt mobility services, and undermine consumer trust.A broader understanding of these risks highlights the urgent need for robust defense mechanisms capable of adapting to sophisticated intrusion attempts.Artificial intelligence (AI)-driven intrusion detection systems (IDS) present a promising approach, leveraging machine learning and deep learning techniques to identify anomalous patterns in vehicular data streams in real time.These systems not only enhance detection accuracy but also enable adaptive responses to previously unseen attack vectors.Narrowing the focus further, secure communication protocols, including cryptographic authentication and lightweight encryption schemes, play a pivotal role in safeguarding data exchange across in-vehicle networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) infrastructures.Integrating AI-driven IDS with resilient communication frameworks offers a layered security model that strengthens embedded system resilience against cyber threats while ensuring compliance with stringent automotive safety standards such as ISO/SAE 21434.This paper emphasizes the synergy of AI-based threat detection with secure communication architectures as a comprehensive strategy to mitigate cybersecurity risks.By aligning technological innovations with regulatory and industry practices, the automotive sector can address emerging challenges proactively, ensuring the safe deployment of connected and autonomous vehicles in an increasingly hostile cyber environment.",
      "published": "2025-09-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7753/ijsea1410.1003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "International Journal of Science and Engineering Applications",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "10.7753/ijsea1410.1003",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7753/ijsea1510.1009",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Coordinated Electric Vehicle Charging in Distribution Networks Under Uncertain Residential Demand",
      "description": "Uncoordinated residential electric vehicle (EV) charging increases evening peaks and may cause voltage drops and feeder overloads.This study develops a scenario-based coordination framework accounting for uncertain arrivals, next-day departures, and initial states of charge.A synthetic fleet of 300 EVs is modeled with truncated normal distributions; 1,000 Monte Carlo charging scenarios are reduced to 12 weighted representatives using peak-period-stratified k-medoids.A multiobjective model minimizes normalized procurement cost, network losses, and daily peak-to-valley range while enforcing charging windows, energy demand, facility limits, and network constraints.The IEEE 33-bus case is solved by linear programming with updated loss sensitivities and verified by nonlinear power flow.Compared with uncoordinated charging, coordination reduces weighted peak power by 28.94%, peak-to-valley range by 71.33%, procurement cost by 8.27%, and network losses by 7.76%.In the worst representative scenario, minimum voltage rises from 0.863307 to 0.903665 p.u., and maximum line loading falls from 133.510% to 98.758%.All EV charging requirements are met.Results indicate that scenario-based coordination can improve the simulated feeder's economy and operating security under the specified synthetic assumptions.",
      "published": "2026-10-10",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7753/ijsea1510.1009",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shi'en Niu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Science and Engineering Applications",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.7753/ijsea1510.1009",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7763/ijcte.2018.v10.1221",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Research of Authenticated Encryption Security Protocol for FlexRay In-vehicle Network",
      "description": "Since the appearance of internet of vehicle (IoV), the in-vehicles network is no longer an isolated system.The OBD-II hardware, GPS, and the WiFi system could cause intrusions during communications.There are many unresolved network security problems yet in in-vehicle bus protocol, like controller area network (CAN), local area network (LIN), and FlexRay.In this paper, having considered the vulnerabilities and a hidden attacking of FlexRay, an authenticated encryption protocol is designed based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-128 and SHA-1 algorithm for FlexRay.We apply the protocol into a simulated FlexRay bus system which is build by CAN software environment.The protocol is also applied in a real Flexray network build by MC9S12XF512 evaluation board The both experimental results show that the security and reliability of in-vehicle bus system are enhanced.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7763/ijcte.2018.v10.1221",
      "matched_terms": [
        "controller area network",
        "flexray",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd-ii",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meng-Zhuo Liu",
        "Yihu Xu",
        "Yujing Wu",
        "Yinan Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer Theory and Engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "10.7763/ijcte.2018.v10.1221",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7840/kics.2026.51.2.348",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Systematic Literature Review of Automotive TARA Methodologies: Classification and Compliance with ISO/SAE 21434",
      "description": "The increase in advanced functionalities has led to a rapid rise in both external connectivity and system complexity, thereby amplifying the impact of cybersecurity threats on vehicle safety. As a result, the automotive industry is now required to conduct Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) in full compliance with UN Regulation No. 155 and the requirements of ISO/SAE 21434. This study adopts the Systematic Literature Review (SLR) methodology and establishes three research questions, search keywords, and inclusion/exclusion criteria to ensure a systematic and objective selection of relevant literature. Through comprehensive searches across major global academic databases, including IEEE Xplore, SpringerLink, ScienceDirect, Scopus and WoS and a screening process, a final set of 15 representative studies on automotive TARA was identified. Each selected study was classified into one of four categories based on the nature of the challenges it aimed to address: (1) high demand for human and time resources, (2) insufficient consideration of safety, (3) insufficient lifecycle coverage, and (4) inadequate evaluation criteria. Furthermore, the degree of compliance with the ISO/SAE 21434 TARA requirements was analyzed for each study. These findings provide foundational insights to support stakeholders in the automotive industry in selecting or developing TARA methodologies suited to their organizational contexts, and offer implications for future improvements to international standards.",
      "published": "2026-02-27",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7840/kics.2026.51.2.348",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sanghyeong Ryu",
        "Yunkeun Song",
        "Yousik Lee"
      ],
      "venue": "한국통신학회논문지",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.7840/kics.2026.51.2.348",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.7906/indecs.18.3.3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automated vehicles risk assessment and evaluation",
      "description": "Statistics show that the number of passenger cars is increasing significantly, which will have a negative impact on social, economic and environmental sustainability, and it will cause severe problems for the next generations. Automated Vehicles (AVs) represent an innovation in automotive technology. They have become a global concern because of their importance in smart traffic systems as well as their significant impact on safety, supposing that traffic will be more efficient and longer travel distance will not be a problem. They will become more acceptable since they will encourage living in suburbs and leaving noisy and polluted cities behind. Drivers will be more relaxed and in comfort while enjoying travel time and some extra privileges that they may have, for example, the chance for spending time more productively and efficiently at non-driving times inside the vehicle. Automated Vehicles are also beneficial for the environment. In fact, it is expected that in the next few years these cars in general will provide a solution for many problems. Researchers and planners of transportation systems are facing many challenges in the field of autonomous vehicles, as the level of safety and mobility involves such elements and circumstances which may cause that the operated travel will be less efficient than expected. The aim of the article is to discuss the challenges, threats, vulnerability, impacts and likelihood of failure faced in the development of AVs by studying information security risk management standard process, and explaining how to apply the process of International Organization for Standardization. The concept of applying ISO to AVs will be discussed here through certain processes.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.7906/indecs.18.3.3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Malak Shatnawi"
      ],
      "venue": "Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "10.7906/indecs.18.3.3",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.82444/warw.33912829",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "As seen on TV : televisual hoaxes in factual entertainment",
      "description": "Since the turn of the century, hoaxes have become increasingly associated with traditional and digital media . However, contemporary scholarship on the subject has largely proven narrow in scope by reducing the phenomenon to either a scourge or epistemic instability or, to a lesser degree, an opportunity for reflexivity to foster media literacy. This thesis combi nes close - textual analysis, reception studies, and semi - structured interviews to establish a broader understanding of the television hoax by examining the variety of power dynamics it can create, subvert, or reinforce depending on the conditions surroundin g its deployment. My primary assertion is that hoaxes result in one of three outcomes: an exploitation of everyday people unaffiliated with the television industry, a form of culture jamming seeking to disempower those in said industry, or a demonstration of viewer agency and the polysemic nature of the medium. Two variables determine which of these events occur: which party is responsible for the hoax and in what genre it transpires ; Part 1 examines the former, Part 2 the latter. Following a literature review, Part 1 controls the second variable by limiting its purview to television news to explore how different sources of a hoax can yield different outcomes within the same genre . Chapter 1 considers the broadcaster’s power to codify truth, Chapter 2 introduces the possibility to usurp this control by patching in broadcast intrusions and Chapter 3 conceptualises how defiant audiences can destabilise the system altogether. Inverting this approach, Part 2 renders the first determinan t constant by only examining hoaxes orchestrated by television subjects unaffiliated with the industry across three different genres. Chapter 4 examines how deceptive reality television contestants benefit the programmes they appear on , Chapter 5 analyses how pranking daytime infotainment can seize control over the televisual space , while Chapter 6 unpacks the bifurcated interpretations of television documentaries to illustrate the polysemic nature of the form’s mode of engagement. This thesis argues that identified hoaxes function as an effective ‘breakdown’ of television ’s normal conditions, which lay s bare our expectations and engagement patterns with the medium . Focusing on the hoax allows us to better understand",
      "published": "2026-09-17",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.82444/warw.33912829",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploitation",
        "infotainment",
        "jamming"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jason Potel"
      ],
      "venue": "Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.82444/warw.33912829",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.83164/27676643",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategic News Management in the Iraq War:",
      "description": "This dissertation examines the role of information strategy and its interaction with the media in modern information environments. In particular it investigates how military information operations utilised the media to protect Coalition strategic vulnerabilities and provide the basis for effective war-fighting in the 2003 Iraq War. It investigates the role information plays in strategy, and its development into concepts of Information and Psychological Operations. In particular, military public communication methods are scrutinised, especially regarding the domestic use of psychological operations and military dedication to ‘truth-telling’. It is concluded that the military generally does communicate ‘truths’, but only ‘selected truths’ for target audiences, resulting in a manipulative relationship. Following this the media-management policies prior to the Iraq War are examined. These are defined as a ‘restrictive model’ which limited the amount of information the media received. An examination of policies during the Iraq War illustrates that the military have moved beyond this model, towards the information saturation of the media. This information, however, was of a narrow nature which appealed to media imperatives. The military’s policies capitalised on these developments, providing information dominance and protecting public will. Following this the legitimacy of this conduct by democratic nations is explored, arriving at the conclusion it is tolerated if utilised in popular wars, however this toleration depletes if public will is insufficient. This conclusion is linked to Clausewitz’s concepts of the trinity and maximum expenditure of effort in warfare. To conclude, it is stated that the military attempted to instigate manipulative relationships with the media in order to affect domestic opinion. However, the media are partly responsible for this through their adoption of infotainment and commercial formats which prioritise spectacle over education. The military, with the aid of PR companies, understood these developments and set to control them with information overload, as opposed to information restriction. These measures are only successful however if the necessary public will has been generated through governmental justification",
      "published": "2026-03-20",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.83164/27676643",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mark"
      ],
      "venue": "Aberystwyth Research portal (Aberystwyth University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.83164/27676643",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.9734/jerr/2024/v26i111310",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Connected Vehicle Information Security Risks and Countermeasures",
      "description": "The development of intelligent connected vehicles has promoted the upgrading of the transportation system, but it also brings challenges in information security. This paper analyzes the current information security vulnerabilities of intelligent connected vehicles, including attack methods, security vulnerabilities, and protective measures. Firstly, through the analysis of the existing attack methods and their principles, the potential security vulnerabilities and threats are summarized. Then, based on security and cryptography technology, relevant measures for information security protection are proposed to achieve all-round protection of intelligent connected vehicle information. Finally, The paper puts forward the measures to solve the information security problem of intelligent connected vehicle from three aspects: Encryption and Authentication, Firewall and Intrusion Detection System, and Over-the-air (OTA).",
      "published": "2024-10-22",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.9734/jerr/2024/v26i111310",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yang Shuhai"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Engineering Research and Reports",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "10.9734/jerr/2024/v26i111310",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.407,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between doi:10.9734/jerr/2024/v26i111310 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: information., risks, information, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "doi:10.9790/487x-2802021733",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Insights Into Transportation Inefficiencies In Global Automotive Supply Chains: The Role Of Technology, Environment, And Regulation",
      "description": "Transportation operations form a vital component of cost efficiency, operational stability, and environmental responsibility within the global automotive industry. This paper critically examines the current transportation practices shaping the sector, moving beyond incremental improvements to address deeper structural inefficiencies and strategic gaps. It highlights the limited integration of telematics, ERP, and TMS systems especially in developing economies as a key barrier to modernization. Environmental challenges arising from conventional transport modes, the limited impact of certain sustainability initiatives, and the underutilization of reverse logistics are also analyzed. Drawing insights from recent supply chain disruptions, the study identifies core weaknesses such as rigid contracts and excessive centralization. Furthermore, it evaluates the effects of regulatory inconsistencies, rising compliance costs, and workforce shortages alongside the growing role of gigbased logistics models. The paper concludes that the future of automotive transportation depends on a comprehensive restructuring of logistics networks centered on efficiency, resilience, sustainability, and international coordination.",
      "published": "2026-02-01",
      "url": "https://doi.org/10.9790/487x-2802021733",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "regulation",
        "resilience",
        "supply chain",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srinivasan Krishnan",
        "P Rajan Chinna"
      ],
      "venue": "IOSR Journal of Business and Management",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "10.9790/487x-2802021733",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:00cfadaa23af",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automated Discovery of Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in Connected Vehicle Protocols",
      "description": "With the development of the emerging Connected Vehicle (CV) technology, vehicles can wirelessly communicate with traffic infrastructure and other vehicles to exchange safety and mobility information in real time. However, the integrated communication capability inevitably increases the attack surface of vehicles, which can be exploited to cause safety hazard on the road. Thus, it is highly desirable to systematically understand design-level flaws in the current CV network stack as well as in CV applications, and the corresponding security/safety consequences so that these flaws can be proactively discovered and addressed before large-scale deployment. In this paper, we design CVAnalyzer, a system for discovering design-level flaws for availability violations of the CV network stack, as well as quantifying the corresponding security/safety consequences. To achieve this, CVAnalyzer combines the attack discovery capability of a general model checker and the quantitative threat assessment capability of a probabilistic model checker. Using CVAnalyzer, we successfully uncovered 4 new DoS (Denial-of-Service) vulnerabilities of the latest CV network protocols and 14 new DoS vulnerabilities of two CV platoon management protocols. Our quantification results show that these attacks can have as high as 99% success rates, and in the worst case can at least double the delay in packet processing, violating the latency requirement in CV communication.We implemented and validated all attacks in a real-world testbed, and also analyzed the fundamental causes to propose potential solutions. We have reported our findings in the CV network protocols to the IEEE 1609 Working Group, and the group has acknowledged the discovered vulnerabilities and plans to adopt our solutions.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-hu-shengtuo.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shengtuo Hu",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Jiachen Sun",
        "Yiheng Feng",
        "Zhuoqing Morley Mao",
        "Henry X. Liu"
      ],
      "venue": "USENIX Security Symposium",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 11,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:01f233fd4196",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CYBER-SECURITY: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR THE AVIATION AND AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES",
      "description": "Today’s vehicles are increasingly ‘connected’; there is wireless data exchange with servers, infrastructure and other vehicles. Tomorrow’s vehicles will be automated and autonomous, capable of sensing their environment and navigating through cities without human input. The ongoing move from traditional air traffic control systems such as radar and voice towards enhanced surveillance and communications systems using modern data networks causes a marked shift in the security of the aviation environment. These advances will increase comfort and convenience for customers, improve products and services, and contribute towards achieving societal goals such as improving road safety, reducing fuel consumption, and facilitating traffic management and parking. The digital world offers unprecedented opportunities. Nevertheless, opportunity comes with risks, and one of these is the threat of a direct cyber-attack on vehicles or a whole vehicle fleet. Keeping cyber-security risks for connected vehicles in check is therefore of crucial importance. The interfaces of connected vehicles present an opportunity for exploiting vulnerabilities if adequate cyber-security mechanisms are not implemented and cyber-security risks are not dealt with appropriately. Attackers may compromise the user’s personal data, threaten the vehicle’s systems or endanger passengers.",
      "published": "2019-09-09",
      "url": "https://journal.thelawbrigade.com/clrj/article/download/362/330",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cyber-security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dr. S. Krishnan Mani"
      ],
      "venue": "Commonwealth Law Review Journal",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4038,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:01f233fd4196 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: societal, surveillance, servers, threaten, personal, direct, user, digital."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:04bba50b56a0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber Security of Traffic Signal Control Systems with Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Our world is becoming increasingly connected through smart technologies. The same trend is emerging in transportation systems, wherein connected vehicles (CVs) and transportation infrastructure are being connected through advanced wireless communication technologies. CVs have great potential to improve a variety of mobility applications, including traffic signal control (TSC), a critical component in urban traffic operations. CV-based TSC (CV-TSC) systems use trajectory data to make more informed control decisions, therefore can accommodate real-time traffic fluctuations more efficiently. However, vehicle-infrastructure connectivity opens new doors to potential cyber attacks. Malicious attackers can potentially send falsified trajectory data to CV-TSC systems and influence signal control decisions. The benefit of CV-TSC systems can be realized only if the systems are secure in cyberspace. Although many CV-TSC systems have been developed within the past decade, few consider cyber security in their system design. It remains unclear exactly how vulnerable CV-TSC systems are, how cyber attacks may be perpetrated, and how engineers can mitigate cyber attacks and protect CV-TSC systems. Therefore, this dissertation aims to systematically understand the cyber security problems facing CV-TSC systems under falsified data attacks and provide a countermeasure to safeguard CV-TSC systems. These objectives are accomplished through four studies. The first study evaluates the effects of falsified data attacks on TSC systems. Two TSC systems are considered: a conventional actuated TSC system and an adaptive CV-TSC system. Falsified data attacks are assumed to change the input data to these systems and therefore influence control decisions. Numerical examples show that both systems are vulnerable to falsified data attacks. The second study investigates how falsified data attacks may be perpetrated in a realistic setting. Different from prior research, this study considers a more realistic but challenging black-box attack scenario, in which the signal control model is unavailable to the attacker. Under this constraint, the attacker has to learn the signal control model using a surrogate model. The surrogate model predicts signal timing plans based on critical traffic features extracted from CV data. The attacker can generate falsified CV data (i.e., falsified vehicle trajectories) to alter the values of critical traffic features and thus influence signal control decisions. In the third study, a data-driven method is proposed to protect CV-TSC systems from falsified data attacks. Falsified trajectories are behaviorally distinct from normal trajectories because they must accomplish a certain attack goal; thus, the problem of identifying falsified trajectories is considered an abnormal trajectory identification problem. A trajectory-embedding model is developed to generate vector representations of trajectory data. The similarity (distance) between each pair of trajectories can be computed based on these vector representations. Hierarchical clustering is then applied to identify abnormal (i.e., falsified) trajectories. In the final study, a testing platform is built upon a virtual traffic simulator and real-world transportation infrastructure in Mcity. The testing platform integrates the attack study and defense study in a unified framework and is used to evaluate the real-world impact of cyber attacks on CV-TSC systems and the effectiveness of defense strategies.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/162931",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attackers",
        "connected vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Shihong Huang"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:061964143b79",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Data Analytics and Engineering in Automobile Data Systems",
      "description": "Data analytics and engineering are revolutionizing the automobile industry, offering transformative capabilities in vehicle design, production processes, and customer experience. As the industry navigates unprecedented challenges such as sustainability imperatives, evolving consumer demands, and disruptive technological advancements, the integration of data-driven methodologies has emerged as a cornerstone of innovation. This research delves into the multifaceted applications of data analytics and engineering within the automobile sector, emphasizing their critical role in optimizing manufacturing processes, enhancing product quality, and facilitating predictive maintenance. Leveraging big data, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and advanced simulation techniques, the paper explores how data-centric approaches are enabling manufacturers to achieve unprecedented levels of efficiency and customization while addressing stringent regulatory and environmental requirements. The discussion begins with an in-depth analysis of data acquisition techniques employed across the automobile lifecycle, including sensor networks, telematics systems, and connected vehicle platforms. By systematically processing and analyzing the colossal volumes of data generated, manufacturers can identify patterns, predict potential failures, and improve operational workflows. Advanced analytics techniques such as predictive modeling, anomaly detection, and real-time decision-making are elucidated with illustrative case studies to underscore their efficacy in enhancing reliability and safety. In addition to operational improvements, the paper examines the critical role of data analytics in enabling innovations such as autonomous driving and electric vehicle (EV) optimization. These technologies rely heavily on real-time data streams and robust engineering frameworks to ensure functionality, efficiency, and regulatory compliance. Furthermore, the study investigates the integration of data analytics in supply chain management and production engineering. By employing digital twins and IoT-enabled smart factories, automobile manufacturers are reshaping their production paradigms. These innovations facilitate the monitoring of production processes in real time, ensuring minimal downtime and the seamless implementation of design changes. The synergy between data analytics and engineering has also fostered advancements in lightweight materials and energy-efficient designs, which are critical in achieving the industry’s sustainability goals. Moreover, the research highlights how predictive analytics is revolutionizing supply chain operations, from demand forecasting to inventory optimization, enabling just-in-time manufacturing practices and reducing overall costs. A critical component of this research focuses on the application of analytics in customer-centric areas, including market segmentation, personalized marketing, and post-sales services. By analyzing consumer preferences and driving patterns, automobile manufacturers are tailoring offerings to meet individual needs while improving the overall user experience. Connected vehicle ecosystems and over-the-air (OTA) updates, powered by data analytics, are enabling manufacturers to deliver continuous improvements to vehicle software, enhancing functionality and ensuring customer satisfaction. The intersection of data analytics with customer engagement strategies thus represents a paradigm shift in how automobile companies interact with their consumers. In addressing the challenges inherent in adopting these transformative technologies, the paper explores issues such as data security, privacy, and the integration of legacy systems with modern data infrastructures. The scalability and interoperability of data analytics solutions remain key considerations, particularly as the industry transitions towards a more connected and electrified future. By examining these challenges alongside proposed solutions, the study provides actionable insights for stakeholders seeking to harness the potential of data analytics and engineering in the automobile industry.",
      "published": "2023-12-15",
      "url": "https://thesciencebrigade.com/jst/article/view/520",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "autonomous driving",
        "connected vehicle",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "supply chain",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vinayak Pillai"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Science & Technology",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4838,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.52,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:061964143b79 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: regulatory, remain, patterns, operational, sensor, studies, user, case."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:064eb71b9095",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "UnCle SAM: Modeling Cloud Attacks with the Automotive Security Abstraction Model",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9c4f2deb96459dacb859df48e21694ff201a76dd",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Zoppelt",
        "Ramin Tavakoli Kolagari"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:0a3046c2cabb",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "To Prevent Wireless Attack Happens in Automobile is Rectified by a Security Protocol Using CAN",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d625c5c59130506ffe5c52dafe196a89a8d1d7b7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automobile",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "P. Vinoth",
        "P. Dharsini"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:0c526d5bb4d1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicles with OTA capabilities – A threat to national security?",
      "description": "This commentary sheds light on the national security risk posed by vehicles equipped with over-the-air (OTA) capabilities. Such vehicles can send and receive signals/information to and from external sources, which, in theory, makes them vulnerable to being remotely controlled or influenced.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/10356/210642",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "threat",
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gabriel Hong Liang Lim"
      ],
      "venue": "DR-NTU (Nanyang Technological University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:0d76c3e1433e",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Funktionale Sicherheit und Cybersecurity nach ISO 26262 und ISO/SAE 21434 inkl. Anwendung bei integrierter KI",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "https://deposit.dnb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=c0c566c48f294c418604c00d74a29b02",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Vera Gebhardt",
        "Gerhard M. Rieger",
        "Juergen Mottok",
        "Christian Gießelbach",
        "Dpunkt.Verlag (Heidelberg)"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:0e3cb5d5a6b4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of Injection Attacks in In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/ece_conf/72/",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lotfi ben Othmane",
        "Lalitha Dhulipala",
        "Moataz Abdelkhalek",
        "Manimaran Govindarasu",
        "Nicholas J. Multari"
      ],
      "venue": "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:0e8b235cd940",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cross-Layer Security and Responsive Evaluation Architectures for Quantum Resistance in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Connected vehicle (CV) technologies are emerging as a crucial technology for improving safety on future roadways. Wireless vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication allows CVs to exchange information that provides enhanced awareness and supports better driving decisions, especially in high-risk or non-line-of-sight scenarios. However, V2X also exposes new surfaces to physical layer attacks and increasingly sophisticated, potentially quantum-capable threat actors. As human or autonomous CV drivers will make split-second safety-critical decisions based on the contents of V2X messages, ensuring their authenticity, as well as their reliable and timely delivery, is crucial. Otherwise, malicious attackers may interfere with safety services or spoof messages to manipulate regional traffic flows and potentially even induce crashes. In this dissertation, we challenge the readiness of CVs to withstand these and other threats from increasingly capable attackers, and we accordingly take steps to harden V2X by designing cross-layer security protocols and developing physically grounded evaluation architectures to evaluate them under realistic conditions. In the first part of this dissertation, we systematically analyze the current threat environment to identify gaps in CV security foundations. We begin by exposing vulnerabilities in 5G Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) by developing two debilitating and stealthy denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that target the resource allocation and scheduling algorithms of C-V2X. We subsequently propose machine learning-based defenses to rapidly and accurately detect each attack. Our DoS attacks demonstrate that availability requires greater attention from system architects and standardization bodies, which until now have developed security requirements that focus primarily on authentication and integrity rather than reliable message delivery. We then shift from wireless to a cryptographic perspective by analyzing the threat of variational cryptanalysis—hybrid quantum-classical attacks designed to run on near-term quantum hardware that have been put forward as a viable method of breaking modern cryptography even before the advent of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. Through extensive simulations of noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) circuits, we demonstrate that NISQ hardware noise and the inherent properties of symmetric cryptography are very effective at neutralizing known variational attacks. We further develop formal bounds on variational cryptanalysis that establish the limitations of known techniques more generally, concluding that such attacks currently pose no credible threat to widely used cryptographic primitives such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In the second part of this dissertation, we focus on hardening CVs against quantum threats. We begin by laying out the fundamental problem: the high overhead of standardized algorithms for quantum-resistant cryptography (QRC), including NIST’s preferred Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), is incompatible with the physical (PHY) layer design and severe wireless constraints of both legacy IEEE and future 3GPP protocols for V2X communication. Based on this incompatibility, we establish that simply substituting QRC for the elliptic-curve cryptography of current security standards (e.g., IEEE 1609.2) is a non-starter, and that more tailored solutions are required. We then delineate the expected evolution of V2X technology, CV deployment requirements, and quantum threats over the coming years. We accordingly develop new authentication protocols tailored for each distinct combination thereof. For legacy systems based on IEEE 802.11p/bd Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC), we develop a cross-layer authentication protocol that uses carefully designed QRC-signed certificates and makes their usage practical via a machine learning-based technique for optimizing certificate distribution intervals based on PHY and MAC layer observations. For current and near-future 5G C-V2X we take an even more explicitly cross-layer approach that combines safety-aware adaptive modulation at the PHY layer with provably secure hybrid message authentication at the application layer to reduce safety violations by more than 92% compared with current systems, even on dense urban roadways. Finally, for high CV density in future 6G C-V2X, we quantify scalability limits on vehicular public-key infrastructure (VPKI) and propose a new, scalable architecture that retains critical trust management benefits of VPKI while alleviating bottlenecks in fast-path (real-time) message authentication to enable practical quantum resistance, even in ultra-high-density environments with up to 800 vehicles per km$^2$. The third part of this dissertation tackles the challenge of testing CV safety and security under realistic conditions. Simulations are scalable and inexpensive, but their abstractions (e.g., stochastic modeling of wireless channels) mean their results do not always align closely with reality. At the other extreme, field testing on real roads is the gold standard, but it is often impractical (if not impossible) due to severe costs, safety risks and legal constraints. Digital twins have emerged as one way to fill the gap, and in the first chapter of this part we develop a new digital twinning framework for CV testing. Our Digital Twin for Connected Vehicle Safety and Security (DT-CoVeSS) provides a basis for physically grounded CV evaluation that combines (1) automated digital twinning of arbitrary environments using open-source geospatial data; (2) a hardware-in-the-loop testbed, with software-defined radios and commercial C-V2X devices supplying actual wireless signals; and (3) an extension of commercial ray-tracing software to the PHY structure of 5G C-V2X signals. In the second chapter, we address crucial limitations of digital twinning—non-responsiveness to internal interactions and difficulty handling out-of-sequence and noisy measurements—by developing our Responsive and Causal Shadowing for Testing (RECAST) digital shadowing framework. Built around our novel Conflict- and Time-Corrected Kalman Filtering Framework (CTC-KFF), which supports causally aware state reconstruction to handle out-of-sequence measurements, RECAST concretely connects communication-layer failures and security attacks to measurable roadway safety outcomes. These contributions facilitate evaluating whether future CV protocols are not only secure, but also practical for safety-critical deployment.",
      "published": "2026-08-01",
      "url": "https://repository.rit.edu/theses/12750",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "connected vehicles",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Geoff Twardokus"
      ],
      "venue": "RIT Scholar Works (Rochester Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:0f7e378e149c",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An overview of millimeter waves challenges in 5G vehicle-to-everything networks",
      "description": "The Automotive Vehicle to Everything (V2X) technology is one of the most important innovations that the world will see in the years to come. This paradigm will support many advanced services such as object detection and recognition, risk identification and avoidance, car platooning. These services will require several keys among them, the high data transmission rates of the order of gigabits per driving hour, and high reliability, and high speed for transition of data, which may be available through the capabilities of the new architecture for the next generation of wireless communications 5G and the wide bandwidth of the millimeter wave (mm Wave) which is deemed to be a real solution for the V2X requirements. However, the challenges related to the reliability/latency and security of the V2X system and nature of mm wave communication require several solutions either for natural challenges such as High path loss propagation, penetrating disability or for the technical challenges. This paper provides an overview of the V2X communication technology investigates the V2X challenges including the mm wave and and finally presents some efficient solutions.",
      "published": "2019-06-17",
      "url": "https://hal.science/hal-02296900",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamed Zbairi",
        "Imad Ez‐zazi",
        "Mounir Arioua"
      ],
      "venue": "HAL",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:0ff1e56657d0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Joint Radar Communications and Risk Assessment for Autonomous Driving",
      "description": "Both radar and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication systems in autonomous vehicles are vulnerable to security threats. However, combining radar and V2V communication systems has the potential to overcome the threats to both systems. This report performs a risk assessment of frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar and dedicated short range communications (DSRC), analyzing the difficulty of performing attacks and the resulting impacts, and presents RadSec, a joint radar communication protocol with sensor data sharing and authentication. The assessment result shows that RadSec has great potential in overcoming automotive security threats against current automotive radar and V2V communication systems. RadSec is shown to improve automotive security for two simulated and three qualitatively discussed use cases. We conclude that joint radar communications should be considered as a technology for enhancing autonomous driving security.",
      "published": "2022-05-04",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/2077/71531",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "risk assessment",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "John Sandell",
        "Qingyun Gu"
      ],
      "venue": "Gothenburg University Publications Electronic Archive (Gothenburg University)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:12ddd03ad4b3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Hardware Security of the Controller Area Network (CAN Bus)",
      "description": "The CAN bus is a multi-master network messaging protocol that is a standard across the vehicular industry to provide intra-vehicular communications. Electronics Control Units within vehicles use this network to exchange critical information to operate the car. With the advent of the internet nearly three decades ago, and an increasingly inter-connected world, it is vital that the security of the CAN bus be addressed and built up to withstand physical and non-physical intrusions with malicious intent. Specifically, this paper looks at the concept of node identifiers and how they allow the strengths of the CAN bus to shine while also increasing the level of security provided at the data-link level.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/honors/989",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Satagaj"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Commons (Liberty University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:15b0f40a0556",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Long Short-Term Memory Neural Networks for False Information Attack Detection in Software-Defined In-Vehicle Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-06-24",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/16615767d2127538dd85b3791caf41d8f01c03f6",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Zadid Khan",
        "M. Chowdhury",
        "Mhafuzul Islam",
        "Chin-Ya Huang",
        "Mizanur Rahman"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 12,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:15b5357cb49f",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Embedded Security for Vehicles : ECU Hacking",
      "description": "A modern automotive vehicle is a complex technical system, containing many electronic, mechanical, and software parts. Typically, a vehicle contain 70 or more ECU's (Electronic Control Units) on an average controlling a large number of distributed functions, of which many are safety-critical like ABS control, Transmission Control, Engine Control and Body Control etc. So if there are possible attacks on the ECU then this could be even more dangerous than the web attacks as these involve the risk of life. The project involves vulnerability analysis of ECU with Tricore microcontroller to understand any security weaknesses and attacks are created to exploit those weaknesses. A service with potential vulnerabilities is implemented on the ECU and attacks to exploit such vulnerabilities are demonstrated. The Tricore architecture is analyzed to find what types of attacks are possible, what the desired targets are and how attacks could be performed over the CAN network. The result of the project is a working example of an exploitable application running on an ECU and microcontroller.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-300740",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "exploit",
        "hacking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siddharth Shukla"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1b4133a7d3f0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Two-Factor Authentication Based Automobile Keyless Entry System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-08-01",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7ef107beb8d70a9b0cfe25c80d507d27007e7876",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automobile",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "O. Akinsanmi",
        "A. D. Usman",
        "A. Abdulraheem",
        "G. D. Obikoya",
        "B. Bajoga"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1c24d3f5ab5b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security assurance of an In-vehicle HMI Manager: specifying certifiable software for In-vehicle infotainment systems",
      "description": "Traditionally in the automotive industry, vehicle safety was the most crucial factor and security of in-vehicle systems was only an afterthought. This resulted in networks that withstood several technical interferences, but were mostly unprotected against malicious attacks. In the future, infotainment, and other software systems in the vehicle will be composed of, and be connected to, several processing units inside the car, with some of them even requiring Internet connection. Security then becomes at least as important as safety, even overlapping in some aspects. Two main problems surge from this interconnection: user data needs to be secure, and the system must be resilient to hacks that could allow remote control of the car. For users to have confidence in the software systems inside the vehicle, an evaluation must be performed. The evaluation result should meet some criteria that users or a regulatory body deem acceptable. With a security evaluation, careful analysis of implementation and design of a system is performed. The higher the scrutiny and detail of the evaluation the higher the cost. It is thus important that evaluation activities correspond to the assets’ value. This dissertation aims at specifying a secure architecture for an HMI Manager. The HMI Manager purpose is to manage several Human-Machine Interface (HMI) systems inside the vehicle to provide a better experience to the user. This work focuses on user data protection, and in generating documentation that would contribute the system certification. Best practices are followed to help create a secure system the system requirements through the use of tried and tested techniques.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/1822/59469",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "David Cerdeira"
      ],
      "venue": "Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1c59e1b664ab",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Enabled Software-Defined Vehicles: An Intelligent Cloud-Edge Architecture for Adaptive, Secure, and Resilient Automotive Software Systems",
      "description": "Software-defined vehicles (SDVs) are shifting automotive engineering from fixed electronic-control-unit deployments toward continuously evolving cloud-connected, edge-compute, and AI-assisted software platforms. This transition enables adaptive features, predictive diagnostics, cybersecurity monitoring, over-the-air software updates, and data-driven user experiences; however, it also increases architectural complexity, update risk, attack surface, and operational uncertainty. This article proposes an AI-enabled cloud-edge architecture for adaptive, secure, and resilient automotive software systems. The architecture integrates centralized and zonal compute domains, Android-based embedded application services, secure cloud-to-edge update orchestration, edge AI inference for anomaly and risk scoring, zero-trust access enforcement, software-bill-of-materials-aware package validation, and recovery mechanisms for interrupted update and application workflows. Unlike conventional SDV reference models that separately discuss AI, OTA updates, cybersecurity, and resilience, the proposed architecture treats them as a unified lifecycle problem: software must be selected, validated, deployed, monitored, recovered, and improved across vehicle, edge, and cloud layers. The paper defines the system layers, data/control flows, AI model placement strategy, threat model, update workflow, resilience state machine, and evaluation metrics. The proposed framework is aligned with automotive software-update engineering, cybersecurity engineering, secure software development, AI risk-management, and cloud-edge security practices available through March 2024. The result is a practical technical architecture intended for next-generation automotive and embedded mobility platforms requiring reliable software evolution under safety, security, latency, and resource constraints.",
      "published": "2024-03-30",
      "url": "https://theamericanjournals.com/index.php/tajas/article/view/ai-enabled-sdv",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srikanth Puram"
      ],
      "venue": "The American Journal of Applied Sciences",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1c6cbb3f30e5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Attacking Automotive RKE Security: How Smart are your 'Smart' Keys?",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/937217ea6c4a56bfd4884cfa75a4d77178e836e3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ritul Satish",
        "Alfred Daimari",
        "Argha Chakrabarty",
        "Kahaan Shah",
        "Debayan Gupta"
      ],
      "venue": "IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1c8ea4e1e485",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Automotive Hazard and Threat Analysis Methods: How Does This Fit with Assumptions of the SAE J3061",
      "description": "In this article, a review of a combined approach to a safety and security threat analysis method and the recommendations of the SAE J3061 guidebook regarding threat analysis and risk is given.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://hal.science/hal-01423453",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Riel",
        "Georg Macher",
        "Christian Kreiner"
      ],
      "venue": "HAL",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1d1dcd9476ea",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Robust federated learning frameworks against data flipping threats in autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for privacy-preserving col laborative training across distributed clients. Its ability to enable large-scale learning while maintaining data confidentiality makes it particularly suitable for autonomous vehicles (AVs), where data is sensitive and decentralized. However, the distributed nature of FL introduces new security challenges, notably label-flipping (LF) attacks, in which malicious participants intentionally corrupt local datasets to degrade the global model’s performance. This thesis addresses these vulnerabilities by proposing a comprehensive framework that ensures both scalability and robustness in FL-based AV systems. The methodology is structured into three key parts. Part One – Development of the FL Framework: We designed and implemented a real-world FL environment integrating Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) models on the SunFounder PiCar platform. This setup enabled collaborative training between vehicles while preserving data privacy. Part Two – The Attack Process: We simulated label-flipping attacks under different adversarial availability levels to analyze the system’s behavior under hostile conditions. A single malicious participant with high availability ( α = 0.9 reduced the source class recall by over 25% and caused a 20% global accuracy drop, highlighting the severity of LF threats. Part Three – Defense Mechanism (FALCON): We introduced FALCON (Federated Anomaly Learning and COllaborative Network), a multi-layer defense architecture integrating Federated Anomaly Detection (FAD), Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and Multi-Class Support Vector Machines (MCSVM). FALCON applies local anomaly detection, peer-to-peer anomaly voting, and server-level graph-based detection using Graph Neural Networks (GNN) to identify and neutralize persistent adversaries. Experimental evaluations demonstrated that the CNN achieved a 94.2% classification accuracy with a latency of 42 ms per frame, while the RL model reached a 91.8% navigation success rate and an average cumulative reward of 1365. Under LF attacks, model performance degraded significantly; however, FALCON restored global accuracy and recall to near-optimal levels, identifying over 90% of adversarial updates and reducing attack success rates to below 5%. Overall, this thesis demonstrates the feasibility of integrating FL into AV systems while effectively addressing adversarial vulnerabilities and scalability constraints. The proposed FALCON architecture represents a major step toward secure, scalable, and resilient federated learning for real-world autonomous driving and beyond.",
      "published": "2026-01-07",
      "url": "https://espace.etsmtl.ca/id/eprint/3817/1/BEN_CHAABENE_Riadh.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Riadh Ben Chaabene"
      ],
      "venue": "Espace ÉTS (ETS)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1d5e6f357e44",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On the security of connected vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2018-04-19",
      "url": "https://www.politesi.polimi.it/handle/10589/140227",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Stefano Longari"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1db99bf2cd66",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A security analysis of an in vehicle infotainment and app platform",
      "description": "There is an increasing trend in the automotive industry towards integrating trusted third-party apps with In-Vehicle-Infotainment systems (IVI) via smartphones. This integration is typically facilitated by a pair of apps, one that executes on the smartphone and the other executes on the IVI which is connected to the Vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. Throughout the evolution of these IVI and App platforms, there has been little public analysis of the security of these protocols and the frameworks that implement these apps on the IVI. This raises the question: to what extent are these apps, protocols and underlining IVI implementations vulnerable to an attacker who might gain control of a driver's smartphone? In this paper, we focus on gaining insights into this question by performing a comprehensive security analysis on an IVI system that is included in at least one 2015 model vehicle from a major automotive manufacturer. This IVI system included vestigial support for the MirrorLink protocol which is intentionally disabled but can be enabled by updating a single configuration value after applying a publicly available firmware update that is securely signed by the manufacturer. Based on our analysis, we document and demonstrate insecurities in the MirrorLink protocol and IVI implementation that could potentially enable an attacker with control of a driver's smartphone to send malicious messages on the vehicle's internal network.",
      "published": "2016-08-08",
      "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot16/woot16-paper-mazloom.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sahar Mazloom",
        "Mohammad Rezaeirad",
        "Aaron Hunter",
        "Damon McCoy"
      ],
      "venue": "Workshop on Offensive Technologies",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 85,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1de861798cd5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Law-aware autonomous driving",
      "description": "Autonomous driving systems (ADSs) necessitate comprehensive testing prior to deployment in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). High-fidelity simulators are crucial for this testing, as they can replicate a wide range of scenarios, including those that are difficult or dangerous to recreate in real-world conditions. While previous approaches have demonstrated that test cases can be generated automatically, they often focus on weak oracles (e.g., reaching the destination without collisions) and fail to assess whether the journey was conducted safely and in compliance with some complex property specifications such as traffic laws. In this dissertation, beyond assessing basic properties like energy consumption and proximity to obstacles, we develop a series of approaches that enable us to evaluate whether an ADS conforms to complex property specifications such as traffic laws. Furthermore, we propose systematic approaches to enhance the ADS, ensuring law/regulation conformance. Firstly, we introduce LawBreaker, an automated framework for testing ADSs against real-world traffic laws. Designed to be compatible with various scenario description languages, LawBreaker offers a rich driver-oriented specification language for describing complex property specifications such as traffic laws, and a fuzzing engine that searches for different ways of violating them by maximising specification coverage. Implemented for Apollo+LGSVL with Chinese traffic laws, LawBreaker was able to find 14 violations of these laws. Secondly, we explore methods for creating `natural' scenarios by manipulating the positions of commonly encountered roadside objects without using `unnatural' adversarial patches. These scenarios adhere to regulatory guidelines for object placement on public streets. Our fuzzing algorithm identifies scenarios where repositioned objects cause significant AV misperceptions, such as misinterpreting traffic light colors, leading to traffic law violations. Implemented for Apollo, our approach induced violations of 15 out of 24 traffic laws. Recognizing that state-of-the-art ADSs can violate traffic laws in certain scenarios, we introduce REDriver in our third work. This rule-based method enforces AV adherence to complex property specifications at runtime. REDriver uses LawBreaker's property specification language to monitor the ADS's planned trajectory with quantitative Signal Temporal Logic (STL) semantics and employs a gradient-driven algorithm to adjust the trajectory when a violation is likely to happen. Tested on two versions of Apollo against Chinese traffic laws, REDriver significantly improved conformance with minimal overhead. However, REDriver's repairs are limited in scope, lack transparency, and are intended as a last resort. To address these limitations, our final work proposes FixDrive, a framework that analyzes near-miss records or law violations to generate AV driving",
      "published": "2024-11-01",
      "url": "https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/656",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "fuzzing",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Governance / regulation",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "SUN, Yang"
      ],
      "venue": "Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge (InK) (Singapore Management University)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:1f68368eb2bb",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure",
      "description": "This research evaluates the security posture of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure using the MITRE TARA. It identifies primary assets and analyzes potential threats, attack feasibility, and impact to prioritize risks. A total of 41 threat scenarios were identified, with 19 classified as high severity, mainly affecting the authentication system and the user credentials. The study highlights the importance of strengthening user-facing functions, access controls, encryption, and anomaly detection to enhance overall resilience. Limitations include the lack of real-world penetration testing, suggesting future work could focus on empirical validation and targeted mitigation strategies.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-249383",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "EV charging",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Yao, Xuemeng"
      ],
      "venue": "Diva portal (Dalarna University Library)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:223607f9dcfb",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Keyless Entry with Anomaly-Based Two-Factor Authentication for Improved User Convenience",
      "description": "Modern vehicles with keyless entry systems remain critically vulnerable to sophisticated cyberattacks, with 93% of stolen vehicles recovered in 2023 involving keyless entry exploits and automotive cybersecurity incidents reaching 215 cases in 2024 alone, resulting in tens of billions of dollars in estimated damages. Traditional multi-factor authentication (MFA) solutions impose significant usability penalties, with studies reporting user dissatisfaction with always-on 2FA systems due to authentication delays ranging from 2.3 to 4.1 seconds. This research investigates an adaptive MFA framework that conditionally activates two-factor authentication only when device anomalies are detected through MAC address verification. The prototype system was implemented using two Raspberry Pi units communicating via infrared signals, with A MAC address protection and TOTP-based secondary authentication. Performance evaluation under controlled laboratory conditions demonstrated near-perfect accuracy in distinguishing between registered and unregistered devices though real-world variability and environmental noise may affect performance. Encryption operations completed in an average of 0.000976 seconds, with system resource utilization remaining minimal, even during peak authentication processes. The adaptive approach reduced authentication friction by 100% during normal operation while maintaining robust security through conditional 2FA activation, achieving maximum effectiveness in preventing unauthorized access when anomalies were detected. This research addresses the question: ”How can adaptive multi-factor authentication (MFA) balance security and usability in automotive keyless entry systems?”. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first working prototype that integrates MAC-anomaly detection with adaptive 2FA in an IR-based keyless entry simulation for automotive systems, demonstrating that adaptive authentication can effectively solve the security-versus-usability problem, which has been a major obstacle to using multi-factor authentication (MFA) in vehicle access control systems. While some studies have proposed anomaly-triggered authentication mechanisms, none have demonstrated a lightweight, MAC-driven prototype tailored to vehicle access control.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://norma.ncirl.ie/9528/1/avadhootprashant.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "exploits",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Avadhoot Prashant Dhanve"
      ],
      "venue": "TRAP@NCI (National College of Ireland)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:226e6c57aa83",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey On Cloud Computing, Security Challenges, Architecture, Applications & Solutions",
      "description": "In this paper, we are going to emphasize on the advancement in computing technology cloud computing is an incredible innovation to perform complex processing. It decreases the need of costly equipment’s and dedicated storage. The connection between information and cloud computing is inspected along .The definition, attributes and grouping of huge information along with certain discourses on cloud computing are presented with focus on accessibility, information honesty, information quality, adaptability, security and administration. There is a rapid development in cloud computing and Internet of things regard the field of wireless communication. We present a survey on the security issues of both the technologies. We studied about the contributions of cloud computing to the Internet of things technology. It will illustrate the improvements on the internet of things on the basis of cloud. We will discuss the pros and cons of merging the technologies. The financial effects on innovation will be discussed, it will mainly emphasize on macroeconomics development. In this examination the results of rivalry and market structures will be brought to spotlight. Secondly the impact on industries and firms renting the storage from the providers will be discussed and how it effects the economics. Vehicular networking has become a significant area due to standardization, traffic management, road safety and infotainment. Vehicles carry more communication systems in sensing power. It can promote intelligent transportation system. Vehicular cloud computing remarkably effects traffic, the executives and street security in a split by utilizing the vehicular assets",
      "published": "2020-03-01",
      "url": "https://sujo.usindh.edu.pk/index.php/USJICT/article/view/640",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hadiqua Fazal",
        "Imran Memon",
        "Tarwan Kumar Khatri",
        "Ghulam Muhammad",
        "Qasim Ali"
      ],
      "venue": "University of Sindh Journal of Information and Communication Technology",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:26658acfa967",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of an image fusion object detection algorithm for the autonomous driving during adversarial weather conditions",
      "description": "Aquest treball dissenya i implementa un algorisme de detecció d'objectes basat només en imatges amb l'objectiu de ser usat en conducció autònoma davant de situacions climatològiques adverses, tals com la neu, la boira o la pluja. S'emprarà la base de dades DENSE tant per a l'entrenament com pel testeig dels models. Basat en l'arquitectura dels SSD, en primer lloc s'estudia la precisió obtinguda per cadascun dels sensors per separat, a continuació s'estudien diferents mètodes per a augmentar la precisió del model. Després es dissenyen models basats en cadascun dels tres mètodes de fusió d'imatges: la fusió basada en píxels, la fusió dels sensors i la fusió de característiques. Per a aquest darrer mètode es dissenyaran els submodels de fusió intermèdia i fusió tardana. Els models són avaluats i comparats entre si, i es conclou que el model amb la millor ràtio entre precisió i rapidesa de detecció és el model basat amb la fusió intermèdia de les característiques.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "http://hdl.handle.net/10609/127647",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "autonomous driving"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Guillem Tudela Debrigode"
      ],
      "venue": "LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2686c5f371c5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Potential future paths in electric vehicle charging",
      "description": "The global response to climate change necessitates urgent greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction, where traffic electrification is seen as one of the most promising pathways for decarbonization of the transport sector. The success of this transition is inextricably linked to the timely development of adequate Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure, which requires effective, forward-thinking regulation to overcome challenges related to installation costs, limited grid capacity, and the lack of standardization. This Master's thesis aims to analyze the current European Union regulatory framework for public EV charging of passenger cars and its impact on three key Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 7, 11, and 13: Affordable and Clean Energy, Sustainable Cities and Communities, and Climate Action). Based on this analysis, the research identifies key factors and uncertainties affecting infrastructure expansion and develops plausible future scenarios and potential regulatory pathways to accelerate emissions reduction activities. A mixed methods approach was employed, beginning with a comprehensive literature review. Data collection utilized three complementary sources: expert insights gathered through a dedicated questionnaire, findings from consumer studies and surveys, and recent academic literature. The collected data confirmed that while current EU regulation, such as the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR), addresses crucial issues like deployment targets and user-friendliness, the pace of adoption is currently hindered by the economic viability for Charging Point Operators (CPOs), the regulatory complexity, inadeqate measuring of success, and persistent consumer concerns regarding charging reliability, availability (especially in rural areas), and high initial EV costs. Using the critical uncertainties identified from this data, four future scenarios were developed via the 2x2 double variable scenario building method. The research concludes that the most effective potential regulatory strategy involves a systemic approach to traffic electrification combined with active collaboration between regulators, CPOs, and the energy sector. This pathway is necessary to meet the intermediate 2030 targets and achieve the final zero-emissions goal by 2050.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "http://www.theseus.fi/handle/10024/903183",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Popovic, Ana"
      ],
      "venue": "Theseus (Ammattikorkeakoulujen)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:26ab6e644d9f",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Vehicle keyless entry system and ranging with UltraWide-Band technology",
      "description": "In the recent past, the automotive industry has been implementing keyless entry systems in new car models, which allow the car key to sense its proximity to the vehicle and open it without requiring user interaction. These systems, while practical, have exposed vehicles to a whole new range of malicious attacks. This project aims to implement the recently appeared technology based on the IEEE802.15.4a specification, commonly known as Ultra-Wide-Band (UWB) into this field. This technology uses very time-narrow and thereby spectrum-wide messages for the purposes of indoor localization. Any two transmitters can calculate their respective distance with the time-of-flight of these messages. With this implementation, two goals want to be achieved: First, solving the exploits that the current attenuation-based systems have; and secondly; allowing the driver to use his car key to precisely know the distance and direction of his car at any given moment.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "http://hdl.handle.net/2117/100805",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "exploits",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alejandro Muelas Orf"
      ],
      "venue": "RECERCAT (Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:29126f3cdfaa",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design models for trusted communications in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks",
      "description": "Intelligent transportation system is one of the main systems which has been developed to achieve safe traffic and efficient transportation. It enables the road entities to establish connections with other road entities and infrastructure units using Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications. To improve the driving experience, various applications are implemented to allow for road entities to share the information among each other. Then, based on the received information, the road entity can make its own decision regarding road safety and guide the driver. However, when these packets are dropped for any reason, it could lead to inaccurate decisions due to lack of enough information. Therefore, the packets should be sent through a trusted communication. The trusted communication includes a trusted link and trusted road entity. Before sending packets, the road entity should assess the link quality and choose the trusted link to ensure the packet delivery. Also, evaluating the neighboring node behavior is essential to obtain trusted communications because some misbehavior nodes may drop the received packets. As a consequence, two main models are designed to achieve trusted V2X communications. First, a multi-metric Quality of Service (QoS)-balancing relay selection algorithm is proposed to elect the trusted link. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is applied to evaluate the link based on three metrics, which are channel capacity, link stability and end-to-end delay. Second, a recommendation-based trust model is designed for V2X communication to exclude misbehavior nodes. Based on a comparison between trust-based methods, weighted-sum is chosen in the proposed model. The proposed methods ensure trusted communications by reducing the Packet Dropping Rate (PDR) and increasing the end-to-end delivery packet ratio. In addition, the proposed trust model achieves a very low False Negative Rate (FNR) in comparison with an existing model.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/13496/1/thesis.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "intelligent transportation",
        "relay",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljawharah Alnasser"
      ],
      "venue": "Durham e-Theses (Durham University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:29c369906213",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding Over-the-Air Updates",
      "description": "In recent years, software complexity in automobiles has increased immensely. The global trend in the automotive sector is increasingly moving towards the Software-Defined Vehicle (SDV). However, the figures for recalls in recent years show a growing cause in software errors and they are set to increase. This means that the number and scope of software updates will also rise. Clearly Over-the-Air (OTA) Updates should be favoured in the future, mitigating the burden and effort of visiting a repair workshop. OTAs can be used to fix bugs, close security gaps, but also to expand functions or increase performance.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://elib.dlr.de/224381/3/AVL_11Symp_Safeguarding_OTAUpdates_GREUTTNER_SCHLENDER_etal_2025.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kim Grüttner",
        "Henning Schlender",
        "Keno Schwarze",
        "Bernd Westphal",
        "Ralf Stemmer"
      ],
      "venue": "elib (German Aerospace Center)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2a4c970ce97f",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Secure and Deterministic Time-Sensitive Networking Architecture for Automotive and Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems: An Integrated Study of Synchronization, Resilience, And Cybersecurity",
      "description": "Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) has emerged as a foundational paradigm for enabling deterministic communication in automotive and industrial cyber-physical systems (CPS), where strict timing guarantees, high reliability, and cybersecurity resilience are simultaneously required. However, the integration of synchronization precision, fault tolerance, and security mechanisms into a unified architectural framework remains an open research challenge. Existing industrial and automotive network designs often treat these concerns independently, leading to inefficiencies, timing uncertainties, and increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks. This research proposes a conceptual and analytical synthesis of secure and deterministic TSN architectures tailored for automotive and industrial CPS environments. The study investigates synchronization mechanisms based on IEEE 802.1AS and IEEE 1588, evaluates fault-tolerant communication strategies, and examines cybersecurity threats targeting time-sensitive protocols. A structured architectural model is derived through comparative synthesis of existing automotive network frameworks and TSN implementations. The analysis further integrates predictability theory to assess real-time guarantees in distributed systems. Findings indicate that achieving deterministic performance under adversarial conditions requires co-design of synchronization, traffic shaping, and intrusion detection mechanisms. Moreover, automotive-grade architectures demonstrate that centralized platform-based designs improve scalability but introduce new security bottlenecks. The study concludes that a unified TSN framework with built-in security and resilience layers is essential for next-generation automotive and industrial CPS.",
      "published": "2026-07-01",
      "url": "https://scientiamreearch.org/index.php/ijcsis/article/view/474/417",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andi Prakoso"
      ],
      "venue": "International journal of computer science & information system.",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2b789e5069e7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Survey on Cyber Security Attacks in Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "In 2016, the “Cyber security best practice for modern vehicle” is introduced by the US Department of Transportation. They encouraged companies to follow the National Institute of Standards and Technologies Cyber Security framework, i.e. identify, protect, detect, respond and recover. Now a days modern cars are new target to the hackers as they become increasingly connected. Cyber security attacks like door locks, disable brakes and engine shutdown are few examples. This paper focuses on solution that vehicle systems should take against the cyber attacks and also highlights the importance of making cyber security a priority for the automotive industry.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://ciitresearch.org/dl/index.php/nce/article/view/NCE052018004",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "M. Rashmi",
        "V. K. Lakshmi Narayan",
        "N Sushmitha"
      ],
      "venue": "CiiT international journal of networking and communication engineering",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2bdbb5955cae",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Tel-AI-Matic Privacy",
      "description": "Vehicles collect a staggering amount of data from drivers and passengers for various reasons. Automobiles increasingly include sensors and technology to improve safety and driver convenience. But auto insurers also find this trove of consumer data useful for pricing through telematics. An ever-growing number of data points can be fed into artificial intelligence (AI) systems to identify correlations with driving risk. Yet the data can also reveal sensitive information related to health and protected traits. Lawmakers, regulators, and plaintiffs are increasingly scrutinizing the privacy practices of automakers and data brokers. Growing scrutiny of automakers' practices necessarily draws attention to the parallel data collection by car insurers. This essay reviews current data collection practices within the auto industry, including insurers. It discusses how and why auto insurers' particularly those leveraging AI - are interested in participating in vast data collection, and reflects on best practices for limiting discrimination and preserving privacy within telematics. Current telematics practices hold real potential to improve automobile safety while simultaneously limiting discrimination in underwriting. We should not let the incorporation of AI into these models threaten these important promises.",
      "published": "2026-04-01",
      "url": "https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/cilj/418",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anya E. R. Prince"
      ],
      "venue": "OpenCommons at University of Connecticut (University of Connecticut)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2c1a92faf337",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Strategic Decisions over Innovation in the Finnish insurance Market: the Arrival of Usage-Based Car Insurances in Finland",
      "description": "For most insurance customers in Finland, and around the world, price is their main criteria to buy or not to buy an insurance. At the same time, risk management is the biggest challenge for the companies. Usage-based insurances based on telematics technology could provide the customers with a chance to significantly lower their car insurance payments and offer the companies a possibility for very efficient risk management. Car insurances based on the technology are already on sale in many countries, but not yet in Finland. What is argued in this thesis, is that the regulations in Finland have affected the insurance companies’ business models which then have affected the competition. This has then led to a situation when it is not necessarily a strategically sound move for insurance companies to strive for telematics despite its possible benefits for them and the customers. Although this is the starting point, the results of this thesis should not just solve this particular problem, but to generate a more widely usable mechanism. In the literature review of this study subjects of disruptive technologies as competitive advantages, business model innovation as competitive advantage, regulation as an obstacle to business model innovation and the relationship of innovation and imitation are all observed. The theoretical framework created from these subjects helps to understand the findings of this study, and supports the final mechanism presented in this thesis. To both, find out an answer to the dilemma of the Finnish insurance market, and to create a mechanism applicable for other issues as well, grounded theory was selected to be the basis for the methodology of this study. For data collection seven interviews were conducted with managers who were well informed in the competitive situation of the market and their company’s strategy. The respondents represent different insurance companies, and account for almost the whole car insurance market in Finland. Based on the findings, and what was discussed in relation to the theoretical framework, it was found out that the high level of regulation has molded the business models of the insurance companies to be similar to each other, which then creates competition where the competitive measures are alike. Also, telematics as a concept is outside the companies traditional comfort zone towards ambiguity and legislation, and it might threaten the profitable status quo so the companies are slow to adapt it. It is then argued that companies should run tests to lessen the level of ambiguity, and to be prepared for sudden changes, create strategic alliances with telematics stakeholders to make imitation more difficult, and finally to diversify away from car insurances to lessen their dependency on that part of the market. It is also proposed that the theory found in this study could be used for example to study the development of the health care industry and the challenges presented by modern information technology in the Finnish taxi-industry and in the area of consumer banking.",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/24491",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Timo Tuomi"
      ],
      "venue": "Aaltodoc (Aalto University)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2d7cc8e16f29",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Efficient Intrusion Detection in CAN Bus Networks",
      "description": "Electric Vehicles (EVs) rely on electric motors powered by complex battery systems to ensure efficient propulsion. A critical element in their performance is the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, widely adopted in the automotive industry for seamless communication among vehicle components, including Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Originally designed with minimal security considerations, the CAN protocol exposes modern connected vehicles to various cyber threats. Attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), Fuzzy, and Impersonation pose significant risks to vehicle safety and operational integrity, highlighting the urgent need for robust Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) tailored to CAN networks. In this study, an advanced hybrid detection model, named RL-RF Guard, is proposed, integrating Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) units, and Random Forest (RF) classifiers to enhance intrusion detection in EV CAN systems. The approach begins with an RNN extracting initial features from CAN traffic, which are further refined by the LSTM network to capture temporal attack patterns. Finally, a Random Forest classifier leverages these deep features to achieve more precise classification between normal and malicious CAN messages. Evaluation on a comprehensive dataset reveals that the RL-RF Guard model attains an accuracy of 98%, significantly enhancing detection capability compared to prior models. This research presents a novel and effective strategy for vehicular network security, combining the temporal learning strengths of RNN and LSTM with the robust classification capabilities of RF The findings underscore the potential of such hybrid architectures to form the backbone of next-generation IDS solutions, ensuring the resilience and trustworthiness of connected vehicles against evolving cyber threats.",
      "published": "2025-04-28",
      "url": "https://journal.esrgroups.org/jes/article/view/9077",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nujud Al-Aql"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Electrical Systems",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3874,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:2d7cc8e16f29 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: normal, operational, service, risks, significant, safety, control, communication."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2dc9dbbfc9cf",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "In-vehicle Network Security Using Secure Elements : Discussion of Security Technologies",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-03-02",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5c183812f5061d8e85b4b1bb4803877bc9437180",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Keisuke Takemori"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2e72edfcd7db",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "O‘ZBEKISTON RESPUBLIKASINING JAHON SAVDO TASHKILOTIGA QO‘SHILISHI VA O‘ZBEKISTON AVTOMOBIL SANOATINI KIBERXAVFSIZLIGINING DOLZARB MASALALARI",
      "description": "The authors of the article consider the issues of accession of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the World Trade Organization from the position of ensuring the development of the automotive industry, including issues of ensuring cyber protection for such enterprises. The fact is that in international trade, cases of hacker attacks on individual companies specializing in the production of cars have worsened. In this regard, the authors propose to strengthen the cybersecurity of the automotive industry of Uzbekistan.",
      "published": "2025-04-10",
      "url": "https://www.tadqiqot.uz/index.php/law/article/view/11242",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Баратов Миродилжон Хомуджонович",
        "Хакимов Равшан Тулкунович",
        "Бори Тохтаходжаевич Акрамходжаев"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of law research",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:2e8f9c366b1f",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Factors affecting consumer behaviour in a black box products in South Africa: particularly in the telematics industry",
      "description": "Crime has given rise to the telematics market in South Africa, however, not much is known about this industry. The telematics products, or vehicle tracking products, have to be installed in vehicles in such a way that the criminals, let alone the owners, will not be able to find it. It is a “black box” product that it is not known what is inside, and it is not to be seen. This then posed a question of how then does one choose one telematics product over the other. This study was aimed at finding out what influences consumer behaviour in the South African telematics market. This study specifically looked at various factors such as understanding of deeper customer insights, operational excellence, readiness, predictive maintenance, new digital services and marketing mix on how they influence consumer behaviour. An empirical study using online survey was conducted amongst 98 respondents who own or rent a telematics product from various telematics companies in South Africa. The key findings indicated that most important atributes to influencing consumers in the telematics industry were operational excellence, response readiness, and the marketing mix. Recommendations were then given that although other atributes that were investigated such as understanding deeper customer insights, predictive maintenance, and new digital services are important, they will not bear much fruit for any organisation if the basics of operational excellence, response readiness, and marketing mix are not mastered.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/10948/2013531",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Othusitse Ronny Sebate"
      ],
      "venue": "Nelson Mandela University Research Repository",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:33597ee98895",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adapting Threat Modeling Methods for the Automotive Industry",
      "description": "We live in a world that is getting more interconnected by each day and we are witnessing a global change where all the devices in our surroundings are becoming “smart” and connected to the Internet. The automotive industry is also a part of this change. Today's vehicles have more than 150 small computers, embedded control units (ECUs), and multiple connection points to the Internet which makes them vulnerable to various on-line threats. Recent attacks on connected vehicles have all been results of security vulnerabilities that could have been avoided if appropriate risk assessment methods were in place during software development. In this paper we demonstrate how the threat modeling process, common for the computer industry, can be adapted and applied in the automotive industry. The overall contribution is achieved by providing two threat modeling methods that are specifically adapted for the concept of the connected car and can further be used by automotive experts. The methods were chosen after an extensive literature survey and with support of domain experts from the vehicle industry. The two methods were then successfully applied to the connected car and the underlying software architecture based on the AUTOSAR standard. We have empirically validated our results with domain experts as well as tested the found vulnerabilities in a simulated vehicle environment.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://research.chalmers.se/en/publication/502671",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "connected car",
        "connected vehicles",
        "ecus",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Adi Karahasanovic",
        "Pierre Kleberger",
        "Magnus Almgren"
      ],
      "venue": "Chalmers Research (Chalmers University of Technology)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 34,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:353c27b23e14",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Education in Multi-Domain Operations: An Automotive Case Study for Defence Trustworthy AI",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d8f3a043e48d79f2bca1d045de587082e682f3b5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Danilo Caivano",
        "Christian Catalano",
        "Gabriel Cellammare",
        "Samuele del Vescovo",
        "Michele Scalera"
      ],
      "venue": "WWDD@IS-EUD",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:36ba2f63118b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SAID: State-aware Defense Against Injection Attacks on In-vehicle Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2022",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b2d286ffa591e2a6c8d49432a6fdbe1d913e7ab",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lei Xue",
        "Yangyang Liu",
        "Tianqi Li",
        "Kaifa Zhao",
        "Jian-Feng Li",
        "Le Yu",
        "Xia-Pu Luo",
        "Ya-Jin Zhou",
        "Guo-Long Gu"
      ],
      "venue": "USENIX Security Symposium",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 23,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:37e9d15b6b26",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Unmanned aerial vehicle system security cyber range construction and attack-defense validation design",
      "description": "Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology is currently widely applied in fields such as agriculture, logistics and environmental monitoring, and its security issues have gradually become a research focus. However, in current UAV security research, existing simulation and testing platforms have problems: effective and systematic threat analysis cannot be carried out to identify attack types and risk points; high-quality attack datasets are difficult to be generated to support the training of intrusion detection models; “attack-defense iterative verification” cannot be realized, that is, the model is tested by attacks and then further optimized according to the results.To address the above problems, an experimental framework for UAV attack-defense closed-loop verification was proposed. A new artificial intelligence-assisted UAV system security testbed with a five-layer architecture (infrastructure layer, simulation layer, communication layer, application layer and intelligent scheduling layer) was designed and implemented. With the simulation test environment provided by the testbed, a comprehensive attack scenario covering Wi-Fi discovery, password cracking to command spoofing was constructed. Using the experimental data generated in this attack scenario, an intrusion detection system based on one-class support vector machine was designed. After iterative adjustment of attack and defense and continuous optimization of experimental parameters, the detection precision of the intrusion detection system for command spoofing attacks was improved from 85.6% to 93.8%. Compared with the model constructed based on the classic local outlier factor algorithm, the optimized one-class support vector machine model has more advantages in detection precision under various attack scenarios, which verifies that the proposed UAV system security testbed is systematic, complete and effective in threat analysis, dataset construction and attack-defense closed-loop verification.",
      "published": "2026-02-01",
      "url": "https://doaj.org/article/b030df0c88e24659b3250f3e4b2d723d",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Li Yujia",
        "Zhang Hui",
        "Bin Duo",
        "Wang Zibin",
        "Zhou Rang",
        "Dongfen Li"
      ],
      "venue": "DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:3a9987a0435a",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Hardware-based Secure Communication Module to Protect Internet Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Information technology has not only been a driving force of the car industries within the last couple of years but it even seems to be of growing importance for the unforeseeable future. The inclusion of information technology is accompanied with the promise of increased comfort and the prospect that future autonomous and connected cars will become a place to spend our time while being on the road. Thus, car manufacturers strive to equip their next-generation cars with wireless network interfaces (e.g. WiFi, BlueTooth and 3G/4G) and to provide various services based on that. The availability of a wireless interface enables, on the one hand remote maintenance services (such as Over-the-Air (OTA) software updates and OTA calibration) at the passengers convenience and a whole eco-system of smart services based on access to the Internet and car-to-car/infrastructure/road/smartphone communication. On the other hand, the availability of telemetry data is a big chance for the manufacturers to obtain data on the performance of their fleet under real-life conditions. However, at the same time, a bi-directional interface that is always connected to the Internet opens up the threat of adversarial intrusion and hacked vehicles, which are, in the worst case, remote-controlled by hackers, or even malware - transforming hacked cars into driving botnets. Therefore, the need arises to implement security features to guarantee the passengers safety while maintaining functionality and comfort. In 2015 two security researchers demonstrated their attack on an unmodified Jeep Cherokee, allowing them to remotely control critical components like the steering or even the breaks of the vehicle. Also other research groups have implemented remote attacks showing the weaknesses of today’s internet connected cars. To increase security of the communication link of such vehicles, this thesis focuses on the development of a hardware-based Secure Communication Module (SCM). Such a module should provide a secure way for communication over the Internet. As the vehicle’s first layer of defense it should work as a firewall as well as a gateway to the inner-vehicle network. Being exposed to the Internet, the operation system of the SCM also needs to be hardened. Additionally, the SCM should isolate the internal car network, preventing malicious control of in-vehicle components. After designing a security concept based on well-known security techniques an ARM Cortex-A9 board i ii running an adopted Linux was used as prototype of an vehicular SCM. A penetration test was performed by an external company, specialized in security audits. The prototype was rated to provide adequate security for connected cars against external attacks. Beside the security, also the functionality was evaluated. Therefore the newly developed SCM was integrated into a car and an OTA firmware update of an internal car component was successfully performed. In contrast to an equivalent update without the security module, the main difference was an increased latency because of the additional device. This cost of a bit slower connection for increased security was accepted for an prototype. Because security is a rather new topic in the automotive industry the main goal of this thesis is to show one approach how a secure communication link can be implemented for connected cars. This can be used as basis for further research and my contribute to more security in a highly connected world. Even though this work is written with the aspect of automotive security, many concepts can be also used in the rapidly growing Internet of Things (IoT) field.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-69265",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "jeep",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "jeep"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreas Schmoll"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4349,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.82,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:3a9987a0435a and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: though, operation, vehicle., like, even, case, services, well."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:407f602c3e66",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Adaptive telematics framework for usage-based insurance in Kenya",
      "description": "This study develops a telematics-based risk classification model for usage-based insurance (UBI) in Kenya's fleet management sector, addressing critical limitations of traditional models through adaptive machine learning techniques.The research employs ADASYN (Adaptive Synthetic Sampling) to resolve class imbalance.This approach enables more effective learning of risky driving patterns compared to conventional sampling methods.The study processes telemetry data-including acceleration, deceleration, RPM, and speed-from Easy Coach Limited vehicles collected between January 2022 and February 2024.After minority class augmentation via ADASYN, several machine learning models were evaluated, including logistic regression, random forests, and gradient boosting.Among these, XGBoost demonstrated optimal performance, achieving a classification accuracy of 99% and an area under the ROC curve (AUC) of 0.98.Notably, the model achieved a precision of 93% and recall of 97% for the minority (risky) class.ADASYN yielded a 27% improvement in the minority class F1-score compared to SMOTE, highlighting its effectiveness in balancing highly skewed datasets.The model was deployed on an Amazon EC2 instance within a secured Virtual Private Cloud (VPC).The instance hosts a Gradio-based interface, which generates a URL endpoint that can be embedded in external web applications.This allows seamless, real-time interaction with the model.Operational monitoring was implemented using Amazon CloudWatch for system health tracking and failure alerts.Model explainability was supported through SHAP (Shapley Additive iii Explanations), providing transparency into feature importance.Key applications of the model include precision-targeted premium adjustments based on risk scores, temporal risk analysis and operational optimization based on RPM and braking behaviors.This work contributes empirical evidence supporting a deployable framework for insurance technology in Kenya.Furthermore, it proposes policy guidelines for the insurance industry to support UBI adoption.Future research directions include applying federated learning to enhance model generalizability across East African fleets while addressing data privacy concerns.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/11071/16379",
      "matched_terms": [
        "privacy",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "R. W. Kiruki"
      ],
      "venue": "SU+ Digital Repository (Strathmore University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:45a98f925db9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "How is Big Data Transforming Operations Models in the Automotive Industry: A Preliminary Investigation",
      "description": "Over the years, traditional car makers have evolved into efficient systems integrators dominating the industry through their size and power. However, with the rise of big data technology the operational landscape is rapidly changing with the emergence of the “connected” car. The automotive incumbents will have to harness the opportunities of big data, if they are to remain competitive and deal with the threats posed by the rise of new connected entrants (i.e. Tesla). These new entrants unlike the incumbents have configured their operational capabilities to fully exploit big data and service delivery rather than production efficiency. They are creating experience, infotainment and customized dimensions of strategic advantage. Therefore the purpose of this paper is to explore how “Big Data” will inform the shape and configuration of future operations models and connected car services in the automotive sector. It uses a secondary case study research design. The cases are used to explore the characteristics of the resources and processes used in three big data operations models based on a connected car framework.",
      "published": "2016-10-09",
      "url": "http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/104713/1/contribution_50046_EMERGING_2016.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "exploit",
        "infotainment",
        "tesla",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gary Graham",
        "Royston Meriton",
        "Bethany Tew",
        "Patrick Hennelly"
      ],
      "venue": "White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:45b142239d1d",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Innovation in the automotive industry: can data-driven business models make a change?",
      "description": "This work analyzes current challenges, future innovations, and business models of the automotive industry. Therefore, it analyzes research and conducted expert interviews. Electrification, connectivity, autonomous driving, and COVID-19 were identified as current challenges. Telematics and data exploitation were identified as two fields on which new business models can be based. Telematics increases value by improving the safety, comfort, and efficiency of vehicles, while customers are willing to pay for it. Literature sees even higher potential in data exploitation than experts. Both agree that the industry needs to increase innovativeness to not become a hardware supplier of a digital product.",
      "published": "2021-01-13",
      "url": "http://hdl.handle.net/10362/127595",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "exploitation",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jonas Hartwig"
      ],
      "venue": "Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:47153fc8b190",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Pre-Integration Processes in Telematics Systems : A Diary Thesis from an Internship Experience",
      "description": "This thesis documents an internship experience within a telematics pre-integration project, using a diary-based approach to capture daily activities, challenges, and reflections. The report provides insights into the coordination and technical processes involved in preparing telematics fea-tures for integration, emphasizing communication, documentation, and project management tasks. Weekly analyses complement the daily diaries by reflecting on emerging themes, problem-solving strategies, and professional growth. The internship focused on two main objectives. First, it aimed to support the author’s professional development in areas such as stakeholder communication, project coordination, and technical documentation. Second, it contributed to the efficiency and accuracy of the pre-integration process by ensuring feature tickets were up to date, clarifying implementation statuses, and maintaining structured data tracking. The work involved collaboration with feature owners, managing Confluence tickets, and maintaining Excel-based tracking systems. These tasks required attention to detail, proactive communication, and organizational skills to ensure smooth progress toward integration milestones. The diary-based methodology provided a structured way to monitor progress, identify challenges, and link experiences to professional development goals. By combining practical contributions to the project with reflective analysis, this thesis demonstrates how internships can foster both technical and transferable skills. It highlights the value of systematic documentation and communication in complex integration projects and offers a resource for those seeking to develop similar competencies.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "http://www.theseus.fi/handle/10024/914480",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Lejla Okic"
      ],
      "venue": "Theseus (Ammattikorkeakoulujen)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:485e5cc1c5bf",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Communication Security Methods and Recommendations for Securing In-vehicle and V2X Communications",
      "description": "Today’s vehicles contain approximately more than 100 interconnected computers (ECUs), several of which will be connected to the Internet or external devices and networks around the vehicle. In the near future vehicles will extensively communicate with their environment via Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), together called V2X communications. Such level of connectivity enables car manufacturers to implement new entertainment systems and to provide safety features to decrease the number of road accidents. Moreover, authorities can deploy the traffic information provided by vehicular communications to improve the traffic management. Despite the great benefits that comes with vehicular communications, there are also risks associated with exposing a safety-critical integrated system to external networks. It has already been proved that vehicles can be remotely hacked and the safety critical functions such as braking system and steering wheel can be compromised to endanger the safety of passengers. This putshigh demands on IT security and car manufacturers to secure vehicular communications. This thesis proposes methods and recommendations for improving the security of internal and external vehicular communications.The main contributions of this thesis are contained in six included papers, and cover the following research areas of automotive security: (i) secure network architecture design, (ii) attack protection, (iii) attack detection, and (iv) V2X security. The first two papers in the collection are on the topic of secure network architecture design and propose an automated approach for grouping in-vehicle ECUs into security domains which facilitate the implementation of security measures in in-vehicle networks. The third paper is on the topic of attack protection and evaluates the applicability of existing Controller Area Network (CAN) bus authentication solutions to a vehicular context. In particular, this paper identifies five critical requirements for an authentication solution to be used in such a context. The fourth paper deals with the issue of attack detection in in-vehicle networks and proposes a specification agnostic method for detecting intrusion in vehicles. The fifth paper identifies weaknesses or deficiencies in the design of the ETSI V2X security standard and proposes changes to fix the identified weaknesses or deficiencies. The last paper investigates the security implications of adopting 5G New Radio (NR) for V2X communications.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://research.chalmers.se/en/publication/514101",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "v2x",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nasser Nowdehi"
      ],
      "venue": "Chalmers Research (Chalmers University of Technology)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:4a7d348cfd76",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Trusted Yet Vulnerable: A Quantitative Analysis of Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) Security",
      "description": "Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are essential for secure computing across mobile devices, cloud platforms, and IoT, yet they remain vulnerable to exploits. This thesis presents a novel approach to enhancing TEE security through automated vulnerability classification and advanced fuzzing techniques. The research first introduces an innovative methodology for classifying vulnerabilities into Trusted Applications (TA), TrustZone Operating Systems (TZOS), and general categories using machine learning algorithms such as Random Forest, J48, Naive Bayes, Multilayer Perceptron, and Support Vector Machines. Evaluating these on a dataset of 750 vulnerabilities from the NIST database demonstrates accurate characterization and improved efficiency over manual methods. The second part applies advanced fuzzing techniques, as shown in CROWBAR and LightEMU case studies, effectively uncovering vulnerabilities independent of TrustZone hardware and software. This integrated approach enhances TEE security by reducing undetected vulnerabilities by 30\\%, providing stakeholders with actionable data for system maintenance, and offering applications in industries like automotive, healthcare, and financial services.",
      "published": "2024-09-01",
      "url": "https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/1893",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "exploits",
        "fuzzing",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nissankararao, Lakshmi Sravani"
      ],
      "venue": "University of New Hampshire Scholars Repository (University of New Hampshire at Manchester)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:4aa3cc38ad3c",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive SPICE and Cyber Security",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-06-27",
      "url": "https://graz.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/automotive-spice-and-cyber-security",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Georg Macher",
        "Alexander Much",
        "Andreas Riel",
        "Richard Messnarz",
        "Christian Kreiner"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:4ac416454569",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CHALLENGES FACING MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN KENYA",
      "description": "Purpose: The study examined the challenges facing the motor vehicle insurance industry in Kenya. Methodology: This study employed a systematic literature review of previous studies on motor vehicle insurance industry with an inclusion criteria of studies not over fear years old. Relevant seminal references and journal articles for the study were also identified using Google Scholar. This research method was preferred in this study since it is reliable and saves on time and resources as compared to primary data collection methods. Findings: From the review of the previous researches, the study found that the motor insurance industry experiences a variety of challenges that affects its growth and sustainability. These challenges range from security, financial, technical, legal and regulatory challenges. The measures put in place to mitigate these challenges were found to be inadequate and requires more effort by the motor insurance industry to work with other entities such as local businesses, vehicle manufacturing companies and the government. The regulatory policies enforced by the regulatory authorities of Kenya were found to have a significant influence on the performance of the motor insurance industry in Kenya. Unique contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The study recommended that the motor insurance industry should invest in innovative technologies such as telematics which can be used in the calculation of premium so as to offer their customers affordable premium prices. The management of the motor insurance companies should invest in new marketing strategies that will improve their customer service delivery especially in the insurance claiming processes. The study also recommended that the IRA should implement better regulation policies that will promote easy adoption of the innovate technologies in the motor insurance industry. This study will be relevant to the key stakeholders in the motor insurance industry. The management of the motor insurance companies will have a wider scope of knowledge on other challenges that they may have not experienced and the measures that have been used to mitigate such challenges. The findings from this study may be helpful to the insurance regulatory authority as they implement policies to accelerate the growth of the insurance business in Kenya. The study will also provide a good literature base for researchers and scholars on studies regarding motor insurance industry since they are still scant.",
      "published": "2021-01-01",
      "url": "https://iprjb.org/journals/IJSM/article/view/1630/1844",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "security",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dr. Ben Kajwang PhD"
      ],
      "venue": "RePEc: Research Papers in Economics",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:4bad8afa5b2c",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "From Attack to Defense: Toward Secure In-vehicle Networks",
      "description": "New security breaches in vehicles are emerging due to software-driven Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivity of modern vehicles. These trends have introduced more remote surfaces/endpoints that an adversary can exploit and, in the worst case, use to control the vehicle remotely. Researchers have demonstrated how vulnerabilities in remote endpoints can be exploited to compromise ECUs, access in-vehicle networks, and control vehicle maneuvers. To detect and prevent such vehicle cyber attacks, researchers have also developed and proposed numerous countermeasures (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems and message authentication schemes). However, there still remain potentially critical attacks that existing defense schemes can neither detect/prevent nor consider. Moreover, existing defense schemes lack certain functionalities (e.g., identifying the message transmitter), thus not providing strong protection for safety-critical ECUs against in-vehicle network attacks. With all such unexplored and unresolved security issues, vehicles and drivers/passengers will remain insecure. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by 1) unveiling a new important and critical vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks (including the Controller Area Network (CAN), the de-facto standard protocol), 2) proposing a new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which can detect not only those attacks that have already been demonstrated or discussed in literature, but also those that are more acute and cannot be detected by state-of-the-art IDSes, 3) designing an attacker identification scheme that provides a swift pathway for forensic, isolation, security patch, etc., and 4) investigating what an adversary can achieve while the vehicle’s ignition is off. First, we unveil a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack called the bus-off attack that, ironically, exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks. That is, their fault-confinement mechanism — which has been considered as one of their major advantages in providing fault-tolerance and robustness — is used as an attack vector. Next, we propose a new anomaly-based IDS that detects intrusions based on the extracted fingerprints of ECUs. Such a capability overcomes the deficiency of existing IDSes and thus detects a wide range of in-vehicle network attacks, including those existing schemes cannot. Then, we propose an attacker identification scheme that provides a swift pathway for forensic, isolation, and security patch. This is achieved by fingerprinting ECUs based on CAN voltage measurements. It takes advantage of the fact that voltage outputs of each ECU are slightly different from each other due to their differences in supply voltage, ground voltage, resistance values, etc. Lastly, we propose two new attack methods called the Battery-Drain and the Denial-of-Body-control attacks through which an adversary can disable parked vehicles with the ignition off. These attacks invalidate the conventional belief that vehicle cyber attacks are feasible and thus their defenses are required only when the vehicles ignition is on.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144125",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyong Tak Cho"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:4ee2dbc4dc2a",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Defense Mechanism against Replay Attack on Remote Keyless Entry System",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://www.koreascience.kr:443/article/CFKO201916842431238.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Young Min Kim",
        "Seong Hwan Kim"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:50d693652d87",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An efficient lightweight Cryptographic Algorithm for Secure Control of Vehicle using Smart Phone",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5bd2e57f7906e17d757493a6f874cdac7a4668de",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "N. Mamtha",
        "N. L. B. Tennisson",
        "G. Rekha",
        "T. Nadu"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:54575544262b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "On Cyber-Security for In-Vehicle Software",
      "description": "We live in a highly connected world, which brings many opportunities, but which also makes us vulnerable to attacks. Security in regular IT systems, such as desktop and server systems, has decades of active research behind it, whereas security in the automotive domain is still a relatively new topic. Vehicular systems are highly computerized: each vehicle, depending on type, brand and model, contains in the order of 100 electronic control units which govern most of the vehicle’s functions. In order to maintain traffic safety, it is therefore paramount that these systems are protected from malicious manipulation, and a natural question is how and to what extent “IT security” can be applied to automotive systems. This thesis covers two different aspects of automotive security, namely how to embed security engineering practices into the automotive development lifecycle, and how automotive characteristics influence the technical design and implementation of security measures. To this end, we develop a risk assessment framework which is well aligned with existing safety processes, since safety engineering is an integral part of automotive system design. We also investigate which typical pitfalls an automotive software developer has to be aware of to avoid the inadvertent creation of software vulnerabilities. We further identify five criteria that an in-vehicle network authentication solution needs to fulfill to be considered for practical use, and we evaluate authentication solutions for the most common automotive bus according to those criteria. Finally, we analyze the typical architecture of a resource constrained electronic control unit for possibilities of exploiting memory corruption bugs, and how techniques from desktop and server systems can mitigate the effects. We can conclude that it is possible to use adaptations of existing security solutions in automotive systems. However, a fair amount of adaptation work is needed to account for the particular characteristics of the automotive domain.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://research.chalmers.se/en/publication/500039",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cyber-security",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljoscha Lautenbach"
      ],
      "venue": "Chalmers Research (Chalmers University of Technology)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:550f7e52ee10",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity for future interconnected and smart vehicles",
      "description": "The continual technological advancements mark the modern world, and the automotive industry is no exception.As vehicles rely more heavily on technology and connectivity, cybersecurity has become a pressing concern to ensure safe and reliable transportation.This PhD dissertation extensively explores the intricate relationship between cybersecurity measures and their significant role in the automotive industry.It emphasizes the necessity of robust security protocols to effectively mitigate cyber threats and ensure operational integrity and passenger safety.In response to the growing need for cybersecurity measures in the automotive sector, new Cybersecurity Approval frameworks have been introduced globally.These frameworks, including the United Nations Regulation No. 155 (UNR155) and strict guidelines from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the United States, highlight the urgent need for enhanced cybersecurity measures.The dissertation comprises several chapters meticulously crafted to examine various aspects of automotive cybersecurity.Starting with an overview of the evolution of automotive technology, the dissertation lays the groundwork for a better understanding of the criticality of cybersecurity in the industry.It then delves into legislative norms and historical and potential cyberattacks, identifies risks, and evaluates economic impacts.Subsequent chapters scrutinize the electrical architecture of vehicles, communication protocols, and security techniques and introduce innovative research projects focusing on hardware authentication, advanced vehicle communication networks, and the authentication of CAN data frames to ensure communication integrity.One of the pivotal contributions of this thesis is the development of novel network architectures that balance high-security standards with the operational demands of real-time automotive systems.The dissertation critically examines the vulnerabilities in current cybersecurity standards within the automotive sector.It proposes enhanced solutions to bolster defences against cyber threats in an increasingly interconnected and automated ecosystem.Through in-depth analysis and the proposition of inno-vi vative security mechanisms adapted to automotive communication protocols, this dissertation aims to fortify the automotive industry's resilience against the continuously evolving cyber threat landscape.The research endeavour addresses current challenges and anticipates future developments, striving to significantly contribute to the field of automotive cybersecurity and ensure the sector's security in the digital age.",
      "published": "2024-07-23",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/11583/2991358",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "regulation"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Franco Oberti"
      ],
      "venue": "PORTO@Iris",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:55f21d7a9062",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Testing and Evaluation to Improve Data Security of Automotive Embedded Systems",
      "description": "In the last two decades, the number of electronic control units (ECUs) in vehicles has increased dramatically. This has resulted in an increased complexity of the vehicles electrical and electronic systems. Electrical and electronic systems have gone from just controlling the engine to controlling every part of the vehicle, from the infotainment system to safety-critical systems. To allow for better collaboration between players in the automotive industry, a development partnership called AUTOSAR has emerged. Included in AUTOSAR is a module handling diagnostics (DCM). The module can be used to read data and change parameters in the ECUs and in the ECU software, since the DCM can access con dential information about the vehicle and modify running software of the ECU, for example the software controlling the engine, it is an attractive target for adversaries. There has been no published research about the security of the DCM module of the AUTOSAR software architecture (that we know of) and how the safety of the passengers can be a ected in the case of a security breach. This thesis tries to ll this research gap by conducting a threat analysis and risk assessment for the DCM module inside AUTOSAR. This thesis evaluates the security of an ECU assumed to control the engine of a vehicle and how possible consequences of an intrusion can a ect the overall safety. It also presents a number of tests used to evaluate the threats and risks found. The tests done targets threats regarding denial of service, tampering, and information disclosure. The thesis is concluded with proposing countermeasures for the threats and risks.",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "https://odr.chalmers.se/bitstream/20.500.12380/219731/1/219731.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion",
        "risk assessment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Johannes Weschke",
        "Filip Hesslund"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:5651d650f506",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Defeating Trust Laundering in Software-Defined Vehicle Software Supply Chain",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2026-07-20",
      "url": "https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/publications/18fbdb82-c947-4f31-a983-8aae3073e717",
      "matched_terms": [
        "supply chain",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Moksha Thisarani Kulathilaka",
        "Abdur Rahman Rakib",
        "Naeem Syed",
        "Adnan Anwar",
        "Soufiene Djahel"
      ],
      "venue": "Pure (Coventry University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:605440993bc2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Toward High-Performance Automotive Ethernet: Architectures, Challenges, and Real-Time Constraints in Next-Generation In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "Background: The shift from traditional automotive bus systems toward IP/Ethernet-based in-vehicle networks is driven by the increasing bandwidth, determinism, and integration demands of advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), infotainment, and over-the-air diagnostics (Lim et al., 2011; Varun & Kathiresh, 2014). However, migrating to Automotive Ethernet introduces multifaceted challenges including real-time performance, electromagnetic susceptibility, security, diagnostic integration, and physical-layer constraints (Lim et al., 2011; Carlson et al., 2012; ISO, 2012). Objective: This paper synthesizes knowledge from seminal technical reports, standards, and contemporary experimental studies to present a comprehensive, publication-ready analysis of Automotive Ethernet design principles, highlight unresolved research gaps, and propose cohesive methodological approaches to ensure deterministic, secure, and scalable in-vehicle networks. Methods: We perform a conceptual systems analysis grounded in referenced studies, standards, and empirical engineering reports. Methodology emphasizes cross-layer design thinking: (1) physical-layer considerations and mitigation of electromagnetic interference (Karim, 2025; PHYS ORG, 2011); (2) protocol-level adaptations for real-time delivery and audio-video bridging (AVB) integration (Wikipedia, 2020; Carlson et al., 2012); (3) diagnostic and DoIP integration per ISO 13400-2 (ISO, 2012); and (4) security design patterns informed by contemporary surveys (Jadhav & Kshirsagar, 2018). Results: Descriptive analysis identifies trade-offs between reduced twisted-pair physical media and gigabit-capable links, delineates how AVB and TSN-like concepts can be adapted to automotive constraints, and articulates security-hardening strategies tailored to vehicular topologies (Carlson et al., 2012; Riches, 2011; ISO, 2012). We present a modular architecture that partitions latency-critical and non-critical traffic, prescribes shielding and topology guidelines validated by empirical shielding studies (Karim, 2025), and shows how DoIP can be integrated without violating real-time bounds (ISO, 2012). Conclusions: Automotive Ethernet is a viable backbone for future in-vehicle networks if designers adopt rigorous cross-layer engineering, embrace emerging timing-aware Ethernet mechanisms, and prioritize security from the outset. Critical research remains in validating deterministic performance in diverse electromagnetic environments and in harmonizing diagnostics, safety, and infotainment on shared physical infrastructures (Lim et al., 2011; Jadhav & Kshirsagar, 2018).",
      "published": "2025-12-11",
      "url": "https://irjernet.com/index.php/feaiml/article/view/252",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "K. Mehra"
      ],
      "venue": "Frontiers in Emerging Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:626c8b832136",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Implementation of a Cost Efficient Passive Keyless Entry Device for the Communication Protocol",
      "description": "The susceptibility to relay attacks is a major safety risk in modern vehicles, due to the system for responding to challenges, such as those used in the Passive Keyless Entry (PKE) of most commercial cars. This form of attacks requires a long-range contact between a vehicle and its key, which circumvents encryption and unlocks the vehicle without direct access to the key. While a number of defences have in recent years been proposed, many are not robust or realistic. Any feasible system is likely to rely on a non-easily manipulated environmental parameter. The device must also be: cost efficient; simple to implement; and take comfort into account, for example the life of the main battery. This work implements and assesses a Relay Attack-resistant PKE device, analyses several of the suggested feasibility strategies in literature, as well as proposes a new method: Curve matching approach. The most promising methods have been concluded: immobility identification, distance limitation protocols and curve-matching approaches - the first of which is to be implemented in the PKE-system prototype. Instead of traditional RFID, the project introduces a PKE device and uses Bluetooth to implement the communication protocol. Disturbance detection is then applied using an accelerometer. The final device is subsequently checked and measured. It is found to be easily implementable, cost-efficient and can improve the protection of PKE systems, although immobilisation detection is not entirely effective. Finally, the recommendation is that manufacturers should employ immobility detection promptly while exploring techniques that are potentially more successful, though uncertain.",
      "published": "2021-07-02",
      "url": "https://tojqi.net/index.php/journal/article/view/1598",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "J Ravindra Babu",
        "Katikireddy Srinivas",
        "Mohammed Ismail",
        "Aatif Jamshed",
        "Asmita Dixit"
      ],
      "venue": "Turkish Online Journal of Qualitative Inquiry",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:629d9ea1397a",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Telematics Options and Capabilities",
      "description": "This presentation describes the data tracking and analytical capabilities of telematics devices. Federal fleet managers can use the systems to keep their drivers safe, maintain a fuel efficient fleet, ease their reporting burden, and save money. The presentation includes an example of how much these capabilities can save fleets.",
      "published": "2017-09-14",
      "url": "https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1389212",
      "matched_terms": [
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Cabell Hodge"
      ],
      "venue": "OSTI OAI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:643c70d4e697",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security analysis of introducing 5G in V2X communications",
      "description": "Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is an area that interests many research institutions as well as the industry. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has developed standards for these communications. Those standards describe a protocol stack that builds on top of the WiFi protocol 802.11p, which offers no security. With the active development of 5G, many companies and research institutes are now interested in using this new technology in V2X communications. The possibility to exchange 802.11p with 5G enables, among many other improvements, enhancing the performance of the ETSI defined security mechanisms. At the same time the new features might also bring new vulnerabilities. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the introduction of 5G in V2X communications affects security. We show that the transition from 802.11p to 5G is possible but not easy, and it requires certain changes to the rest of the protocol stack. Furthermore, several possible improvements of the security mechanisms provided higher up in the stack are proposed. The improvements include removal of the current certificate mechanism for authentication, since certain features of 5G will make it redundant. Finally, the pros and cons of introducing 5G in V2X communications are discussed.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://odr.chalmers.se/bitstream/20.500.12380/255942/1/255942.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "security",
        "v2x",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Romi Zaragatzky"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:6491a6c7ad19",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing Automotive Networks with Vehicle-Agnostic Technologies",
      "description": "Modern vehicles are incredibly complex and operate through an exchange of information between many Electronic Control Units (ECUs)—which are small embedded computers that can contain an array of sensors and inputs. These ECUs communicate through Controller Area Networks (CANs), a broadcast network with a lightweight protocol, which have been mandated for use in most vehicles since 2008. Previous research has shown that a vehicles CANs are critically vulnerable to exploitation: hackers can remotely execute code and collect potentially sensitive private information. Although numerous examples of intrusions and attacks have been demonstrated through research, the practical application of cybersecurity remains inconsistent across automotive manufacturers. Further, passenger vehicle manufacturers use propriety encodings for CAN messages, obfuscating the meaning of data. To help solve this critical issue, we present our research towards producing a vehicle-agnostic intrusion detection system. Our proposed solution is an after-market prototype which can plug in to an automotive on-board diagnostic port to monitor network traffic. The prototype uniquely configures itself per-vehicle and uses a suite of algorithms to determine the presence of a cyber-attack. Our research expands upon current CAN detection solutions by matching signals in the obfuscated network with known values generated from automotive diagnostic services.",
      "published": "2020-05-05",
      "url": "https://publish.tntech.edu/index.php/PSRCI/article/view/605",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Samuel C. Hollifield"
      ],
      "venue": "Proceedings of Student Research and Creative Inquiry Day",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:6647ccf164d2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "How far is the law of tort ready to adapt to driverless cars",
      "description": "In its July 2016 Consultation Paper, ‘Pathway to Driverless Cars: Proposals to support advanced driver assistance systems and automated vehicle technologies’, the United Kingdom’s Department for Transport concluded: \\n \\n‘We are not currently proposing any significant change in our rules on liability in road traffic accidents to reflect the introduction of automated cars. We still think a fault based approach combined with existing product liability law, rather than a new strict liability regime, is the best approach for our legal system. We think that the existing common law on negligence should largely be able to adapt to this new technology’ \\n \\nWhat impact will the evolution of driverless cars have on the application of existing common law principles of negligence of a human actor where harm is caused in a road traffic accident? Should a driver be liable for an omission to engage (or disengage) onboard automotive assistance? What standard of care is expected of a driver stepping in to take control? How far are perceptions of trust and risk relevant to a transitional phase with a mix of autonomous and non-autonomous traffic? What new risks are created by autonomous vehicles, such as reliance on third party services (such as mapping), interoperability failures with other systems (such as highway control), faults in data collection and sharing (such as telemetrics and onboard records of driver autonomy) and of cyber-security comprises (including hacked systems). \\n \\nThe common law of negligence is predicated on the piecemeal development of principles and their application incrementally through case law and decisions of appellate courts. That is a naturally time-consuming process, and recent reform proposals may remove many road traffic accident claims from the litigation process. Is the civil justice system equipped effectively to deal with driverless vehicles? \\n \\nThis presentation hopes to explore some of these issues.",
      "published": "2017-05-03",
      "url": "http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/32588/1/How_far_is_the_law_of_tort_ready_to_adapt_to_driverless_cars.pptx",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "cyber-security",
        "driver assistance"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "John Bates"
      ],
      "venue": "Northumbria Research Link (Northumbria University)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:673ec36b6028",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Memethodology",
      "description": "With the accessibility of graphic editors and the development of social media, visual communication has reached a state where images that are important for cultural, social or political events are created by internet subcultures. Visual artists or graphic designers with academic degrees then just thematize their activity or directly exploit them on walls or objects housed in brick-and-mortar institutions, which include art and design schools. These can be characterized as a market-driven recombination of fragmented assignments, skills, guests, lectures or conferences, the nature of which is subordinated to the automated algorithm configuration of digital platforms. Schools fulfil the role of browser extensions instead of becoming browsers themselves. Paradoxically, the outputs of intensive training that are part of this non-stop, passively received infotainment of a consumer-randomized approach to education cannot be capitalized on by themselves – it is not the formal quality of the outputs that plays a role, but their skillful entanglement in the social fabric of purposeful relationships. The thesis therefore draws on the assumptions that expertise can have extremely low visual resolution, that a pointer in an orientation system may not be a vector arrow but an interpretation of Marxism on TikTok. The thesis may not only thematise these and other approaches but actively participate in them through the formation of memethodology as a formally and content-inclusive open-source medium.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-732736",
      "matched_terms": [
        "exploit",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jakub Polách"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Repository (National Repository of Grey Literature)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:6807b183e190",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber security of vehicle CAN bus",
      "description": "There are currently many research projects underway concerning the intelligent transport system (ITS), with the intent to develop a variety of communication solutions between vehicles, roadside stations and services. In the near future, the roll-out of 5G networks will improve short-range vehicle-to-vehicle traffic and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. More extensive services can be introduced due to almost non-delayed response time. Cyber security is central for the usability of the services and, most importantly, for car safety. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is an automation bus that was originally designed for real-time data transfer of distributed control systems to cars. Later, the CAN bus was developed as a universal automation system for many automation solutions. One of its characteristics is that bus traffic is not supervised in any way due to the lack of timing of control. In other words there are no authentication mechanism. This article highlights different approaches and their usability to reveal the car’s CAN bus malfunctions. The study complements earlier studies on the safety of vehicles in the CAN bus. Based on the test results, practical methods can be evaluated to detect changes in CAN bus traffic, such as targeted cyber-attacks. The article is based on the results of a study on the cybersecurity of cars conducted at the University of Jyväskylä (AaTi study). Initially, the AaTi study attempted to identify the message content of the bus and to detect interferences via the Neural network solution. However, the problem with the neural network was the computational performance required and the lack of prediction accuracy. After that the study was focused on experiments that were based on the arrival times of control messages, that is, their timing-based intrusion detection. In this sense the research did concentrate on kernel density estimation, one-class support vector machine solution, absolute deviation method and categorization. Due to methodological challenges, a method for detecting intrusions based on statistical processing of message traffic was ultimately developed as an outcome of the study.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:jyu-202001071036",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "vehicle-to-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jouni Pöyhönen",
        "Pyry Kotilainen",
        "Janne Poikolainen",
        "Janne Kalmari",
        "Pekka Neittaanmäki"
      ],
      "venue": "Jyväskylä University Digital Archive (University of Jyväskylä)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:69bcc78ac5f7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial robustness of intrusion detection systems for the in-vehicle networks of connected and autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) rely on machine learning (ML)-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to secure in-vehicle network (IVN) communications. However, ML models are inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While prior adversarial research in CAVs has predominantly focused on perception models, particularly object detection, the robustness of IVN-based IDSs remains largely underexplored. This thesis addresses this gap by investigating the adversarial robustness of IVN-based IDSs, introducing an IVN-specific threat taxonomy, and developing an attack method capable of generating adversarial IVN frames under varying levels of attacker knowledge of the deployed IDS model. Experimental results demonstrate that adversarial manipulation poses a severe threat to IVN-based IDSs. Under complete attacker knowledge of the deployed IDS model, detection performance drops from an F1-score of 99% to as low as 19%, with attack success rates reaching up to 89%. Even under limited knowledge, detection performance decreases from 95% to 38%, with success rates of up to 60%. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, this thesis proposes Explainability guided Counterfactual Adversarial Training (EXCAT), a novel defense mechanism that leverages model explainability to generate more representative adversarial training examples. EXCAT restores detection performance to up to 94% and reduces attack success rates to as low as 7.55%, demonstrating that explainability-guided training offers a promising direction for strengthening IVN-based IDS robustness and improving the safety of deployed CAV systems.",
      "published": "2025-09-01",
      "url": "https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/186697/9/alorainif.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Fatimah Aloraini"
      ],
      "venue": "ORCA Online Research @Cardiff (Cardiff University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:6b4ae817bb33",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing Intrusion Detection Systems on the Internet of Vehicles: Mitigating DoS and Spoofing Attacks in CAN Bus Networks",
      "description": "This report studies the “Intrusion Detection System (IDS)” methodologies for actually “identifying and mitigating” Denial of Service (DoS) and spoofing attacks in the “Controller Area Network (CAN) bus” of “Internet of Vehicles (IoV)” systems. This study specifically employs secondary data, the study utilises machine learning approaches, especially “Random Forest and Logistic Regression”, as well as deep learning models to create strong detection mechanisms. The investigation is performed in Jupyter Notebook utilising Python programming language, leveraging its comprehensive libraries and instruments for data analysis and machine learning. In this research both CICIDS 2017, and CICIoV 2024 dataset are used. The focus point is determined in the case of CICIoV 2024. This research explores the results to show that both “machine learning and deep learning approaches” greatly improve the detection accuracy and reaction time to possible threats. The Random Forest algorithm demonstrated increased precision in differentiating normal and attack traffic, while the Logistic Regression delivered beneficial understandings of the attribute significance of attack routines. The deep learning standards, on the other hand, excelled in catching complex designs and irregularities in the data. This thorough process not only supports the protection of IoV systems but also delivers a scalable framework for prospective analysis in vehicular network security.",
      "published": "2024-01-01",
      "url": "https://norma.ncirl.ie/8459/1/pushpakkishorattarde.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Pushpak Kishor Attarde"
      ],
      "venue": "TRAP@NCI (National College of Ireland)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:6ddff3624562",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Servicing a Connected Car Service",
      "description": "Increased wireless connectivity to vehicles invites both existing and new digital methods of attack, requiring the high prioritisation of security throughout the development of not just the vehicle, but also the services provided for it. This report examines such a connected car service used by thousands of customers every day and evaluates it from a security standpoint. The methods used for this evaluation include both direct testing of vulnerabilities, as well as the examination of design choices made which more broadly affect the system as a whole. With the results are included suggestions for solutions where necessary, and in the conclusion, design pitfalls and general considerations for system development are discussed.",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-2453",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Benjamin Svensson",
        "Kristian Varnai"
      ],
      "venue": "Diva portal (Dalarna University Library)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:6e1aa4b8b08b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Concept for an Intrusion Detection System over Automotive Ethernet",
      "description": "A modern automotive vehicle is a complex technical system, containing many electronic, mechanical, and software parts. Typically, a high-end vehicle contains 70 or more electronic control units (ECUs) on average. These are controlling a large number of distributed functions, of which many are safety-critical, and adding complexity, which is surpassing 100 million lines of code. Furthermore, the communication link in the automotive architecture is also being upgraded from the traditional controller area network (CAN) bus to Automotive Ethernet, in order to enable higher communication bandwidth and handle the increasing complexity. However, introducing Ethernet opens up for new attacks and loopholes to be exploited by hackers. Attacks on ECUs are even more dangerous than web attacks, as these involve the safety of the persons inside the vehicle. To secure the in-vehicle communication the automotive industry needs to look into traditional cybersecurity protection techniques from an automotive perspective. One security solution gaining more and more attention regarding in-vehicle security is the concept of an intrusion detection system (IDS).In this thesis, we propose a concept for a host-based IDS relying on two different detection methods. We suggest a combination of specification-based, focusing on message sequencing and allowed elapsed time in between a request and its respective response, and anomaly-based detection, evaluating the frequency, payload length and timeout for request-response pairs. To evaluate our IDS we execute five different attack scenarios, where we calculate binary classification metrics and measure its classification speed. Our evaluation shows that the proposed IDS successfully detects malicious events such as delay, packet injection, exhaustion and two different flooding attacks. Based on our experience designing an in-vehicle IDS, we describe potential difficulties, limitations and future improvements that engineers can use to implement or improve their adaptation of an in-vehicle IDS system. We believe the results of this master’s thesis can be applied in more advanced research, especially in the field of IDS for in-vehicle networks, and can hopefully contribute to a safer driving experience.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9006826",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Hanna Lindwall",
        "Pontus Ovhagen"
      ],
      "venue": "Lund University Publications Student Papers (Lund University)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 2,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:70cabe40fbd2",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Identity-Based Secure Authentication Framework for On-Demand Electric Vehicle Charging Systems",
      "description": "The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) has significantly increased the demand for efficient and secure charging infrastructure. As EV charging systems evolve into intelligent and interconnected platforms, ensuring secure authentication of vehicles becomes a critical requirement. Unauthorized access, energy theft, and cyber-attacks pose serious threats to the reliability and integrity of EV charging networks. Traditional authentication mechanisms often rely on centralized systems or password-based methods, which are vulnerable to various security risks.This research proposes an identity-based authentication framework for on-demand EV charging systems, leveraging cryptographic techniques to ensure secure and efficient vehicle authentication. The proposed system eliminates the need for complex certificate management by utilizing identity-based cryptography, where a trusted authority generates private keys based on unique vehicle identities.The system incorporates a secure authentication protocol using cryptographic hash functions and HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code). Each electric vehicle is assigned a unique private key derived from its identity and a master secret maintained by the trusted authority. During the authentication process, a nonce is generated to ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks. The system computes a pseudonymous identity and authentication token, which are verified using HMAC-based validation.A graphical user interface is developed using Tkinter to simulate the EV charging environment. The system allows vehicle registration, wallet management, charging session initiation, and transaction logging. A lightweight SQLite database is used to store vehicle information and charging logs, ensuring efficient data management.The authentication process is designed to be computationally efficient, enabling real-time validation without significant delays. Performance evaluation is conducted by measuring authentication time, demonstrating the system’s capability to handle multiple sessions efficiently.The proposed system enhances security by providing features such as mutual authentication, resistance to replay attacks, and protection against identity spoofing. It also ensures data integrity and confidentiality during communication between EVs and charging stations.Experimental results indicate that the system achieves low authentication latency while maintaining high security standards. The framework is scalable and can be integrated into smart grid environments and IoT-based EV infrastructures.In conclusion, the proposed identity-based authentication system provides a secure, efficient, and scalable solution for modern EV charging networks. It addresses key security challenges and contributes to the development of reliable and intelligent transportation systems.",
      "published": "2026-04-07",
      "url": "https://ijdim.com/journal/index.php/ijdim/article/view/627",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "charging stations",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "A. Naga Raju SUBHAKAR KOPPARTHI"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Data Science and IoT Management System",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:7200ade624fb",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Considerations for a Connected Car",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-06-01",
      "url": "https://www.earticle.net/Article/A258794",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected car",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jae Woong Joo",
        "Jung Kyoo Lee",
        "Jong Hyuk Park"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Cryptology",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:774a8974e81f",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber security threat analysis and attack simulation for unmanned aerial vehicle network",
      "description": "Use of unmanned systems in various tasks has increased exponentially in the recent past.These systems enable users to complete vital missions efficiently, without risking human lives.Nonetheless, these systems pose a threat to the general population if the operational cyber security is not handled.Especially, the armed unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVS), which can cause catastrophic damage to life and property.It is important to know the risk and understand the impact of various possible attacks on the overall UAVS.Clearly, the most economical way to achieve this is to simulate operational scenarios of UAVS before actual deployment.In this dissertation, we propose methods to assess various threats, develop threat models, evaluate risk and impact of attacks.We finally use these methods to develop a simulation testbed environment for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Networks (UAVNet) cyber security analysis.The testbed was designed to be open source to enhance the usability and audience reach.We also demonstrated the use of this testbed in academia for any related research or student learning and consequently, a performance evaluation of the testbed for use in generic computing environment was carried out.Based on the experiments performed for various communication denied scenarios, we evaluate the impact of various attacks against UAVNet from the communication perspective and report the results to demonstrate the necessity and usefulness of the simulaiii tion testbed.Implemented attacks include Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Jamming, GPS Jamming and GPS Spoofing.Additional implementation of an antispoofing technique for GPS spoofing was further done to indicate the usefulness of testbed and flexibility to develop attacks as well as their detection and mitigation measures.Although no amount of words can express my thankfulness and gratitude for my committee, my family and my friends, I would still make an attempt to acknowledge them.I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Weiqing Sun, for his guidance, care and patience.He not only provided me with an excellent environment for doing research, he also helped me mold myself into a better",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1438816219",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "jamming",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Y. Javaid"
      ],
      "venue": "OhioLink ETD Center (Ohio Library and Information Network)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 13,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:793c5361d766",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Models on the Move: Towards Feasible Embedded AI for Intrusion Detection on Vehicular CAN Bus",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2024",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c755da2afc9ac6fc3b834904126dbc95a14099c7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "intrusion",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "He Xu",
        "Di Wu",
        "Yu-Feng Lu",
        "Jiwu Lu",
        "Haibo Zeng"
      ],
      "venue": "USENIX Annual Technical Conference",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:798f1629c02c",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Relay-attacker : Utnyttjande av trådlösa bilnycklar",
      "description": "Bilen är en av de saker som många människor använder dagligenoch för att underlätta användandet kommer det hela tiden nya funk-tioner som underlättar användandet. Ett exempel är trådlösa nycklar.Många moderna bilar använder en teknik som kallas för “keyless” vilketinnebär att bilnycklarna under intervaller sänder ut radiosignaler. Detger en möjlighet att inte behöva hålla i nyckeln när bilen ska användasoch bilägaren har det lättare att öppna bilen och lasta in saker, utanatt aktivt behöva använda nycklen.Men är det tillräckligt säkert med helt trådlösa nycklar? Signaler-na är öppen för alla som kan avlyssna dem. Signalerna mellan bil ochnyckel skickas trådlöst och obehöriga kan lyssna av innehållet. I dettaprojekt undersöker vi möjligheten att spela in signalen och därefterspela upp den igen i syfte att låsa upp en bil, utan tillgång till denverkliga nyckeln. Vi utför experiment på X fordon, med olika nycklaroch olika signalfrekvenser. Om det är öppet för alla borde det ock-så gå att spela in dessa signaler och sända ut dem med hjälp utaven radiosändare. Det kallas för en relay-attack och där kommer syftetmed detta arbete, nämligen en studie om hur attackerna går till ochhur enkelt det egentligen är att göra dem själva. Samt att ett experi-ment utförs på en mängd olika bilar med olika typer av bilnycklar medvarierande frekvenser.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-40262",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Anton Marklind",
        "Simon Marklind"
      ],
      "venue": "Diva portal (Dalarna University Library)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:7a1c6f39467d",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Application level attacks on Connected Vehicle Protocols",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://atc.usenix.org/system/files/raid2019-abdo.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmed Abdo",
        "Sakib Md. Bin Malek",
        "Zhiyun Qian",
        "Qi Zhu",
        "Matthew Barth",
        "Nael Abu‐Ghazaleh"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:7cff1e3e8e3e",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Security Evaluation and Internal Penetration Testing Of the CAN-bus",
      "description": "From the early ages of civilization, people have always fought to have safety and comfort in all the aspects of their lives. Contemporary vehicles are not an exception. Nowadays, vehicles contain a number of electronic control units (ECUs) which form networks and provide many different functions. In order to let the driver benefit from the new technology, the automotive manufacturers have created a strong relationship between the vehicle and the fleet management. Remote diagnosis and firmware updates over the air (FOTA) are some examples of services brought by the new technology in order to involve a minimum of customer inconvenience. This approach brings a considerable number of advantages: the vehicle needs no longer to be brought in a service station, the update of a firmware is made as soon as it is released, and the time between discovering an error and identifying its causes is reduced. But, in order to assure these functions, in-vehicle networks are connected to external networks, a fact that exposes them to dangerous threats such as cyber attacks. The in-vehicle network consists of a number of networks where each of them has different impact on the vehicle’s mechanism. These networks are formed by a number of ECUs and are used differently. For instance, MOST (media oriented system transport) is used in to transmit voice, audio, and video content. LIN (local interconnected network) is responsible for controlling door locking mechanisms, windows and mirrors. For critical applications, such as engine control and anti-lock braking system (ABS), CAN (controller area network) is used. This master thesis evaluates the security in in-vehicle networks by focusing on the CAN-bus protocol, since the most critical applications use this protocol for communications. In order to perform this evaluation, the development of a framework for conduction a penetration test is done.",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "https://odr.chalmers.se/bitstream/20.500.12380/212488/1/212488.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "penetration",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sareh Talebi"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:7e9211963892",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Advancing CCAM’s cybersecurity assessment : overcoming current challenges and shaping future solutions",
      "description": "Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility (CCAM) promises transformative advancements in smart transportation, driven by the deployment of Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs). However, cybersecurity challenges hinder their widespread adoption. This session explores a comprehensive stack of cybersecurity solutions involving sensor fusion and distributed intelligence; trust based frameworks; and the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA), as mandated by UNECE Regulation No. 155 and the ISO/SAE 21434. Through expert insights and lessons learned from EU projects, like ULTIMO, AutoTRUST, CHORUS, SELFY, AI4CCAM, CONNECT, CITCOM and DistriMuSe, the session will identify the relationship between the current cybersecurity solutions, their gaps and potential forward-thinking solutions. Topics include situational awareness, cooperative resilience, AI-driven risk assessment, and distributed systems based on multi-sensor communication. Panellists from industry, academia, and standardisation bodies will discuss strategies to strengthen CAV resilience and establish trust as a foundation for enabling safety-critical functionalities in Level-3 onward vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/01KFJAXW9564H3BFTTKGHAHQE5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Meriem Benyahya",
        "Marina Presas",
        "Ljubomir Jovanov"
      ],
      "venue": "Ghent University Academic Bibliography (Ghent University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:7f088f0a5875",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security for Connected Vehicles in Cyberspace",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/icete/icete2019-1.html#Ben-Othman19",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jalel Ben‐Othman"
      ],
      "venue": "International Conference on E-Business and Telecommunication Networks",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:80df19b03b77",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safe and Secure Over-the-Air Software-Updates for Software-Defined Vehicles",
      "description": "The most decisive feature of a software-defined vehicle is the significant implementation and further evolution of the vehicle functionality through software. This goes hand in hand with the need for regular software updates, for example to rectify errors or eliminate security vulnerabilities. Forecasts on the frequency of such software updates assume 50 to 200 updates per year for each SDV. Essential precondition for such safe and secure software over the air updates are modular, open-source software components with well-defined software interfaces, reliable and traceable compatibility checking, as well as its low-effort integration into the dev-ops cycle of the software updates. Based on results from the research project UP2DATE, we present approaches and technologies for an end-to-end compatibility checking of updates based on time and resource specifications as well as plans for their further development along the upcoming project UP2DATE4SDV. In a concluding outlook we open perspectives for application and integration possibilities into open source projects like Eclipse SDV (S-CORE, VELOCITAS, UPROTOCOL, etc.) or ELISA/AGL, as well as cooperation perspectives for HAL4SDV, SHIFT2SAV, CODE4EV, and FEDERATE.",
      "published": "2025-06-04",
      "url": "https://elib.dlr.de/226554/1/20250604to05_SDVCommunityDays_noVid.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vehicles",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Gregor Nitsche"
      ],
      "venue": "elib (German Aerospace Center)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:810bb30768ee",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Boys Will Be Boys",
      "description": "Sexting is a growing problem among adolescents with possible severe consequences. In both the public discourse and the scientific literature, the effects on boys seem absent. U-Centraal, a social organisation based in Utrecht, combats problems involving sexting by means of education programs. Therefore a new educational program - Bloedlink - was developed in concordance with the police. This research aims to give insights in the experience of the effects of sexting on adolescent boys by offering new theoretical insights. Also, the Bloedlink-program for boys is evaluated through qualitative research (qualitative interviews and observation). Findings indicate that boys are victim of sexting as well. Also Bloedlink is evaluated as a well functioning education program, even though there are still improvements to be made. Important in battling sexting problems is educating both boys and girls separately but simultaneously. In addition, it is of extra importance to educate the more vulnerable non-western adolescent boys. Especially the use of infotainment works well for adolescent boys. Several recommendations were made: (1) materials should be updated, (2) boys should be paired to a confidant, and (3) educators should be culture and gender sensitive.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/354951",
      "matched_terms": [
        "infotainment",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Z.J. Franz"
      ],
      "venue": "Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:83bad6d22e93",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Impact of uncoordinated electric vehicle charging on the distribution grid",
      "description": "Charging electric vehicles (EVs) represents an extra and increasing load for the power system. And the higher the charging power is, the more likely it is that serious problems will arise. In addition to home charging, in Hungary - the area of interest in this paper - Level 2 chargers in the streets are currently installed with a maximum charging power of 22 kW. Since the local market share of EVs is low at present and expected to remain relatively low in the years to come, it is essential to see where the limits of the low-voltage distribution grid are in terms of taking the extra EV charging load. This paper presents extensive simulation results taking various EV charging characteristics, arrival statistics, household load variation, and other assumptions into consideration to determine how EV charging will affect the low voltage grid. The stochastic simulations were conducted in DIgSILENT Power Factory augmented with a Python code. Simulation results indicate that an already moderately loaded grid is capable of accommodating EVs at a penetration level of approximately 20%, which can be considered a high value.",
      "published": "2020-04-16",
      "url": "https://papers.itc.pw.edu.pl/index.php/JPT/article/view/1507",
      "matched_terms": [
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "penetration"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Csaba Farkas"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of Power Technologies",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:861017b49a82",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study on Vulnerabilities in Connected Cars",
      "description": "This report researches the state of cyber security in connected cars. Specifically, common vulnerabilities and trends related to security issues in connected passenger cars are identified. The study is conducted through a systematic review of publicly reported vulnerabilities and incidents related to computer systems in connected cars. Some of the largest manufacturers in the automotive industry are researched along with common automotive suppliers. In addition, systems and devices used in connected cars are identified to further extend the reach of the study. The scope of this thesis is limited to publicly available material from two types of sources. The first source is the repository of cyber security company Upstream, which monitors automotive incidents in real-time. The second source is the National Vulnerability Database, NVD. The most common types of vulnerabilities linked to connected cars were found to be predominantly related to remote keyless systems (RKS), mobile applications, infotainment systems and the OBD port. A vast majority of the found vulnerabilities were remotely exploitable.The most common weakness was related to failure or lack of protection mechanisms.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-259361",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "infotainment",
        "keyless",
        "obd",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Melek Gülsever"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:86735ed9f7dc",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Pushing the Digital Transformation of Logistics: A Tri-Continental Study of Regulatory Environments",
      "description": " Logistics accounts for 11% of global GDP. The digital transformation fundamentally changes society -logistics in particular via trends such as automation, data analytics, and telematics. Logistics is falling behind on the digital adoption curve. Regulation potentially plays a crucial role in facilitating and structuring the digital transformation.",
      "published": "2018-09-30",
      "url": "http://hdl.handle.net/10453/128243",
      "matched_terms": [
        "regulation",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "T Lammers",
        "Moritz Petersen",
        "Sebastian Brockhaus"
      ],
      "venue": "UTS ePRESS (University of Technology Sydney)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:882ac361d323",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Connected vehicles, communications and security infrastructure",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2015-10-08",
      "url": "https://www.omicsonline.com/open-access/2090-4886/2090-4886.C1.003_013.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tarek Saadawi"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Sensor Networks and Data Communications",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:8a219400d3ab",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Device for protecting a keyless entry system for a motor vehicle against relay attacks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016-07-02",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e1b600485b8365586c0b436e6f595731670671e5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rainer Vens"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:8de257b10920",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Compliance Issues in GenAI Based Code Generation for Automotive Software : A Safety and Security Perspective",
      "description": "Background. Generative AI (GenAI) tools are increasingly capable of generating code from natural language prompts, creating a compelling opportunity for their use in safety and security-critical automotive software development. However, there is a lack of systematic study examining the compliance issues that arise when using GenAI tools for code generation under automotive standards such as ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434. Objectives. This study examines and categorises the compliance issues that arise when GenAI tools generate AUTOSAR module code, and measures the frequency, severity, and correction effort associated with those issues, with specific reference to ISO 26262 and ISO/SAE 21434. Methods. Following a quasi-experimental design, four GenAI tools, Google AI Studio,Claude.ai, Mistral Le Chat, and OpenAI Codex, were used to generate C++ implementations of an AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform functional cluster from a formal software specification using a role-based zero-shot prompting strategy. Generated artifacts were evaluated through a compliance pipeline comprising compilation testing, static code analysis against MISRA C++, CERT C++ and CWE and manual requirements traceability analysis. Results. All four tools failed initial compilation and required iterative self-correction, with correction effort varying considerably across tools; one tool required manual intervention to reach a successful build. Static code analysis revealed violations across all tools and all evaluated categories from the outset, with exception handling and dynamic memory management as the most frequently occurring non-compliance categories,and violations persisted across all tools after iterative correction. No critical severity cybersecurity weaknesses were identified in any codebase. None of the tools achieved full requirements implementation coverage, and traceability coverage and tag accuracy varied considerably across tools. Conclusions. This exploratory study contributes a four dimension compliance assessment framework, compilation correctness, MISRA C++ static code analysis,CERT C++ and CWE static code analysis, and requirements traceability. It is applied to a single AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform module generated by four GenAItools in one experimental run per tool. All four tools produced compilation errors and static code analysis violations across multiple categories, with static code analysis violations persisting even after iterative correction. None of the tools achieved full requirements implementation coverage, and traceability accuracy varied substantially, establishing that both require explicit and independent verification in GenAI assisted development workflow.. These findings are bounded to the conditions of this study and require validation across further AUTOSAR modules and GenAI tools. They are presented as an initial characterisation of the compliance landscape.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-30102",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Masood Vattian"
      ],
      "venue": "Diva portal (Dalarna University Library)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:92eeeb9f2143",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Physical-Fingerprinting of Electronic Control Unit (ECU) Based on Machine Learning Algorithm for In-Vehicle Network Communication Protocol “CAN-BUS”",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as a legacy protocol for in-vehicle data communication. Simplicity, robustness, and suitability for real-time systems are the salient features of the CAN bus protocol. However, it lacks the basic security features such as massage authentication, which makes it vulnerable to the spoofing attacks. In a CAN network, linking CAN packet to the sender node is a challenging task. This paper aims to address this issue by developing a framework to link each CAN packet to its source. Physical signal attributes of the received packet consisting of channel and node (or device) which contains specific unique artifacts are considered to achieve this goal. Material and design imperfections in the physical channel and digital device, which are the main contributing factors behind the device-channel specific unique artifacts, are leveraged to link the received electrical signal to the transmitter. Generally, the inimitable patterns of signals from each ECUs exist over the course of time that can manifest the stability of the proposed method. Uniqueness of the channel-device specific attributes are also investigated for time-and frequency-domain. Feature vector is made up of both time and frequency domain physical attributes and then employed to train a neural network-based classifier. Performance of the proposed fingerprinting method is evaluated by using a dataset collected from 16 different channels and four identical ECUs transmitting same message. Experimental results indicate that the proposed method achieves correct detection rates of 95.2% and 98.3% for channel and ECU classification, respectively.",
      "published": "2017-12-11",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/140731",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omid Avatefipour"
      ],
      "venue": "Deep Blue (University of Michigan)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 7,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:937c32ceb398",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Secure Automotive Ethernet : Balancing Security and Safety in Time Sensitive Systems",
      "description": "Background.As a result of the digital era, vehicles are being digitalised in arapid pace. Autonomous vehicles and powerful infotainment systems are justparts of what is evolving within the vehicles. These systems require more in-formation to be transferred within the vehicle networks. As a solution for this,Ethernet was suggested. However, Ethernet is a ’best effort’ protocol which cannot be considered reliable. To solve that issue, specific implementations weredone to create Automotive Ethernet. However, the out-of-the-box vulnerabil-ities from Ethernet persist and need to be mitigated in a way that is suitableto the automotive domain. Objectives.This thesis investigates the vulnerabilities of Ethernet out-of-the-box and identify which vulnerabilities cause the largest threat in regard tothe safety of human lives and property. When such vulnerabilities are iden-tified, possible mitigation methods using security measures are investigated.Once two security measures are selected, an experiment is conducted to see ifthose can manage the latency requirements. Methods.To achieve the goals of this thesis, literature studies were conductedto learn of any vulnerabilities and possible mitigation. Then, those results areused in an OMNeT++experiment making it possible to record latency in a sim-ple automotive topology and then add the selected security measures to get atotal latency. This latency must be less than 10 ms to be considered safe in cars. Results. In the simulation, the baseline communication is found to take1.14957±0.02053 ms. When adding a security measure latency, the total dura-tion is found. For Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SecureHash Algorithm (SHA)-512 the total duration is 1.192274 ms using the up-per confidence interval. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)- ED25519 has the total latency of 3.108424 ms using the upper confidenceinterval. Conclusions. According to the results, both HMAC-SHA-512 and ECDSA- ED25519 are valid choices to implement as a integrity and authenticity secu-rity measure. However, these results are based on a simulation and should beverified using physical hardware to ensure that these measures are valid.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-18235",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "infotainment",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Martin Lang"
      ],
      "venue": "Diva portal (Dalarna University Library)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:93f6d3e741f3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Keyless Anti-Jamming Communication via Randomized DSSS",
      "description": "Nowadays, wireless networking is ubiquitous. In wireless communication systems, multiple nodes exchange data during the transmission time. Due to the natural use of the communication channel, it is crucial to protect the physical layer to make wireless channels between nodes more reliable. Jamming attacks consider one of the most significant threats on wireless communication. Spread spectrum techniques have been widely used to mitigate the effects of the jammer. Traditional anti-jamming approaches like Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) require a sender and a receiver to share a secret key prior to their communication. If this key is compromised by the jammer, the jammer can then generate the frequency hopping patterns or the spreading codes used by the communicators to disrupt the wireless communication. This dissertation includes two works as a countermeasure of jamming attacks using DSSS without the requirement of sharing a secret key. In the first work, we propose the Randomized Positioning DSSS (RP-DSSS) scheme as an extension to RD-DSSS. RP-DSSS randomly relocates the index codes for each message. This randomization hides the indices from the adversaries and thus achieves the enhanced security. Also in this dissertation, we design an “onion” spreading technique, which encodes the random positions recursively using RP-DSSS, and pads additional spreading codes to reduce the probability that a jammer can infer these random positions. In the second work, we propose Random Allocation Seed DSSS (RAS-DSSS) which mainly focuses on concealing a random seed from the attacker by inserting it at a random position of a spreading message. In RAS-DSSS, We develop a new technique to identify the location of a random seed at a receiver by aligning between multiple received messages. Thus, a receiver can obtain the position of a random seed, and then he can recover both a random seed then regenerating the spreading codes used to spread an original message.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/8151",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "jamming",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ahmad Alagil"
      ],
      "venue": "Digital Commons - University of South Florida (University of South Florida)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:9406bf3cb7c7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Post-Quantum Secure Over-the-Air Update of Automotive Systems",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c30e6a60f944defa483ed382cb9c73a37a5205e3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "secure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Joppe W. Bos",
        "Alexander Dima",
        "Alexander Kiening",
        "Joost Renes"
      ],
      "venue": "IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 8,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:945b6a99371e",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity enhancement for safety related low-end automotive electronics",
      "description": "This work addresses research questions related to the security and safety of in-vehicle networks, particularly in scenarios where low-end automotive control units (ECUs), previously not equipped with cybersecurity measures, interact with high-end ECUs. The increasing complexity and connectivity of modern vehicles have surfaced new cybersecurity risks, making it essential to develop effective and efficient cybersecurity solutions even in the most resource-constrained components. At first, we investigate the threats and risks present in low-end to high-end ECU communication scenarios, with a focus on identifying unacceptable risks in the communication between low-end and high-end ECUs. We then evaluate the effectiveness of a novel approach for an ECU internal secret key derivation, to address the identified vulnerabilities and reduce the risk to a sufficiently low level at an computational overhead, which is acceptable for the industry partners target hardware. Next, we provide a generalized concurrent error detection scheme for lightweight cryptography functionality, which we apply to our first contribution. Finally, we assess the merit in terms of automotive functional safety, by assessing the contributions through complementary deductive and inductive functional safety analyses in accordance with ISO 26262. This evaluation confirmed the merit of the contributions to the safety-related requirements of the rear light application target hardware and serves as a showcase example for practitioners attempting to use functionality to meet cybersecurity and functional safety requirements.To evaluate these research questions, an existing resource-constrained automotive electronic demonstrator for a rear light application was utilized, provided by the involved industry partner. The cybersecurity threats and risks were determined according to recent guidelines and indications from the automotive security standard ISO 21434, which provides a framework for ensuring the security of automotive systems. A cost-effective novel internal key derivation scheme was proposed and evaluated, based on lightweight cipher primitives using addition, rotation and XOR (ARX) operations, which served as the basis for a lightweight authentication scheme. This approach enables the generation of device-unique secret keys within the resource-constrained device, where the cipher primitive can be reused for authentication functions of the device and its data.The solution was qualitatively evaluated for its hardening of the identified cybersecurity gap and quantitatively assessed for its achievement of the set computational resource target, using metrics such as execution time and memory usage. However, the susceptibility to radiation-induced soft error upsets (SEU) was identified as a potential shortcoming of the solution. To address this, a further contribution was made to generalize parity-based concurrent error detection for the lightweight authentication scheme.This approach provides a generalized scheme for concurrent error detection whenever an ARX cipher can be represented as an acyclic directed graph.The solution was synthesized in digital logic using automotive semiconductor technology and evaluated for its expansion factor with respect to synthesized chip area. A complexity statement and error coverage lemmas provided an indication of the scalability and error coverage, which was confirmed by an error injection test bench evaluation in software.By executing a state-of-the-art deductive fault tree analysis, complemented by an inductive failure mode effect analysis, the benefit to systematic and random faults could be shown and the set qualitative as well as quantitative functional safety requirements were shown to be fulfilled with our contributions in place. The usage of cybersecurity measures for functional safety purposes resembles a showcase example, aiding practitioners of cybersecurity and functional safety to improve safety related applications for future mobility applications where modern functional safety is only achievable by addressing cybersecurity adequately. The thesis concludes by summarizing the main findings and implications of the research, including the development of a cost-effective internal key derivation scheme, a generalized concurrent error detection scheme for ARX ciphers, and the merit of using cybersecurity functionality to achieve functional safety requirements. The contributions of this research have the potential to improve the security and safety of in-vehicle networks, and the findings can be applied to other domains where resource-constrained devices are used in similar network configurations. An outlook on a selective data access concept is also presented, which was the initial target of the research proposal but was not pursued in favor of approaching other cybersecurity and functional safety gaps that emerged early on during the research activity.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://resolver.obvsg.at/urn:nbn:at:at-ubk:1-60904",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso 21434",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sergei Nicholas Hammer"
      ],
      "venue": "University of Klagenfurt",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:9b06109dec52",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity Best Practices for Integration/Retrofit of Telematics and Aftermarket Electronic Systems into Heavy Vehicles",
      "description": "This document reviews and applies existing transportation cybersecurity best practices from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and other organizations to heavy vehicles. The focus is on telematics and aftermarket devices, as they are a common attack vector, and requirements for electronic logging devices (ELDs) in the United States have increased the rate at which such devices are being deployed. There are two primary focus areas in this document: policy and procedure recommendations and technical recommendations. This document is intended for use by truck/bus manufacturers, telematics service providers (TSPs), motor carriers, heavy truck dealers/installers, fleet managers, mechanics, drivers, and Government regulators. This document may also be useful to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who build tractors, trailers, engines, and other systems for trucks, as it will help them consider how their systems might be accessed, legitimately or maliciously. Finally, Federal, State, and local governments can use the document as a “best practices” guide when considering cybersecurity risks associated with deployment of telematics devices.\\n",
      "published": "2020-05-01",
      "url": "http://ntlsearch.bts.gov/ntl/md.do?id=74281",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dan Klinedinst"
      ],
      "venue": "ROSA P",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:9cbe45769df6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "New immobilizer concept based on Scania’s electrical platform",
      "description": "Immobilizers are security systems that are set up and installed in modern vehicles in order to prevent thieves from starting the vehicles. The idea is that if any wrong keys are used to start the vehicle, the immobilizer detects the wrong key and start the immobilization procedure to stop the vehicle from turning on. The vehicle ignition key (key transponder or key fob) is one of the important components in an immobilizer system. An ignition key in an immobilizer system has a Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) chip inside it. This RFID chip holds a specific encryption algorithm and particular number of bits (encryption key bits) in itself. Using the encryption algorithm and encryption key bits, RFID chip inside the key authenticates and identifies itself as the right key to the immobilizer system in order to disable the immobilization procedure and start the vehicle. However, there are two ways thieves can disable the immobilization procedure and start the vehicle. The first approach is by discovering the specific encryption algorithm and key bits in the right key transponder (RFID) and using them to duplicate the correct RFID chip to disable the immobilization procedure and start the vehicle. The second approach is by exploiting the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in vehicle security network (CAN bus) to bypass the immobilizer and manipulate the immobilization procedure to start the vehicle. Scania vehicles are not using the most secure RFID and immobilization procedures, hence they are vulnerable to two vehicle theft approaches above. Therefore in this thesis project, I have done research and investigation on Scania vehicles key transponder (RFID) and analyzed their immobilization procedures in order to identify the roots and origins of vulnerabilities in Scania RFID and immobilization procedures. As the first result of this thesis work, I have found and proposed an RFID chip having one of the strongest encryption algorithms and proper number of encryption key bits for all Scania vehicles. As the second result of this thesis project, I have proposed and introduced two new individual immobilization procedures exclusively for Scania hybrid and electrical vehicles. Both proposed RFID (encryption algorithm) and immobilization procedures will be implemented in Scania vehicles in near future and will increase the security of Scania immobilizers significantly.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-29180",
      "matched_terms": [
        "can bus",
        "immobilizer",
        "key fob",
        "secure",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Navid Varzandeh"
      ],
      "venue": "DiVA (University of Gävle)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:a09378a33557",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Enhancing Security in EV Charging Systems via Trusted Computing",
      "description": "Electric Vehicle (EV) charging is becoming a more and more relevant part of everyday life, therefore mitigating potential security vulnerabilities is an essential part of system design. We analyze the new ISO 15118-20 charging protocol through a cybersecurity lens and note that it does not adequately consider the system's cyber-physical components: The high-power charging circuitry can be used by malicious parties to either damage connected EVs, or be used as part of a larger power grid attack theorised in prior work. In this research we do a design space exploration around performing remote attestation on such embedded systems, and discuss what the architecture of such a system would look like in an EV charging context. We implement a proof of concept remote attestation service compatible with ISO 15118-20 on an experimental platform. Performance benchmarks show less than half a second is added to the charging handshake. We find additional uses for the system's Trusted Platform Module (TPM): Developing a method to securely exchange system capabilities between EV and charging station that is immune to downgrade attacks. We present a modified version of ISO 15118-20 to show how this can be used, and how secure exchange can also be used to extend the previous remote attestation service -- allowing for bidirectional attestation whilst also simplifying implementation. Physical experiments show a similarly reasonable performance overhead. Finally, after noting that a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is only required here for remote attestation purposes, we lay out a future proposal for a hardware platform capable of performing remote attestation in hardware. We list a number of challenges that will need to be overcome to develop this system, as well as discussion on how some of these problems could be overcome.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/2292/74318",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "charging station",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ross Porter"
      ],
      "venue": "ResearchSpace (University of Auckland)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:a18873324f7e",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion Detection using Bit Timing Characteristics for CAN Bus",
      "description": "In today's world, most automobiles use Controller Area Network (CAN) bus for communication between various Electronic Control Units (ECUs), also called nodes on the CAN bus. Each ECU on the CAN bus is a microcontroller that sends a unique identifier used for node identification. It is possible to spoof node A by sending the same identifier through node B and thereby control node A. Thus, a hacker can control the steering using the car's internal lights and render it ineffective or misuse them. In order to combat this, we try to fingerprint each node by identifying its identifier's unique bit timing characteristics. To that extent, bit timing characteristics used are the Time of Flight (TOF) intervals between successive rising edges of identifier bits, for an ECU. Similarly, other characteristics such as TOF between successive falling edges of the CAN bus node identifier can also be used for node classification. In order to measure these TOFs, we use a device called Time-to-Digital Convertor, which essentially triggers a ring oscillator to measure time values between rising/falling edges of a signal, to the order of picosecond accuracy. These timing values are used as features into the K-nearest neighbors (KNN) classifier algorithm. Once the classifier is trained, it can be used to predict a new timing value into a particular node category, which if different from the expected category is a sign of compromise or intrusion. It is seen that we achieve 95% accuracy of correctly predicting the compromised node under simulation tests. Thereafter, the thesis deals with experimentally predicting an intrusion in the CAN bus system utilizing EPOS Studio CAN bus position controller for Maxon motors. The clock timings being extremely accurate leads to the conclusion that employment of better statistical techniques for node characterization is needed for intrusion detection, which is outside the scope of this work.",
      "published": "2019-07-19",
      "url": "http://hdl.handle.net/10919/91902",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Chitvan Kirit Patel"
      ],
      "venue": "VTechWorks (Virginia Tech)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:a2af1e24d2a1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "EVs@Scale - Addressing Cybersecurity Risks Between EVSE and Charge Point Management Systems",
      "description": "The EVs@Scale consortium, funded by the VTO, aims to find cybersecurity gaps within EV charging industry.This report provides data, analyzes common risks, and highlights the need to secure publicly available information at all stages within charging operations.Argonne's researchers concentrated on Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI), networks connecting chargers to Central Management Systems.i This work identifies risks and vulnerabilities, demonstrates open-source tool usage and results, and highlights best practices.Findings included unprotected administrative panels, web-facing Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) chargers running unencrypted protocols, and extensive data enumeration.The testing methodology followed four steps.First, Passive OSINT (Open-Source INTelligence) identified entities for further investigation.Next, Automated Information Gathering collected detailed data on identified organizations.Then, Correlation of Findings associated IPs, scans, and public endpoints with specific charge network operators.Finally, Analysis of the findings provided a detailed account of vulnerabilities and risks discovered, along with best practices.This methodology enabled Argonne researchers to correlate findings and risks to major Charging Network Operators (CNOs), noting a trend towards increased security.Open-source tools were used to identify web-facing servers, IoT, industrial, and networked devices which allow researchers to find insecure protocols, keywords, or business assets.All tools used during this evaluation are available to the public and free to use.To address these issues, EV charge network operators are encouraged to use cybersecurity principles and best practices when deploying networked EVCI.Recommendations include implementing least-privilege access for management consoles, secure-by-design networks using Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) 2.0.1, and hardening Charge Point Management Systems (CPMS) and Application Programming Interface (API) backends.To address cyber hygiene risks, operators should employ qualified managed security service providers or hire internal cybersecurity staff.Emerging protocols and standards should be independently assessed based on business needs and data handling, emphasizing future-proofing physical infrastructure, as deployments may go years without updates.This research aims to improve the management and ongoing maintenance of EVCI and ensure compliance with existing IT and OT industry security standards.i Central management systems (CMS) were examined for OCPP version 1.6/1.6jand Charging Stations Management Systems (CSMS) were examined for OCPP 2.0.1 and above.",
      "published": "2024-10-17",
      "url": "https://www.osti.gov/biblio/2467410",
      "matched_terms": [
        "charging stations",
        "cybersecurity",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "evse",
        "ocpp",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Matthew Sampson"
      ],
      "venue": "OSTI OAI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information)",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:a33705c71063",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Privacy as a Commodity Is Not the Case: Privacy Calculus Model for Connected Cars",
      "description": "With the development of information and telecommunication technology, more and more products can integrate such technologies to provide more convenient service to consumers. The connected car is the presence of devices in an automobile that connect the devices to other devices within the vehicles and or devices, networks and services outside the car including other cars, home, office or infrastructure. The data generated by telematics and vehicle infotainment systems is highly revealing of personal lifestyles, habits and preferences include customer account. The purpose of the paper is to figure out effect of social behaviors of connected car on social adjustment as partner, and how this relationship affects determining willingness to provide personal information of connected car consumers. To do so, a research model and the hypothesis have been developed accordingly. The model will be tested by using the sample from South Korea’s care driver. The potential contributions have been addressed consequently.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "http://aisel.aisnet.org/whiceb2018/44",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "infotainment",
        "privacy",
        "telematics"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Minho Ju",
        "Jian Mou"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of the Association for Information Systems",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 4,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:a83302693d37",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Drift with Devil: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Localization in High-Level Autonomous Driving under GPS Spoofing",
      "description": "For high-level Autonomous Vehicles (AV), localization is highly security and safety critical. One direct threat to it is GPS spoofing, but fortunately, AV systems today predominantly use Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) algorithms that are generally believed to have the potential to practically defeat GPS spoofing. However, no prior work has studied whether today’s MSF algorithms are indeed sufficiently secure under GPS spoofing, especially in AV settings. In this work, we perform the first study to fill this critical gap. As the first study, we focus on a production-grade MSF with both design and implementation level representativeness, and identify two AV-specific attack goals, off-road and wrong-way attacks. To systematically understand the security property, we first analyze the upper-bound attack effectiveness, and discover a take-over effect that can fundamentally defeat the MSF design principle. We perform a cause analysis and find that such vulnerability only appears dynamically and non-deterministically. Leveraging this insight, we design FusionRipper, a novel and general attack that opportunistically captures and exploits take-over vulnerabilities. We evaluate it on 6 real-world sensor traces, and find that FusionRipper can achieve at least 97% and 91.3% success rates in all traces for off-road and wrongway attacks respectively. We also find that it is highly robust to practical factors such as spoofing inaccuracies. To improve the practicality, we further design an offline method that can effectively identify attack parameters with over 80% average success rates for both attack goals, with the cost of at most half a day. We also discuss promising defense directions.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-shen.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "exploits"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Junjie Shen",
        "Jun Yeon Won",
        "Zeyuan Chen",
        "Qi Alfred Chen"
      ],
      "venue": "USENIX Security Symposium",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 94,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:a89160c69d70",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Next-Generation Automotive E/E Architectures: Unifying Zonal Computing, Deterministic Ethernet-TSN, Secure CAN Protocols, and Fault-Tolerant Lockstep Mechanisms",
      "description": "This article presents a comprehensive, original synthesis of current knowledge and forward-looking propositions for resilient, secure, and economically optimized electrical/electronic (E/E) architectures in modern vehicles. It integrates evidence and theoretical positions from research on zonal architectures, fault-tolerant lockstep processors, in-vehicle networking (CAN, CAN-FD, and TSN over Ethernet), scheduling and update strategies, and security vulnerabilities that threaten vehicle safety and availability. The structured abstract outlines objectives, methodological framing, key findings, and implications. The main contribution is a unified conceptual framework that reconciles reliability-by-design (hardware lockstep and heterogeneous redundancy), secure communications (CAN hardening and secure firmware-over-the-air), and pragmatic system-level optimization (cost, scheduling, and power supply considerations). The framework is supported by detailed discussion of mechanisms—dual-core lockstep, share-driven scheduling, selective denial-of-service attacks and defenses, and OTA update parallelization—and by a critical appraisal of trade-offs between cost savings and safety requirements. The article concludes with prioritized research directions and engineering recommendations for industry and academia aimed at achieving scalable, secure, and verifiable zonal E/E systems.",
      "published": "2024-02-12",
      "url": "https://scientiamreearch.org/index.php/ijcsis/article/view/187/158",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can-fd",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Dr. Arjun V. Menon"
      ],
      "venue": "International journal of computer science & information system.",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:aa5bc259512d",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Combinatorial Construct for Keyless Message Dispersal (Work in Progress)",
      "description": "We propose a keyless and lightweight message transformation scheme based on the combinatorial design theory for the confidentiality of a message transmitted in multiple parts through a network with multiple independent paths, or for data stored in multiple parts by a set of independent storage services such as the cloud providers. Our combinatorial scheme disperses a message into v output parts so that (k-1) or less parts do not reveal any information about any message part, and the message can only be recovered by the party who possesses all v output parts. Combinatorial scheme generates an xor transformation structure to disperse the message into v output parts. Inversion is done by applying the same xor transformation structure on output parts. The structure is generated using generalized quadrangles from design theory which represents symmetric point and line incidence relations in a projective plane. We randomize our solution by adding a random salt value and dispersing it together with the message. We show that a passive adversary with capability of accessing (k-1) communication links or storage services has no advantage so that the scheme is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2).",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://eprints.qut.edu.au/94441/1/Camtepe_CCNKMD.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Seyit Ahmet Camtepe",
        "Ed Dawson",
        "Xavier Boyen"
      ],
      "venue": "QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology)",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ac3cf94cc16e",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A Study of Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses in Connected Cars",
      "description": "Security vulnerabilities in connected cars can have devastating consequences. For this reason we compiled and analyzed vulnerabilities in connected cars using empirical data to gain an understanding of the security issues in the automobile industry. The data is gathered from the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and analyzed with the help of the CVSS system and the CVE and CWE databases. 183 reports were found from the company Qualcomm and 28 reports were found from the rest of the industry. Qualcomm was analyzed seperately to avoid skewed results. Exploitability and impact trends of the vulnerabilities were analyzed and we found that the vulnerabilities generally were highly exploitable and had an high impact according to CVSS standards. The CWE classifications of the vulnerabilities were also analyzed. We found that the most common weaknesses among the major car companies were Protection Mechanism Failure, Information Exposure, Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer and Improper Input Validation. The most common weaknesses for Qualcomm components were Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer, Improper Input Validation, Improper Access Control, NULL Pointer Dereference, Improper Validation of Array Index and Information Exposure. Looking deeper into the vulnerable components we found that 47% of the vulnerabilities were in the Infotainment system and 39% were in the Telematics Control Unit.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-260965",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobile",
        "connected cars",
        "infotainment",
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerabilities",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Koray Mustafa Kaya"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b1192b6d7ed0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Threats to Security in DSRC/WAVE",
      "description": "Abstract. Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) enabled road vehicles are on the brink of actualizing an important application of mobile ad hoc networks. It is crucial that the messages exchanged between the vehicles and between the vehicles and specialized infras-tructure be reliable, accurate and confidential. To this end, we propose to identify the security threats inherent in the emerging DSRC Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) architecture. We rank the identified threats according to the European Telecommunications Stan-dards Institute’s (ETSI) threat analysis methodology. We also discuss possible countermeasures to the most critical threats. 1",
      "published": "2015-07-07",
      "url": "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.600.1461",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "threat",
        "threats",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Christine Laurendeau",
        "Michel Barbeau"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 18,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b317c9ea280b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fast and vulnerable: a story of telematic failures",
      "description": "Modern automobiles are complex distributed systems in which virtually all functionality — from acceleration and braking to lighting and HVAC — is mediated by com-puterized controllers. The interconnected nature of these systems raises obvious security concerns and prior work has demonstrated that a vulnerability in any single com-ponent may provide the means to compromise the system as a whole. Thus, the addition of new components, and especially new components with external networking ca-pability, creates risks that must be carefully considered. In this paper we examine a popular aftermarket telem-atics control unit (TCU) which connects to a vehicle via the standard OBD-II port. We show that these devices can be discovered, targeted, and compromised by a re-mote attacker and we demonstrate that such a compro-mise allows arbitrary remote control of the vehicle. This problem is particularly challenging because, since this is aftermarket equipment, it cannot be well addressed by automobile manufacturers themselves. 1",
      "published": "2015-08-10",
      "url": "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.697.1867",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacker",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "obd-ii",
        "security",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ian Foster",
        "Andrew Prudhomme",
        "Karl Koscher",
        "Stefan Savage"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 150,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b38c25442986",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Contributions to in-vehicle networks: error injection and intrusion detection system for CAN, and audio video bridging synchronization",
      "description": "Vehicles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECUs) responsible for performing tasks as simple as lighting up brake lights or as complex as controlling the wheels of an electric car. The exchange of information between ECUs uses the Controller Area Network (CAN) and the Controller Area Network with Flexible Data Rate (CAN FD), which provides higher data rates and payloads, as the main and most used intra-vehicular networks, at least until today. Interconnected ECUs must work perfectly and interact with each other as well as with other car components in a reliable way, thus it is indispensable to test and predict the behavior of these units in error situations. For this, an error injection mechanism can be very advantageous for checking various error conditions in real-world scenarios that affect the safety of vehicles. Furthermore, nowadays, cars are also equipped with network technologies that provide connectivity to the external world. This offers numerous possibilities in terms of new applications and services to be provided, however makes the car a network node subject to cyber-attacks. It is then necessary to provide security mechanisms to prevent, or at least detect, attacks. Besides CAN and CAN FD networks, the advent of 100BASE-T1 Ethernet has feasible the outcome of many new automotive applications with higher bandwidth demands. In order to be use Ethernet in applications that require determinism, a series of IEEE standards, which together constitute the Audio Video Bridging (AVB), were developed and proposed. The IEEE 802.1AS, for instance, is the AVB standard that defines the generalized Precision Time Protocol (gPTP), responsible for node synchronization within AVB networks. In this context, this dissertation intends to make contributions for CAN/CAN FD networks as well as for the automotive Ethernet. For CAN networks, it proposes a novel Error Injection Technique to assist with system level validation tests and also an Intrusion Detection System based on machine learning algorithms. For automotive Ethernet, it designs and proposes a hardware implementation of the gPTP protocol that achieves the required nanoseconds precision, while also providing implementation details for future researches on that protocol.",
      "published": "2018-07-04",
      "url": "https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/31916",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Araujo Filho",
        "Paulo Freitas de"
      ],
      "venue": "Americanae (AECID Library)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b4fe870b48f6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "My Connected Car Is Under Attack: \"TPM\", “TPM” HELP ME",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-06-30",
      "url": "https://www.thinkmind.org/articles/vehicular_2019_6_30_30076.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Jeevan Visvesha"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b5bf2c7934dd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Safeguarding Over-the-Air Updates - Abstract",
      "description": "In recent years, software complexity in automobiles has increased immensely. The global trend in the automotive sector is increasingly moving towards the Software-Defined Vehicle (SDV). However, the figures for recalls in recent years show a growing cause in software errors and they are set to increase. This means that the number and scope of software updates will also rise. Clearly Over-the-Air (OTA) Updates should be favoured in the future, mitigating the burden and effort of visiting a repair workshop. OTAs can be used to fix bugs, close security gaps, but also to expand functions or increase performance.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://elib.dlr.de/216322/1/DLR_SDV_OTA-abstract.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Grüttner, Kim",
        "Schlender, Henning",
        "Westphal, Bernd"
      ],
      "venue": "elib (German Aerospace Center)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b78aa6628cae",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intelligent Connected Vehicle Security: Threats, Attacks and Defenses",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2023",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5cd529b87ffb8727cb2f45db90dc8ec61c1a4bd7",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "connected vehicle",
        "security",
        "threats"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xifeng Wang",
        "Li-Min Sun",
        "Chao Wang",
        "Hong-Song Zhu",
        "Lian Zhao",
        "Shu-Jie Yang",
        "Chang-Qiao Xu"
      ],
      "venue": "Journal of information science and engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b7cdc11c0c59",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Fingerprinting electronic control units for vehicle intrusion detection",
      "description": "As more software modules and external interfaces are getting added on vehicles, new attacks and vulnerabilities are emerging. Researchers have demonstrated how to compromise in-vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and control the vehicle maneuver. To counter these vulnerabilities, various types of defense mechanisms have been proposed, but they have not been able to meet the need of strong protection for safety-critical ECUs against in-vehicle network attacks. To mitigate this deficiency, we propose an anomaly-based intrusion detection system (IDS), called Clock-based IDS (CIDS). It measures and then exploits the intervals of periodic in-vehicle messages for fingerprinting ECUs. The thus-derived fingerprints are then used for constructing a baseline of ECUs' clock behaviors with the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm. Based on this baseline, CIDS uses Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) to detect any abnormal shifts in the identification errors - a clear sign of intrusion. This allows quick identification of in-vehicle network intrusions with a low false-positive rate of 0.055%. Unlike state-of-the-art IDSs, if an attack is detected, CIDS's fingerprinting of ECUs also facilitates a rootcause analysis; identifying which ECU mounted the attack. Our experiments on a CAN bus prototype and on real vehicles have shown CIDS to be able to detect a wide range of in-vehicle network attacks.",
      "published": "2016-08-10",
      "url": "https://atc.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_cho.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "exploits",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kyong-Tak Cho",
        "Kang Geun Shin"
      ],
      "venue": "USENIX Security Symposium",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 450,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:b8543967ade7",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards an Elaborated Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment for Highly Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "Worst-case assumptions about the operational environment during Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) not only limit its representation of the dynamic nature of the environment but also result in a conservative approach towards risk-classification-based safety assurance, making it inadequate for highly automated vehicles. This is because, with increasing levels of driving automation, the responsibility of driving shifts from the human driver to the vehicle. While the current approach to HARA ensures safety, it does so at the cost of higher reliance on the human driver as the primary element of the control loop. To this end, we propose a systematic approach for representing and incorporating non-worst-cases of the operational situation while conducting HARA. This results in Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) values which more accurately depict the dynamic characteristics of the environment. Furthermore, this representation aids in determining suitable safety goals and corresponding safety measures that do not depend on the presence of a human driver in the loop, thereby increasing the system availability and performance.",
      "published": "2024-04-08",
      "url": "https://hal.science/hal-04769853",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nikita Bhardwaj Haupt",
        "Peter Liggesmeyer"
      ],
      "venue": "HAL",
      "year": 2024,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:bb40d1e6c9ae",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security attacks on RECKLESS-APPs: \"Remote car keyless applications\" for new semi autonomous vehicles",
      "description": "Rapid technological advancements of vehicle manufacturing and the modern wireless technology opens the door for several new Intelligent Transportation applications. Remote Keyless system in vehicles is considered one of the famous applications that has been developed recently, which is susceptible to many cyberattacks. Remote Keyless applications on smartphones were developed in the past few years to perform the functionality of keyless fob and are expected to replace the physical keyless fobs in the next few years, which can open the door to many cyberattacks. In this research, we implemented a simulation that represents the REmote Car KeyLESS Applications (RECKLESS-apps) on the smartphones. In this thesis we demonstrate the types of cyber-attacks these applications could face. Our research serves as a proof that remote car keyless applications that would replace the physical keys could be vulnerable to various malicious cyber-attacks. We study these attacks and provide remedies, cyber-hygiene and best practices to remedy some of these attacks.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/534",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "keyless",
        "security",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mohamed El-Tawab"
      ],
      "venue": "JMU Scholoraly Commons (James Madison University)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:bdd9db2b53dc",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "OTARQ: Adaptive and Automated Risk Quantification Method for OTA Updates in SDVs",
      "description": "The increasing frequency of Over-The-Air (OTA) updates on Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs), combined with heterogeneous OTA architectures, introduces unpredictable attack entry points and vulnerabilities that may scale with fleet size. These vulnerabilities can escalate from external infrastructure components to in-vehicle systems, expanding the attack surface across the update ecosystem. In SDV architectures, realtime vulnerability risk management is challenging, as OTA updates may be deployed before corresponding security patches are released and validated. This work presents OTARQ (OTA Risk Quantification), an automated risk quantification framework that integrates cybersecurity, safety, and fleet impact assessment. The framework automatically computes a final risk score from natural-language vulnerability descriptions. OTARQ is adaptive and context-aware, dynamically adjusting its parameters according to update criticality and vulnerability location. Experiments on representative OTA threat scenarios validate both the accuracy of the risk quantification and its sensitivity to deployment context.SDV, OTA updates, vulnerability analysis",
      "published": "2026-08-03",
      "url": "https://hal.science/hal-05709703v1",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "cybersecurity",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "khaoula Sghaier",
        "Ghada Gharbi",
        "Badis Hammi",
        "Pierre Merdrignac",
        "Pierre Parrend",
        "Didier Verna"
      ],
      "venue": "HAL",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:bddb209466e0",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Development and Evaluation of CANBench: A Testbed for Assessing the Security of Automotive CAN Buses",
      "description": "Modern vehicles rely heavily on electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate via the controller area network (CAN) bus, a protocol developed in the 1980s with minimal security considerations. The growing number of ECUs has heightened the risk of cyberattacks on vehicles. Although CAN bus security has been extensively researched, the CAN standard still lacks built-in security measures. Furthermore, testing proposed security mechanisms is challenging due to the proprietary nature of automotive systems. To address this, an open-source physical testbed was developed using inexpensive, off-the-shelf components to support automotive CAN bus security research. The testbed provides a controlled environment for simulating and evaluating various attacks and defense mechanisms. It was assessed for functionality, reproducibility, and ease of use. Testing demonstrated the testbed's ability to replay CAN traffic in near real-time and accurately simulate replay, spoofing, and denial of service attacks. Additionally, usability testing was conducted with individuals who had minimal experience with automotive networks. The participants successfully reproduced the tool and executed attacks using the provided documentation. These results highlight the testbed's reproducibility, usability, and potential to advance future automotive security research.",
      "published": "2025-04-15",
      "url": "https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/10732",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "spoofing"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "McClellan, Trevor S"
      ],
      "venue": "ScholarsArchive (Brigham Young University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:be3dbeb74a37",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "VEHICLE INDIVIDUAL CAN-PROFILE FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CONTROL UNITS",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ab61b541bc92b58239490b6bda5a1ae81b788ef8",
      "matched_terms": [
        "secure",
        "vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bayerische Patentallianz GmbH"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:bee36fc9395a",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Adversarial Attacks and Defense Mechanisms in Autonomous Vehicle Perception",
      "description": "Traffic and vehicles have changed a lot in the recent years. Vehicles are constantly developing to be more advanced with different automated and intelligent features. Autonomous driving technology is one part of this development. The autonomous technology in vehicles use sensors, machine learning, and digital information to understand what is happening around them. However, these technologies also bring security risks that affects them in various ways. The purpose of this thesis is to examine adversarial attacks against autonomous vehicle perception systems and the defense mechanisms developed against them. Autonomous vehicles rely on visual perception modules that process sensor data with the help of neural networks. Tasks such as object detection, classification, and tracking are used. The attacks are discussed based on their goals, such as misclassification, hiding, and appearing attacks, as well as attacks targeting sensor fusion systems. Based on the reviewed literature, perception systems can be vulnerable to carefully designed inputs that cause incorrect or misleading results. Existing defense approaches, including certified defenses and vision-based consistency checking, offer promising ways to mitigate these attacks. However, they also have limitations in practical use. These results suggest that adversarial attacks against autonomous vehicle perception remain an important security concern. Possible future research work may include a focus on more efficient defenses, improved sensor fusion, and more realistic testing environments. This study is conducted as a literature review.",
      "published": "2026-05-21",
      "url": "http://hdl.handle.net/10138/634311",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "attacks",
        "autonomous driving",
        "autonomous vehicle",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Niklas Nygård"
      ],
      "venue": "Työväentutkimus Vuosikirja",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:c204796716bd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "車載用サイバーセキュリティ国際標準 : ISO/SAE 21434[Road vehicles : Cybersecurity engineering]開発動向 (情報セキュリティ・個人情報保護 : 法改正,企業の取組み)",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2020-06-01",
      "url": "https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/40022255267",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "茂之 川名"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 9,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:c90c8a11372a",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Fail-Operational Intrusion Detection System for In-Vehicle Networks",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016-11-01",
      "url": "https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10040592-towards-fail-operational-intrusion-detection-system-vehicle-networks",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Clinton Young",
        "Joseph Zambreno",
        "Gedare Bloom"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:c95e52348716",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in vehicular over-the-air update systems : A systematic literature review",
      "description": "Modern vehicles run on software. Braking, steering, driver assistance, and even door locking all depend on code, and a new passenger car may carry more than 100 million lines of it. When that code needs fixing, manufacturers increasingly distribute patches wirelessly through over-the-air (OTA) updates rather than physical recalls. However, the same wireless channel that delivers a security fix can also be exploited, and the OTA chain presents a long attack surface: backend servers, cellular links, in-vehicle gateways, and individual control units each offer a point of entry. Man-in-the-middle interception, replay of outdated firmware, rollback to vulnerable versions, and firmware tam-pering have all been documented, and a 2024 formal analysis of the Uptane framework, widely regarded as the most trusted OTA security standard, surfaced six previously undetected flaws. Regulators have responded with legally binding requirements. UNECE R155 and R156, ISO 24089, ISO/SAE 21434, and China's GB 44495/44496 now govern how vehicle software must be secured and updated across most major markets. What has been missing is a methodologically transparent synthesis of the academic research that could inform compliance efforts. Existing OTA surveys rely on narrative methods without documented search protocols, and PRISMA-compliant automotive reviews have not targeted OTA specifically. This thesis addresses that gap. Six databases were searched for peer-reviewed work published between 2018 and March 2026; 1,299 unique records were screened; and after quality assessment and a post-hoc narrowing to the post-regulation period (2021 to 2026), fifty studies were retained for in-depth analysis. The review produces a threat-countermeasure map and a regulatory coverage matrix, both of which surface a pattern that prior surveys were not positioned to detect: research has concentrated heavily on se-curing the delivery of updates, while operational requirements such as update failure handling, post-update verifi-cation, and continuous monitoring are each addressed by no more than three studies.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-26484",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "driver assistance",
        "in-vehicle",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "regulation",
        "unece r155",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aiham Alaaraj"
      ],
      "venue": "Diva portal (Dalarna University Library)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3953,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:c95e52348716 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: backend_cloud, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: vehicle_control; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: undetected, servers, backend, targeted, regulatory, operational, studies, even."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ccbfb136a8f9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "SODA-IIoT4Automotive: Blockchain to keep the Automotive ECU up-to-date",
      "description": "Automotive vehicles are composed of several dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECU). With the increasing connectivity of the vehicles, the update of the ECU software will soon be performed Over-The-Air (OTA). This includes the update of the in-vehicle infotainment, but also the more critical ECUs such as the body, motion and Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS) ECUs. For PSA and Valeo the accountability and the availability of ECU software updates are crucial, particularly for security patches which require a fast deployment.",
      "published": "2017-04-14",
      "url": "https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01516313",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Nabil Bouzerna",
        "Benjamin Venelle",
        "Antoine Boulanger"
      ],
      "venue": "HAL",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:cd3fc7660647",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cryptanalysis of the Megamos Crypto Automotive Immobilizer",
      "description": "The Megamos Crypto key fob is used in one of the most widely deployed automotive electronic immobilizers. Such an anti-theft device is designed to prevent hot-wiring of the vehicle. We have reverse-engineered all proprietary security mechanisms of the key fob and have found several weaknesses in the cipher and also in their usage and configuration by carmakers. We exploit these weaknesses in three practical attacks that recover the 96-bit key fob secret key. We end our article with suggestions to mitigate some of our attacks, something that knowledgeable users can do themselves.",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/en/publications/4ef529d4-cf9e-4ea9-8bcb-ee1b2fd7238c",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "exploit",
        "immobilizer",
        "key fob",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Roel Verdult",
        "Flavio D. Garcia"
      ],
      "venue": "University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 6,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ce05570921f9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "An Adaptable Security-by-Design Approach in Remote Monitoring and Over-the-Air Update Systems for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025-06-01",
      "url": "https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/d1b88762-fbd9-4006-b241-41d8e545081f",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected vehicles",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Victormills Iyieke"
      ],
      "venue": "Pure (Coventry University)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3951,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.56,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:ce05570921f9 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ce67fa77ee9e",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Analysis of Ethernet in Cars",
      "description": "With the development of advanced driving assistance systems, the amount of data that needs to be transmitted within a car has increased tremendously. Traditional communication bus based systems are unable to meet today’s requirements; hence automotive Ethernet is being developed and standardized. Ethernet has for many years been the de facto standard in interconnecting computers. In that time several vulnerabilities of the networking protocol stack implementations and even the protocols themselves have been discovered. The knowledge from exploiting computer networks can be applied to the automotive domain. Additionally, vehicle manufacturers tend to implement their own stacks, due to copyleft reasons; hence the chances of implementation faults increases as opposed to using well-tested open source solutions. Since the line between security and safety in cars is almost nonexistent, security has to be properly addressed. This thesis investigates the security of automotive Ethernet and its accompanying protocols. It starts with an introduction to computer and automotive networking and protocols. After a solid foundation is laid, it investigates what makes up automotive Ethernet, its application in the field, and the automotive specific components relying on it. After looking at related work, a data network security audit and analysis as defined by the open-source security testing methodology is performed. The system is graded with risk assessment values. Weak points are identified and improvements suggested. The impact of the proposed improvements is shown by reevaluating the system and recalculating the risk assessment values. These efforts further the ultimate goal of achieving increased safety of all traffic participants.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-215329",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "risk assessment",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ammar Talic"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 5,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:cea94a269c6b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Detection of injection attacks on in-vehicle network using data analytics",
      "description": "We investigate the possibility of detection of injection attacks using data analytics techniques\\nin this thesis. The automotive industry is innovating the modern vehicles towards connectivity by\\ninterfacing them with various external entities. These entities are exposing the automobile to cyber\\nattacks instead of ensuring its safety. Therefore it is important to consider the security aspect while\\ndeveloping these interfaces. Firstly, we try understand the automobile network architecture and the\\npossible security threats associated with it. Next, we examine the various possible cyber-attacks\\non automobiles described in the literature. We experiment and analyze the attack scenarios by\\nperforming injection attacks on a vehicle. We collect the data during the injection attacks and\\napply multiple data analysis techniques. These techniques build a model based on data during\\nnormal operation. The observations from the data collected during injection attacks is fit into\\nthese techniques. The data points that do not fit the model are termed as attack points. Finally\\nwe examine and analyze the results and their accuracy in detecting injection attacks.",
      "published": "2018-01-01",
      "url": "https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/16804",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automobiles",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sri Lalitha Dakshayani Dhulipala"
      ],
      "venue": "Iowa State University Digital Repository (Iowa State University)",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ceea22a38a68",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "TELEMATICS – THE ESSENTIAL CORNERSTONE OF GLOBAL VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC SAFETY",
      "description": "The networking of active and passive safety (APIA) is the fundamental basis for comprehensive vehicle safety. Situation-relevant information relating to driver reactions, vehicle behaviour and traffic environment are fed into a crash probability calculator, which continually assesses the current crash risk and intervenes when necessary with appropriate measures to avoid a crash and reduce potential injuries. APIA provides effective protection not only for vehicle occupants but also for other, vulnerable road users. As this functionality up till now only relates to the vehicle itself, the next logical step is enhancement leading to the ultimate goal in safety performance, telematics. The integration of this embedded, in-vehicle wireless communication system allows Car-to-Car (C2C) and Car-to-Infrastructure (C2I) functionality for, e.g. hazard warning. This is an integral element of the cascaded Active Passive Integration Approach. This paper describes the current status in the functional potential attained by networking active and passive safety systems (APIA) and introduces the next ultimate step towards global vehicle and traffic safety, telematics.",
      "published": "2015-03-24",
      "url": "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.579.5053",
      "matched_terms": [
        "in-vehicle",
        "telematics",
        "vulnerable"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Peter E. Rieth",
        "James Remfrey",
        "Ulrich Stählin"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:d44f9112823d",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Lightweight Static File Analysis for Pre-Installation Anomaly Screening in Automotive OTA Updates",
      "description": "Automotive Over-the-Air (OTA) updates are increasingly important for maintaining modern vehicle software, especially in In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems that rely on complex Linux-based and Android-based platforms. Existing OTA protections mainly focus on cryptographic trust, integrity verification, authorization, and access control. While these mechanisms are essential, they do not directly determine whether the files inside a valid and authorized update package appear benign for the target vehicle software environment. This leaves a content-level security gap where suspicious or malicious files may still be introduced through compromised build, supplier, repository, or packaging processes before an update is signed or distributed. At the same time, large labelled datasets of malicious automotive OTA packages are limited, making fully supervised detection difficult in this setting. This thesis addresses these challenges by proposing OTA-Sentinel, a lightweight pre-installation anomaly-screening framework that learns normal OTA file structure from benign update data using practical static byte-level representations. Through comparisons of classical, deep, and few-shot anomaly detection methods under data-scarce OTA security conditions, the thesis demonstrates the feasibility and limitations of lightweight static anomaly detection for OTA package inspection and provides an empirical foundation for adding content-level screening to existing automotive OTA security pipelines.",
      "published": "2026-07-28",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14721/40088",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Supply chain / SBOM"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Darwin Liao"
      ],
      "venue": "Scholarship@Western (Western University)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4672,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:d44f9112823d and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; attack_vectors: privilege; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment, vehicle_sensor_supplier_espionage; shared terms: normal, trust, large, limited, making, where, access."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:d88a49588653",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cyber-Security Threats of Connected and Automated Vehicles",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2021",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/41dbc93071d5f8544323cc85fdf1724afe1b10a3",
      "matched_terms": [
        "cyber-security",
        "threats",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xhoendi Collaku",
        "Azeem Hafeez"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:d8bb84d87557",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Phase detection based two-way ranging in sub-GHz band for remote keyless entry systems (本文)",
      "description": "emote keyless entry (RKE) systems have rapidly penetrated the vehicular market thanks to their enhancing convenience, usability, and simplicity.Utilizing near field communications (NFC), passive RKE systems allow a user to unlock a vehicle by being within a certain close proximity to the vehicle without any touch of its key fob.However, its vulnerability to eavesdropping in wireless channel is a serious threat to cause a lot of vehicle theft.The attack called relay attack or two-thief attack intercepts the NFC channel from the vehicle and relays the wireless communications between the key fob and the vehicle.The attack is made available without any concerns for communication protocols, just by wireless repeaters.The vehicle is fooled into believing that the key fob got closer to it, and then unlocks itself.This relay attack has become a social problem and its solution is crucial and urgent.",
      "published": "2022-01-01",
      "url": "https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=KO50002002-20225853-0003",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "key fob",
        "keyless",
        "relay",
        "threat",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "イチロウ セト",
        "Ichiro Seto",
        "一郎 瀬戸"
      ],
      "venue": "Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB)",
      "year": 2022,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:d9289eeb370c",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design and implementation of an intrusion detection system (IDS)for in-vehicle networks",
      "description": "The Controller Area Network (CAN) was specified with no regards to security mechanisms at all. This fact in combination with the widespread adoption of the CAN standard for connecting more than a hundred Electrical Control Units (ECUs), which control almost every aspect of modern cars, makes the CAN bus a valuable target for adversaries. As vehicles are safety-critical systems and the physical integrity of the driver has the highest priority, it is necessary to invent suitable countermeasures to limit CAN’s security risks. As a matter of fact, the close resemblances of in-vehicle networks to traditional computer networks, enables the use of conventional countermeasures, e.g. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). We propose a software-based light-weight IDS relying on properties extracted from the signal database of a CAN domain. Further, we suggest two anomaly-based algorithms based on message cycle time analysis and plausibility analysis of messages (e.g. speed messages). We evaluate our IDS on a simulated setup, as well as a real in-vehicle network, by performing attacks on different parts of the network. Our evaluation shows that the proposed IDS successfully detects malicious events such as injection of malformed CAN frames, unauthorized CAN frames, speedometer plausibility detection and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Based on our experience of implementing an in-vehicle IDS, we discuss potential challenges and constraints that engineers might face during the process of implementing an IDS system for in-vehicle networks. We believe that the results of this work can contribute to more advanced research in the field of intrusion detection systems for in-vehicle networks and thereby add to a safer driving experience.",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://odr.chalmers.se/bitstream/20.500.12380/251871/1/251871.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "intrusion",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Marco Bresch",
        "Noräs Salman"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 14,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:d9c0767cc7e4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity in System Design",
      "description": "As embedded systems become ubiquitous, their exposure to side-channel attacks exploiting physical leakages like power signatures in DPA and timing variations in branch prediction attacks demands innovative defenses. This study presents a detailed hardware-based approach integrated into system design, utilizing a co-design framework that combines secure modules such as electromagnetically shielded processors, randomized clocking mechanisms to introduce unpredictability, and software optimizations for embedded real-time systems. Employing a multidisciplinary methodology, we leveraged simulations in LTSpice for electrical modeling and collaborative prototyping on FPGA clusters, simulating attacks across diverse scenarios. Results indicate a 40% drop in attack success rates, with energy efficiency maintained through techniques like adaptive power gating, supported by empirical data on latency and power draw. The findings stress the importance of security in early design phases, with practical applications in IoT ecosystems and automotive infotainment systems. To foster broader adoption, we propose alignment with standards like NIST SP 800-57 for cryptographic modules. Future directions include interdisciplinary collaborations for AI-enhanced defenses and quantum-safe hardware, ensuring systems remain secure against sophisticated, adaptive threats.",
      "published": "2025-06-30",
      "url": "https://findcollaborate.com/bookseries/index.php/index/article/view/84",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Rizka Dwi Puspitasari"
      ],
      "venue": "Engineering Daily Book Series.",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:da4b5c694de6",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Primjena telematskih sustava u cestovnom prometu",
      "description": "The purpose of this paper work is to ephasise the meaning of telematics in modern times and its need. It's more often that you need verification and security at the work place, especially when it comes to trafficing issues. That verification is more often used to protect people, transport and transported goods This work shows meaning of telematic systems in monitoring working time, breaks and others related activities, and also simplifies cargo and driver tracking. Telematic systems can be devided in several different categories, and each one of them is in charge that certain parts work properly in vehicle tracking.",
      "published": "2017-09-22",
      "url": "https://dabar.srce.hr/en/islandora/object/pfri%3A1396",
      "matched_terms": [
        "security",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Viktorija Latica Antončić"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:dbc91620171a",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Avoiding Vulnerabilities in Connected Cars a methodology for finding vulnerabilities",
      "description": "We have entered a new era where connectivity through Internet, everywhere and at all times is taken for granted. The development of cars has turned to a very advanced object with about 100 million lines of code and more than 100 electronic control units (ECUs) interconnected to control everything from steering, acceleration, brakes and other safety critical systems. One problem is that cars were never created with Internet connectivity in mind and adding this connectivity as an afterthought, raises a lot of security concerns. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no model or method suited for the vehicle industry which considers security analysis for the whole range from the start of the development to aftermarket release. Neither, have we been able to find any model or method which we consider suitable to use within the vehicle industry in a plain practical manner considering security evaluation and testing. Therefore, there is a need for a methodology which meets these requirements. This thesis assesses security considerations relating to potential vulnerabilities in vehicles and aims to introduce a method to find these vulnerabilities during development. This method is named PPDM (Predict-Prevent-Detect-Method) and is comprised of six phases, defined using state diagrams and pseudo code, with accompanied explanations. It covers the whole development cycle from idea to aftermarket security evaluation. By integrating PPDM into an industrial context, security can be considered in all development phases and also enabling method adaption to meet different situations. PPDM has been achieved by conducting research on various security models, security aspects and attacks. Attacks have been studied both theoretically and empirically. The empirical part is documented and suggested as usage to find vulnerabilities as part of PPDM. A validation of PPDM with a Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided as Proof of Concept (POC), intended to demonstrate how PPDM can be used to find potential vulnerabilities. Keywords: automotive cyber security, vulnerability assessment, threat risk modelling, threat assessment, vehicle cyber attacks, exploratory testing, method integration, industrial integration, security models",
      "published": "2016-01-01",
      "url": "https://odr.chalmers.se/bitstream/20.500.12380/238172/1/238172.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected cars",
        "ecus",
        "security",
        "threat"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kim Strandberg"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:dd224b576961",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Applying Machine Learning for Fleet Transportation Optimization and Trailer IoT Insights in Supply Chains",
      "description": "For contemporary supply chain operations, effective fleet mobility and trailer management are essential. There are many chances to improve decision-making, save expenses, and increase performance by incorporating Machine Learning (ML) approaches into various fields. In order to solve issues including route planning, fuel efficiency, and predictive maintenance, this study investigates the use of machine learning (ML) models in fleet transportation optimization and trailer IoT data analysis. The study demonstrates how machine learning algorithms analyze real-time Internet of Things data to produce insights that can be put to use, allowing for preventive steps to reduce operational disturbances and downtime. Additionally, the study looks at how data-driven solutions affect supply chain effectiveness, highlighting how telematics systems can provide accurate tracking and monitoring. The results show that by optimizing resource use and minimizing environmental effects, ML-based techniques not only simplify fleet and trailer operations but also support the sustainability of supply chain networks. For industries looking to use sophisticated analytics to modernize their logistics processes, the suggested architecture provides a scalable solution.",
      "published": "2025-03-19",
      "url": "https://ijisae.org/index.php/IJISAE/article/view/7677",
      "matched_terms": [
        "supply chain",
        "telematics",
        "tracking"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "Privacy / data protection",
        "Supply chain / SBOM",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Abraaz Mohammed Khaja"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:decce5623931",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Design of Connected Car Security System",
      "description": "In the past, automotive security referred to prevention of physical approach such as ‘door lock’. However, as time goes by, the trend of automotive security has been changed from the physical character to very intelligent character. Such change has given hackers chances to attack automotive communication systems. The current automotive communication systems use CAN protocol with a few weak points. First, ID spoofing, second, DDoS attacks and third, Android immortal applications. Vehicles use a number of ECU for the purpose of controlling engine, door lock and handle. The CAN protocol provides signals in a broad-cast way and thus, hackers may access to the relevant signals very easily. In order to attack the automotive communication system, hackers often use widely-used applications such as Android or IOS. If a car owner distributes signals widely through Bluetooth dongle, hackers easily access to the signals and collect and analyze the relevant data and produce particular data for attacking the automotive ECU to transmit the data to ECU and finally control ECU. Therefore, this thesis has proposed a method for preventing such attacks based on personal authentification system and Android terminal.",
      "published": "2016-06-01",
      "url": "http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE06726997",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "ecu",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Tea-Hyung Kim",
        "Jong-Wook Jang"
      ],
      "venue": "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FUTURE INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:dfdeb7797c04",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Threats and Countermeasures for Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "With the rapid development of connected vehicles, automotive security has become one of the most important topics. To study how to protect the security of vehicle communication, we analyze potential threats for connected vehicles and discuss countermeasures to mitigate these threats. In this thesis, we examine 25 services that connected vehicles can provide. Entities, connections, and message flows in these services are investigated and synthesized into a vehicle network structure. The 25 services are divided into six use cases including: infotainment service, remote monitoring, device control, Vehicle-toeverything (V2X), diagnostics service, and in-vehicle Intrusion Detection System (IDS). We establish communication models for these use cases and analyze the potential threats based on Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) criteria. We discuss possible countermeasures that can mitigate these threats based on existing network security techniques. Each alternative countermeasure’s advantages and limitations are presented. To filter possible attacks, we investigate and design firewalls in four components of a vehicle: Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) module, gateway, Telematic Control Unit (TCU), and Human-Machine Interface (HMI). We also simulate a firewall for an HMI application by building a communication model in Python.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-259494",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment",
        "intrusion",
        "security",
        "v2x"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Telematics / infotainment"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xuwei Gong"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.3975,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:dfdeb7797c04 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: confidentiality, services, service, control, communication, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e0179e22197e",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SOCIOTECHNICAL VULNERABILITIES ON ELECTRIC VEHICLE CHARGING ACROSS THE UNITED STATES",
      "description": "The rapid expansion of the electric vehicle (EV) industry has rendered EV chargers essential to the U.S. There is, however, a notable gap in understanding the impact of losing existing chargers due to disruptive events, especially from sociotechnical vulnerabilities that arise from asset ownership and operation. This thesis addresses this gap by examining the extent of influence that EV charging companies, partners, investors, and employees have on consumer accessibility to charger infrastructure. To achieve this, we develop novel methods to construct and analyze an adversarial sociotechnical network that includes a physical network of chargers and vehicles alongside a social network of EV charging companies, investors, and employees. Results show that Tesla has an out-sized influence on EV charging access in North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia, despite having less infrastructure than competitors. Moreover, we are able to identify companies and individuals not part of EV charging station companies that may have out-sized influence on the industry, and indirectly, on charging services across each state.",
      "published": "2025-06-01",
      "url": "https://hdl.handle.net/10945/74046",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adversarial",
        "electric vehicle charging",
        "ev charging",
        "tesla",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "AI / machine learning"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "tesla"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Bye, Kelly V."
      ],
      "venue": "Calhoun: The Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Archive (Naval Postgraduate School)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e037a13eb4fd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cloud Security Architecture for the Automotive Industry: A Framework for Secure Multi-Cloud Deployment",
      "description": "This paper examines the automotive industry since it fundamentally transforms toward Software-Defined Vehicles (SDV) and exponentially increases the reliance on cloud and multi-cloud infrastructures. The attack surface expands in a dramatic way because of a shift to this model. Today cyber risks target centralized cloud backends managing entire fleets not individual vehicles. A comprehensive security architecture should be developed proactively and without delay, as potential threats may escalate, and stringent regulatory frameworks such as UNECE R155 and ISO/SAE 21434 are anticipated to come into effect. In this paper, the Automotive Multi-Cloud Security Framework (AMCSF), which is a conceptual cloud security architecture model for the automotive industry, is proposed based on a systematic literature review as well as comparative analysis of industry practices. ISO/SAE 21434 describes vehicle cybersecurity lifecycle processes the five-layer model would integrate. It works also with modern cloud-oriented technologies like Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) and Cloud Workload Protection Platforms (CWPP). The study primarily concludes that risk can be effectively managed in modern automotive ecosystems only if protections are applied synergistically and include both the vehicle itself and its cloud infrastructure. This paper will be helpful to cybersecurity and cloud solution engineers and architects in automotive (OEM, Tier-1/Tier-2), vSOC/DevSecOps teams, cybersecurity and compliance management specialists (CSMS/UNECE R155, ISO/SAE 21434), as well as consultants and executives responsible for designing and operating secure multi-cloud backends.",
      "published": "2025-11-19",
      "url": "https://ijcjournal.org/InternationalJournalOfComputer/article/view/2444",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "secure",
        "unece r155"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Geol Kang"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Computer (IJC)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e12fbb6bafb5",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the in-vehicle network",
      "description": "Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single electronic vehicle component is compromised, it is possible to take control of the vehicle. These components, called Electronic Control Units, are embedded systems which manage a significant part of the functionality of a modern car. They communicate with each other via the in-vehicle network, known as the Controller Area Network, which is the most widely used automotive bus. \\n \\nIn this thesis, we introduce a series of novel proposals to improve the security of both the Controller Area Network bus and the Electronic Control Units. \\n \\nThe Controller Area Network suffers from a number of shortfalls, one of which is the lack of source authentication. We propose a protocol that mitigates this fundamental shortcoming in the Controller Area Network bus design, and protects against a number of high profile media attacks that have been published. We derive a set of desirable security and compatibility properties which an authentication protocol for the Controller Area Network bus should possess. We evaluate our protocol, along with other proposed protocols in the literature, with respect to the defined properties. Our systematic analysis of the protocols allows the automotive industry to make an informed choice regarding the adoption suitability of these solutions. \\n \\nHowever, it is not only the communication of Electronic Control Units that needs to be secure, but the firmware running on them as well. The growing number of Electronic Control Units in a vehicle, together with their increasing complexity, prompts the need for automated tools to test their security. Part of the challenge in designing such a tool is the diversity of Electronic Control Unit architectures. To this end, this thesis presents a methodology for extracting the Control Flow Graph from the Electronic Control Unit firmware. The Control Flow Graph is a platform independent representation of the firmware control flow, allowing us to abstract from the underlying architecture. We present a fuzzer for Electronic Control Unit firmware fuzz-testing via Controller Area Network. The extracted Control Flow Graph is tagged with static data used in instructions which influence the control flow of the firmware. It is then used to create a set of input seeds for the fuzzer, and in altering the inputs during the fuzzing process. This approach represents a step towards an efficient fuzzing methodology for Electronic Control Units. To our knowledge, this is the first proposal that uses static analysis to guide the fuzzing of Electronic Control Units.",
      "published": "2020-11-25",
      "url": "http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/11044/7/Radu2020PhD.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "controller area network",
        "electronic control unit",
        "fuzzing",
        "in-vehicle"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Andreea-Ina Radu"
      ],
      "venue": "University of Birmingham Institutional Research Archive (University of Birmingham)",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e1b91c14532b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "One Car, Two Frames: Attacks on Hitag-2 Remote Keyless Entry Systems Revisited",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2017-01-01",
      "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot17/woot17-paper-benadjila.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Ryad Benadjila",
        "Mathieu Renard",
        "José Lopes Esteves",
        "Chaouki Kasmi"
      ],
      "venue": "Workshop on Offensive Technologies",
      "year": 2017,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e355d027e963",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Analyse zum Thema KFZ-Diebstahl&Prävention: Sicherheitsrisiko durch Keyless-Systeme",
      "description": "Diese Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit den sicherheitstechnischen Herausforderungen schlüsselloser Fahrzeugsysteme im Kontext moderner Kfz-Diebstähle. Nach einer Darstellung der Entwicklung von mechanischen zu elektronischen Sicherheitslösungen sowie einer Analyse aktueller Diebstahltrends werden Funktionsweisen und potenzielle Schwachstellen von Keyless-Systemen aufgezeigt. Im Rahmen einer experimentellen Untersuchung werden unterschiedliche Fahrzeugmodelle praxisnah getestet, um die Anfälligkeit gegenüber Relay-Angriffen zu bewerten. Ergänzend werden technologische Gegenmaßnahmen sowie zukünftige Perspektiven der Diebstahlprävention diskutiert. Damit wird ein Beitrag zur sicherheitstechnischen Bewertung moderner Zugangssysteme geleistet.",
      "published": "2025-10-02",
      "url": "https://libdoc.whz.de/opus4/frontdoor/index/index/docId/18824",
      "matched_terms": [
        "keyless",
        "relay"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Laurenz Mosch"
      ],
      "venue": "LIBDOC - Westsächsische Hochschule Zwickau",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e49139346938",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security Improvements in Connected Cars - Case Study: CEVT Connected Cars",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://odr.chalmers.se/bitstream/20.500.12380/300694/1/CSE%2019-86%20ODR%20Ji%20Cheng.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "connected cars",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Xinyu Ji",
        "Hanwei Cheng"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e56349604444",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Automotive Cybersecurity: From Risk Assessment to Mitigation",
      "description": "As road vehicles are increasingly defined by their software capabilities and connected service infrastructure, it has become widely accepted that cybersecurity is vital to keep road users and their environment safe and secure. Failures of vehicular cybersecurity can lead to loss of life, severeinjuries, financial losses and breaches of privacy.Automotive system development faces several challenges, including long development lead times and system life-times, highly heterogeneous hardware, multi-tiered supply chains and legal, safety and real-time requirements. These challenges frame the available design choices. An effective cybersecurity concept must be rooted in a thorough understanding of the risks associated with connected vehicles. Furthermore, efficient processes are essential for responding to newly discovered vulnerabilities and incidents. This thesis aims to deepen our understanding of these issues through three primary objectives: (1) to explore the systematization of threat analysis and risk assessment to facilitate cybersecurity requirements engineering, (2) to examine how cybersecurity engineering processes can be implemented to address cybersecurity issues effectively, and (3) to analyze the influence of automotive technology on the design of cybersecurity measures.The first part of this thesis focuses on risk assessment and standardization by (a) developing a risk assessment methodology which influenced ISO/SAE 21434, an automotive cybersecurity engineering standard, (b) updating the risk assessment methodology to fully align with the standard, and (c) critically analyzing ISO/SAE 21434 to identify conceptual weaknesses, while proposing improvements to its threat analysis and risk assessment framework, and vulnerability and incident handling processes. The second part focuses on the design and implementation of risk mitigation measures by examining (i) common automotive cybersecurity design issues, (ii) memory exploitation and protection techniques for resource-constrained electronic control units, (iii) the impact of the CAN bus’s technical constraints on authentication protocols and (iv) the potential of 5G telecommunication technology to strengthen security in vehicle-to-everything communication.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://research.chalmers.se/en/publication/548518",
      "matched_terms": [
        "authentication",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "exploitation",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "vehicle-to-everything",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "V2X / connected",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Aljoscha Lautenbach"
      ],
      "venue": "Chalmers Research (Chalmers University of Technology)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4824,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.42,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:e56349604444 and T-017: structured overlap in assets: supply_chain, vehicle_intelligence; impacts: privacy; lifecycle: governance; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: incident, vital, primary, loss, service, risks, impact, privacy."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e598a54e9397",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Cybersecurity standards and regulations in the automotive industry : overview and perspectives",
      "description": "Η αυξανόμενη συνδεσιμότητα και πολυπλοκότητα των σύγχρονων οχημάτων έχει αναδείξει την κυβερνοασφάλεια ως κρίσιμο ζήτημα στην αυτοκινητοβιομηχανία. Η παρούσα εργασία εξετάζει τα πρότυπα και τους κανονισμούς που έχουν θεσπιστεί για την προστασία των οχημάτων από κυβερνοεπιθέσεις. Ιδιαίτερη έμφαση δίνεται στα τέσσερα θεμελιώδη πλαίσια: το πρότυπο ISO 26262 για τη λειτουργική ασφάλεια των ηλεκτρονικών συστημάτων, το SAE J3061 ως την πρώτη κατευθυντήρια οδηγία για την κυβερνοασφάλεια οχημάτων, το νεότερο και ευρέως αποδεκτό ISO/SAE 21434 για την ενσωμάτωση μηχανικής κυβερνοασφάλειας στον κύκλο ζωής ανάπτυξης, και τον διεθνή κανονισμό UNECE WP.29 R155, ο οποίος επιβάλλει τη δημιουργία και πιστοποίηση Συστήματος Διαχείρισης Κυβερνοασφάλειας (CSMS) από τους κατασκευαστές. Η εργασία αναλύει το περιεχόμενο και την υιοθέτηση αυτών των προτύπων, την πρακτική εφαρμογή τους στη βιομηχανία, τις προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζονται, καθώς και τις μελλοντικές τεχνολογικές και κανονιστικές εξελίξεις. Στόχος είναι η ανάδειξη της σημασίας μιας ολιστικής και διαρκώς εξελισσόμενης προσέγγισης για την ασφάλεια των οχημάτων στο νέο ψηφιακό τοπίο.",
      "published": "2025-06-01",
      "url": "https://dione.lib.unipi.gr/xmlui/handle/unipi/18018",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "iso/sae 21434",
        "wp.29"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Αλέξανδρος Τριανταφύλλου"
      ],
      "venue": "Dione (University of Piraeus)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e62fff1dc3c3",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Finding Software Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Using Software Verification",
      "description": "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) usage in various tasks has increased exponentially in the recent past, which enable users to complete vital missions efficiently and without risking human lives.However, and like any other systems, it poses a cybersecurity threat if not handled correctly.Therefore, it is essential to know the risk and understand the impact of various possible attacks on the overall UAVs.For this purpose, model checking and fuzzing techniques have been applied to improve the UAV approach's security.Nevertheless, there is little effort focused on using those methods in the software domain, especially when investigating low-level implementation vulnerabilities related to UAV software.In this dissertation, UAV risks and the impact of cyberattacks investigated by applying bounded model checking and fuzzing techniques.As a result, a new verification algorithm was developed in a tool named De pthK to verify UAV software correctness.The work's primary research objectives examined through two scientific papers centred on these key research disciplines.These studies undertaken described in Chapter 4 and 5.Paper 1 (Verification and refutation of C programs based on k-induction and invariant inference) outlines a new verification algorithm for detecting UAV software vulnerabilities (e.g., concurrency and buffer overflow bugs).The approach's effectiveness was evaluated and showed better results compared to the state-of-the-art testing tools.The new framework also formed the basis for UAVs software verification development.Paper 2 (Finding Security Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Using Software Verification) demonstrated the risks from exploiting UAV software vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of the proposed approach.The experiment results show UAV software failures that hardly detected by other verifiers and was quickly and efficiently detected by the proposed verification algorithm.",
      "published": "2021-03-08",
      "url": "https://research.manchester.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/50558a51-b9c6-4ceb-bc62-f3d3a75e6fe2",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "cybersecurity",
        "fuzzing",
        "vehicles"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Omar M. K. Alhawi"
      ],
      "venue": "Research Explorer (The University of Manchester)",
      "year": 2021,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 1,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e7ace34d4ffd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "CANPak: An Intrusion Detection System against Error Frame Attacks for Controller Area Network",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2025",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dc662eb2f0752585e6a32e59b9dc2d5f67668293",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "controller area network",
        "intrusion"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Intrusion detection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sikandar Mehmood Abbasi",
        "Stefano Longari"
      ],
      "venue": "ITASEC/SERICS",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:e90513d91545",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIGNAL FEATURES AND ATTACK COMPLEXITY OF REMOTE KEYLESS ENTRY SYSTEMS",
      "description": "Modern cars utilize remote keyless entry systems for their owners to quickly and conveniently lock and unlock their vehicles at a distance using wireless signals. The drawback, however, is that these key-fob systems become vulnerable to various kinds of attacks, such as replay and roll-jam. Previous literature has explained these attacks and discussed various cryptographic weaknesses. The impact of signal level features such as modulation type, jamming tolerance, frequency behavior, and burst structure on the practical difficulty of attacks when using low-cost software-defined radio tools is less understood. For this research, a combination of two radios was used, one capable of transmission alongside one for receiving, to simulate a low-resource attacker model. This thesis investigated key-fob attacks by discussing what vulnerabilities could be identified in captured radio frequencies signals from four selected systems, how differences in these four selected systems affected susceptibility to these attacks, and what signal features were associated with increasing the difficulty for executing the attacks. The research questions were answered by combining literature review, system modeling, baseline signal characteristic recording, and controlled replay and roll-jam attacks at standardized distances. Collected results indicated that multiple implementation choices across our four selected systems, particularly modulation scheme and frequency behavior, made sizable differences in attack execution difficulty. The observed lack of impact that burst behavior had on the execution of attacks appeared consistent across the four systems tested. If a system showed behavior consistent with having implemented rolling code, combining frequency shift keying modulation with a wide frequency gap resulted in the most practically difficult system to attack. Therefore, implementing effective replay and freshness protection mechanisms while also utilizing multiple frequencies with a large frequency gap increases security of a system. Increasing technical friction can help deter common criminals from targeting systems they know are more difficult to attack.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-78243",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "keyless"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Keyless / hardware",
        "Wireless / GNSS / SDR"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Simon Malmström",
        "Melker Blyckert"
      ],
      "venue": "DiVA (Mälardalen University College)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ec60bd3e5c23",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Securing the Connected Car : Application Code Matters",
      "description": "The development of embedded software for automotive applications has seen dramatic changes in recent years. Difficulties with uncontrolled, software induced acceleration in Toyota’s Prius models and surrounding legal issues. The rise of ISO 26262 and the disruption to development practices in its wake. A near exponential rise in embedded software content, and corresponding increases in software engineering complexity. And now, the “connected car” is falling under the spotlight with its vulnerability to attack from malicious hackers being demonstrated in models from a range of manufacturers.This will outline the relationship between automotive software systems architecture, domain separation, and application software. It will assert that no single technology amongst these offers a “silver bullet” to guarantee security, and that no connected system is ever going to be both useful and absolutely impenetrable. It makes sense to protect it proportionately to the level of risk involved if it were to be compromised, and that means applying multiple levels of security so that if one level fails, others are standing guard.",
      "published": "2018-01-31",
      "url": "https://hal.science/hal-02156350",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "automotive",
        "connected car",
        "security",
        "toyota",
        "vulnerability"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [
        "toyota"
      ],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Mark Pitchford"
      ],
      "venue": "HAL",
      "year": 2018,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex",
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ec7b250e2e24",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards a Standardised Framework for Securing Connected Vehicles",
      "description": "Vehicular security was long limited to physical security - to prevent theft. However, the trend of adding more comfort functions and delegating advanced driving tasks back to the vehicle increased the magnitude of attacks, making cybersecurity inevitable. Attackers only need to find one vulnerability in the myriad of electronic control units (ECUs) and communication technologies used in a vehicle to compromise its functions. Vehicles might also be attacked by the owners, who want to modify or even disable certain vehicle functions.Many different parties are involved in the development of such a complex system as the functions are distributed over more than 100 ECUs, making it difficult to get an overall picture of the achieved security. Therefore, moving towards a standardised security framework tailored for the automotive domain is necessary.In this thesis we study various safety and security standards and proposed frameworks from different industrial domains with respect to their way of classifying demands in the form of levels and their methods to derive requirements. In our proposed framework, we suggest security levels appropriate for automotive systems and continue with a mapping between these security levels and identified security mechanisms and design rules to provide basic security. We further study in detail a mechanism which provides freshness to authenticated messages, namely AUTOSAR SecOC Profile 3, and present a novel extension that offers a faster synchronisation between ECUs and reduces the number of required messages for synchronisation.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://research.chalmers.se/en/publication/511915",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "autosar",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecus",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Thomas Rosenstatter"
      ],
      "venue": "Chalmers Research (Chalmers University of Technology)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:ed3c62a10dc9",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Commonalities in Vehicle Vulnerabilities",
      "description": "",
      "published": "2016",
      "url": "https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ebcee808ca91d8264d4fac4479a856fe1d25f234",
      "matched_terms": [
        "vehicle",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Corey Thuen Senior Security Consultant IOActive"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2016,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "semanticscholar"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:f01b26713a18",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Intrusion protection of in-vehicle network: study and recommendations",
      "description": "Modern vehicles include several electronic control units (ECUs), organized in a controller area network (CAN), and interact with external networks for reasons such as comfort, infotainment, and autonomy. The security risks from this increasing external interaction are alarming for the safety-critical vehicle systems, since possible attackers have more options for intrusion. For example, an attack might result in malfunctioning braking system and put lives in danger. This thesis examines the type of counter measures for the commercial vehicle system of Scania to make intrusions impractical, and compares it to the case of passenger vehicles. This study focuses on the infotainment ECU and its Bluetooth interface, by first examining in practice the vulnerabilities that make an intrusion to the commercial vehicle feasible. The attacks considered are broken down into steps to first exploit the Bluetooth interface, then the communications between the infotainment and instrument cluster ECUs, and finally performing a flooding attack on the internal network. Tests on a test bench and on a truck simulated the attacks to examine their feasibility. The feasibility evaluation of the attack steps that could not be tested, due to resource and time limitations, is supported by previous studies. To examine and evaluate the attacks this study uses attack trees, which represent an attack as series of steps (combined in alternative or complementary steps) in a tree-like structure. Afterwards, this study examines counter measures some of which are found in literature, to mitigate the vulnerabilities that can enable the attacks considered, e.g. DoS attack on CAN bus. The findings and suggestions of the study are compared and related to the general case of the automotive industry. In conclusion, this thesis explores security issues of a particular ECU in Scania’s electrical system combining practical work with previous studies, and can be used as a starting point for further research, for example, in-depth testing of all attack steps.",
      "published": "2015-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-170805",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attackers",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "can bus",
        "controller area network",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "in-vehicle",
        "infotainment"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Alexandros Asvestopoulos"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2015,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 3,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:f1b1780dcfdd",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of OBD-II Dongles as A New Over-the-Air Attack Surface in Automotive IoT",
      "description": "With the growing trend of the Internet of Things, a large number of wireless OBD-II dongles are developed, which can be simply plugged into vehicles to enable remote functions such as sophisticated vehicle control and status monitoring. However, since these dongles are directly connected with in-vehicle networks, they may open a new over-the-air attack surface for vehicles. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive security analysis on all wireless OBD-II dongles available on Amazon in the US in February 2019, which were 77 in total. To systematically perform the analysis, we design and implement an automated tool DONGLESCOPE that dynamically tests these dongles from all possible attack stages on a real automobile. With DONGLESCOPE, we have identified 5 different types of vulnerabilities, with 4 being newly discovered. Our results reveal that each of the 77 dongles exposes at least two types of these vulnerabilities, which indicates a widespread vulnerability exposure among wireless OBD-II dongles on the market today. To demonstrate the severity, we further construct 4 classes of concrete attacks with a variety of practical implications such as privacy leakage, property theft, and even safety threat. We also discuss the root causes and feasible countermeasures, and have made corresponding responsible disclosure.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://atc.usenix.org/system/files/sec20summer_wen_prepub.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "automotive",
        "in-vehicle",
        "obd-ii",
        "privacy"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Haohuang Wen",
        "Qi Alfred Chen",
        "Zhiqiang Lin"
      ],
      "venue": "USENIX Security Symposium",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 35,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:f36c5eb9bb2b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Evaluating and Proposal of Over-The-Air Update Architecture For Railway Signalling Applications",
      "description": "Railway control systems increasingly require cybersecurity measures aligned with Industry 4.0 trends and recently published standards such as CLC/TS 50701. Manual software updates in distributed railway networks can cost operators a huge sum deployment cycle due to on-site technician requirements and track downtime, while introducing safety risks during the update cycles that leave systems vulnerable to emerging threats. Over-The-Air (OTA) updates offer a solution, reducing deployment costs and enabling rapid security patch delivery within days rather than months. This thesis comprehensively reviews Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) principles, security protocols, and cybersecurity measures in Linux and Android operating systems. Existing OTA implementations from the automotive industry are analyzed to design a customized OTA architecture for railway signalling systems, including the identification of hardware requirements and security features aligned with CLC/TS 50701 to support a robust and secure framework. The proposed architecture is implemented and validated on a ARM64 hardware, demonstrating successful rollback from corrupted updates within 3 boot cycles and maintaining read-only root filesystem protection throughout the update process.",
      "published": "2026-01-01",
      "url": "http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-575382",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "cybersecurity",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "OTA / updates"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Siva Shankar Siva Saravanan"
      ],
      "venue": "KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)",
      "year": 2026,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:f5524a9c2a9f",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Security in V2I projects :incorporating security into a framework for communication between connected cars and infrastructure",
      "description": "Connected cars will communicate more and more with external infrastructure, e.g. traffic signs or lights. This is called Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I). In order to manage security in V2I, a framework is developed. The following aspects are processed in this framework: 1. List of 9 vulnerabilities specific to V2I projects 2. List of attack methods corresponding to these vulnerabilities 3. Risk analysis of the vulnerabilities 4. Measures, mapped to the attack methods 4. Security requirements corresponding to the vulnerabilities and measures The framework is verified via a case study at Concorda, a V2I project run at Rijkswaterstaat. Three security experts of both vendors and Rijkswaterstaat itself largely agreed that the main aspects of the framework being included would be useful in their work. The framework would especially be useful in future projects due to the current immature state of V2I. The contributions of this research are manifold. For practitioners, this framework gives a comprehensive overview of the above-mentioned aspects by combining literature and existing documentation. In terms of research, this research mainly identifies the lack of focus on specifically V2I projects in the connected car area, of which this research forms a base to work further upon.",
      "published": "2020-01-01",
      "url": "https://essay.utwente.nl/84274/",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "connected car",
        "connected cars",
        "security",
        "vulnerabilities"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "L.H.A. Arnold"
      ],
      "venue": "",
      "year": 2020,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:f8d6b4d218c4",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Integrating Threat Modelling and Mitigation Strategies for Securing Over-The-Air (OTA) Updates for Autonomous Vehicles",
      "description": "The Over-the-Air (OTA) updates have become a vital component in automobile industry for maintaining the security, reliability and performance of the vehicle, still there are significant security risks which can compromise functionality of the vehicle. In this thesis we will look into how integration of threat modelling and mitigation strategies can secure the OTA update in autonomous vehicles. Using STRIDE methodology as the primary framework, the study finds critical threats at each stage of OTA process, this includes the firmware distribution, communication channels and the in-vehicle execution process. A secure OTA system architecture is designed and also implemented with cryptographic signatures, integrity validation, secure communication and also a fail-safe mechanism for updates. The evaluation of implementation was done through different scenario-based testing and analysing resistance towards attacks, showing improvement in confidentiality, integrity and availability. The findings emphasized that it is important to have combination of methodical threat modelling and practical security control, this offers both practical guidance and academic knowledge to the industry practitioners which are devoted in enhancing the robust software update mechanism of autonomous vehicles.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://norma.ncirl.ie/9790/1/varundilipbhiwapurkar.pdf",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "automobile",
        "autonomous vehicles",
        "in-vehicle",
        "secure",
        "security"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "In-vehicle network / CAN",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Varun Dilip Bhiwapurkar"
      ],
      "venue": "TRAP@NCI (National College of Ireland)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:fa203186790d",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Towards Secure and Forensically-Enabled Resilient Vehicle Design",
      "description": "The rise of autonomous and connected vehicles has introduced significant cybersecurity challenges in the automotive domain. An increase in regulations has mandated compliance with vehicle cybersecurity requirements. These regulations require vehicles to be designed to withstand cyberattacks, equipped with mechanisms to detect and effectively respond to threats, and ensure a secure process for software updates and digital forensics. However, a gap remains in providing clear technical guidance for securing vehicles and ensuring compliance with evolving regulations. This thesis aims to address this gap by presenting tools and methodologies to strengthen cybersecurity within the automotive industry.In the first part of the thesis, we analyze and adapt methodologies for various phases of the vehicle life cycle and propose a systematic approach to predict and mitigate vulnerabilities throughout the entire life cycle. We also conduct a comprehensive review of resilience techniques, fault tolerance, and dependability related to attack detection, mitigation, recovery, and endurance. By applying our methodology and integrating these review findings, we develop a framework to design vehicles that are safe, secure, and resilient against various cyberattacks. In addition, we perform a systematic literature review of automotive digital forensics, providing an overview of the research landscape and its practical applications. This review guides future research and supports engineers in developing forensic mechanisms.The second part focuses on architecture, where we introduce a reference architecture for vehicle software updates to address the growing need for rapid and secure bug patching and software modifications. We present an attacker model, perform a threat assessment, define general security requirements that align with common security goals and directives, and provide formal proof of security and correctness. Furthermore, we propose a second reference architecture that addresses the digital forensic challenges identified in the first part of the thesis, with the aim of improving the security and effectiveness of forensic practices within the automotive domain. In summary, this thesis presents tools and methodologies to strengthen cybersecurity in the automotive domain and guide compliance with regulations. It provides a proactive approach to predict and mitigate vehicle vulnerabilities, integrates resilience techniques into vehicle design, establishes a secure software update framework, and offers insights and guidelines for designing automotive digital forensic systems.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://research.chalmers.se/en/publication/545699",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "automotive",
        "connected vehicles",
        "cybersecurity"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Governance / regulation"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Kim Strandberg"
      ],
      "venue": "Chalmers Research (Chalmers University of Technology)",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": [
        {
          "threat_id": "T-017",
          "relevance_score": 0.4016,
          "evidence_strength_score": 0.34,
          "confidence": "low",
          "status": "review",
          "explanation": "Plausible match requiring review between t:fa203186790d and T-017: structured overlap in assets: vehicle_intelligence; lifecycle: governance, monitoring_detection; specific rules: vehicle_espionage_assessment; shared terms: recovery, digital, where, significant, connected."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "t:fae19717a38b",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "AI-Enabled Software-Defined Vehicles an Intelligent Architecture for Adaptive, Secure, and Resilient Automotive Software Systems",
      "description": "Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) represent the next evolutionary phase of intelligent transportation systems where software, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud connectivity, and edge computing collectively govern vehicle functionalities. Traditional automotive architectures based on hardware-centric Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are increasingly inadequate for managing the complexity of autonomous driving, cybersecurity threats, adaptive intelligence, and real-time vehicle orchestration. This paper proposes an AI-enabled intelligent architecture for adaptive, secure, and resilient automotive software systems in SDVs. The proposed framework integrates AI-driven decision layers, software-defined networking, edge-cloud orchestration, cybersecurity intelligence, and resilient fault-management mechanisms to achieve scalable and autonomous vehicular ecosystems. The study explores the transition from domain-based ECU architectures to zonal and centralized computing models, emphasizing machine learning-enabled predictive diagnostics, over-the-air (OTA) software updates, autonomous software orchestration, and zero-trust vehicular cybersecurity. Furthermore, the research presents architectural components, system workflow, AI integration layers, security modules, and resilience mechanisms suitable for next-generation intelligent transportation environments. Experimental evaluation and comparative analysis demonstrate significant improvements in adaptability, fault tolerance, computational efficiency, and cyber resilience when compared to conventional automotive architectures. The proposed model contributes toward safer, self-optimizing, and continuously evolving intelligent mobility ecosystems.",
      "published": "2023-12-31",
      "url": "https://ijisae.org/index.php/IJISAE/article/view/8299",
      "matched_terms": [
        "automotive",
        "autonomous driving",
        "cybersecurity",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "intelligent transportation",
        "resilience",
        "secure",
        "vehicular"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "V2X / connected",
        "OTA / updates",
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "AI / machine learning",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Srikanth Puram"
      ],
      "venue": "International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications in Engineering",
      "year": 2023,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": true,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:fb5553c0e9c1",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "Losing the Car Keys: Wireless PHY-Layer Insecurity in {EV} Charging",
      "description": "Electric vehicles (EVs) are proliferating quickly, along with the charging infrastructure for them. A new generation of charger technologies is emerging, handling more sensitive data and undertaking more complex interactions, while using the charging cable as the communication channel. This channel is used not only for charging control, but will soon handle billing, vehicle-to-grid operation, internet access and provide a platform for third-party apps — all with a public interface to the world. We highlight the threat posed by wireless attacks on the physical-layer of the Combined Charging System (CCS), a major standard for EV charging that is deployed in many thousands of locations worldwide and used by seven of the ten largest auto manufacturers globally. We show that design choices in the use of power-line communication (PLC) make the system particularly prone to popular electromagnetic side-channel attacks. We implement the first wireless eavesdropping tool for PLC networks and use it to observe the ISO 15118 network implementation underlying CCS, in a measurement campaign of 54 real charging sessions, using modern electric vehicles and state-of-the-art CCS chargers. We find that the unintentional wireless channel is sufficient to recover messages in the vast majority of cases, with traffic intercepted from an adjacent parking bay showing 91.8% of messages validating their CRC32 checksum. By examining the recovered traffic, we further find a host of privacy and security issues in existing charging infrastructure including plaintext MAC-layer traffic recovery, widespread absence of TLS in public locations and leakage of private information, including long-term unique identifiers. Of particular concern, elements of the recovered data are being used to authorise billing in existing charging implementations. We discuss the implications of pervasive susceptibility to known electromagnetic eavesdropping techniques, extract lessons learnt for future development and propose specific improvements to mitigate the problems in existing chargers.",
      "published": "2019-01-01",
      "url": "https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c74b0b81-8828-4a45-a5cf-525538045e13/files/m767dc9eb78a7d57345d64b7e5b5e5463",
      "matched_terms": [
        "attacks",
        "ev charging",
        "iso 15118",
        "privacy",
        "security",
        "vehicle-to-grid"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "EV charging",
        "Privacy / data protection"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Richard Baker",
        "Ivan Martinović"
      ],
      "venue": "Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford)",
      "year": 2019,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 43,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "t:fd8dd59d946c",
      "type": "paper",
      "title": "European Control Units",
      "description": "With the rapid development in technology almost everything is becoming automated, many fields like manufacturing, delivery, electronics, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, retail, are being automated and automotive industry is no exceptions. In the present automated or non-automated cars most of the operations are controlled by multiple ECUs (Electronic Control Unit). A car generally utilizes around 60 to 80 ECUs that oversees the functioning of Engine Control, Power Control, Airbags, Heating, Venting, and Air Conditioning, Headlamps, Braking Systems, Assistance Driving Adaptive Systems (ADAS), Infotainment systems and so on. All of such ECUs needs to be connected to the central ECU in order to function and the central ECU is connected to the internet to perform necessary functions, which leave it open for cyber-attack. Even if the ECU is not directly connected to the internet the attacker could have multitude attack vectors to get access of the vehicle and take control of it.Automotive manufacturers cannot afford to overlook the security given the progress made in the area of AI. Now car manufacturers not just have to worry about the performance and style of the car but also about the safety and security as well, as all the functionalities are controlled by ECUs which in turn raises a huge risk of cyber-attack.In this thesis, there would be discussion on the impact of cybersecurity on a vehicle’s headlights and propose a Threat Analysis Risk Assessment (TARA) upholding the ISO/SAE 21434 standard, which deals with cybersecurity in industry of an automotive product, encompassing design, development, production, operation and decommissioning. Finally, after assessing the vulnerability and risk in the product security measures are suggested to secure the ECUs from cyber-attacks.",
      "published": "2025-01-01",
      "url": "https://resolver.obvsg.at/urn:nbn:at:at-ubk:1-60585",
      "matched_terms": [
        "adas",
        "attack",
        "attacker",
        "attacks",
        "automotive",
        "ecu",
        "ecus",
        "electronic control unit",
        "infotainment",
        "iso/sae 21434"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Autonomous / ADAS",
        "Standards / TARA",
        "Telematics / infotainment",
        "ECU / fuzzing / pentest"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [
        "Sweta Kumari Dhanuk"
      ],
      "venue": "University of Klagenfurt",
      "year": 2025,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "openalex"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "087728571ce8",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "Shadowy AI Relay Disables OpenAI Codex, Claude Code Sandboxes",
      "description": "The enigmatic service is providing popular AI coding tools to mainland China and other regions where OpenAI and Anthropic products are not officially for sale — but with key security features turned off.",
      "published": "Thu, 29 Oct 2026 10:00:00 GMT",
      "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/ai-relay-service-openai-codex-claude-code-sandboxes",
      "matched_terms": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Dark Reading"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "0df4223e0170",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "Japan Protests Russia’s Seizure of Japan Tobacco Assets - Bloomberg.com",
      "description": "Japan Protests Russia’s Seizure of Japan Tobacco Assets Bloomberg.com",
      "published": "Fri, 06 Nov 2026 07:57:00 GMT",
      "url": "https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiqgFBVV95cUxNNmtGY0M2U0VxZk9BTS1yUWJPeXR3QXVoNS1QOG13WHA4Q3JMMmROX0tYTTcyWS11a3llVmJNdU5sQy05a3lZT25VVWM1UFlyakhCSzJVdk5NSmxVa2dnd2I2cFhOd2tzbFBDSEhjbGpPOW1mbk9jSEVNVVdKV09KQmpaMm1YWm1jMjFFRGx0Qy1USm50eWstUmtjVTB0WTF2U2lmaU9XNUVoZw?oc=5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
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      "linked_cves": [],
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      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Bloomberg"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "149ba5a2cd58",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "LLMjacking Emerges as Thriving Cybercriminal Enterprise",
      "description": "Cybercriminals have turned reselling cloud access to LLMs into a lucrative business model, with some victims paying as much as $1 million in resource consumption before access was revoked.",
      "published": "Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:35:50 GMT",
      "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/cloud-security/llmjacking-thriving-cybercriminal-enterprise",
      "matched_terms": [
        "AI",
        "AI-Powered Cyber Operations"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI",
        "AI-Powered Cyber Operations"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Dark Reading"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "1911ccffa4c0",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "Cyber chief: UK facing AI-powered attacks on critical infrastructure within two years",
      "description": "The NCSC warns that ‘tech on the cheap’ has left UK organisations exposed to AI uncovering and exploiting longstanding cyber security weaknesses and calls for urgent investment in resilience.",
      "published": "Tue, 03 Nov 2026 12:00:00 +0000",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/cyber-chief-uk-facing-ai-powered-attacks-on-critical-infrastructure-in-two-years",
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        "Critical Infrastructure"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Critical Infrastructure"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "NCSC UK"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "1b8b07e9987e",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "Why China Uses a ‘National Team’ to Influence Trading - Bloomberg.com",
      "description": "Why China Uses a ‘National Team’ to Influence Trading Bloomberg.com",
      "published": "Fri, 06 Nov 2026 05:12:00 GMT",
      "url": "https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiswFBVV95cUxQWGZ4NFVYSllGdXQxUWhaT2g5VEpYSkUydFF4ZnVHelAtUkFRdXV6dF9zcVFxaEJMSUVJSFp4VDlOVlFYUFRFa1ZpR01SdVpfTG5INFRldXdPNHpzbXU5SndLbk5SMFBfb2ZIMGk4SGkwUzZmMWZKbExqZW81TW5Ob2xfNWk0RWNMSGEyMUc2bWVUa1I4UjFka1pfa3Y4bURpUWtWTC1ZbWhkRFF5SHRoc0lXZw?oc=5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
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      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Bloomberg"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "27f702dae8e4",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "New VOLTA Infostealer Uses Claude, Gemini, and Kimi AI to Rank Victims by Financial Value",
      "description": "Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new Windows infostealer malware called VOLTA-AUTODOXER (aka VOLTA) that makes use of a large language model (LLM) to rank a victim's stolen data by their monetization value. Like other typical stealer families, VOLTA is equipped to harvest passwords and cookies from Chromium-based web browsers; data from Outlook profiles and Slack workspaces;",
      "published": "Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:21:07 +0530",
      "url": "https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/new-volta-infostealer-uses-claude.html",
      "matched_terms": [
        "AI",
        "AI-Powered Cyber Operations"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI",
        "AI-Powered Cyber Operations"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "The Hacker News"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "2a84423daf66",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "Trust Is Not What It Seems — and Fraudsters Are Counting on It",
      "description": "Threat actors don't need to rely on malware to breach organizations anymore. They're simply calling help desks and politely asking for access, with a little help from artificial intelligence.",
      "published": "Fri, 23 Oct 2026 20:57:56 GMT",
      "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/cyber-risk/trust-is-not-what-it-seems-and-fraudsters-are-counting-on-it",
      "matched_terms": [
        "AI",
        "AI-Powered Cyber Operations"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "AI",
        "AI-Powered Cyber Operations"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Dark Reading"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "2afdd40f7020",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "China Blocks SoftBank Acquisition of ABB Robot Unit, FT Says - Bloomberg.com",
      "description": "China Blocks SoftBank Acquisition of ABB Robot Unit, FT Says Bloomberg.com",
      "published": "Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:07:00 GMT",
      "url": "https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMitgFBVV95cUxOWl80SWsybGZKU2I4aDRBUnp5cjJYVlhLTmhrYzhGcXNzRk0tMVFsQ2Q3dmRJcUdRXzZQeDY4M3B6dE9CQ0E2LWt1d09QNm93S2NyQzROLWRHQnJBS3pIREVuRVloeGdmWnFBaXd5dE4yTFVmZVdJcXN3cWhmSk56NGo3S1JTUTI1X2h0R3FOcmFiQnhPVjFIT0JTYmFyOS1aY1VtOTVzak9BSGtiQ05rdEVTajh6Zw?oc=5",
      "matched_terms": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
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      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Bloomberg"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "348b861244e7",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "SBOMs Alone Can't Reveal the Scope of a Supply Chain Attack",
      "description": "A recent Shai-Hulud attack shows defenders need real-time visibility into production code and affected services to respond to supply chain compromises.",
      "published": "Tue, 27 Oct 2026 19:58:06 GMT",
      "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/cyber-risk/sboms-alone-scope-supply-chain-attack",
      "matched_terms": [
        "Supply Chain",
        "Supply Chain Fragility"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Supply Chain",
        "Supply Chain Fragility"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Dark Reading"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "384d5026af2e",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "China to Cut Diesel Exports on Tight Stocks, Energy Aspects Says - Bloomberg.com",
      "description": "China to Cut Diesel Exports on Tight Stocks, Energy Aspects Says Bloomberg.com",
      "published": "Fri, 06 Nov 2026 02:51:00 GMT",
      "url": "https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMitAFBVV95cUxPdkxjc2VBQi0yTGF0OUdORXRrRE1Rd3U3cjB2MTFDM04xcGJ6RzNWUzl3NEs4ZENYejh1V0ZmdmZVbVBFSGJtdmNLUFBhNU1VZFpjWjB1Q0I4MEhQTzR5dzFNcjVraHdJbXNHSURDcmhCdjBYY2N0ZjBXRk84UkZkU2JkZVRZNDE2LVd6bndoOEhGWmhubFMwcHhaSTc1M3hJTVNfQUcydkFOczBuYXNtMV8yQlA?oc=5",
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        "Critical Infrastructure",
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Critical Infrastructure",
        "Geopolitics",
        "Cyber as Geopolitical Instrument"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "Bloomberg"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "3b1906da0dc0",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "NCSC-2026-0462 [1.00] [M/H] Kwetsbaarheden verholpen in Juniper Networks Session Smart Router en Session Smart Conductor",
      "description": "Juniper heeft meerdere kwetsbaarheden verholpen in Juniper Networks Session Smart Router en Session Smart Conductor. De kwetsbaarheden betreffen verschillende componenten van de Juniper Networks Session Smart Router en Session Smart Conductor. - Er zijn out-of-bounds read- en write-fouten in HTTP-parser, TCP proxy, TCP header verwerking en VRRPv3 packet verwerking, die kunnen leiden tot service crashes, geheugenbeschadiging, sessie desynchronisatie en mogelijke informatielekken. - Een improper initialisatieprobleem in de beveiligingspolicy kan leiden tot het gebruik van onjuiste encryptiesleutels, wat decryptie van netwerkverkeer of denial of service kan veroorzaken. - Verder kunnen lokale aanvallers door speciaal vervaardigde directorynamen onbedoeld bestanden unmounten tijdens service cleanup, wat de beschikbaarheid beïnvloedt. - Ongeauthenticeerde API endpoints maken het mogelijk voor lokale niet-geprivilegieerde gebruikers om als root willekeurige bestanden te overschrijven. - Onvoldoende verificatie van data-integriteit in de model cache directory kan leiden tot het uitvoeren van willekeurige code en privilege escalatie. - In de AccessManager module is er een OS command injection mogelijk via ongeldige invoer bij het verwijderen van auditregels, wat ook het verwijderen van bestanden mogelijk maakt. - Onjuiste bestandspermissies in de RoutingManager module van Session Smart Conductor kunnen lokale gebruikers toegang geven tot gevoelige routinggegevens. - Ongefilterde invoer in request body parameters maakt HTTP response splitting mogelijk. - De AutomatedProvisioner van Session Smart Conductor bevat een kwetsbaarheid die ongeauthenticeerde remote command execution als root toestaat via speciaal vervaardigde salt minion IDs. - In de ConfigDirector component kunnen geauthenticeerde REST gebruikers via ongesaniteerde invoer in certificaat- en private key API's willekeurige bestandsoperaties uitvoeren, waaronder lezen, overschrijven en verwijderen. - Een stack buffer overflow in de DHCP client van Session Smart Router kan leiden tot remote code execution. - Een onbeveiligde interne endpoint in Session Smart Router maakt het mogelijk voor ongeauthenticeerde aanvallers om administratieve privileges te verkrijgen. - Een integer overflow in de Deep Packet Inspection certificate scanner kan een denial of service veroorzaken bij het inspecteren van TLS certificaten. - Een integer underflow in de DhcpMessageDecoder kan leiden tot informatielekken en service crashes. - Tenslotte kunnen in de AccessManager component met config-write rechten OS command injection en privilege escalatie plaatsvinden door onvoldoende validatie en neutralisatie van invoer in YANG configuraties.",
      "published": "Fri, 30 Oct 2026 13:15:45 +0000",
      "url": "https://advisories.ncsc.nl/advisory?id=NCSC-2026-0462",
      "matched_terms": [
        "Governance",
        "Regulation & Resilience"
      ],
      "topics": [
        "Governance",
        "Regulation & Resilience"
      ],
      "vendors": [],
      "surfaces": [],
      "linked_cves": [],
      "authors": [],
      "venue": "",
      "year": null,
      "doi": "",
      "sources": [
        "NCSC"
      ],
      "cited_by": 0,
      "open_access": false,
      "matches": []
    },
    {
      "id": "3f37e9fbada3",
      "type": "signal",
      "title": "Russian Regions Cut Payments to Families of Fallen Soldiers - Bloomberg.com",
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